

COMPREHENSIVE UNIVERSITIES?

In a crisp and stimulating paper* read at the 1980 Conference of HERDSA, and reported in the *Australian Higher Education Supplement* on May 7, 1980, Dr. Ron Parry (1) commented that the decision of the Tasmanian Government to hand over a major part of the activities of the Hobart Branch of the Tasmanian College of Advanced Education to the University of Tasmania highlighted the failure of the Williams Committee to comprehend the instability of the Martin binary principles, (2) predicted that the Tasmanian system would soon be copied elsewhere in Australia, (3) warned against such measures without first contemplating the role of TAFE, and (4) threw out for debate a suggestion that States might create a new type of university made up of TAFE colleges, CAEs and the universities that decided to go "comprehensive" in order to survive to deal with the problems of rationalisation.

I think that Dr. Parry over-estimated the significance of the Tasmanian decision. The Kearney Committee recommended that the University should have the major responsibility for tertiary education in the south and the CAE in the North. The recent decision to go a little further became possible because — to quote the Tasmanian TEC — the University undertook "to provide all the features of teacher education required in the South" and in particular "an integrated B.Ed. course". It does not seem to me that because of this, to quote Dr. Parry, the Government of Tasmania "in one crisp decision over-turned the framework of our national dialogue on the nature of higher education and the relationships between them".

Dr. Parry placed great emphasis on the University's decision to describe itself as a "comprehensive university" and to offer some sub-degree courses. But the very claim that the University will become a "comprehensive university" is misleading and should be abandoned. The University is and will remain a much less comprehensive university than the Universities of Sydney, Melbourne and Queensland. The two significant changes in Tasmania are (1) a sharper geographical specialisation between the University and the CAE and (2) the decision of the University to take over a small number of sub-degree programs, and neither is at all revolutionary.

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Sub-degree programs were common practice in universities before the Universities Commission adopted the views of the Murray and Martin Committees that universities should abandon them. The Williams Committee pointed to the success of some CAEs in providing TAFE courses without losing their "integrity" and of some TAFE colleges in providing advanced education courses without losing interest in "lower level" courses, and suggested that some universities introduce or re-introduce sub-degree courses (for up to 20% of enrolments) where that would lead to more economical operations and/or an extension of educational opportunities. The Committee suggested the use of "contracting across the sectors" to provide a co-ordinating mechanism.

It is intriguing that Dr. Parry regards the Tasmanian decision as contrary to the Williams Committee analysis and recommendations whereas — subject to one reservation — I take the opposite view. My reservation in applauding the Tasmanian development relates to the possible response of the Federal TEC to the move. Dr. Parry maintained that after Deakin "the binary philosophy could never be the same again in Australia". Deakin bulked large in CAE submissions to the Committee of Inquiry into Education and Training, and the sudden change in course-approvals procedures and in levels of finance when a university was created to replace the Teachers College and the Gordon Institute of Technology was submitted as evidence that the binary approach simply perpetuated favourable treatment for institutions called universities. That view would be strengthened and the basic binary approach weakened if the University of Tasmania created a significant number of sub-degree programs and admitted a significant number of students to them, but the TEC treated the degree and diploma programs at the University as covered by the normal procedures and financial formulae of the Universities Council.

I agree of course with Dr. Parry that post-secondary boards in other States should not rush to copy Tasmania without considering the role of TAFE — nor I would add without a careful study of the action rather than the rhetoric in Tasmania.

CO-ORDINATING AND GOVERNING BOARDS: COMPLEMENTARY OR CONFLICTING ROLES

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The Evolution of Statewide Boards

By all historical and comparative standards, most American states have remarkable accomplishments to their credit in higher education. Given a primary role by virtue of history and the U.S. Constitution, the states, from some early colonial support for private colleges to the emergence of large public systems over the past hundred years, have invested vast sums of public tax money to support wider access, greater diversity, and enhanced quality. Of course, many close to higher education will immediately protest this generalisation and point to lingering injustices in rates of college attendance, to various signs of the decline of diversity, and to assorted evidence of the threats to academic standards.

Yet for those who will put things in perspective, either historically or in terms of higher education systems abroad, the overall verdict must be that, by and large, the states have done well. This is particularly true when another important variable is added to the picture. For most of the time in most of the states, this support of public tax funds has been accompanied by a "self-denying ordinance" whereby the state which paid the piper agreed not to call the tune. The surprising thing is not that some states now and then have attempted to intervene in academic matters, but that, as the level of tax funds increased to finance the transition from elite to mass higher education, there have not been more such interventions.

