The Logic of Tax Limits: Alternative Constitutional Constraints on the Power to Tax.

Brennan, Geoffrey; Buchanan, James

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Peer reviewed

ERIC Number: EJ210905

Record Type: Journal

Publication Date: 1979-Jun

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The Logic of Tax Limits: Alternative Constitutional Constraints on the Power to Tax.

Brennan, Geoffrey; Buchanan, James

National Tax Journal, v32 n2 p11s-22s Jun 1979

In order to offer an analysis of alternative tax limitation possibilities, the ways in which Leviathan (the nonbenevolent despot model of government) can be constrained by elements of the "fiscal constitution" are examined. Journal availability: see EA 511 898. (Author/IRT)

Descriptors: Finance Reform, Government (Administrative Body), Government Role, Mathematical Models, Tax Allocation, Tax Rates, Taxes

Publication Type: Journal Articles; Opinion Papers; Speeches/Meeting Papers

Education Level: N/A

Audience: N/A

Language: English

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