

# The Private Sphere in Citizenship Education for Deliberative Democracy: The Liberal and Feminist Arguments against Public–Private Dualism

Yusuke Hirai \*

*One of the challenges in substantiating deliberative democracy as a normative theory is the educational challenge of how to cultivate civic virtue, especially mutual respect and civility, in children. The cultivation of civic virtue is not limited to school education, but is also an activity related to family education. However, liberal theorists who advocate the theory of deliberative democracy, based on the dualism of public and private, have limited their discussions to the issue of civic development in the field of public education. This article proposes to understand and compare the many competing theories on public-private dualism, particularly in liberal and feminist spaces. Beginning with an analysis of the work of liberal theorists such as David Archard as well as Harry Brighouse and Adam Swift, and moving on to that of feminist theorists such as Susan Okin, this article examines competing theories on education in school and in the family, to whom the responsibility of education belongs, and where feminist and liberal thought enlighten these debates. This article will clarify the theoretical tendencies and principles of liberal arguments aimed at overcoming the public-private dualism in education, and present a strategy for overcoming the challenges that this theory encompasses by seeking reference points in feminist thought, especially with attention to conception of relational autonomy.*

**Keywords:** education for deliberative democracy / rethinking public-private dualism / conception of relational autonomy

## 1. Introduction

The purpose of this article is to clarify the philosophical trends of liberal arguments that aim to overcome the public-private dualism concerning education and to reinforce the liberal

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\* University of Tsukuba  
e-mail: youhirai@human.tsukuba.ac.jp

theory of citizenship education toward the realization of deliberative democracy.

In modern mature societies (including Japanese society), individuals have been freed from the traditional constraints, with each person's freedom and diversity of identity widely recognized. However, it is also true that the possibility of new social integration must be questioned as a result of this progression of individualization. Educational studies must also address this issue as its theme. It is liberal thinkers who have theoretically explored how to form a just society while respecting individual freedom and recognizing diversity of identity to the fullest extent. Since the revival of political philosophy by John Rawls, there has been an ongoing debate on the compatibility between respect for individual freedom and the building of a just society, both of which are related to modern educational ideals.

In the context of the normative philosophy of education that developed in the Anglo-American sphere from the 1970s on, liberal theorists tended to discuss citizenship education for the realization of a just society from the late 1990s to the 2000s. Their theories were developed and supported by the ideals of justice, social equality, and democracy. They were primarily concerned with autonomy as the educational aim, based on the idea that once autonomous individuals are established, they can think publicly and find a way to establish a socially cooperative and just system. Here they found a sense of purpose for the resolution of diverse social issues politically through the realization of an ideal democracy.

The conception of deliberative democracy came from the hope for its realization. Deliberative democracy is a model of democracy that questions the aggregative model of democracy. The normative theory of deliberative democracy emerged in the 1990s and 2000s in the context of a pivot in democratic theory (Dryzek, 2000; Talisse, 2005). This pivot occurred when democratic theorists began to conceive of the essence of democracy not as voting, majority rule, constitutional rights, or self-government but as deliberation in the decision-making process. The problem with conventional theories of democracy is that they will not reflect the voices of minority groups in decision-making because they see preferences among participants as fixed and believe that majoritic preferences show the total will. Deliberative democracy is valuable as a philosophy required in our difficult time in that it attempts to resolve social issues by listening to and coordinating the interests of members as much as possible. However, its realization has been fraught with difficulties. Even its prominent advocate Amy Gutmann has attempted to overcome social divisions in the 2010s, going so far as to retreat from the normative nature of deliberative democracy and to advocate the theory of political compromise (Hirai, 2019). This shows how difficult it is to dissolve social divisions.

A notable feature of deliberative democracy is that participants are expected to change their preferences through deliberation (Tamura, 2008). Yet the prerequisite for deliberation to function effectively to bring about a change in preferences is that the participants must be able to respect and justify each other's opinions: they must have the civic virtue of mutual respect.

