This study tests the fit of competing models of strike causes on a sample of public school districts in New York. The models are based on differing assumptions. One is that strikes are the result of mistakes or imperfect information; the other is that strikes are rational choices made in expectation of gain. The differences in these views are significant, since they can lead to divergent theoretical and policy conclusions. The models were tested by comparing 14 striking districts to a sample of adjacent or closely similar ones that did not strike in the same year. The gross comparison of the contract changes in strike as opposed to nonstrike situations shows at least three clear patterns: (1) there are more contract changes in strike situations; (2) the overall distribution of gains and losses varies from strike to nonstrike situations; and (3) the relationship of union to board gains varies considerably across different subjects. In terms of overall winners and losers, strike situations seem to favor the board to a modest degree, while nonstrike situations favor the union. The evidence overall tends to support a random or error view of strike effects, while the model of rational choice is weakly supported. References are included. (Author/TE)