

The Effects of Holocaust Education on Students' Level of Anti-Semitism

Stacy B. Gordon, Christopher A. Simon, Leonard Weinberg

The University of Nevada at Reno

Since the 1970s Jewish and other religious organizations in the United States and elsewhere in the Western World have made a substantial effort to introduce the Holocaust as a subject for study in the curricula of public secondary schools as well as institutions of higher education.¹ The effort has met with considerable success. Hundreds of schools and universities throughout the United States, not to mention secondary and higher education programs in Canada, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands etc. now offer instruction about the Nazi campaign to exterminate the European Jewish community during World War II.² The format for Holocaust education varies. In some cases it is included on a voluntary basis, but in others school authorities have made it a mandatory part of civics or history instruction. In some instances the Holocaust stands by itself while in others it shares attention with the sufferings of other ethnic groups; in some instances, entire programs of study are devoted to the subject.

The American public in general appears to agree that learning about the Holocaust is a good idea. According to a 1990 Gallup survey conducted on behalf of the Anti-Defamation League (ADL), an exceptionally high percentage of Americans know in general terms what the Holocaust was but agree overwhelmingly on the importance of learning about it. Between 80 and 90 per cent of those questioned by Gallup believed valuable lessons could be learned by studying the Nazi attempt to destroy the European Jewish community. By learning about the Holocaust, the respondents believed, students were likely to become more tolerant of minority groups in general, not only Jews. In addition to greater tolerance, most Americans believed Holocaust education would encourage students to avoid "going along with the crowd"; they would learn to resist in-group pressures towards racial and religious bigotry. Lastly, for those responding to the Gallup survey, a major benefit from learning about the Holocaust was preventive. Teaching the subject would inoculate against the occurrence of a new Holocaust.³

It is difficult to say with precision how much of the current decrease in anti-Semitism has been attributable to Holocaust education in the classroom. Exposure to such films as *Schindler's List* and visits to the National Holocaust Memorial Museum in Washington and similar museums in other cities may have played a role as well. Or, it may be simply the result of a generational change in the American public. But no matter the cause(s), anti-Semitism in the United States recently reached an all-time low. Compared with surveys, using similarly

worded questions, dating back to the 1960s, the findings reported by the ADL (based on a national opinion survey conducted on its behalf by Kiley, et al.) suggest that in 1998 only about 12 per cent of Americans could reasonably be regarded as anti-Semitic.⁴

The good news must be qualified by the fact that 12 per cent of some 275 million people still represents a large number of individuals. And among this anti-Semitic minority there are a handful of individuals who are willing to express their prejudices through violence. For example, America has witnessed recent terrorist attacks carried out in the summer of 1999 by such individuals as Buford Furro Jr., and Benjamin Smith—the latter a University of Indiana student who had received some Holocaust education while attending high school in a Chicago suburb.⁵

Despite the apparent benefits, Holocaust education is not without its opponents and skeptics. Recently one critic objected to its evident growth as a field of study in universities.⁶ According to this critic, “Holocaustology,” replete with study centers, professional journals, major and minor areas of concentration, graduate degree programs et cetera, serves only to cheapen and trivialize the tragedy. And in an even more critical vein the historian Peter Novick casts doubt not only on the medium but also on the message. He asserts that the Holocaust’s very extremity makes it a poor means for learning moral lessons. “There are.... more important lessons about how easily we become victimizers to be drawn from the behavior of normal Americans in normal times than from the behavior of the SS in wartime.”⁷ Novick concludes that in the long run there may no benefit to their well-being in Jews being habitually depicted as victims. He argues that it may not be healthy for American Jews to get caught up in a grotesque competition with African-Americans and other minority groups over whose sufferings were the most severe.

In this study we cannot hope to resolve what the reader quickly discerns to be ardently expressed and intensely contested disagreements over the benefits of Holocaust education. What we do intend is to evaluate the effects of learning about the Holocaust on some American university students. What tangible benefits, if any, derive from knowing more about the Nazi attempt to murder the Jews of Europe?

The possible answers to this question may be expressed in hypothetical terms:

1. Potentially, instruction in and knowledge of the Holocaust may reduce the level of anti-Semitism among those exposed to it. In addition, Holocaust education may produce a higher level of tolerance for immigrants and various minority groups in the American population, not only Jews. Alternatively, instruction and knowledge (the two aren’t necessarily identical) may affect appraisals of Jews but not other minorities;

2. It is of course perfectly conceivable that knowledge and instruction have no impact on the magnitude of anti-Semitism or other forms of prejudice. Knowing and learning about the Holocaust may not have any significant

consequences for individuals' values in general; and,

3. It is at least conceivable that Holocaust education may be negatively related to bigotry. Instruction may do more to elevate than reduce anti-Semitism by showing Jews, in exceptionally vivid terms, to be victims of genocidal violence. This status may lead respondents to conclude that there must be something about Jews that warranted their murder.

