



The Temporary Teachers' Hiring Policy in the Municipal Educational System of Cametá (Pará, Brazil, 2013–2020)¹

Ariel Feldman



Daihana Maria dos Santos Costa

Universidade Federal do Pará
Brazil

Citation: Feldman, A., & Costa, D. M. dos S. (2021). The temporary teachers' hiring policy in the municipal educational system of Cametá (Pará, Brazil, 2013–2020). [Translated from the original, A política de contratação de professores temporários na rede municipal de ensino de Cametá (Pará, Brasil, 2013-2020)]. *Education Policy Analysis Archives*, 29(80). <https://doi.org/10.14507/epaa.29.5687>

Abstract: This paper aims to analyze the temporary teachers' hiring policy in Cametá, during the last two municipal administrations (2013–2020). The main focus is the interface between disputes for local power and the municipal administration of education. This is a case study using a qualitative approach, employing the procedures of documental analysis, interviews, participant observation, and a survey for data collection. Our theoretical framework was based on understandings from the anthropology of politics, with the concept of *clientelism* as the central analytical category. Moreover, we draw from literature that centers research done from a municipal perspective. The results indicate that the

¹ This is an unofficial English translation provided by the authors and has not been peer-reviewed. We thank the Office/Pro-Rector of Research and Graduate Studies of the Federal University of Pará (PROPEP/UFPA) for funding the translation of this article to English, fulfilled by the company Zemo Traduções.

Journal website: <http://epaa.asu.edu/ojs/>

Facebook: /EPAAA

Twitter: @epaa_aape

Manuscript received: 22/6/2020

Revisions received: 8/3/2021

Accepted: 8/3/2021

practice of hiring temporary teachers occurs mainly in schools in the rural area, being based on clientelist relationships. Several actors are involved in the hiring process and these clientelist relationships, with emphasis on city council members, school principals, and temporary teachers. Furthermore, the precarization of the labor of temporary teachers was observed, with recurring delayed salaries and months worked without payment. The performance of the public prosecutor's office proved to be insufficient in a scenario of non-compliance with the legal framework that regulates the teaching profession in the Brazilian education system.

Keywords: Temporary hiring; Clientelism; Politics; Educational policy

La política de contratación de maestros temporales en el sistema escolar municipal público de Cametá (Pará, Brasil, 2013–2020)

Resumen: Esta investigación analiza la política de contratación de docentes temporales en el sistema escolar público de Cametá durante las dos últimas administraciones municipales (2013–2020). Nuestro enfoque central es la investigación de las interfaces entre la disputa por poder político local y la administración municipal de la educación pública. Es un estudio de caso con un enfoque cualitativo. Los métodos de recolección de datos fueron análisis documental, entrevistas, observación participante y aplicación de un cuestionario cerrado (*survey*). Nuestro marco teórico se basó en supuestos de la antropología política, con el concepto de *clientelismo* como categoría analítica central. Además, embasamos en una literatura que propone la investigación centrada desde una perspectiva municipal. Los resultados indican que la práctica de contratar maestros temporales afecta principalmente a las escuelas en el área rural y se basa en relaciones clientelistas, involucrando a varios actores, especialmente concejales, maestros temporales y directores de escuela. Además, se observó la precarización del trabajo docente de los maestros temporales, con atrasos salariales recurrentes y meses trabajados sin remuneración. Observo-se, por fin, una actuación insuficiente del ministerio público ante un escenario de incumplimiento del marco legal que regula la contratación de maestros en la educación pública.

Palabras-clave: Contratación temporal; Clientelismo; Política; Política educativa

A política de contratação de professores temporários na rede municipal de ensino de Cametá (Pará, Brasil, 2013–2020)

Resumo: Objetiva-se analisar a política de contratação de professores temporários na rede municipal de ensino de Cametá durante as duas últimas gestões municipais (2013–2020). O foco central da pesquisa é a investigação das interfaces entre disputa pelo poder político local (municipal) e a gestão educacional. Trata-se de um estudo de caso em abordagem qualitativa, tendo como procedimentos de coleta de dados análise documental, entrevistas, observação participante e aplicação de questionário fechado (*survey*). Nosso referencial teórico pautou-se em pressupostos da antropologia da política, tendo o conceito *clientelismo* como categoria analítica central, bem como ancorou-se em literatura que privilegia estudos realizados *a partir do município*. Os resultados indicam que a prática de contratação de professores temporários em Cametá incide majoritariamente em escolas da zona rural, sendo pautada em relações de natureza clientelista envolvendo diversos atores, sobretudo vereadores, professores temporários e diretores de escola. Ademais, observou-se a precarização do trabalho docente dos temporários, com atrasos salariais recorrentes e meses trabalhados sem receber, sendo a atuação do ministério público insuficiente diante

de um cenário de inobservância do arcabouço legal que regula o magistério

Palavras-chave: Contratação temporária; Clientelismo; Política; Política educacional

The Temporary Teachers' Hiring Policy in the Municipal Educational System of Cametá (Pará, Brazil, 2013–2020)

The aim of this paper is to analyze the temporary teachers' hiring policy in the municipal educational system of Cametá during the last two municipal administrations (2013–2020), focused on investigate the interfaces between the dispute for local (municipal) political power and the educational management. In straight contact for more than ten years with the teaching universe in a number of municipalities in the countryside of Pará (Cametá, Bragança, Pacajá, Baião, Mocajuba, Tomé-Açu, Portel, Altamira and Igarapé-Miri), we realize that the temporary teachers' hiring in the municipal educational system is straightly related to the political dispute for local power. Based on this insight, we decide to further investigate how these hiring were processed, using the municipality of Cametá as a case study.

How is the process of these teachers' hiring in Cametá? What are the players involved in this process? How do these players understand the hiring process? Why is the presence of temporary teachers a permanent phenomenon in Cametá? How important is the nomination of temporary teachers in the dispute for local political power? These are the main questions that guided the research.

The choice for the municipality of Cametá was random, as it could be any other municipality in the countryside of Pará where Elementary School was municipalized. After all, in a preliminary observation, we noticed in other municipalities the same correlation between the hiring of temporary teachers and the dispute for local political power. The choice for the cutting in Cametá was also due to our greater knowledge about the idiosyncrasies of the local politics. Since 2001, two groups have alternated in municipal power, the Partido dos Trabalhadores (Workers' Party, PT), which governed Cametá between 2013 and 2016, and the group of the current mayor, Waldoli Valente, who was elected in 2016 by the Democratas (DEM) but is currently affiliated with the Partido Social Cristão (Social Christian Party, PSC). Political rivalry is relevant to the kind of cutting we are suggesting *from the municipality*, because our research aims to analyze how the dispute for local political power interferes with the process of hiring temporary teachers. We will analyze three other subsidiary aspects, the profile of these temporary teachers in comparison with the permanent teachers², the working conditions to which they are submitted, and how the current legislation is being complied with or not.

The existence of temporary teachers is a structural phenomenon in the Brazilian basic education public system, despite of a number of legal instruments that try to reduce to a minimum and residual level the existence of this kind of teaching contract. However, although this is a widespread phenomenon, data from the School Census indicate that there are more temporary teachers, proportionally, in rural schools. Between 2011 and 2018, the percentage of temporary teachers in Basic Education was stabilized between 22% and 24% of the total number of the teachers. In turn, in rural schools the percentage of temporary teachers in relation to the total number of teachers, in the same period, was between 37% and 41% (Ministério da Educação, &

² To become a permanent teacher in Brazil, admission by public competition is required.

Instituto Nacional de Estudos e Pesquisas Educacionais Anísio Teixeira, 2018)³. Thus, the existence of temporary teaching contracts is a structural phenomenon in Brazilian Basic Education, with a higher incidence, almost double, in rural schools.

The available literature has made little progress in understanding why there are more temporary teachers in the Brazilian rural communities. Roughly speaking and schematically, we can separate the literature that researches about temporary teachers into four major groups of studies. The *first group* of studies analyzes *the profile of these teachers through data from the School Census* (Neto & Pinto, 2016; Seki et al., 2017). In general terms, temporary teachers are younger than permanent teachers (effective/stable), however, the studies did not indicate a significant difference between the levels of schooling of these two categories of teachers.⁴

The second group covers *studies that analyze the effects of these kind of contracts on teaching work and school performance*. Ferreira (2016) showed that the temporary teacher of the municipal education system of Fortaleza presents significant signals of illness and suffering. Marques (2006), analyzing a school of the State education system in the state capital of Ceará, found that temporary teachers receive delayed payments and are forced to change the school that they teach every six months. Nascimento (2014), in turn, analyzing the state education system of Ceará found that the proficiency in math and Portuguese of students taught by temporary teachers is lower than that of students taught by permanent teachers. Other studies (Ambrosio, 2007; Basílio, 2010; Cainelli, 2016; Ferreira, 2013; Ferreira & Abreu, 2014, Gesqui, 2009; Nauroski, 2014; Novaes, 2010; Souza, 2011) present similar conclusions, as they demonstrate that temporary teachers work in precarious conditions, they are not contemplated by the Job and Career and Remuneration Plans (PCCR), and they are often not protected by labor legislation, which leads to pedagogical losses.

In dealing with pedagogical losses, Ambrósio (2007, p. 76), who analyzed the relationship between hired teachers and the pedagogical process in schools of the state education system of Rio Grande do Sul, understands that is “impossible to think this temporary teacher in the collective of the school to which he/she belongs[...],” because he/she cannot participate in the pedagogical meetings and training carried out in the school unit. Novaes (2010, p. 263), in an analysis of temporary teachers in the state education system of São Paulo, is emphatic in stating that “there are no pedagogical project that can resist such high degree of improvisation[...],” highlighting the “precarious working conditions, their lack of connection to the schools where they work, the remuneration difference to which they are submitted, the diversity of school subjects that they have to take on daily [...].”