The challenge of how to foster civic virtue, especially mutual respect and civility, in children has been one of the issues to be addressed. In the 1990s, a political-philosophical inquiry into the nature of civic education was conducted by liberal theorists, intersecting with the issue of the conflicts on educational authorities of the state and parental rights of education for their own children (Hirai, 2017). The discussion in political philosophy of education in the 1990s tended to focus on conflicts over the educational objectives and contents of school education in the public realm alone, however. The development of civic virtue should

not be limited to school education; the development of moral values such as mutual respect and civility should also be part of family education. The discussion needed is one that enters the private education realm and the inner realities of family education.

The fact that liberal theorists, even Gutmann, who advocate deliberative democracy have limited their discussion of citizen formation to the realm of public education shows that the assumption of public-private dualism is strong in liberal theory building. To explore the possibility of bridging private education and civic education for the realization of deliberative democracy, arguments that overcome public-private dualism must be considered. This article focuses on recent theories of liberalism that actively discuss the nature of education in the private sphere, specifically David Archard's theory of the family and Harry Brighouse and Adam Swift's theory. Both philosophies have developed arguments that relativize public-private dualism while maintaining the position of liberalism, potentially forming a new point of view on this problem.

## **2. The Principle of Restriction of the Right of Parents to Nurture and Educate Their Children: A Philosophical Argument by David Archard**

### **2.1 Some Points of View Relativizing Public-Private Dualism**

One of the main issues for consideration in liberal citizenship education is who has authority over the education of children and what educational content is justified. In the 1980s and 1990s, these issues were philosophically examined as a problem of the conflict between the educational authority of parents and the state. The principle of guaranteeing the right of children to be educated as future citizens was presented as a principle that restricted the freedom of parents to educate their own children, with a discussion of the necessity of sharing educational authority between parents and the state (Hirai, 2017: chap. 3; chap. 6). As an extension of these discussions, the question is how the principle of justice as a social normative theory can be applied to issues surrounding the family.

One of liberalism's legitimate arguments for this question is Matthew Clayton's theory of justice in upbringing. Clayton builds the logic of coordinating parental interests and children's interests, followed by the use of Rawls's theory of political liberalism and Ronald Dworkin's theory of equality of resources to explore the basic structure of a just society (Clayton, 2007). He expands the argument for the basic structure of a just society to the family sphere and claims a conception of justice in upbringing. The reason why he extends the scope of theory of justice to the private sphere is that he thinks the following inequalities occurs in the family sphere in the distribution of resources: inequality in parenting ability, inequality in parental income, and inequalities in child care. Clayton makes the argument for correcting the inequalities between families that exist in our society, and discusses the issue of justification of state interference in the families.

British moral philosopher David Archard also addresses the tension that exists between the freedom of parents to nurture and educate their children within the family and the role of the state to protect children as future citizens to realize a just society in *Children: Rights and Childhood* (second edition, 2004) and in *The Family: A Liberal Theory* (2010). But his arguments are distinctive in that they go deeper into family values.

Archard's basic position on public-private dualism must first be considered. He asks the

deeply philosophical question, “If the family can be regulated, should it be?”, and gives the following three reasons why it should be: First, because of the interests of children; second, because of the interests of adults; and third, because of the collective interest of the family<sup>1</sup> (Archard, 2010: xvii-xviii). For the first reason, the state has reasons to monitor and control families based on the need to protect children. For the second, the family should be regulated in particular from the perspective of ensuring equality of opportunity. The kind of family into which a child was born and the kind of parental influence he/she is subject to will greatly determine his/her opportunities, attitudes, dispositions, and capacities, serving as a means of passing on advantages and disadvantages from one generation to the next. In addition, for the third reason, because the family, as the place where children grow up, is the means by which society is reproduced over time, there are good reasons to intervene in concern for future society. By offering these reasons, Archard goes on to argue that the family cannot properly be described as a private institution and to specify it as one that “properly falls within the scope of certain kinds of state and social regulation” (ibid.: xviii-xix).

