This thesis collects three essays on applied microeconomics. The first essay proposes an econometric framework to study the role played by course-assignment mechanisms in shaping the learning outcomes observed in higher-education institutions. Particular emphasis is placed on the existence of student-professor match effects in the production of learning and on choice-based assignment mechanisms potentially leading to learning suboptimal student-professor pairings. The second essay uses this framework to explore the question in a concrete empirical setting. I use higher-education academic records to estimate the model and simulate the learning outcomes under counterfactual policy assignments of students and professors. The final essay extends the classical theory of natural monopoly regulation to settings in which the consumption of the good or service being provided is subject to evasion. Chapter 1. Matching Students and Professors in Higher Education: An Empirical Framework--In higher education, most course-assignment mechanisms rely on students directly choosing which instructor to enroll in a given course. How does this contribute to learning and the efficient use of instructional inputs? This chapter develops an econometric framework to estimate student-professor match effects in the learning process and the extent to which students' choices over instructors lead to efficient student-professor pairings. I extend the literature on teacher value-added by modeling instructors as differing in both their grading policies and teaching abilities. In addition, the framework models students as having preferences over both the expected learning and expected scoring that results after matching with a given instructor. Two main identification challenges are addressed. First, I show how to econometrically disentangle the contributions of an instructor's teaching effectiveness and grading policy over the observed distribution of scores. Behind this result is the use of sequences of subject-related courses, standard in post-secondary curricula, as useful in achieving this decomposition. Second, I demonstrate how to identify a model of student demand for instructors of a course when the assignment follows a first-come, first-served approach; a course-assignment mechanism commonly used in higher education institutions. Chapter 2. Matching Students and Professors in Higher Education: An Empirical Exercise--This chapter uses the learning model described in Chapter One to study the role of choice-based course-assignment mechanisms in a concrete empirical setting. In particular, I explore counterfactual policies seeking to improve learning outcomes through reassigning students and professors in ways that exploit match-effects among them. Using post-secondary academic records from a university in the Dominican Republic, I estimate the model and document the existence of substantial student-professor match effects. However, when allowed to choose, students do not always select the instructor from whom they will learn the most; they place as much weight on expected scores. Relative to the observed assignment rule, assigning students to the predicted learning-optimal instructor on average leads to a 4.87 percent increase in a student's academic achievement and a 5.54 percentage points reduction in the dropout rate. Chapter 3. Ramsey Pricing Revisited: Natural Monopoly Regulation With Evaders--In this chapter, coauthored with Nicolas Figueroa and Martin Besfamille, we consider a model featuring a single-product natural monopoly, which faces evaders, i.e., individuals that may not pay the price. By exerting a costly effort, the firm can deter evasion. To maximize the total surplus, a regulator sets the price, the level of deterrence effort, and socially costly transfers to ensure the monopoly's participation. We obtain a modified Ramsey formula, which clearly shows that the mere existence of evaders dampens the use of the price as a means to finance the firm's deficit. The regulated price is always below the monopoly price and, under sufficient conditions, also below marginal cost. Then, we generalize the model to incorporate moral hazard. Finally, we undertake an empirical application of our results, which shows quantitatively that the downward tendency of regulated prices in a context of high evasion is significant. [The dissertation citations contained here are published with the permission of ProQuest LLC. Further reproduction is prohibited without permission. Copies of dissertations may be obtained by Telephone (800) 1-800-521-0600. Web page: http://bibliotheek.ehb.be:2222/en-US/products/dissertations/individuals.shtml.]