ERIC Number: EJ1338424
Record Type: Journal
Publication Date: 2022
Pages: 29
Abstractor: As Provided
ISBN: N/A
ISSN: ISSN-0276-8739
EISSN: N/A
Can Financial Incentives Help Disadvantaged Schools to Attract and Retain High-Performing Teachers? Evidence from Chile
Elacqua, Gregory; Hincapie, Diana; Hincapie, Isabel; Montalva, Veronica
Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, v41 n2 p603-631 Spr 2022
Extensive sorting of high-performing teachers into the most advantaged schools contributes to the wide socioeconomic achievement gaps in many countries. The Chilean Pedagogical Excellence Assignment (AEP) pays bonuses to high-performing teachers that are larger if they work at a disadvantaged school. Using a sharp regression discontinuity based on the program's eligibility rules, we estimate how the award affects where high-performing teachers choose to work. The bonus, equivalent to 16 percent of an average annual salary, increased retention of high-performing teachers in disadvantaged schools by 17 to 21 percentage points. In contrast, those teachers in more advantaged schools seem to use the award as a quality signal to stay or move to relatively high-achieving schools. While the program accomplished its goal of retaining high-performing teachers already working at disadvantaged schools, it did not achieve the objective of attracting better teachers from more advantaged schools.
Descriptors: Incentives, Financial Support, Disadvantaged Schools, Academic Achievement, Achievement Gap, Teacher Effectiveness, Awards, Program Effectiveness, Teacher Salaries, Teacher Persistence, Faculty Mobility, Foreign Countries, Eligibility, Teacher Recruitment
Wiley. Available from: John Wiley & Sons, Inc. 111 River Street, Hoboken, NJ 07030. Tel: 800-835-6770; e-mail: cs-journals@wiley.com; Web site: https://bibliotheek.ehb.be:2191/en-us
Publication Type: Journal Articles; Reports - Research
Education Level: N/A
Audience: N/A
Language: English
Sponsor: N/A
Authoring Institution: N/A
Identifiers - Location: Chile
Grant or Contract Numbers: N/A