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What is Politically-Economic Modern?
World Sub-orders in a Social Science Educator's Take on History Pedagogy

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Abstract:

At the dawn of the 21st century—when your author, who is now an educator, was in college—the United States was the sole global superpower. But the world changed with the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, as well as other events that remade the world in which current students now study. As an educator, I can explain that the structure of the world, termed "world orders," can subsist of underlying world "sub-orders," and "sub-order traits" which even underlie them historically, and how students can outline them. In this way, while political-economic history looks to be constantly repeating itself, with the alignment of "traits" changing, what is considered "modern" and how we go about teaching it in history, political, and economic courses is the research aim of this article. Unlike the historian, whose job it is to identify such "traits," the social scientist should attempt to measure their importance; as educators, we need to point this difference out to students. These new ideas come from an educator with a background in both history and the social sciences. The article summarizes the current world order and concludes with a discussion of what "future" world orders might be, based on sub-orders, while offering ideas for educators to use for students, many of whom will be future scholars, on how to measure which world orders and "sub-orders" are generationally and empirically "modern."

Key words: Education, modern, paradigm shift, sub-order, sub-order trait, world order

Introduction

The word "modern," whether it is referring to history, politics, economics, art, architecture, the hard sciences like chemistry or physics, or many other disciplines, is a word that is thrown about easily, but do we truly know or understand what "modern" is or means? Is it the same for

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educators as it is for students? In political-economy, a social science combining the two subjects, any event that changes the world dramatically is now often called a change in "world order." Dividing the world into eras, or orders of worldly nations' influences, makes the history of any subject easier to teach and study. How can we as educators convey this message to students for their own understanding, and for their own future research, in order to categorize the world?

In fact, there are few clear-cut eras in such disciplines that can be marked by a single event, let alone by perhaps thousands of events or even thousands of individuals. Students need to understand this totality. In an admittedly Eurocentric view, Rome did not fall for a single reason, nor did the "Dark Ages" so start, the "Renaissance" begin, the "Enlightenment" and "Reformation" take hold, the "Age of Empires" and "Exploration" develop, the "Industrial Revolution" surge ahead, or the current age jolt forward. This is true whether one prefers the term "Space Age," "Computer Age," "Information Age," or the "Age of Globalization," with globalization in its most hyper sense viewed as a new phenomenon that students today are writing about along with newer debatable issues such as race relations and sustainability.

As an educator and researcher, I think that educators would do well to start classes—or, in the middle of courses when appropriate—by discussing our own personal relationships with history in order to help students know where we are coming from, the events that we remember, and how they shaped our lives as history changed. Also, perhaps we would do well to teach students to list or outline various events or categories of events that can here be called world "sub-orders," which can be further broken down into "sub-order traits." These traits are noted by historians and measured via cases/regressions by social scientists. This is despite the fact that many of the authors of history texts might not be world-systems writers. In this regard, teaching students how to outline historical events, with major headings for world orders, sub-headings for sub-world orders, and spaces for sub-order traits, could give them a better understanding of events, help them distinguish on their own what is "modern" and what is the "past," and teach them analytical skills for their own academic future and to become understanding citizens.

Modernity Review

In literature, Shakespeare used the word modern in the 15th century to describe "every-day" or "commonplace" events (Delanty, 2007). In other subjects such as sociology, most look to the 17th-century Enlightenment or to the writings of Freud or Durkheim in the 19th century for modernity. In the hard sciences, most point to Copernicus, Galileo, Kepler, or Newton, although some might point to Planck or Einstein more recently, while with technology, the printing press of the 15th

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century is noted as a turning point. In art and music, the 18th and 19th century Romantic movements started modernism, most agree, while in religion, most point to an 1864 work by Pope Pius IX, although some point to the Vatican II Council of the 1960s.

In politics, most look to writings before major upheavals, such as the American and French Revolutions, while in economics, while "neo" is used to mean "new," most point to John Maynard Keynes in the 1930s and 1940s. The 1648 Treaty of Westphalia, which ended the Thirty Years' War in Europe, is now generally regarded as truly "modern" in political-economy because it created a long international peace by ending the Catholic rule of Europe, thus giving sovereignty to many states. Yet others like Dussel and Quijano look toward colonialism in the global South as a world-involving beginning.

Although many scholars have opined since then, it was not until much later that Francis Fukuyama, a U.S. Defense Department official, claimed in the late 1980s and several times throughout the 1990s that there was "an end of history," because countries around the world had refined democracy and the world stood, for a brief moment, on the precipice for global peace led by the United States. He was only to echo the mistakes of earlier scholars with such buoyant hopes. Students will often take the view that history cannot repeat itself, or that it will follow different "laws" or rules, but we as educators should try to emphasize that "this time is not different," and that some laws, counter to relativism, tend to stay the same.

