

## The Mystery of Education

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### Abstract

In this paper, I shall shortly investigate if some kind of guiding principle, general message, or fascinating buzzword can manifest in philosophy or pedagogy (in their theory and practice). The question which I am interested in is whether the pedagogical and philosophical aspects can meet in education. To put it more specifically: whether a spirited and noble buzzword exists or not. It is obvious that goodness is not universal and obligatory; one “only” has to strive for it. This article claims that the cultures of philosophy and pedagogy can do a lot for the formation and practice of independent and critical thinking and the virtue of goodness. Critical thinking requires the bravery of the intellect; goodness necessitates the decency, the nobleness of the heart and the catchword of philosophy and pedagogy soul. One has to learn and understand both of these catchwords.

*Keywords:* culture, virtue, critical reflexivity, goodness

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## **The Mystery of Education**

“What led me to sociology before was the critical reflexivity.”

Iván Szelényi

### **Introduction**

Elaborating on Szelényi's utterance chosen as his motto, one can undoubtedly expect from philosophy and, furthermore, from pedagogy (practical pedagogy), that they will critically evaluate the examined questions and concerned subject. In philosophy, critical thinking can be considered a widespread method. However, in pedagogy, the critical attitude has not become a common criterion. Nevertheless, it can easily happen that the theory and practice of pedagogy might receive strong “ammunition” and motivating force from philosophy.

In this paper, I shall investigate if some kind of guiding principle, general message, or catchword can manifest in philosophy or pedagogy (in their theory and practice). The question in which I am interested is whether pedagogical and philosophical aspects can meet in education, or to put it more specifically, whether a spirited and noble catchword exists or not.

### **Defining the Art of Philosophy: Science or Not?**

Let us start out from the general abstract meaning of culture. Even nowadays one can accept Spengler's about one-century-old definition without approaching the narrower notions of culture and the known application utilized in sociology and philosophy that culture is an organism “which makes its incorporated peoples and estates become possessors of a universal idiom based on a common history” (Spengler, Vol 2, 1994., p. 54.). This universal history and idiom allow a human being, the humanity of a given moment, to be capable of expressing how he views himself and his community as a form of self-expression that is a natural human

need. The human being, continues Spengler, “talks about himself through culture, (...) his knowledge and opinion are the part of his self-expression” (Vol 1, 1994, p. 178.).

Whatever the truth is, philosophy has an important role in culture in both its narrower and broader senses. It interrogates itself and the world continuously and consciously. The philosopher is led by his love of wisdom. Nevertheless, the criterion of philosophy strongly divides the discipline. Many views and misconceptions have evolved in terms of the essence of philosophy and wisdom. In my opinion, the most widespread and biggest misconception is the one which regards philosophy as a science and thus interprets and evaluates “the science of wisdom” in accordance with scientific principles. This kind of interpretation has a certain foundation; one can refer to the cultural historical fact that different kinds of disciplines have evolved from philosophy. Many researchers have drawn the conclusion that philosophy became the science of sciences. The expectation is enormous: philosophy will give the final and authoritative responses to the grandiose and complicated questions that other disciplines cannot answer. The stubbornly curious person who asks questions all the time cannot get rid of the comfortable standpoint that philosophy will have the final word and will articulate the incontestable truth.

I think disciplinary criteria cannot be derived from philosophy without any negative impact. The reason for it is that the foundations of philosophy and the nature, behavior, categorization, and methodology of sciences are different. The major difference is in terms of their scope. Philosophy does not investigate all aspects of reality; furthermore, the philosopher is not interested in the details, but in the integrity of the world, thus the scope of philosophy is the “whole.” A further considerable difference is that the professional scientist attempts to unearth the governing rule in a manner that validates the discovered law, scientific data, or fact from an exact scientific viewpoint. Or, at least, it indicates the borders of its validity that is accepted by every reasonable person. Nevertheless, one must see that the

philosopher must not have such pretensions and aims. He must be satisfied with—which is not a small thing—communicating thoughts, posing questions and, as I have mentioned before, inquiring into reality. In addition, he cannot even present and prove irrefutably what he has discovered. Maybe that is why the particular phenomenon emerges that some people accept the standpoint of the philosopher but others do not. Lastly, one cannot disregard the standpoint that the philosopher analyzes such general and deep-lying questions that he cannot even answer. The afore quoted Spengler is right when he writes that “philosophy regarding its deepest foundations is nothing, but the defence against the inconceivable” (Vol. 1, 1994, p. 209).