Archard further states that family life in the home is normally regarded as quintessentially private, and the key liberal right of privacy ought then to protect the life an individual enjoys as a member of a family. It is therefore necessary to consider what is indeed ‘private’; Archard addresses it here:

In short, the definition of the ‘private’ in advance of the delimitation of public authority gets things the wrong way round. It is not that the acts or the space can be defined as ‘private’ independently of an appreciation of the purposes of the law and of public regulation. Rather we first define the proper scope of ‘public authority’ and understand what is private as that which falls outside that scope. Thus, the private is simply what ought not to be publicly regulated, rather than what can be described as private and then claim exemption from legal control (ibid.: 19).

According to Archard, the private is not a realm with clear boundaries that can be defined independently but rather a realm of relations whose boundaries are determined in relation to public authority. Such a view clearly shows that Archard does not believe in the clarity of public-private dualism. From this basic position, Archard develops a multifaceted theory of the family based on the principles of liberalism and advocating the family appropriately for a liberal society.

## **2.2 To What Extent and for What Reasons should the State be Allowed to Intervene in the Private Sphere?**

Archard examines the issue of to what extent the state may intervene in the upbringing of children in liberal society in his book *Children* (2004: Part 3). He first identifies the “liberal standard” that defines the proper relationship between the state, family, and children in a liberal democratic society. He states that it consists of three elements: First, the existence of a reason for involvement that places the highest priority on the best interests of the child; second, that parents, who are primarily responsible for the welfare of a particular child, are entitled to the freedom to bring up children (autonomy), free from unconsented intrusion on the family’s domain (privacy); and third, that the threshold of state intervention is clearly defined (the standards relate either to proven family breakdown or to the occurrence of serious harm to children) (Archard, 2004: 154). While confirming these criteria of liberalism, Ar-

chard stops short of endorsing them.

In the discussion of parents' rights to bear and rear their children in *Family*, Archard does not challenge the criteria of liberalism. The right to bear children is indeed recognized as a freedom of parents, but the right to rearing is conditional on the fulfillment of the obligation to provide the child with a minimum decent education to guarantee the child's future freedom (Archard, 2010: chapter 10). In the discussion developed in a later chapter, however, the need to expand the scope of state intervention is explained by extending the theory of liberalism from the perspective of promoting social justice. Although this expansion is not radical, it is necessary from the perspective of state correction of "injustice *within* the family," such as the unequal distribution of work between men and women within the family, and "injustice *between* families," such as the intergenerational transmission of educational disparities (ibid.: 158).

Archard's argument for the expansion of the role of the state can also be found in his discussion of collectivist nurturing (ibid.: chapter 13), which is essentially a thought experiment to see how much power the state should be granted to achieve social justice. Archard raises the topic of Plato's idea of the nationalization of children and the publicization of child rearing, and rejects this as flouting liberal views. He goes on to say, however, that licensing of parenthood is an option in today's society, where family forms are becoming more diverse and the traditional image of child rearing and education is becoming more relative.

With the caveat that "[t]he proposal to license parents may seem so outrageous, so wrong-headed and unjust, as to merit immediate rejection," Archard argues that it is worth offering three valid reasons why this proposal should be seriously considered (ibid.: 185). First, society does presently license a range of activities that potentially harm others and require proof of competence for safe performance (driver's licenses and medical licenses are typical examples), and there is good reason to regard nurturing as equivalent to such activities. Second, there are strict guidelines set by child-welfare agencies, such as those for selecting foster parents and potential adoptive parents. Third, the idea that authorizing parenthood is clearly wrong stems from the basic belief that humans should not need the state's permission to rear their own children, but the right to raise children is controversial and uncertain.

Archard's rationale for the possibility of licensing parenthood as a means of eliminating unfit parents who do not provide a minimum level of rearing and education for their children is fundamentally based on the standards of liberalism and therefore cannot necessarily be totally rejected. At the least, the possibility of state intervention in the family can be justified from the perspective of the child's best interest.