A *third strand of research*, mainly conducted by legal experts and lawyers (Moraes & Oliveira, 2019; Volpato et al., 2019), but also by educational researches (Brito, 2013), analyzes the legal frameworks that regulate the hiring of temporary teachers and indicate the illegality of large-scale hiring using this kind of contract.

Finally, a *fourth group of studies* tries to understand the causes of the persistence of this phenomenon. The precariousness of the work promoted by the neoliberal prescription is a causal factor that is quite

³ The School Census records the existence of temporary teachers since 2011. The School Census (Ministério da Educação, & Instituto Nacional de Estudos e Pesquisas Educacionais Anísio Teixeira, 2018) was used through the Laboratory of Educational Data (Laboratório de Dados Educacionais), recovered from <https://dadoseducacionais.c3sl.ufpr.br/#/>.

⁴ There are different nomenclatures in the state and municipal education systems for temporary and permanent teachers, included in this last designation, as of 2012, the effective/stable depending on the length of service (Neto & Pinto, 2016). The ways of hiring temporary teachers also differ. Here we adopt the nomenclature used by the School Census since 2011.

referenced in the studies (Ferreira, 2016; Seki et al., 2017; Souza, 2011).⁵ Another factor pointed out, and which is related to the neoliberal ideology of reducing public spending and fiscal balance, is the budget restriction of the education system (Santos, 2016).

We should also point out that researches about the state education systems are more frequent. We found studies carried out in São Paulo state education system (Basílio, 2010; Diolina, 2017; Gesqui, 2009; Neto & Pinto, 2016; Novaes, 2010; Santos, 2016), Paraná (Fernandes, 2014; Nauroski, 2014; Ferreira & Abreu, 2014; Ferreira, 2013) and Ceará (Marques, 2006; Nascimento, 2014). We also found researches conducted in state capitals (Ferreira, 2016; Souza, 2018) and municipalities in metropolitan regions (Moraes & Oliveira, 2019).

This work is relevant, first of all, because it carries out empirical research with a qualitative approach within the *municipality*. It is, then, another perspective of analysis, which is to understand the importance of nominating temporary teachers in the dispute for local power in a countryside municipality, in which the formal salary labor market is extremely restricted. Secondly, as we will see, it is a municipality with the majority of the population and students of the education system living in the *rural area*.

This paper will analyze, in a synthetic way, the profile of temporary teachers of the municipal education system of Cametá. We will also address the perception of these teachers in relation to the teaching work conditions resulting from the temporary contract. We will also highlight the noncompliance with the legal framework and aspects related to the public prosecutor performance. In other words, we will briefly dialogue with the first three groups of studies about the matter in question. However, the main contribution of this research is with the fourth group of studies, i.e., *we intend to broaden the understanding of the causal factors of the persistence of temporary teachers in public education system*.

In a first moment, we will describe the methodology of the research. In the sequence, we will make some considerations about the theoretical framework, mainly reflecting on concept *clientelism*, a concept that empirical research has shown to be useful to explain our object of research, the policy of hiring temporary teachers in Cametá. Then, we will contextualize the locality, showing, among other aspects, the inflection that the *policy of funds (política de fundos)*, which was started in 1996 with the Fund for Maintenance and Development of Elementary School and for Valorization of Teaching (*Fundo de Manutenção e Desenvolvimento do Ensino Fundamental e de Valorização do Magistério*, hereinafter, FUNDEF), has represented in the municipal life. Finally, we will enter into the discussion of our object of research itself.

Methodology

This research is a singular case study in qualitative approach (Bogdan & Biklen, 1994). Initially, documentary analysis and interviews were carrying out between August 2017 and March 2018 with eight temporary teachers (hereinafter, teachers A, B, C, D E, F, G and H). The temporary teachers were contacted in one of the nine rural districts that form the municipality, which will not be named in order to maintain anonymity of those interviewed. The choice to concentrate the interviews in only one district was due to logistic reasons, since Cametá has 3,081.367 km² (Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatística, 2010). The choice for a rural district was based on the fact that, between 2013 and 2018, more than 90% of temporary teachers worked in the rural area in Cametá (Ministério da Educação, & Instituto Nacional de Estudos e Pesquisas Educacionais Anísio Teixeira, 2018), as it will be shown in table 5. Thus, five of the eight temporary teachers who were willing to

⁵ Some studies, such as Ferreira (2016), Seki, Souza, Gomes and Evangelista (2017) and Souza (2011) can be included, within the suggested scheme, in two distinct strands.

participate of this interview are from the riverside zone and worked in schools in that region; three temporary teachers live in the city but work or have worked in schools in the riverside zone and/or in roadside schools.

In these initial interviews, there were only two criteria for choosing the interviewees: they must have worked as a temporary teacher in one of the last two municipal administrations and they must be willing to be interviewed and to sign the Free and Informed Commitment Form.⁶ Two of the interviewed teachers (A and B) worked in the last two administrations, i.e., both PT administration (2013–2016) and major Waldoli Valente administration (2017–2020), two (teachers D and E) worked only in Waldoli Valente administration and, at last, three (teachers F, G and H) worked only in PT administration.

The interview as a methodological resource has a key role in qualitative analysis. From the persons' speeches, new research steps were outlined (Alves & Silva, 1992). Thus, from the teachers' interviews, other players appear as relevant players to understanding the hiring of temporary teachers, namely, the councilors. In contact established with the City Hall, two of the fifteen councilors were available to give an interview, being our concern that one was from the government coalition and the other one from the opposition. In the sequence, interviews were held between April and May 2018, with these two councilors (hereinafter, councilor A from the opposition party and councilor B from the government party), looking for information about their perceptions about the process of hiring temporary teachers.

A last interview was carried out, in November 2018, with a research subject who, in the chronological section of this study, has already held a second-level position in the Municipal Department of Education (hereinafter, SEMED) and, according to our evaluation, has an outstanding view of municipal political disputes. This research subject, who has an active party political action, as well as experience in educational management, proved an important collaborator during the course of the research process, in order to provide subsidies for ongoing analyses. It should be noted that standards of conduct reported by more than one observer had greater probative value than standards of conduct reported by only one observer (Auyero & Benzecry, 2017).

After establishing a direct relationship with the interviewees, we carried out a data systematization, i.e., an interview transcription systematization, creating an initial open coding to generate a list of topics (Emerson et al., 1996). Four topics, which were recurrently addressed by the interviewees, caught our attention during this codification and seemed key elements for a better approach for our research object: the working conditions of the temporary teacher, the way hiring occurs, the active participation of temporary teachers during the hiring process and, finally, the performance of councilors and school principals in this process. After this initial systematization, the need to deepen the subjects dealt with in the interviews was verified. Thus, an on-site participant observation was carried out in two rural schools, one riverside school and one roadside school, the first one in November 2019 and the second one in March 2020. These observed schools, with the consent of the school principal, are located in other rural districts, different from the one where the interviews were conducted. Therefore, three of the nine rural districts that compose the municipality of Cametá were analyzed on-site. The participant observation carried out in these two schools was recorded in a research logbook, which also went through a process of systematization and creation of topics (Emerson et al., 1996).

⁶ Following the standards for social research in Brazil, all interviewed signed the Free and Informed Commitment Form, in which the objective of the research was informed.

Understanding a case study as having a well defined thematic focus, but with a possible diversity in methodology and data collection techniques (Almeida, 2016), and also understanding that there are no rigidly defined boundaries between a qualitative and quantitative approach (Creswell, 2010), a survey was conducted (Williams, 2004), collecting questionnaires between January and March 2019, with 28 teachers who worked in temporary contracts between 2013 and 2020, selected at random, 14 in the PT administration (2013–2016) and 14 in the current mayor Waldoli Walente administration.⁷ There was only one criterion for being a respondent to the questionnaire: the respondent must have worked as a temporary teacher in one of the last two municipal administrations. Within the chronological section of the research, as we will see in table 4, the average of temporary teachers was 352 per year (Ministério da Educação, & Instituto Nacional de Estudos e Pesquisas Educacionais Anísio Teixeira, 2018). Thus, the sample of 14 survey respondent teachers for each administration represents 4% of the annual average number of temporary teachers. The survey, in this research, is not considered an isolated instrument of analysis, as its results will always be analyzed in combination with the qualitative approach.

Theoretical Framework

Our research is based on theoretical assumptions of anthropology of politics. In this way, the research aims to understand how people give meaning to the social actions they practice (Palmeira & Goldman, 1996). For Bezerra (1999, p. 11), a study on the anthropology of politics “is not concerned with the must be of politics, but how it is actually practiced,” because research of this nature emphasizes the “construction of analysis from the way people who participate in the exercise of politics conceive their experience.” According to Kushnir (2007, p. 163) “the anthropological approach to politics can be defined in a simple way: explain how social players understand and experience politics, i.e., how objects and practices related to the world of politics are meant.” Still according to Kushnir (2007, p. 163), the world of politics “is not a data in advance, but it needs to be investigated and defined from the formulations and behaviors of social players and particular contexts.”

Thus, in this paper, following the suggestions of the anthropology of politics, we will privilege politics in action. The meaning that social players give to their attitudes is thus of theoretical and methodological importance. It should be emphasized, then, that it was the empirical research that referred us to the key concept in our analysis: *clientelism*. In other words, the empiricism led us to the definition of our key analytical category, and not the opposite. We do not start the field research with a closed conceptual and theoretical framework.

