Two philosophers of education, Sarah Stitzlein and Lauren Bialystok, have recently expressed criticisms of so-called "Parental Conscience Acts," which allow parents to opt their children out of aspects of the public school curriculum that they find objectionable. (These laws and policies should be distinguished from those which allow parents to enroll their children in nonpublic schools or to homeschool them, which are far less controversial.) Both Stitzlein and Bialystok acknowledge that dissenting consciences are important and worth protecting in a liberal democracy; Stitzlein has even argued at length that children have a positive "right" to be taught how to dissent well. Yet Stitzlein and Bialystok argue that dissent can be taken too far, when it serves to undermine crucial goals of public education. For this reason, they do not believe parents should be allowed to simply opt their children out of parts of the curriculum, though they differ on the exact reasons why opt-out is objectionable. In this article, Emily Wenneborg argues that both Stitzlein and Bialystok place conscientious parents in a situation in which they have no room to appropriately exercise their consciences. She first summarizes their respective arguments against so-called "Parental Conscience Acts," and then explains the double bind for conscientious parents that results from each of their arguments. Finally, she offers her recommendations for maintaining the integrity of the public school curriculum without forcing conscientious parents into such double binds.