### **3. New Theoretical Trends in Liberalism Regarding the Dualism of Public and Private Education**

#### **3.1 The Significance of the Family in Development of Autonomy**

In a departure from Archard's argument, the educational and political philosophers Brighouse and Swift developed a theory of justice over the upbringing and education of children, examining public-private dualism. In their representative co-authored work *Family Values*, they attempt to place the discussion of the asymmetrical relationship between parents and

children within the family in the context of egalitarian liberal justice theory. They launch a discussion from the standpoint of liberalism about issues in the realm of the family that have been silenced by liberalism's retention of public-private dualism.<sup>2</sup>

Brighouse and Swift describe their position as egalitarian liberalism and describe the issue of the family as follows: "Our egalitarianism leads us to condemn the inequalities that arise between children born into different families. Our liberalism makes us worry about the rights that parents and children have over their own lives, and with respect to each other, and about the proper limits of state authority with regard to both parents and children" (Brighouse & Swift, 2014: 3). They recognize that the two challenges intersect and consider the priority between parenting freedom and its regulation. They question the compatibility between egalitarian justice and parents' rights.

In response to the conundrum of how to reconcile social equality with the nurturing of children within the family, they state that: "Our more modest aim is to offer an account of 'family values properly understood' that shows the possibility of child-rearing practices and institutions that realize the values distinctively made available by familial relationships, that respects those individual liberties that are indeed worthy of respect, and that mitigates—massively mitigates—the conflict with equality." (ibid.: 4) Like Archard, Brighouse and Swift are critical of the construction of liberal theories based on public-private dualism; they thus question the extent to which the state can intervene in the nurturing of children within families (ibid.: chapter 1). Their basic position is that state intervention in the parent-child relationship within the family is permissible from the perspective of fostering children's autonomy (ibid.: 12). For them, children have a vital interest in developing the capacity for autonomy, and parents harm children by denying them the kind of upbringing that develops that capacity. When this occurs, the state may legitimately step in to prevent it.

This argument of fostering autonomy as a justification for state intervention is one that has gained a certain amount of support as an educational aim in liberal theory (Hirai, 2017: Chapter 6). However, Brighouse and Swift show that the family may be a disincentive to the development of children's autonomy, while at the same time showing the positive value of the family for children's development:

Even affluent well-intentioned societies have not been very good at creating state institutions that provide children with the kind of stable attachments they need not simply to develop their capacity for autonomy but also to become adults with the emotional resources to sustain healthy relationships. Keeping in mind these practical limitations will often lead to the conclusion that children whose parenting is far from ideal are better off with their parents than they would be in the care of public authorities (Brighouse & Swift, 2014: 13).

It is shown here that what is desired when children grow up as citizens is not only that they develop autonomy, but that they possess the emotional resources to develop healthy relationships, and that the family can make a significant contribution to their development. In this way, Brighouse et al. attempt to clarify the value of the family for the future public sphere and society, which is difficult to derive via public-private dualism, while maintaining a liberal position.

### 3.2 What is the Value of a Family Upbringing?

The central issue of Brighouse and Swift's book is the correction of intra-familial or inter-familial injustice regarding freedom and equality. Their egalitarian liberal work also intended to theoretically overcome the conflict between the state and parents over the upbringing and education of their children. However, the originality of the liberal argument lies in the fact that they are trying to find the value of the family as an extension of such discussions.

In their discussion of the necessity of the family in child upbringing and education, Brighouse and Swift consider contentions similar to Archard's argument of collectivist nurturing. Their arguments, however, contain different emphases. Brighouse and Swift see the child as a being with capacities to develop into an independent adult without vulnerability, as well as a being that cannot have a fully developed and unique conception of what is valuable to his or her life during childhood. As they see it, it is therefore necessary, in the best interest of the child, to intervene in a paternalistic manner (Brighouse & Swift, 2014: 62). Yet even if a paternalistic intervention is justified in the name of nurturing the child, it must be considered whether the parents must intervene thus *within* the family. To Brighouse and Swift, there are four options: fostering by trained and specialized employees in state-regulated quasi-orphanages; fostering shared between "parents" and designated child-raising specialists as in *kibbutzim*; communes, where a large number of adults collectively and jointly raises a group of children; or families, in which a small number (no more than four) adults — "parents" — raise children (ibid.: 70-71).