Methodology

In order to test these alternative hypotheses, we administered a survey that attempted to measure the influence of Holocaust education on anti-Semitism and political and social tolerance more generally. The survey instrument, consisting mostly of forced choice items, was submitted to students enrolled in one history and two political science courses at the University of _____ during the 1999 fall semester. One course was devoted exclusively to the study of genocide and the Holocaust. The second, a survey course in the western tradition, included a two week long account of the Holocaust in the context of World War II. Both courses were upper division offerings composed primarily of junior and senior level students. These two courses served as our "experimental group." The third course was simply an introduction to American politics in which there was no discussion of the Holocaust at all, thus serving as our "control group." The American politics course was a mixture of lower and upper division students—there was no statistical relationship between class standing and level of anti-Semitism ($r=0.028$, $p<0.764$), so the mixture of students should not pose a problem for the study. Questionnaires were distributed in the Western Tradition's course immediately before and immediately after the Holocaust sequence—the intention here was to measure impact following instruction. In the control group courses, the questionnaires were distributed at the first and last class meetings.

The survey (provided in its entirety in the Appendix) consisted of questions regarding the respondent's knowledge of the Holocaust, their demographic characteristics, and a series of political and social indicators. Our social trust/political cynicism indicators were drawn from the work of Verba and Nie (1972) *Participation in America*.⁸ Their indicators are still used in national survey research by academics and private polling firms, such as the Gallup organization. Respondents were asked to respond to the various statements by placing themselves on a seven-point agree/disagree scale. The variables were added together to create the trust/cynicism measure.

The anti-Semitism and general tolerance indicators were drawn from the Anti-Defamation League (ADL) surveys. Part of a national study of anti-Semitism in the United States, the ADL index was employed for response comparison purposes. In addition to the anti-Semitism index, we also drew a select group of ADL survey questions that measure general political and social intolerance. Attitudinal questions regarding the position of women in contemporary society, African-American, Hispanic-Americans, and HIV-infected individuals were included in the survey. We anticipated that general political and social intolerance would be related to anti-Semitic attitudes (see work on political

and social intolerance conducted by Rockeach 1966).⁹ Each of the individual responses to questions on the anti-Semitism scale were shown to be reliable using standard reliability analysis (Cronbach's $\alpha=0.9175$). An additive index created, with the higher number value indicating a higher level of anti-Semitic attitude [8,56].

The random assignment of individuals to control and experimental groups normally plays a central role in experimental design. In this study, it was not possible to randomly assign students to the American Politics, Holocaust Studies, and Western Traditions courses. Rather, student enrollment in these courses was based largely upon course availability, the need to fill basic undergraduate education requirements, and personal interest. None of these courses was required for graduation—there were other offerings available for students who wished to meet the aforementioned educational needs. Therefore, self-selection into control and experimental groups posed a serious challenge to our findings.

Nevertheless, it was not clear from the outset that there were significant differences in values, opinions, and beliefs between the two student populations, nor was it supposed that students in our control and experimental groups were significantly different in terms of levels of political tolerance or anti-Semitism. Furthermore, we assumed that students who pursued either the control group course (i.e., American Politics) or the experimental group courses (i.e., Holocaust and Genocide or Western Traditions) were similar in terms of demographic characteristics. Therefore, we expected that the self-selection bias would be minimized by the effects of other extraneous factors related to course choice scheduling factors, general interest in the subject or instructor, et cetera. While the results partially confirmed our expectations in this instance—e.g., no difference in political ideology ($F=0.11$) or family income ($F=0.90$) or gender composition ($\chi^2_{(2,235)}=2.78, p<0.25$).

We suspect that if Holocaust education is to have a significant impact on individuals' political and social tolerance, it seems important that students who are currently intolerant take the course. It seems likely, however, that students who are less politically and socially tolerant or who harbor strong anti-Semitic attitudes will opt out of courses which present information that does not coincide with their preconceived opinions, attitudes or beliefs.