Normally instrumentalities of state governments were required to operate under fairly tight fiscal controls in order to ensure that their activities and expenditures were in strict conformity with their established legal base. When the states began to found public universities, however, they turned not to their normal models of public accountability but rather to the private sector precedents wherein charters had been granted to legal entities known as boards of trustees (or some variation of this term) who thereby gained the power to govern the institutions largely free of state public sector controls. Of course, the exact powers granted to the public institutions varied somewhat from state to state, and as time passed and more colleges were established, they varied even within a state from one type of institution to another. But the following summary provides a picture of some dimensions of the self-denying ordinance.¹

• Twenty-three states give some form of constitutional recognition to higher education whereas few state departments, other than constitutional offices, are so recognised.

- Forty states confer corporate powers on their highest educational boards (few other departments have them).
- Elections or appointments of board members are for a longer period than for most public offices, and it is often specified that selection of board members be on a nonpolitical basis.
- Many boards have been given direct borrowing power rarely given to state divisions.
- Many are given power to appoint treasurers and select their own depositories and disburse funds, especially institutional funds, directly — a condition very rare in other state agencies.
- Many higher education boards are given wide discretion and in many instances complete autonomy on policy matters, such as admission requirements, graduation requirements, programmes, courses, and degrees to be offered.
- Almost all states leave to the higher education boards full authority over all matters relating to academic and professional personnel.
- Most states require more or less complete personnel reporting in connection with the budget but leave final determination to the boards after the appropriation is made. Few boards are given complete authority over administrative and clerical personnel other than the highest administrative position.

A major difference from the private sector after the Dartmouth College Case in 1819 was that except for those instances where such legal arrangements were put into state constitutions state grants of power to public institution governing boards could later be altered by mere state legislation.² And, of course, even state constitution provisions could be amended, albeit with greater difficulty. The impressive thing is that, given the pressures which emerged, so many essentials of the self-denying ordinance survived as long as they did in as many states as they did.

Let us examine now the ways in which the increasing size, cost and complexity of both higher education and other state government activities over the past 100 years or so have ultimately caused nearly all states to modify the self-denying ordinance.

The Emergence of Complexity

When, in a given state, there was only one state university, its lay board of trustees could advise the governor and state legislators on what programmatic and fiscal policies they considered to be in the best interests of both the university and the state. Student

* See previous article

numbers were so low, the costs involved were so relatively modest and curriculum issues in the early days of classical studies were so straightforward that most problems emerging between the early university and state government could be worked out on a direct bilateral basis. The trustees, after all, had been appointed partly on the basis of their ability to include a concern for the public interest in their deliberations. Furthermore, such trustees often had strong political connections with which to back up their advice.

But the century following the Civil War witnessed basic changes in several aspects of American life which were ultimately to have major impact on higher education. The economy gradually shifted from agricultural to industrial; society similarly moved from rural to urban; state governments left behind *laissez faire* for extensive regulatory and welfare activities; and the national government grew in power and functions even more than the states. Responding to these changes, higher education developed from an elite to a mass system (now poised on the brink of universal access) with accompanying increases in number and diversity of institutions, in costs and in complexity of curriculum.

These additional layers of complexity can be examined one by one. First, following the Morrill Act of 1862, a number of states established separate land-grant institutions to teach agriculture and mechanical arts, although in some cases these functions were simply assumed by the existing state university or contracted to private colleges. In any case, the curriculum was broadened, more students were attracted and both diversity and costs increased.

Next, to the traditional offerings of the state university were added increased interest in graduate education and research, heavily influenced by German science, and new programmes in public service, a distinctly American contribution to higher education, exemplified by the practice of the "Wisconsin idea" at Madison by President Van Hise.

The resulting richness of programme has been well described.⁹

Universities began extensive research programmes in the physical and biological sciences; provided new services for the farmers, industries and other special-interest groups; added professional schools in new areas such as social work, public administration, industrial relations, and municipal management; further specialised in agriculture, medicine, and dentistry; and increased course offerings in almost all previously existing academic fields. Land-grant colleges began to extend their programmes into academic and professional disciplines which had traditionally been offered only by the state university.

Another layer of complexity resulted from the spread of normal schools, speeded by state moves to compulsory secondary education. Soon many of these institutions became state teachers colleges; then

some became state colleges, with programmes through the master's degree in liberal arts and business administration as well as education; and finally, an increasing minority has even been designated as state universities, with expansion into doctoral level work occasionally permitted.

Another major source of growth and diversity has been the American community college movement. Catering particularly to urban areas relatively neglected by earlier established universities and colleges, the junior colleges widened access to large new groups of young people: those who could not meet the admission standards of some four-year institutions and those who lived in areas without such four-year institutions and who could not afford to attend college unless they lived at home. As time passed, these institutions also broadened their functions and became "community colleges" where college transfer, two-year technical and adult education programs were all combined. Although these institutions began as products of local government, problems of funding, planning and co-ordination gradually brought them more and more into the statewide orbit as well.

State problems with higher education were not confined merely to appropriating adequate funds to provide the necessary facilities for student access, as difficult as even this probably was. In addition, thorny questions arose about the desirability of the state university and land-grant college beginning to overlap in programmes, about the wisdom of normal schools evolving toward university status, about the educational rationale for two-year institutions becoming four-year ones.

