This paper presents findings of a study that examined the effects of two dispute resolution procedures--fact-finding and compulsory final-offer, issue-by-issue interest arbitration--on teachers' wages, fringe benefits, and language provisions. New Jersey uses fact-finding dispute resolution, in which a recommendation for settlement is submitted to the parties by a neutral third party. Connecticut uses compulsory final-offer, issue-by-issue interest arbitration, which compels a final and binding decision to be rendered by the neutral third party. Methodology involved two phases: (1) analysis of teacher contracts in 50 randomly selected K-12 school districts in Connecticut (n=25) and New Jersey (n=25) for the years 1980-86; and (2) questionnaires sent to each sample district's business administrator, of which 14 (56 percent) were returned from New Jersey and 13 (52 percent) from Connecticut. Findings indicate that teachers who rely on compulsory interest arbitration tend to fare no better than do teachers who rely on fact-finding. Specifically, New Jersey teachers were paid higher wages and realized significantly greater gains in benefits. However, Connecticut teachers had two superior language provisions. Variables accounting for the unexpected findings include arbitrator characteristics and interests, the degree of teacher organization unity statewide, and time requirements. A conclusion is that the loss of power to teachers that results from reliance on neutral third parties may give teacher unions reason to reevaluate their means of dispute resolution. Nineteen tables are included. (Contains 30 references.) (LMI)