I cannot avoid discussing the question of the relationship of philosophy and science. Philosophical discourses and debates emerge concerning this problem. In this respect, let me refer to the work of the excellent contemporary philosopher, János Tőzsér. It is worth quoting his text in detail, on the one hand, because it indicates the most important particularity of philosophy—one could say its mission, or buzzword. On the other hand, an idea occurs in it which can directly be related to pedagogy (to a given discipline), namely to one of its characteristics—however, a not sufficiently emphasized feature.

Philosophy is (...) a failed task, – he writes - because it did not solve any of the philosophical problems. (...) Nevertheless, philosophy is the best mentor of *critical reflexivity* (...) and helps us to become such alert personages who consider assembling their epistemic affections through their self-reflexivity as a responsibility. (...) This is the *moral* dimension of practicing philosophy, but, at the same time, it gives *pedagogic significance*. If somebody literally experiences from his childhood that in terms of certain questions he cannot exclusively rely on his epistemic affection, he will not become fanatic (or demagogue – S. K.) and will be *a better person* in general than without this competence. He will be able to do what not many people can: place

himself in the cognitive perspective of others and understand their motivations.

(Tózsér, 2018, p. 13. and p. 343)

The extract contains many fruitful ideas which can encourage us to profoundly debate or agree. I do not share the negative perspective of the author, namely that philosophy would be a futile campaign because it cannot solve the examined problems (what is more, not even a single one of them!). However, the task of philosophy is not to give final and eternal answers, but “only” to propose an infinite number of starting points, approaches, and questions concerning the whole of the world, its existence, the place of men in it, and the purpose of men. In addition (let us think about the aforementioned idea of Spengler), it discovers deeply imbedded dilemmas that cannot even be answered from a theoretical viewpoint. What is the consequence? The philosopher cannot endeavour to make *ex cathedra* assertions, as he does not possess a firm and unique truth that subjugates all people. The philosopher cannot be in the elevated position which claims that he is in possession of all knowledge, as he is not the representative of the science of sciences. The love of wisdom means that he does not pursue feverishly eternal and universal answers which are comprehensible for everybody. Instead, he realizes that he lives in the state of continuous *intellectual orientation*, and the major result of his reasoning is the ability to articulate more *differentiated questions*. Because of these criteria, philosophy is *not a science*, but a certain form of restless intellectual occupation, intellectual joy. Nevertheless, philosophy is not free from the task to follow permanently the results of disciplines that fundamentally shape the given epoch and to reflect them in a certain way. In other words, one can claim that philosophy is not simply a science (especially not the king of sciences), but arguing that it should separate itself from the development of sciences and should not take inspiration from them is equally unacceptable.

Furthermore, in the quoted extract of Tózsér’s work, one can find a wonderful realization and a remarkable but not examined prevision too. His former idea was highlighting

the *critical* function; to put it differently, he defines the most important function, the essence of philosophy, as the critical judgement of phenomena (philosophy is the best mentor of critical reflexivity). The other is the importance of *goodness*, which can be regarded as one of the possible—if not decisive—spheres of the conjugation of philosophy and pedagogy. Last but not least, I state that both of them, namely critical skill or ability and the virtue of goodness, are catchwords of philosophy and pedagogy. I shall discuss them separately in the following sections. The latter one might be presented in a slightly more detailed manner, because as a discipline, pedagogy has not paid enough attention to the theme of goodness.

### **Critical Reflexivity**

It is worth considering the idea chosen as Szelényi's motto. The personal remark of the famous Hungarian sociologist can serve as a general moral which can be adopted by philosophy and pedagogy (in this case, practical pedagogy). The actual context is the following: “What led me to sociology before was critical reflexivity with the help of which one can reflect on the used data. (...) The researcher (...) uses critical reflexivity in order to determine what his data means and how he produced them” (Szelényi, 2019, p. 109–110). What does this kind of critical reflexivity mean in terms of philosophy, science, and everyday education? It is not a secret that the critical stance has always been present in the history of philosophy, from the Socratic tradition through critical empiricism to 20<sup>th</sup> century analytical philosophy and so on. In this case, let me highlight one specific addition in order to demonstrate the idea in question. I deliberately choose such texts which have been disregarded by philosophers, and referring to them might shock some of the thinkers: namely, I shall refer to one of the essays of Karl Marx. In the letter of September 1843 that Marx wrote to Ruge, one can interpret the following: the task of philosophy is not to construct the future, but to realize it. “I am referring to *ruthless criticism of all that exists*, ruthless both in the sense of not being afraid of the results it arrives at and in the sense of being just as little

afraid of conflict with the powers that be.” (Marx & Engels, 1957, p. 346). Ferenc Tőkei, a well-known Hungarian philosopher, rightfully remarks in relation to the above-mentioned lines that Marx himself calls “ruthless criticism of all that exists” critical philosophy in which principle of historicity applies in contrast with dogmatism (1977, p. 373–374).

