BMJ Open

BMJ Open is committed to open peer review. As part of this commitment we make the peer review history of every article we publish publicly available.

When an article is published we post the peer reviewers' comments and the authors' responses online. We also post the versions of the paper that were used during peer review. These are the versions that the peer review comments apply to.

The versions of the paper that follow are the versions that were submitted during the peer review process. They are not the versions of record or the final published versions. They should not be cited or distributed as the published version of this manuscript.

BMJ Open is an open access journal and the full, final, typeset and author-corrected version of record of the manuscript is available on our site with no access controls, subscription charges or payper-view fees (http://bmjopen.bmj.com).

If you have any questions on BMJ Open's open peer review process please email editorial.bmjopen@bmj.com

BMJ Open

BMJ Open

Effect of the Public Disclosure of Industry Payments Information on Patients: Results from a Population-Based Natural Experiment

Journal:	BMJ Open
Manuscript ID	bmjopen-2018-024020
Article Type:	Research
Date Submitted by the Author:	10-May-2018
Complete List of Authors:	Kanter, Genevieve; University of Pennsylvania Perelman School of Medicine, General Internal Medicine Carpenter, Daniel; Harvard University Lehmann, Lisa; Harvard Medical School Mello, Michelle; Stanford University Stanford Law School; Stanford University School of Medicine
Keywords:	MEDICAL ETHICS, Health policy < HEALTH SERVICES ADMINISTRATION & MANAGEMENT, HEALTH ECONOMICS



EFFECT OF THE PUBLIC DISCLOSURE OF INDUSTRY PAYMENTS INFORMATION ON PATIENTS: RESULTS FROM A POPULATION-BASED NATURAL EXPERIMENT

Genevieve P. Kanter, PhD¹

Daniel Carpenter, PhD²

Lisa Soleymani Lehmann, MD PhD³

Michelle M. Mello, JD PhD⁴

- Division of General Internal Medicine and Department of Medical Ethics and Health Policy,
 University of Pennsylvania Perelman School of Medicine, and Leonard Davis Institute of
 Health Economics, University of Pennsylvania; 1312-B Blockley Hall, 423 Guardian Drive,
 Philadelphia, PA 19104, USA; Tel 215.898.2703; Email gpkanter@pennmedicine.upenn.edu.
 (Corresponding author)
- Department of Government and Radcliffe Institute for Advanced Study, Harvard University; 1737 Cambridge Street, CGIS Knafel Building 405, Cambridge, MA 02138, USA; Tel 617.495.8280; Email dcarpenter@gov.harvard.edu.
- Department of Medicine and Center for Bioethics, Harvard Medical School, and Department of Health Policy and Management, Harvard T. H. Chan School of Public Health, Boston, MA; National Center for Ethics in Health Care, Veterans Health Administration, Washington, DC; 810 Vermont Avenue NW, Washington DC 20420, USA; Tel 202.632.8457; Email lisa.lehmann@va.gov.
- ⁴ Stanford Law School and Department of Health Research and Policy, Stanford University School of Medicine; 559 Nathan Abbott Way, Stanford, CA 94305, USA; Tel 650.725.3894; Email mmello@law.stanford.edu.

Word Count: 2177 (excluding title page, abstract, references, figures, and tables)

Keywords: physician industry relationships, Open Payments, public disclosure, transparency, industry payments, conflicts of interest, patient awareness

ABSTRACT

Objective

To determine the effect of the public disclosure of industry payments to physicians on patients' awareness of industry payments and knowledge about whether their physicians had accepted industry payments.

Design

Interrupted time series with comparison group (difference-in-difference analyses of longitudinal survey).

Setting

Nationally representative US population-based surveys. Surveys were conducted in September 2014, shortly prior to the public release of Open Payments information, and again in September 2016.

Participants

Adults aged 18 and older (n=2,180).

Main outcome measures

Awareness of industry payments as an issue; awareness that industry payments information was publicly available; knowledge of whether own physician had received industry payments.

Results

Public disclosure of industry payments information through Open Payments did not significantly increase the proportion of respondents who knew whether their physician had received industry payments (p=0.918). It also did not change the proportion of respondents who became aware of the

issue of industry payments (p=0.470) but did increase the proportion who knew that payments information was publicly available (9.6% points, p=0.011).

Conclusions

Two years after the public disclosure of industry payments information, Open Payments does not appear to have achieved its goal of increasing patient knowledge of whether their physicians have received money from pharmaceutical and medical device firms. Additional efforts will be required to improve the utilization and effectiveness of Open Payments for consumers.

Open: first published as 10.1136/bmjopen-2018-024020 on 1 March 2019. Downloaded from http://bmjopen.bmj.com/ on May 15, 2025 at Department GEZ-LTA Erasmushogeschool
Protected by copyright, including for uses related to text and data mining, Al training, and similar technologies.

STRENGTHS AND LIMITATIONS

- This is the first national policy evaluation of the effect of transparency of industry payments on patients.
- Findings are based on a strong natural experiment design: interrupted time series with comparison group (difference-in-difference).
- Nationally representative sample of respondents was followed longitudinally.
- Individuals lost to attrition between survey waves may have been different from those who completed the second wave.

INTRODUCTION

In 2010, the United States Congress—concerned about the adverse influence of financial relationships between physicians and drug and device firms, and the lack of transparency surrounding these relationships—enacted the Physician Payments Sunshine Act.[1] As part of reforms included in the Affordable Care Act (ACA),[2] the Sunshine provision required pharmaceutical and medical device firms to report, for public release, detailed information on the financial payments and gifts of monetary value that these firms made to physicians.

Payments for consulting and for serving as faculty speaker at continuing medical education events and conferences; for food/drink, travel, lodging, and entertainment; as well as for royalties and research were to be reported for public disclosure. The rationales underlying this disclosure requirement were that patients, in making health care decisions, would be better informed of the potential influence of industry ties on their physicians, and payment transparency could deter physicians from accepting payments that patients might view as suspect.[1,3]

Since the passage of the US Sunshine Act, similar initiatives have emerged in Europe and Canada. The European Federation of Pharmaceutical Industries and Associations (EFPIA) now requires, of its member countries, the public disclosure of pharmaceutical industry payments made to health care providers, although health care workers in some countries can refuse consent to the public disclosure of their individual-level information.[4,5] In Britain, industry payments to health care providers have been reported through the Disclosure UK programme as part of the EFPIA initiative,[6,7] with approximately 70% of providers participating in public disclosure.[8] In Ontario, Canada, legislation has been introduced requiring the public

disclosure of payments made by pharmaceutical and medical device firms to health care providers.[9,10]

The degree to which these transparency initiatives improve, in practice, patient awareness and knowledge of industry payments has not been previously studied. We sought to rigorously evaluate the effects of the earliest of these industry payments transparency initiatives: the Open Payments programme created by the US Physician Payments Sunshine Act. In a national longitudinal survey fielded before and after the Sunshine Act's data release in 2014, we investigated awareness and knowledge of industry payments to physicians among a representative cohort of American adults. Because 3 US states had already made industry payments information publicly available, respondents in these states served as a comparison group (since they already had prior exposure to this information) for those who became newly apprised of payments information with the release of Open Payments data. This design improves on a simple pre/post design and allows for a better-controlled evaluation of the effect of the Sunshine Act. Findings from the US experience can guide implementation of transparency programmes in other countries.

DATA AND METHODS

Sample

The sample for our initial survey consisted of 3,542 American adults aged 18 and older selected from KnowledgePanel (KP), a large, nationally representative US household panel maintained by the research firm GfK. KP households are selected through address-based

sampling so that the sampling frame covers 97% of US households, including non-Internet households. Details on survey sampling methodology are provided in Appendix S1.

We drew a nationally representative sample with oversampling in Massachusetts and Minnesota to enable us to detect smaller effects in these two states, which had previously passed "Sunshine laws" requiring the public disclosure of industry payments made to physicians in the state. (We did not oversample Vermont, which also had a preexisting disclosure law, because an oversample of this relatively small population would still not have generated sufficient power to detect an effect in that state.) We refer to these two states and Vermont as "Sunshine states."

The sample of respondents for the follow-up survey consisted of the group of all Wave 1 respondents who were available for re-contact (2,711/3,542=77%). Appendix S2 shows the flow diagram for sample selection. Individuals who were not available for re-contact were more likely to be racial/ethnic minorities and not be in paid employment than those who were re-contacted, but were similar along most other dimensions (Appendix S3).

Patient and public involvement statement

The study did not involve patients. The results of the survey will be given to GfK for dissemination.

Survey Design

GfK administered the 6-minute Wave 1 survey and the 10-minute Wave 2 survey online.

Both surveys included items on awareness and knowledge of industry payments (questions

provided in Appendix S4). In particular, we asked whether respondents were aware of the issue of industry payments, knew that industry payments information was publicly available, and knew if the physician they had seen most frequently during the past 12 months had received payments. Survey data were linked to information on respondents' sociodemographic and self-reported health characteristics provided by GfK.

Survey Administration

The first survey was fielded September 26-October 3, 2014, with almost all surveys (94%) completed by the Open Payments data release date of September 30. Details on administration of the Wave I survey are available elsewhere.[11]

The Wave 2 survey was fielded September 16-October 2, 2016, two years after the initial survey. Appendix S1 provides further details on Wave 2 survey administration.

Statistical Analysis

We used a difference-in-difference approach (interrupted time-series with control) to estimate the effects of the national, public release of Open Payments information.[12-14] To estimate the effect of the Open Payments release, we compared mean changes in the outcomes of interest among individuals residing in states that did not have state Sunshine laws to changes among persons residing in states with Sunshine laws (Massachusetts, Minnesota, and Vermont). By using the Sunshine states as comparators, we could improve on a simple pre/post study design and account for secular trends affecting all states--for example, changes

associated with the ACA--that otherwise could have confounded our estimates of the effect of payments disclosure.

We calculated unadjusted and adjusted difference-in-difference effects. Regression-adjusted models—-used to increase precision of the estimates--included age, education categories, urban residence, household income categories, employment categories, previous diagnosis of any of 21 chronic conditions, previous diagnosis of cancer, previous diagnoses of stroke or myocardial infarction, previous diagnosis of a mental health disorder, number of physician visits, whether insured, quadratic terms of age and number of visits, year fixed effects, and individual fixed effects (which absorb gender, race/ethnicity, and other time-invariant individual characteristics). Standard errors were clustered at the state level. All analyses used GfK-constructed longitudinal weights adjusting for non-coverage, nonresponse, and oversampling.

Analyses were conducted using Stata 14 (College Station, TX). Full regression results for models with and without individual fixed effects are reported in Appendix S5. Results from alternative specifications, including unweighted models, are reported in Appendix S6.

RESULTS

Sample Characteristics

Of the 2,711 respondents from Wave 1 who were re-contacted, 80% completed the survey, for an overall completion rate of 62%. (A non-response analysis may be found in Appendix S3.) Table 1 presents the characteristics of Wave 1 and Wave 2 respondents.

Respondents in the two waves were similar along most sociodemographic and health

dimensions. In the balanced panel consisting of individuals who responded to both surveys (n=2,180), respondents who lived in Sunshine states (n=208, 4% weighted) were similar along almost all dimensions to those who lived in non-Sunshine states (n=1,972).

Effect of Disclosure on Awareness and Knowledge of Industry Payments

Columns 1 and 2 of Table 2 show, respectively, the unadjusted 2014 and 2016 levels of awareness and knowledge of industry payments in Sunshine and non-Sunshine states among individuals who responded to both survey waves. Prior to Open Payments, non-Sunshine state residents had lower awareness of the issue of industry payments than residents of Sunshine states (45.5% vs. 58.0%), as well as lower awareness that industry payments information was publicly available (9.8% vs. 19.4%).

After Open Payments, overall awareness of the issue increased in both Sunshine and non-Sunshine states, with a relatively greater increase in awareness in non-Sunshine states (8.7% points vs. 5.6% points). Awareness that industry payments information was publicly available also increased more in non-Sunshine states relative to Sunshine states, which exhibited a decline in reported awareness (3.2% points vs. -6.7% points). This decline likely reflects the effect of media attention in the pre-period surrounding the Open Payments data release, which activated short-term awareness that quickly decayed.

In both Sunshine and non-Sunshine states, a very small proportion of respondents claimed to know whether their own doctor had received industry payments prior to the public release of data (3.8% and 4.4%, respectively). In both types of states, this knowledge about their own doctors changed little after the public release.

Columns 4 and 5 of Table 2 compare the changes in awareness and knowledge in non-Sunshine states, which were newly exposed to the payments information, to changes in Sunshine states. Column 4 reports the unadjusted difference (DD) estimates of the effect of the Open Payments data release and Column 5 reports the regression-adjusted DD estimates of the effect. The DD estimates show that Open Payments did not increase awareness of the issue of industry payments (p=0.470), but did significantly increase awareness that industry payments information was publicly available (9.6 % points, p=0.011). The release of Open Payments data did not, however, increase knowledge about whether one's own doctor had received payments (p=0.918).

DISCUSSION

A key objective of the Sunshine Act was to improve the information available to patients about their physicians' financial ties with industry.[1,3] In this first national evaluation of the effect of the Sunshine Act on patients, we found that although Open Payments increased awareness that industry payments information was publicly available, it did not increase people's knowledge of whether their own doctor had received payments. Two years after the Open Payments release, 13% of respondents knew that industry payments information about their physicians was available, and only 3% of respondents knew whether their doctor had received payments. In this regard, Open Payments has fallen well short of its aspiration to better inform patients of their physicians' industry relationships.

Our findings are consistent with the experience of transparency initiatives in other areas of medicine. Studies of the effect of the disclosure of physician and hospital quality have shown

that patients have been largely unaware of and rarely use the information made available.[15-17] Providers have been more responsive,[15,16] so Open Payments may well have effects on physician behavior.

Our DD strategy provides estimates that are more credibly interpreted as causal—rather than simply associational—because Sunshine states can be used as a comparison group. Nevertheless, there are some limitations to the study. With DD, confounding might occur if there were other aspects of the health care environment affecting awareness and knowledge of industry payments that affected Sunshine states but not non-Sunshine states, or vice versa. One possible source of confounding is that the three Sunshine states all participated in the Medicaid expansion, possibly increasing patient engagement in these states. We conduct sensitivity analyses, estimating models with an indicator for Medicaid expansion and models restricting the sample to only residents in Medicaid expansion states; our findings are robust to these adjustments (Appendix S6). We are not aware of other changes that would have differentially affected Massachusetts, Minnesota, and Vermont versus non-Sunshine states during this period. Secondly, a general concern raised with web-based household panels is that refusal to participate in the panel could lead to sample non-representativeness relative to the population. Previous studies have shown, however, that there appears to be very little bias in the KN panel in the area of health and health-related behavior.[18,19] An additional concern is that survey respondents may not have been fully representative of US households because of attrition. Although the response rate among persons invited to take the Wave 2 survey was high (80%), and the overall completion rate between the first and second survey was within survey norms (62%), those who left the sample may have been different from those who

remained. In a separate analysis, we found that individuals lost to attrition had reported, during Wave 1, less education and less health insurance coverage but were otherwise similar along most other dimensions, including health status (Appendix S3). To correct for some of the attrition bias, we used longitudinal weights that matched the distribution of key demographic characteristics of our survey sample to the distribution of the US population (see Appendix S1).

In summary, because very few patients are aware of, much less accessing, information available through Open Payments, efforts beyond the unveiling of a public website will be required to improve patient use of industry payments information. These efforts could come from the Centers for Medicaid and Medicare Services (CMS), which oversees Open Payments and also administers Medicare and Medicaid programmes; for example, CMS could use its pre-existing relationships with Medicare and Medicaid beneficiaries to highlight payments information and integrate it with other CMS resources that beneficiaries use regularly. More broadly, health insurers could provide information about industry payments on "Find a Physician" websites where patients go to select doctors from within a network. In addition, physicians themselves who value their "pharm-free" status [20] could highlight this fact to current and prospective patients.