Today, internationally, conditions are reverse - unstable. Despotism is growing globally, rendering the world a consternate powder keg. In the United States, "cancel culture" supporters are trying, whether for good or bad, to rewrite modern American colonial history in support of a seemingly overdue education on African-American history, which makes the subject of "modernity" even more important. Sharing our own perspectives about growing up and how we were taught would make these issues easier to understand for students and let them know where we personally are coming from. For instance, President Andrew Johnson was treated as a "hero" in my history texts, while today he is regarded as a villain for his clemency toward the post-Civil War South. My mother did a great job of sharing her views of history, speaking of the "duck and cover" of the Cold War era and about the newsreels at the start of movies in the 1940s and '50s.

So, what is "modern," and how do we, as educators, help students measure it, through political-economic world orders, in these very much intertwined social sciences? Aside, does living in "modernity," or researching it, make us feel more important?

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With the study of history, in history classes that I have taken and in the titles of countless books I have read or perused, historians use such lines as "launched us into the modern age." However, other books also refer to modern ages which are many years different. Conversely, still later authors assign the word "modern" to periods unthought of by earlier authors. Perhaps, in looking over more information, later authors have a greater view of the totality of historical changes. We, as educators, need to convey this knowledge to students so that they can be aware that history can often be over-sensationalized and used at times to market new books.

Many educators can probably remember their parents asking them: Does that seem "old" to you? or "that must seem so far away?" I have noticed that my students view history very differently from me, often focusing on recent events that seem to me inconsequential in the larger span of history. Perhaps, then, research into this question must go beyond a historian's view and take the shape of a social scientist's. In this way, one can take into consideration as educators that, maybe, in history's span, each generation in any and all disciplines newly defines what is "modern." History does not always progress forwards, as naïve historians and philosophers like Hegel might assert, and instead, we have definitive marking points of when disruptions in history occur, "world orders," which may be different from an educator's and student's perspective.

The youth, and our students, ultimately determine what is modern. Yet, generations by themselves are constantly being renamed and analyzed. The average life expectancy of humans has increased dramatically since early humankind. In *The Bible*, human lifespans were around 40 years, so is it a surprise that the length of 40 years, or sometimes 80 years in the extreme case, is used to describe some time from long ago in *The Bible?* If asked to choose what seems "far away" to me, a middle-aged man, I would answer World War I, an event that occurred approximately 70 years—roughly the average lifespan decades ago—before I was born.

Assuming that children are born when their parents are around 30 years old on average, this equates to two generations to the year 1909, around the time of the start of World War I. By this measure, today's students would put "modern" much later. And yet, in the field that I work in as an educator, political-economy, scholars would put the modern age probably at the time of the following generation in history, or at two generations if one is assuming that children are born when their parents are 20. This dates to World War II, which drastically reshaped the world. In Figure 1, for instance, the beginning of one generation to the next is 20-25 years. But is this simply clinging to the obvious?

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In an undergraduate course that I took as a student, "The History of the U.S., West of the Mississippi," a professor posed the question, "What is the American West?" Was it surprising that most of the students indicated on their map handouts that it was America west of the Mississippi River, which was the description specified in the course catalog?

The same may be true for how students and educators look at world changes as a whole. True changes in disciplines was studied by Thomas Kuhn, who coined the phrase "paradigm shifts," which are sudden moments in history in which thinking dramatically changes. As such, most historical scholars might point to a more pivotal event of "modernity" such as the 1648 Treaty of Westphalia, which ended the Thirty Years' War and curtailed Catholic southern Europe. For historians, is this a naïve answer?

Table 1:
Generations.

Generation	Birth years (roughly)	U.S. Population today
Greatest (or GI) Generation	Prior to 1924	1.7 million
Silent Generation	1925-1942/45	20.87 million
Baby Boomers	1946-1964	69.56 million
Generation X	1965-1979/80	65.17 million
Millennials	1980/81-1996	72.12 million
Generation Z	1997-no endpoint set	About 68 million

(From CNN and Statistica)

Note: Global generations have tended to follow the same pattern as in the United States, at least until the Baby Boomer generation, after which, as in places like the Middle East, countries are witnessing "youth bulges," while in Europe and Russia the population is declining. Some researchers place a gap generation between the Baby Boomers and X, X and the Millennials, and the Millennials and Generation Z.

But most students and individuals are not (yet) historical scholars, so there is clearly a difference between scholars and the average person, and with different generations and races. So, a true study of modernity would require a carefully worded survey involving both scholars and lay people of all races and countries. Perhaps, as educators, we should, like my teacher of "the West" course, ask students at the start of all introductory history courses to write an essay about their

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earliest memories of history, major changes, and how they view modernity, in order to understand where they are coming from.

To conduct a larger, societal study of "modernity," such demographic research is beyond the scope of this philosophical paper. We can nevertheless analyze how political-economic historians talk of "ages" and "orders," as opposed to "old," "modern," and "the future." "World orders" refer to the alignment of nations based on international rules. An idea introduced in this paper will be the idea of "sub-orders," after the Westphalia treaty, and "sub-order traits," which are underlying structures and which can change in importance to the nations that lead the political-economic world. These traits can start a new "order" by such realignment.

