In some ways America's response to the murderous surprise attacks of September 11, 200l, resembled that of previous wars. The nation was mobilized and its military directed to hit back as soon as possible. Unlike past wars, however, the enemy proved to be a shadowy terrorist organization with a religious identity, a long-term strategy, and no fixed address. The Al Qaeda network did have fighters, however, and--in Taliban-ruled Afghanistan--a safe harbor. When the U.S. armed forces invaded that country to overthrow the Taliban regime, it captured thousands of prisoners, many of whom were thought to belong to Al Qaeda. Other suspected Al Qaeda operatives were captured elsewhere around the world, and in time, the immediate concern for disarming suspected hostile fighters and rendering them harmless gave rise to unprecedented questions: What are we to do with prisoners who are captured in a war that is unlikely to have any formal end? When, if ever, must these prisoners be released? What rights must be accorded enemy combatants who shun uniforms and fight on behalf of an organization that deliberately seeks to inflict civilian casualties? How do we ensure that persons being held as enemy combatants are in fact enemy combatants and not innocent bystanders? This article examines several court cases and the subsequent rulings to evaluate the answers to these questions. Several student activities on this topic conclude the article. (Contains 28 endnotes.)