The evidence suggests that we were not correct in our assumption that largely extraneous factors play a role in enrollment decisions related to the experimental and control group courses. In terms of general demographic differences, for instance, the experimental group courses had a noticeably larger proportion of female students than did the control group. Nearly two thirds of the students in the experimental group courses were women, while a little more than half of the American Politics course students were women (see Table 1).

It is not clear why this enrollment difference is present. It is possible at least that women were more likely to enroll in the experimental group courses for reasons related to their own continuing struggles against gender-based

discrimination and intolerance.

The experimental group courses had a greater percentage of racial and ethnic minorities than did the control group offering, perhaps due to an underlying dynamic similar to that affecting female students. The control and experimental groups did not differ dramatically on the other demographic characteristics. The students in the experimental classes were, on average, two to four years older than the students in the control group. In addition, the control group was much more likely to have their permanent residence outside of the state. However, both of these differences were not likely due to self-selection based on the subject of the class, but to the difference between the types of students who enroll in upper and lower division courses.

Table 1

Gender Differences

	% Women	%Men	N
Experimental Groups			
Western Traditions	50%	50%	34
Holocaust Education	63%	37%	86
Control Group			
American Politics	52%	48%	115

Ethnic/Racial Differences

	% White	%Non-White	N
Experimental Groups			
Western Traditions	24%	76%	34
Holocaust Education	19%	81%	84
Control Group			
American Politics	18%	82%	112

Political Philosophy (1=Very Liberal; 4=Moderate; 7=Very Conservative)

	Pretest	Posttest	t
Experimental Groups			
Western Traditions	3.72 (0.50)	4.43 (0.50)	1.01
Holocaust Studies	4.62 (0.30)	4.29 (0.36)	0.72

Control Group			
American Politics	3.91 (0.26)	4.17 (0.29)	0.67
	F=2.07	F=0.12	

The control and experimental groups did not vary in any meaningful way on the ideology measure. The ideology instrument was based on each respondent's self-placement on a seven-point scale on which one was the most liberal and seven the most conservative. On this measure, the control group was the most conservative (although still moderate) with an average ideology score of 3.96 on the pre-test. The Western Tradition and Holocaust students scored slightly more liberal--3.50 and 3.90, respectively.

We used a one-way ANOVA to compare knowledge level about the Holocaust by class—there was no statistically significant difference between the control and experimental groups. Table 2 demonstrates the difference in the amount of holocaust information the students held prior to taking their respective classes. The value on the knowledge variable indicates the number of correct responses on six objective, multiple-choice questions about the Holocaust. The higher the value, the higher the respondent's knowledge of the Holocaust. The average score for those in the Holocaust class was 3.37 compared with 3.25 for the Western Traditions group and 3.11 for the control group.

We used a one-way ANOVA to compare knowledge level about the Holocaust by class—there was no statistically significant difference between the control and experimental groups. Table 2 demonstrates the difference in the amount of holocaust information the students held prior to taking their respective classes. The value on the knowledge variable indicates the number of correct responses on six objective, multiple-choice questions about the Holocaust. The higher the value, the higher the respondent's knowledge of the Holocaust. The average score for those in the Holocaust class was 3.37 compared with 3.25 for the Western Traditions group and 3.11 for the control group.

Therefore, students were probably not self-selecting themselves on the basis of prior information level; it would be in the rational self-interest of students with high levels of knowledge about the Holocaust or political violence to enroll in the experimental group courses, as it would reduce their costs in terms of study time and likely increase the benefits in terms of academic performance. One possible explanation for the lack of statistical significance in knowledge about the Holocaust between the control and experimental group could be that students who are anti-Semitic have a high level of knowledge about the Holocaust, but have already "made up their mind" about Jews and other racial and ethnic minorities'—exposure to Holocaust education, therefore, would not likely serve to reinforce their anti-Semitic beliefs.

Comparing responses to the anti-Semitism scale used in the analysis, the level of anti-Semitism between the control and experimental groups is not significantly different. Our evidence tends to support the contention that students in the Holocaust and Western Tradition courses exhibited exceedingly low levels of anti-Semitism to begin with, but do not really know that much about the Holocaust--they are pursuing the courses because they wish to gain further information that would

