From a "prima facie" point of view, Nietzsche's use of virtue may appear to be a form of virtue ethics. Certainly, this is one position that has been established within the secondary literature; however, I argue that a more fruitful philosophical reading is to view his use of virtue as a part of his "drive" psychology. Indeed, what makes Nietzsche's philosophical psychology relevant to this topic, is the way in which he characterises the "sovereign individual" as an agent that is in control of good or appropriate actions because they are strong enough in character to sublimate their "drives" in the act of willing. Nietzsche's philosophical psychology has important educational implications because an obvious place to cultivate the "sovereign individual" is through education, but to Nietzsche, education and educational institutions seem only interested in promoting certain Christian virtues (e.g., faith, hope, and charity), and herd forming virtues (e.g., obedience, guilt, and equality) that breed sick young people who are decadent and weak willed. In response to this dilemma, I turn my attention to how Nietzsche overcomes this problem by proposing new virtues that should figure in a new type of education which is concerned with educating the "will" of the "sovereign individual." Central to Nietzsche's new type of education is the painful labour of self-cultivation ("Bildung"), the revaluation of one's values, and a ceaseless striving to overcome obstacles (will to power), so we are "able" to educate ourselves "against" life-negating virtues or vices that make us decadent and weak willed.