the so-called "sunset" laws (e.g., all Colorado state agencies must pass scrutiny and be recreated every so many years) if not by other more specifically higher education approaches.

At the level of the governing board, Gil Paltridge of the Berkeley Center is now working with the Association of Governing Boards to develop board self-evaluation kits for trustees at public four-year, private four-year and public two-year colleges. So it may soon be possible for board members to use carefully designed instruments to see if they are living up to their challenges. I, of course, would press strongly to include several self-evaluation questions concerning board relations with the statewide co-ordinating board. Here I don't want to be misunderstood: there is nothing in my training as a political scientist that tells me it will be possible — or even desirable — to set up structures and seek personalities wherein all differences and conflicts between governing boards and a central co-ordinating board can be made to disappear. There will always be areas where differences in constituencies, in perspectives and in perceived interests will — and should — lead to vigorous disagreement over given issues in postsecondary education. A co-ordinating board is no more infallible than other social institutions, and it needs strong and articulate institutions as healthy counterpressures. But, given some goodwill of the kind expressed by Harold Enarson, open decision-making procedures, accurate data gathering and no small doses of statesmanship, it should be possible to confine the disagreements to non-pathological levels.

The Carnegie Commission recommended that some national association like the American Council on Education (ACE) create with the addition of significant lay participation an equivalent operation to the AAUP Committee which investigates allegations of abuses of academic freedom.[13] The ACE counterpart would have been on call to examine alleged cases of abuse of central powers. While no one has moved to implement this recommendation (the prospect of trying to apply sanctions to guilty states may have been too perplexing), Roger Heyns, President of the ACE, did send out a letter on January 6, 1976, announcing that his organisation would establish panels of qualified persons who would then be available to visit a state where relations between the central board and institutions had become badly strained. The invited observer(s) would then do their best to restore the necessary working relationships.

In the light of the severe challenges which face postsecondary education over the next decade, let us hope that most of these co-ordinating/governing board relationships will stay healthy — or that when they deteriorate dangerously, they can be quickly restored. Anything other than that and we shall all end up as civil servants of the state, and no one that I know thinks higher education can prosper in that context.[14]

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ACCOUNTABILITY AND AUTONOMY: A CROSS-NATIONAL ANALYSIS OF RECENT TRENDS

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If misery loves company, then Australian academics disturbed over State encroachments on university autonomy might take some solace from cross-national comparisons. State power over higher education has been growing throughout much of the world.[1] Increased dependence on government funds, increased accountability, increased mandated inter-institutional co-ordination — these and other new common Australian themes are being widely played out, albeit with significant variations. The balance between State control and university autonomy has surely become the most salient question, cross-nationally, in the politics of higher education.

This essay focuses on the changing relationship between the State and the university. It obviously provides no more than a brief overview. It first analyses the trend toward greater direct accountability to the State; then it turns more to inter-system comparisons of the fate of institutional autonomy.

Direct Accountability

Universities today are being held accountable more than previously to the idea that they should serve the public interest directly. The notion that the university best serves the public interest **in**directly, by pursuing its own goals directly, has fallen upon relatively hard times. So has the related notion that sufficient accountability is insured through free market mechanisms. The rationale of the first is that students, professors, and university administrators are the people best able to make policy dealing with teaching and research. Good teaching and research then benefit society-at-large. The rationale of the second is that market competition satisfies student and professor choice, and thereby fosters institutional responsiveness, administrative and curriculum innovation, and system flexibility.[2] Thus efficiency and excellence are ensured, demands met. But both rationales are losing ground to the rationale for direct accountability to the State — that the State has a responsibility actively to pursue the public interest when it spends the public dollar. While these three rationales often co-exist in different degrees, the last is ascendant and most requires elaboration.

