Two classic questions in epistemology concern whether knowledge is firstly propositional or firstly practical (the know-that/know-how debate) and whether testimony is a basic source of epistemic justification (the reductionism/anti-reductionism debate about testimony). In this paper, I consider the relationship between these two classic debates in epistemology. I hold that consideration of the two questions in tandem adds perspective to both debates. Firstly, considering the question of testimony within the know-that/know-how debate makes clear the necessity of developing a concept of practical testimony within the epistemology of practical knowledge. In this paper, I draw on Hawley's work to develop such a concept and call it 'demonstration'. Secondly, considering the know-that/know-how debate in the epistemology of testimony sheds new light on the efficacy of testimony alone in transmitting knowledge. Because demonstration is not completely efficacious in transmitting know-how, I hold that the reductionism debate itself must diverge into propositional and practical halves. In the paper, I go on to identify two imperfect alliances: between intellectualism about know-how and anti-reductionism about testimony and between anti-intellectualism about know-how and reductionism about testimony. I also sketch out the importance of the concept of demonstration to understanding practical learning and teaching.