The Brazilian historical-political journey, but not only of this country, is marked by a permanent tension between the public and private spheres (Bobbio, 2009). According to abundant literature, the use of a privileged public position in favor of private interests was a perennial social practice in the periods prior to the current constitutional order that began in 1988. The historical process of formation of the Brazilian nation is marked by social practices defined as “mandonismo” (Queiroz, 1976), “coronelismo” (Leal, 1997), clientelism (Graham, 1990) and patrimonialism (Faoro, 2001), which reveal, according to this literature, the privatist character of the country's political journey. Of these concepts, clientelism stands out, and it was used as theoretical reference in this research.

⁷ All those involved in the research, either during the participant observation or in the collection of anonymous closed questionnaires, were duly informed of the objectives of the investigation, always in accordance with the standards of social research in Brazil.

According to Carvalho (1997, s. p.), throughout the 20th century, “the concept of clientelism has always been used loosely.” Here we follow the good definition of Hilgers (2011), which had as key concern to establish some criteria for the good definition of the *clientelism* concept. The author understands that this social practice needs to be analyzed on the microsociological level, and not in a macropolitical dimension. In other terms, the Brazilian political structure, for example, could not, according to Hilgers' definition, be defined neither as clientelistic, nor patrimonial one, but a structure based on constitutional and democratic principles, which finds, at the microcosmological level, particular social interactions that can be defined as clientelistic. These social interactions, according to the author, need to have some features in order to be defined in this way: longevity, diffuseness, face-to-face contact, and inequality.

According to Bahia (2003), clientelism is a system of asymmetric exchanges, i.e., it asks for a relationship between economically, politically and socially unequal subjects (clients and patrons). From this perspective, with specific reference to electoral clientelism, this can be characterized as a “type of relationship between political players that involves the granting of public benefits in the form of jobs, tax benefits or exemptions in exchange for political support” (Carvalho, 1997, s/p). The mutual benefit between unequal individuals in electoral clientelism, therefore, comes through the offer of the citizen's vote and electoral support to the political representative, for whom it is exactly what interests him. On the other hand, the politician offers material or non-material benefits, favors and promises of employment to the voter, if the politician is elected. Thus, these relationships of exchange and mutual benefit are the base of the clientelistic practices and “in the end, it is the electoral victory that allows access to power and, in a sense, the reproduction of the political class” (Filho, 1994, p. 228).

The pyramid structure of the relationships of a clientelistic nature is also noteworthy. In this aspect, the presence of agents between the and the client is a feature repeatedly identified in the literature. In the peripheral areas of Buenos Aires, these intermediaries are called *punteiros* (Auyero & Benzecry, 2017). In the Anglo-Saxon world, they are called *brokers* (Stokes, Dunning, Nazareno e Brusco, 2013). Face-to-face contact, which is another important feature that defines the clientelism concept, often occurs through these agents. We will see in this research that the school principals can be conceptually defined as *brokers*. Stokes, Dunning, Nazareno and Brusco understand the *brokers* as

[...] local intermediaries who provide targeted benefits and solve problems for their followers; in exchange, they request followers' participation in political activities such as rallies – and often demand their votes. Thus brokers are engaged in sustained and frequent interactions with voters, observing their individual behavior and gaining knowledge of their inclinations and preferences, (Stokes et al., 2013, p. 75)

It is also important to emphasize that clientelism is a relationship of reciprocity. Despite being hierarchical and unequal, the relationship between the client and the boss is a two-way street. This means that there is a reasonable margin for negotiation, i.e., the client, especially in a democratic context, has relative freedom to bargain in order to make the best use of this reciprocal relationship (Hilgers, 2011).

Political disputes in Brazil, more specifically in the countryside, i.e., in the municipal district, are always very heated. In this sense, the electoral race for the conquest of a larger number of voters and, later, the maintenance of this electorate passes through a markedly clientelistic political culture (Lopez, 2004; Pase et al., 2012). Political culture is here understood as a “set of beliefs and values that citizens incorporate over time” (Baquero & Prá, 2007, p. 19).

Understanding that many political practices are supported by a political culture, we took care that our analysis was not trapped in a cultural determinism, as is warned by Souza (2015). The Brazilian people, according to our judgment, cannot be understood as eternally trapped to cultural practices that confuse the public with the private. Our understanding is that political culture influences the actions of social groups, but does not determine them. This is one of the reasons why the concept of *clientelism* is more accurate than *patrimonial* one. As was well noted by Souza (2015), the understanding of Brazilian society as patrimonial one in nature has created a cultural epistemological trap. In addition, we believe that the analysis in which the contemporary Brazil is a patrimonial country is mistaken. The formulator of this concept, Weber (1999), understands that there are two types of state organizations, the traditional one and the rational-legal one (we except the charismatic, because is *sui generis*). The weberian explanatory key to distinguish these paradigms is the way in which domination is legitimized, justified, and thus is becoming normal. A patrimonial society, roughly speaking, within the traditional model, legitimizes domination by seniority, by historical roots, where certain family groups have privileges because tradition reports that it has always been so. Brazil post-constitution of 1988 unequivocally cannot be seen as a patrimonial society. After all, the Brazil of the 21st century is not, essentially, a society that sustains privileges justifying them by hereditary lineages. Using the weberian categories, the contemporary Brazil is, in nature, a rational-legal society that legitimizes the political and social *status quo* through the reason and a complex and modern legislative framework. We thus reiterate the understanding of *clientelism* as a microsociological phenomenon, but not a macropolitical one (Hilgers, 2011).

In addition to the concept of *clientelism*, a key analytical category in our analysis, it is necessary to give a theoretical support for the geographical cut-off of the research, i.e., the *municipal district*. The educational research, currently, understands that the Brazilian federalism centralizes the decision-making in the national level, relegating to the municipalities only the execution of public policies (Feldman, 2020). According to this view, there is a dichotomy between the policy decision-making process and the policy making process (Arretche, 2012). Concepts such as *interference* and *permeability* were formulated to indicate the elaboration of vertical public educational policies, i.e., those developed in national or state level and imposed on municipal entities, without dialogue or co-participation by the municipality in the elaboration of these policies (Werle, 2005). Although this is a good diagnosis of Brazilian federalism, which in fact concentrates decision-making power in the central level, both in the legislative and executive powers, this view has generated a tendency to relegate the action of the local (municipal) players to a second level. In other words, it seems that the dispute for the local power did not have as much relevance in the implementation of educational policies within the contemporary Brazilian federalism. The social and political actions of local (municipal) players would not be determinant, since they do not have, according to this paradigm, enough autonomy to interfere in the process of public policy decision-making (Feldman, 2020).

Thus, this study seeks to revisit the literature that understands municipal political disputes as having great relevance in the configuration of Brazilian federalism. Graham (1990, p. 1) shows how in the Second Reign (1840-1889), a highly centralized system, “patronage [clientelism] formed the connecting web of politics in nineteenth-century Brazil and sustained virtually every political act.” According to Graham (1990, p. 2), “patronage meant both the act of filling government positions and the protection of humble clients, even landless agricultural workers,” and these two inseparable levels of clientelism - local and national - “were entwined through elections.” Thus, the Graham’s argument (1990, p. 2) is that “elections tested and displayed the local patron's leadership.”

Leal (1997), in turn, analyzes the context of the First Republic (1889-1930), a historical moment of power concentrated in state presidents (now governors). The political scientist demonstrates how state presidents had needed to make alliances with the municipal leaderships,

known as colonels, for electoral victory. Leal shows how the municipal leaderships were always at the same political side in relation to the state government, that is, they supported the state president, because they needed to have the ability to nominate for public positions in order to maintain power in their electoral corral, and these public positions were, at that time, mostly state positions. Thus, roughly speaking, the exchange relationship between state presidents and colonels (municipal leaders) was established. On the one hand, the colonel would assure the election victory to the state president; on the other, the state government granted some freedom so that the local leadership could nominate people to public positions. Leal's doctoral thesis, which later became the seminal book *Coronelismo, enxada e voto* ("Coronelismo," hoe and vote), when defended in 1947, was entitled *O municipalismo e o regime representativo no Brasil - uma contribuição para o estudo do coronelismo* (the English version was translated as *Coronelismo: the municipality and representative government in Brazil*). The original title of the research shows the relevance that Leal gives to municipal political disputes.

Finally, let us cite the political sociology of Queiroz (1976). Her research, developed on-site in municipalities in the countryside of Bahia in the 1950s, sought to overthrow "the myth that a small group of bigwigs, in the Court and in the Federal Capital, commanded the party strives, pulling from afar the little cords that moved the colonels in the countryside" (Queiroz, 1976, p. 25). Queiroz's concern was to carry out investigations having as a starting point "the level in which the political phenomenon is more violent and colors all the other aspects of group life - the municipal level." In this study, we seek a better understanding the relationship between the tough disputes for the municipal power and the hiring of temporary teachers.

Thus, in order to seek a better compression of how educational policies materialize, it is essential to carry out studies *from the municipality*. The basic theoretical assumption of our research is that the municipal players move with a relative degree of autonomy and that their actions are important for a better understanding of certain observable phenomena when investigating public policies in education. The next step is the contextualization of the municipality of Cametá, as well as a brief analysis of a very peculiar historical moment in Brazilian federalism, of the educational funding and of municipal life, the historical period of the policy of funds (1997-2020).