Size is a key factor. The enrolment boom following the Second World War signalled the end of the traditional, elitist university, not just in many of the more developed countries but even in some of the less developed ones. Bigger enrolments mean bigger expenditures. Bigger expenditures, as the Robbins Committee in England (1963) or Martin Committee in Australia (1964-5) argued, justify more direct State activity. Government expenditures generally have risen, not just in absolute but even in proportional terms so that many universities have come to rely increasingly on public revenues. Higher education claims significantly greater shares of the public dollar, even of the enlarged public education dollar, than previously. Such trends are familiar to Australians, who have seen university income evolve from a government-endowment-tuition mix to a near government monopoly, while higher education's share of the GNP more than doubled from the early 1960s to the mid-1970s.[3] Heightened university dependence on government funds is generalisable to many nations (Canada, Great Britain, the U.S.) where mixed public-private funding had been characteristic. And skyrocketing government expenditures have occurred, not just in these nations but in the traditionally State-oriented ones in which public funding had already been the rule for some time. Moveover, if bigger enrolments and expenditures have been accompanied by greater accountability to the State, so has retrenchment! The argument is that scarcity makes direct protection of the public interest all the more imperative.[4]

Universities are now held directly accountable to contribute to a wide variety of social, economic and political goals — some of which their governments themselves did not actively pursue a little while back. A salient example in the U.S. concerns "affirmative action", or, to its critics, "reverse discrimination". U.S. government guidelines for aid set minimum percentage representation by race and sex within the student and professional bodies. Beyond equal opportunity employment aimed at eradicating discrimination, affirmative action fixes numerical balances which must influence future appointments. Universities have to present thorough analyses of their problems and plans to overcome them. They must prove their compliance with government policies. Not surprisingly, many universities charge that they are considered guilty until proven innocent. A paradoxical parallel to U.S. affirmative action is found in South Africa. The State there forces the university to comply with the dictates of apartheid. Whites cannot enrol in black universities and severe restrictions are placed on black attendance at white universities, according to a law ironically entitled the Extension of University Education Act (1959).[5]

U.S. courts have also become increasingly active in holding the university accountable for the individual rights of members of the university community. Among these rights are tenure, academic freedom, and student participation. Indicative of the courts' guiding role is their involvement in cases of academic freedom whereas there had been no such involvement prior to the Second World War, despite fervent disputes over the issue.[6]

Another issue which is increasingly used to justify direct accountability to the State — many more could be cited — is the application of knowledge. There has been increased emphasis on "practicality". Australia's Martin Committee was not alone in that among the democratic nations. In some of the authoritarian nations, such as Argentina and Chile, insistence on the practical is coupled with harsh crackdowns on many areas of critical, liberal arts, inquiry. African governments have repeatedly interfered in higher education in order to push "Africanisation". to build new nations based on relevant curriculum, not that passed down from the University of London. (Obviously, Communist governments insist on the applied in their higher education.)

Government preoccupation that higher education fulfil certain technical tasks has often led it to establish technical institutes, thus creating binary higher education systems. These institutes are generally far more directly accountable than universities to the State. Certainly this is the case with Venezuela's or Mexico's technical institutes, as reflected in the direct State appointment of their institutes' directors, while most university rectors are selected by the universities themselves. Similarly, State supervision over accreditation and other academic and financial matters is greater in Britain's polytechnics than in its universities. Another important, relatively new, sector which comes in for more direct government control than universities do is the community college sector. These colleges are also usually created with explicit public interest ends, such as equal access or attention to needs of the local citizenry. The U.S. is, of course, the most prominent case, with over 1000 community colleges, but experiments have been started elsewhere as well. The main point is that institutional proliferation has often meant special growth in sectors which are particularly accountable to the State.

As institutions have proliferated, States have assumed increasingly active roles in co-ordinating them, or at least in appointing committees to do so. Going beyond the Murray Committee (1957), the Martin Committee dealt not just with universities but all of Australian higher education as has the recent Williams Report.[7] Major debate arose concerning the need for diversity versus the penchant for uniform equality that the concept of a co-ordinated "system" sometimes implies. Conflict also emerges as major universities resist "being reduced" to mere system members. Evidence comes from most Latin American nations, as the University of Chile, or the Central University of Venezuela, or the University of Buenos Aires, insist that they are **the** national universities, properly setting system modes, not submissively following them.

