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Angrist, Joshua D.; Pathak, Parag A.; Zárate, Román Andrés – National Bureau of Economic Research, 2019
The educational mismatch hypothesis asserts that students are hurt by affirmative action policies that place them in selective schools for which they wouldn't otherwise qualify. We evaluate mismatch in Chicago's selective public exam schools, which admit students using neighborhood-based diversity criteria as well as test scores. Regression…
Descriptors: Selective Admission, Affirmative Action, Admission Criteria, Public Schools
Abdulkadiroglu, Atila; Angrist, Joshua D.; Hull, Peter D.; Pathak, Parag A. – Grantee Submission, 2016
Charter takeovers are traditional public schools restarted as charter schools. We develop a grandfathering instrument for takeover attendance that compares students at schools designated for takeover with a matched sample of students attending similar schools not yet taken over. Grandfathering estimates from New Orleans show substantial gains from…
Descriptors: Charter Schools, Organizational Change, School Restructuring, Educational Change
Abdulkadiroglu, Atila; Hu, Weiwei; Pathak, Parag A. – National Bureau of Economic Research, 2013
One of the most wideranging reforms in public education in the last decade has been the reorganization of large comprehensive high schools into small schools with roughly 100 students per grade. We use assignment lotteries embedded in New York City's high school match to estimate the effects of attendance at a new small high school on student…
Descriptors: Small Schools, High Schools, Selective Admission, Competitive Selection
Pathak, Parag A.; Sonmez, Tayfun – National Bureau of Economic Research, 2011
In Fall 2009, officials from Chicago Public Schools changed their assignment mechanism for coveted spots at selective college preparatory high schools midstream. After asking about 14,000 applicants to submit their preferences for schools under one mechanism, the district asked them re-submit their preferences under a new mechanism. Officials were…
Descriptors: Foreign Countries, Selective Admission, Educational Change, Comparative Education
Abdulkadiroglu, Atila; Angrist, Joshua D.; Pathak, Parag A. – National Bureau of Economic Research, 2011
Talented students compete fiercely for seats at Boston and New York exam schools. These schools are characterized by high levels of peer achievement and a demanding curriculum tailored to each district's highest achievers. While exam school students clearly do very well in school, the question of whether an exam school education adds value…
Descriptors: Public Schools, Selective Admission, Attendance, Academic Achievement
Pathak, Parag A.; Sethuraman, Jay – National Bureau of Economic Research, 2010
This paper formally examines two competing methods of conducting a lottery in assigning students to schools, motivated by the design of the centralized high school student assignment system in New York City. The main result of the paper is that a single and multiple lottery mechanism are equivalent for the problem of allocating students to schools…
Descriptors: Urban Education, High School Students, Student Placement, Admission (School)