As transparency efforts in Europe, Canada, and other regions advance, the US experience suggests that web-based public disclosure is limited in its ability to inform patients about physicians and their industry interests. Additional policy initiatives will likely be required to widely disseminate this information and make it more salient for patients.

CONTRIBUTORSHIP STATEMENT

Study concept and design: Kanter, Mello

Acquisition, analysis, or interpretation of data: Kanter, Mello, Carpenter, Lehmann

Drafting of the manuscript: Kanter

Critical revision of the manuscript for important intellectual content: Kanter, Mello, Carpenter,

Lehmann

Statistical analysis: Kanter

Administrative, technical, or material support: Kanter, Mello, Carpenter, Lehmann

Study supervision: Kanter

Dr. Kanter had full access to the data and takes full responsibility for the integrity of the data and the accuracy of the data analysis. All authors have read, revised, and approved the final version of the paper.

DATA SHARING STATEMENT

No additional data are available.

COMPETING INTERESTS

The authors have no competing interests to disclose.

FUNDING

This research was funded by the Greenwall Foundation.

REFERENCES

- Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services. 42 CFR Parts 402 and 403. Medicare,
 Medicaid, children's health insurance programs; transparency reports and reporting of
 physician ownership or investment interests. Federal Register 78. 2013.
 https://www.cms.gov/OpenPayments/Downloads/Affordable-Care-Act-Section-6002-Final-Rule.pdf. Accessed April 26, 2018.
- Section 6002 of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act. Public Law 111-148.
 http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PLAW-111publ148/pdf/PLAW-111publ148.pdf. Accessed April 26, 2018.
- 3. US Senate special committee on aging. Grassley, Kohl say public should know when pharmaceutical makers give money to doctors. Press release. September 7, 2007. http://www.aging.senate.gov/press-releases/grassley-kohl-say-public-should-know-when-pharmaceutical-makers-give-money-to-doctors. Accessed April 26, 2018.
- European Federation of Pharmaceutical Industries and Associations. Disclosure of payments
 to HCPs. https://www.efpia.eu/relationships-codes/disclosure-of-payments-to-hcps/.
 Accessed April 26, 2018.
- 5. Bulik BS. 'Sunshine' hits Europe: Pharma's doc payments now available, but numbers are far from comprehensive. FiercePharma. July 25, 2016. https://www.fiercepharma.com/marketing/sunshine-finally-reaches-europe-disclosure-pharma-payments-to-docs-now-available. Accessed April 26, 2018.
- 6. Association of the British Pharmaceutical Industry. Disclosure UK. http://www.abpi.org.uk/ethics/ethical-responsibility/disclosure-uk/. Accessed April 26, 2018.

- 7. Adlington K, Godlee F. Disclosure UK: transparency should no longer be an optional extra. BMJ 2016; 354:i3730 doi:10.1136/bmj.i3730.
- 8. Hawkes N. Doctors getting biggest payments from drug companies don't declare them on new website. BMJ 2016; 354:i3679 doi:10.1136/bmj.i3679.
- Hoskins E. Bill 160, Strengthening Quality and Accountability for Patients Act, 2017.
 http://ontla.on.ca/web/bills/bills_detail.do?locale=en&Intranet=&BillID=5096. Accessed
 April 26, 2018.
- 10. Grant K. Ontario law to require drug firms to reveal funds paid to doctors' groups, patient advocates. The Globe and Mail. February 22, 2018. https://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/national/ontario-law-to-require-drug-firms-to-reveal-funds-paid-to-doctors-groups-patient-advocates/article38061619/. Accessed April 26, 2018.
- 11. Pham-Kanter G, Mello MM, Lehmann LS, Campbell, EG, Carpenter D. Public awareness of and contact with physicians who receive industry payments: a national survey. J Gen Intern Med 2017; 32:767-774 doi 10.1007/s11606-017-4012-3.
- 12. Wooldridge JJ. Econometric analysis of cross section and panel Data. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press; 2002.
- Cameron CA, Trivedi PK. Microeconometrics: methods and applications. New York:
 Cambridge University Press; 2005.
- 14. Shadish WR, Cook TD, Campbell DT. Experimental and quasi-experimental designs for generalized causal inference. Boston: Houghton Mifflin; 2002.

- 15. Fung CH, LIM Y, Mattke S, Damberg C, Shekelle PG. Systematic review: the evidence that publishing patient care performance data improves quality of care. Ann Intern Med 2008; 148:111-123.
- 16. Marshall MN, Shekelle PG, Leatherman S, Brook RH. The public release of performance data: what do we expect to gain? a review of the evidence. JAMA 2000; 283(14):1866-74.
- 17. Schauffler HH, Mordavsky JK. Consumer reports in health care: do they make a difference?

 Annu Rev Public Health 2001; 22:69-89.
- 18. Baker LC, Bundorf MK, Singer S, Wagner TH. Validity of the survey of health and internet and knowledge network's panel and sampling. Stanford, CA: Stanford University; 2003.
- 19. Huggins VJ, Dennis MJ, Seryakova K. An evaluation of nonresponse bias in internet surveys conducted using the knowledge networks panel. Proceedings of the Survey Research Methods Section, Joint Statistical Meetings of the American Statistical Association 2002; 1525-1530.
- 20. AMSA. PharmFree: Promoting evidence-based prescribing, pharmaceutical innovation, and access to medicines. http://www.pharmfree.org/. Accessed April 26, 2018.

Table 1. Characteristics Of Respondents By Wave And By Sunshine State Residence

	Weighted Di	stribution %		Weighted		
	Wave 1, 2014	Wave 2, 2016	Statistical significance (Bonferroni	Sunshine	non-Sunshine	Statistical significance (Bonferroni
	(n=3,542)	(n=2,180)	correction) ^a	Balanced I	Panel (n=2,180)	correction) ^a
Gender			n.s.			n.s.
Female	52%	52%		55%	52%	
Male	48%	48%		45%	48%	
Race/Ethnicity			n.s.			**
Caucasian	66%	65%		92%	63%	
Hispanic	15%	16%		3%	16%	
Black, Non-Hispanic	11%	12%		2%	12%	
Other	8%	8%		2%	8%	
Age			n.s.			n.s.
<=20	4%	2%		1%	5%	
21-30	19%	18%		15%	19%	
31-40	16%	17%		15%	17%	
41-50	15%	17%		15%	16%	
51-60	21%	21%		28%	21%	
61+	25%	26%		26%	22%	
Education			n.s.			n.s.
Less than high school	12%	11%		4%	13%	
High school graduate	30%	29%		28%	31%	
Some college	29%	29%		26%	27%	
College graduate	29%	32%		41%	29%	
Household Income			n.s.			*
\$0 - \$24,999	18%	17%		8%	14%	
\$25,000 - \$49,999	22%	21%		15%	21%	

1
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16 17
18
19
20
21 22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
42 43
73

\$50,000 - \$74,999	18%	18%		15%	18%	
\$75,000 - \$99,999	15%	14%		17%	14%	
\$100,000+	26%	30%		45%	33%	
Employment			**			n.s.
Employed for pay	51%	57%		60%	54%	
Self-employed	7%	6%		8%	7%	
Retired	19%	18%		20%	17%	
Not working-disability	7%	6%		3%	7%	
Not working-other	17%	12%		9%	16%	
Urban/Rural			n.s.			n.s.
Urban	84%	86%		88%	84%	
Rural	16%	14%		12%	16%	
Resides in State with Sunshine La	aw		n.s.			
No	96%	96%			••	
Yes	4%	4%			••	
Self-rated Health			n.s.			n.s.
Excellent	14%	13%		17%	14%	
Good	61%	64%		64%	63%	
Fair	21%	20%		19%	21%	
Poor	4%	3%		1%	3%	
Diagnosis of chronic condition ^c			n.s.			n.s.
No	45%	46%		39%	45%	
Yes	55%	54%		61%	55%	
Diagnosis of mental health disor	der		**			n.s.
No	82%	98%		82%	83%	
Yes	18%	2%		18%	17%	
Diagnosis of cancer			*			n.s.
No	91%	94%		92%	92%	
Yes	9%	6%		8%	8%	

Diagnosis of stroke or myoc	ardial infarction		n.s.			n.s.
No	97%	95%		98%	97%	
Yes	3%	5%		2%	3%	
Any health insurance covers	age		**			n.s.
No	18%	8%		8%	16%	
Yes	82%	92%		92%	84%	

^{**} significant at 0.01 level with Bonferroni correction (0.01/13=0.00077)

n.s. not significant

Percentages may not add up to 100 because of rounding.

Notes:

- a. p-values are from chi-squared test of independence with Rao-Scott correction, testing the difference in distribution values between the two groups of respondents. Asterisks indicate significance with Bonferroni correction.
- b. Respondent characteristics from Wave 1 (2014) survey.
- c. Chronic conditions include acid reflux, asthma, COPD, atrial fibrillation, chronic pain, cystic fibrosis, diabetes, epilepsy, eye disease, gout, heart disease, hepatitis C, hypertension, high cholesterol, HIV, kidney disease, multiple sclerosis, osteoarthritis, osteoporosis, rheumatoid arthritis, sleep disorder.

^{*} significant at 0.05 level with Bonferroni correction (0.05/13=0.0038)

Table 2. Changes In Awareness And Knowledge Of Industry Payments After Payments Information Disclosure

				Difference-in	-Difference Estimates	
	Mean or	Percentage	Change	Unadjusted Difference in	Regression-Adjusted Difference in	
	2014	2016	2014-16	Change	Change (95% CI) ^a	P value ^b
Awareness and Knowledge of	Industry Paymer	nts (% Answerii	ng Yes)			
August of industry navenants (1	1014 maan 46 0	-d 40 0)				
Aware of industry payments (2		<u> </u>				
Non-Sunshine states	45.5%	54.1%	8.7%	3.1%	2.3%	0.4701
Sunshine states	58.0%	63.6%	5.6%	3.170	(-4.0%,8.6%)	0.4701
Aware that industry payments	info publicly ava	ilable (2014 me	an 10.2, sd 30.2)			
Non-Sunshine states	9.8%	12.9%	3.2%	0.00/	9.6%	0.04.00*
Sunshine states	19.4%	12.6%	-6.7%	9.9%	(2.3%,16.9%)	0.0108*
					, , ,	
Know whether own doctor has	received industr	y payments (20	14 mean 4.4, sd	20.5)		
Non-Sunshine states	4.4%	3.1%	-1.3%	0.000	-0.1%	0.0400
Sunshine states	3.8%	2.7%	-1.1%	-0.2%	(-2.3%,2.0%)	0.9183

^{*} significant at 0.05 level

Analyses of awareness and knowledge measures based on balanced panel of individuals with non-missing survey items who responded to both 2014 and 2016 surveys: 1,831 non-Sunshine residents and 197 Sunshine residents for awareness of payments; 1,834 non-Sunshine residents and 196 Sunshine residents for awareness that payments information was public and for knowledge of whether own doctor had received payments.

^{**} significant at 0.01 level

Notes:

- a. Regression models include age, education categories, urban residence, household income categories, employment categories, previous diagnosis of chronic conditions (which include acid reflux, asthma, COPD, atrial fibrillation, chronic pain, cystic fibrosis, diabetes, epilepsy, eye disease, gout, heart disease, hepatitis C, hypertension, high cholesterol, HIV, kidney disease, multiple sclerosis, osteoarthritis, osteoporosis, rheumatoid arthritis, sleep disorder), previous diagnosis of cancer, previous diagnosis of stroke or myocardial infarction, previous diagnosis of mental health disorder, number of visits to the doctor, whether insured, quadratic terms of age and number of visits to account for non-linearities in age and visits, year fixed effects, and individual fixed effects (which absorb gender, race/ethnicity, and other time-invariant individual characteristics). All analyses used Gfk-constructed weights that adjusted for non-coverage, nonresponse, oversampling, and attrition. Standard errors were clustered at the state level.
- b. Reported P values for regression-adjusted change.

EFFECT OF THE PUBLIC DISCLOSURE OF INDUSTRY PAYMENTS INFORMATION ON PATIENTS: RESULTS FROM A POPULATION-BASED NATURAL EXPERIMENT

SUPPLEMENTARY APPENDIX

- S1. Survey sampling methods
- S2. Sample selection flow diagram
- S3. Characteristics of Wave 2 respondents and non-respondents
- S4. Survey questions
- S5. Full regression results
 - S4a. Models with individual fixed effects
 - S4b. Models without individual fixed effects
- S6. Alternative specifications
 - S5a. Unweighted models
 - S5b. Models without individual fixed effects
 - S5c. Regression-adjusted models that include an indicator for Medicaid expansion

Open: first published as 10.1136/bmjopen-2018-024020 on 1 March 2019. Downloaded from http://bmjopen.bmj.com/ on May 15, 2025 at Department GEZ-LTA Erasmushogeschool
Protected by copyright, including for uses related to text and data mining, Al training, and similar technologies.

S5d. Medicaid expansion states only

MANUSCRIPT: PUBLIC DISCLOSURE OF INDUSTRY PAYMENTS

SUPPLEMENTARY APPENDIX S1 SURVEY SAMPLING METHODS

Survey Sampling and Administration

Individuals selected for the initial (Wave 1) survey were recruited from KnowledgePanel® (KP), a nationally representative household panel assembled by the research firm GfK. KP households are selected through random digit dialing and address-based sampling so that landline households as well as cell-phone-only and no-phone households are in a sampling frame covering 97% of US households. KP households agree to participate in occasional surveys and, in return for their participation, accumulate points that they can redeem for cash, merchandise, and other items of monetary value (average accumulation valued at \$4-\$6 per month). Households without Internet access are provided a webenabled computer and free Internet service for the duration of their participation in the panel. Detailed information about KP sampling methodology, incentive structures, informed consent, and other human subjects issues are documented in Dennis and Thomas (2013).¹

For Wave 1, individuals were sampled from KP households in all 50 states, excluding DC, to constitute a nationally representative sample, with oversampling in Massachusetts and Minnesota to enable us to detect smaller effects in these two states that had previously passed Sunshine laws. We did not oversample Vermont, the third Sunshine state, because even an oversample of this relatively small population would have not have generated sufficient power to detect an effect in that state.

The Wave 1 sample consisted of 3,542 respondents who completed the initial survey in 2014 (Wave 1 completion 45.9%). More details on administration of the Wave 1 survey may be found in Pham-Kanter et al (2017).²

For Wave 2, GfK identified 2,711 (77%) respondents from Wave 1 respondents who were still in the panel in 2016 and who were available for re-contact. All of these individuals were asked to complete the Wave 2 survey.

Survey Field Period

The first survey was fielded online September 26-October 3, 2014, with almost all surveys (94%) completed by the Open Payments data release date of September 30. The Wave 2 survey was fielded online September 16-October 2, 2016, two years after the initial survey.

Individuals selected for the surveys received a notification email with a link to the survey. After three days, individuals who had not responded to the survey were sent an email reminder. For Wave 2, which had a slightly longer field period than Wave 1, nonrespondents also received an automated email reminder 11 days after the initial survey contact.

Completion Rate

Of those who were re-contacted for Wave 2, 80% (n=2,180) completed the survey, resulting in an overall completion rate of 62%. The sample selection flow diagram is shown in Appendix S2.

MANUSCRIPT: PUBLIC DISCLOSURE OF INDUSTRY PAYMENTS


Completion rates varied by state and ranged from 40% to 81.8%. Average completion rates for Sunshine and non-Sunshine states did not differ significantly from each other (61.1% and 66.5%, respectively, p=0.062).

