A general theory of bargaining that is applicable to all types of bargaining situations and that provides a framework for analyzing the stages of the bargaining process is presented. Bargaining theory is critiqued with special attention directed to theories of Zeuthen, Hicks, Pen, and Chamberlain. The proposed framework in bargaining power is based on the notion of dependence and emphasizes the tactical, subjective nature of bargaining power. It is suggested that bargaining is understood by knowing how bargainers perceive, use, and manipulate power. The framework in bargaining is applied to concessions, and social-psychological data are used to indicate how different images of bargaining power result in different levels of concession. Additionally, the following two viewpoints are contrasted: a theory of deterrence that suggests that building up punitive capabilities reduces the tendency of parties to use punitive tactics and facilitates concession making; and a theory of conflict spiral that indicates that building up of punitive capabilities increases the likelihood of parties using punitive tactics in a way that inhibits serious bargaining. Research data are cited to demonstrate how bargainers can maximize the positive consequences of punitive capabilities, specified by deterrence theory, while minimizing the negative consequences delineated by the conflict spiral theory. Attention is also directed to tactics of argumentation at the bargaining table, including three types of normative arguments; and the role of bargaining power in conflict resolution. A bibliography is appended. (SW)