As educators, we need to bring into class discussion current events of when such sub-orders may be changing, as, for instance, it is at present with Russia possibly becoming a "rogue nation" due to its invasion of Ukraine. My methodology here will reconcile various authors' views philosophically and then show several examples of how the world's sub-order traits have changed since World War I, an event already mentioned as my "old" view of modernity. Then, the paper will show how educators can help students to better understand these global changes. The analysis will conclude with ideas for future research.

Literature Review

To understand the political-economic world, students need to learn the current writings on *world orders*. Most scholars argue, as already discussed, that the current world order dates back to the 1648 Treaty of Westphalia, a subject that most history or political-economic students know little about. For much of the history of the world, Europe was isolated from the Far East and the Americas, such that Rome was the world's first superpower, followed by the Holy Roman Empire. The first real scholarly mention of a "world order" came from Henry Kissinger in his 1957 book *A World Restored*, a work based on his dissertation. Kissinger, according to Haass (2017), wrote, "No order is safe without physical safeguards against aggression" (p. 22).

Older students, though, might perhaps recognize the second ostensible mention of a world order in the 1977 book *The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics* by Australian academician Hedley Bull. He wrote about the power of international "forces" or rules (Haass, 2017, pp. 18-19). The third rendition of a world order, this time applied in propinquity, came from former U.S. president George H. W. Bush, who used the term in 1989 to draw a distinction between the United States and the rest of the world, particularly Russia, after the collapse of the Soviet Union. His "world order" also referred to the rise of regional powers in multiple spheres

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of influence around the world. Since then, many scholars including Kissinger (2014), Haass (2017), and other academicians and practitioners have made further references to the term. Sadly, many students of history today do not know these facts.

Perhaps, as educators, in discussing books from different periods, we should ask students about the differences in perspectives between historians and social scientists, or how different authors view "modernity." While the historian looks for such orders, the social scientist should measure and quantify them, such as through surveys and by looking at the ongoing changes in the world sub-order traits. "Traits" is a term introduced here to describe a ranking of the most important social, economic, and political factors underlying the world order. Thus, a historian's book titled "… and the war that changed America" could be restated as "and the war that changed America by 15%." This percentage could be measured by the trait change in economic growth or trade, the political ideology and class structure of the country, or the international power of the country, such as the number of leadership roles in international organizations.

Consequently, for new generations of students, the defining dates of "modernity" are constantly changing. The research in this paper will thus examine the existing literature and put forth a hypothesis that "modern" is defined by generations and means a significant event or change in a discipline equated to roughly the age expectancy of one or more generations which brought about that significant change. This should correspond to one dramatic change in the alignment of sub-order traits. Also changing are the dates of "the future," which is an equally complex topic, here left aside. This article will discuss methods for future research—by scholars or by students who will be future scholars—in order to analyze whether or not such a hypothesis of modernity based on world orders is palpable.

Definitions

The world order itself is best characterized by Kissinger (2014) as a "general equilibrium of power" (p. 3). He quotes ancient Indian texts discussing a "circle of states," writing that "power (at that time) was the dominant reality. It was multidimensional, and its factors were independent. All elements in a given situation were relevant, calculable, and amenable to manipulation toward a leader's strategic aims" (p. 195), and then goes on to list some of these traits.

Many astute students are aware of Thomas Hobbes's 1651 book *Leviathan*, penned just three years after the Treaty of Westphalia, where Kissinger attributes that humankind surrendered their individual sovereignty to states. Kissinger (2014) paraphrases that this was "the only way to

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overcome the perpetual fear of violent death war" (p. 31). Foreign policy expert Charles Hill (2019) points to Immanuel Kant's 1794 essay "Perpetual Peace," which was based on the idea of future republics living peacefully, perhaps hopeful from the revolutions against monarchies of that era (Hill, 2019, p. 3). Haass (2017) defines world orders as "the extent to which there is a widely shared definition of the rules" (p. 103) and says that there can be multiple orders at the same time (p. 257). Here, they would be referred to as sub-orders. This layering happened in the 1980s with "liberal" capitalism, of open trade spreading in the developing world (p. 55). Today's students are often confused by the changes in the term "liberal" over time, and rightfully so.

French historian Simon Serfaty (2012) writes of sub-order traits, calling them "power attributes," the most important ones being "size of the population and territory, resource[s]…, economic capability, military strength, political stability and competence" (p. 27). He lists other scholars' takes on these powers, and writes that they layer on top of each other to create political "steering" power (p. 28). Later, he refers to the three most important ones, mass, military, and economics, as "core attributes" (p. 38). Even further, he divides the 1940s and 1950s into periods based on what one could call traits, as "perspective, mood, assumptions, and formula (or outcome)" (p. 90). All of these traits are constantly in flux, and students should be made aware.