Let us try to react to the presented objectives and aims referenced above with no regard to political affiliation. What are we talking about? I shall not detail the content of the quotation’s second part (it is about dealing with power conflicts), as it is such a self-explanatory expectation. Nevertheless, I must peremptorily mention that the Marxian carrier proves that it is possible to think and work independently from the existing political powers. Albeit, it requires enormous moral courage, commitment, and grit. As a result, surely not many people are capable of it. The first part of the sentence is important and exciting. What does he mean by the phrase “not being afraid of the results it arrives at”? When the researcher, who can be a philosopher or the representative of any other discipline, examines a thing, he proceeds with a concrete idea, or hypothesis. Then he continues the investigation as long as possible. He does not stop at the point in the investigation which proves his hypothesis. In other words, he is not tempted by his vanity; he consequently elaborates on the primarily obtained results. If he can consequently finish the analysis, there is a high probability that he has to revise his former hypothesis, or maybe he has to modify his initial conceptions. To put it differently, he is not afraid of his own data because he is capable of measuring his research critically and self-critically. Furthermore, he is able to do the necessary modification and ready to fundamentally change the way he thinks, his starting point, and his research itself. I reckon that such a self-correction step poses a similar challenge as coming into conflict with the existing political powers because one needs to fight a battle with oneself and not with some kind of external force. In that sense, I state that Marxian guidance does not lose from its validity, one can (should) take on that standpoint.

As I have mentioned before, philosophy cannot separate itself from contemporary scientific development. Philosophy should and must incorporate the newest and most important results of sciences because it can use them as a foundation. And now one can compliment this principle with the aforementioned thoughts. Following the new laws discovered and justified by disciplines on a certain level (nevertheless, one knows that the philosopher is not a professional scientist) is important, because with the help of this step—among others—he can revise and control the obtained results. Furthermore, he is able to rethink and restructure his research.

Based on the current state and direction of today`s science, one can regrettably remark that the reaction of both philosophy and pedagogy is not satisfying. It is a commonly known sequel that there is large-scale scientific and technological development; however, social adaptation to the world of computers, robots, and so-called smart televisions and phones becomes more and more demanding. It means that every kind of human activity can be modelled and can be described as an algorithm. It also puts the questions of philosophy and pedagogy that were regarded until now as traditional into a different context. In my opinion, philosophy and especially pedagogy have not elaborated on (maybe have not even found) fast and adequate responses to the latest scientific discoveries and inventions. It is also possible that there are and will be such drastic technological changes that one cannot do anything with them despite the proper reaction of philosophy and pedagogy. It is worth considering the seemingly astounding prognosis of a contemporary historian. “Today,” the famous contemporary historian Yuval Noah Harari writes, “our knowledge grows in an incredibly rapid pace (...) which leads to even larger and faster changes. Consequently, we will be able to interpret the present and predict the future less and less. (...) The more data one has, the more one understands history; the faster it changes its direction, the faster one`s knowledge becomes obsolete.” (2017, p. 57–58). The standpoint of the author can be contested; however,



one can reflect on his conclusions. Presumably, one has to rethink the relationship of philosophy and science. The classic role of philosophy was to follow and interpret the development of science and to take inspiration from it. It seems that in the near future the relationship will fundamentally change; philosophy might not simply mechanically follow sciences but might try to interpret and control the development of disciplines. At the same time, it might also offer an organizing principle which originates from its own perception about the world in order to understand knowledge in relation to the world or rather to interpret knowledge and the world in a critical and self-critical manner. This means that the significance of philosophy will not wither. It is very unlikely that philosophy will cease to exist, although education policy hastily thinks it. In consequence, many members in leadership at universities have a limited way of thinking. It would be worth revising the education of philosophy in tertiary education, especially in teacher training. In public education, in the case of the education of disciplines, it should be reconsidered if there is enough sensibility on a given level to the aptitude which allows somebody to make underlying ideological and philosophical correlations explicit. On the contrary, the role of philosophy will soon be extended according to all indications. The reason behind this is the process during which there is an increasing social need to balance the fast-paced economic, scientific, and technical transformations and people's sense of security. One can expect philosophy to be a theoretical orientation point which helps people find their real place, in the continuously and radically changing world, in the relations to be formed between them and their environment—or at least to be able to effectively react to the new challenges of life.

