The projected prevalence of daily adult smoking in 2025, with a 10% annual increase in excise tax, under a range of modelling assumptions
| Scenario | Non-Māori men (%) | Non-Māori women (%) | Māori men (%) | Māori women (%) | Total (%) | Year <5% prevalence |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Annual 10% increase in excise (base-case*) | 8.2 (8.1 to 8.4) | 6.1 (6 to 6.3) | 18 (17 to 18) | 18 (18 to 19) | 8.7 (8.6 to 8.9) | 2039 |
| Persisting impact: initiation† | 7.9 (7.7 to 8.1) | 5.9 (5.7 to 6) | 17 (16 to 17) | 17 (17 to 18) | 8.3 (8.2 to 8.5) | 2035 |
| Persisting impact: cessation† | 7.3 (7.1 to 7.5) | 5.4 (5.2 to 5.6) | 16 (15 to 16) | 16 (16 to 17) | 7.8 (7.6 to 8) | 2034 |
| Elasticity: −0.2 at all ages (prevalence) | 7.9 (7.7 to 8.1) | 5.9 (5.7 to 6) | 17 (17 to 18) | 18 (17 to 18) | 8.4 (8.3 to 8.6) | 2038 |
| Elasticity: 50% higher for Māori | 8.4 (8.2 to 8.5) | 6.2 (6.1 to 6.3) | 17 (17 to 18) | 18 (17 to 18) | 8.7 (8.6 to 8.8) | 2039 |
| Elasticity: prevalence proportion 25% | 8.8 (8.6 to 8.9) | 6.5 (6.4 to 6.6) | 19 (19 to 19) | 20 (19 to 20) | 9.3 (9.2 to 9.4) | 2042 |
| Illicit market: stable at 1% | 8.2 (8 to 8.3) | 6.1 (5.9 to 6.2) | 18 (17 to 18) | 18 (18 to 19) | 8.7 (8.5 to 8.8) | 2039 |
| Illicit market: +5% per year to 50% | 8.5 (8.4 to 8.7) | 6.3 (6.2 to 6.4) | 18 (18 to 19) | 19 (18 to 19) | 9 (8.9 to 9.1) | 2040 |
| Illicit market: +20% per year to 50% | 8.5 (8.4 to 8.6) | 6.3 (6.2 to 6.4) | 18 (18 to 19) | 19 (18 to 19) | 9 (8.9 to 9.1) | 2040 |
| Tax pass-through: 80% | 8.3 (8.2 to 8.5) | 6.2 (6 to 6.4) | 18 (18 to 19) | 19 (18 to 19) | 8.8 (8.7 to 9) | 2039 |
| Tax pass-through: 120% | 8.1 (8 to 8.3) | 6 (5.9 to 6.2) | 18 (17 to 18) | 18 (18 to 19) | 8.6 (8.5 to 8.7) | 2039 |
| Illicit price: 25% of legal price | 8.4 (8.2 to 8.6) | 6.2 (6.1 to 6.4) | 18 (18 to 19) | 19 (18 to 19) | 8.9 (8.7 to 9) | 2039 |
| Illicit price: 65% of legal price | 8.2 (8.1 to 8.4) | 6.1 (6 to 6.2) | 18 (17 to 18) | 18 (18 to 19) | 8.7 (8.6 to 8.8) | 2039 |
| Best-case‡ | 8 (7.9 to 8.2) | 6 (5.9 to 6.1) | 17 (17 to 18) | 18 (18 to 18) | 8.5 (8.4 to 8.7) | 2038 |
| Worst-case‡ | 8.7 (8.5 to 8.9) | 6.4 (6.3 to 6.6) | 19 (18 to 19) | 19 (19 to 20) | 9.2 (9 to 9.4) | 2040 |
Mean and 95% uncertainty intervals presented.
*Base-case scenario has illicit price set at the legal price minus two-thirds of the tax, 100% tax pass-through and illicit market share increasing by 1% per year to a maximum of 50% of the market.
†The base-case scenario assumes that price increases in a given year have an effect on initiation and quitting in that year only. In these scenario analyses, we assume that price increases in the current and previous year have an impact on prevalence (via initiation and cessation, respectively), with the same price elasticities as the base-case analysis.
‡Best-case scenario (from a public health perspective) has illicit price set at 65% of the legal price, 120% tax pass-through and illicit market share stable at baseline estimate of 1%. Worst-case scenario has illicit price set at 25% of the legal price, 80% tax pass-through and illicit market share increasing rapidly (20% per year to a maximum of 50% of the market).