But, as American scholar Richard Haass (2017) writes, "power on paper does not translate into power in practice" (p. 205). Thomas Kuhn, in his 1963 book *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions*—which scholar Samir Okasha (2002) calls one of the most important philosophical books of the last 50 years, especially in the social sciences—lays out "paradigm shifts" (Okasha, 2002, p. 77). Although he moderated them several times, Kuhn's primary theory was that research and events continue historically in the same model of thought until a paradigm revolution takes place and all issues in that science are viewed through a new lens. Perhaps looking at orders and sub-orders is a new paradigm shift itself in the study of political-economy; perhaps the "traits," often called "forces," are. Science has had many paradigm shifts in history. In 1542, the Copernican revolution changed the way we look at our solar system, placing the sun at its center. Over the next 100 years in physics, new discoveries were made by Galileo, Kepler, and Descartes, followed by Newton's laws of gravity, motion, and calculus, which reigned as the greatest scientific achievements for the next two centuries. However, it was a scientific revolution in other disciplines, such as biology, first by Charles Darwin's theory of evolution in the mid-19th century and then Watson and Crick in 1953 with their model of DNA, which continued the changing paradigms while other disciplines stalled (Okasha, 2002, pp. 3-12).

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Theory

The philosophy of Kuhn's work on paradigms was in large part a response to the idea known as "Positivism," led by 20th century philosopher Karl Popper (Sumner & Tribe, 2009, p. 61). Popper tried to clarify what exactly constitutes science and social science, arguing that an idea could not only be considered scientific if it could be proven true, but if it also could be proven false, or was falsifiable (Okasha, 2002, p. 13). Today, most social scientists conduct research, some statistical, in which it is believed that nothing in fact can be proven true, and that only the false can be rejected. Many students today often miss this important point.

Thus, any survey evidence of the median or mean year or event of "modernity" in a survey other than hypothesized should be rejected. Yet, this quantitative research should still be conducted after this paper. Growing up, I heard the term "new era" constantly, but it was the positivists who started using math and empiricism in the social sciences, starting with Auguste Compte and a group of 19th-century economists. In the 1930s, a variated branch emerged of logical positivism, the Vienna Circle, which added to social sciences the concepts of deduction versus induction: Deduction is thought from the general to the specific theories, while induction is the line of reasoning that moves from the specific theories to the general empiricism.

While research at that time had been more deductive, it appears to have become more inductive as more research has been done. As the ideas in this paper are relatively new research, they are, thus, more "deductive" (Sumner & Tribe, 2009, pp. 54-61).

Students, often unaware, need to realize that in all academic disciplines, there is almost always a dichotomy of thought. "Relativism," the opposing view that Sumner and Tribe (2009) describe, which has arisen in the last two centuries in opposition to positivism, includes such thinkers as Kuhn, Nietzsche, and Foucault. Relativists would argue, somewhat similarly to how I do in this article, that no exact time may exist for "modernity": It changes with generations; new students constantly have new views.

Relativists do not aim to prove a single truth or law, but rather provide a more informed understanding of a topic (Sumner & Tribe, 2009, pp. 58-60). More recently, Pope Benedict XVI of Germany, a country known for its research on and applied to relativism, strongly spoke out against relativism from a moral perspective. This school has been redefined in recent years (the mid-20th century) into another school of philosophy known as "realism," which is a middle ground between the two. However, Sumner and Tribe (2009) cite Kanbur and Shaffer as saying of these scholars, with Pope Benedict included, that "They distinguish between positivist/ empiricist

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approaches at one extreme (based on observation which establishes knowledge claims) and relativist… approaches (based on discourse' for the establishment of knowledge … (versus non-subjectively) at the other" (p. 58).

For interested students, the paramount theory in political-economy on the relationship between countries is "World Systems Theory," created in the 1960s at the State University of New York (SUNY) by scholar Immanuel Wallerstein. World Systems Theory claimed that the globe could be divided into a core, a semi-periphery, and a periphery of countries. Despite being controversial for not focusing on capitalism and communism, and while not technically analyzing world orders over time, it is technology, he argued, that is most important in needing to advance among the circles. There is no doubt that developing countries have benefitted from the technology of the West, whether legally or surreptitiously. Wallerstein also posited that the world has consisted of two stages: from the 16th century when the European economy expanded until 1945, and 1945 to the present, because World War II was so institutionally influential (So, 1990, pp. 176-193).

World War II changed the empirical rules for peace and conflict, particularly in that the United States continued a trait of demanding "unconditional surrender," which had been a policy since the Civil War. There may have been alternative ways of ending this war and the wars that followed. This American demand for a perfect outcome, such as to be the sole possessor of nuclear weapons, then to be joined by the Soviet Union, may have created a sub-order within the post-WWII world order that Wallerstein outlined, and may have affected the outcomes in the Korean and Vietnam Wars. At that time, scholars from the "Third World," neither affiliated with the U.S. nor Russia, began to lay out "dependency theory," that developing countries "depended" on larger nations, especially those with troops nearby, in trading with them, which has of course changed with the emergence of such politically-economic independent states as the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa), for example. Others point to neoliberalism and the spread of the idea of lower taxes and tariffs.

