Comments on the issues introduced by Saltzstein (PS 522 554) in this issue. Elaborates on Saltzstein's proposed social cognitive factors that may account for discrepancies between moral reasoning and action, highlighting strengths and weaknesses. (AA)

Uses example of racism to compare Vygotsky's and Piaget's perspectives on the development of mind within the framework of questions regarding the mutual influence of societies and individuals. Notes that Vygotsky emphasizes knowledge transmission from older to younger, whereas Piaget emphasizes construction of new knowledge with potential for…

Provides a critical overview of research on play and cognitive development and an analysis of the two major theoretical frameworks (from Piaget and Vygotsky) that have informed it. Outlines the key features of a more powerful research perspective that defines and shapes the context of play as a social activity. (Author/BB)

This paper reviews research on physical attractiveness from a dialectical-interactional perspective and attempts to examine the relationship between outer appearance and inner psychological characteristics from a developmental perspective. (BD)

Comments on Nicolopoulou's article in this issue on the idea that play is an inherently social and cultural cognitive childhood activity. Emphasizes the importance of cultural variation of play for research and education. (BB)

Examines two theoretical approaches on how we understand our own and others' minds: a causal explanatory and an interpretive social approach. Explores the relations between these views and suggests that the real challenge of the cognitive revolution is to unite the two approaches, to achieve a causal naturalistic account of the acquisition and…

Suggests that a better understanding of the development of children's theories of mind, requires theoretical perspectives that do not privilege the child who conceptualizes or actively participates in social interactions. Proposes that a better understanding of the relationships among brain, psyche, behavior, and culture should be promoted. (AA)

Examines Astington and Olson's proposal under the context of von Wright's and Hempel's theories of explanation and understanding. Suggests that for taking children's meaning making seriously, researchers should find a principled way to acknowledge the role of interpretation in scientific thinking even in the making of explanation itself. (AA)

Examines the relationship between causal-explanatory and interpretive-hermeneutic approaches to how we understand our own and others' minds. Suggests that the two approaches discussed by Astington and Olson are mutually enlightening but, contrary to the proposed position, are irreducible to each other. (AA)

Points out agreement that the concepts a child acquires are variants of those exemplified by the cultures in which they grow up. Suggests, however, that learners interpret these cultural practices in terms of models causally determined by their cognitive or representational capacities and by the stock of concepts currently available. (AA)