Survey Weights

Our analysis uses survey weights provided by GfK that account for non-coverage, oversampling, and nonresponse/attrition. These GfK weights use, as a benchmark, distributions derived from the 2014 March Supplement Current Population Survey (CPS) so the survey sample matches the US adult population on key demographic dimensions (gender, age, race/Hispanic ethnicity, education, Census region, household income, homeownership status, metropolitan residence, Internet access). Details on the construction of survey weights are documented in Dennis and Thomas (2013).²

MANUSCRIPT: PUBLIC DISCLOSURE OF INDUSTRY PAYMENTS

SUPPLEMENTARY APPENDIX S2 SAMPLE SELECTION FLOW DIAGRAM



MANUSCRIPT: PUBLIC DISCLOSURE OF INDUSTRY PAYMENTS

SUPPLEMENTARY APPENDIX S3

CHARACTERISTICS OF WAVE 2 RESPONDENTS AND NON-RESPONDENTS



Table S3. 2014 Characteristics of Wave 2 Respondents and Non-Respondents

				Weighted Distribution %		Statistical
		Wave 2	Not contacted or	Significance		
		respondents	did not respond	(Bonferroni		
		(n=2,180)	(n=1,362)	correction) ^a		
Gender				n.s.		
	Female	49%	56%			
- /	Male	51%	44%	**		
Race/Eth				**		
	Caucasian	70%	60%			
	Hispanic	10%	14%			
	Black, Non-Hispanic	13%	19%			
	Other	8%	8%	**		
Age	. 20	40/	F0/	**		
	<=20	4%	5%			
	21-30	17%	23%			
	31-40	15%	16%			
	41-50	15%	16%			
	51-60	22%	18%			
F.1	61+	27%	22%	**		
Educatio		400/	450/	**		
	Less than high school	10%	15%			
	High school graduate	31%	27%			
	Some college	28%	30%			
Hausaha	College graduate	31%	27%			
Housenc	old Income \$0 - \$24,999	150/	240/	n.s.		
		16%	21%			
	\$25,000 - \$49,999 \$50,000 - \$74,000	22% 19%	24% 18%			
	\$50,000 - \$74,999					
	\$75,000 - \$99,999 \$100,000	16%	15%			
Employr	\$100,000+	28%	23%	**		
Lilipioyi	Employed for pay	52%	48%			
		6%	7%			
	Self-employed Retired	21%	16%			
	Not working - disability	7%	8%			
	Not working - disability Not working - other	14%	21%			
Urban/R		1470	21/6	n.s.		
Ol Dalij iv	Urban	16%	16%	11.5.		
	Rural	84%	84%			
Rocidos	in State with Sunshine Law	8470	8476	n.s.		
incoluco	No	96%	96%	11.3.		
	Yes	4%	4%			
Self-rate	ed Health	470	470	n.s.		
Jen rate	Excellent	13%	15%	11.5.		
	Good	63%	58%			
	Fair	21%	22%			
	Poor	3%	5%			
Diagnosi	h	370		n.c		
Diagnosi	is of chronic condition	42%	49% 51%	n.s.		
	No Yes	58%	51%			
Diagnosi	is of mental health disorder	36%	51%	n.s.		
Diagnosi	No	83%	80%	11.5.		
	Yes	17%	20%			
Diagnosi	is of cancer	1776	20%	nc		
riagi 1031	No No	91%	92%	n.s.		
	Yes	91%	92% 8%			
Diagnosi	res is of stroke or myocardial infarction	370	670	n.s.		
Piagilosi	No	97%	96%	11.5.		
	No Yes	9/% 3%	96% 4%			
Any ha-		3%	4%	**		
Aпу пеа	Ith insurance coverage	169/	240/	ar ar		
	No Yes	16% 84%	21% 79%			

^{**} significant at 0.01 level with Bonferroni correction (0.01/13=0.00077)

Percentages may not add up to 100 because of rounding.

^{*} significant at 0.05 level with Bonferroni correction (0.05/13=0.0038)

a. P-values are from chi-squared test of independence with Rao-Scott correction, testing the difference in distribution values between Wave 2 respondents and nonrespondents using base weights. Asterisks indicate significance with Bonferroni correction.

b. Chronic conditions include acid reflux, asthma, COPD, atrial fibrillation, chronic pain, cystic fibrosis, diabetes, epilepsy, eye disease, gout, heart disease, hepatitis C, hypertension, high cholesterol, HIV, kidney disease, multiple sclerosis, osteoarthritis, osteoporosis, rheumatoid arthritis, sleep disorder.

MANUSCRIPT: PUBLIC DISCLOSURE OF INDUSTRY PAYMENTS

SUPPLEMENTARY APPENDIX S4 SURVEY QUESTIONS

Awareness and Knowledge of Industry Payments

1. Some doctors receive payments from pharmaceutical (drug) and medical device companies in the form of small gifts such as pens, mugs, or books; reimbursement for travel and conference presentations; or financial compensation for consulting services. Have you heard about these payments before now?

Response choices: Yes; No; Don't know

- 2. A variety of sources recently began posting information about payments made by pharmaceutical and medical device companies to doctors. Were you aware that this information is available?

 *Response choices: Yes, I was aware; No, I was not aware; Not sure
- 3. Do you know whether the doctor you've seen most frequently in the past 12 months has received any payments from a pharmaceutical or medical device firm?
 - Response choices: Yes, I know my doctor has received payments; Yes, I know my doctor has not received any payments; No, I do not know whether my doctor has received any payments; Not sure

Open: first published as 10.1136/bmjopen-2018-024020 on 1 March 2019. Downloaded from http://bmjopen.bmj.com/ on May 15, 2025 at Department GEZ-LTA Erasmushogeschool
Protected by copyright, including for uses related to text and data mining, Al training, and similar technologies.

MANUSCRIPT: PUBLIC DISCLOSURE OF INDUSTRY PAYMENTS

SUPPLEMENTARY APPENDIX S5 FULL REGRESSION RESULTS

S5a. Models with individual fixed effects
S5b. Models without individual fixed effects



Table S5a. Full Regression Results, Models With Individual Fixed Effects

	Dependent variable				
	Awareness of	Awareness of	Knowledge of owr		
	payments	public info	doctor payments		
pen Payments disclosure	0.0227	0.0961	-0.0011		
ppen rayments disclosure					
	(0.0312)	(0.0363)	(0.0107)		
ge	-0.0347	-0.0672	-0.0293		
	(0.0738)	(0.0625)	(0.0297)		
ge squared	-0.0004	-0.0004	0.0001		
	(0.0003)	(0.0002)	(0.0001)		
ess than high school education					
igh school graduate	-0.0523	-0.1071	-0.0677		
	(0.1136)	(0.0667)	(0.0574)		
ome college	0.0784	-0.0230	-0.0408		
	(0.1410)	(0.0880)	(0.0571)		
ollege graduate	0.1760	-0.0341	-0.0953		
	(0.1572)	(0.1636)	(0.0714)		
rban residence	-0.1190	0.0253	0.0239		
	(0.0991)	(0.0526)	(0.0175)		
ousehold income \$0-\$24,999					
ousehold income \$25,000-\$49,999	 0.0411	 0.0405	 0.0352		
	(0.0526)	(0.0345)	(0.0267)		
ousehold income \$50,000-\$74,999	0.0194	-0.0098	0.0147		
, asserted in Section 4. 1,200	(0.0918)	(0.0383)	(0.0268)		
ousehold income \$75,000-\$99,999	0.0432	-0.0177	0.0176		
, asserted a most most property of the control of t	(0.1088)	(0.0399)	(0.0391)		
ousehold income \$100,000+	0.0608	0.0197	0.0304		
	(0.0857)	(0.0529)	(0.0274)		
ot employed					
elf-employed	0.0066	-0.1170	0.0123		
	(0.1079)	(0.0990)	(0.0502)		
mployed for pay	-0.0209	-0.0477	-0.0254		
	(0.0725)	(0.0594)	(0.0426)		
etired	-0.0492	0.0243	0.0111		
	(0.0816)	(0.0767)	(0.0489)		
iagnosis of chronic condition ^a	0.0407	0.0156	-0.0011		
-	(0.0486)	(0.0408)	(0.0165)		
agnosis of cancer	-0.0979	-0.0044	0.0126		
	(0.0802)	(0.0440)	(0.0222)		
agnosis of MI or stroke	-0.0346	0.0144	-0.0190		
5	(0.0888)	(0.0682)	(0.0477)		
agnosis of mental health disorder	0.0506	-0.0066	-0.0107		
and the state of t	(0.0532)	(0.0321)	(0.0274)		
umber of office visits	0.0025	-0.0014	0.0002		
unider of office visits	(0.0038)	(0.0036)	(0.0023)		
umber of office visits squared					
umber of office visits squared	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000		

	BMJ Open			کے Page 32 of 49 0 وم
Health insurance coverage	(0.0001) 0.0402 (0.0605)	(0.0001) 0.0341 (0.0554)	(0.0000) 0.0119 (0.0113)	: first publishe
Year fixed effects Individual fixed effects	YES YES	YES YES	YES YES	d as 10.11
F-statistic (degrees of freedom) R ²	3.64 (22,49) 0.7602	2.7 (22,49) 0.6452	2.46 (22,49) 0.6709	36/bmjop Protect
Sample Size	2,028	2,030	2,030	ed by
				Spen: first published as 10.1136/bmjopen-2018-024020 on 1 March 2019. Downloaded from http://bmjopen.bmj.com/ on Mi Protected by copyright, including for uses related to text and data mining, Al training, and se page Page
				open.bmj.com/ on May 15, 2025 at Department GEZ-LTA Erasmushogeschool . ning, Al training, and similar technologies.

Notes:

a. Chronic conditions include acid reflux, asthma, COPD, atrial fibrillation, chronic pain, cystic fibrosis, diabetes, epilepsy, eye disease, gout, heart disease, hepatitis C, hypertension, high cholesterol, HIV, kidney disease, multiple sclerosis, osteoarthritis, osteoporosis, rhematoid arthritis, sleep disorder.

Table S5b. Full Regression Results, Models Without Individual Fixed Effects

<u>-</u>	Dependent variable				
-	Awareness of	Awareness of	Knowledge of owr		
	payments	public info	doctor payments		
Open Payments disclosure	0.0234	0.1018	0.0004		
	(0.0229)	(0.0244)	(0.0070)		
Non-Sunshine state resident	-0.0223	-0.0824	-0.0025		
	(0.0182)	(0.0126)	(0.0051)		
Post-Open Payments year ^a	0.0608	-0.0738	-0.0125		
	(0.0149)	(0.0230)	(0.0039)		
Age	0.0066	0.0009	-0.0024		
	(0.0030)	(0.0022)	(0.0014)		
Age squared	-0.0001	0.0000	0.0000		
- Se squared	(0.0000)	(0.0000)	(0.0000)		
Less than high school education	(0.000)	(0.0000)	(0.0000)		
and the serious cadeation			••		
High school graduate	0.0828	 0.0170	 -0.0179		
iigii sellooi graduate	(0.0254)	(0.0195)	(0.0216)		
Some college	0.1971	0.0430	-0.0149		
some conege	(0.0265)	(0.0178)	(0.0208)		
Callaga aradusta	0.2933		• • •		
College graduate		0.0919	-0.0067		
0	(0.0363)	(0.0197)	(0.0217)		
Caucasian					
Black, non-Hispanic	-0.1722	-0.0364	0.0029		
	(0.0274)	(0.0120)	(0.0167)		
Hispanic	-0.1003	0.0041	0.0031		
	(0.0372)	(0.0187)	(0.0114)		
Other/Multi	-0.0402	0.0334	0.0141		
	(0.0426)	(0.0307)	(0.0253)		
Female	-0.0212	-0.0358	0.0253		
	(0.0237)	(0.0154)	(0.0071)		
Urban residence	0.0059	-0.0027	0.0170		
	(0.0362)	(0.0210)	(0.0079)		
Household income \$0-\$24,999	••				
Household income \$25,000-\$49,999	0.0985	0.0161	-0.0045		
	(0.0250)	(0.0168)	(0.0172)		
Household income \$50,000-\$74,999	0.1446	0.0086	0.0173		
	(0.0249)	(0.0185)	(0.0161)		
Household income \$75,000-\$99,999	0.1619	0.0077	-0.0044		
. ,	(0.0372)	(0.0172)	(0.0176)		
Household income \$100,000+	0.1898	0.0251	-0.0135		
	(0.0261)	(0.0171)	(0.0153)		
Not employed					
tot employed					
Self-employed	 0.1070	 -0.0080	 -0.0158		
Jen-employeu					
Employed for nav	(0.0385)	(0.0289)	(0.0127)		
Employed for pay	0.0478	0.0063	-0.0171		
Dating d	(0.0211)	(0.0136)	(0.0094)		
Retired	0.0938	0.0194	-0.0079		

	BMJ Open			Page 34 of
	(0.0283)	(0.0216)	(0.0087)	ģ
Diagnosis of chronic condition ^b	0.0842	0.0069	0.0033	2
Diagnosis of chronic condition	(0.0273)	(0.0180)	(0.0140)	Ġ
Diagnosis of cancer	0.0155	-0.0202	0.0140)	2
Diagnosis of carreer	(0.0335)	(0.0198)	(0.0152)	ĝ
Diagnosis of MI or stroke	0.0344	0.0781	0.0261	3
-	(0.0447)	(0.0487)	(0.0190)	ā
Diagnosis of mental health disorder	r 0.0484	-0.0004	-0.0043	Pro
	(0.0335)	(0.0205)	(0.0106)	tec
Number of office visits	0.0098	0.0022	0.0019	ted
	(0.0033)	(0.0023)	(0.0011)	by
Number of office visits squared	-0.0001	0.0000	0.0000	60
Harlife to a constant	(0.0000)	(0.0000)	(0.0000)	руг
Health insurance coverage	0.0193	-0.0068	-0.0016 (0.0155)	igh
	(0.0278)	(0.0194)	(0.0155)	,∓ (=:
Voor fixed offeets ^a	VES	VEC	VEC	برا: :
Year fixed effects ^a Individual fixed effects	YES NO	YES NO	YES NO	ıdir.
ilidividual fixed effects	NO	NO	NO	ig f
F-statistic (degrees of freedom)	101.02 (27,49)	20.87 (27,49)	15.25 (27,49)	or c
R ²	0.1399	0.0266	0.0164	rse
N.	0.1399	0.0200	0.0104	s re
Sample Size	2,028	2,030	2,030	ilat
osteoarthritis, osteoporosis, rhematoid			•	Protected by copyright, including for uses related to text and data mineral sets and data sets and dat
				, ອີ
				≥
				ning, Al training, and similar technologies.
				iing
				j, a
				b p
				E S
				ilar
				tec
				'n
				gie
				ÿ
				,
For peer re	eview only - http://bmjopen.bmj.cor	m/site/about/guidelines.xht	:ml	
				•

Notes:

- a. Coefficient on year fixed effect reported as coefficient on Post-Open Payments year.
- a. Chronic conditions include acid reflux, asthma, COPD, atrial fibrillation, chronic pain, cystic fibrosis, diabetes, epilepsy, eye disease, gout, heart disease, hepatitis C, hypertension, high cholesterol, HIV, kidney disease, multiple sclerosis, osteoarthritis, osteoporosis, rhematoid arthritis, sleep disorder.