Setting

Municipal Economy

Cametá, founded in 1635 by Portuguese on the left bank of the Tocantins River, currently is connected to Belém, the state capital, on a road-fluvial route of approximately 5 hours. In the last Census, in 2010, it had 120,896 inhabitants, and 56% of the population lived in rural areas (Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatística, 2010). Of the 93,197 currently eligible voters in the municipality, 42% vote in sections located in rural and riverside areas, 21% vote in the villages (chief towns of district) and 37% vote in the urban area (Tribunal Regional Eleitoral do Pará, 2020).⁸ In the

⁸ The Regional Electoral Court of Pará (Tribunal Regional Eleitoral do Pará, 2020) classifies voting sites into 4 types, rural area (15% of voters), riverside areas (27% of voters), district (21% of voters) and neighborhoods of the municipality's urban area (37% of voters). In to the Regional Electoral Court of Pará classification, districts are the villages (chief towns of district) of the 9 administrative districts that — in addition to the district of Cametá— form the municipality according to the Master Plan of the Municipality of Cametá (Cametá, 2007): village of Carapajó, village of Curuçambaba, village of Joana Coeli, Village of Carmo, village of Porto Grande, Village of Juaba, village of Cupijó (Torres do Cupijó district), village of Areião and village of Moraiba. The Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics (Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatística, 2017c) considered, in the Census of 2010, based on the Master Plan of the Municipality of Cametá, the villages (chief towns of district) as urban areas. The School Census (Ministério da

last decade, the enrollments in municipal schools in the rural area have always represented more than 73% of the total, and the school units in the rural area have always represented more than 83% of the total (Ministério da Educação, & Instituto Nacional de Estudos e Pesquisas Educacionais Anísio Teixeira, 2018). It is therefore a predominantly rural municipality, and this is reflected in the municipal education system. It is shown, in the following table 1, a synthesis of the economic trajectory of the municipality, through the share of each economic activity in the total Gross Value Added (GVA) of the municipality.

Table 1

Percentage share of Gross Value Added (GVA), by sector, using total current prices, Cametá (2002–2017)⁹

	Agriculture	Industry	Services*	Public administration**
2002	42.74	3.24	17.7	36.31
2003	40.85	3.03	17.55	38.57
2004	30.44	4.56	20.74	44.26
2005	30.67	3.98	22.31	43.03
2006	31.89	3.55	21.93	42.63
2007	29.13	3.28	22.66	44.93
2008	26.54	3.44	22.37	47.66
2009	25.67	3.18	22.74	48.41
2010	29.31	3.61	20.68	46.4
2011	28.63	3.65	21.18	46.53
2012	32.03	0.08	21.36	46.52
2013	28.81	3.6	20.66	46.94
2014	28.11	3.79	23.39	44.71
2015	29.52	4.23	22.75	43.51
2016	32.84	3.89	22.2	41.07
2017	32	3.44	21.69	42.87

Source: Prepared by the authors based on Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics (Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatística, 2017b).

*Excluding administration, defense, public education and health and social security.

**Administration, defense, public education and health and social security

Table 1 shows that the main economic activities in Cametá are agriculture and public administration, which together always represented, between 2002 and 2017, more than 73% of the municipal GVA. The municipal agriculture is based on family agro-extractivism, especially açaí and

Educação, & Instituto Nacional de Estudos e Pesquisas Educacionais Anísio Teixeira, 2018), following the guidelines of Decree 7352 of 2010 (Brazil, 2010), considers the school units located in the villages as rural schools, because a rural school, according to the decree, is "that located in a rural area, as defined by the Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics - IBGE, or that located in an urban area, provided that it predominantly serves rural populations." For a reflection about the villages (chief towns of district) and aspects of the countryside-city relationship, check Antunes e Hespanhol (2014).

⁹ Chronological cutting restricted to data made available by the Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics (2017b)

fishing, in the riverside area, and manioc and black pepper, on the dry land (Ribeiro et al., 2004; Neris Nogueira et al., 2011). Within the public administration, the municipal administration stands out. Within the municipal administration, SEMED stands out. To understand the importance of SEMED in the local economy and politics, however, it is necessary to understand the impact of the *policy of funds*, instituted as of 1996, on municipal life.

The Policy of Funds and Municipal Education System

In 1996, the federal government approved in Congress the Constitutional Amendment n° 14, creating the basis for the FUNDEF. Twenty-seven state accounting funds were created (including the Federal District), which sub-linked 60% of several taxes already constitutionally linked, since 1988, to education. The FUNDEF did not establish new sources of education funding, and was characterized as a redistributive policy. The redistribution happened, however, almost exclusively at the intra-state level, because the 27 funds were autonomous and constituted mostly by state taxes, with little participation from the federal government. In 2006, after the end of FUNDEF, which was valid for 10 years, it has been established the Fund for Maintenance and Development of Basic Education and Valorization of Education Professionals (*Fundo de Manutenção e Desenvolvimento da Educação Básica e de Valorização dos Profissionais da Educação* hereinafter, FUNDEB). FUNDEB, running until 2020, did not substantially change the structures of FUNDEF. The most significant changes were the expansion of the policy, previously focused on Elementary School, which would now cover the entire Basic Education (Early Childhood Education, Elementary School and High School),¹⁰ and the increase in the volume of federal resources in an attempt to mitigate inequalities among the 27 federation units (Gouveia & Souza, 2015).

The *policy of funds* – as this education funding policy implemented by FUNDEF and FUNDEB is called – had as one of its main effects to induce the municipalization process of Elementary School. Throughout the 20th century, municipalities provided approximately 20% to 30% of the Elementary School enrollments in Brazil, and the states provided 50% to 60% (Araújo, 2005). With the policy of funds, this picture is reversed. In the last decade (2011-2018), the municipalities provided between 50% and 60% of Elementary School enrollments and the states between 20% and 30% (Ministério da Educação, & Instituto Nacional de Estudos e Pesquisas Educacionais Anísio Teixeira, 2018). In Cametá, the process of municipalization of the Elementary School started in 2000. Table 2 shows the growth in enrollments in the municipal education system since the implementation of FUNDEF.

Table 2 shows that the municipal education system was relatively small in 1997, compared to the current situation. From 1997 to 2001, that is, in 5 years, the municipal education system grew from 8,238 to 41,589 enrollments, a number that gradually decreased until 33,631 enrollments observed in 2018. Between 1999 and 2000, we also saw the transfer of Elementary School enrollments from the state education system to the municipal system, with the state education system taking over exclusively the High School enrollments from that year on. Besides the municipalization of state Elementary School enrollments, there was a race for new enrollments, increasing the total number of enrollments, because the policy of funds tied the transfer of resources to the number of enrollments.

¹⁰ Currently, without age/grade distortion, the Elementary School covers schooling from 6 to 14 years old. The term Basic Education is broader, and currently includes, without age/grade distortion, Early Childhood Education (0 to 5 years old) and Elementary School and High School (15 to 18 years old).

Table 2*Public basic education enrollments in Cametá by level of administration (1997-2018)*

Year	State Education System	Municipal Education System	Total
1997	13,925	8,238	22,163
1998	14,521	11,739	26,260
1999	20,459	16,796	37,255
2000	3,193	34,609	37,802
2001	3,177	41,589	44,766
2002	3,451	40,536	43,987
2003	4,685	40,917	45,602
2004	5,300	40,853	46,153
2005	4,754	42,544	47,298
2006	5,752	42,033	47,785
2007	6,665	38,985	45,650
2008	6,049	40,165	46,214
2009	5,543	40,102	45,645
2010	6,403	37,692	44,095
2011	6,188	37,556	43,744
2012	5,629	37,588	43,217
2013	6,312	36,960	43,272
2014	6,431	36,394	42,825
2015	7,025	35,032	42,057
2016	7,018	33,658	40,676
2017	6,939	34,384	41,323
2018	6,609	33,631	40,240

Source: Prepared by authors based on Ministério da Educação, & Instituto Nacional de Estudos e Pesquisas Educacionais Anísio Teixeira (2018).

From the municipalization process of Elementary School induced by the policy of funds, SEMED becomes one of the main economic engines of the municipality. As we saw earlier, in table 1, public administration represented, from 2002 to 2017, between 36% and 48% of municipal GVA. Within the public administration, the municipal administration stands out, as we have already informed. In addition, since the policy of funds, SEMED has become the main secretariat of the municipality, as shown in table 3, which compares the total current revenues of the municipality with the revenues allocated to SEMED through the policy of funds.

Table 3*Municipal revenue of Cametá compared to Fundef/Fundeb revenues, in current prices (1997-2017)¹¹*

	Year	Current Revenues (A)	Fundef/Fundeb (B)*	B/A (%)
	1997	7,683,110.10		
FUNDEF	2001	24,974,996.46	10,968,172.40	44%
	2002	33,359,072.24	13,383,530.74	40%
	2003	36,116,707.52	14,708,388.07	41%
	2005	51,116,823.13	19,915,204.62	39%
	2006	58,039,697.91	23,075,367.00	40%
FUNDEB	2007	74,269,820.82	35,272,108.54	47%
	2008	88,036,075.81	43,029,173.91	49%
	2009	96,189,925.69	50,111,628.20	52%
	2013	160,126,011.87	87,642,052.64	55%
	2015	200,631,383.79	112,693,560.97	56%
	2016	212,864,542.23	116,482,238.35	55%
	2017	211,915,154.83	118,348,625.01	56%

Source: prepared by authors based on National Treasury Secretariat (Secretaria do Tesouro Nacional, 2019).

* This already includes the Federal complementation.