In these various issues, the device of traditional lay trustees was something less than totally effective in helping the state to resolve them. The same "boosting" spirit that made each local Chamber of Commerce work to put its city larger on the map also operated in most governing boards to cause them to push aggressively for bigger and better facilities and programmes. Often such requests were justified, but sometimes they were not. While governors and state legislators had considerable practice in working through budgetary fights — even bitter ones — they lacked any frame of reference by which to judge the increasingly complex questions relating to allocations of new programmes and changed institutional missions.

The problem of responding to competing and contradictory lay trustees' advice was compounded by the fact that state governments were expanding many of their other functions at the same time: agriculture, highways, police protection and prisons, public health and hospitals, parks and recreation, welfare and industrial regulation — all these and others demanded time, attention and state funds.

During the years when early state legislative suspicions of excessive gubernatorial power still lingered,

the part-time legislators would tend to piecemeal, *ad hoc* responses to these various pressures — and a maze of overlapping boards, commissions and agencies were created, each with its own goals and budget needs. Relative political strength rather than relative state needs more often than not determined the results.

It gradually became evident that only a greatly strengthened state executive office could bring some coherence out of this haphazard crazyquilt mode of operations. Starting with Illinois in 1917, state after state undertook a comprehensive reorganisation and consolidation of government. The following five principles were generally observed.⁴

1. Consolidate all operating state agencies into a small number of departments, each organised around a function of the government.
2. Establish clear lines of authority from the governor to all departments and state agencies.
3. Establish staff offices and controls to provide the governor with the administrative techniques necessary for effective direction.
4. Eliminate as many administrative boards and commissions as possible.
5. Provide a post-audit system under the legislative branch.

The consequences of such a reorganisation were to centre state policy-making power in the executive budget process. Supplementary controls over most state activities evolved in other staff offices: a controller would pre-audit expenditures for "legality" and sometimes for "propriety" as well; a central purchasing office would order all major supplies and equipment; a civil service commission would control the hiring, remuneration and administration of personnel; a state planning or public works office might exert detailed controls over the design and construction of public buildings. The overall idea (often imperfectly realised) was for the governor to be given both the power and the responsibility to run a coherent administration and a tight ship.

To retain some degree of legislative check on this burgeoning executive power, most states provided for a post-audit to be conducted under legislative supervision, and an increasing number of state legislative bodies have created their own review and research agencies, with substantial staff to provide careful analysis of executive fiscal and programme proposals. State activities, then, would often receive rigorous examination from both executive and legislative branches.

State Responses to Increased Complexity and Cost in Higher Education

At a time then, when many other independent and quasi-independent state activities were being brought under more direct executive control and legislative scrutiny, did the self-denying ordinance

relationship survive the general weakening in the lay trustee pattern of coping with increased costs and complexity in higher education? The answer to this varies from state to state, and from period to period, but a safe generalisation is that by the 1970s all states except three had moved to replace the original bilateral relationship involving great institutional freedom of action, with some type of formal statewide board of higher education, dealing with the institutions on a multilateral basis and narrowing sometimes more, sometimes less, their former freedom of action. It is nevertheless also true that the creation of these statewide boards with their special status (several are even established on a constitutional basis) represents a distinct continuing concession from state government, often still exempting higher education operations from the controls normally imposed on other state activities.

Although normal schools and teachers colleges in some states were administered on a multilateral basis by one governing board (frequently the state board of education because of its interest in teacher education), the first truly statewide boards for all senior institutions in a multiple-unit system were created in the early twentieth century. Superseding any existing institutional or sub-system governing structures, consolidated governing boards were established in Florida in 1905, in Iowa in 1906 and in some 14 other states (including Alaska and Hawaii, later added to the Union) by the end of World War II.

In the other 34 states, however, state government continued to deal directly with separate institutional or sub-system boards, notwithstanding increased strain in doing so. In some 11 states between 1945 and 1970, presidents sensed the increasing danger of state modification of the bilateral patterns and moved to set up more or less formal channels for voluntary interinstitutional co-ordination. Only one of those 11 voluntary associations still survives, however, and legislation has been introduced several times recently in Nebraska to institute a statutory statewide board in that state as well.

In 28 states a statutory board has been created on the co-ordinating model wherein institutional and/or sub-system governing boards continue to function, but within the multilateral planning and co-ordinating guidelines laid down by the co-ordinating board. Unlike the consolidated model which universally has strong governing powers, or the voluntary association which universally lacked any binding powers, the co-ordinating boards differ markedly from state to state, ranging from purely advisory functions to powers of lump-sum appropriations protected by constitutional status.

