

THE EROSION OF UNIVERSITY AUTONOMY IN AUSTRALIA

In April 1981 as part of the Review of Commonwealth Functions the Prime Minister announced the closure of the School of Engineering at Deakin University. This decision represents a watershed in the erosion of university autonomy that has been taking place over the last thirty years. The precedent has been set. At any time the Federal Government may decide to close a university department or faculty, or even a university, without prior enquiry or warning, by the use of its monetary powers. With this single action the Federal Government has immeasurably strengthened its hold over the universities. Henceforth the threat of a closure will always be there, even if it is never actually put into practice.

The action of the Prime Minister has also made it quite clear that the so-called 'special relationship' said to exist between the universities and the Federal Government in the Menzies era and for some years afterwards, is dead. In fact it died in the early seventies, but the vice-chancellors and some academics, no doubt working on the old adage 'we live in hope and die in despair', have grimly clung to this dead relationship right up to the present day. It was thought it would save the universities when all else failed, but it did not save Deakin Engineering, nor did it stop the mergers being forced on the universities in New South Wales and Queensland.

In line with this grim determination to cling to the past the vice-chancellors apparently did not see the closure of Deakin Engineering as an attack on autonomy. When the CTEC supported the closure as a legitimate use of federal monetary powers, the chairman of the AVCC described this as a 'reasonable' attitude, and also welcomed the news that the CTEC would protect the autonomy of the universities!!¹ How long will it take the vice-chancellors to realise that the CTEC is no longer in the game of defending the universities?

Another recent action by the Federal Government — the creation of centres of excellence — has been attacked because it will take research funds away from those institutions and faculties not lucky to be chosen as 'excellent'. But in the rhetoric provoked by this decision little or nothing has been said about how it will further impinge upon university autonomy, particularly in the vital area of research. The decision will enable the Federal

¹ E.H. Medlin put a case for such an organisation in 'A Case for an Association of Australian Universities' in *Vestes* 19, 1, 1976. (Ed)

B. Bessant
School of Education
La Trobe University

Government to direct substantial research funds into those areas the government of the day sees as important. The individual university will have less to spend on research, and as a result its ability to decide on what research shall be done will be limited.

This article attempts to place these most recent intrusions upon university autonomy in the context of developments over the last thirty years. One of the main themes in the article is that since the early seventies the role of the AUC and later the TEC has been to implement and justify government policies. In this, CTEC support for the closure of Deakin Engineering is only one of many examples where the Commission has acted as an arm of government. The members of the Commission can not be relied upon to speak up in favour of university autonomy. It is unfortunate that some Australian academics still see the Commission in the 'protective' role of the Universities Commission of the sixties. 'The Commission will "look after" the universities somehow!' It is also unfortunate that this undying belief in the CTEC has been one of the main obstacles to bringing together a broadly representative body of university staff in an organisation dedicated to the defence of the universities and their autonomy.*

The Context of Control

In an article in *Vestes* Daniel Levy pointed out that 'state power over higher education has been growing through much of the world', and that

*The balance between state control and university autonomy has surely become the most salient question, cross-nationally, in the politics of higher education.*²

The issue for universities in many countries has become 'accountability to the State' as governments demand results in return for the greatly increased expenditures on higher education. In Britain the University Grants Committee is now directly accountable to the British Education Ministry which has become closely involved in university policy-making. India, Nigeria, Mexico and most South American countries have all seen similar trends towards the erosion of university autonomy in recent years. In the United States co-ordinating bodies have been established in most states with varying powers over the institutions of higher education. The influential Carnegie Commission on Higher Education in its findings in the seventies complained of the 'glacial' spread of state power over both public and private universities.³

Increasing world-wide state interest in higher education should be seen in the historical context of State concern for schooling in general. In the history of schooling in Australia and many other 'western' countries over the last 100 years, the consistent pattern has been one of increasing State intervention: initially at the elementary school level and later through to secondary and tertiary. In Australia the colonial governments moved in to take over elementary schooling in the 1870s and 1880s, and later between 1905 and 1915 they did the same for secondary schooling. An elaborate system of inspection was instituted to ensure that schools conformed to the rules and courses laid down by the State bureaucracies.