Table 2

	Pretest	Posttest	t
<i>Knowledge About the Holocaust</i>			
Experimental Groups			
Western Traditions	3.15 (0.23)	3.12 (0.16)	0.08
Holocaust Education	3.23 (0.13)	4.72 (0.17)	6.55***
Control Group			
American Politics	3.31 (0.14)	3.17 (0.13)	0.76
	F=0.23	F=33.65***	
<i>Levels of anti-Semitism (0=not anti-Semitic; 56=highly anti-Semitic)</i>			
Experimental Groups			
Western Traditions	13.53 (2.56)	10.27 (1.66)	1.06
Holocaust Education	11.30 (0.84)	11.58 (1.17)	0.20
Control Group			
American Politics	14.11 (1.14)	14.99 (1.37)	0.50
	F=0.22	F=0.06	
<i>General Political Intolerance (0=not intolerant; 49=highly intolerant)</i>			
Experimental Groups			
Western Traditions	16.16 (1.24)	16.06 (1.26)	0.07

Holocaust Education	15.75 (0.78)	17.64 (1.27)	1.34
Control Group			
American Politics	18.04 (0.85)	20.08 (0.99)	1.57
	F=0.13	F=0.06	

* p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

support their extant opinions, beliefs, and attitudes. Holocaust education may produce greater political and social tolerance; but, if the anti-Semitism scale is an indication of tolerance, then the respondents' scores demonstrate a high level of tolerance in the pre-test.

The level of knowledge about the Holocaust did significantly improve for students enrolled in one of the experimental group courses. As reported in Table 2, the average pretest score for knowledge of Holocaust was approximately 3.23 for the students in the Holocaust studies course, while students enrolled in Western Traditions answered 3.15 questions correct on average. The control group score was 3.31, which was not significantly different from the experimental group courses.¹⁰

Exposure to Holocaust education in the Western Traditions course lasted for approximately two weeks, while the Holocaust course was a 16 week course devoted to the racial, social, and political intolerance surrounding the genocide of the European Jewry and other individuals and groups deemed "undesirable" by the Nazi regime. What is particularly interesting in these findings is that knowledge level about the Holocaust in the post-test increased significantly for both experimental group courses. The F-statistic further illustrates the change in the level of knowledge for one of the experimental group courses.

Students enrolled in the experimental group courses were less anti-Semitic than the control group students. Nevertheless, it is important to point out that the difference between the groups in both the pre- and post-test were not significantly different as demonstrated by the F-statistics reported below. On average, neither the control nor experimental groups appeared to be very anti-Semitic. (It should be noted, however, that the self-reporting attitudes regarding highly contentious issues e.g., anti-Semitism may lead respondents to answer questions in a socially-desirable manner. Therefore, the possibility of biased responses was present, but difficult to analyze).

One method of determining if social desirability was influencing the students' self-reported level of anti-Semitism would be to study their general level of political tolerance regarding women, racial and ethnic minorities, and gay lifestyles. As we discussed above, a series of questions were included in our survey were designed to evaluate the students general political and social tolerance. We found some evidence of bias regarding the self-reporting of anti-Semitic attitudes, beliefs and opinions.

Vol 27, No. 3, Mar 2004

While Holocaust studies students were the least likely to be politically and socially intolerant, the difference was not significantly different from the other two classes. Overall the level of general intolerance was low for all three classes; but, in relative terms, it was not as low as their reported level of anti-Semitism. In other words, the students appear to be somewhat more intolerant in a general sense, but less intolerant of Jews. This was true for both the pre and post-test results. Exposure to Holocaust education using either the short (Western Traditions) or semester long versions had no statistically significant impact on either anti-Semitism or social and political tolerance more generally. In general, students began these educational experiences exhibiting low levels of anti-Semitism and social and political intolerance and simply remained that way at the conclusion of these experiences. This was as true for women, but racial/ethnic minorities exhibited a higher level

Table 3: Regression Analysis of Covariance Models

Y=Anti-Semitism

Independent Variables	B	s.e.	BETA	t
Knowledge Index	0.42	0.42	0.05	0.99
Ideology ^a	-0.10	0.21	-0.02	-0.47
Gender ^b	-5.50	1.14	-0.24	-4.83***
Race/Ethnicity ^c	4.91	1.48	0.16	3.31***
Test ^d	0.06	1.14	<0.01	0.05
Group ^e	-3.03	1.14	-0.13	-2.66**

Constant=15.85(p<0.001)

F=6.92 (p<0.001)

R-Square= 0.10

Adj. R-Square=0.09

Y=General Political/Social Tolerance

Independent Variables	B	s.e.	BETA	t
Knowledge Index	-0.30	0.32	-0.05	-0.92
Ideology	-0.27	0.16	-0.08	0.09@
Gender	-4.37	0.86	-0.25	-5.11***
Race/Ethnicity	0.77	1.11	0.04	0.70
Test	1.90	0.86	0.11	2.22*
Group	-1.60	0.86	-0.09	-1.87@

Constant=22.13 (p<0.001)

F=6.59 (p<0.001)

R-Square= 0.10

Adj. R-Square=0.08

@ p<0.10

* p<0.05

** p<0.01

*** p<0.001

^a 7 point Likert Scale: 1=Liberal; 4=Moderate; 7=Conservative^b 1=Female; 0=Male^c 1=Person of Color; 0=White^d 1=Post-Test; 0=Pre-Test^e 1=Experimental Group; 0=Control Group

of anti-Semitism when compared with non-persons of color (see Table 3).