Brighouse and Swift argue that only the last of these, the "family," is "able reliably to meet some of children's vital interests," because "only a particular kind of relationship between children and adults...and the goods that it makes possible, can arise only when authority (including the authority to act paternalistically) and care for a child are concentrated in a small number of adults" (ibid.: 71). Family care is favored and prioritized because it produces relational goods.

What is noteworthy about Brighouse and Swift's position is that it goes beyond the argument that the state should take the lead in imposing certain restrictions on parental freedom in order to achieve social equality. Further, their argument puts forth the idea of relational goods and shows the value of the family as having a positive influence on the promotion of children's autonomous behavior and their emotional, moral, and cognitive development. In the discussion of relational goods, the significance of nurturing and educating children brings about a sense of well-being for the parents as subjects, emphasizing the formation of their values through interaction with their children. A characteristic of the discussion of relational goods is that it not only tries to find positive effects for children in the private sphere of child rearing and education but also tries to identify positive effects for parents.<sup>3</sup>

It should also be noted, however, that such upbringing and education within the family does not always naturally result in positive effects and benefits for both children and parents. Brighouse and Swift recognize that, in the real world, parenthood is for many a deep source of anxiety and frustration, and that "[p]overty and the multiple disadvantages that accompany it can easily create a microenvironment in which the task of parenting well is all but insuperable" (ibid.: 148). They emphasize the role of the state in implementing such things as anti-poverty measures as a way to create an environment in which parents can positively take

on the burden of raising and educating their children within the family in order for the relational goods to produce benefits for many people.

#### 4. A Feminist Perspective on Overcoming Public-private Dualism: A Relational Approach to Autonomy

A new theoretical trend in liberalism advances the theory of justice in nurturing and education, which acknowledges to a certain extent the possibility of state intervention in the private sphere. This is accompanied by the awareness that the problems latent in the private sphere, as a sphere of freedom, should be made manifest as problems related to the public sphere. This awareness is similar to that of feminist theorists, arguing the problem of overcoming the public-private dualism from the perspective that “the personal is political.” Compared to the feminist argument on public-private dualism, however, liberal nurturing and education theory is constructed on the assumption of a gender-neutral subject, which raises practical problems. This paper will now turn to Susan Okin’s feminist critique of liberal justice theory in her book *Justice, Gender, and the Family* (1989) to discover how it differs from the arguments of Archard and Brighouse and Swift.

Firmly rooted in feminism, which denounces the social structure of inequality between the sexes rooted in the private sphere, Okin points out four major difficulties inherent in public-private dualism: first, the inability to escape the dynamics of power even in the private sphere; second, the increasing invisibility of the state’s intervention in the private sphere as the boundary between the public and private spheres is clarified by political decisions; third, the invisibility of the fact that gender is socialized in the private sphere; and fourth, the division of gender roles within the family which erects practical and psychological barriers that prevent women from entering other spheres of life (Okin, 1989: 111).

Brighouse and Swift clearly note, “We do not doubt that the family as it actually exists has been, and continues to be, a crucial site of gender, injustice, but its gendered aspect is not our topic here” (Brighouse & Swift, 2014: xiii-xiv). In their theory building, “assumptions about how the job of caring for children is, or should be, divided between men and women, nor about how any such division should impact on the distribution of goods more generally” are not covered. Their theory bridging the public/private division does not add a clear response to the first and fourth problems Okin points out. Although Brighouse and Swift argue that child rearing is not necessarily based on gender differences (it can be adapted to child rearing by same-sex partners), it is necessary to bring gender issues within the family into the discussion when most child rearing is shared by both sexes. Brighouse and Swift’s argument has less awareness of the issue of injustice within the family compared to the issue of injustice between families. This critical issue needs to be discussed further to overcome public-private dualism in the context of liberalism.