MANUSCRIPT: PUBLIC DISCLOSURE OF INDUSTRY PAYMENTS

SUPPLEMENTARY APPENDIX S6 ALTERNATIVE SPECIFICATIONS

S6a. Unweighted models

S6b. Regression-adjusted models without individual fixed effects

S6c. Regression-adjusted models that include an indicator for Medicaid expansion

S6d. Medicaid expansion states only



Open: first published as 10.1136/bmjopen-2018-024020 on 1 March 2019. Downloaded from http://bmjopen.bmj.com/ on May 15, 2025 at Department GEZ-LTA Erasmushogeschool
Protected by copyright, including for uses related to text and data mining, Al training, and similar technologies.

pen-2018-0240 led by copyrig

Table S6a. Alternative Specification: Unweighted Models

				Difference-in	n-Difference Estimates	
				Unadjusted	Regression-Adjusted	
	Mean or F	Percentage	Change	Difference in	Difference in	
	2014	2016	2014-16	Change	Change (95% CI) ^a	P value ^b
Awareness and Knowledge of Industry Payments (% Answering Yes)					7 X	
Aware of industry payments					20°	
Non-Sunshine states	49.7%	58.1%	8.4%	2.8%	5. 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19	0.4031
Sunshine states	58.9%	64.5%	5.6%	2.070	S 2.3% (-3.2%,7.7%)	0.4031
Aware that industry payments info publicly available					ek W	
Non-Sunshine states	10.9%	13.0%	2.1%	11.3%	a a b o o o o o o o o o o	<0.0001**
Sunshine states	20.9%	11.7%	-9.2%	11.5%	<u>o</u> 91.3% (8.0%,13.9%)	<0.0001
Know whether own doctor has received industry payments					o ted	
Non-Sunshine states	4.4%	2.9%	-1.5%	0.0%	6 – 50.0% (-2.0%,2.0%)	0.9828
Sunshine states	4.1%	2.5%	-1.5%	0.0%	a n	0.9828

Analyses of awareness and knowledge measures based on balanced panel of individuals with non-missing survey items who responded to both 2014 and 2016 surveys: 1,831 cm Sunshine residents and 197 197 Sunshine residents for awareness of payments; 1,834 non-Sunshine residents and 196 Sunshine residents for awareness that payments information was public and for k we we will be used to sunshine residents for awareness that payments information was public and for k we we will be used to sunshine residents for awareness that payments information was public and for k we will be used to sunshine residents for awareness that payments information was public and for k we will be used to sunshine residents for awareness that payments information was public and for k we will be used to sunshine residents for awareness that payments information was public and for k we will be used to sunshine residents for awareness that payments information was public and for k we will be used to sunshine residents for awareness that payments information was public and for k we will be used to sunshine residents for awareness that payments in the sunshine residents are used to sunshine residents and the sunshine residents are used to sunshine residents and the sunshine residents are used to sunshine residents and the sunshine residents are used to sunshine residents and the sunshine residents are used to sunshine residents and the sunshine residents are used to sunshine residents are used to sunshine residents and the sunshine residents are used to sunshine residents are used to sunshine residents. doctor had received payments.

a. Regression models include age, education categories, urban residence, household income categories, employment categories, previous diagnosis of chronic conditions (wind include acid reflux, asthma, COPD, atrial fibrillation, chronic pain, cystic fibrosis, diabetes, epilepsy, eye disease, gout, heart disease, hepatitis C, hypertension, high cholesterol, HIV, kidney disease, multiple clerosis, osteoarthritis, osteoporosis, rheumatoid arthritis, sleep disorder), previous diagnosis of cancer, previous diagnosis of stroke or myocardial infarction, previous diagnosis of mental health d 🛱 🖫 r, number of visits to the doctor, whether insured, quadratic terms of age and number of visits to account for non-linearities in age and visits, and year and individual fixed effects. All analyses used Gpt denoted weights that adjusted for non-coverage, nonresponse, oversampling, and attrition. Standard errors were clustered at the state level.

b. Reported *P* values for regression-adjusted change.

Table S6b. Alternative Specification: Regression-Adjusted Models Without Individual Fixed Effects

				Difference-i		
				Unadjusted	Regression-Adjusted	
	Mean or I	Percentage	Change 2014-16	Difference in	Difference in	
	2014	2016		Change	Change (95% CI) ^a	P value ^b
Awareness and Knowledge of Industry Payments (% Answering Yes)					6 S	
Aware of industry payments					ž u	
Non-Sunshine states	45.5%	54.1%	8.7%	3.1%	8 <u>-2</u> .3% (-2.3%,6.9%)	0.3128
Sunshine states	58.0%	63.6%	5.6%	3.170	S 2.3% (-2.3%,0.3%)	
Aware that industry payments info publicly available					<u>e</u> 8	
Non-Sunshine states	9.8%	12.9%	3.2%	9.9%	at vi 6 9 0.2% (5.3%,15.1%)	0.0001**
Sunshine states	19.4%	12.6%	-6.7%	9.970	<u>o</u> w0.2% (3.3%,13.1%)	0.0001
Know whether own doctor has received industry payments					o tec	
Non-Sunshine states	4.4%	3.1%	-1.3%	-0.2%	o	0.9583
Sunshine states	3.8%	2.7%	-1.1%	-0.2%	<u>a</u> a 3.0% (-1.4%,1.5%)	0.9565

Analyses of awareness and knowledge measures based on balanced panel of individuals with non-missing survey items who responded to both 2014 and 2016 surveys: 1,831 cm. Sunshine residents and 197 197 Sunshine residents for awareness of payments; 1,834 non-Sunshine residents and 196 Sunshine residents for awareness that payments information was public and for k and for k doctor had received payments.

a. Regression models include age, education categories, urban residence, household income categories, employment categories, previous diagnosis of chronic conditions (what is a condition categories) as the condition of the cond COPD, atrial fibrillation, chronic pain, cystic fibrosis, diabetes, epilepsy, eye disease, gout, heart disease, hepatitis C, hypertension, high cholesterol, HIV, kidney disease, multiple classes, esteoarthritis, osteoporosis, rheumatoid arthritis, sleep disorder), previous diagnosis of cancer, previous diagnosis of stroke or myocardial infarction, previous diagnosis of mental health disorder, number of visits to the doctor, whether insured, quadratic terms of age and number of visits to account for non-linearities in age and visits, indicator for non-Sunshine state, indicator for post-Open ments year (2016), interaction between non-Sunshine state indicator and post-Open Payments year indicator, gender, and race/ethnicity categories. All analyses used Gfk-constructed weights distributed for non-coverage, nonresponse, oversampling, and attrition. Standard errors were clustered at the state level.

b. Reported P values for regression-adjusted change.

pen-2018-0240 led by copyrig

 Table S6c. Alternative Specification: Regression-Adjusted Models that Include an Indicator for Medicaid Expansion

				Difference-ir	n-Difference Estimates	
				Unadjusted	Regression-Adjusted	
	Mean or I	Percentage	<u>Change</u> 2014-16	Difference in	Difference in	
	2014	2016		Change	Change (95% CI) ^a	P value ^b
Awareness and Knowledge of Industry Payments (% Answering Yes)						
Aware of industry payments					7 u	
Non-Sunshine states	45.5%	54.1%	8.7%	3.1%	9 1.6% (-4.6%,7.7%)	0.6127
Sunshine states	58.0%	63.6%	5.6%	3.170	S D (-4.0%,7.7%)	
Aware that industry payments info publicly available					els W	
Non-Sunshine states	9.8%	12.9%	3.2%	9.9%	at vi G.8% (1.4%,16.1%)	0.0203*
Sunshine states	19.4%	12.6%	-6.7%	3.376	d 30.8% (1.4%,10.1%)	0.0203
Know whether own doctor has received industry payments					o fed	
Non-Sunshine states	4.4%	3.1%	-1.3%	-0.2%	6 – 7 0.1% (-2.3%,2.1%)	0.9206
Sunshine states	3.8%	2.7%	-1.1%	-0.2%	a a a	0.9206

Analyses of awareness and knowledge measures based on balanced panel of individuals with non-missing survey items who responded to both 2014 and 2016 surveys: 1,831 cm. Sunshine residents and 197 Sunshine residents for awareness of payments; 1,834 non-Sunshine residents and 196 Sunshine residents for awareness that payments information was public and for kareness of whether own doctor had received payments.

Notes

a. Regression models include age, education categories, urban residence, household income categories, employment categories, previous diagnosis of chronic conditions (when it is composed include acid reflux, asthma, COPD, atrial fibrillation, chronic pain, cystic fibrosis, diabetes, epilepsy, eye disease, gout, heart disease, hepatitis C, hypertension, high cholesterol, HIV, kidney disease, multiplications, osteoarthritis, osteoporosis, rheumatoid arthritis, sleep disorder), previous diagnosis of cancer, previous diagnosis of stroke or myocardial infarction, previous diagnosis of mental health disorder, number of visits to the doctor, whether insured, quadratic terms of age and number of visits to account for non-linearities in age and visits, and year and individual fixed effects. All analyses used G adjusted for non-coverage, nonresponse, oversampling, and attrition. Standard errors were clustered at the state level.

b. Reported ${\it P}\,$ values for regression-adjusted change.

eed by copyright 2018-024020 Estimates Table S6d. Alternative Specification: Medicaid Expansion States Only Difference in Unadjusted Difference in Mean or Percentage Change Change (95% CI)^a 2014 P value 2016 2014-16 Change Awareness and Knowledge of Industry Payments (% Answering Yes) ਰੁ 5 201 5 2.1% (-4.8%,8.9%) 5 00 5 00 6 6 (2.8%,10.2%) Aware of industry payments Non-Sunshine states 44.5% 53.2% 8.7% 3.1% 0.5414 Sunshine states 58.0% 63.6% 5.6% Aware that industry payments info publicly available 9.3% 5.3% Non-Sunshine states 14.5% **9**1.6% (3.8%,19.3%) 12.0% 0.0045** Sunshine states 19.4% 12.6% -6.7% aded fro Know whether own doctor has received industry payments 4.0% 2.9% -1.1% **3**.2% (-2.0%,2.4%) Non-Sunshine states 0.0% 0.8694 Sunshine states 3.8% 2.7% -1.1%

Analyses of awareness and knowledge measures based on balanced panel of individuals with non-missing survey items who responded to both 2014 and 2016 surveys and resided in Medicaid expansion states: 1,101 non-Sunshine residents and 197 Sunshine residents for awareness of payments; 1,093 non-Sunshine residents and 196 Sunshine residents for awareness that payments information was public; 1,094 non-Sunshine residents and 197 Sunshine residents for knowledge of whether own doctor had received payments.

a. Regression models include age, education categories, urban residence, household income categories, employment categories, previous diagnosis of chronic conditions (what is include acid reflux, asthma, COPD, atrial fibrillation, chronic pain, cystic fibrosis, diabetes, epilepsy, eye disease, gout, heart disease, hepatitis C, hypertension, high cholesterol, HIV, kidney disease, multipless clerosis, osteoarthritis, osteoporosis, rheumatoid arthritis, sleep disorder), previous diagnosis of cancer, previous diagnosis of stroke or myocardial infarction, previous diagnosis of mental health disorder, number of visits to the doctor, whether insured, quadratic terms of age and number of visits to account for non-linearities in age and visits, and year and individual fixed effects. All analyses used G control of the control .com/ on May 15, 2025 at Department GEZ-LTA Erasmushogeschool aining, and similar technologies. adjusted for non-coverage, nonresponse, oversampling, and attrition. Standard errors were clustered at the state level.

b. Reported P values for regression-adjusted change.

MANUSCRIPT: PUBLIC DISCLOSURE OF INDUSTRY PAYMENTS

REFERENCES FOR SUPPLEMENTARY APPENDIX

- 1. Dennis JM, Thomas RK. Documentation for human subjects review committees: GfK company information, past external review, confidentiality, and privacy protections for panelists. http://www.knowledgenetworks.com/ganp/irbsupport. Updated 2013. Accessed April 26, 2018.
- 2. Pham-Kanter G, Mello MM, Lehmann LS, Campbell EG, Carpenter D. Public awareness of and contact with physicians who receive industry payments: a national survey. J Gen Intern Med 2017. DOI: 10.1007/s11606-017-4012-3.



BMJ Open

BMJ Open

Effect of the Public Disclosure of Industry Payments Information on Patients: Results from a Population-Based Natural Experiment

Journal:	BMJ Open
Manuscript ID	bmjopen-2018-024020.R1
Article Type:	Research
Date Submitted by the Author:	29-Sep-2018
Complete List of Authors:	Kanter, Genevieve; University of Pennsylvania Perelman School of Medicine, General Internal Medicine Carpenter, Daniel; Harvard University Lehmann, Lisa; Harvard Medical School Mello, Michelle; Stanford University Stanford Law School; Stanford University School of Medicine
Primary Subject Heading :	Health services research
Secondary Subject Heading:	Ethics
Keywords:	MEDICAL ETHICS, Health policy < HEALTH SERVICES ADMINISTRATION & MANAGEMENT, Sunshine Act, physician industry relationships, Open Payments, conflict of interest

SCHOLARONE™ Manuscripts

EFFECT OF THE PUBLIC DISCLOSURE OF INDUSTRY PAYMENTS INFORMATION ON PATIENTS: RESULTS FROM A POPULATION-BASED NATURAL EXPERIMENT

Genevieve P. Kanter, PhD¹

Daniel Carpenter, PhD²

Lisa Soleymani Lehmann, MD PhD³

Michelle M. Mello, JD PhD⁴

- Division of General Internal Medicine and Department of Medical Ethics and Health Policy,
 University of Pennsylvania Perelman School of Medicine, and Leonard Davis Institute of
 Health Economics, University of Pennsylvania; 1312-B Blockley Hall, 423 Guardian Drive,
 Philadelphia, PA 19104, USA; Tel 215.898.2703; Email gpkanter@pennmedicine.upenn.edu.
 (Corresponding author)
- Department of Government and Radcliffe Institute for Advanced Study, Harvard University; 1737 Cambridge Street, CGIS Knafel Building 405, Cambridge, MA 02138, USA; Tel 617.495.8280; Email dcarpenter@gov.harvard.edu.

Open: first published as 10.1136/bmjopen-2018-024020 on 1 March 2019. Downloaded from http://bmjopen.bmj.com/ on May 15, 2025 at Department GEZ-LTA Erasmushogeschool
Protected by copyright, including for uses related to text and data mining, Al training, and similar technologies.

- Department of Medicine and Center for Bioethics, Harvard Medical School, and Department of Health Policy and Management, Harvard T. H. Chan School of Public Health, Boston, MA; National Center for Ethics in Health Care, Veterans Health Administration, Washington, DC; 810 Vermont Avenue NW, Washington DC 20420, USA; Tel 202.632.8457; Email lisa.lehmann@va.gov.
- ⁴ Stanford Law School and Department of Health Research and Policy, Stanford University School of Medicine; 559 Nathan Abbott Way, Stanford, CA 94305, USA; Tel 650.725.3894; Email mmello@law.stanford.edu.

Word Count: 2685 (excluding title page, abstract, references, figures, and tables)

Keywords: physician industry relationships, Open Payments, public disclosure, transparency, industry payments, conflicts of interest, patient awareness

ABSTRACT

Objective

To determine the effect of the public disclosure of industry payments to physicians on patients' awareness of industry payments and knowledge about whether their physicians had accepted industry payments.

Design

Interrupted time series with comparison group (difference-in-difference analyses of longitudinal survey).

Setting

Nationally representative US population-based surveys. Surveys were conducted in September 2014, shortly prior to the public release of Open Payments information, and again in September 2016.

Participants

Adults aged 18 and older (n=2,180).

Main outcome measures

Awareness of industry payments as an issue; awareness that industry payments information was publicly available; knowledge of whether own physician had received industry payments.

Results

Public disclosure of industry payments information through Open Payments did not significantly increase the proportion of respondents who knew whether their physician had received industry payments (p=0.918). It also did not change the proportion of respondents who became aware of the

issue of industry payments (p=0.470) but did increase the proportion who knew that payments information was publicly available (9.6% points, p=0.011).

Conclusions

Two years after the public disclosure of industry payments information, Open Payments does not appear to have achieved its goal of increasing patient knowledge of whether their physicians have received money from pharmaceutical and medical device firms. Additional efforts will be required to improve the utilization and effectiveness of Open Payments for consumers.

Open: first published as 10.1136/bmjopen-2018-024020 on 1 March 2019. Downloaded from http://bmjopen.bmj.com/ on May 15, 2025 at Department GEZ-LTA Erasmushogeschool
Protected by copyright, including for uses related to text and data mining, Al training, and similar technologies.

STRENGTHS AND LIMITATIONS

- This is the first national policy evaluation of the effect of transparency of industry payments on patients.
- Findings are based on a strong natural experiment design: interrupted time series with comparison group (difference-in-difference).
- Nationally representative sample of respondents was followed longitudinally.
- Individuals lost to attrition between survey waves may have been different from those who completed the second wave.