The former began their study of the Holocaust with such little anti-Semitism and social intolerance it would have been virtually impossible for the exposure to produce even less.

This status quo outcome was not true in regard to students' self-placement on our measure of political ideology (see Table 1). We did not anticipate the result, but it was true nonetheless, that students who learned about the Holocaust became significantly more liberal in outlook. Why? This is, of course, our speculation but to the extent liberalism in American life is associated with high levels of public financial support for the poor and needy as well as with the protection of religious freedom and individual liberty, it does not seem astonishing in retrospect that a review of the Nazi dictatorship's record of brutality would elicit this response.

In addition to one-way ANOVAs, we conducted two regression ANACOVAs (analysis of covariance) model (see Table 3). "Analysis of covariance is a multiple regression model that contains both continuous independent variables and categorical independent variables represented by dummy variables" (Allen 1997: 147). Our continuous and ordinal (treated as continuous) variables were our measures of knowledge about the Holocaust (indexed) and general political ideology (7 point Likert scale). Our categorical independent variables were gender (1=female), test (1=post-test), class (1=experimental group courses), and race/ethnicity (1=person of color).

The dependent variables in the models were indexed variables representing anti-Semitism and general political tolerance (higher score represented higher levels of intolerance). In the first model, we found that experimental effect across time was insignificant; additionally, knowledge about the Holocaust was not significant in explaining respondents' level of anti-Semitism. Only three variables were significant in the reduced model reported: gender, race/ethnicity and group (i.e., experimental or control group). Women were significantly less anti-Semitic than men and the experimental group reported a significantly lower level of anti-Semitism than the control group. Additionally, racial/ethnic minorities (i.e., persons of color) were found to be significantly more anti-Semitic than non persons of color.

In our second ANACOVA, we tried to explain respondents' general level of political and social tolerance. We found a marginally significant negative relationship between general political/social tolerance and general political ideology—respondents who were more conservative were more tolerant. Women were significantly more tolerant than were men. The experimental groups were marginally more tolerant than the control group. Interestingly, all groups became significantly more intolerant in the post-test analysis.

Conclusion

What do we know now that we did not know before? It seems clear that knowing more about the Holocaust did not reduce the level of anti-Semitism or general intolerance for the students who acquired this knowledge (political liberalism is another matter). This result was almost exclusively the outgrowth of the fact most students in the experimental courses began their studies with low levels of anti-Semitism and high levels of general tolerance. In a sense there was

little room for the courses to produce less anti-Semitism and more tolerance since students showed little anti-Semitism and intolerance beforehand.

This leads us to draw a second conclusion. In the university setting in which our study was conducted Holocaust education was largely a matter of self-selection. Students attracted to the course(s) tended to be individuals with pre-existing attitudes about Jews and other minorities. Holocaust education simply re-enforced these attitudes. It would be valuable to know what impact teaching about the Holocaust would have on students and others who were not self-selected and whose levels of anti-Semitism and general intolerance approximated the general population.

Endnotes

¹ For an account of this development see David Wyman, The United States. in David Wyman (ed.), *The World Reacts to the Holocaust* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996) pp. 726-736.

² See for example, Bruce Carrington and Geoffrey Short, "Holocaust Education, Anti-racism and Citizenship," *Educational Review* 49:3 (1997) pp. 271-281; Philip Rubenstein and Warren Taylor, "Teaching About the Holocaust in the National Curriculum," *The British Journal of Holocaust Education* 1:1 (1992) pp. 47-54.

³ Cited in Peter Novick, *The Holocaust in American Life* (Boston: Houghton, Mifflin, 1999) p.232.

⁴ *Highlights From a November 1998 Anti-Defamation League Survey on Anti-Semitism and Prejudice in America* (New York: ADL, 1998) p 3.

⁵ See "Two more state agencies racist group linked to shooting spree. CNN Interactive (July 12,1999).