For me it is evident that the “traditional” critical function of philosophy (namely the “ruthless criticism of all that exists”) will become stronger in the future. Without critical attitudes and thinking, the only thing one can reach is that one gets lost in the translucent world of chaotic changes from which one cannot escape, and gradually disappears in it.

It is inevitable for the theory and practice of pedagogy to face the new challenges of education. Pedagogy must give its answer to the question of how education should adopt to the positive and negative effects of the digital society. Humans tend to feel and enjoy the beneficial impact of new technologies at first. They do not see the dangers or simply do not want to take them into consideration. In relation to the latter symptoms, it is easy to think that the later one reacts to the negative consequences, or the less one takes them into consideration, the bigger the loss will be. Let me refer to the warnings of two contemporary researchers (communication specialists and philosophers) here.

Gabor Szécsi, a Hungarian philosopher and famous communication researcher, writes that “a mass medium does not simply provide the readers with information, but it also influences the interpretation of information” (2012, p. 79). In other words, whether one recognizes it or not, or likes it or not, a mass medium also serves to manipulate the users. As we witness the spectacular spread of mass media (smart television, internet, smartphones, social media), one can expect that education faces a considerable challenge; along with the education from parents and teachers, the child receives personality-forming impulses from media, such as the invasion of tabloids “causing mental deterioration,” false and not credible information, fearmongering, crime triggering, and so on. It is obvious that similar phenomena have self-destructing and self-distorting consequences, and teachers should prepare children and young people to be able to properly react and to defend effectively against the dangers. The best defense (form and method) against the negative mental repercussions is the formation and strengthening of the formerly emphasized *critical attitude and approach*. As we will see, requiring critical reflexivity is not only beneficial for philosophy and sociology but for pedagogy too. Its application is not simply desirable, but also necessary in terms of pedagogical endeavors. According to my own hypothesis, that is far from the general conception, direction, and especially practice of pedagogy.

The other remark of Gábor Szécsi can be related more to the requirement of the formation and challenge of self-critical ability and self-control. One cannot really contest that children who watch television and surf on the net encounter information that should only be available to adults.

Consequently, the borderlines between childhood and youth and between youth and adulthood become more and more blurred. (...) Children who watch television channels and browse on the internet more consciously use the same communication medium as adults but access more and more information than them. (...) All this inevitably leads to the weakening of the authority of adults originating from the traditional social situation and role. (Szécsi, 2013, p. 46–47)

The loss of authority of adults is really a new consequence, so it cannot be denied that education must be carried out in such a situation and such circumstances. But let me pose the question elaborating on the remark of the author: has pedagogy (sociology, psychology, ethics, social pedagogy, and jurisprudence) seriously faced this current situation, and has it drawn the conclusion concerning the loss of authority?

The other researcher to whom I would like to refer is Miklós Almási, an excellent Hungarian philosopher. Almási warns us, “The sociality of the individual is shaken, (...) the threads that lead from the other to the self are weakened. (...) In the digital age the emotional culture is irreversibly degrading” (2019, p. 22–23 and p. 141). I also reckon that emotional culture has withered, and unfortunately I should add that there are problems with mental culture, too. The internet and social media—despite their positive effects—are teeming with various kinds of superficial knowledge, stupid content that can easily and rapidly infect people, especially children and young women and men. That is only true, of course, if one cannot recognize the importance of sensible, independent, and critical thinking and even

neglects its development—or, what is even worse, if one works against the formation of critical reflexes. Unfortunately, it can happen.

### **The Mystery or *Ars Poetica* of Education**

The latter quotations raise the question of the competence, existence, and mission of pedagogy and touch indirectly upon the problematic relationship of philosophy and pedagogy. An unfortunate result is that in the circles of both philosophers and pedagogues, one can experience a certain degree of antipathy towards each other's finding. Because of their aristocratic affections, philosophers may think that it is derogatory to pose and deal with simple pedagogical questions. It is true the other way around as well: there are some pedagogical researchers and/or practicing teachers who consider discussing a pedagogical outlook too abstract, incomprehensible, and useless. In consequence, they do not want to show interest towards any philosophical dimension.