INTRODUCTION

In 2010, the United States Congress—concerned about the adverse influence of financial relationships between physicians and drug and device firms, and the lack of transparency surrounding these relationships—enacted the Physician Payments Sunshine Act.[1] As part of reforms included in the Affordable Care Act (ACA),[2] the Sunshine provision required pharmaceutical and medical device firms to report, for public release, detailed information on the financial payments and gifts of monetary value that these firms made to physicians.

Payments for consulting and for serving as faculty speaker at continuing medical education events and conferences; for food/drink, travel, lodging, and entertainment; as well as for royalties and research were to be reported for public disclosure. The rationales underlying this disclosure requirement were that patients, in making health care decisions, would be better informed of the potential influence of industry ties on their physicians, and payment transparency could deter physicians from accepting payments that patients might view as suspect.[1,3]

Since the passage of the US Sunshine Act, similar initiatives have emerged in Europe and Canada. The European Federation of Pharmaceutical Industries and Associations (EFPIA) now requires, of its member countries, the public disclosure of pharmaceutical industry payments made to health care providers, although health care workers in some countries can refuse consent to the public disclosure of their individual-level information.[4,5] In Britain, industry payments to health care providers have been reported through the Disclosure UK programme as part of the EFPIA initiative,[6,7] with approximately 70% of providers participating in public disclosure.[8] In Ontario, Canada, legislation has been introduced requiring the public

disclosure of payments made by pharmaceutical and medical device firms to health care providers.[9,10]

In the US, the Sunshine Act and its Open Payments programme have provided policymakers and the public with a good overview of the scope, scale, and reach of industry payments. In 2017, drug and device firms made \$8.4 billion in payments to physicians, of which 55% was directed towards research activities; the rest was primarily directed at informing and influencing the clinical care delivered by physicians and remunerating them for consulting and ownership interests.[11] Studies using Open Payments data have shown that about 48% of physicians receive industry payments in a given year,[12] and 65% of patients see physicians who had received payments in the previous year.[13]

The release of payments data has also enabled analyses showing associations between industry payments and increased prescribing [14,15] and increased Medicare prescribing costs.[16] Much more remains to be studied, but at the very least, the Open Payments disclosure programme has begun to shed light on the flow of industry payments within the health care system.

One important outstanding question is the degree to which the transparency initiatives like the Sunshine Act and the EFPIA Code improve, in practice, patient awareness and knowledge of industry payments. We sought to rigorously evaluate the effects of transparency on patients by examining the effect of the Open Payments programme, the earliest of these industry payments transparency initiatives. In a national longitudinal survey fielded before and after the Sunshine Act's data release in 2014, we investigated awareness and knowledge of industry payments to physicians among a representative cohort of American adults. Because 3

US states had already made industry payments information publicly available, respondents in these states served as a comparison group (since they already had prior exposure to this information) for those who became newly apprised of payments information with the release of Open Payments data. This design improves on a simple pre/post design and allows for a better-controlled evaluation of the effect of the Sunshine Act. Findings from the US experience can guide implementation of transparency programmes in other countries.

DATA AND METHODS

Sample

The sample for our initial survey consisted of 3,542 American adults aged 18 and older selected from KnowledgePanel (KP), a large, nationally representative US household panel maintained by the research firm GfK. KP households are selected through address-based sampling so that the sampling frame covers 97% of US households, including non-Internet households. Details on survey sampling methodology are provided in Appendix S1.

We drew a nationally representative sample with oversampling in Massachusetts and Minnesota to enable us to detect smaller effects in these two states, which had previously passed "Sunshine laws" requiring the public disclosure of industry payments made to physicians in the state. (We did not oversample Vermont, which also had a preexisting disclosure law, because an oversample of this relatively small population would still not have generated sufficient power to detect an effect in that state.) We refer to these two states and Vermont as "Sunshine states."

The sample of respondents for the follow-up survey consisted of the group of all Wave 1 respondents who were available for re-contact (2,711/3,542=77%). Appendix S2 shows the flow diagram for sample selection. Individuals who were not available for re-contact were more likely to be racial/ethnic minorities and not be in paid employment than those who were re-contacted, but were similar along most other dimensions (Appendix S3).

Patient and public involvement statement

The study did not involve patients. The results of the survey will be given to GfK for dissemination.

Survey Design

GfK administered the 6-minute Wave 1 survey and the 10-minute Wave 2 survey online. Both surveys included items on awareness and knowledge of industry payments (questions provided in Appendix S4). In particular, we asked whether respondents were aware of the issue of industry payments, knew that industry payments information was publicly available, and knew if the physician they had seen most frequently during the past 12 months had received payments. Survey data were linked to information on respondents' sociodemographic and self-reported health characteristics provided by GfK.

Survey Administration

The first survey was fielded September 26-October 3, 2014, with almost all surveys (94%) completed by the Open Payments data release date of September 30. Details on administration of the Wave I survey are available elsewhere.[13]

The Wave 2 survey was fielded September 16-October 2, 2016, two years after the initial survey. Appendix S1 provides further details on Wave 2 survey administration.

The Drexel University Institutional Review Board determined that the foregoing survey protocol was not research involving human subjects as defined by the US Department of Health and Human Services and Food and Drug Administration guidelines.

Statistical Analysis

We used a difference-in-difference approach (interrupted time-series with control) to estimate the effects of the national, public release of Open Payments information.[17-19] To estimate the effect of the Open Payments release, we compared mean changes in the outcomes of interest among individuals residing in states that did not have state Sunshine laws to changes among persons residing in states with Sunshine laws (Massachusetts, Minnesota, and Vermont). By using the Sunshine states as comparators, we could improve on a simple pre/post study design and account for secular trends affecting all states--for example, changes associated with the ACA--that otherwise could have confounded our estimates of the effect of payments disclosure.

We calculated unadjusted and adjusted difference-in-difference effects. Regression-adjusted models—used to increase precision of the estimates--included age, education categories, urban residence, household income categories, employment categories, previous

diagnosis of any of 21 chronic conditions, previous diagnosis of cancer, previous diagnoses of stroke or myocardial infarction, previous diagnosis of a mental health disorder, number of physician visits, whether insured, quadratic terms of age and number of visits, year fixed effects, and individual fixed effects (which absorb gender, race/ethnicity, and other time-invariant individual characteristics). Standard errors were clustered at the state level. All analyses used GfK-constructed longitudinal weights adjusting for non-coverage, nonresponse, and oversampling.

Analyses were conducted using Stata 14 (College Station, TX). Full regression results for models with and without individual fixed effects are reported in Appendix S5. Results from alternative specifications, including unweighted models, are reported in Appendix S6.

RESULTS

Sample Characteristics

Of the 2,711 respondents from Wave 1 who were re-contacted, 80% completed the survey, for an overall completion rate of 62%. (A non-response analysis may be found in Appendix S3.) Table 1 presents the characteristics of Wave 1 and Wave 2 respondents. Respondents in the two waves were similar along most sociodemographic and health dimensions. In the balanced panel consisting of individuals who responded to both surveys (n=2,180), respondents who lived in Sunshine states (n=208, 4% weighted) were similar along almost all dimensions to those who lived in non-Sunshine states (n=1,972).

Effect of Disclosure on Awareness and Knowledge of Industry Payments

Columns 1 and 2 of Table 2 show, respectively, the unadjusted 2014 and 2016 levels of awareness and knowledge of industry payments in Sunshine and non-Sunshine states among individuals who responded to both survey waves. Prior to Open Payments, non-Sunshine state residents had lower awareness of the issue of industry payments than residents of Sunshine states (45.5% vs. 58.0%), as well as lower awareness that industry payments information was publicly available (9.8% vs. 19.4%).

After Open Payments, overall awareness of the issue increased in both Sunshine and non-Sunshine states, with a relatively greater increase in awareness in non-Sunshine states (8.7% points vs. 5.6% points). Awareness that industry payments information was publicly available also increased more in non-Sunshine states relative to Sunshine states, which exhibited a decline in reported awareness (3.2% points vs. -6.7% points).

In both Sunshine and non-Sunshine states, a very small proportion of respondents said they knew whether their own doctor had received industry payments prior to the public release of data (3.8% and 4.4%, respectively). In both types of states, this knowledge about their own doctors changed little after the public release.

Columns 4 and 5 of Table 2 compare the changes in awareness and knowledge in non-Sunshine states, which were newly exposed to the payments information, to changes in Sunshine states. Column 4 reports the unadjusted difference (DD) estimates of the effect of the Open Payments data release and Column 5 reports the regression-adjusted DD estimates of the effect. The DD estimates show that Open Payments did not increase awareness of the issue of industry payments (p=0.470), but did significantly increase awareness that industry payments information was publicly available (9.6 % points, p=0.011). The release of Open Payments data

did not, however, increase knowledge about whether one's own doctor had received payments (p=0.918).

DISCUSSION

A key objective of the Sunshine Act was to improve the information available to patients about their physicians' financial ties with industry.[1,3] In this first national evaluation of the effect of the Sunshine Act on patients, we found that although Open Payments increased awareness that industry payments information was publicly available, it did not increase people's knowledge of whether their own doctor had received payments. Two years after the Open Payments release, 13% of respondents knew that industry payments information about their physicians was available, and only 3% of respondents knew whether their doctor had received payments. These findings, together with findings from an earlier study showing that 1.5% of survey respondents had used the Open Payments database,[20] suggest that Open Payments has fallen well short of its aspiration to better inform patients of their physicians' industry relationships.

Our findings of a minimal effect of disclosure on patients are consistent with the experience of transparency initiatives in other areas of medicine. Studies of the effect of the disclosure of physician and hospital quality have shown that patients have been largely unaware of and rarely use the information made available.[21-23] Providers have been more responsive,[21,22] so Open Payments may well have effects on physician behavior.

There was a significant increase, of almost 10% points, in awareness that payments information was publicly available. This effect was driven by an increase in awareness in states

in which payments information was newly available, as expected, and by a decrease in awareness in Sunshine states, where that information was already available. The decline in Sunshine states likely reflects the effect of media attention in the pre-period surrounding the Open Payments data release, which activated short-term awareness that quickly decayed. This decline does not appear to be driven by differential attrition patterns in Sunshine states versus non-Sunshine states, as there did not appear to be significant differences in the observed characteristics of Wave 1 respondents lost to follow up across the two types of states (results available upon request).

Our DD strategy provides estimates that are more credibly interpreted as causal—rather than simply associational—because Sunshine states can be used as a comparison group.

Nevertheless, there are some limitations to the study. With DD, confounding might occur if there were other aspects of the health care environment affecting awareness and knowledge of industry payments that affected Sunshine states but not non-Sunshine states, or vice versa.

One possible source of confounding is that the three Sunshine states all participated in the Medicaid expansion, possibly increasing patient engagement in these states. We conduct sensitivity analyses, estimating models with an indicator for Medicaid expansion and models restricting the sample to only residents in Medicaid expansion states; our findings are robust to these adjustments (Appendix S6). We are not aware of other changes that would have differentially affected Massachusetts, Minnesota, and Vermont versus non-Sunshine states during this period. Secondly, a general concern raised with web-based household panels is that refusal to participate in the panel could lead to sample non-representativeness relative to the population. Previous studies have shown, however, that there appears to be very little bias in

the KN panel in the area of health and health-related behavior.[24,25] An additional concern is that survey respondents may not have been fully representative of US households because of attrition. Although the response rate among persons invited to take the Wave 2 survey was high (80%), and the overall completion rate between the first and second survey was within survey norms (62%), those who left the sample may have been different from those who remained. In a separate analysis, we found that individuals lost to attrition had reported, during Wave 1, less education and less health insurance coverage but were otherwise similar along most other dimensions, including health status (Appendix S3). To correct for some of the attrition bias, we used longitudinal weights that matched the distribution of key demographic characteristics of our survey sample to the distribution of the US population (see Appendix S1).

In summary, because very few patients are aware of, much less accessing, information available through Open Payments, efforts beyond the unveiling of a public website will be required to improve patient use of industry payments information. These efforts could come from the Centers for Medicaid and Medicare Services (CMS), which oversees Open Payments and also administers Medicare and Medicaid programmes. For example, CMS could use its pre-existing relationships with Medicare and Medicaid beneficiaries to highlight payments information and integrate it with other online CMS resources that beneficiaries use regularly. CMS could engage in more active outreach by providing informative leaflets for Medicare and Medicaid patient support organizations to distribute, or by launching media campaigns.

More broadly, beyond CMS, health insurers could provide information about industry payments on "Find a Physician" websites where patients go to select doctors from within a

network. In addition, physicians themselves who value their "pharm-free" status [26] could highlight this fact to current and prospective patients.

As transparency efforts in Europe and Canada advance, the US experience with the Sunshine Act can help inform policymaking in these other regions, although cross-country differences in enacted legislation should be taken into account. EFPIA, for example, does not include reporting of payments made for food and beverage, a category that accounts for a large percentage of industry payments in the US,[12,13] and is thought to be an important influence on prescriber behavior.[27] Similarly, payments for research and development are not reported, under the EFPIA code, at the individual physician level—only at the aggregate level. This partial disclosure of payments suggests that patients in the 33 countries covered by EFPIA may have even less incentive to seek out payments information than patients in the US.

We found that web-based public disclosure is limited in its ability to inform patients about physicians and their industry interests. Additional policy initiatives will likely be required in the US and elsewhere to widely disseminate industry payments information and make it more salient for patients.

CONTRIBUTORSHIP STATEMENT

Study concept and design: Kanter, Mello

Acquisition, analysis, or interpretation of data: Kanter, Mello, Carpenter, Lehmann

Drafting of the manuscript: Kanter

Critical revision of the manuscript for important intellectual content: Kanter, Mello, Carpenter,

Lehmann

Statistical analysis: Kanter

Administrative, technical, or material support: Kanter, Mello, Carpenter, Lehmann

Study supervision: Kanter

Dr. Kanter had full access to the data and takes full responsibility for the integrity of the data and the accuracy of the data analysis. All authors have read, revised, and approved the final version of the paper.

DATA SHARING STATEMENT

No additional data are available.

COMPETING INTERESTS

The authors have no competing interests to disclose.

FUNDING

This research was funded by the Greenwall Foundation.

REFERENCES

- Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services. 42 CFR Parts 402 and 403. Medicare,
 Medicaid, children's health insurance programs; transparency reports and reporting of
 physician ownership or investment interests. Federal Register 78. 2013.
 https://www.cms.gov/OpenPayments/Downloads/Affordable-Care-Act-Section-6002-Final-Rule.pdf. Accessed September 26, 2018.
- Section 6002 of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act. Public Law 111-148.
 http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PLAW-111publ148/pdf/PLAW-111publ148.pdf. Accessed
 September 26, 2018.
- 3. US Senate special committee on aging. Grassley, Kohl say public should know when pharmaceutical makers give money to doctors. Press release. September 7, 2007. http://www.aging.senate.gov/press-releases/grassley-kohl-say-public-should-know-when-pharmaceutical-makers-give-money-to-doctors. Accessed September 26, 2018.
- European Federation of Pharmaceutical Industries and Associations. Disclosure of payments
 to HCPs. https://www.efpia.eu/relationships-codes/disclosure-of-payments-to-hcps/.
 Accessed September 26, 2018.
- 5. Bulik BS. 'Sunshine' hits Europe: Pharma's doc payments now available, but numbers are far from comprehensive. FiercePharma. July 25, 2016. https://www.fiercepharma.com/marketing/sunshine-finally-reaches-europe-disclosure-pharma-payments-to-docs-now-available. Accessed September 26, 2018.
- 6. Association of the British Pharmaceutical Industry. Disclosure UK. http://www.abpi.org.uk/ethics/ethical-responsibility/disclosure-uk/. Accessed September 26, 2018.