The federal Higher Education Amendments Act of 1972 included a Section 1202 which authorised the states to designate a new or existing agency as the

state planning commission for postsecondary education. Although the amount of federal funds to be allocated was, and remains, extremely modest, some 46 states have either designated their existing statewide boards (sometimes with augmented

membership to meet federal requirements of broad representation of all institutions, public and private, voc. ed. and proprietary) or created a new 1202 commission. The resulting pattern is indicated in Table 1.

TABLE 1
A Classification of States by Pattern of Statewide Boards and 1202 Commissions, 1975

1.	No statewide co-ordinating board (1202 only)	Delaware Nebraska	Vermont
2a.	Consolidated board (acting as 1202)	Hawaii (augmented) Idaho	Montana (augmented) Nevada (augmented) North Dakota (augmented) Rhode Island (augmented) Utah (augmented) West Virginia (augmented)
2b.	Consolidated board (with separate 1202)	Alaska Arizona Florida Georgia Iowa Kansas Maine North Carolina	Mississippi South Dakota
2c.	Consolidated board (with no 1202)		Wisconsin
3a.	Advisory co-ordinating board (acting as 1202)	Arkansas (augmented) California Maryland (augmented) Michigan Alabama	Minnesota New Hampshire Washington Wyoming
3b.	Advisory co-ordinating board (with separate 1202)		
3c.	Advisory co-ordinating board (with no 1202)		
4a.	Regulatory co-ordinating board (acting as 1202)	Connecticut Illinois Indiana Louisiana Massachusetts (augmented) Missouri New Jersey (augmented)	New Mexico New York Ohio Oklahoma Oregon Pennsylvania (augmented) South Carolina (augmented) Virginia
4b.	Regulatory co-ordinating board (with separate 1202)		Texas
4c.	Regulatory co-ordinating board (with no 1202)	Kentucky Colorado	Tennessee

The Declining Yet Substantial Role of Governing Boards

There are clearly a variety of forces, both internal and external, which are acting to lessen the areas of operating discretion formerly enjoyed by college and university boards of trustees. One has only to mention the increase in faculty unions, in student lobbying, in state and federal controls and in various accreditation activities to sense some of the constraints on board decisions.

Yet, even while it is important to recognise the changing dimensions of board powers, it is also necessary to insist that strong crucial powers remain. It is a shrinking but still vital core area and high quality board performance is necessary.

Perhaps the best way to illustrate this diminished but still essential board role is to quote at some length from an excellent article by Harold Enarson, a President of Ohio State University. In a 1974 address to the American Association for Higher Education on "What's Left on Campus to Govern",⁵ he said:

"We in the university world have watched this accumulation of external authority over the life of the university in moods ranging from vague disquiet to near despair. Recently we have witnessed an acceleration in the imposition of external controls. All this has created a literature that is rich with the language of lamentation. We speak sadly of outside **intervention**, of **intrusions** into internal affairs, of the **erosion** of autonomy, of the **homogenisation** of higher education, of the **excesses** of centralisation.

We lay full claim to the pejorative phrase, and saturate our lamentations with emotion-riddled words such as **red tape**, **bureaucracy**, **politicisation**, and the like. In short, most of us bring to the new scene the fine discrimination and objectivity which the **Chicago Tribune** brought to the role of the federal government. The "burocracy" that Colonel McCormick made famous now threatens to engulf us — and we do not like it one bit!

In all this, clarity of thought would be served if we were to distinguish between the rhetoric of debate and political squabble on the one hand and the reality of substantive issues on the other hand. It may be good debating tactics for universities to talk of **state bureaucrats**, just as it is good tactics for state system people to talk about institutional **insularity**, **narrow local perspectives**, and the like. But such rhetoric does not help us to grapple thoughtfully with immensely difficult issues.

No state-supported institution anywhere exists apart from the state which created it and whose public interest it exists to serve. By the same token, no state co-ordinating agency, or any other agency of government for that matter, serves the great goals of efficiency, economy and accountability unless it has a sophisticated and sensitive grasp of the transcendent importance of quality education, in all its rich and varied meanings.

We should expect that the individual university would have legitimate concerns about the kinds of intervention it experiences at the hands of external authority. But the state agency overseeing higher education also has equally legitimate concerns. Its public charge generally includes the wise use of resources, improved delivery of educational services to neglected constituencies and communities, the fair pricing of education, and the balanced development of all the constituent units that make up a state system. Both the university and the state system agency are accountable to the public through their elected representatives. If the state agency "intrudes" in institutional affairs, as it frequently does, it is also true that the university may "intrude" in the domain of the state agency by actions that conflict with public obligations imposed on the state agency. Put simply, any unbridled provincialism on the part of the university is as threatening to the public interest as is the desire of state agencies to police universities for the sake of control itself.