Less and less is system co-ordination left to voluntary arrangement or market mechanisms. Instead, co-ordinating boards now explicitly pursue the task. This is especially true in systems where institutional decentralisation and autonomy had been characteristic. Following the example of Great Britain's University Grants Committee (UGC), many systems have tried to bring State influence to bear without, however, granting direct authority to government ministries. But as systems have grown beyond the point where gentlemen's agreements, mutual understandings, and the like could function fairly efficiently, more bureaucratic mechanisms have evolved. The UGC's shift, in the 1960s, from accountability to Treasury to accountability to Education is indicative. Whereas policy review had been only general, since Treasury is "notoriously bad at controlling anything directly", experts in the Education Ministry have become directly involved in policy-making. "There is now hardly a category of university expenditure that is not conditioned by UGC prescriptions."[8] Since 1970 UGC accounts are open to inspection by the Comptroller and Auditor-General.

Similar trends have developed in many of the Commonwealth systems that have experimented with variants of the UGC. The Murray Committee led to creation of Australia's University Commission, through which government funds would flow. As in Canada, the Commission's powers then expanded. And, since the late 1970s, the Tertiary Education Commission has advised government on enrolment quotas by field of study, and on finance. Nigeria's National University Commission has witnessed significant increases in government representation and, with it, significant increases in its power of co-ordination over the creation of new institutions, manpower policy, and a host of other issues. India's UGC "is by far the most important influence at the national level on higher education".[9]

Various sorts of co-ordinating boards have also taken on greater authority in the Americas. Nearly every Latin American system has a council of rectors, but the voluntary versus government balance varies significantly. Many councils, like those in Argentina and Chile, have traditionally been weak, though military governments may strengthen them. Within many other councils, such as the Mexican, there is a constant struggle between university and government authority. But the rule seems to be this: Councils have only become powerful where governments have dominated, Cuba would be the clearest case. Even in the U.S., however, statewide co-ordinating boards have taken on increased powers. Most states now have some sort of board which makes binding rules on the system, though the powers of the boards continue to vary a great deal across states.

Thus far, our discussion of direct accountability to the State has been so general that a number of important qualifications deserve consideration. For the sake of brevity, however, I will raise just one, the private-public distinction. Degrees of direct accountability to the State can vary significantly between private (less) and public (more) sectors.

Private higher education sectors are not present in much of the world. Some European systems have but a few private institutions, serving specialised purposes. Others, like Belgium and especially the Netherlands, have seen their private sectors lose much of this privateness, even to the point where private institutions in the Netherlands derive 100% of their income from the government.[10] In Great Britain "private" at most indicates some distinction between the more autonomous **universities** as opposed to other institutions of higher education. But private sectors are quite vibrant in much of Asia and the Americas.

The U.S. has the best known private sector, something of an international symbol of privateness. So there is great concern over the fate of that sector. At mid-century roughly 50% of all U.S. higher education enrolments were in the private sector, by 1975 less than 25%. Thus a far greater proportion of the system is now more accountable to government than to market. And the crisis goes far deeper. Even within the 25%, privateness has seriously eroded. There is enormous variation, but many nominally private institutions are increasingly accountable to government. Many are now included in state-wide governing boards and planning. They are accountable for numerous social missions (discussed above), which government pursues.[11] While there are many factors conditioning the decline of privateness, a major one is increased dependence on government funds. This is especially true of private institutions that rely on federal funds for research or student aid, or on state governments for direct institutional aid. Despite all the changes of recent years, however, **most** private institutions remain somewhat less accountable to the State than most public ones.

Latin American cases show that increased public accountability is not a uniform trend; here is a region where the private sector has grown so startlingly that it has gained proportionately on a public sector in the midst of its own unprecedented growth. Private enrolments jumped from roughly 10% to 34% of the total between 1960 and 1975.[12] Reasons for the private boom include a religious reaction to secular publicness, a political reaction to intense public politicisation, a social-class reaction by privileged sectors to the increased access of middle sectors to the public institutions and credentials which they themselves had previously monopolised, and an academic reaction to declining academic quality in the public sector. Just how private the private institutions are varies considerably across and within systems. Traditionally bureaucratised ministries in Argentina and Brazil try to enforce system-wide regulations. But private universities in Mexico, Venezuela and much of Central America are quite private indeed — hardly accountable in any direct sense to the State. As the Brazilian case most clearly shows, however, massive private enrolments (roughly 65% in 1975) may ultimately trigger increased State involvement because the State cannot allow such a huge sector to deteriorate too far. Government funds, and of course regulation, seem to flow inevitably to "mass" private sectors. Japan in the 1970s, with roughly 80% private sector enrolments, shows the same pattern.[13]

Institutional Autonomy

Insistence on direct accountability to the State often involves deleterious efforts on institutional autonomy. The two concepts are obviously inversely related, though they are not mutually exclusive opposites. This section will focus on the present fate of autonomy, concentrating on basic differences across systems.