- 7. Adlington K, Godlee F. Disclosure UK: transparency should no longer be an optional extra. BMJ 2016; 354:i3730 doi:10.1136/bmj.i3730.
- 8. Hawkes N. Doctors getting biggest payments from drug companies don't declare them on new website. BMJ 2016; 354:i3679 doi:10.1136/bmj.i3679.
- Hoskins E. Bill 160, Strengthening Quality and Accountability for Patients Act, 2017.
 https://www.ontario.ca/laws/statute/S17025. Accessed September 26, 2018.
- 10. Government of Ontario. Ontario passes legislation to strengthen transparency in health care. News release. December 12, 2017. https://news.ontario.ca/mohltc/en/2017/12/strengthening-quality-and-accountability-for-patients-act-2017-1.html. Accessed September 26, 2018.
- 11. The Facts About Open Payments Data. https://openpaymentsdata.cms.gov/summary.

 Accessed September 26, 2018.
- 12. Tringale KR, Marshall D, Mackey TK, Connor M, Murphy JD, Hattangadi-Gluth JA. Types and distribution of payments from industry to physicians in 2015. JAMA 2017; 317:1774-1784.
- 13. Pham-Kanter G, Mello MM, Lehmann LS, Campbell EG, Carpenter D. Public awareness of and contact with physicians who receive industry payments: a national survey. J Gen Intern Med 2017; 32:767-774 doi 10.1007/s11606-017-4012-3.
- 14. DeJong C, Aguilar T, Tseng CW, Lin GA, Boscardin WJ, Dudley RA. Pharmaceutical industry-sponsored physician prescribing patterns for Medicare beneficiaries. JAMA Intern Med 2016; 176:1114-1122.

- 15. Fleischman W, Agrawal S, King M, Venkatesh AK, Krumholz HM, McKee D, Brown D.

 Association between payments from manufacturers of pharmaceuticals to physicians and regional prescribing: cross sectional ecological study. BMJ 2016; 365:i4189.
- 16. Perlis RH, Perlis CS. Physician payments from industry are associated with greater Medicare

 Part D prescribing costs. PLOS One 11:30155474.
- 17. Wooldridge JJ. Econometric analysis of cross section and panel Data. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press; 2002.
- Cameron CA, Trivedi PK. Microeconometrics: methods and applications. New York:
 Cambridge University Press; 2005.
- 19. Shadish WR, Cook TD, Campbell DT. Experimental and quasi-experimental designs for generalized causal inference. Boston: Houghton Mifflin; 2002.
- 20. Young PD, Xie D, Schmidt H. Towards patient-centered conflicts of interest policy. Int J Health Policy Manag 2018; 7:112-119.
- 21. Fung CH, LiM Y, Mattke S, Damberg C, Shekelle PG. Systematic review: the evidence that publishing patient care performance data improves quality of care. Ann Intern Med 2008; 148:111-123.
- 22. Marshall MN, Shekelle PG, Leatherman S, Brook RH. The public release of performance data: what do we expect to gain? a review of the evidence. JAMA 2000; 283(14):1866-74.
- 23. Schauffler HH, Mordavsky JK. Consumer reports in health care: do they make a difference?

 Annu Rev Public Health 2001; 22:69-89.
- 24. Baker LC, Bundorf MK, Singer S, Wagner TH. Validity of the survey of health and internet and knowledge network's panel and sampling. Stanford, CA: Stanford University; 2003.

- 25. Huggins VJ, Dennis MJ, Seryakova K. An evaluation of nonresponse bias in internet surveys conducted using the knowledge networks panel. Proceedings of the Survey Research Methods Section, Joint Statistical Meetings of the American Statistical Association 2002; 1525-1530.
- 26. AMSA. PharmFree: Promoting evidence-based prescribing, pharmaceutical innovation, and access to medicines. http://www.pharmfree.org/. Accessed September 26, 2018.
- 27. Wazana A. Physicians and the pharmaceutical industry: is a gift ever just a gift? JAMA 200; 283:373-380.

Table 1. Characteristics Of Respondents By Wave And By Sunshine State Residence

	Weighted Di	stribution %		Weighted	Weighted Distribution % ^b	
	Wave 1, 2014	Wave 2, 2016	Statistical significance (Bonferroni	Sunshine	non-Sunshine	Statistical significance (Bonferroni
	(n=3,542)	(n=2,180)	correction) ^a	Balanced I	Panel (n=2,180)	correction) ^a
Gender			n.s.			n.s.
Female	52%	52%		55%	52%	
Male	48%	48%		45%	48%	
Race/Ethnicity			n.s.			**
Caucasian	66%	65%		92%	63%	
Hispanic	15%	16%		3%	16%	
Black, Non-Hispanic	11%	12%		2%	12%	
Other	8%	8%		2%	8%	
Age			n.s.			n.s.
<=20	4%	2%		1%	5%	
21-30	19%	18%		15%	19%	
31-40	16%	17%		15%	17%	
41-50	15%	17%		15%	16%	
51-60	21%	21%		28%	21%	
61+	25%	26%		26%	22%	
Education			n.s.			n.s.
Less than high school	12%	11%		4%	13%	
High school graduate	30%	29%		28%	31%	
Some college	29%	29%		26%	27%	
College graduate	29%	32%		41%	29%	
Household Income			n.s.			*
\$0 - \$24,999	18%	17%		8%	14%	
\$25,000 - \$49,999	22%	21%		15%	21%	

\$50,000 - \$74,999	18%	18%		15%	18%	
\$75,000 - \$99,999	15%	14%		17%	14%	
\$100,000+	26%	30%		45%	33%	
Employment			**			n.s.
Employed for pay	51%	57%		60%	54%	
Self-employed	7%	6%		8%	7%	
Retired	19%	18%		20%	17%	
Not working-disability	7%	6%		3%	7%	
Not working-other	17%	12%		9%	16%	
Urban/Rural			n.s.			n.s.
Urban	84%	86%		88%	84%	
Rural	16%	14%		12%	16%	
Resides in State with Sunshine Lav	W		n.s.			
No	96%	96%				
Yes	4%	4%				
Self-rated Health			n.s.			n.s.
Excellent	14%	13%		17%	14%	
Good	61%	64%		64%	63%	
Fair	21%	20%		19%	21%	
Poor	4%	3%		1%	3%	
Diagnosis of chronic condition ^c			n.s.			n.s.
No	45%	46%		39%	45%	
Yes	55%	54%		61%	55%	
Diagnosis of mental health disord	er		**			n.s.
No	82%	98%		82%	83%	
Yes	18%	2%		18%	17%	
Diagnosis of cancer			*			n.s.
No	91%	94%		92%	92%	
Yes	9%	6%		8%	8%	

Diagnosis of stroke or myocardial i	nfarction		n.s.			n.s.
No	97%	95%	11.5.	98%	97%	11.5.
Yes	3%	5%		2%	3%	
Any health insurance coverage	370	370	**	270	370	n.s.
No	18%	8%		8%	16%	
Yes	82%	92%		92%	84%	

^{**} significant at 0.01 level with Bonferroni correction (0.01/13=0.00077)

n.s. not significant

Percentages may not add up to 100 because of rounding.

Notes:

- a. p-values are from chi-squared test of independence with Rao-Scott correction, testing the difference in distribution values between the two groups of respondents. Asterisks indicate significance with Bonferroni correction.
- b. Respondent characteristics from Wave 1 (2014) survey.
- c. Chronic conditions include acid reflux, asthma, COPD, atrial fibrillation, chronic pain, cystic fibrosis, diabetes, epilepsy, eye disease, gout, heart disease, hepatitis C, hypertension, high cholesterol, HIV, kidney disease, multiple sclerosis, osteoarthritis, osteoporosis, rheumatoid arthritis, sleep disorder.

^{*} significant at 0.05 level with Bonferroni correction (0.05/13=0.0038)

Table 2. Changes In Awareness And Knowledge Of Industry Payments After Payments Information Disclosure

	Differen-				-Difference Estimates	
	Mean or	Percentage	Change	Unadjusted Difference in	Regression-Adjusted Difference in	
	2014	2016	2014-16	Change	Change (95% CI) ^a	P value ^b
Awareness and Knowledge of	Industry Paymer	nts (% Answerin	ng Yes)			
Aware of industry payments (2	2014 mean 46.0, s	sd 49.8)				
Non-Sunshine states	45.5%	54.1%	8.7%	3.1%	2.3%	0.4701
Sunshine states	58.0%	63.6%	5.6%	5.170	(-4.0%,8.6%)	0.4701
Aware that industry payments	info publicly ava	ilable (2014 me	an 10.2, sd 30.2)			
Non-Sunshine states	9.8%	12.9%	3.2%	0.00/	9.6%	0.0100*
Sunshine states	19.4%	12.6%	-6.7%	9.9%	(2.3%,16.9%)	0.0108*
Know whether own doctor has	received industr	y payments (20	14 mean 4.4, sd	20.5)		
Non-Sunshine states	4.4%	3.1%	-1.3%	0.20/	-0.1%	0.04.03
Sunshine states	3.8%	2.7%	-1.1%	-0.2%	(-2.3%,2.0%)	0.9183

^{*} significant at 0.05 level

Analyses of awareness and knowledge measures based on balanced panel of individuals with non-missing survey items who responded to both 2014 and 2016 surveys: 1,831 non-Sunshine residents and 197 Sunshine residents for awareness of payments; 1,834 non-Sunshine residents and 196 Sunshine residents for awareness that payments information was public and for knowledge of whether own doctor had received payments.

^{**} significant at 0.01 level

Notes:

- a. Regression models include age, education categories, urban residence, household income categories, employment categories, previous diagnosis of chronic conditions (which include acid reflux, asthma, COPD, atrial fibrillation, chronic pain, cystic fibrosis, diabetes, epilepsy, eye disease, gout, heart disease, hepatitis C, hypertension, high cholesterol, HIV, kidney disease, multiple sclerosis, osteoarthritis, osteoporosis, rheumatoid arthritis, sleep disorder), previous diagnosis of cancer, previous diagnosis of stroke or myocardial infarction, previous diagnosis of mental health disorder, number of visits to the doctor, whether insured, quadratic terms of age and number of visits to account for non-linearities in age and visits, year fixed effects, and individual fixed effects (which absorb gender, race/ethnicity, and other time-invariant individual characteristics). All analyses used Gfk-constructed weights that adjusted for non-coverage, nonresponse, oversampling, and attrition. Standard rige. errors were clustered at the state level.
- b. Reported P values for regression-adjusted change.

EFFECT OF THE PUBLIC DISCLOSURE OF INDUSTRY PAYMENTS INFORMATION ON PATIENTS: RESULTS FROM A POPULATION-BASED NATURAL EXPERIMENT

SUPPLEMENTARY APPENDIX

- S1. Survey sampling methods
- S2. Sample selection flow diagram
- S3. Characteristics of Wave 2 respondents and non-respondents
- S4. Survey questions
- S5. Full regression results
 - S5a. Models with individual fixed effects
 - S5b. Models without individual fixed effects
- S6. Alternative specifications
 - S6a. Unweighted models
 - S6b. Models without individual fixed effects
 - S6c. Regression-adjusted models that include an indicator for Medicaid expansion
 - S6d. Medicaid expansion states only

MANUSCRIPT: PUBLIC DISCLOSURE OF INDUSTRY PAYMENTS

SUPPLEMENTARY APPENDIX S1 SURVEY SAMPLING METHODS

Survey Sampling and Administration

Individuals selected for the initial (Wave 1) survey were recruited from KnowledgePanel® (KP), a nationally representative household panel assembled by the research firm GfK. KP households are selected through random digit dialing and address-based sampling so that landline households as well as cell-phone-only and no-phone households are in a sampling frame covering 97% of US households. KP households agree to participate in occasional surveys and, in return for their participation, accumulate points that they can redeem for cash, merchandise, and other items of monetary value (average accumulation valued at \$4-\$6 per month). Households without Internet access are provided a webenabled computer and free Internet service for the duration of their participation in the panel. Detailed information about KP sampling methodology, incentive structures, informed consent, and other human subjects issues are documented in Dennis and Thomas (2013).¹

For Wave 1, individuals were sampled from KP households in all 50 states, excluding DC, to constitute a nationally representative sample, with oversampling in Massachusetts and Minnesota to enable us to detect smaller effects in these two states that had previously passed Sunshine laws. We did not oversample Vermont, the third Sunshine state, because even an oversample of this relatively small population would have not have generated sufficient power to detect an effect in that state.

The Wave 1 sample consisted of 3,542 respondents who completed the initial survey in 2014 (Wave 1 completion 45.9%). More details on administration of the Wave 1 survey may be found in Pham-Kanter et al (2017).²

For Wave 2, GfK identified 2,711 (77%) respondents from Wave 1 respondents who were still in the panel in 2016 and who were available for re-contact. All of these individuals were asked to complete the Wave 2 survey.

Survey Field Period

The first survey was fielded online September 26-October 3, 2014, with almost all surveys (94%) completed by the Open Payments data release date of September 30. The Wave 2 survey was fielded online September 16-October 2, 2016, two years after the initial survey.

Individuals selected for the surveys received a notification email with a link to the survey. After three days, individuals who had not responded to the survey were sent an email reminder. For Wave 2, which had a slightly longer field period than Wave 1, nonrespondents also received an automated email reminder 11 days after the initial survey contact.

Completion Rate

Of those who were re-contacted for Wave 2, 80% (n=2,180) completed the survey, resulting in an overall completion rate of 62%. The sample selection flow diagram is shown in Appendix S2.

MANUSCRIPT: PUBLIC DISCLOSURE OF INDUSTRY PAYMENTS


Completion rates varied by state and ranged from 40% to 81.8%. Average completion rates for Sunshine and non-Sunshine states did not differ significantly from each other (61.1% and 66.5%, respectively, p=0.062).

Survey Weights

Our analysis uses survey weights provided by GfK that account for non-coverage, oversampling, and nonresponse/attrition. These GfK weights use, as a benchmark, distributions derived from the 2014 March Supplement Current Population Survey (CPS) so the survey sample matches the US adult population on key demographic dimensions (gender, age, race/Hispanic ethnicity, education, Census region, household income, homeownership status, metropolitan residence, Internet access). Details on the construction of survey weights are documented in Dennis and Thomas (2013).²

MANUSCRIPT: PUBLIC DISCLOSURE OF INDUSTRY PAYMENTS

SUPPLEMENTARY APPENDIX S2 SAMPLE SELECTION FLOW DIAGRAM



MANUSCRIPT: PUBLIC DISCLOSURE OF INDUSTRY PAYMENTS

SUPPLEMENTARY APPENDIX S3

CHARACTERISTICS OF WAVE 2 RESPONDENTS AND NON-RESPONDENTS



		Weighted [Distribution %	Statistical
		Wave 2	Not contacted or	Significanc
		respondents	did not respond	(Bonferror
		(n=2,180)	(n=1,362)	correction
Sender		(=/===/	(** =//	n.s.
ciiaci	Female	49%	56%	11.5.
	Male	51%	44%	
Race/Etl		31%	4470	**
vace/ Lti	Caucasian	70%	60%	
	Hispanic	10%	14%	
	Black, Non-Hispanic	13%	19%	
	Other	8%	8%	**
\ge				**
	<=20	4%	5%	
	21-30	17%	23%	
	31-40	15%	16%	
	41-50	15%	16%	
	51-60	22%	18%	
	61+	27%	22%	
ducatio	on			**
	Less than high school	10%	15%	
	High school graduate	31%	27%	
	Some college	28%	30%	
	High school graduate Some college College graduate	31%	27%	
Jouraho	old Income	31/0	2770	n.s.
iousciic	\$0 - \$24,999	16%	21%	11.3.
	\$25,000 - \$49,999	22%	24%	
	\$50,000 - \$74,999	19%	18%	
	\$75,000 - \$99,999	16%	15%	
	\$100,000+	28%	23%	
Employr	nent			**
	Employed for pay	52%	48%	
	Self-employed	6%	7%	
	Retired	21%	16%	
	Not working - disability	7%	8%	
	Not working - other	14%	21%	
Jrban/R	=	11/0	22/3	n.s.
	Urban	16%	16%	
	Rural	84%	84%	
) ocidos	in State with Sunshine Law	04/6	04/0	
resides		000/	000/	n.s.
	No	96%	96%	
	Yes	4%	4%	
elt-rate	ed Health			n.s.
	Excellent	13%	15%	
	Good	63%	58%	
	Fair	21%	22%	
	Poor	3%	5%	
Diagnos	is of chronic condition ^b			n.s.
5	No	42%	49%	
	Yes	58%	51%	
)iagnos	is of mental health disorder	5676	49% 51%	n.s.
, ug 1103	No	83%	80%	11.5.
	Yes	17%	20%	
iagnos	is of cancer	0	0	n.s.
	No	91%	92%	
	Yes	9%	8%	
Diagnos	is of stroke or myocardial infarction			n.s.
	No	97%	96%	
	Yes	3%	4%	
Any hea	Ith insurance coverage			**
,	No	16%	21%	

^{**} significant at 0.01 level with Bonferroni correction (0.01/13=0.00077)

Percentages may not add up to 100 because of rounding.