Plainly the task ahead is to develop consultative relationships that bring the legitimate concerns of the individual institutions and the legitimate concerns of state agencies into shared perspectives. Warfare is too costly. Moreover, in most states both the universities and the state higher education agency share — at the deepest level of conviction — those multiple goals symbolised by words such as equity, efficiency, economy, excellence, pluralism, diversity, and the like. Our conflicts — intense and passionate as they seem — are hardly civil wars. Rather they are lover's quarrels by persons who see many things differently but who unite in strong conviction that the higher learning is our mutual concern and responsibility. Put still another way, some state control of public higher education is inescapable just as some substantial degree of institutional independence is indispensable. Our collective task is to make a planned "mesh of things." Wars of manoeuvre are poor substitutes for responsible, creative statecraft.

Our would-be controllers need to take to heart our lectures on the tyranny of excessive centralisation and thoughtless intrusion. But those of us serving in the universities need to take to heart the admonition that we cease our lamentations and take a firmer hand in attacking those matters that are unmistakably within our direct responsibility.

We ask ourselves, "What is left on campus to govern?" almost as if to invite a cynical response. In moods of exhaustion, a president is tempted to say that he is left with all the distasteful tasks of governance: to divide a starvation budget equitably, to pacify a restless student body, to telephone the Mayor or Governor or National Guard to quell the streakers, to mediate intramural controversies, and to put a fair face on the disaster of a losing athletic team. However, as John Gardner has so often emphasised, these large systems within which we spend our working lives contain much more elbow room for personal initiative than we dare admit, especially to ourselves.

So what's left to govern? **Just about everything.**

- The lump sum appropriation is fairly common; we have the necessary legal freedom to alter priorities in the division of resources.
- Faculty and deans and vice presidents are not hired or fired by super-boards; this is our sweet privilege.
- The humane and efficient management of our dormitory systems is our task alone; no super-board in its right mind would have it otherwise.
- The initiative for seeking research grants, foundation largess, and private fund raising is exclusively ours.
- The demotion of losing coaches is everyone's interest but the exclusive burden of the president and/or the trustees.
- The organisation of curricula and of courses of instruction is still our domain, as are methods of instruction and measures of student performance.
- We are free to reorganise our administrative structure, consolidate departments, create centres and institutes, pioneer in inter-disciplinary ventures, and join in inter-institutional co-operative ventures.
- As for the tenure system, this briar patch is ours to enjoy or to modify as we wish.

What else is in our domain? Well, we are free to revitalise liberal education, shorten the curricula, revise subject matter requirements, and even to alter drastically the internal system of governance. We are free — thankfully — to choose the text books, the library materials, and the laboratory equipment we desire; free to alter the standard tests used for admission to professional schools; free to open classes in the evening; free to combat excesses of specialisation; and free to run bars, restaurants, bookstores, art galleries, sports programmes, alumni tours, overseas excursions, and all those other good things.

Perhaps we have more freedom, even with all the constraints, than we have the talent, courage and imagination to exercise.

We are free to enforce the "no-smoking" signs in the classroom, to require full work for full pay, to equalise teaching loads, to police the manifest abuses of our grading systems, to improve space utilisation by using late afternoon hours for instruction, to recruit minorities (at least for the present) and even to expel star athletes who flunk Physical Education 101.

So what else is left to govern? Only educational policy in virtually every aspect — that's all.

- We can despair in the face of the dreary statistics on the new depression in higher education, or we can change those educational policies and practices which deny working people of all ages equal access to educational opportunity and deny ourselves the market that we need to sustain enrolments.
- We can deplore the current emphasis on career training as the triumph of mere vocationalism, or we can fashion much improved counselling services along with planned work-study experiences. There is simply no good reason why the world of work and the world of formal classroom instruction cannot be melded in creative ways which permit the student to test job interests while experiencing the relevance, or lack of relevance, of formal classroom instruction.
- We can limp along with the present system of requirements for a baccalaureate degree, or we can critically examine our systems — more likely "non-systems" — and find ways to save everyone's time. There is something terribly wrong when a typical student requires 4½ years to complete a standard four-year programme. Yet this wasteful stretch-out is now generally the common experience.
- We can cherish our few remaining overseas projects, lament the nation's new isolationism, deplore the fading interest of the foundations and the federal government in promoting an international dimension, or we can redefine our academic requirements to include a far more vivid sense of the diversity of world cultures and of our mutual dependence. The familiar incantations in defence of a foreign language requirement intone the symbols rather than the substance of cross-cultural understanding.
- We can be timorous in the face of collapsing standards and intellectual sloth, or we can insist that the fifty-minute classroom hour require intellectual rigour from teacher and student alike; that the grading system be fair and equitable; that the syllabus be coherent and relevant — and that it be honoured; and that the teaching-learning enterprise be infused throughout with an insistence on high quality performance.

Let's face it — the agenda is crowded with tasks that are solely within the competence and concern of the individual college or university. In these great domains no state agencies constrain us, intrude upon us, or dictate to us.