Table 3 shows that the FUNDEF resources represented, from 2001 to 2006, between 39% and 44% of the municipal budget. With the advent of FUNDEB, this percentage increased, due to the increase in the Federal complementation (federal government), representing, from 2007 to 2017, between 47% and 57% of the municipal budget. In summary, the policy of funds and the municipalization process of Elementary School increased the weight of education revenues in relation to total municipal spending. Article 212 of the constitution elaborated in 1988 established a mandatory minimum of 25% of municipal taxes on education (Brasil, 1988). However, with the FUNDEF/FUNDEB resource redistribution policy, this ratio between revenues earmarked for education and total municipal revenues reached 57% in 2017.¹²

What is the impact of the policy of funds in relation to our research subject (temporary teachers) and our scale of analysis (the municipality of Cametá)? Teaching work has become the main formal employment in Cametá, and SEMED the main source of formal employment in the municipality, as we will see below. Legislation requires that at least 60% of the FUNDEF/FUNDEB is spent in the remuneration of teachers. In Cametá, in 2016, 72.92% of the

¹¹ The years in which Cametá is not listed in the National Treasury Secretariat (Secretaria do Tesouro Nacional, 2019) were excluded from the table.

¹² Our argument is that resources for education have, in relative terms, a high weight in the municipal budget. This does not mean that resources are sufficient for the basic supplies required for quality education. Currently, education is still underfunded in Cametá. We suggest, to demonstrate the underfunding of education in Cametá, a survey in the Simulator of Cost Student-Quality (SIMCAQ):

<https://www.simcaq.c3sl.ufpr.br/>

FUNDEB resources were spent on teachers' remuneration (Ministério da Educação & Fundo Nacional do Desenvolvimento da Educação, 2016).¹³

However, before we begin the analysis of our research subject, the policy of hiring temporary teachers in Cametá, it is necessary to briefly contextualize the political groups that have alternated in municipal power during the 21st century.

Political Groups and Municipal Rivalry

Since the municipalization process of the Elementary School in Cametá, which began in 2000, two political groups have alternated in municipal power. Partido dos Trabalhadores (Workers' Party, PT) administered the municipality from 2001 to 2004 and from 2013 to 2016. On the other hand, the political group that has Waldoli Valente as a leader, who has passed through several parties (PFL/DEM, PSD, and PSC), was in the city hall from 2005 to 2012 (two mandates) and from 2017 to 2020. The two groups are different because the first one, PT, is organized through a party structure, which had, as of May 2020, 7,657 members (Partido dos Trabalhadores, 2020),¹⁴ and there were internal disputes within the party. On the other hand, the second group revolves around a historically centralizing leadership, Waldoli Valente, who had already been mayor in the 1980s. As we will show throughout this paper, however, it was observed that these two groups resemble each other in many ways in relation to the conduct of the policy of hiring temporary teachers. The main difference in relation to the conduct of the policy analyzed here was the realization, under the PT administration, of a public competition for the admission of permanent teachers in 2013–2014 (Cametá, 2013), which generated an impact, as we will see, on the relationship between permanent and temporary teachers of the municipal education system.

In about a decade observing the political disputes in Cametá, and also in other municipalities in the countryside of Pará, we have noticed that municipal rivalries are structural factors in social life (Queiroz, 1976). In the election period, the municipalities in the countryside of Pará are usually separated in two main political groups, each one with a different color, and urban and rural residences are filled with flags. In Cametá, in the last two decades, W. Valente's group has used yellow and blue. PT has always used red. Colored flags, for some 20 years, have separated the population into antagonistic groups. The rivalry between these two groups, as we will see, has a direct influence in the policy of hiring of temporary teachers.

Let us move on, then, to the analysis of our research subject, the policy of hiring temporary teachers in Cametá.

Results and Discussion

Temporary Teachers: Legal Frameworks

According to Article 206, paragraph V of the Federal Constitution, teachers must be admitted exclusively through public competition. Article 37 of the Constitution, as amended by Constitutional Amendment 19 of 1998, which deals with the principles of direct and indirect public administration, among them impartiality, establishes, in item II, that “the appointment to a public office or job depends on prior approval in a public competition (...) except for appointments to commissioned positions (...).” In the item IX, it states “the law will establish the cases of hiring for a

¹³ The last available summary report of budget execution for Cametá is from 2016 (Ministério da Educação & Fundo Nacional do Desenvolvimento da Educação, 2016).

¹⁴ Information obtained from the Partido dos Trabalhadores website (2020) in the restricted area for affiliates. We thank an affiliate for kindly providing us with this information.

determined period of time to meet the temporary need of exceptional public interest” (Brasil, 1988). However, as already observed, despite the constitutional text, the presence of temporary teachers is a permanent and structural phenomenon in Brazil.

The 2014 National Education Plan (PNE), with 10-year targets, in its strategy 18.1 provides to structure the public basic education systems so that, by the beginning of the third year of this PNE, at least 90% (ninety percent) of the respective teaching professionals (...) are in permanent positions and are working in the school networks to which they are linked. (Brasil, 2014)

The Pará State Education Plan (PEE) reproduces the strategy of the PNE mentioned above. It stands out in relation to the PEE, that in the situational analysis related to target 18, no data are shown regarding the types of contracts existing in the state education system (Pará, 2015, p. 28-29).

The Municipal Education Plan (PME), on the other hand, is silent and does not reflect the target 18.1 of PNE. In its target 11, PME is restricted to ensure, within two years, an evaluation of the validity of the Career Plan for Basic Education Professionals [*Plano de Cargos, Carreira e Remuneração*, PCCR]; and pay attention to the reference of the national professional minimum salary as a minimum basis for valuing the remuneration of education professionals. (Cametá, 2015, p. 11)

It is interesting to note that Cametá's PCCR makes no mention of the teaching category “temporary teachers.” In its article 4, PCCR separates the SEMED's positions into three types: the permanent staff, i.e., those approved in a public competition; the supplementary staff that is ending, “consisting of (...) exceptionally stable servants”; and, finally, the commissioned staff, freely appointed and dismissed by the Chief Executive” (Cametá, 2012, p. 3). Thus, as Ferreira (2013) observed for the state education system of Paraná, temporary teachers in Cametá are not covered by the municipal PCCR. Temporary teachers are outside the law and social labor protection, as we will demonstrate.

Finally, note that the hiring of public servants in Cametá is provided for in municipal law No. 1,255 from May 25th, 1994, which regulates the paragraph 4 of Article 42 of Organic Law of the municipality, which provides for the hiring of personnel on a temporary basis to meet temporary needs, in accordance with Article 37, item IX of the Federal Constitution (Cametá, 1994).

The above-mentioned law makes it clear that the contract term will be 12 months, extendable for an equal period only once. Likewise, in its article 3, it states that the temporary employees will follow a legal regime, with rights and duties provide in the Statute of Public Servants of the Municipality of Cametá. There is also, in article 4 of this law, the mention that the hiring must obey the principles of isonomy, legality, impersonality, and publicity (Cametá, 1994).

In the following, we will see that empirical research demonstrates non-compliance with almost all the above-mentioned legal framework.

Temporary and Permanent Teachers in Cametá

Cametá, even with the advance resulting from a public competition carried out in 2013–2014 (Cametá, 2013) during PT administration, is still far from the goal stipulated by the PNE to be achieved in 2017, i.e., that “at least 90% (ninety percent) of the respective teaching professionals (...) are in permanent positions” (Brasil, 2014). Table 4 shows the ratio between temporary and permanent teachers and formal jobs in the municipality.

Table 4*Personnel employed and teachers of the municipal education system of Cametá (2011–2017)¹⁵*

Year	Employees (A)	Permanent teachers (B)	Temporary teachers (C)	Total of teachers (D)	C/D (%)	C/A (%)	D/A (%)
2011	5242	1,057	343	1,373	25%	7%	26%
2012	5209	1,031	377	1,411	27%	7%	27%
2013	6590	1,018	524	1,528	34%	8%	23%
2014	7351	1,164	353	1,509	23%	5%	21%
2015	7026	1,293	294	1,567	19%	4%	22%
2016	6667	1,354	225	1,558	14%	3%	23%
2017	6791	1,314	355	1,649	22%	5%	24%
2018	6005	1,272	362	1,625	22%	6%	27%

Source: Prepared by authors based on Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics (Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatística, 2017a) and Ministry of Education, & National Institute of Educational Studies and Research Anísio Teixeira (Ministério da Educação, & Instituto Nacional de Estudos e Pesquisas Educacionais Anísio Teixeira, 2018).

Table 4 shows that the percentage of temporary teachers in relation to the total number of teachers in the municipal education system was 34% in 2013. With the public competition carried out in 2013–2014 (Cametá, 2013), this percentage dropped to 23% in 2014, which was maintained until 2018, a year that recorded 22% of temporary teachers in relation to the total number of teachers in the education system, with some downward trend between 2015 and 2016. In other words, even with the reduction resulting from a public competition, the percentage of temporary teachers is still more than double what is stipulated in the PNE, which envisages a maximum of 10% of temporary teachers in relation to the total teachers.

Table 4 also shows that teaching is the main formal job in Cametá, and SEMED is the main source of formal jobs in the municipality. From 2011 to 2017, teachers in the municipal public education system represented between 21% and 27% of the formal jobs in the municipality.

Finally, it is observed that temporary teachers represented, from 2011 to 2017, a percentage of 5% to 8% of the total jobs in the municipality. This percentage, however, becomes more significant in rural areas. Cross-referencing the statistical data with our participant observation, we find that in the rural area, the municipal school is the main, if not the only, source of formal jobs. Besides the municipal government, commerce, which is concentrated in the urban area, is the other main source of formal employment. Considering that the rural zone has a significant electoral importance, the correlation between the appointment of temporary teachers and the municipal political disputes is assessed.