One of the clearest cleavages across systems, I would argue, separates democracies and highly authoritarian regimes. Autonomy is generally much greater in the former. At the other **extreme,** it even becomes difficult to apply the concept meaningfully. This is the case in systems where the universities are basically politicised to the State's norms, as in China or Cuba. I would not imply that no university-government conflict emerges in Communist systems, or even in a totalitarian Nazi system, but the scope of such conflict is generally limited.

Relatively clear comparisons emerge when political regimes change. University autonomy has increased when democratic regimes have replaced the Nazi dictatorship in (West) Germany (1945), Peronist dictatorship in Argentina (1955), or Perez Jimenez dictatorship in Venezuela (1958). Conversely, the advent of harsh authoritarian regimes has had dire consequences on university autonomy in nations like the Philippines or in Latin America's Southern Cone. Brazil (1964), Chile and Uruguay (1973) and Argentina (1976) are the prime examples of the latter. Similarly, independent Africa's quick slide into single party and military authoritarian rule was a serious blow to university autonomy in that region.

Correlations between regime type and degree of autonomy are not perfect, however, Substantial autonomy can exist under regimes, like the Mexican, which are authoritarian in the sense of being non-democratic, but which do not, perhaps cannot, maintain the degree of control over societal institutions that is found in more repressive authoritarian systems.[14] Across democratic regimes, moreover, degrees of university autonomy vary greatly.

Perhaps the most basic cleavage among democratic regimes lies between the relatively centralised and relatively decentralised higher education systems.[15] Most of Europe has long been characterised by Statist systems. The Napoleonic model treats the university as a very public institution, an arm of the State. The ministry therefore makes uniform rules for the higher education systems. It creates, certifies, supports and governs its higher education institutions. Sweden, France and Italy are good examples. The Napoleonic model was transferred to other regions and one still sees its predominance, though hardly unchallenged, in most Latin American systems.

More decentralised systems have derived basically from a more pluralist, Anglo-American tradition, also transferred to other nations. Ministries are traditionally much less powerful in such systems, universities more so. The U.S., Great Britain, Canada and Australia are good examples.

Federalism is one of the structures most associated with decentralised systems. Only West Germany among the continental European, basically Statist systems, has a strong State (Land) level. Within Latin America, only Brazil, and to some extent Mexico, have relatively important State roles unless we really stretch our imaginations. Comparatively great dispersion of government authority to the States has been especially characteristic of, for example, Australia, Canada and the U.S. Like private-public differentiation, inter-state differentiation can help autonomy by encouraging institutional competition and therefore entrusting some accountability to market mechanisms, in contrast to the tendency of uniform, central systems to rely on accountability to the State. Of course, there is no rule that universities retain more autonomy by dealing primarily with State rather than national governments. Divided public power probably correlates more than central public power with autonomy mostly because the sort of system that would fragment public power is likely to be one that might also be favorable to autonomy.

Inter-system conclusions about different patterns of autonomy are valid only at very general levels of comparison. A growing array of exceptions in recent years has given rise to a "convergence" hypothesis.[16]

Traditionally decentralised systems have seemingly caught planning fever. Our earlier discussion of increased direct accountability is relevant here. Much of this is accomplished at the state level in the U.S., but, as in Australia, the national government's role in finance and governance has expanded. Symbolic of the U.S. change is the creation of a Department of Education, defying a centuries-old tradition of opposition to such centralisation; the department's role in higher education is probably yet to be determined. In any case, drift toward more centralised State control seems especially likely wherever dispersed funding sources dry up and the State becomes **the** benefactor. While Australia's abolition of tuition is especially dramatic, the U.S. too sees proportionally less of its income provided by non-government sources. Similarly, as indicated earlier, there is convergence when systems with dual private-public sectors let their private ones become more dependent on government funds, in essence making the systems as a whole more Statist. Brazil and Japan are apparently in the early stages of such a process, while Belgium, Chile and the Netherlands are in more advanced stages.

