ERIC Number: ED639201
Record Type: Non-Journal
Publication Date: 2023-Sep
Pages: 50
Abstractor: As Provided
ISBN: N/A
ISSN: N/A
EISSN: N/A
Strategic Disclosure of Test Scores: Evidence from US College Admissions. EdWorkingPaper No. 23-843
Brian McManus; Jessica Howell; Michael Hurwitz
Annenberg Institute for School Reform at Brown University
The impact of test-optional college admissions policies depends on whether applicants act strategically in disclosing test scores. We analyze individual applicants' standardized test scores and disclosure behavior to 50 major US colleges for entry in fall 2021, when COVID-19 prompted widespread adoption of test-optional policies. Applicants withheld low scores and disclosed high scores, including seeking admissions advantages by conditioning their disclosure choices on their other academic characteristics, colleges' selectivity and testing policy statements, and the COVID-related test access challenges of the applicants' local peers. We find only modest differences in test disclosure strategies by applicants' race and socioeconomic characteristics.
Descriptors: Disclosure, Test Results, Scores, College Admission, College Applicants, Standardized Tests, COVID-19, Pandemics, Selective Admission, Race, Socioeconomic Status, College Entrance Examinations
Annenberg Institute for School Reform at Brown University. Brown University Box 1985, Providence, RI 02912. Tel: 401-863-7990; Fax: 401-863-1290; e-mail: AISR_Info@brown.edu; Web site: http://www.annenberginstitute.org
Publication Type: Reports - Evaluative
Education Level: Higher Education; Postsecondary Education
Audience: N/A
Language: English
Sponsor: N/A
Authoring Institution: N/A
Identifiers - Assessments and Surveys: SAT (College Admission Test)
Grant or Contract Numbers: N/A