Next we will detail the importance of temporary teachers in rural area of Cametá.

¹⁵ Chronological cutting started in 2011, the first year in which the School Census records teaching hiring modalities, and ended, for the dimension of personnel employed – Employees (A) – in 2018, the last year in which the historical series were made available by IBGE (data regarding to employees for 2018 were added during the peer review process, as they were only made available by IBGE on June 25th, 2020)

Temporary Teachers in Rural Areas

It can be observed in table 5 that the phenomenon of temporary teacher contracts in Cametá is eminently rural.

Table 5

Temporary teachers and teachers in the rural area in the municipal education system of Cametá (2011–2018)

Year	Total of teachers in the rural area (A)	Total of temporary teachers (B)	Total of temporary teachers in the rural area (C)	B/A (%)	C/B (%)
2011	1,077	343	340	32%	99%
2012	1,073	377	359	35%	95%
2013	1,145	524	499	46%	95%
2014	1,128	353	335	31%	95%
2015	1,168	294	266	25%	90%
2016	1,142	225	211	20%	94%
2017	1,197	355	320	30%	90%
2018	1,140	362	337	32%	93%

Source: Prepared by authors based on Ministry of Education, & National Institute of Educational Studies and Research Anísio Teixeira (Ministério da Educação, & Instituto Nacional de Estudos e Pesquisas Educacionais Anísio Teixeira, 2018).

First of all, table 5 shows that, between 2011 and 2018, more than 90% of temporary teachers of Cametá worked in the rural area. Secondly, we need to highlight that the proportion of temporary teachers in relation to the total number of teachers in the municipal education system is more pronounced in the rural area. If this ratio, as shown in table 4, oscillated, from 2011 to 2018, between 19% and 34%, according to table 5 the same ratio oscillated, in the same period, between 20% and 46% in the rural area. In summary, table 5 shows that the phenomenon of temporary teacher contracts in Cametá is much more pronounced in the rural area.

Qualification of Temporary Teachers

As already mentioned, the studies comparing temporary and permanent/stable teachers point out that the former group is younger than the latter, but no significant differences were found regarding the initial qualification of these two teaching categories (Seki et al., 2017; Neto & Pinto, 2016). Table 6 shows the qualification of temporary teachers in municipal education system compared to that of permanent teachers.

Table 6

Qualification of teachers in the municipal education system of Cametá, in percentage, temporary versus permanent teachers¹⁶

Year	High School		Normal High Sch.		Bachelor		Specialization with bach.	
	Temp.	Perm.	Temp.	Perm.	Temp.	Perm.	Temp.	Perm.
2011	6%	5%	78%	62%	13%	26%	2%	6%
2012	7%	8%	67%	48%	21%	34%	3%	9%
2013	6%	8%	61%	44%	31%	36%	2%	11%
2014	6%	7%	63%	34%	29%	44%	2%	13%
2015	7%	8%	60%	32%	31%	45%	2%	14%
2016	8%	8%	60%	29%	28%	47%	2%	15%
2017	13%	7%	46%	30%	39%	47%	2%	16%
2018	12%	7%	46%	26%	40%	45%	2%	20%

Source: Prepared by authors based on Ministry of Education, & National Institute of Educational Studies and Research Anísio Teixeira (Ministério da Educação, & Instituto Nacional de Estudos e Pesquisas Educacionais Anísio Teixeira 2018).

Differently from that pointed by Neto and Pinto (2016) in the state education system of São Paulo, there is a difference in qualification between temporary and permanent teachers in the municipal education system of Cametá. However, it is a difference that is on a downward trend. As shown in table 6, in 2011, 78% of temporary teachers in the municipal education system had Normal High School as their highest qualification, a percentage that has dropped to 46% in 2018. 13% of temporary teachers in the municipal education system of Cametá, in 2011, had bachelor degree as initial qualification, and this percentage increased to 40% in 2018.

In summary, even in 2018, there is a difference between the qualification of temporary teachers compared to that of permanent teachers. However, this difference has been reducing between 2011 and 2018, with a strong trend of increase in the qualification of temporary teachers as well as of permanent teachers. The hypothesis we suggest is the impact of the National Program for the Qualification of Basic Education Teachers (*Programa Nacional de Formação de Professores da Educação Básica*, PARFOR), which began in 2009 in Cametá (Bastos, 2017b), and the Program to Support the Restructuring and Expansion of Federal Universities (*Programa de Apoio a Reestruturação e Expansão da Universidades Federais*, REUNI), which since 2007 has expanded and/or created undergraduate courses at the University Campus of Tocantins/Cametá, of the Federal University of Pará (Camargo & Araújo, 2018; Sousa, 2011). There are indications that these two public policies together have increased the qualification of teachers in the municipal education system of Cametá, both temporary and permanent.

Table 6 also shows that the qualification of permanent teachers has presented a trend to increase the number of specializations with bachelor, which was 6% in 2011 and rose to 20% in 2018. Temporary teachers with specialization and bachelor degrees remained at the same level of 2% during this period of time. Our research has shown that temporary teachers are not covered by the PCCR (Cametá, 2012), so they do not receive any financial advantage when they become specialists,

¹⁶ Four indicators of teacher qualification were used from the School Census, which together represent 99% of the teachers in the municipal education system, both temporary and permanent teachers.

unlike the permanent teachers. Temporary teachers in Cametá work in precarious conditions, with salary delays, and usually without a signed contract. Following we will present in more detail the working conditions of temporary teachers in Cametá.

Work Conditions of Temporary Teachers

The interviewed teachers, when asked what are the positive and negative points, in their point of view, of hiring on a temporary basis, answered, in general, that the positive point was the opportunity to work. Regarding the negative aspects, it is important to observe the answer from teacher A, who worked in the last two administrations, both in the PT administration and in Waldoli Valente's administration:

Because it seems that when a teacher is a temporary teacher, I have noticed, not only me but also other colleagues, that just because he is a temporary teacher, he doesn't seem to have the same quality, the same financial value as a permanent teacher, because the permanent teacher gets paid regularly every month, but in my case, as far as other temporary teacher, no. Temporary teachers do their job, are committed with the work, and when it comes time to be paid, it takes two months to be paid. I mean, I see that he is undervalued because he is a temporary teacher. (Teacher A)

Regarding to the working conditions, teacher B complained that it was “about respect, you know, they have no respect for us...they only pay when they want to” (Teacher B). The interviews provided consistent evidence that temporary teachers usually receive late salaries. The interviews and participant observation showed that it is also a usual practice for many schools to hire temporary teachers in March, dismiss them in June, rehire them in August, and dismiss them again in November or December. In most cases, this arrangement is verbal, without any kind of signed contract. Thus, temporary teachers are not paid during the vacation period, in January, February and July, and in many schools it is a repeated practice at the beginning of the school year, i.e., in February, the students do not have some teachers yet, because the temporary ones are only hired in March. Table 7 shows the 28 respondents' answers, all temporary teachers, 14 from each administration, regarding to the contractual conditions, salaries and the form of payment.

Table 7 shows that temporary teachers in Cametá are not protected neither by labor legislation nor by the PCCR. In both administrations, 100% of the respondents said they always received late salaries. As table 7 also shows, 86% of the respondents who worked in the PT administration and 71% of those who worked in W. Valente's administration stated that they did not sign any kind of employment contract. The fact that most of the temporary teachers say they receive their salaries through deposits in their accounts and that they do not know if they are registered in the City Hall, as shown in table 7, cross-checked with other elements of the research, indicates that these teachers are outside of the system.

Table 7*Contractual and salary conditions and form of payment for temporary teachers, in percentages*

Questions about:	Option checked	PT administration (2013–2016) – 14 respondents	W. Valente administration (2017–2020) – 14 respondents
Form of payment	Deposit in account	86%	71%
Delayed salary	Yes, it was usual to receive the salary delayed	100%	100%
City Hall registration	I don't know	86%	92%
Employment contract signed	I did not assign any kind of contract	86%	71%

Source: Survey carried out by authors.

We checked the names of teachers who reported to work as temporary teachers against the payrolls of the Cametá City Hall. The City Hall website, through the transparency portal, only provides the complete historical series of payrolls from 2017 onwards. For 2016, only the payrolls from January to May are available. From 2013 to 2015, this documentation is not available (Cametá, 2020). This checking was held with 6 teachers who reported to work in 2016, 12 in 2017, 11 in 2018, and 8 in 2019.

Of all these teachers mentioned above, only 2 teachers were located on the payrolls during the months of March, April, and May 2016. It is important to remember that 2016 is the last year of PT administration. The payroll for these 2 teachers shows, however, that their contract began in March 2016. On the December 2016 payroll, which is not on the transparency portal of the City Hall website, but which we obtained from a teacher in our field research, the names of these 2 temporary teachers no longer appear. The fact that these only 2 temporary teachers we found on the payrolls in the year 2016 started their contract in March and are no longer on the December payroll reinforces the data collected during the interviews and participant observation, i.e., that these teachers are hired in March, in July they are fired, rehired in August, and receiving salaries until November. Temporary teachers, therefore, are hired with the school year already started, which leads to a lack of teachers in February.

The other temporary teachers who worked in Waldoli Valente's administration, between 2017 and 2019, do not appear on the City Hall payroll. It is premature to say that the practice of no registration of temporary teachers in the City Hall payroll differs from PT administration (2013–2016) to W. Valente's administration (2017–2020). However, in this small sample, no temporary teacher who reported to work in W. Valente's administration are on the payroll, while 2 of 6 teachers who reported to work during 2016, the last year of PT administration, are in the City Hall payroll.