⁶ Gabriel Schoenfeld, "Auschwitz and the Professors. Commentary (June 1998) pp. 42-46.

⁷ Novick, *op cit*. P 13.

⁸ Norman Nie and Sidney Verba, *Participation in America* (New York: Harper & Row, 1972)

⁹ We also asked survey respondents to rank their social and political values. Milton Rokeach's work in the 1960's and 1970's related to political and social intolerance was primarily based on an index of individual values. We employed his sixteen value index in our survey to determine if social and political values was related to political and social intolerance, and more importantly if exposure to Holocaust education led to a significant change in students' political and social values and to greater political and social tolerance. These results have yet to be analyzed and, therefore, have not been presented here.

¹⁰ As per reviewer suggestion, ANACOVA regression was used to model anti-Semitism in the pre-test analysis. If the ANOVA regression produced a dummy variable coefficient, then the model would indicate that, controlling for knowledge level and various respondent background characteristics (e.g., race/ethnicity, gender, general political/social tolerance) there is a significantly different coefficient for control and experimental groups in terms of their level of anti-

Semitism. The final model: $y=19.21-0.06\text{KNOWLEDGE}-6.90\text{GENDER}^{***}-0.21\text{IDEOLOGY}+5.66\text{RACE}^{**}-3.83\text{GROUP}^*$. KNOWLEDGE=Knowledge of Holocaust indexed score. GENDER: 1=Female, 0=Male. IDEOLOGY: 7-point Likert scale—1=Liberal, 4=Moderate, 7=Conservative. RACE: 1=Person of Color, 0=White. R-Square: 0.15; Adjusted R-Square: 0.13; $F=5.98(p<0.001)$. * $p<0.05$, ** $p<0.01$, *** $p<0.001$.

References

- Allen, M. 1997. *Understanding regression analysis*. New York: Plenum Publishing.
- Carrington, B. & G. Short. 1997. Holocaust education, anti-racism, and citizenship. *Educational Review*. 49(3): 271-281.
- Carrington, B. & G. Short. 1998. *Highlights from a November 1998 anti-defamation league survey on anti-semitism and prejudice in America*. New York: Anti-Defamation League.
- Nie, N. & S. Verba 1972. *Participation in America*. New York: Harper & Row.
- Novick, P. 1999. *The Holocaust in american life*. Boston,: Houghton Mifflin.
- Rubenstein, P. & W. Taylor 1992. Teaching about the holocaust in the national curriculum. *The British Journal of Holocaust Education*. 1(1): 47-94.
- Shoenfeld, G. 1998. Auschwitz and the professors. *Commentar*, June, 42-46.
- Shoenfeld, G. 1999. Two more state agencies say racist group linked to shooting spree. *CNN Interactive*. July 12.
- Wyman, D. 1996. The United States. In D. Wyman, ed. *The world reacts to the Holocaust*. (pp 726-736). Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press.

Appendix: Indicators Used in Survey Instrument

General Knowledge Questions:

(Multiple Choice Responses)

What were the Nuremberg Laws?

Who was Oscar Schindler?

What were the Einsatzgruppen?

Which of the following was NOT a concentration or death camp?

In what year did the "Final Solution" begin?

General Cynicism/Trust/Efficacy Indicators

(1=Strongly Disagree; 7=Strongly Agree)

Most people in positions of power try to exploit people like me.

I usually trust people, even those whom I do not know very well.

I enjoy meeting people and talking and working with with them.

The people who run the country are concerned with what happens to me.

The government officials with whom I am familiar are generally honest.

Anti-Semitism Indicators Anti-Semitism Indicators

(1=Strongly Disagree; 7=Strongly Agree)

Jews are more willing than others to use shady practices to get what they want.

Jews are more loyal to Israel than to America.

Jews have a lot of irritating faults.

International banking is pretty much controlled by Jews.

Jews don't care what happens to anyone but their own kind. Jews always like to be at the head of things.

Jews stick together too much.

Jewish businessmen are so shrewd that other people don't have a chance.

General Political/Social Intolerance Indicators

(1=Strongly Disagree; 7=Strongly Agree)

The idea that everyone has a right to his own opinion is being carried too far these days.

Nothing in other countries beats the American way of life.

I do not have much in common with people of other races.

It bothers me to see immigrants succeeding more than Americans who were born here.

Women should return to their traditional role in society.

We have gone too far in pushing equal rights in this country.

AIDS might be God's punishment for immoral sexual behavior.