When I was a young student, my mother spoke about World War II being "old." After this, Haass (2017) picks up, writing on "nuclearization." The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty of 1968 reasoned that fewer nuclear states, five at the time, were acceptable (p. 60); Haass (2017) writes that the treaty failed because joining was voluntary, it did not prevent obtaining production parts such as centrifuges, there were no protections against concealment, and there were no penalties for rule breaking (pp. 68-69). Yet, Latin America and Africa have signed their own treaties (pp. 193-194). Haass writes that the post-WWII idea of the European Union (EU) was to link Germany and France so as to avoid more war between them, and to help end colonialism (pp. 61-62).

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Current students, being ethnically diverse, might take interest in researching these other, less-central areas of the world.

Then came other "world orders," which we shall call "sub-orders," with World War II being a sub-order of Westphalia, the former of which established the five most powerful countries of the U.N. Security Council, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and the Soviet Warsaw Bloc. Economically, British economist John Maynard Keynes, who, along with Americans like economist H. B. White under President Harry Truman, devised the free-world, post-war "gold standard system" at Bretton Woods. Then, after the containment trait of the Cold War sub-order, in 1989, the Berlin Wall came down, and President George H. W. Bush declared a new "world order," which I remember hearing as the first time overtly applied, with a public scramble to understand its true meaning. Government documents, though, showed that regional powers were expected to emerge, but under a highly U.S.-dominant world. By the year 2000, it was a halcyon instant, as the U.S. was the lone "superpower" in the world. Scholars like Francis Fukuyama, a minor defense department official, was writing about the "end of history," in which the world would remain forever situated. But history remakes itself, as students know.

As a student, the world changed for me on September 11, 2001, with "terrorism" (another example of my term "sub-order," yet others might point to powerful groups as "institutions"), then two poorly-planned wars, and an expanded U.S. budget and trade deficit, which contributed to globalization. "Globalism" gave rise to the BRICS, consumer and business technology, the FAANG companies (Facebook, Amazon, Apple, Netflix, and Google), and BATs (Baidu, Alibaba, and Tencent), which are the world of today's students. Technology has been used to provoke divisions in the country, and internationally, rising economic and political nations have created the most dangerous international system since the start of World War I, a tinderbox or powder keg ready to explode. My doctoral professors referred to Yale's Samuel P. Huntington (1968), who, in his "gap ratio theories," created relationships between different types of power for individuals, that they demand change when their expectations of socio-economic power are not met. Huntington's ratios may apply to states in the world order as well, not just domestically. As states gain economic power, they may wreak havoc on the world order for political power, possibly developing nuclear weapons. An example of this is China; the U.S. can contain its economic power via fiscal soundness, but it may be changing politically.

Applicable for today's students, Haass (2017) writes that now there is a growing tension between larger and smaller states (p. 197), so-called, "dependency theory," the continued threat of terrorists gaining nuclear weapons (p. 126), and an inner and outer core of the EU (p. 285), which

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its moral leader, the United Kingdom, has just left. There is a type of "ordered convergence" of the world's economies, in which most of the West and the global South owe the East in financial debt. Previous efforts during the Cold War to leverage or link issues with other countries is declining in favor of smaller states having greater independence. Haass (2017) argues that larger states have "sovereign obligation" to intervene on behalf of all citizens, across borders, not just on account of governments, whether it be through force or the use of non-governmental organizations and foreign aid, which demand an expanded role (pp. 220-227, 255). "Authoritarianism" is expanding globally, but the West maintains strong universities, sound institutions, and a precedent-based, entrepreneurship-protecting legal system (pp. 290-291). Urging students to feel patriotic about such American features in class is important as a country, but so is teaching about the international environment, which is also meaningful.

Methodology

The following outlines show my detailing of the major changes in the world sub-orders since WWI, some 70 years prior to my birth, which can be used as an example to students for how to do such outlining. Usually, wars or treaties lead to the next order, but sub-orders can build up to these wars of treaties, and the sub-orders strongly define the new order. As the world orders change, some sub-orders remain, and others are reformed or developed. The causes of war, as outlined by Barry (2018), are conflicts over values, resources, and perceptions of power, but also fear and influence to control and protect one's territorial boundaries, as well as possibly influence others'. These are directly or indirectly linked to sub-orders. Some sub-order traits continue into new orders, unchanged, while others rise or decline in importance, which is certainly debatable.

Results

Students can see, in the results section, the current possible sub-order traits listed in order of geo-political significance, chiefly since WWI, and summarized in Figure 2. Of utmost importance, first, is 1648's sovereignty, both internally, and externally for countries. Next, as with Serfaty (2012), would come geo-political strength (physical size, location, population). World political organizations/conferences would come after, created in the World War II sub-order: the U.N., World Bank, WTO, IMF, NATO, EU, U.S.-MCA [NAFTA], then ASEAN, APEC, Mercosur, with "sub-traits" being: a) role of treaties- secret/non-secret, b) rules for war- preemption, how wars are ended- unconditional surrender, peace with honor, open/covert foreign policy, role of borders, and c) peaceful transfer of power. As with Serfaty (2012), then come domestic economics: a) resources, b) capitalism vs. communism/socialism, c) debt, d) corruption (institutions [the law]),

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e) media, f) manufacturing versus agriculture/services, g) consumption versus production, h) central banks, i) development, like: i) infrastructure, ii) urbanization, iii) clean water, iv) structure of companies, and v) monopolies. This differs from the Cold War, whereas, due to alignment, capitalism/communism would rank much higher.