It was Sartre who insisted that free men are 'condemned to freedom'. So it is with our colleges and universities. We are condemned to much more choice than we are prepared to acknowledge, let alone to face. It is much easier to rail at the insensitivity of "that world out there" — the governors, legislators, state bureaucracies, and an 'indifferent public' than it is to face up to the burden of choice."

Division of Powers Between Co-ordinating and Governing Boards

While President Enarson's general observations are both accurate and reassuring, they are not meant to chart out the exact distribution of powers in any particular state system. Those of us who have studied a multiplicity of such systems find that the details vary markedly from one state to another, depending as much on the role of personalities, politics and history as on that of formal differences in structure.

Notwithstanding such diversity in details, the Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching, in a Commentary on **The States and Higher Education**,⁵ is urging each state to follow the precedent of the Washington State plan for postsecondary education in trying to sort out which powers would be located centrally and which would reside at the campus level. Obviously, the resulting treaties or covenants would reflect the particular conditions prevailing in each separate state. But since the Washington State plan used the Glenny, Berdahl, Palola and Paltridge model⁷ as a point of departure, I will repeat that pattern here and then follow it with comparable patterns drawn from an earlier Carnegie Commission work⁸ and a Task Force of the American Association of State Colleges and Universities.⁹ All of these plus another by Fred Harclerod can be found in an excellent Education Commission of the States report, **Co-ordination or Chaos**.¹⁰

Powers Necessary for Co-ordination

As a participatory agency, the co-ordinating board must rely on widespread consensus for its decisions, and on persuasion and co-operation rather than fiat and pure power for policy and implementation. Nevertheless, certain legal powers are necessary to the board to underpin and reinforce the intent of the state to plan and create a comprehensive system. We recommend that the board have the following minimum powers:

- to engage in continuous planning, both long-range and short-range;
- to acquire information from all postsecondary institutions and agencies through the establishment of statewide management and data systems;

- to review and approve new and existing degree programmes, new campuses, extension centres, departments and centres of all public institutions, and, where substantial state aid is given, of all private institutions;
- to review and make recommendations on any and all facets of both operating and capital budgets and, when requested by state authorities, present a consolidated budget for the whole system; and
- to administer directly or have under its co-ordinative powers all state scholarship and grant programmes to students, grant programmes to non-public institutions, and all state-administered federal grant and aid programmes.

Perhaps the key jurisdictional issue between the co-ordinating board and the institutional boards is where to draw the dividing line between their respective powers and responsibilities. Some co-ordinating staff members, impatient with group processes and widespread participation by interested parties and often lacking skill in leadership and persuasion, seek increased power to intervene directly into the legitimate provinces of institutional governing boards and their staffs. The exercise of such power finally leads both legislators and institutional leaders to the conclusion that institutional governing boards are superfluous. Thus, the chief advantages of co-ordination have been lost to the state and to the institutions.

If the co-ordinating board is not to pre-empt the *raison d'être* of the institutional governing board, it should stay out of the following matters (and if the law now allows these interventions, the board should use great restraint in exercising the powers):

1. student affairs, **except** general admissions standards, enrolment ceilings, and enrolment mixes applicable to the various systems and sub-systems of institutions;
2. faculty affairs (hiring, promotion, tenure, dismissal, salaries), **except** general guidelines applicable to salaries;
3. selection and appointment of any person at the institutional or agency level, including the president or chief executive and board members;
4. approval of travel, in-state or out-of-state, for staff of any institution;
5. planning of courses or programmes, including their content, and selecting subjects of research;
6. presenting of arguments and supporting materials for institutional operating or capital budgets, **except** that the board should present and support its own recommendations on budgets;
7. contractual relationships for construction, land acquisition, equipment, and services;
8. general policing or maintenance of civil order on campus; and
9. negotiations and contractual relationships with unions representing institutional personnel, **except** that such negotiations may be conducted within guidelines and/or budgetary parameters set by the state or board.⁷

Carnegie Commission Recommendations⁸

Distribution of Authority

To achieve balance between public control and influence versus institutional independence, the commission favours the following patterns for the distribution of authority between public agencies (including co-ordinating councils) and academic institutions (including multicampus systems):

Public Control

Basic responsibility for law enforcement
 Right to insist on political neutrality of institutions of higher education
 Duty to appoint trustees of public institutions of higher education (or to select them through popular election)

Right to reports and accountability on matters of public interest
 Duty of courts to hear cases alleging denial of general rights of a citizen and of unfair procedures

Institutional Independence
 Governance

Right to refuse oaths not required of all citizens in similar circumstances
 Right to independent trustees: No *ex officio* regents with subsequent budgetary authority
 Right to non-partisan trustees as recommended by some impartial screening agency, or as confirmed by some branch of the state legislature, or both; or as elected by the public

Financial and Business Affairs

Appropriation of public funds on basis of general formulas that reflect quantity and quality of output
 Post-audit, rather than pre-audit, of expenditures, of purchases, of personnel actions