On the other hand, many of Europe's centralised systems have attempted to decentralise a bit, for increased flexibility. No experiment has created more interest than France's 1968 reforms. Sweden's 1977 decentralisation attempt is also particularly noteworthy, for Sweden is perhaps the world-wide symbol of centralised planning in higher education.[17] Similar efforts have been made in Latin America. Brazil has created fundacoes (loosely, "university foundations") and Venezuela has created "experimental" public universities meant to offer alternatives to the traditional public sector. And of course the growth, often founding, of private sectors represents a sharp turn away from Statist traditions. U.S. post-war promotion of Japan's private sector left Japan with a curious combination of both worlds — a centralised Statist public sector, but a more independent private sector.

Some evidence of convergence also emerges with regard to the level of the academic structure in which authority is lodged. State-oriented systems in Europe (notably France and West Germany), and to a lesser extent Latin America, have been impressed by the Anglo-American practice of entrusting considerable policy-making authority at the university-wide level. A strong "middle" level is thus attempted as a degree of authority is taken both from the "chairs" and faculties below and the ministries above.[18] Presumably university administrators can be more trusted than scattered chairs and faculties to have the interest and ability to make policy for the entire institution. Many European and Latin American universities have simultaneously pressed for departmentalisation as a better companion than chairs and faculties for university-wide authority. With this has come more participatory rights for junior professors, another move in the U.S. direction. Meanwhile, the U.S. and Britain keep pushing more authority up to the co-ordinating board and government level. Convergence also seemed to occur, especially in the late 1960s, when European and U.S. universities granted more participation to students. This "Latin Americanisation" came just as the advent of harsh authoritarian regimes coupled with the tremendous growth of "depoliticised" private universities fell hard upon student participation in Latin America, strengthening the hand of university administrators and, in the authoritarian cases, of government officials.

Convergence should not be overestimated, however. Decentralised systems have moved considerably toward greater centralisation, but experiments in the other direction have produced much less conclusive results. Furthermore, there is great evidence that existing structures **condition** future policies. Margaret Archer's mammoth study, focusing on France and Russia (centralised) and Great Britain and Denmark (decentralised) show the improbability of convergence.[19] Clearly, Britain and the U.S. still have stronger university administrations, more departmentalisation, and less government involvement than Europe's traditionally Statist systems. And experiments with student participation have generally been abortive.

A fuller comparative analysis of autonomy, including an assessment of convergence, would have to move beyond general considerations to specific considerations of different aspects of governance. Some systems allow for greater autonomy in appointments but then impose extensive guidelines on curriculum policy. Others monitor appointments of university officials more closely but then trust these officials to make policy. Thus some of the efforts in Statist systems (e.g., Sweden) to allow greater institutional autonomy have been accompanied by greater extra-university influence over appointments.[20] There are indeed many blends of autonomy in appointments, substantive academic policy, and financial policy.

A Matter of Perspective

Academics in nations such as Australia and the U.S. can look in different directions and come to different conclusions on the state of university autonomy in their systems. Looking back historically within these systems they are likely to be struck by the State's contemporary prominence, by increased emphasis on direct university accountability to the State. Looking laterally at other contemporary systems, however, they are just as likely to be struck by their own still enviable degrees of autonomy. Whatever the extent of convergence, it has not swept away most fundamental differences between traditionally less and traditionally more Statist systems.

Cross-national analysis also helps provide perspectives on the multiplicity of solutions that can be found to balance State and university authority. Present trends should be seen less as inevitabilities than policy choices. The most important example might well be increased State authority. Many believe that State authority must become pre-eminent as State funding becomes pre-eminent. But it is not empirically clear that the correlation is so tight.[21] Nor is it logically or normatively clear that State personnel can better pursue the public interest than university personnel can. It is important to consider policy alternatives such as market accountability to students, voluntary co-operation among institutions, independent intermediary bodies, strong university administrations, private institutions, and even promotion of frankly State-run institutions to meet State needs, thereby freeing autonomous universities from direct accountability to the State. Such alternatives are nothing new to many systems. It is ironic, however, that they sometimes seem increasingly anachronistic to many planners in those systems — precisely while they seem like the prescribed innovative relief to many higher education experts in more Statist systems. I do not mean to make a blanket argument against increased State involvement.[22] I only argue that cross-national analyses of accountability and autonomy illustrate that a great variety of balances is possible.