It is too simple an explanation of this process, which has been extending to the tertiary field since the 1940s, to see it as the result of the governments' desire to keep track of what happens to the money spent on schooling. This is only the outward manifestation of the State's concern with schooling in general. What goes on in schools (and universities and colleges) is vital to those concerned with the preservation of the established order and the shape of the evolving society. The 'reformers' who introduced universal elementary schooling and secondary schooling for all declared that they were acting in the 'national interest', just as Sir Robert Menzies believed that the expansion of the university system was in the interests of his 'forgotten people' — the middle classes — which he equated with the 'national interest'.⁴

Universities in Australia may have attracted little government interest until the 1940s, but once their expansion was under way and a greatly increased number of students were involved (many of whom were not from the upper and professional classes as in previous years), State concern for the universities also increased. It was not just a question of money — an accountant's concern about efficiency and quantum — but the more significant question of the schooling of people, that is, the potential to influence their skills and values. Similar levels of government interest and concern can be discerned in other countries.

The Universities and the Second World War

Until the Second World War Australian universities remained small, rather ineffectual institutions, almost solely concerned with providing training for the professions and some higher clerical positions. Fees were charged in all universities except the University of Western Australia so that students were invariably drawn from the homes of parents who could afford the fees, although there was a very limited scheme of scholarships. Even without fees the universities would have been out of the reach of most students, because only a small minority went on to the higher levels of the secondary school.⁵

Society demanded little of the universities. They were so remote from the ordinary man it was difficult for him to comprehend their relevance, and the universities were happy for that situation to continue. This isolation from society indirectly safeguarded the autonomy of the universities from the State governments which created and financed them.

The political, social and economic repercussions of the Second World War changed all this, and forced the universities to face a new situation. Not only were they called upon to meet the demands of a society requiring them to play a much more significant role in the training of skilled personnel, but they were confronted by increased student populations which seriously undermined their traditional isolation and elitism.

Apart from this physical growth which involved a greater State and federal investment in the universities, there was now a closer association between universities and government. This was a decisive period in the emergence of the universities from obscure, almost private and somewhat independent institutions, to becoming instruments of government policy. As the universities were creations of governments no changes in acts of incorporation were necessary but simply a shift in behaviour.

The universities were encouraged by governments to expand their facilities to meet what these governments saw as State and national needs. This entailed the development of new training courses or research programmes, and the expansion of existing courses in those faculties where the governments (rather than the universities) saw a need.⁶ Invariably this led to a further emphasis in the universities on the more specifically vocational courses in the sciences and social sciences, rather than classical and literary studies. Well before the establishment of the Australian Universities Commission (AUC) in 1959 the universities were strongly influenced by State and federal governments.

They had become accountable to these governments. It might well be argued that the battle for university autonomy was already lost in these years. At any rate, the slide from being creations of government to creatures of government was well under way. It went a long step further with the establishment of the AUC following the Murray Report. With these changes went a significant shift in the sources of university funding. In 1940 35.4% of total university income came from the States, 0% from the Commonwealth and 23.6% from fees. In 1960 the figures respectively were 38.5%, 33.6%, 13.4%. The Commonwealth had emerged as a major source of university funds.⁷

The Universities and the AUC

The Murray Report proposed a Grants Committee, a type of 'buffer' device similar to the British institution. It was to be a semi-independent body existing between government and the universities. As in Britain it was to consist mostly of academics and to be left largely to its own devices, except for the actual financial parameters. It was to be a source of advice to the government on the needs of the universities.⁸

There was also a much greater possibility of the various universities accepting directions and control from such a committee, than from the direct intervention of a minister for education. Harold Holt, Treasurer in the Menzies government, stressed this aspect when introducing the Bill to establish the Universities Commission. He saw the success of the new body as dependent upon it securing the 'confidence and trust of all those who are interested in the universities'. It was not envisaged as a body of coercion.⁹

