The rhetorical functions of history depend on the domain in which history is used, with no connotations of interpretive priority attaching to the social or the academic realm. The appropriation of history in support of social causes as radically opposed as socialism and fascism fuels the temptation to subsume history under ideology, with the result that history is "relativized" as whatever interpretation of past events supports a particular cause. History when used as a warrant in public argument is immensely authoritative, acquiring a mythic character when divorced from factual evidence. The fact that history can by used to suit almost any purpose demonstrates how interpretive latitude allowed by uncontested terms (which are not amenable to logical dissection) can instigate widespread adherence to the principles these terms embody. Quarrels among academic historians regarding interpretation indicate that historians themselves do not use history consensually. History in public argument is not simply true--it is truth--and as an argumentative warrant provides a point for building consensus around argumentative claims. However, rhetors who advocate a position ordained by history could escape from moral responsibility, since the argument is not theirs but that of history. It would be well to remember that the power of history is no more the property of a single cause or ideology than truth is the exclusive possession of only one person. History deserves a place in public argument, but it is not the last word. (Extensive references are attached.) (NKA)