We would like to thank the commentators for their time and thoughtfulness--the commentaries are, in general, engaging and informative. Interestingly, most of the discussion has to do with the nature of representation, not with our basic critique of nativist infant research. Regarding the latter, there seems to be general agreement. Regarding representation, however, there seems to be general disagreement. This disagreement extends to basic notions of what constitutes representation--what its ontology is. In the target article, we presented an outline of an alternative, interactivist model of representation in order to show that it is possible to avoid the problems of foundationalism - that it is possible to account for the emergence of representation. Some of the commentaries, however, proceed on the basis of background--or foreground--assumptions about the nature of representation that we have argued are fundamentally flawed, or that don't seem to us to be relevant to either our critique or our alternative model. Nevertheless, there are some important convergences concerning representation as well as concerning the nativism-empiricism debate. The fundamental characteristic of representation is that it is truth-valued aboutness for the organism itself, with the special criterion of organism-detectable representational error. Only with organism-detectable representational error is the normativity of representation inherent in the organism, not just in the eye of an observer, but also only with such detectable error is error-guided behavior and learning (and development) possible. This central criterion, we argue, can only be met by an anticipatory, action-based model, at least roughly similar to Piaget's; and such a model enables the transcendence of the nativism-empiricism pendulum because it permits an account of representational emergence. We know that representational emergence has to be possible: Representation did not exist 13 billion years ago, and it does now, so any model that cannot account for such emergence must be rejected. The interactivist model, thus, satisfies multiple criteria of representation. The model, however, does not directly address some of the issues mentioned in the commentaries, such as fleeting vs. stable, short term vs long term, presentational vs representational, environmental interaction vs internal interaction, perceptual vs non-perceptual, early vs late, and so on. Some of these can be of interest and importance from some perspectives, but are not relevant, we argue, to basic issues of the ontology of representation, and thus, not to foundationalism. We have drawn from each commentary one or two of the issues that we argue are central to any adequate framework for developmental psychology. Addressing these issues will in general be in three parts: 1) possible convergences, 2) disagreements and confusions, and 3) pursuit of further topics.