The Australian Government did not entirely accept the notion of a 'grants' committee, because the Prime Minister (R.G. Menzies) felt that the committee should have a co-ordinating as well as a financial role.¹⁰ Although at the time this aspect was played down by the government and almost ignored by the academic community, it was to have a most profound influence on the future development of Australian universities. The functions of the Commission were to advise the federal government on:

- (a) the necessity for financial assistance and the conditions upon which any financial assistance should be granted; and
- (b) the amount and allocation of financial assistance.¹¹

The acquiescence, and in many cases the support of academic staff for the passing of general university control and direction to a semi-government, non-elected and quite secretive body, may be explained during this period simply by the general acceptance of Commission policies as being in the best interests of all concerned. As has been pointed out, it was much easier for the universities to accept this type of control than if it had been exercised directly by the government. Nevertheless, one could have expected that an alert academic community might have made some objections, for these developments did raise basic questions of university autonomy and academic freedom.

Whatever the reason for this academic indifference to the power of the Commission, by the seventies it had had some considerable success in convincing staff and vice-chancellors that it was just as concerned as they with preserving university autonomy. Nevertheless, the *Sixth Report* of the Commission

did find it necessary to attempt a justification of government interference with the autonomy of the universities. The Commission saw —

no conflict between respect for university self-government and the encouragement of universities to respond to community needs.¹⁴

While it continued to re-iterate its support for institutional autonomy it did not see it as an infringement of this autonomy if universities were asked 'to respond to government requests to expand facilities to train students for the various professions' such as social work, special education, medicine and dentistry.¹⁵ This argument could also be applied to the contraction or abolition of university courses, as universities were to discover before the decade was over.

One of the most striking features of the discussions which were recorded in the sixties about the role of the universities is the absence of any real criticism of the establishment of the AUC and its gradual assumption of power over Australian universities. For most academics, the Commission was the body which dispensed the money, and during the late fifties and the sixties there was plenty. In those golden years new universities were established, old ones extended, academic salaries were increased, promotion prospects brightened. By the end of the decade the power and influence of the Commission was complete.

While the Commission had no legal authority to require universities to conform to its directions it exercised its monetary powers in such a way as to secure effective control over the siting and establishment of new universities and the nature of their courses of study. It became necessary for all universities to seek the Commission's approval before establishing new faculties and departments. This generally had to be sought in the universities' submissions to the Commission for the forthcoming triennium. The extent of the universities' dependence on AUC largesse became apparent in these submissions made by the individual universities. They were formidable documents covering every aspect of university life — the setting up of new courses and programmes, building proposals, library provisions, admissions policies, residential accommodation, advisory services, etc., as well as full details regarding student and staff projections and university finances.¹²

During the fifties and the sixties the direction of university teaching and research was channelled away from the humanities and literary studies to the sciences, the technologies and the new social sciences. AUC became the main agent and interpreter of these changes. The Commission saw itself as acting in the national interest.¹³ It received moral support from the Murray and Martin enquiries and ac-

tive encouragement from government leaders who anticipated an ever increasing demand for trained personnel to meet the needs of government, industry and commerce.

When the Whitlam Labor Government threatened to establish a Tertiary Education Commission there was a chorus of protest from the vice-chancellors and university staff lest the 'special relationship' which was said to exist between the universities and the Commission would be lost. No one actually spelt out how this relationship worked out in practice, but the implication was that it was a very personal, individual (almost subtle) affair rather than, it was implied, the more heavy-handed relationship which existed between the Colleges of Advanced Education and the Commission on Advanced Education.¹⁶ The AUC had worked hard and with much success to conceal its real power over the universities which, nevertheless, effectively limited their autonomy in a multitude of ways.

An important underlying factor was the development of the technical education sector and its dramatic expansion in the seventies. It broadened its offerings and separated into two sectors — advanced education, and technical and further education. The cost and complexity of three sectors of post-secondary education provided additional momentum to the exercise of federal power. Post-secondary education was not only of national significance in itself, but its full value could not be realized, it was argued, until it was systematized.