Assignment of all funds to specific purposes
 Freedom to make expenditures within budget, to make purchases, and to take personnel actions subject only to post-audit
 Determination of individual work loads and of specific assignments to faculty and staff members

Examination of effective use of resources on a post-audit basis
 Standards for accounting practices and post-audit of them
 General level of salaries
 Appropriation of public funds for buildings on basis of general formulas for building requirements

Determination of specific salaries
 Design of buildings and assignment of space

Academic and Intellectual Affairs

General policies on student admissions:
 Number of places
 Equality of access
 Academic level of general eligibility among types of institutions

Selection of individual students

General distribution of students by level of division
 Policies for equal access to employment for women and for members of minority groups
 Policies on differentiation of functions among systems of higher education and on specialisation by major fields of endeavour among institutions
 No right to expect secret research or service from members of institutions of higher education; and no right to prior review before publication of research results; but right to patents where appropriate

Academic policies for, and actual selection and promotion of, faculty members
 Approval of individual courses and course content

Policies on and administration of research and service activities

Enforcement of the national Bill of Rights
 Policies on size and rate of growth of campuses

Determination of grades and issuance of individual degrees
 Selection of academic and administrative leadership
 Policies on academic freedom
 Policies on size and rate of growth of departments and schools and colleges within budgetary limitations
 Academic programmes for new campuses and other major new endeavours within general authorisation

Influence but not Public Control

Institutional Independence

Academic Affairs — Innovation

Encouragement of innovation through inquiry, recommendation, allocation of special funds, application of general budgetary formulas, starting new institutions

Development of and detailed planning for innovation

Levels of Decision for Higher Education Functions⁹

Function	Elements in the System			
	State Government	Co-ordination Element	Governance Element	Institution
System Organisational Structure	Establishes broad structural arrangements. Defines role of elements	Develops detailed co-ordinating policies and procedures	Develops detailed governing	Participates in development of co-ordinating and governance
Programme Allocation	Adopts broad general guidelines	Assumes major recommending and decision-making responsibility recognising interests of governing element and institutions	Approves on basis of co-ordinating element recommendations and institutional capabilities and interests	Develops and executes programmes
Budget Development	Very broad policy. Appropriates funds	Reviews and relates budget to entire state's needs and recommends in terms of priorities	Approves budget request with respect to justifiable needs (for own institution)	Prepares budget request
Fiscal Policies	Broad regulations, relations with other state agencies	Organises broad policy guidelines	Approves institutional recommendations which conform to state and co-ordinating element broad regulations and guidelines	Executes broad policies and develops internal policies
Programme Content		Approves in terms of needs of state	Approves mainly in terms of institutional capability	Proposes, develops and operates
Personnel Selection	Establishes broad policy	Co-ordinates among elements within state policy	Approves institutional policies and considers institutional recommendations within policies	Participates in development of policy and executes selection
Planning	Expresses state interests and needs	Articulates plans of institutions and governing elements. Executes necessary statewide plans	Expresses governing element interests and concerns. Co-ordinates with other elements	Maintains continuous planning programme. Initiates planning of institutional programme
Evaluation-Accountability	Establishes basic requirements	Co-ordinates among elements	Establishes basic policy	Executes policy, accepts responsibility for effective performance
Capital Programmes	Very broad policy. Appropriates funds	Approves in terms of state priorities and needs	Approves in terms of institutional goals and needs	Prepares and proposes capital programme and recommends priorities

Evaluating the Results

Ideally, when all the sorting out of powers is completed and the agreed system has been operational for an adequate time, there would be some way to evaluate the way it all is working.

The ECS Task Force on Comprehensive Statewide Planning for Postsecondary Education¹¹ recommended that in addition to thinking conceptually about long-range planning in both strategic and tac-

tical terms, efforts should be made periodically to establish an independent evaluation of the process itself, not encumbered with efforts to rethink substance as such.

Only one state — Alabama — now has provisions for formal outside evaluation every four years.¹² But evaluation is very much "blowing in the wind" these days and I predict the formal process will become more common — via such legislative innovations as

the so-called "sunset" laws (e.g., all Colorado state agencies must pass scrutiny and be recreated every so many years) if not by other more specifically higher education approaches.

At the level of the governing board, Gil Paltridge of the Berkeley Center is now working with the Association of Governing Boards to develop board self-evaluation kits for trustees at public four-year, private four-year and public two-year colleges. So it may soon be possible for board members to use carefully designed instruments to see if they are living up to their challenges. I, of course, would press strongly to include several self-evaluation questions concerning board relations with the statewide co-ordinating board. Here I don't want to be misunderstood: there is nothing in my training as a political scientist that tells me it will be possible — or even desirable — to set up structures and seek personalities wherein all differences and conflicts between governing boards and a central co-ordinating board can be made to disappear. There will always be areas where differences in constituencies, in perspectives and in perceived interests will — and should — lead to vigorous disagreement over given issues in postsecondary education. A co-ordinating board is no more infallible than other social institutions, and it needs strong and articulate institutions as healthy counterpressures. But, given some goodwill of the kind expressed by Harold Enarson, open decision-making procedures, accurate data gathering and no small doses of statesmanship, it should be possible to confine the disagreements to non-pathological levels.

