The study examines military manpower procurement for peacetime. It considers the broad alternative systems of conscription and voluntarism and develops models of demand and supply for military labor to show how these are affected by the choice of procurement system. Empirical applications are made using evidence from Australia, Canada, Great Britain, and the United States. Evaluation of the alternative systems in the peacetime context is made in terms of allocative efficiency, distributional effects, adjustment flexibility, and issues of social control. Although the budget cost of a volunteer force is usually greater than that of a drafted one, it was found that a peacetime draft of a professional standing military would impose real economic costs not present in the volunteer system. The volunteer force would better serve the distributional criterion of equity and could be supplemented by a draft for reserves, possibly lottery, and a stand-by draft for major expansion. In general, findings favored an all-volunteer recruitment for active duty in peacetime. Appendixes tabulate and identify data. (Author/MDW)