Thus in the three post-war decades as individual and idiosyncratic institutions were threaded together into a system of higher education, two marked shifts in power occurred as far as universities were concerned — from State to federal government, and from universities to government via the agency of the AUC.

The Universities and the TEC

The Tertiary Education Commission was established on 22 June 1977, and is the Federal Government's present source of advice on tertiary education (now called the Commonwealth Tertiary Education Commission).

It has three Councils — one of each of the tertiary sectors. The Commission described its functions in the following way in its first publication, *Recommendations for 1978*:

The prime function of the Commission under its Act is to inquire into and advise the Minister on the necessity for, and the conditions and allocation of, financial assistance in respect of universities, colleges of advanced education and technical and further education institutions. The Act also provided that the Commission should:

- (a) *inquire into and advise the Minister on any other matter relating to tertiary institutions that is referred by the Minister or which the Commission considers requires inquiry by it;*
- (b) *perform, on behalf of the Commonwealth, administrative functions in relation to programs of financial assistance for tertiary education;*
- (c) *make recommendations to the Minister as to the institutions and proposed institutions that should be regarded as universities or colleges of advanced education and technical and further education or institutions for the purposes of the Act;*
- (d) *where required by the Minister, inquire into and provide advice to him in relation to institutions established or proposed by the Commonwealth for the provision of tertiary education.*

The Commission is required to consult State authorities responsible for matters relating to universities, colleges of advanced education and technical and further education institutions. It is to perform its functions with the object of promoting:

- (a) *the balanced and co-ordinated development of the provision of tertiary education in Australia; and*
- (b) *the diversifying of opportunities for tertiary education.*

The function of each Council is:

- (a) *to inquire into and advise the Minister and the Commission on matters relating to its sector;*
- (b) *in accordance with the Commission's directions, to provide assistance to the Commission in matters relating to its sector, in particular, in administration of programs of financial assistance and representation of the Commission on sectoral matters; and*
- (c) *if required by the Commission to provide assistance to it in matters other than those relating to its particular sector.¹⁷*

Thus the responsibilities of the new TEC were much wider than those given to the AUC in 1959, but were probably only a recognition of the actual responsibilities the AUC (and the Australian Commission on Advanced Education) had assumed over the years by the exercise of their monetary powers. These had become doubly significant when the Federal Government assumed the responsibility for financing all higher education from 1 January 1974.

The new structure of the TEC downgraded the three commissions which had existed previously and put a new body, the TEC, between the commissions (now called councils) and the government. This new body was much more suited to the new role for the commissions which had emerged by 1977.

Prior to 1976 the commissions gathered together the data from the tertiary institutions necessary to assess the needs of those institutions for each triennium. The commissions then made their recommendations to the government regarding policy direction and financial expenditure.¹⁸ In an era of expansion in the tertiary sector the Federal Government had generally accepted these recommendations without making substantial alterations. All this changed in 1975 when the Whitlam Government, facing the new era of financial stringency, rejected the recommendations of the commissions for the forthcoming triennium, and abandoned the system of triennial funding which had been originally instituted by Menzies in 1959 (against strong Treasury opposition). For 1976 the 1975 levels of funding were applied. Thus the commissions' recommendations were overridden and the way thrown open for the issue of funding guidelines by the government.

In 1976 the Fraser Government restored the triennial system on a 'rolling' basis, but at the same time issued guidelines for the commissions which laid down the limits for government funding and also indicated government policy directions. This constituted a major reversal of the role of the commissions which were now forced to work in line with the government directives. Any independence they had previously exercised was now effectively eliminated.¹⁹

But to make the government's role even more effective the new body, the TEC, was necessary. It was not simply another tier in the bureaucratic structure, but a body much more closely tuned to government thinking and policy. In composition it was dominated by 'political' appointments, the representation of the three councils being confined to the three chairmen.²⁰ Its essential task has been to monitor the recommendations of the three councils and draw them into line with government policy. It has reversed the role of the earlier commissions in that prior to 1976 the commissions saw themselves as making a case to the government for expenditure in each sector, although this did not always correspond with the reality. The TEC's role has been to implement government policy and to resist and overturn the recommendations of the councils so that the final TEC recommendations will be acceptable to the government.