The third issue Okin points out, namely the criticism directed at gender socialization in the private sphere, is, however, reminiscent of the perspective of child development in the family and contains an important perspective if interpreted from a different angle. In fact, Brighouse and Swift argue that one of the justifications for the family and the reason children need the family is “because it produces certain goods that would otherwise not be available, or, in some cases, would be much more difficult to produce” (ibid.: 57). This means

that children need appropriate care within the family for their normal development. One of the rationales for the necessity of the family for the child is that the child's normal development requires proper care within the family (ibid.: 58). The value of relational goods is evaluated based on the developmental aspect of children, which also indicates that autonomy, which Brighouse and Swift consider their primary educational aims, has a different connotation from the autonomy conception of liberalism in general. Their conception of autonomy has something in common with relational autonomy, which has been developed through feminist rethinking of the concept of autonomy since the 2000s.

Mackenzie and Stoljar underlay the idea of relational autonomy with the following feminist critique of autonomy or the autonomous agent: "The critiques emphasize that an analysis of the characteristics and capacities of the self cannot be adequately undertaken without attention to the rich and complex social and historical contexts in which agents are embedded; they point to the need to think of autonomy as a characteristic of agents who are emotional, embodied, desiring, creative, and feeling, as well as rational, creatures; and they highlight the ways in which agents are both psychically internally differentiated and socially differentiated from others" (Mackenzie & Stoljar, 2000: 21). They further point out that "many relational approaches investigate the relationship between autonomy and feelings of self-respect, self-worth, and self-trust" (ibid.: 22). The relational approach is further characterized by the following perspectives of analysis to show that repressive socialization and social relationships inhibit the development of autonomy: first, the process of formation of an agent's desires, beliefs, and emotional attitudes; second, the development of competencies and capacities necessary for autonomy, including capacities for self-reflection, self-direction, and self-knowledge; and third, the ability of the agent to act on autonomous desires or to make autonomous choices (ibid.).

These feminist notions of relational autonomy and Brighouse and Swift's discussion of the concept of autonomy and relational goods are built on similar problematic concerns. The development of the liberal theory of education can be confirmed in the arguments of Brighouse and Swift, who try to show that even if autonomy is defined as the purpose of education, the family, which is based on the principle of intimacy and relationship, also plays a major role in its development.

## **5. Prospects for Citizenship Education Bridging Public and Private Education**

This article has primarily discussed the liberal theories on the family of Archard and Brighouse and Swift. When comparing their arguments, the latter's argument retains the goal of fostering autonomy and thus imposes stronger restrictions on parental freedom and greater tolerance of state intervention in the family sphere. However, Brighouse and Swift's discussion of the questioning of the public-private dualism of children's education can be seen as forcing a reconsideration of theories of citizenship education that focus on the political sphere. The new theory of liberalism is significant in that it presents an argument for reinforcing the theory of citizenship education while questioning the concept of autonomy and implying the perspective of relational autonomy.

As indicated in the introduction to this paper, liberal theorists such as Amy Gutmann, a deliberative democracy theorist, tend to think of citizenship education as confined to the

realm of public education. Gutmann states as following:

Justice is far more likely to be served by democratic citizens who reason together in search of mutually justifiable decisions than by people who are uninterested in politics or interested in it only for the sake of power... Because continuing disagreement among reasonable people of good will is inevitable in any free society, mutual respect is an important virtue... One feature of democratic education is its dedication to teaching (not indoctrinating) the skills and virtues of deliberative citizenship... Parents, the primary educators of children, need not focus on educating their children for citizenship as long as publicly funded primary and secondary schools are teaching children the skills and virtues of free and equal citizenship. Teaching children to be responsible members of a family is likely to have positive spillover effects for responsible citizenship.(Gutmann, 2003: 510)

Here, the value of private education is expected to have only a secondary effect in citizenship. The ideal citizen envisioned by Gutmann seems to be an autonomous citizen who can think critically and make rational decisions. But in addition, if deliberative citizenship requires deliberative civic virtues such as mutual respect and civility, they must be accompanied by the emotional resources to develop human relationships, since they mean valuing the will of others. It may be unreasonable to leave the cultivation of these virtues to public education alone. Rather, as Brighouse et al. have argued (confirmed in 3.1 of this article), education within the family should also be involved.