In Cametá, according to teacher jargon and based on PCCR (Cametá, 2012), there are two working arrangements in relation to the working hours. The teacher who has, according to the jargon, “100 hours” works five shifts (morning, afternoon or evening) per week and has, weekly, 25 hours of office hours (for preparing classes, studying and correcting student activities). On the other

hand, there is also the teacher, still according to the jargon, with “200 hours,” who works 10 shifts a week and has, weekly, 50 hours of office hours.¹⁷ It was observed that temporary teachers receive, regardless of the working hours, the minimum value, i.e., the value paid to the teacher who has “100 hours.” Even if they have a specialization, which according to the PCCR would generate a salary increase, the temporary teacher does not receive any advantage for this. In summary, the temporary teacher in the municipal education system of Cametá, when receives his salary — besides the delay, we observed cases in which the teacher worked and, at the time of the research, had not yet received his salary — is paid according to the lowest possible value provided for in the PCCR, regardless of the working hours and his qualification.

We already outlined a brief profile of the temporary teacher in the municipal education system of Cametá, as well as demonstrated the precarious conditions in which he works as a teacher; we will now analyze how the hiring process of these teachers occurs.

The Hiring Process: Clientelistic Relations

During the interviews, the teachers talked about the process by which they were hired, and in their statements one can see the direct influence of politicians, especially councilors, as well as the role of school principals.

It was the mayor who said he was going to hire me, because I have been working for a long time, for ten years, and together with the school principal. Then she asked me for my documents and, since I have been working for a long time, so there was no problem. Then she took my documents and then I am working again under a contract. (Teacher A)

Ah, the political issue, you know...politics, in this case, we have relatives, in this case... because it is like this: either we are called by relatives or we are called by a councilor. You go to whomever you can...so, in my case, it was a question of parentage. My mother is cousin of the person who takes care of the school [principal], so she indicates me and I am hired. (Teacher B)

Well, it was politics, you know, everything was about politics. It was like this, I worked with the councilor, then he was elected and got me this contract. (Teacher C)

My aunt, who is the school principal there, asked for my documents and said she was going to get me a job. She talked to someone she has contact and influence with there, I think he/she is one of these councilors, so I got it, I'm working. (Teacher D)

It was a political camaraderie. I know several councilors and people who work with them. Then I help them in the electoral campaigns, I am always engaged, and they trust me and hire me. (Teacher F).

It is about politics. I have a cousin who is always a school principal, regardless the school she is working for. She is even close to the mayor, there is a councilor who is

¹⁷ There are variations, in Cametá, between higher and lower Elementary school.

a good friend of hers[...]. Then she is my friend too, so she can take my documents there, and I got hired. (Teacher E)

The “politics” present in the speech of some of the interviewees, conceptually, can be defined as clientelism, as the relationship involving political representatives and potential voters, where the vote and political support are the main elements of exchange for the receipt of gifts and benefits (Auyero & Benzecry, 2017; Carvalho, 1997; Hilgers, 2011; Stokes et al. 2013). In this relationship, it is necessary to observe and emphasize the role of mediators in some of the clientelistic interrelationships, as in this specific case in which school principals were mediators between voters and vote pullers (teachers) and the political representative for the signing of the future possible contract.

It was evident in the interviews with four teachers that, in fact, parentage was a support that favored them and facilitated the acquisition of the temporary contract. Political interactions in the rural area, according to Queiroz (1976), were structured in the 1950s and 1960s around large parental ties, which Queiroz called “parentage groups,” a network of blood ties and cronyism. Participant observation, conducted in the riverside area, indicated similarities between Queiroz's analysis and the observed social area. One of the communities where we were hosted to conduct observation, in November 2019, is a village with about 70 houses and 296 people, almost all of them interrelated by parental or crony ties. Another researched location, also a riverside community, where 5 interviews were conducted, has approximately 100 houses and 500 inhabitants, who are related by parentage and friendship ties.¹⁸ In relation to the parentage ties, we observe the main role of the school principal in the process of hiring temporary teachers. Teachers A and D are, respectively, the brother and nephew of the school principal, who was essential for both of them to get the contract. Teacher E said he was supported by “a cousin who is always a school principal,” which indicates long-standing relationships, which is characteristic of clientelistic relationships. On the other hand, teacher B indicates that the school principal's function is that of an intermediary:

Yes, my mom is the school principal, but she is not the one who is the school's boss. She is the boss of the school's facilities, but who decides who is hired or not is them [politicians, councilors], and in this case she only accepts them at the school. In this case, the decision is taken by people from the outside. (Teacher B)

The research indicates, therefore, that school principals play the role of former canvassers (Queiroz, 1976), which, as we have seen, the literature specialized in the study of clientelism defines as brokers. Then, it is interesting to note that the position of school principal is still via political appointment, and there is no election to choose who will hold the position, despite the fact that the Municipal Education Plan provides, in strategy 10.1, “develop measures to enable the direct election of school principals with broad participation of the school community within two years of the plan's effectiveness” (Cametá, 2015, p. 21). Thus, the research indicates that the persistence of politically appointed school principals is closely related to their function as intermediaries in the clientelist relationship. Participant observation showed that, as a rule, the school principal is the broker between the councilor and the electoral base. The ability that the school principal has to organize this electoral base, distributing positions to temporary teachers and other employees in the rural school environment, is decisive for his appointment as school manager.

The results of the survey corroborate the reports collected through the interviews, demonstrating the network of relationships established in the process of hiring temporary teachers.

¹⁸ The names of the communities have not been mentioned to preserve the identity of the people that participated in the research.

Among the 14 respondents who served as temporary teachers during PT administration (2013–2016), 11 (79 %) said they got the contract through a politician, 10 (71%) said they got the job through a councilor, 8 (57%) through a relative, 8 (57%) through the school principal, and 13 (93%) said they campaigned in elections to facilitate the hiring. Among the 14 respondents who served as temporary teachers during the administration of the current mayor Waldoli Valente (2017–2020), 11 (79 %) said they got the contract through a politician, 7 (54%) said they got the job through a councilor, 9 (64%) through a relative, 7 (54%) through the school principal, and 14 (100%) said they campaigned in elections to facilitate the hiring. The questions were separated and one negative answer did not exclude neither the possibility of another answer is positive, nor the possibility of all answers are positive.

Thus, the analysis of the survey answers, together with the participant observation and the interviews, indicates that the process of hiring temporary teachers is anchored in a network of relationships involving relatives, councilors, school principals, and, in a broader perception, politicians, and the engagement during the electoral campaign is a relevant element. Another important element is that both political groups, which have alternated in municipal power since 2000, carry out the same kind of practice, because the research indicates that the distribution of countryside schools to councilors, giving them the prerogative of appointing principals and temporary teachers, is a strategy for the executive branch to have a majority in the City Council. An interviewed person, called as research subject, with a privileged position over municipal political disputes, understands that the municipal executive power, in order to create a situation of governability, needs a good ability to give to councilors the right to appoint temporary civil servants in their electoral bases, notably in the countryside. Among these temporary civil servants, teachers stand out, because they are considered by this interviewed person as opinion makers. In summary, according to this interviewed person, the executive branch gives to several legislators the possibility of appointing temporary employees, especially teachers in rural areas, in order to form a majority in the City Council, either by co-opting the opposition party councilors or by pleasing those in the government base.

Clientelism is a social practice established in a network, in a pyramidal structure, with important intermediary or broker performance. Besides, clientelism is, by definition, an exchange relationship that, even though it is hierarchical, presumes a certain freedom of action by both parties involved, boss and client. In the following, we will make some reflections to think about this practice from the point of view of the clients, that is, the temporary teachers.

Clientelism from the Point of View of the Clients

Auyero (2011, p. 130, 131) believes it is necessary to “shift the focus of attention in studies of political clientelism and pay much more attention to the place this political arrangement occupies in the lives of the most deprived people.” According to him “client perspectives are crucial to understanding and explaining the objective and subjective foundations of political clientelism” (Auyero, 2011, p. 131). The author concludes by stating “we need to work harder and better to reconstruct and explain the client perspective” (Auyero, 2011, p. 131).

Following Auyero’s suggestions, our research sought to understand the hiring of temporary teachers, defined as a clientelist practice, from the clients' point of view. At a certain point in the interview, the two teachers who had worked in the last two administrations, both in PT and Waldoli Valente administrations, were asked whether they are supporters of the party currently in power, to which they replied:

Because, well, I do not have difficulties in the question of parties, I am not a kind of person who stays on one side or on the other side, you know. I don't have, how can I

say ... I don't have a desire about this question, when there is a change of mayor, I always keep working, that's why I've been working for ten years, because I don't have this difficulty in being together with them, they know, they talk to me about my way of doing things and I know, I don't really have it, for example...because, look, I've been working on PT's side all these years and now I'm also on Waldoli's side, do you understand? (Teacher A)

Yes, I am. It is because, like this, we play on the side that favors us. In politics, in fact, we have to understand how politics works. We can't hold anyone's flag, wear anyone's T-shirt, in the case of us together, if our side wins, we get in, if our side loses, we are out for four years, you know? However, in the case, at least in my opinion, we shouldn't look bad with anyone, do you know, in this case we stay with one, and then, when the elections come close, we see who is going to win so we can decide whether to change sides or stay on the same side. It is because there are people who say "ah, someone is better, another one is better" and fight over politicians, but at the end, no one is better than anyone else, they are all equal. In this case, we need to take advantage of them, just as they take advantage of us [...]. (Teacher B)

Meanwhile, teacher D, who worked in the current administration, of Waldoli Valente, answered that he is on the side of the party that is currently in the city hall, "but I don't know if I had not voted for him, maybe not. But since I gave my word that I was going to vote for him and I did that, then it was better, right" (Teacher D). As for Professor G, who worked in PT administration, when asked if he was on the side of the party that is currently administrating the municipality of Cametá, he answered: "I know how to be on everybody's side [interviewee laughed]" (Teacher G).