At a recent seminar at the University of Melbourne, Professor P.J. Fensham who had been on the Universities Council for four years, said that 'more and more . . . the top group sit in judgement on the three sectors'. He pointed out that the recommendations of the individual councils were taken to be simply representations on behalf of the constituent institutions and not recommendations tempered not only by the needs of all the institutions but also by the needs of society. In his address, Professor Fensham concluded:

We find the Commission taking it upon itself to prove the recommendations of the constituent councils, not simply from a co-ordination and co-operation point of view, but because it injected into their part of Volume I (of the Triennial Report) an assessment of what the public purse would stand in higher education.²¹

A good example of how the TEC has functioned as an arm of government has been its efforts at labour market forecasting (manpower planning), particularly in regard to teacher education. The TEC has been anxious to provide a statistical rationale for the government's policy of drastically cutting back on teacher education and the closure or amalgamation of colleges which have been linked with the efforts to redirect students into the business studies and the technologies.²² In doing this, late in 1979 the TEC issued a working paper on the supply and demand for new teacher graduates in the 1980s.²³ This was an extremely crude attempt to justify cuts in teacher education. The assumptions and even the arithmetic of this paper were criticised by Merv Turner from La Trobe University in *A Critical Response* published by the Federation of Australian University Staff Associations.²⁴ A further effort was made in the TEC's *Report for the 1982-84 Triennium* which devoted many pages to labour market forecasting for engineering, teacher education and medicine.²⁵

In this *Report* the TEC has taken what it regards as the upper limit for teacher demand in the 1980s and based its recommendations on that limit.²⁶ However, Gerald Burke from Monash University has shown quite convincingly that this so-called upper limit is in fact a mid-range estimate, and he concludes that 'Demand could quite easily rise some 30% above the TEC's upper estimates'.²⁷ It is therefore difficult to escape the conclusion that the TEC's efforts at labour market forecasting have been dominated by government pressure to provide a justification for the Federal Government's tertiary education policies. In this way the TEC is now functioning in much the same way as any department of government.

The Universities and the State Co-ordinating Bodies

There are now co-ordinating bodies established by statute in four States (Western Australia, South Australia, Victoria and New South Wales) and non-statutory, advisory bodies in Queensland, Tasmania and in the Northern Territory (see Appendix A). The co-ordinating bodies all have general advisory functions to the minister of education in each State/Territory, but they differ significantly in their powers and functions.

In general these bodies have been mainly concerned with the non-university sector of tertiary education, and, to date, have shown some reluctance to interfere with university autonomy. Nevertheless, there have been a number of developments which

suggest that as these bodies extend their powers and expertise they will seek to bring the universities under their influence. There is a simple, seductive appeal in the plea that their value as State planning bodies is reduced if they have different powers and relationships with each of the three different sectors. To do the job properly, they argue, they must have equal powers over all.

The Victorian (VPSEC), South Australian (TEASA) and Western Australian (WAPSEC) bodies present the greatest potential threat to university independence both because of their statutory powers, and in the case of VPSEC and WAPSEC, their *modus operandi*. All three have power to require any post-secondary institution to furnish them with information and to require the institutions to inform them of all representations, submissions, etc., made to the TEC. While this process does not prevent the institutions making submissions to the TEC, it means that the State body is able to comment on these submissions to the TEC for good or ill.

The most serious development affecting the universities has been the power given to these three bodies in relation to the approval of new courses of study. In the name of achieving a 'rationalisation of resources' and preventing 'unnecessary duplication' each of these three bodies now has a role in looking at new courses of study.