NOTES

1. This article draws substantially on ideas developed in other works of mine. See "Universities and Governments: The Comparative Politics of Higher Education," *Comparative Politics* 12, No. 1 (1979), pp. 99-121; "The Politics of Higher Education: Reconciling Autonomy and the Public Interest," *Review of Higher Education* 2, No. 2 (1979), pp. 18-29; *The State and Higher Education: Comparing Private and Public Sectors in the Americas* (forthcoming).
2. See, for example Joseph Ben-David, *Trends in American Higher Education* (Chicago: University of Chicago, 1972), pp. 1-47.
3. Bruce Williams, *Systems of Higher Education: Australia* (New York: International Council for Educational Development, 1978), pp. 13, 69. On the accountability issue in Australia see Alan Lindsay and Garry O'Byrne, "Accountability of Tertiary Education at the National Level: A Chimera?" *Vestes* 22, No. 2 (1979), pp. 27-33.
4. Morris Kogan presents a fine analysis of how the British State used first expansion and then stagnation to justify its growing role. *Educational Policy-Making* (Hamden, CT: George Allen and Unwin, Ltd., 1975), pp. 26-44.
5. Academic Freedoms Committees, *The Open University in South Africa and Academic Freedom* (Cape Town: Juta, 1974). Recently, however, there have been some initiatives at liberalisation.
6. John Brubacher, *The Courts and Higher Education* (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1971), pp. 57, 138.
7. John Webb, "Diversity in Higher Education — Some Problems Relating to the Genesis and Implementation of the Martin Report," *Vestes* 22, No. 2 (1979), p. 19.
8. Kogan, pp. 196-97.
9. Susanne Hoeber Rudolph and Lloyd I. Rudolph, "The Political System and the Education System: An Analysis of Their Interaction," in Rudolph and Rudolph, eds., *Education and Politics in India* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1972), p. 72. On Nigeria see Nduka Okafor, *The Development of Universities in Nigeria* (London: Camelot Press, 1971). On Canada see Edward Sheffield, et al., *Systems of Higher Education: Canada* (New York: International Council for Educational Development, 1978).
10. This information is based on a forthcoming manuscript by Roger L. Geiger, "Private Higher Education: An International Analysis."
11. The private-public gap has narrowed with respect to court rulings, but there are still significant differences. See William A. Kaplin, *The Law of Higher Education* (San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass, 1978).

12. Daniel Levy, "Latin American Student Politics in the Seventies," in Philip Altbach, ed., *Student Activism* (Metuchen, NJ: Scarecrow Press, forthcoming 1981).
13. See, for example, William Cummings, Ikuo Amano, and Kazuyuki Kitamura, eds., *Changes in the Japanese University* (New York: Praeger, 1979).
14. See Daniel Levy, *University and Government in Mexico: Autonomy in an Authoritarian System* (New York: Praeger, 1980).
15. For a very useful, broad analysis see: John. H. Van de Graaff, Burton R. Clark, Durotea Furth, Dietrich Goldschmidt, and Donald Wheeler, *Academic Power: Patterns of Authority in Seven National Systems of Higher Education* (New York: Praeger, 1978).
16. A widely read formulation is found in James Perkins, "The Future of the University," in Perkins, ed., *Higher Education: From Autonomy to Systems* (New York: International Council for Educational Development, 1972), p. 30 and passim.
17. On France see Alain Bienayme's summary of reactions to the 1968 reform: *Systems of Higher Education: France* (New York: International Council for Educational Development, 1978). On Sweden, see Rune T. Premfors, "The Politics of Higher Education in Sweden: Recent Developments, 1976-78," *European Journal of Education* 14, No. 1 (1979), pp. 81-106.
18. Burton R. Clark, "Academic Power: Concepts, Modes, and Perspectives," in Van de Graaff, et al., pp. 174-75. The subtle ways in which formal authority at the top (ministry) often left considerable leeway to the bottom (chair) indicate that even the centralised Statist system really have allowed far more autonomy, in at least some senses of that concept, than one might imagine from reading laws and statutes. A thorough analysis of this phenomenon is found in Burton R. Clark, *Academic Power in Italy* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1977).
19. Margaret Archer, *The Social Origins of Educational Systems* (London: Sage, 1978).
20. Jan-Erik Lane, "University Autonomy — A New Analysis," a working paper of the Center for Administrative Studies, Umea University (1977), p. 46.
21. Levy, *University and Government*, pp. 100-37.
22. More consideration must be given to which areas of international governance are crucial to autonomy and which might more reasonably allow for greater State involvement. See, for example, Robert Berdahl, *Statewide Co-ordination of Higher Education* (Washington, D.C.: American Council on Education, 1971), pp. 8, 253.