From 9/11 onward comes terrorism, which was not a major trait of importance under communism, and perhaps was a dilemma going back to the Arab encroachment on Africa and Europe in the 7th- 15th centuries; this consists of: a) the threat of terrorism at home, and b) fighting terrorism and rogue/failed states abroad. In the 1960s-1970s, U.S. presidents Johnson and Carter created the importance of the next trait in my WWII sub-order: human rights within countries and in foreign policy, and a) ethnic and racial equal rights, b) classes and income equality/inequality, c) women's rights, social capital, d) nationalism- strength of countries internally (openness), and e) national unity. Spheres of influence, world opinion (just wars), and international respect are more from another era, not our own. Environmental conditions are having a huge impact on geo-politics, such as in the rainforests in the South, the wildfires and reefs in the East, and geo-politics in the Arctic, and trying to keep temperatures globally from rising 2° C.

Especially pertinent for current students, in the age of globalization, next would come economic trade: a) manufacturing, exports/imports, institutions, b) currencies, c) supply chains, d) smaller trade rules, e) international corporations, f) outsourcing, g) intermediate trade, h) intra-industry trade (countries with McDonalds do not go to war), and i) internal and external financial systems, which are more important in the past several decades than they have ever been. With modernity, comes technology: diffusion, social media for revolution-making, cyberspace/hacking, nuclear weapons, AI and robots (historically, the printing press, and machine guns in WWI), which are going to play an even more prominent role in the future, but, with recent events, it is questionable if a cyberattack could start a conventional war. However, in cyberspace, writes Haass (2017), there are "billions of (possible) actors" (p. 141). In the 1970s, energy such as oil was important, but now the U.S. is nearly energy independent, and Saudi Arabia is diversifying, but Russia has built many pipelines to secure its neighbors.

Following these traits might come non-governmental organizations and foreign aid, missionaries, refugees, religious connections and power, and education. While the Chinese, by observation, are strong at math and engineering, there is wide-spread knowledge that their schools lack creativity, and, from personally being an educator, they lack of edification of other countries than the U.S. This would be followed by a) refugees, and b) religion, which are very different than

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where they would have ranked directly post-WWII. Finally, last but not least is culture: a) immigration, b) slavery in the mid-East and Africa, c) assimilation, d) copying the West (China and Japan) culturally, and e) trying to copy the East, which were important centuries ago. Religion would have been higher prior to Westphalia, and post-WWII to Vatican II, and terrorism, technology, energy, and economic trade (which was virtually non-existent until the 18th century) would have been much lower. In Figure 2, one can see how the world has changed in sub-orders and the ranking of importance of sub-order traits simply since World War I, which shaped many international rules, but which were overshadowed and were replaced by many "rules" after World War II.

Discussion: The Future

Current students are growing up in a different world. When I was finishing college, the United States was, in the year 2000, the sole superpower in the world order, based on World War II's political-economic institutions, to which terrorism and preemption as world "sub-orders-traits," both falling under the WWII paradigm, that were again amended by the Cold War, and superimposed upon WWI, and going back to Westphalia. Today's students need to be able to "map out" such changes.

Today's students will need to analyze what the next "sub-order" will be—that is, if the pandemic, Russia as a "rogue state," or Artificial Intelligence (AI) and cyber-attacks will be the new sub-orders, or if a new nuclear arms race around the world will create new sub-orders. Technology, such as that raising economic production or for consumer use, affected the economics of the last century; however, it had less impact than technology, whether through nuclear proliferation, drones, cyber or AI weapons, will in the future. Or, the world order could more greatly be affected by climate change and energy geopolitics (for instance, how oil flows in pipelines from one country geographically to others, giving the former more power). Much of this research will be done by students/scholars of the future. But this paper has shown that we are still living under the Treaty of Westphalia, WWI, WWII, the Cold War, and terrorism, mostly in that order. New regional powers are emerging which, through technological diffusion, could become nuclear states. Since WWI, the U.S. has led the world militarily, but this may be changing.

Already, ideas exist for how to preserve the WW II political sub-order, but how will students and future leaders reconcile the inclusion of smaller stakeholders, whose economies will likely converge over the next 50 years, with the issue of nuclear weaponization? Additionally, artificial Intelligence (AI) should be feared not in the sense that the robots will "turn on us," as in science

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fiction, but in questions of whether we are ceding our power to other authorities electronically. Through careful policies, future leaders and world countries need to reach an equilibrium of power with the machines, with policies that treat AI and human workers with parity. Should we tax "capital," if we shall call it that, and, along with this, create better laws for privacy and security?