The Carnegie Commission recommended that some national association like the American Council on Education (ACE) create with the addition of significant lay participation an equivalent operation to the AAUP Committee which investigates allegations of abuses of academic freedom.¹³ The ACE counterpart would have been on call to examine alleged cases of abuse of central powers. While no one has moved to implement this recommendation (the prospect of trying to apply sanctions to guilty states may have been too perplexing), Roger Heyns, President of the ACE, did send out a letter on January 6, 1976, announcing that his organisation would establish

panels of qualified persons who would then be available to visit a state where relations between the central board and institutions had become badly strained. The invited observer(s) would then do their best to restore the necessary working relationships.

In the light of the severe challenges which face postsecondary education over the next decade, let us hope that most of these co-ordinating/governing board relationships will stay healthy — or that when they deteriorate dangerously, they can be quickly restored. Anything other than that and we shall all end up as civil servants of the state, and no one that I know thinks higher education can prosper in that context.¹⁴

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ACCOUNTABILITY AND AUTONOMY: A CROSS-NATIONAL ANALYSIS OF RECENT TRENDS

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If misery loves company, then Australian academics disturbed over State encroachments on university autonomy might take some solace from cross-national comparisons. State power over higher education has been growing throughout much of the world.¹ Increased dependence on government funds, increased accountability, increased mandated inter-institutional co-ordination — these and other new common Australian themes are being widely played out, albeit with significant variations. The balance between State control and university autonomy has surely become the most salient question, cross-nationally, in the politics of higher education.

This essay focuses on the changing relationship between the State and the university. It obviously provides no more than a brief overview. It first analyses the trend toward greater direct accountability to the State; then it turns more to inter-system comparisons of the fate of institutional autonomy.

Direct Accountability

Universities today are being held accountable more than previously to the idea that they should serve the public interest directly. The notion that the university best serves the public interest indirectly, by pursuing its own goals directly, has fallen upon relatively hard times. So has the related notion that sufficient accountability is insured through free market mechanisms. The rationale of the first is that students, professors, and university administrators are the people best able to make policy dealing with teaching and research. Good teaching and research then benefit society-at-large. The rationale of the second is that market competition satisfies student and professor choice, and thereby fosters institutional responsiveness, administrative and curriculum innovation, and system flexibility.² Thus efficiency and excellence are ensured, demands met. But both rationales are losing ground to the rationale for direct accountability to the State — that the State has a responsibility actively to pursue the public interest when it spends the public dollar. While these three rationales often co-exist in different degrees, the last is ascendant and most requires elaboration.

Size is a key factor. The enrolment boom following the Second World War signalled the end of the traditional, elitist university, not just in many of the more developed countries but even in some of the less developed ones. Bigger enrolments mean bigger expenditures. Bigger expenditures, as the Robbins

Committee in England (1963) or Martin Committee in Australia (1964-5) argued, justify more direct State activity. Government expenditures generally have risen, not just in absolute but even in proportional terms so that many universities have come to rely increasingly on public revenues. Higher education claims significantly greater shares of the public dollar, even of the enlarged public education dollar, than previously. Such trends are familiar to Australians, who have seen university income evolve from a government-endowment-tuition mix to a near government monopoly, while higher education's share of the GNP more than doubled from the early 1960s to the mid-1970s.³ Heightened university dependence on government funds is generalisable to many nations (Canada, Great Britain, the U.S.) where mixed public-private funding had been characteristic. And skyrocketing government expenditures have occurred, not just in these nations but in the traditionally State-oriented ones in which public funding had already been the rule for some time. Moreover, if bigger enrolments and expenditures have been accompanied by greater accountability to the State, so has retrenchment! The argument is that scarcity makes direct protection of the public interest all the more imperative.⁴

Universities are now held directly accountable to contribute to a wide variety of social, economic and political goals — some of which their governments themselves did not actively pursue a little while back. A salient example in the U.S. concerns "affirmative action", or, to its critics, "reverse discrimination". U.S. government guidelines for aid set minimum percentage representation by race and sex within the student and professional bodies. Beyond equal opportunity employment aimed at eradicating discrimination, affirmative action fixes numerical balances which must influence future appointments. Universities have to present thorough analyses of their problems and plans to overcome them. They must prove their compliance with government policies. Not surprisingly, many universities charge that they are considered guilty until proven innocent. A paradoxical parallel to U.S. affirmative action is found in South Africa. The State there forces the university to comply with the dictates of apartheid. Whites cannot enrol in black universities and severe restrictions are placed on black attendance at white universities, according to a law ironically entitled the Extension of University Education Act (1959).⁵