THE SOCIAL POSITION OF ACADEMICS IN AUSTRALIAN SOCIETY: SOME OBJECTIVE AND SUBJECTIVE PERSPECTIVES*

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Whether he be king or clergyman, lawyer, soldier, physician, professor, merchant, dealer or artisan, he is worthy of his wage, and he need not blush to claim it, if only this is not his highest reward.[1]

In 1860, this statement by the Rev. Dr. John Woolley, the first Professor of Classics at the University of Sydney, paid service to the egalitarian ethos of Australian society. It is ironic that in the early years of Australian university life, it was an academic who argued for an equality of status for all occupational endeavours. However, throughout the years, the egalitarian ethos has been declared a myth. Then, as well as now, academics in Australia have held positions of high status, along with other members of the professional community. This prestige has been called "disproportionate", "desperately courted", and "distasteful to many thinking Australians".[2] Yet, apart from the fleeting comments of journalists and social commentators, the social position of academics has rarely been, if ever, studied directly or systematically.

It can no longer be doubted that occupations in Australia, as indeed elsewhere, are differentially valued and receive unequal status and prestige by the general population. The cumulative evidence from empirical research suggests considerable consensus about the social ranking of occupations, even with the precise measurement instruments and conceptual refinements of contemporary social science research.[3] However, little research has been done about the consequences of differences in prestige on recruitment and career patterns by individuals in those occupations.

The Importance of Social Position

One important theory in sociology argues that recruitment to and the performance of occupational roles is directly related to the rewards accruing to those occupying those roles. The argument contends that career patterns are more or less a matter of choice, and that the decision to pursue a particular career is the result of a rational assessment of the costs and benefits a particular career might be expected to provide. Furthermore, the rewards which accrue to certain careers is held to be the result of societal consensus, which implicitly allocates those rewards on the basis of the "need" that certain occupations be chosen and performed at a high standard. Thus the benefits of a career in medical practice are seen as the results of the costs of becoming a medical practitioner (in terms of training time and forgone benefits) as well as the societal need for a constant supply of committed medicos. The theory also suggests that the level of performance of the duties, skills and responsibilities of careers is also affected by the reward structure. It is clear, according to this perspective then, that recruitment to a career and the quality of career performance are a function of the social position of the career in the society.

Career reward structure includes many dimensions. The most obvious and that which receives most attention is monetary reward. Jobs and occupations are often regarded in terms of the salaries or income attached to them. Thus a career which results in a high income is generally regarded as being highly valued, important and necessary for society. In addition most occupations involving high income also require longer training periods than most, and thus involve larger costs. However, another dimension of the reward structure which does not involve money is that of prestige or social position. Often high social status and prestige will be attributed to an occupation even though the monetary rewards may be low. This is most frequently the case with jobs involving traditional roles in society, for example, religious or some political careers.

Academics represent persons holding a unique position in this context. The social role of the man of knowledge in society has been explored by social scientists.[4] However, in more precise contexts, academics provide additional services in society because of the emergent multiple roles of universities and colleges. Universities and other similar tertiary institutions not only provide havens for society's intellectuals and social commentators, but also represent important training grounds for certain professions and vocationally specific careers.

Academics, however, do not simply hold jobs; they are also members of a professional community. As such the reward structure is related to both monetary rewards and prestige in society generally, as well as other more professional rewards, such as professional standing and professional advancement. Academics generally argue that the latter are more important than the former, and that ultimately the intrinsic satisfaction of academic work, be it teaching or research, supersedes both of the above.[5] However,

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