IEEE P802.11
Wireless LANs

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| Comment Resolutions for 11be D1.0Group Key Handshake CIDs |
| Date: 2021-11-17 |
| Author(s): |
| Name | Affiliation | Address | Phone | email |
| Rojan Chitrakar | Panasonic |  |  | Rojan.chitrakar@sg.panasonic.com |
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Abstract

This submission proposes resolutions of comments received from TGbe comment collection 36 (TGbe Draft 1.0).

* CIDs: 6205, 6632, 6723, 6724, 7883 (5 CIDs)

Revisions:

* Rev 0: Initial version of the document.
1. **Introduction**

Interpretation of a Motion to Adopt

A motion to approve this submission means that the editing instructions and any changed or added material are actioned in the TGbe Draft. The introduction and the explanation of the proposed changes are not part of the adopted material.

***Editing instructions formatted like this are intended to be copied into the TGbe Draft (i.e. they are instructions to the 802.11be editor on how to merge the text with the baseline documents).***

***TGbe Editor: Editing instructions preceded by “TGbe Editor” are instructions to the TGbe editor to modify existing material in the TGbe draft. As a result of adopting the changes, the TGbe editor will execute the instructions rather than copy them to the TGbe Draft.***

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| CID | Commenter | Clause  | Page | Line | Comment | Proposed Change | Resolution |
| 6205 | Michael Montemurro | 35.3.5.2 | 256 | 10 | The second paragraph of this subclause is redundant with the details described in Clause 12 and should be modified to describe the secuirty association. | Change "Different links use different GTK/IGTK/BIGTK and each link has its own PN space. TheGTK/IGTK/BIGTK of each setup links are delivered to the non-AP MLD using a single 4-way handshake as defined in 12.7.6 (4-way handshake)."to"After a successful multi-link (re)setup between a non-AP MLD and an AP MLD, GTKSA, BIGTK SA, and IGTK SAs are established between each affiliated STA and affilated AP managed through the AP MLD and non-AP MLD SME. Key update procedures for group keys are performed between the AP MLD and the non-AP MLD as defined in 12.7.7 (Group key handshake."Note: This proposed resolution assumes that the text changes in https://mentor.ieee.org/802.11/dcn/21/11-21-0300-03-00be-crs-for-d0-3-group-key-handshake-cids.docx are incorporated into the draft. | **Revised.**Agree with the comment that group key security association should be described, however as of D1.3 they are missing in clause 12 and related text is added as part of this resolution to clarify that a single GTKSA, IGTKSA and BIGTKSA are maintained between an AP MLD and a non-AP MLD. Regarding group key update, the relevant text is already added in D1.3. TGbe editor to make the changes shown in IEEE 802.11-21/1277r0 under all headings that include CID 6205. |
| 6632 | Po-Kai Huang | 12.7.7 | 209 | 1 | Group handshake is used to update the group key. Similar to the design we add in 12.7.6. Allow group key handshake to update keys of all setup links in one excahgne. | Follow the design in 12.7.6 for group key handshake by allowing KDE of GTK, IGTK, BIGTK of other links to be included in group key handshake to complete update in one handshake. | **Revised.**Agree with the comment that for MLO it should be possible to carry the GTK/IGTK/BIGTK KDEs of multiple links in a single group key handshake. The relevant text is already added in D1.3. No further action required from the TGbe editor for CID 6632. |
| 6723 | Rojan Chitrakar | 12.7.7 |   |   | Clause 12.7.7 (Group key handshake) should also be expanded to allow delivery of the GTK/IGTK/BIGTK of other setup links using a single group key handshake. | Expand Clause 12.7.7 (Group key handshake) to allow delivery of the GTK/IGTK/BIGTK of other setup links using a single group key handshake. | **Revised.**Agree with the comment that for MLO it should be possible to carry the GTK/IGTK/BIGTK KDEs of multiple links in a single group key handshake. The relevant text is already added in D1.3. No further action required from the TGbe editor for CID 6723. |
| 6724 | Rojan Chitrakar | 12.7.7 |   |   | The same MLO KDE (e.g. MLO GTK) may occur multiple times for the same link in a Group Key handshake Message 1, e.g. for different Key IDs. | Allow the same MLO KDE (e.g. MLO GTK) to occur multiple times for the same link (and not just for different links) in a Group Key handshake Message 1, e.g. for different Key IDs. | **Rejected.**Similar comment as CID 6722. CID 6724 is rejected with the same resolution: there is only one MLO GTK per link passed from the Authenticator to the Supplicant in the 4-way handshake or the group key handshake. |
| 7883 | Yongho Seok | 35.3.5.2 | 256 | 10 | "Different links use different GTK/IGTK/BIGTK and each link has its own PN space. The GTK/IGTK/BIGTK of each setup links are delivered to the non-AP MLD using a single 4-way handshake as defined in 12.7.6 (4-way handshake)."Group key handshake (12.7.7) can be also used to deliver the GTK/IGTK/BIGTK of each setup links. | Include the group key handshake. | **Revised.**Agree with the comment that for MLO it should be possible to carry the GTK/IGTK/BIGTK KDEs of multiple links in a single group key handshake. The relevant text is already added in D1.3. No further action required from the TGbe editor for CID 7883. |

Baseline is 11be\_D1.3 and REVme\_D1.0

SP: Do you agree to incorporate the changes proposed in IEEE 802.11-21/1277r0 to the lastest 11be draft for the following CIDs?