The U.N. and world institutions are unlikely to change anytime soon, although there have been calls to add more emerging market countries to the Security Council, so only a world war or sudden change in sub-order traits would alter it. Kissinger (2014) lists four "traits" crucial for the future: humanitarian values around the globe, such as affecting democracy and failed states; the international economic system; the inability of the world leaders to affect smaller conflicts which often are byzantine from ethnic groups and regional organizations; and finally, the effect of U.S. internal divisions translating into foreign power.

Students and teachers may disagree, but the strongest traits may well be regarding cyberspace/nuclear weapons. Also, there is the issue of a resurgent Russia. This resurgence is similar to, with sanctions, the harsh treatment of Germany after World War I, in the international reparation system, which led to the start of World War II in Europe. Russian president Putin follows a predictable strategy: When Russia's borders are involved, what he would call "coups," such as with Chechnya, Georgia, or the Ukraine, he orders a small force to usurp a piece of land. This was only after questioning the United States and trying to determine the response. Former U.S. president Trump came into office saying that the U.S. would "win an arms race," though the U.S. withdrew from the INF (Intermediate Nuclear Forces) arms treaty, before both states build more super-sonic missiles, non-radioactive nuclear bombs, advanced drones, or AI weapons. These treaties should include China if possible. Of potential could be to agree to rules for defensive weapons, placed in Turkey or Azerbaijan, as the Russians have suggested. Election interference may, too, create a new order, because of Russia's response to presidential candidate Clinton's time as Secretary of State, when she encouraged Russian protests. Former Russian president Medvedev warned in 2016 of a new Cold War (Haass, 2017, p. 100).

Classroom discussions might take on current political events, combined with history. The Thucydides Trap from ancient Greece predicts that growing powers, such as the United States and China, will inevitably end in war, as a Harvard study predicts because 12 out of 16 historical cases have (Allison, 2015, pp. 1-17). But China is more of a competitor, and the United States, I believe, is simply jealous/fearful of its trading and financial power, and its rising power politically if China pursues it. The United States must tread carefully on Taiwan. Political scientist Samuel P.

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Huntington (1993) claimed that that the world, from the 1990s onward, would witness a "clash of civilizations," particularly between the West, the Islamic nations, and the East, most notably the emerging power of China. The main causa belli might be the encroachment on fishing islands disputed with Japan, a major U.S. ally, or Taiwan, where the U.S. seems confused over its "One China Policy" and "strategic ambiguity."

Consequently, there is not really a clash of civilizations, a term former U.S. president Obama took issue with, but more of a squeezing of civilizations into a smaller world. The world needs more treaties, and more efforts at multi-lateral containment of rogue states, like North Korea and Iran, the most dangerous kind. As Serfaty (2012) writes, such states may feel that preemptive strikes may give them a surprise advantage (p. 30). Or, rogue states could continue to develop nuclear weapons while the rest of the world tries to out-wait them with pressure.

A treaty to consider, perhaps, for all nuclear states, and additional states if they wish to be part of it, would be that the development, or the process of it, of nuclear weapons by a state is a threat to all other current nuclear powers, and even non-nuclear powers; and, use of nuclear weapons by such a state, that has recently required them since the nuclear states signed the treaty, would be an attack on all treaty members. Use of nuclear weapons by an established nuclear state upon a non-nuclear state would be an attack on all established nuclear states. This treaty would prevent spread of "nuclear weapons," however defined.

Future students might write on technology and weapons, as Haass (2017) ruminates on such a treaty for cyberspace, admitting that "these are still early days…" (p. 247). Kissinger (2014) writes of the danger of nuclear weapons spreading from one state to others in the future, and also of, like Haass, the danger of preemptive attacks, by any side. This danger is especially in-light of the preemption trait begun by U.S. president George W. Bush for the Iraq War. The figure below shows some of the major changes to sub-order traits following historical turning points.

Table 2:
Sub-order traits (an example for students)

WWI (1914) + Aftermath	**WWII (1941) + Aftermath**
Wilson-collective security	U.N., NATO, IMF, World Bank, GAAT
Reparations- world payment system	U.S., France, U.K., and USSR, get nuclearized
Freedom of seas	Unconditional surrender becomes the norm
No secret treaties	U.S. becomes involved in Southeast Asia
Start of U.N. (League of Nations)	President Nixon removes the gold standard

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Buffer states to contain Russia
Cars and tanks- oil becomes important
Ottomans- Sykes-Picot pact,
Middle East divided

U.S. starts importing more consumer goods
Israel/Mid-east peace becomes an important issue
U.S. loses first war, in Vietnam

Berlin Wall Falls 1989
World War II institutions remain
Regional powers/treaties replace USSR
Unified Germany
Expanded NATO
Rise of economic BRICS
China joins the WTO
EU unification completed
Start of computer use-
(developed from war and space)

9/11: Terrorism Emerges (WWII Institutions Solid)
Rise of terrorists and the threat of nuclearization
China hikes military spending and builds atolls
Preemptive attack used in Iraq
Iraq becomes a danger; Iran gains power
Arab Spring
ISIS causes Syria, Libya, and Africa to crumble
Turkey takes in certain refugees among many
U.S. budget deficit soars; Asia's wealth increases
Russia gains oil; tries to start an Eastern Order
China- Africa development; digital yuan rises
Future- nukes return, and cyber security looms
Rush to discern the powers of AI
Mideast peace process stalls
Pandemic causes halts in world trade and travel
Bitcoin and monopolistic tech companies arise

Note: The top traits stay mainly the same: the sub-orders change in importance, just as how, when U.S. political leaders are asked the most "dangerous" foreign entity, the answers constantly vary and change.