The WAPSEC Act specifies that an institution must advise it before making any submission on the introduction, discontinuance or significant change in the character or content of any course, and (as with other submissions to the TEC) this may be delayed for up to thirty days. WAPSEC may advise the governing bodies of post-secondary bodies, and make recommendations to the TEC on proposals for the establishment of new courses. It has no role of course approval as such, although it may determine the minimum requirements for new awards and accredit these awards when requested to do so by a post-secondary institution. WAPSEC also advises on salaries and conditions of employment.

The TEASA Act similarly specifies that it must be informed of any representations by an institution to the TEC on the introduction, continuance, discontinuance or significant change in the content of any existing course, and TEASA may make recommendations to any institution, or to the TEC as to courses that may or may not be provided. TEASA does, however, have the power of course approval as far as advanced education institutions are concerned; it has the power to accredit such courses and approve awards to be made; an advanced education institution may not introduce a new course unless TEASA has approved it. But this does not apply to universities.

The VPSEC Act is the most restrictive of all. VPSEC has similar powers to those of WAPSEC and TEASA as far as advising what courses of study should be offered. But not only must a post-secondary institution advise it before making any submissions to Commonwealth authorities (on any subject) but also the VPSEC Act provides that a post-secondary institution

shall not expend funds supplied by the Government of Victoria or the Government of the Commonwealth upon a course of study introduced after the commencement of this section unless that course has been approved by the Commission.²⁸

This means that in Victoria a new course in a university, having passed through the university's own committees, must then be vetted by VPSEC as well as the TEC. While rationalisation may be the overt aim of this control mechanism, it is not far removed from full-scale accreditation of university courses by outside bodies, a move which was envisaged in recent draft legislation in Victoria.²⁹

A vital consideration with these co-ordinating bodies is how their members see their role. Are they simply public servants carrying out the government's wishes or do they see themselves as experts advising the appropriate minister and exercising a measure of independence? There are marked differences between the way the various bodies function which does suggest that their roles vary from State to State. What appears as a highly secretive, conspiratorial approach by VPSEC is in marked contrast with the fairly open and co-operative stance taken by TEASA. WAPSEC documents are 'non-public' and only its annual report is public and its stance generally secretive also. The members of VPSEC have been attacked for carrying out the wishes of the Victorian Government in much the same way as any public servants. In fact, in the areas of teacher education and engineering they have over-reacted to the embarrassment of the government.

The VPSEC operations have been criticised in that the operators have shown a lack of tact and negotiating skills. There has been little co-operation with the tertiary institutions and the organisation has tried to enforce its wishes by directives rather than negotiation. On the other hand TEASA has generally co-operated with the tertiary institutions and has been willing to change or modify proposals. In VPSEC's case there is a clear need for that organisation to have some expert assistance if we are to judge from the quality of the background material which has been made public.

This article has attempted an outline of the various institutional controls which have been developed or are being developed over universities, and how they have impinged upon the traditional notions of university autonomy. It has not been concerned with other influences which may have also restricted the autonomy of universities in recent years, e.g. the demands of the professional associations and registration boards, the pressures from such bodies as the Federation of University Staff Associations, the Australian Union of Students and the Australian Vice-Chancellors' Committee for uniformity. Pressures from such organisations may well have been as limiting as government pressures, but little research has been done in this area.

Is university autonomy worth worrying about? I believe it is because of its close interrelationship with academic freedom. The freedom of the individual academic to pursue his or her teaching and research as he or she wishes is closely linked with the ability of the academic staff to influence university policies on teaching and research, just as the latter is dependent on the ability of the university to devise its own programmes of teaching and research without outside interference. Ironically enough one of the most cogent statements on university autonomy to appear in recent years was in the *Sixth Report* of the AUC. It stated that the commitment to university autonomy —