The new trend of liberal theory of family values and of relational development of autonomy may offer two implications for contemporary education. The first is its demonstration that it is the various factors of sensitivity that overcome the limits of liberalism's theory of citizenship education, which holds that autonomous individuals resolve public issues through the exercise of reason. This tells us that education in the family is also linked to the establishment of individual autonomy. Second, the development of relational autonomy, based on the idea of relational goods, has the potential to enhance parents' awareness of parenting. At the very least, if the significance of private education is clarified in principle, it could increase parents' awareness of parenting.

What implications does this new trend of the liberal arguments have for Japan's educational reality? As Omomo also points out, Japanese-style public education faces the challenges of a fundamental rethinking of the concept of public education in the nation-state, which guarantees education to the people, and the substantial blurring of the distinction between the public and private sectors regarding educational responsibilities for children (Omomo, 2020: 6-7). In considering a new Japanese-style public education, it is important, for example, to strengthen school management based on social governance theory, such as community schools, and to establish a system that reflects the will of parents who represent the interests of their children in policy and demand educational responsibility. However, as Katsuno also points out, "[w]ithout equal guarantees to all parents and community members to express their views and participate substantively in decision-making, participatory school management may become an undemocratic mechanism that benefits some and inhibits others" (Katsuno, 2020: 269). To overcome these challenges, the arguments over deliberative democracy and private education deserve attention. The key to the realization of deliberative democracy is the development of civic virtue among participants. The cultivation of civic virtue in the pri-

vate sphere can lead to a healthier democracy for the next generation. In addition, the effect of nurturing in the private sphere would be to deepen parents' awareness of the educational value of their children's autonomy, which would have the effect of deepening their interest in their children's education. One of the significant points of this article is its suggestion that the valuing of private education as relational goods has a positive impact on the formation of school communities that are positioned in the middle of the public/private sphere.

### Notes

- 1 Archard defines 'family' in functionalist terms, noting that there are a number of enduring disagreements about the nature, and value, of the family. For example, such definition as "A family is a married heterosexual couple rearing their biological offspring" seeks to persuade the hearer that it expresses the ideal image of the family and the normative view of the family of those who so stipulate (Archard, 2010: 2-3). Archard states that "[w]e can... distinguish – and should always do so – between a properly neutral definition of what counts as an instance of a family, and a commendation of some familial form" (ibid.: 3), and ultimately defines the family in terms of its essential functional role as "*as a multigenerational group, normally stably co-habiting, whose adults take primary custodial responsibility for the dependent children*" (ibid.: 10. Emphasis in original). Based on this definition, a family is not necessarily composed solely of parents (yet this 'parents' does not necessarily mean biological parents, but includes legal parents). Furthermore, 'family' is distinguished from 'home' as a stable living (and nurturing) place.
- 2 In contrast to Archard, Brighouse and Swift specify 'family' as a sphere concept and emphasize its principles or values as follows: "The family is where we experience our most important attachments and relationships, a realm not of rationality but of emotion and intimacy, a sphere of commitment and self-sacrifice." (Brighouse & Swift, 2017: 6).
- 3 Brighouse and Swift illustrate the value of relational goods with the following reference to the question of what is special about being a parent. "For most people, intimate relationships with others are essential for their lives to have meaning. Rather than being alone in the world, seeking to fulfill their own pleasures, people thrive when they are connected to other human beings with whom they enjoy deep and close relationships. These relationships are challenging—in an intimate relationship one does not fully control the response of the other person, and one has to discern her interests even when she does not necessarily articulate them well, and act to further those interests and come to share some of them as one's own. The love and voluntary compliance of others in a relationship, when recognized, contributes to a sense of well-being and self-worth, as does successful attendance to the well-being of those others." (Brighouse & Swift, 2017: 87-88).

### Acknowledgement

This article was supported in part by JSPS Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research JP19K14086.

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