CID: 6205, 6632, 6723, 6724, 7883

**12.6 RSNA security association management**

**12.6.1 Security associations**

**12.6.1.1 Security association definitions**

12.6.1.1.8 GTKSA (CIDs 6205)

***TGbe editor: Change the subclause as follows (Track Change On):***

The GTKSA results from a successful 4-way handshake, FT 4-way handshake, FT protocol, FT resource request protocol, group key handshake, or FILS authentication, and is unidirectional. In an infrastructure BSS, there is one GTKSA, used exclusively for encrypting group addressed MPDUs that are transmitted by the AP and for decrypting group addressed transmissions that are received by the STAs. In an IBSS or in a PBSS, each STA defines its own GTKSA, which is used to encrypt its group addressed transmissions, and stores a separate GTKSA for each peer STA so that encrypted group addressed traffic received from other STAs may be decrypted. A GTKSA is created by the Supplicant’s SME when message 3 of the 4-way handshake is received, when message 1 of the group key handshake is received, when the Reassociation Response frame of the FT handshake is received, or when the FILS authentication with a status code indicating success is received. The GTKSA is created by the Authenticator’s SME when the SME changes the GTK and has sent the GTK to all STAs with which it has a PTKSA. It has the same lifetime as the BSS, unless superseded. A GTKSA consists of the following:

* Direction vector (whether the GTK is used for transmit or receive).
* Group cipher suite selector.
* (#6205) For non-MLO, GTK. For MLO, one GTK for each setup link.
* Authenticator MAC address.
* (#6205) For MLO, the Authenticator’s MAC address is the MLD MAC address of the AP MLD.
* Key ID.
* All authorization parameters specified by local configuration. This might include parameters such as the STA’s authorized SSID.

When the GTK is used to encrypt individually addressed traffic (the selectable cipher suite is “Use group cipher suite”), the GTKSA is bidirectional.

* IGTKSA (CIDs 6205)) (CIDs 6

When management frame protection is enabled, a non-AP STA’s SME creates an IGTKSA when it receives a valid message 3 of the 4-way handshake or FT 4-way handshake, the Reassociation Response frame of the fast BSS transition protocol with a status code indicating success, a Mesh Peering Open Message of the Authenticated Mesh Peering Exchange (AMPE) protocol, a valid message 1 of the group key handshake, or the (Re)Association Response frame of FILS authentication with a status code indicating success. The Authenticator’s SME creates an IGTKSA when it establishes or changes the IGTK with all STAs to which it has a valid PTKSA or mesh PTKSA(#240). An IGTKSA has the same lifetime as the BSS, unless superseded.

An IGTKSA consists of the following:

* Direction vector (whether the IGTK is used for transmit or receive)
* Key ID
* (#6205) For non-MLO, IGTK. For MLO, one IGTK for each setup link.
* Authenticator MAC address
* (#6205) For MLO, the Authenticator’s MAC address is the MLD MAC address of the AP MLD.
* BIGTKSA (CIDs 6205)

An Authenticator’s SME creates a BIGTKSA when dot11BeaconProtectionEnabled is true. A BIGTKSA has the same lifetime as the BSS, unless superseded.

A Supplicant’s SME creates a BIGTKSA when dot11BeaconProtectionEnabled is true, upon receiving a BIGTK from its Authenticator.

* Direction vector (whether the BIGTK is used for transmit or receive)
* Key ID
* (#6205) For non-MLO, BIGTK. For MLO, one BIGTK for each setup link.
* Authenticator MAC address
* (#6205) For MLO, the Authenticator’s MAC address is the MLD MAC address of the AP MLD.

35.3.5.2 Multi-link security (CIDs 6205)

***TGbe editor: Modify the section as the following (Track Changes ON):***

After a successful multi-link (re)setup between a non-AP MLD and an AP MLD, a PMKSA, a PTKSA, (#6205) a GTKSA, an IGTKSA, if management frame protection is enabled, and a BIGTKSA, if beacon protection is enabled are established between the non-AP MLD and the AP MLD (see Clause 12 (Security)). The PTKSA and GTKSA are used for cryptographic encapsulation and decapsulation of individually addressed MPDUs and group addressed MPDUs respectively, across all setup links as described in 12.5.3.3 (CCMP cryptographic encapsulation), 12.5.5.3 (GCMP cryptographic encapsulation), 12.5.3.4 (CCMP decapsulation) and 12.5.5.4 (GCMP decapsulation). When management frame protection is enabled, the IGTKSA is used to provide integrity protection for group addressed robust management frames across all setup links as described in 12.6.19 (Protection of robust Management frames). When beacon protection is enabled, the BIGTKSA is used to provide integrity protection for Beacon frames across all setup links as described in 12.6.23 (Protection of Beacon frames).

Different (#6205) APs affiliated with an AP MLD use different GTK/IGTK/BIGTK. Each AP and the corresponding non-AP STA affiliated with an associated non-AP MLD maintains a single PN/IPN/BIPN for each GTK/IGTK/BIGTK. The GTK/IGTK/BIGTK of each setup links are delivered to the non-AP MLD using a single 4-way handshake as defined in 12.7.6 (4-way handshake). When a GTK/IGTK/BIGTK update is triggered for an AP affiliated with the AP MLD, the updated GTK/IGTK/BIGTK may be delivered to the non-AP MLD using the Group key handshake over any enabled link as defined in 12.7.7 (Group key handshake).