It is time to realize that these reluctant, indifferent attitudes make the cultures of both pedagogy and philosophy poorer. If the representatives of both practical and theoretical philosophy and pedagogy are open to the findings of one another, they will be able to unearth valuable resources which would not be accessible in another way. Both parties should strive for the creation of a more integral relation and they should not exclude one another from their own spheres. A more integral cooperation in accordance with my own conviction is a treasure, and the rejection of it would be foolishness and narrow-mindedness. Let me present some concrete aspects in relation to finding common points.

Firstly, mentioning philosophy for children seems to be obvious. I do not wish to detail the status of philosophy for children in Hungarian research and education (it could be the scope of another paper). However, examining the relationship between being a philosopher and existing as a child might offer a possibility to unearth new knowledge and connections. One can think of the witty realization of Gaarder: “the philosopher remains

sensitive all his life as a child.” To put it differently, for children (the primary, though not the sole subjects of education), new knowledge remains an eternal miracle and discovery, and for the philosopher it remains a kind of mystery (I will reflect on this expression later). Being fascinated by the world motivates the philosopher and the little child at the same time. As Aristotle argues: “People (...) started to philosophise out of fascination” (2002, p. 41).

Another common trait between the small child and the philosopher is a sense of fascination and curiosity. Both of them pose questions with stubborn perseverance; the philosopher continuously interrogates the world, and the child poses its inquiring questions on his broader or narrower environment without any rest. Posing questions concerning phenomena and objects is ultimately a primary element or basic particularity of both the philosopher and children. As I said before, the philosopher cannot give convincing and incontestable answers in all respects, just as the child is not capable of fully understanding, of seeing through the answers, the “whys.” He is only asking continuously. Consequently, the comparison of the American philosopher for children, Matthew Lipman, was just, namely that “children have the same motive for thinking as philosophers” (Douglas, 2011). György Tamássy, an important representative of Hungarian philosophy for children, elaborates on it as well when he states, “They are more courageous, motivated than adults, their aptitude for philosophy is stronger” (2010, p. 92).

The two latter quotations contain some exaggerated statements. Nevertheless, one cannot contest that the ceaseless desire for inquiry and manifestation is in the center of childhood existence. However, it is not identical with the critical thinking to which philosophy motivates people. Nevertheless, one should not underestimate the significance of asking questions. Let us not forget, as I have mentioned before, posing questions in itself is sensible and valuable. Seeking answers, no matter what they bring to light, is important. Remaining modest in relation to one`s cognitive activity is a sympathetic and desirable

conceptualization. One should be satisfied with the articulation of questions. Articulating one's questions in a more and more punctual, differentiated manner is already a considerable result. Making it more conscious and practicing it and transforming it into skills and competences is the first level (condition) of forming a more superior way of thinking for children. In this case, it means the functioning of critical thinking. It is obvious for me that such a buzzword of philosophy cannot be indifferent to pedagogy. Educating children and youth towards thinking critically and independently is very desirable. Starting off this basis, the theory and practice of pedagogy could become more productive. From this point, it is desirable and practical to work out concrete and professional educational aims, forms, and methods.

Another important buzzword also exists in terms of which pedagogy is more competent, even in comparison with philosophy. It is a special virtue, goodness, or the endeavor to be good.

The research of goodness as a theme is primarily the task or responsibility of educational philosophy. An educational philosophical outlook, more precisely taking into consideration and processing the educational philosophical results, can be another example for the integral cooperation between philosophy and pedagogy.

Let me refer to the above-quoted book of Tózsér. One can only welcome the idea of the author that a critical attitude and goodness are in some kind of connection. However, he does not investigate the problems of "the good," but he can motivate us to conduct a systematic and profound investigation. In this respect, especially pedagogy has debts; the fall back – I would like to emphasise it one more time - is not acceptable and comprehensible for me. Researchers of pedagogy, especially educational theory, face a serious hiatus because they intensively deal with many questions (such as socialization, community, education as a process, rightfulness, telling the truth, honesty, and decency, among other virtues), but the

definition and essence of goodness is not mentioned many times. This discrepancy increases even more if one poses the question of what the intrinsic content or superior particularity of education can be. One could say: What is the most fascinating impetus of education? What is its “sacred” mission? As one will see, this is nothing more sacred in education than the representation and realization of the virtue of goodness or at least the endeavor to do so. One single question primarily motivates the teacher: how can he make the child, the young man or woman, become a good person? To put it another way: how can he make the world better, at least on a small scale?

