IEEE P802.11
Wireless LANs

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| Adding a Password Identifier to SAE |
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|  |  |  |  |  |

Abstract

This document proposes a way to add a password identifier to SAE allowing for a password to be uniquely identified when an ambiguity exists, for instance when a password is identified by a wildcard peer MAC address.

Discussion:

In practice passwords are shared among multiple STAs. This is effectively having a wildcard MAC address as the peer MAC address in the dot11RSNConfigPasswordValueTable. In some situations, it is necessary to have a multitude of shared passwords where different members of different groups would share a password. In this case it is necessary to provide a password identifier to allow the recipient of an SAE Commit message to further idenfity the particular password to use.

This submission proposes to define a new Element and add it to SAE Commit messages to identify the password to use in the SAE exchange.

***Instruct the editor to modify tables 9-39 and 9-40 as indicated:***

**9.3.3.12 Authentication frame format**

 **Table 9-39—Authentication frame body**

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  **Order** |  **Information** |  **Notes** |
|  21 |  Association Delay Info | The Association Delay Info element is present in FILS Authenticaiton frames as defined in Table 9-40 (Presence of fields and elements in Authentication frames) |
|  22 |  Password Identifier | The Password Identifier element is optionally present in certain Authenticaiton frames as defined in Table 9-40 (Presence of fields and elements in Authentication frames) |
|  Last |  Vendor Specific | One or more vendor-specific elements are optionally present. These elements follow all other elements. |

 **Table 9-40—Presence of fields and elements in Authentication frames**

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Authentication algorithm** | **Authentication transaction sequence number** | **Status code** | **Presence of fields 4 onwards** |
| SAE |  1 |  Any | Scalar is present if the Status Code field is zero.Element is present if the Status Code field is zero.Anti-Clogging Token is present if status is 76 or if frame is in response to a previous rejection with Status 76.Finite Cyclic Group is present if the Status Code field is zero or 76.Password Identifier element is optionally present if the Status Code is zero or <ANA-1>. |

***Instruct the editor to modify table 9-52 in section 9.4.1.9 as indicated and update the reserved number accordingly:***

**9.4.1.9 Status Code field**

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| <ANA-1> | UNKNOWN\_PASSWORD\_IDENTIFIER | Authentication rejected because the password identifier is unknown. |

***Instruct the editor to modify table 9-88 as indicated and to add a new sub-section to 9.4.2 to add the following text (currently 9.4.2.a):***

**9.4.2 Elements**

 **Table 9-88—Element IDs**

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  **Element** |  **Element ID** |  **Element ID**  **Extension** |  **Extensible** | **Fragmentable** |
| Password identifier (see 9.4.2.a (Password Identifier element)) |  255 |  <ANA-2> |  No |  No |

**9.4.2.a Password identifier element**

The Password identifier element contains a string used to look up a password. See Figure 9-b (Password identifier element format).

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  Element ID |  Length  |  Element ID Extension |  Identifier |

Octets 1 1 1 variable

 **Figure 9-b—Password identifier element format**

The Element ID, Length, and Element ID Extension fields are defined in 9.4.2.1 (General).

The Identifier field is a variable-length string which identifies a password as specified in 12.4 (Authentication using a password).

***Instruct the editor to modify section 12.4.3 as indicated:***

**12.4.3 Representation of a password**

Passwords are used in SAE to deterministically compute a secret element in the negotiated group, called a password element. The input to this process needs to be in the form of a binary string. For the protocol to successfully terminate, it is necessary for each side to produce identical binary strings for a given password, even if that password is in character format. There is no canonical binary representation of a character and ambiguity exists when the password is a character string. To eliminate this ambiguity, a STA shall represent a character-based password as an ASCII string. Representation of a character-based password in another character set or use of a password preprocessing technique (to map a character string to a binary string) may be agreed upon, in an out-of-band fashion, prior to beginning SAE. If the password is already in binary form (e.g., it is a binary preshared key) no character set representation is assumed. The binary representation of the password, after being transformed from a character representation or directly if it is already in binary form, is stored in the dot11RSNConfigPasswordValueTable. When a “password” is called for in the description of SAE that follows the credential from the dot11RSNConfigPasswordValueTable is used. When a “password identifier” is called for in the description of SAE that follows, the identifier from the dot11RSNConfigPasswordValueTable is used.

***Instruct the editor to modify section 12.4.4.2.2 as indicated:***

**12.4.4.2.2 Generation of the password element with ECC groups**

The password element of an ECC group (***PWE***) shall be generated in a random hunt-and-peck fashion. The password, optionally a password identifier, and a counter, represented as a single octet and initially set to 1, are used with the peer identities to generate a password seed.