... stems from a conviction that universities will in general better achieve their purposes by self-government than by detailed intervention on the part of the public authorities. The purposes for which universities are founded and for which society continues to maintain them, include the preservation, transmission and extension of knowledge, the training of highly skilled manpower and the critical evaluation of the society in which we live. . . . One of the roles of a university in a free society is to be the conscience and critic of that society; such a role cannot be fulfilled if the university is expected to be an arm of government policy.³¹

The ability of a university and its staff to be the 'conscience and critic' of society depends largely on university and academic autonomy. But it also carries with it a measure of social responsibility towards the university's teaching and research. The spectre of the academic in his or her ivory tower completely detached from involvement in real life situations is an all too familiar image seen by many Australians as being typical of university staff. This academic detachment from the problems of ordinary humanity may have suited the elite of English society in the nineteenth century, but where is its relevance today? This is not to deny the academic's right to pursue knowledge in the way he or she thinks fit. But it does

suggest that when carrying out research or planning teaching programmes there is a moral obligation to take his or her social responsibilities seriously.

University staff and university administrations need to see as one of their major functions the task of being actively and publicly critical of the many social, political, economic, technical, agricultural and environmental problems confronting Australia, and to make it their business to be heard on these issues where they concern their own specialities. The university should see as part of its role a willingness to assist the public to become more critical and aware. It should give intelligent, practical advice, tuition and guidance on everyday problems, as well as national issues, and consciously build up public confidence to a point where on specific issues within the university's competence, the public will turn to the university for help. Too often the university's contact with the public is confined to an 'open day' or a 'community week' each year.

As Sir John Crawford suggested in 1969 when Vice-Chancellor of the Australian National University, universities should establish their own commissions of inquiry to report on national matters of importance.³² Far too often university administrators and staff see contact between the university and the 'outside world' as undesirable, as likely to damage the university's image. It is time they realised that the aloofness of a university from its local environment will quickly bring public distrust and ignorance leading to the cutting of funds and the imposition of controls which will make the exercise of academic freedom by staff and university impossible. Academic freedom and institutional autonomy do carry with them a measure of social responsibility.

Those who uphold freedom to think are not really vulnerable to attack if they are prepared to be missionaries. There is only one freedom of thought, not several kinds, and that freedom, if it is to impress anyone in a mass age, must be a forceful, living thing practised by the whole profession, not just by a few courageous people.³³

Appendix A

The State and Territory Co-ordinating Bodies

All the existing tertiary co-ordinating bodies were established during the 1970s. They are as follows:

Western Australia — Western Australian Post-Secondary Education Commission (established by the W.A. Post-Secondary Education Commission Act 1970-1976) WAPSEC

New South Wales — NSW Higher Education Board (established by the Higher Education Act 1975) NSWHEB

Queensland — Joint Advisory Committee on Post-Secondary Education (established by the Queensland Minister for Education in 1976 as a non-statutory advisory body) JACPS (QLD)

Victoria — Victorian Post-Secondary Education Commission (established by the Post-Secondary Education Act 1978) VPSEC

South Australia — Tertiary Education Authority of South Australia (established by the Tertiary Education Authority Act 1979) TEASA

Tasmania — Tertiary Education Commission of Tasmania (established by Cabinet Minute with effect from 1 January 1979) TECT

Northern Territory — Post-School Advisory Council (established in accordance with the provisions of the N.T. Education Act 1979, as an advisory body to the N.T. Education Minister) PSAC (NT)