^{*} significant at 0.05 level with Bonferroni correction (0.05/13=0.0038)

a. P-values are from chi-squared test of independence with Rao-Scott correction, testing the difference in distribution values between Wave 2 $respondents \ and \ nonrespondents \ using \ base \ weights. \ Asterisks \ indicate \ significance \ with \ Bonferroni \ correction.$

b. Chronic conditions include acid reflux, asthma, COPD, atrial fibrillation, chronic pain, cystic fibrosis, diabetes, epilepsy, eye disease, gout, heart disease, hepatitis C, hypertension, high cholesterol, HIV, kidney disease, multiple sclerosis, osteoarthritis, osteoporosis, rheumatoid arthritis, sleep disorder.

MANUSCRIPT: PUBLIC DISCLOSURE OF INDUSTRY PAYMENTS

SUPPLEMENTARY APPENDIX S4 SURVEY QUESTIONS

Awareness and Knowledge of Industry Payments

1. Some doctors receive payments from pharmaceutical (drug) and medical device companies in the form of small gifts such as pens, mugs, or books; reimbursement for travel and conference presentations; or financial compensation for consulting services. Have you heard about these payments before now?

Response choices: Yes; No; Don't know

- 2. A variety of sources recently began posting information about payments made by pharmaceutical and medical device companies to doctors. Were you aware that this information is available?

 *Response choices: Yes, I was aware; No, I was not aware; Not sure
- 3. Do you know whether the doctor you've seen most frequently in the past 12 months has received any payments from a pharmaceutical or medical device firm?

Response choices: Yes, I know my doctor has received payments; Yes, I know my doctor has not received any payments; No, I do not know whether my doctor has received any payments; Not sure

MANUSCRIPT: PUBLIC DISCLOSURE OF INDUSTRY PAYMENTS

SUPPLEMENTARY APPENDIX S5 FULL REGRESSION RESULTS

S5a. Models with individual fixed effects S5b. Models without individual fixed effects



Open: first published as 10.1136/bmjopen-2018-024020 on 1 March 2019. Downloaded from http://bmjopen.bmj.com/ on May 15, 2025 at Department GEZ-LTA Erasmushogeschool
Protected by copyright, including for uses related to text and data mining, Al training, and similar technologies.

Table S5a. Full Regression Results, Models With Individual Fixed Effects

Table S5a. Full Regression Results, Models V	Vith Individual Fixed Effects		
		Dependent variable	
	Awareness of	Awareness of	Knowledge of own
	payments	public info	doctor payments
pen Payments disclosure	0.0227	0.0961	-0.0011
open rayments disclosure	(0.0312)	(0.0363)	(0.0107)
	(0.00 ==)	(6.6565)	(0.0207)
age	-0.0347	-0.0672	-0.0293
	(0.0738)	(0.0625)	(0.0297)
ge squared	-0.0004	-0.0004	0.0001
	(0.0003)	(0.0002)	(0.0001)
ess than high school education			
igh school graduate	-0.0523	-0.1071	-0.0677
	(0.1136)	(0.0667)	(0.0574)
ome college	0.0784	-0.0230	-0.0408 (0.0571)
allogo graduato	(0.1410) 0.1760	(0.0880)	(0.0571)
ollege graduate	(0.1572)	-0.0341 (0.1636)	-0.0953 (0.0714)
rban residence	-0.1190	0.0253	0.0239
Todil residence	(0.0991)	(0.0526)	(0.0175)
usehold income \$0-\$24,999			
ousehold income \$25,000-\$49,999	 0.0411	 0.0405	 0.0352
useriola ilicollie \$25,000-\$49,999	(0.0526)	(0.0345)	(0.0267)
usehold income \$50,000-\$74,999	0.0194	-0.0098	0.0147
13enoid income \$30,000-\$74,333	(0.0918)	(0.0383)	(0.0268)
usehold income \$75,000-\$99,999	0.0432	-0.0177	0.0176
	(0.1088)	(0.0399)	(0.0391)
usehold income \$100,000+	0.0608	0.0197	0.0304
	(0.0857)	(0.0529)	(0.0274)
employed		· ·	
		0.1170	
-employed	0.0066	-0.1170	0.0123
ployed for pay	(0.1079) -0.0209	(0.0990) -0.0477	(0.0502) -0.0254
proyect for pay	(0.0725)	(0.0594)	(0.0426)
tired	-0.0492	0.0243	0.0111
··· ·	(0.0816)	(0.0767)	(0.0489)
agnosis of chronic condition ^a	0.0407	0.0156	-0.0011
and the contraction	(0.0486)	(0.0408)	(0.0165)
agnosis of cancer	-0.0979	-0.0044	0.0126
	(0.0802)	(0.0440)	(0.0222)
agnosis of MI or stroke	-0.0346	0.0144	-0.0190
	(0.0888)	(0.0682)	(0.0477)
gnosis of mental health disorder	0.0506	-0.0066	-0.0107
	(0.0532)	(0.0321)	(0.0274)
ımber of office visits	0.0025	-0.0014	0.0002
	(0.0038)	(0.0036)	(0.0023)
ımber of office visits squared	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000

Health insurance coverage	(0.0001)	(0.0001)	(0.0000)
	0.0402	0.0341	0.0119
	(0.0605)	(0.0554)	(0.0113)
Year fixed effects	YES	YES	YES
Individual fixed effects	YES	YES	YES
F-statistic (degrees of freedom) R ²	3.64 (22,49)	2.7 (22,49)	2.46 (22,49)
	0.7602	0.6452	0.6709
Sample Size	2,028	2,030	2,030

//J Open: first published as 10.1136/bmjopen-2018-024020 on 1 March 2019. Downloaded from http://bmjopen.bmj.com/ on May 15, 2025 at Department GEZ-LTA Erasmushogeschool Protected by copyright, including for uses related to text and data mining, Al training, and similar technologies.

Standard errors clustered at the state level, reported in parentheses.

Notes:

a. Chronic conditions include acid reflux, asthma, COPD, atrial fibrillation, chronic pain, cystic fibrosis, diabetes, epilepsy, eye disease, gout, heart disease, hepatitis C, hypertension, high cholesterol, HIV, kidney disease, multiple sclerosis, osteoarthritis, osteoporosis, rhematoid arthritis, sleep disorder.

Table 55h Full Regression Results Models Without Individual Fixed Effects

Table S5b. Full Regression Results, Models V	vitilout iliaividuai Fixed Elle		
	Awareness of	Dependent variable Awareness of	Knowledge of own
	payments	public info	doctor payments
Open Payments disclosure	0.0234	0.1018	0.0004
Open rayments disclosure	(0.0229)	(0.0244)	(0.0070)
Non-Sunshine state resident	-0.0223	-0.0824	-0.0025
	(0.0182)	(0.0126)	(0.0051)
Post-Open Payments year ^a	0.0608	-0.0738	-0.0125
ost open rayments year	(0.0149)	(0.0230)	(0.0039)
ge.	0.0066	0.0009	-0.0024
Age	(0.0030)	(0.0022)	(0.0014)
age squared	-0.0001	0.0000	0.0004)
ge squared	(0.0000)	(0.0000)	(0.0000)
ess than high school education			
ligh school graduate	0.0828	0.0170	-0.0179
	(0.0254)	(0.0195)	(0.0216)
ome college	0.1971	0.0430	-0.0149
allana avadosta	(0.0265)	(0.0178)	(0.0208)
ollege graduate	0.2933	0.0919	-0.0067 (0.0317)
aucasian	(0.0363)	(0.0197) 	(0.0217)
lack, non-Hispanic	-0.1722	-0.0364	0.0029
	(0.0274)	(0.0120)	(0.0167)
ispanic	-0.1003	0.0041	0.0031
	(0.0372)	(0.0187)	(0.0114)
ther/Multi	-0.0402	0.0334	0.0141
	(0.0426)	(0.0307)	(0.0253)
emale	-0.0212	-0.0358	0.0253
ula a a mani al a a na	(0.0237)	(0.0154)	(0.0071)
rban residence	0.0059	-0.0027	0.0170
ousehold income \$0-\$24,999	(0.0362)	(0.0210)	(0.0079)
ousenoid income 30-324,333	••		••
lousehold income \$25,000-\$49,999	 0.0985	0.0161	 -0.0045
	(0.0250)	(0.0168)	(0.0172)
lousehold income \$50,000-\$74,999	0.1446	0.0086	0.0173
	(0.0249)	(0.0185)	(0.0161)
lousehold income \$75,000-\$99,999	0.1619	0.0077	-0.0044
	(0.0372)	(0.0172)	(0.0176)
ousehold income \$100,000+	0.1898	0.0251	-0.0135
	(0.0261)	(0.0171)	(0.0153)
ot employed			
elf-employed	 0.1070	 -0.0080	 -0.0158
· <i>·</i>	(0.0385)	(0.0289)	(0.0127)
mployed for pay	0.0478	0.0063	-0.0171
. ,	(0.0211)	(0.0136)	(0.0094)
etired	0.0938	0.0194	-0.0079

	(0.0283)	(0.0216)	(0.0087)
Diagnosis of chronic condition ^b	0.0842	0.0069	0.0033
	(0.0273)	(0.0180)	(0.0140)
Diagnosis of cancer	0.0155	-0.0202	0.0185
	(0.0335)	(0.0198)	(0.0152)
Diagnosis of MI or stroke	0.0344	0.0781	0.0261
	(0.0447)	(0.0487)	(0.0190)
Diagnosis of mental health disorder	0.0484	-0.0004	-0.0043
	(0.0335)	(0.0205)	(0.0106)
Number of office visits	0.0098	0.0022	0.0019
	(0.0033)	(0.0023)	(0.0011)
Number of office visits squared	-0.0001	0.0000	0.0000
	(0.0000)	(0.0000)	(0.0000)
Health insurance coverage	0.0193	-0.0068	-0.0016
	(0.0278)	(0.0194)	(0.0155)
Year fixed effects ^a	YES	YES	YES
Individual fixed effects	NO	NO	NO
F-statistic (degrees of freedom)	101.02 (27,49)	20.87 (27,49)	15.25 (27,49)
R^2	0.1399	0.0266	0.0164
Sample Size	2,028	2,030	2,030

Standard errors clustered at the state level, reported in parentheses.

Notes:

- a. Coefficient on year fixed effect reported as coefficient on Post-Open Payments year.
- a. Chronic conditions include acid reflux, asthma, COPD, atrial fibrillation, chronic pain, cystic fibrosis, diabetes, epilepsy, eye disease, gout, heart disease, hepatitis C, hypertension, high cholesterol, HIV, kidney disease, multiple sclerosis, osteoarthritis, osteoporosis, rhematoid arthritis, sleep disorder.

//J Open: first published as 10.1136/bmjopen-2018-024020 on 1 March 2019. Downloaded from http://bmjopen.bmj.com/ on May 15, 2025 at Department GEZ-LTA Erasmushogeschool.

Protected by copyright, including for uses related to text and data mining, Al training, and similar technologies.

MANUSCRIPT: PUBLIC DISCLOSURE OF INDUSTRY PAYMENTS

SUPPLEMENTARY APPENDIX S6 ALTERNATIVE SPECIFICATIONS

S6a. Unweighted models

S6b. Regression-adjusted models without individual fixed effects

S6c. Regression-adjusted models that include an indicator for Medicaid expansion

S6d. Medicaid expansion states only



eed by copyright Difference-in-Difference Estimates Table S6a. Alternative Specification: Unweighted Models Regression-Adjusted
Difference in Unadjusted Difference in Mean or Percentage Change Change (95% CI)^a 2014 P value 2016 2014-16 Change Awareness and Knowledge of Industry Payments (% Answering Yes) ਰੁ 5 2019 5 2019 5 2019 5 2019 6 2019 Aware of industry payments Non-Sunshine states 49.7% 58.1% 8.4% 2.8% 0.4031 Sunshine states 58.9% 64.5% 5.6% Aware that industry payments info publicly available 10.9% 2.1% Non-Sunshine states 13.0% 11.3% <0.0001** Sunshine states 20.9% 11.7% -9.2% aded fro Know whether own doctor has received industry payments 4.4% 2.9% -1.5% **3**.0% (-2.0%,2.0%) Non-Sunshine states 0.0% 0.9828

-1.5%

Analyses of awareness and knowledge measures based on balanced panel of individuals with non-missing survey items who responded to both 2014 and 2016 surveys: 1,831 cm Sunshine residents and 197 197 Sunshine residents for awareness of payments; 1,834 non-Sunshine residents and 196 Sunshine residents for awareness that payments information was public and for kan decided of whether own doctor had received payments.

2.5%

4.1%

a. Regression models include age, education categories, urban residence, household income categories, employment categories, previous diagnosis of chronic conditions (如是过nclude acid reflux, asthma, COPD, atrial fibrillation, chronic pain, cystic fibrosis, diabetes, epilepsy, eye disease, gout, heart disease, hepatitis C, hypertension, high cholesterol, HIV, kidney disease, multiple clerosis, osteoarthritis, osteoporosis, rheumatoid arthritis, sleep disorder), previous diagnosis of cancer, previous diagnosis of stroke or myocardial infarction, previous diagnosis of mental health di the cancer in the cancer is the can doctor, whether insured, quadratic terms of age and number of visits to account for non-linearities in age and visits, and year and individual fixed effects. All analyses used Gpt denote the design of the control of adjusted for non-coverage, nonresponse, oversampling, and attrition. Standard errors were clustered at the state level. nj.com/ on May 15, 2025 at Department GEZ-LTA Erasmushogeschool training, and similar technologies.

b. Reported *P* values for regression-adjusted change.

Sunshine states

pen-2018-0240 led by copyrig

 Table S6b. Alternative Specification: Regression-Adjusted Models Without Individual Fixed Effects

				Difference-ii	n-Difference Estimates	
				Unadjusted	Regression-Adjusted	
	Mean or I	Percentage	Change	Difference in	Difference in	
	2014	2016	2014-16	Change	Change (95% CI) ^a	P value ^b
Awareness and Knowledge of Industry Payments (% Answering Yes)						
Aware of industry payments					7 u	
Non-Sunshine states	45.5%	54.1%	8.7%	3.1%	8 9 2 .3% (-2.3%,6.9%)	0.3128
Sunshine states	58.0%	63.6%	5.6%	3.170	S 2.3% (-2.3%,0.9%)	0.3128
Aware that industry payments info publicly available					els W	
Non-Sunshine states	9.8%	12.9%	3.2%	9.9%	at <u>n</u> ed 9 0.2% (5.3%,15.1%)	0.0001**
Sunshine states	19.4%	12.6%	-6.7%	9.970	<u>o</u> 3 0.2% (3.3%,13.1%)	0.0001
Know whether own doctor has received industry payments					o led	
Non-Sunshine states	4.4%	3.1%	-1.3%	-0.2%	e	0.9583
Sunshine states	3.8%	2.7%	-1.1%	-0.2%	a a a	0.9363

Analyses of awareness and knowledge measures based on balanced panel of individuals with non-missing survey items who responded to both 2014 and 2016 surveys: 1,831 cm. Sunshine residents and 197 Sunshine residents for awareness of payments; 1,834 non-Sunshine residents and 196 Sunshine residents for awareness that payments information was public and for kareness of whether own doctor had received payments.