Without going into details concerning the educational political investigation in relation to this topic, let me mention some related viewpoints. The ideal of goodness as a virtue appears in the history of philosophy and in educational philosophy. Kant’s idea was that good as a virtue is actually “the power of men’s maxim that lies in the fulfilment of duty. (...) Goodness is a duty” (1991, p. 509–510). It is a beautiful thought; however, it is an exaggeration. Good deeds are, of course, important, but cannot be prescribed. (I agree with the standpoint of György Lukács; see in the following sections.) Nevertheless, relating education and the conceptions of good is an idea worth remarking upon. Kant writes in another work that “the freedom of education is a requirement of the universal betterment of mankind” (2005, p. 636). This is a great realization: education in accordance with this viewpoint is really the universal betterment of the world, and the tutor is led by the endeavor for virtues and ideals.

A similar interpretation of education could bring us an additional useful piece of information, but, for the moment, referring to a contemporary educational philosopher will be sufficient. Richard Pring emphasizes, in harmony with the quotation of Kant, that the teacher’s primary aim is to make people “whole.” Namely, the question actually is, “How can one become a good person, a better person” (Pring, 2004, p. 22).

Goodness as an endeavor is an integral part of education; linking the ideal virtue of goodness to the essence of education is not an induced and aggressive process. Not only do they tolerate each other, but they mutually reinforce one another, so one might say that they live in symbiosis. The most obvious, punctual, and beautiful description of this connection cannot be read either in philosophy or in educational philosophy, and not even in pedagogy, but in an essay of a 20<sup>th</sup> century Hungarian writer, Milán Füst. I cannot resist mentioning this reference in his diary, a unique excerpt that can serve as an indispensable resource for all teachers. It is regrettable that such thoughts of Milán Füst have been disregarded by researchers on pedagogy (and maybe practicing pedagogues as well).

They preach in school with no effect, there is none either when the priest, your mother or father tells you to be good, (...) you decide in your childhood you will be good, clean and unselfish for nothing... Life comes – and you have forgotten now, - you cheat, steal, live for pleasures. (...) You are tricky, pusillanimous. (...) But the education that I have got from my mother, the idealism ignorant of life that I received while being breastfed (...) But life is – unfortunately – not like this. (...) And do you believe your mother did not know life? She knew, - but still (...) she wanted to share the better of herself (...), faith risen up from her because her child can be – *must* be free and clean. (...) And when you will have a child: - you (...) will be careful (...) to reveal the horrible, ... and you will point at life the way just like Moses did with the promised land to the hopeful. (Füst, 1976, p. 178–179)

I consider the above-mentioned text as a wonderful pedagogical creed. Life is full of injustice, fallibility, sin, evil, and, in addition, people do not experience, or at least not in a perceivable manner, that the world has become better and people have become nobler. Nevertheless, in spite of that, one does not lose the desire or the need to be good. One craves goodness and one can rightfully pose the question: what can be nobler than desiring to reach



this goal? And if sometimes adults commit bad things or fall into sin, there is still the axiomatic, natural hope that their children should become better adults than they are.

Education is the mechanistic expression of goodness. In this manner, it is not an exaggeration at all to say the solemn ideal, the superior virtue of goodness creates the exceptional world of education and its veritable mystery.

Finally, I shall touch upon another correlation. An important philosophical or educational-philosophical dilemma described by György Lukács argues that if there is good, then evidently bad must exist. “If goodness occurs in us, then paradise shall have become reality. (...) Goodness is leaving ethics, (...) as ethics is universal and obligatory, (...) goodness is miracle and mercy, (...) ‘obsession’. In the soul of those who are good, all psychological contents, every cause and consequence cease to exist” (Lukács, 1957, p. 540–541 and p. 543).

In other words, goodness is not universal and obligatory—as Kant professes—one “only” has to strive for it. Nevertheless, it is encouraging, and it is obvious that good people live among us.

### **Conclusion**

It is obvious that the cultures of philosophy and pedagogy can do a lot for the formation and practice of independent and critical thinking and the virtue of goodness. Critical thinking requires the bravery of the intellect; goodness necessitates decency, the nobleness of the heart and soul. *One has to learn and understand both of these catchwords*, and one has to overcome many bad habits, misbeliefs, and educational struggle and failure. However, if one realizes it, it will recompense one for all the pain and hard work.

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