Offers a theoretical account of moral rationality within a rational constructivist paradigm examining the nature and relationship of rationality and reasoning. Suggests progressive changes through developmental levels of moral rationality. Proposes a developmental moral epistemology that accommodates moral pluralism to a greater degree than does…

Suggests that constructivist rationality may be more pervasive across cultures than Moshman commits to. Proposes that rationality is not always adequate, and there is a need for essentially moral labor, such as differentiating moral from nonmoral or analyzing differing moral constructs and their potential coexistence, coordination, and structural…

Suggests that while doubting that the dichotomy introduced by Subbotsky can cover the entire domain of motivation, he should applaud the emphasis on the neglected but critical importance of motivation in developmental psychology, and the attempt to distinguish different types of motivation, even as contributors to a single behavior. (AA)

Examines two theoretical approaches on how we understand our own and others' minds: a causal explanatory and an interpretive social approach. Explores the relations between these views and suggests that the real challenge of the cognitive revolution is to unite the two approaches, to achieve a causal naturalistic account of the acquisition and…

Suggests that a better understanding of the development of children's theories of mind, requires theoretical perspectives that do not privilege the child who conceptualizes or actively participates in social interactions. Proposes that a better understanding of the relationships among brain, psyche, behavior, and culture should be promoted. (AA)

Examines Astington and Olson's proposal under the context of von Wright's and Hempel's theories of explanation and understanding. Suggests that for taking children's meaning making seriously, researchers should find a principled way to acknowledge the role of interpretation in scientific thinking even in the making of explanation itself. (AA)

Examines the relationship between causal-explanatory and interpretive-hermeneutic approaches to how we understand our own and others' minds. Suggests that the two approaches discussed by Astington and Olson are mutually enlightening but, contrary to the proposed position, are irreducible to each other. (AA)

Points out agreement that the concepts a child acquires are variants of those exemplified by the cultures in which they grow up. Suggests, however, that learners interpret these cultural practices in terms of models causally determined by their cognitive or representational capacities and by the stock of concepts currently available. (AA)

Examines two different types of human motivation, pragmatic and nonpragmatic. Experimental studies in preschool-age children in both the former Soviet Union and Western cultures are presented. Suggests that the two contrasting conceptions of human motivation lead to totally different practical strategies for transforming human motivation in…