Notes

a. Regression models include age, education categories, urban residence, household income categories, employment categories, previous diagnosis of chronic conditions (which include acid reflux, asthma, COPD, atrial fibrillation, chronic pain, cystic fibrosis, diabetes, epilepsy, eye disease, gout, heart disease, hepatitis C, hypertension, high cholesterol, HIV, kidney disease, multiplication categories, osteoarthritis, osteoporosis, rheumatoid arthritis, sleep disorder), previous diagnosis of cancer, previous diagnosis of stroke or myocardial infarction, previous diagnosis of mental health disorder, number of visits to the doctor, whether insured, quadratic terms of age and number of visits to account for non-linearities in age and visits, indicator for non-Sunshine state, indicator for post-Oper ments year (2016), interaction between non-Sunshine state indicator and post-Open Payments year indicator, gender, and race/ethnicity categories. All analyses used Gfk-constructed weights that adjusted for non-coverage, nonresponse, oversampling, and attrition. Standard errors were clustered at the state level.

b. Reported ${\it P}\,$ values for regression-adjusted change.

pen-2018-02402 ted by copyrigh

 Table S6c. Alternative Specification: Regression-Adjusted Models that Include an Indicator for Medicaid Expansion

				Difference-in	n-Difference Estimates	
				Unadjusted	Regression-Adjusted	
	Mean or F	Percentage	Change	Difference in	Difference in	
	2014	2016	2014-16	Change	Change (95% CI) ^a	P value ^b
Awareness and Knowledge of Industry Payments (% Answering Yes)					fo :	
Aware of industry payments					20°	
Non-Sunshine states	45.5%	54.1%	8.7%	3.1%	5 9 1 .6% (-4.6%,7.7%)	0.6127
Sunshine states	58.0%	63.6%	5.6%	3.170	S T D (-4.070,7.770)	0.0127
Aware that industry payments info publicly available					elar	
Non-Sunshine states	9.8%	12.9%	3.2%	9.9%	8 2 8.8% (1.4%,16.1%)	0.0203*
Sunshine states	19.4%	12.6%	-6.7%	9.970	<u>a</u> 3.8% (1.4%,10.1%)	0.0203
Know whether own doctor has received industry payments					o tec	
Non-Sunshine states	4.4%	3.1%	-1.3%	-0.2%	6 7 7 7 7 1	0.9206
Sunshine states	3.8%	2.7%	-1.1%	-0.2%	<u>a</u> m	0.9206

Analyses of awareness and knowledge measures based on balanced panel of individuals with non-missing survey items who responded to both 2014 and 2016 surveys: 1,831 car Sunshine residents and 197 Sunshine residents for awareness of payments; 1,834 non-Sunshine residents and 196 Sunshine residents for awareness that payments information was public and for kareness of whether own doctor had received payments.

Notes

a. Regression models include age, education categories, urban residence, household income categories, employment categories, previous diagnosis of chronic conditions (when it is composed include acid reflux, asthma, COPD, atrial fibrillation, chronic pain, cystic fibrosis, diabetes, epilepsy, eye disease, gout, heart disease, hepatitis C, hypertension, high cholesterol, HIV, kidney disease, multiplications, osteoarthritis, osteoporosis, rheumatoid arthritis, sleep disorder), previous diagnosis of cancer, previous diagnosis of stroke or myocardial infarction, previous diagnosis of mental health disorder, number of visits to the doctor, whether insured, quadratic terms of age and number of visits to account for non-linearities in age and visits, and year and individual fixed effects. All analyses used Garage adjusted for non-coverage, nonresponse, oversampling, and attrition. Standard errors were clustered at the state level.

b. Reported *P* values for regression-adjusted change.

pen-2018-0240 led by copyrig

 Table S6d. Alternative Specification: Medicaid Expansion States Only

				Difference-ir	n-Difference Estimates	
				Unadjusted	Regression-Adjusted	
	Mean or I	Percentage	Change	Difference in	Difference in	
	2014	2016	2014-16	Change	Change (95% CI) ^a	P value ^b
Awareness and Knowledge of Industry Payments (% Answering Yes)					7 3	
Aware of industry payments					20°	
Non-Sunshine states	44.5%	53.2%	8.7%	3.1%	8 -2.1% (-4.8%,8.9%)	0.5414
Sunshine states	58.0%	63.6%	5.6%	3.170	S 2.1% (-4.8%,8.9%)	0.5414
Aware that industry payments info publicly available					elat	
Non-Sunshine states	9.3%	14.5%	5.3%	12.0%	8 2 0 1.6% (3.8%,19.3%)	0.0045**
Sunshine states	19.4%	12.6%	-6.7%	12.070	<u>a</u> 21.0% (3.8%,13.3%)	0.0045
Know whether own doctor has received industry payments					o tec	
Non-Sunshine states	4.0%	2.9%	-1.1%	0.0%	6 – 5.2% (-2.0%,2.4%)	0.8694
Sunshine states	3.8%	2.7%	-1.1%	0.0%	a a	0.8094

Analyses of awareness and knowledge measures based on balanced panel of individuals with non-missing survey items who responded to both 2014 and 2016 surveys and resided in Medicaid expansion states: 1,101 non-Sunshine residents and 197 Sunshine residents for awareness of payments; 1,093 non-Sunshine residents and 196 Sunshine residents for awareness that payments information was public; 1,094 non-Sunshine residents and 197 Sunshine residents for knowledge of whether own doctor had received payments.

a. Regression models include age, education categories, urban residence, household income categories, employment categories, previous diagnosis of chronic conditions (what include acid reflux, asthma, COPD, atrial fibrillation, chronic pain, cystic fibrosis, diabetes, epilepsy, eye disease, gout, heart disease, hepatitis C, hypertension, high cholesterol, HIV, kidney disease, multiple classes, osteoarthritis, osteoporosis, rheumatoid arthritis, sleep disorder), previous diagnosis of cancer, previous diagnosis of stroke or myocardial infarction, previous diagnosis of mental health disper, number of visits to the doctor, whether insured, quadratic terms of age and number of visits to account for non-linearities in age and visits, and year and individual fixed effects. All analyses used Guern adjusted for non-coverage, nonresponse, oversampling, and attrition. Standard errors were clustered at the state level.

b. Reported P values for regression-adjusted change.

MANUSCRIPT: PUBLIC DISCLOSURE OF INDUSTRY PAYMENTS

REFERENCES FOR SUPPLEMENTARY APPENDIX

- 1. Dennis JM, Thomas RK. Documentation for human subjects review committees: GfK company information, past external review, confidentiality, and privacy protections for panelists. http://www.knowledgenetworks.com/ganp/irbsupport. Updated 2013. Accessed April 26, 2018.
- 2. Pham-Kanter G, Mello MM, Lehmann LS, Campbell EG, Carpenter D. Public awareness of and contact with physicians who receive industry payments: a national survey. J Gen Intern Med 2017. DOI: 10.1007/s11606-017-4012-3.



STROBE (Strengthening The Reporting of OBservational Studies in Epidemiology) Checklist

A checklist of items that should be included in reports of observational studies. You must report the page number in your manuscript where you consider each of the items listed in this checklist. If you have not included this information, either revise your manuscript accordingly before submitting or note N/A.

Note: An Explanation and Elaboration article discusses each checklist item and gives methodological background and published examples of transparent reporting. The STROBE checklist is best used in conjunction with this article (freely available on the Web sites of PLoS Medicine at http://www.annals.org/, Annals of Internal Medicine at http://www.annals.org/, and Epidemiology at http://www.annals.org/, and Epidemiology at http://www.annals.org/. Information on the STROBE Initiative is available at www.strobe-statement.org.

Section and Item	Item No.	Recommendation	Reported on Page No. 1
Title and Abstract	1	(a) Indicate the study's design with a commonly used term in the title or the abstract	including
		(b) Provide in the abstract an informative and balanced summary of what was done and what was found	6
Introduction			s re
Background/Rationale	2	Explain the scientific background and rationale for the investigation being reported	for uses related to t
Objectives	3	State specific objectives, including any prespecified hypotheses	ext and
Methods			
Study Design	4	Present key elements of study design early in the paper	data min
Setting	5	Describe the setting, locations, and relevant dates, including periods of recruitment, exposure, follow-up, and data collection	
Participants	6	 (a) Cohort study—Give the eligibility criteria, and the sources and methods of selection of participants. Describe methods of follow-up Case-control study—Give the eligibility criteria, and the sources and methods of case ascertainment and control selection. Give the rationale for the choice of cases and controls Cross-sectional study—Give the eligibility criteria, and the sources and methods of selection of participants (b) Cohort study—For matched studies, give matching criteria and number of exposed and unexposed Case-control study—For matched studies, give matching criteria and the number of controls per case 	ing, Al training, and similar technologies.
Variables	7	Clearly define all outcomes, exposures, predictors, potential confounders, and effect modifiers. Give diagnostic criteria, if applicable	90

Section and Item	Item No.	Recommendation	Reported on Page No.
Data Sources/	8*	For each variable of interest, give sources of data and details of methods of	
Measurement		assessment (measurement). Describe comparability of assessment methods if	
		there is more than one group	
Bias	9	Describe any efforts to address potential sources of bias	Pa
Study Size	10	Explain how the study size was arrived at	otect
Quantitative Variables	11	Explain how quantitative variables were handled in the analyses. If applicable,	<u>0</u>
		describe which groupings were chosen and why	у сор
Statistical Methods	12	(a) Describe all statistical methods, including those used to control for	S T
		confounding	ght, ir
		(b) Describe any methods used to examine subgroups and interactions	otected by copyright, including for
		(c) Explain how missing data were addressed	ng for
		(d) Cohort study—If applicable, explain how loss to follow-up was addressed	
		Case-control study—If applicable, explain how matching of cases and controls was addressed	uses related to text and
		Cross-sectional study—If applicable, describe analytical methods taking account of sampling strategy	o text
		Sampling strategy	and
		(e) Describe any sensitivity analyses	data
Results	1		mining
Participants	13*	(a) Report numbers of individuals at each stage of study—eg numbers potentially	φ , Α
		eligible, examined for eligibility, confirmed eligible, included in the study,	l tr
		completing follow-up, and analysed	gninik
		(b) Give reasons for non-participation at each stage), and
		(c) Consider use of a flow diagram	<u>s</u>
Descriptive Data	14*	(a) Give characteristics of study participants (eg demographic, clinical, social) and	ar t
		information on exposures and potential confounders	echno
		(b) Indicate number of participants with missing data for each variable of interest	ologie:
		(c) Cohort study—Summarise follow-up time (eg, average and total amount)	, ,
Outcome Data	15*	Cohort study—Report numbers of outcome events or summary measures over time	similar technologies.
		Case-control study—Report numbers in each exposure category, or summary measures of exposure	
		Cross-sectional study—Report numbers of outcome events or summary measures	

	Item No.	Recommendation	Reported on Page No.
Main Results	16	(a) Give unadjusted estimates and, if applicable, confounder-adjusted estimates	
		and their precision (eg, 95% confidence interval). Make clear which confounders	
		were adjusted for and why they were included	
		(b) Report category boundaries when continuous variables were categorized	τ
		(c) If relevant, consider translating estimates of relative risk into absolute risk for a	rote
		meaningful time period	otected b
Other Analyses	17	Report other analyses done—eg analyses of subgroups and interactions, and	<u> </u>
		sensitivity analyses	у соругі
Discussion			gnt,
Key Results	18	Summarise key results with reference to study objectives	in ciu
imitations	19	Discuss limitations of the study, taking into account sources of potential bias or	Ing t
		imprecision. Discuss both direction and magnitude of any potential bias	ng for uses
Interpretation	20	Give a cautious overall interpretation of results considering objectives, limitations,	
		multiplicity of analyses, results from similar studies, and other relevant evidence	related
Generalisability	21	Discuss the generalisability (external validity) of the study results	10 te
Other Information			⊥ xt and
Funding	22	Give the source of funding and the role of the funders for the present study and, if	
Funding *Give information sepa		Give the source of funding and the role of the funders for the present study and, if applicable, for the original study on which the present article is based recases and controls in case-control studies and, if applicable, for exposed and unexpose	ara ming, g, sed groups in A
*Give information sepa cohort and cross-sectio Once you have comple	arately for onal studio	applicable, for the original study on which the present article is based r cases and controls in case-control studies and, if applicable, for exposed and unexposes. checklist, please save a copy and upload it as part of your submission. DO NOT includes	sed groups in tra
*Give information sepa cohort and cross-sectio Once you have comple	arately for onal studio	applicable, for the original study on which the present article is based r cases and controls in case-control studies and, if applicable, for exposed and unexposes.	sed groups in training, and similar
*Give information sepa cohort and cross-sectio Once you have comple	arately for onal studio	applicable, for the original study on which the present article is based r cases and controls in case-control studies and, if applicable, for exposed and unexposes. checklist, please save a copy and upload it as part of your submission. DO NOT includes	sed groups in training, and similar
*Give information sepa cohort and cross-sectio Once you have comple	arately for onal studio	applicable, for the original study on which the present article is based r cases and controls in case-control studies and, if applicable, for exposed and unexposes. checklist, please save a copy and upload it as part of your submission. DO NOT includes	sed groups in training, and similar
*Give information sepa cohort and cross-sectio Once you have comple	arately for onal studio	applicable, for the original study on which the present article is based r cases and controls in case-control studies and, if applicable, for exposed and unexposes. checklist, please save a copy and upload it as part of your submission. DO NOT includes	sed groups in training, and similar
*Give information sepa cohort and cross-sectio Once you have comple	arately for onal studio	applicable, for the original study on which the present article is based r cases and controls in case-control studies and, if applicable, for exposed and unexposes. checklist, please save a copy and upload it as part of your submission. DO NOT includes	sed groups in training, and similar
*Give information sepa cohort and cross-sectio Once you have comple	arately for onal studio	applicable, for the original study on which the present article is based r cases and controls in case-control studies and, if applicable, for exposed and unexposes. checklist, please save a copy and upload it as part of your submission. DO NOT includes	sed groups in training, and similar
*Give information sepa cohort and cross-sectio Once you have comple	arately for onal studio	applicable, for the original study on which the present article is based r cases and controls in case-control studies and, if applicable, for exposed and unexposes. checklist, please save a copy and upload it as part of your submission. DO NOT includes	sed groups in training, and similar
*Give information sepa cohort and cross-sectio Once you have comple	arately for onal studio	applicable, for the original study on which the present article is based r cases and controls in case-control studies and, if applicable, for exposed and unexposes. checklist, please save a copy and upload it as part of your submission. DO NOT includes	sed groups in training, and similar
*Give information sepa cohort and cross-sectio Once you have comple	arately for onal studio	applicable, for the original study on which the present article is based r cases and controls in case-control studies and, if applicable, for exposed and unexposes. checklist, please save a copy and upload it as part of your submission. DO NOT includes	sed groups in training, and similar
*Give information sepa cohort and cross-sectio Once you have comple	arately for onal studio	applicable, for the original study on which the present article is based r cases and controls in case-control studies and, if applicable, for exposed and unexposes. checklist, please save a copy and upload it as part of your submission. DO NOT includes	sed groups in training, and similar
*Give information sepa cohort and cross-sectio Once you have comple	erately for onal studie eted this c e main ma	applicable, for the original study on which the present article is based r cases and controls in case-control studies and, if applicable, for exposed and unexposes. checklist, please save a copy and upload it as part of your submission. DO NOT includes	sed groups in tra