References

1. *Australian*, 13 January 1982.
2. *Vestes*, 23, 2, 1980, p.19.
3. Carnegie Commission on Higher Education, *The Capital and the Campus: State Responsibility for Post-secondary Education*, New York, 1971.
4. See B. Bessant, 'Robert Gordon Menzies and Education in Australia', in S. Murray-Smith (ed.) *Melbourne Studies in Education*, Melbourne, 1977, pp.97-8.
5. See J. Cleverley, J. Lawry (eds.), *Australian Education in the Twentieth Century*, Melbourne, 1972, pp.172-5.
6. In 1957 the Prime Minister, R.G. Menzies, made it clear that the universities must serve the nation and be no longer a refuge of privilege for the few. . . . the community is accepting heavy burdens (i.e. university financing) in order that, through the training of university graduates, the community may be served'. (*Australian Parliamentary Debates*, H. of R., 28 November 1957, vol. 17, p.2701).
7. *Report of the Australian Universities Commission on Australian Universities 1958-1963*, October, 1960, p.4.
8. *Report of the Committee on Australian Universities* (Murray Report), Canberra, 1957, p.101.
9. *Australian Parliamentary Debates*, H. of R., vol. 23, 21 April 1959, p.1371.
10. *Ibid.*, vol. 17, p.2698.
11. *Australian Universities Commission Act*, No. 30, 1959.
12. For example see La Trobe University, *Submission to the Australian Universities Commission, 1976-1978 Triennium*, Vols. 1 and 2, December 1973. The UC Report for 1977-79 Triennium, July 1976 (Canberra, 1976) gives a graphic indication of the power of the UC over the universities. Note particularly 6.37-6.60 (pp. 84-9) on new developments in universities where the UC rejects almost every new proposal put forward by the universities.
13. See *Report of the Australian Universities Commission on Australian Universities 1958-1963*, Canberra, 1960, pp.69-75.
14. *Sixth Report of the Universities Commission*, May 1975 (pre-print version), p.17.
15. *Ibid.*, p.70.
16. Report of the Panel to Advise on Arrangements for Amalgamating the Universities Commission and the Commission on Advanced Education, August 1975, p.22; AVCC, Letter from Chairman AVCC (David P. Derham) to Dr. H.C. Coombs, Chairman Royal Commission in Australian Government Administration, 21 July 1975; Melbourne University Staff Association, Submission by MUSA General Committee to the Minister for Education in Victoria on the establishment of a Statutory Tertiary Education Advisory Council, May 1976, p.4.
17. Tertiary Education Commission, *Recommendations for 1978*, Canberra, 1977, pp.1-2.
18. *Sixth Report*, op. cit., pp.11-12.
19. Hugh Philp argued in 1970 that the AUC had already become merely another government department. Its recommendations were made according to decisions already made by the government instead of being the basis of those decisions. See H. Philp 'The Piper and the Tune — From Murray to the Fourth A.U.C. Report', *Australian University*, May 1970, 8, 1, pp.24-7.
20. The TEC consists of four full-time members (chairman and the chairmen of the three councils) plus five part-time members appointed by the government.
21. From notes of an address given by Professor P.J. Fensham at a National Conference on the TEC Report, Teacher Education Contraction, Forced Amalgamations, Multi-Campus Arrangements, organised by the Centre for the Study of Higher Education, University of Melbourne, 27 July 1981.
22. Tertiary Education Commission, *Report for 1982-84 Triennium*, vol. 1, part 1, Canberra, February 1981, pp.141-2.
23. Tertiary Education Commission, *TEC Working Paper on the Supply and Demand for New Teacher Graduates in the 1980s*, November 1979.
24. Merv Turner, *The TEC Working Paper on the Supply and Demand for New Teacher Graduates in the 1980s: A Critical Response*, Melbourne, March 1980.
25. Tertiary Education Commission, *Report for the 1982-84 Triennium*, op. cit., chs. 4 and 5.
26. *Ibid.*, p.118.
27. Gerald Burke, *Forecasting Future Needs for Teachers*, Melbourne, August, 1981, p.3.
28. *Victorian Post-Secondary Education Commission Act*, no. 9145, 1978, section 28(4).
29. A Bill for an Act to Amend the Post-Secondary Education Act 1978.
30. The best example of this was the attempts by VPSEC to define policy on the future of teacher education in Victorian state colleges late in 1979. Far-reaching cuts and amalgamations were envisaged without consultation with the institutions concerned.
31. *Sixth Report*, op. cit., sections 4.22, 4.23.
32. John Crawford, *The University and Government*, Canberra, 1969, p.12.
33. G.Z.F. Bereday, *Universities for All*, San Francisco, 1973, p.137.