Conclusion

In the future, by using a college's list of student alumni as a methodology, one could further conclude "what is modern," or the "modern world order." Or, one could use as subjects those with graduate degrees compared to those who are undergraduates, and conduct a survey with carefully worded questions. One could ask respondents to identify a major event (order) they consider modern. Or, perhaps, regressions could be run which assign values equating the beta of sub-orders to determine, at some threshold, when they have created a new world order. Charles Hill, writing in 2016 about the 2020s, predicted that there will be the "end of modernity" since U.S. power would dissipate, especially in the Arab world, and that Russia and China would become dominant (Hill, 2016, pp. 1-2). China sees periodic downturns in its economy, and Russia, from Belarus to Uzbekistan to Azerbaijan, is witnessing upheaval near its vast territories. Hill

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(2019), who notes that Fukuyama's "end of history" came from Hegel, the German philosopher, asserts that history is simply repeating itself. But it is more likely redefining itself in terms of modernity with a new generation of students, citizens, and leaders around the globe, I would argue. And Mr. Fukuyama is still writing.

Progressive students might be interested in Fukuyama's 2018 book *Identity: The Demand for Dignity and the Politics of Resentment*, which argues that citizens of nations are now searching for recognition of their ethnic and racial identities, which he uses to explain everything from the rise of Mr. Putin in Russia's Orthodox order, to migrants from various islands, to the Black Lives Movement, to the MeToo movement. Fukuyama traces the need for worth to the Greek concept of "thymos," to Hegel, to a student of Hegel's named Kojeve, to a Cornell classmate. But, as reviewer Louis Menand (2018) puts it, he is weak on explanation, such as, I might add, why this is happening now? Perhaps it is due to social isolation from technological media, or the increasingly diversity of states from migration? This will be a subject for future students. As for me, when I was a student, I wish that had a better understanding of world orders.

Students and social scientists, in this fashion, will continue debating about the world in which we live, and how to conduct studies and define reality in conjunction with other disciplines. Some fields, in which the term "modern" is firmly established, have created the term "post-modern." Philosophers will continue to question whether or not social science can answer everything, such as "what is modern," which philosophy can certainly add to (Okasha, 2002, pp. 54-55). William van Orman Quine, whom Okasha (2002) calls the most important American philosopher of the 20th century, has challenged the notion of "scientism," the trending belief of giving science such a high societal status, with an idea called "naturalism." The latter theorizes that humans are part of the natural order. I would argue that humans are sovereign parts, still, of human-made world orders and sub-orders.

Physics has reemerged with such issues as string theory and what exactly is dark matter and dark energy in the universe's expansion (Okasha, 2002). Along these lines, the debate over what is modern is such a profound question that it has nearly evenly divided Americans on the question of the universe's and humankind's creation, between those who see humans as created by God along with the universe eons ago, to those believing in the Big Bang Theory and evolution, ideas which developed in the early 20th century (Okasha, 2002). Pope Francis even philosophizes that there was a long period before creation, a period of non-existence in which God purely loved the world, an "order" of sorts.

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Much scientific research is ongoing, and further examples, which are meant to be linked to history, are, for example, work on consciousness by linguists, following Noam Chomsky, which claims that children are born with parts of the brain that already understand language, genetically, which impacted the historical formation of nations. Along the line of creation, biologists are debating whether to continue to classify organisms based on similarity of aspects, called pheneticists, or based on evolution, called cladists. These ideas will give rise to new theories of early humans, even further pushing back our ideas about world orders (Okasha, 2002, pp. 54-55, 107-119).

Certainly, U.S. schools need greater education on international topics and world orders, both in the high school and college classrooms. Moreover, "the greatest promise for progress in social science lies in an eclectic view of methodology that recognizes the potential contributions of diverse tools to meeting these shared standards" (Brady & Collier, 2010, p. 199). Teachers need to continue using these new tools and methods to relate current events to students' own lives, and prepare them to be future scholars in understanding history and the social sciences and to identify when and by how much changes occur. With hope, a firm grasp on sub-orders and sub-order traits will create a new standard to study world orders, as a tool to both scholars and students to understand what is politically-economic modern for each generation. Without doubt, the future will see a continued debate among educators, social scientists, and students alike on how to conduct research, and help how to define what is "modern," that gives us greater meaning and viewpoints with which to categorize and compare changes in world events. As we have seen, this can be done at least in part by looking at and measuring changes to the world order in terms of sub-orders and traits in each of politics, history, economics, and even other disciplines.

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