Algorithmically this process is described as follows:

found  = 0;

counter  = 1

Length  = len(p )

base = password [ || identifier ]

  do {

 pwd -seed  = H(MAX(STA-A-MAC, STA-B-MAC) || MIN(STA-A-MAC, STA-B-MAC),

 base  || counter )

 pwd -value  = KDF-Hash-Length (pwd -seed , “SAE Hunting and Pecking”, p )

where

KDF-Hash-Length  is the key derivation function defined in 12.7.1.7.2 (Key derivation

 Function (KDF)) using the hash algorithm identified by the AKM suite

selector (see Table 9-145 (AKM suite selectors))

len() returns the length of its argument in bits

[ || identifier ] indicates the optional inclusion of a password identifier, if present

***Instruct the editor to modify section 12.4.4.3.2 as indicated:***

**12.4.4.3.2 Genration of the password element with FFC groups**

The password element of an FFC group (***PWE***) shall be generated in a random hunt-and-peck fashion similar to the technique for an ECC group. The password, optionally a password identifier, and a counter, represented as a single octet and initially set to 1, are used with the two peer identities to generate a password seed.

Algorithmically this process is described as follows:

found  = 0;

counter  = 1

Length  = len(p )

do {

 pwd-seed  = H(MAX(STA-A-MAC, STA-B-MAC) || MIN(STA-A-MAC, STA-B-MAC),

 password [ || identifier ] || counter )

 pwd-value  = KDF-Hash-Length (pwd-seed , “SAE Hunting and Pecking”, p )

where

KDF-Hash-Length  is the key derivation function defined in 12.7.1.7.2 (Key derivation

 Function (KDF)) using the hash algorithm identified by the AKM suite

selector (see Table 9-145 (AKM suite selectors))

len() returns the length of its argument in bits

[ || identifier ] indicates the optional inclusion of a password identifier, if present

***Instruct the editor to modify section 12.4.5.4 as indicated:***

**12.4.5.4 Processing of a peer’s SAE Commit message**

If the peer’s SAE Commit message contains a password identifier, the value of that identifier shall be used in construction of the password element (***PWE***) for this exchange. If a password identifier is present in the peer’s SAE Commit message and there is no password with the given identifier a STA shall fail authentication.

Upon receipt of a peer’s SAE Commit message both the scalar and element shall be verified.

***Instruct the editor to modify section 12.4.7.4 as indicated:***

**12.4.7.4 Encoding and decoding of SAE Commit messages**

An SAE Commit message shall be encoded as an Authentication frame with an Authentication Algorithm Number field set to 3, a Transaction Sequence Number of 1 and a Status Code of SUCCESS Status codes not equal to SUCCESS indicate a rejection of a peer’s SAE Commit message and are described in 12.4.7.6 (Status codes).

An SAE Commit message shall consist of a Finite Cyclic Group field (9.4.1.44 (Finite Cyclic Group field)) indicating a group, a Scalar field (9.4.1.41 (Scalar field)) containing the scalar, and an FFE field containing the element (9.4.1.42 (Finite field element (FFE) field)). If the SAE Commit message is in response to an Anti-Clogging Token request (see 12.4.7.6 (Status codes)), the Anti-Clogging Token is present (see 9.4.1.40 (Anti-Clogging Token field)). If a password identifier is used in generation of the password element (***PWE***) the Password identifier element shall be present and the identifier shall be encoded as a UTF-8 string in the Identifier portion of the element (see 9.4.2.a (Password identifier element)).

***Instruct the editor to modify section 12.4.7.6 as indicated:***

**12.4.7.6 Status codes**

An SAE Commit message with a status code not equal to SUCCESS shall indicate that a peer rejects a previously sent SAE Commit message. An unsupported finite cyclic group is indicated with a status code of UNSUPPORTED\_FINITE\_CYCLIC\_GROUP, “Authentication is rejected because the offered finite cyclic group is not supported.” An unknown password identifier is indicated with a status code of UNKNOWN\_PASSWORD\_IDENTIFER, “Authentication is rejected because the password identifier is unknown.” An Anti-Clogging Token is requested by transmitting an SAE Commit message with a status code of ANTI\_CLOGGING\_TOKEN\_REQUIRED, “Anti-Clogging Token Requested,” with the Anti-Clogging Token occupying the Token field of the Authentication frame.

***Instruct the editor to add “Com, BadId/1(<ANA-1>)/Del)” to the state machine transition from Nothing state back to Nothing state in Figure 12-4 in 12.4.8.1.***

***Instruct the editor to add “Rej(<ANA-1>)/Del” to the state machine transition from Committed state to Nothing state in Figure 12-4 in 12.4.8.1.***

***Instruct the editor to add “Com, BadId/Del” to the state machine transition from Committed state to Nothing state in Figure 12-4 in 12.4.8.1.***

***Instruct the editor to modify section 12.4.8.5.2 as indicated:***

**12.4.8.5.2 Protocol instance variables**

In addition, protocol instances maintain the following six indicators that are not maintained as state variables but, instead, indicate the cause of certain behavior.

