This article examines how teachers unions affect teachers' well-being under various legal institutions. Using a district-teacher matched data set, this study identifies the union effects by three approaches. First, I contrast teacher outcomes across different state laws toward unions. Second, I compare the union-nonunion differentials within the same legal environment, using multilevel models and propensity score matching. Finally, unexpected legal changes restricting the collective bargaining of teachers in four states form a natural experiment, allowing me to use the difference-in-difference estimation to identify the causal effect of weakening unionism on teacher outcomes. I find that (a) many teachers join unions even when bargaining is rarely or never available, and meet-and-confer or union membership rate affects teachers' lives in the absence of a bargaining contract; (b) how unions influence teacher outcomes vary greatly by different legal environment; and (c) the changes in public policy limiting teachers' bargaining rights significantly decrease teacher compensation.