* BadID—The password identifier in an SAE Commit message is unknown or wrong.
* BadGrp —The group specified in an SAE Commit message is not supported.
* DiffGrp —The group specified in an SAE Commit message is supported but differs from the one offered.

***Instruct the editor to modify section 12.4.8.6.3 as indicated:***

**12.4.8.6.3 Protocol instance behavior – Nothing state**

Upon receipt of a Com event, the protocol instance shall check the Status of the Authentication frame. If the Status code is not SUCCESS, the frame shall be silently discarded and a Del event shall be sent to the parent process. Otherwise, the frame shall be processed by first checking whether a password identifier is present. If so and there is no password associated with that identifier, BadID shall be set and the protocol instance shall construct and transmit an Authentication frame with Status Code set to UNKNOWN\_PASSWORD\_IDENTIFIER. If there is no password identifier present or if a password is associated with that identifier, the frame shall be processed by next checking the finite cyclic group field to see if the requested group is supported. If not, BadGrp shall be set and the protocol instance shall construct and transmit an Authentication frame with Status code UNSUPPORTED\_FINITE\_CYCLIC\_GROUP indicating rejection with the finite cyclic group field set to the rejected group, and shall send the parent process a Del event. If the group is supported, the protocol instance shall zero the Sc and Rc counters and it shall generate the PWE and the secret values according to 12.4.5.2 (PWE and secret generation). It shall then process the received SAE Commit message (see 12.4.5.4 (Processing of a peer’s SAE Commit message)). If validation of the received SAE Commit message fails, the protocol instance shall send a Del event to the parent process; otherwise, it shall construct and transmit an SAE Commit message (see 12.4.5.3 (Construction of an SAE Commit message)) followed by an SAE Confirm message (see 12.4.5.5 (Construction of an SAE Confirm message)). The Sync counter shall be set to 0 and the t0 (retransmission) timer shall be set. The protocol instance transitions to Confirmed state.

***Instruct the editor to modify section 12.4.8.6.4 as indicated:***

**12.4.8.6.4 Protocol instance behavior – Committed state**

Upon receipt of a Com event, the t0 (retransmission) timer shall be canceled. Then the following is performed:

* The protocol instance shall check the Status code of the Authentication frame. If the Status code is ANTI\_CLOGGING\_TOKEN\_REQUIRED, a new SAE Commit message shall be constructed with the Anti-Clogging Token from the received Authentication frame, and the commit-scalar and COMMIT-ELEMENT previously sent. The new SAE Commit message shall be transmitted to the peer, Sync shall be zeroed, and the t0 (retransmission) timer shall be set.
* If the Status code is UNKNOWN\_PASSWORD\_IDENTIFIER, the protocol instance shall send a Del event to the parent process and transition back to Nothing state.

[snip]

* If there is a password identifier associated with the password when the protocol instance constructed its SAE Commit message and either there is no password identifier in the received frame or the password identifier in the received frame does not match the password identifier used to construct the protocol instance’s SAE Commit message, BadID shall be set, the protocol instance shall send a Del event to the parent process and transition back to Nothing state.
* If the group is supported but does not match that used when the protocol instance constructed its SAE Commit message, DiffGrp shall be set and the local identity and peer identity shall be checked.

***Instruct the editor to modify section C.3 as indicated:***

**C.3 MIB detail**

Dot11RSNAConfigPasswordValueEntry ::=

 SEQUENCE {

dot11RSNAConfigPasswordValueIndex Unsigned32,

dot11RSNAConfigPasswordCredential OCTET STRING,

dot11RSNAConfigPasswordIdentifier OCTET STRING,

dot11RSNAConfigPasswordPeerMac MacAddress }

dot11RSNAConfigPasswordIdentifier OBJECT-TYPE

 SYNTAX Identifier

 MAX-ACCESS read-write

 STATUS current

 DESCRIPTION

 “This is a control variable.

 It is written by an external management entity.

 Changes take effet as soon as practical in the implementation.

 This variable is a UTF-8 string that an implementation uses to uniquely

 identify a password to support provisioning multiple passwords for

 a single PeerMac.”

 ::= { dot11RSNAConfigPasswordIdentifierEntry 3 }

dot11RSNAConfigPasswordPeerMac OBJECT-TYPE

 SYNTAX MacAddress

MAX-ACCESS read-write

STATUS current

DESCRIPTION

"This is a control variable.

It is written by an external management entity.

Changes take effect as soon as practical in the implementation.

This variable represents the MAC address of the peer

that is to be authenticated. A wildcard BSSID is

permitted when passwords are shared among peers."

::= { dot11RSNAConfigPasswordValueEntry 4 }

**References:**