The interviews indicate the importance of the temporary teacher, beyond the pedagogical work, as an agent strategically engaged in municipal politics. The employability of this teacher depends on strategic alliances, usually through intermediaries, with politicians who are from parties more favorable to take over the government. The behavior of the teachers, as demonstrated by the statement of teacher B that it is necessary to "understand how politics works," looking for the side that would most likely favor them, is a demonstration of a political culture, that is, of the beliefs and behaviors of citizens regarding politics.

Understanding clientelism as a relationship of reciprocity, it is necessary to observe this phenomenon from the client's point of view, i.e., the temporary teacher, in a context, as already observed, of little formal employment offer. Materially, it is a struggle for daily survival. However, clientelism also has an aspect rooted in political culture. As Souza (2015) warns, it is important to avoid creating a cultural epistemological prison, which would pre-define the Brazilian people as eternally unable of distinguishing public from private. Thus, taking due care not to create determinisms of both economic and cultural nature, it is necessary to understand that the social phenomenon observed here is grounded in a "set of beliefs and values that citizens incorporate over time" (Baquero & Prá, 2007, p.19).

The Perception of Councilors about the Temporary Teachers

Interviews were carried out, between April and May 2018, with two councilors of the Cametá City Council, who met us in their offices. Both interviewed councilors are from the current

legislature (2017–2020), however, councilor A is from an opposition party, while councilor B is from the government coalition.

Before the interview, we briefly explained to the councilors what the research was about. The councilors were asked if they had ever indicated people to SEMED to be hired as temporary teachers. The answer of both councilors was negative, claiming that such a practice was not in line with their political ideals. Councilor B, which supports Waldoli Valente administration, said “we did not commit ourselves to this profile, precisely so as not to commit our vision of making an independent, democratic and republican administration” (Councilor B). Councilor A, from an opposition party, reported: “I came here, but I didn't come for this policy, I came for a different policy [...]” (Councilor A).

However, according to the councilors, there are other members of the city council who do not follow this political ideal, so they said they are aware that there is this practice in the City Council, where councilors indicate people to SEMED to be hired temporarily. The explanation for this, according to one of the legislators interviewed, from the government's base, is that the councilors who act in this way are

more committed to their own project of power in politics, I believe that those [councilors] are more committed to this practice that is common in Brazil, of corporatism, of keeping their own project more personal and less republican. (Councilor B)

In this sense, councilor A, from an opposition party, also pointed out to the issue that to be in a government coalition is determinant to the politician to have more influence than another in relation to political appointments to SEMED.

Look, constantly, [councilors] who are from a government coalition, all those who are from a government group, obviously they have conversations with the mayor, they indicate someone, it is usual, this thing always happens, do you know. However, we [...] are from opposition parties, considered as members of opposition parties. We are not, we have no indication, and it is also not an attribution of the councilor. (Councilor A)

According to the councilor's speech above, it is not an attribution of the legislative representatives to appoint people to jobs and/or positions in the public sector, however, the population itself does not have this understanding. The councilors claimed that is very usual people ask them for jobs, promise votes, and campaign in exchange for receiving jobs later. According to councilor A, it is usual for people to question him in the following way: “Ah, candidate, when you are elected, get a job for my son, for my daughter, or that I am a graduate and still haven't passed in a public competition” (Councilor A). According to councilor B, “it is usual [for people to approach him asking for a job] and as I said Cametá is also a reflection of Brazil, the further away from the big cities and from a politicized community, the more recurrent is this practice” (Councilor B).

The councilor's speeches show that the political culture demarcates clientelistic attitudes and values not only from political representatives towards the citizens, because the inverse process also occurs. As already pointed out, clientelistic relations, as the literature points out, are always a two-way street.

The Performance of the Public Prosecutor's Office

Municipal Decree No. 085/2018 (Cametá, 2018), dated June 11, 2018, stipulated, in its, article 1, “to dismiss all temporary public servants from the structure of the Cametá Public

Administration, without exception.” In the preliminary considerations of the decree, it is stated that “the Municipality of Cametá maintains today [June 2018] a significant number of 146 (one hundred and forty six) temporary servants.” Attached at the end of the decree is a list of 146 dismissed temporary employees. It is noteworthy that this list includes only 3 temporary teachers, while the School Census recorded, in 2018, the existence of 362 teachers with this kind of contract.

During the interview with councilor A, from an opposition party, he mentioned that the City Council had forwarded a complaint to the Public Prosecutor's Office about the rate of temporary teachers. We talked about this issue in the interview with councilor B, from a government party, but he told us that he was only aware of the aforementioned complaint by the municipal legislature to the Public Prosecutor's Office only through off the record comments, and could not say whether there was this complaint or not and what were its consequence. Therefore, we can realize that the issue is quite sensitive in the political disputes at the municipal level. The preliminary considerations of Municipal Decree No. 085/2018 (Cametá, 2018), already mentioned, politicizes the issue, stating that there is “communication from the municipal executive power to the Public Prosecutor of Labor, made in 2016, that the municipality had, in 2013, the staggering payroll of 2,360 (two thousand, three hundred and sixty) temporary employees.” We can see, in this passage, an attempt to attribute to the previous administration the problem of the excess of temporary employees in the municipality.

In this way, it is important to emphasize that our research indicated that the process of hiring temporary teachers on a clientelist basis is not exclusive to either administration, constituting an ingrained social practice, widely spread, with prominence in rural areas, and observed in a very similar way in both administrations. The main difference between the two administrations, as already mentioned, is that the PT administration (2013–2016) carried out a public competition. As we have also pointed out, the research indicates the existence of a “set of beliefs and values that citizens incorporate over time” (Baquero & Prá, 2007, p.19), which is independent of the political group in power. It is also important to differentiate the social phenomenon defined here as clientelism from illegal practices within the public administration. Hilgers (2011) warns about the conceptual confusion surrounding the use of the category clientelism, often confused with vote buying or corruption. As we have already pointed out, according to Hilgers, however, clientelism needs to be defined as a microsociological phenomenon that contains some characteristics: longevity, diffuseness, face-to-face contact, and inequality.

However, analyzing the subject of this research, the hiring of temporary teachers, in a broader way, we realize that much of the legal framework already mentioned (PNE, PEE, CF, and Municipal Law 1.255 of May 25th, 1994) is not being complied with. Brito (2013) has shown that the Public Prosecutor's Office acted in a decisive way in order to a series of public competitions for teachers took place in several state education systems. In a participant observation in a school in the rural area of Cametá, it was noticed that the school suffered strong interference from a councilor, at that moment in a government party, in early 2013, who, according to reports received, in the first months of PT administration, appointed a number of temporary employees and teachers, removing some of the permanent employees and dismissing the temporary ones remaining from the previous administration. However, with the 2013-2014 public competition (Cametá, 2013), a wave of newly recruited permanent teachers arrived at the school, forming the teaching staff that, with few changes, was maintained until the beginning of 2020. In other words, the public competition generated stability in the teaching staff of this school. However, what seems to have had a great effect in a school that has the advantage of being relatively close to the urban center, did not change significantly the structure of the kind of teaching contract in the other rural schools. In summary, the public competition has mitigated the problem, which is still far from being solved.

In this way, it is understood that the Public Prosecutor's Office has a key role in dealing with the excess of temporary teachers, considering that holding public competitions is the main mitigating effect. Still on this issue, the aforementioned interviewee, called as research subject, with a privileged position on municipal political disputes, stated the following about the performance of the Public Prosecutor's Office regarding temporary teachers:

In fact, the Public Prosecutor's Office do not permit the hiring of teachers. The city hall has been circumventing this hiring practice for a long time. The Public Prosecutor's Office even in the previous administration and in the current one as well, it has been threatening to fine the manager and the secretary, trying to force them not to hire public teachers. However, they [Public Prosecutor's Office] do not succeed because they [municipal administration] cheat the law, in other words, they mislead the Public Prosecutor's Office. In addition, the Public Prosecutor's Office turns a blind eye and allows itself to be misled, because I am not talking about one year or one month, but over many years. In the previous administration [of Mayor Iracy Nunes, from PT, from 2013 to 2016], every semester, everyone was fired because a document arrived from the Public Prosecutor's Office saying that the administration had to fire everyone. Then they would fire, and after one or two months, they would hire again. And nowadays it is the same thing. (Research subject).

We register, in April 2019, a request for information with the Public Prosecutor's Office about its speculated actions in the municipality of Cametá, about hiring temporary teacher by SEMED. The requests for this information were made using the Access to Information Law (LAI). According to the LAI, the MP has 20 days (with the possibility of an additional 10 days) to return with an answer to the requester. However, even with the maximum limit of days elapsed, no return was obtained from the Public Prosecutor's Office.

Final Considerations

The objective of the paper was to analyze the policy of hiring temporary teachers in the municipal education system of Cametá during the last two municipal administrations (2013–2020), and the main focus of the research was the investigation of the interfaces between the dispute for local (municipal) political power and the educational administration. We started from some research problems, among others things to understand how the hiring process of these teachers occurs in the municipality and what the importance of the appointment of temporary teachers in the dispute for local political power is.

The research indicated a causal factor not yet explored by the literature to explain the persistence of temporary teachers in the public education systems, namely, the importance that the appointment of these teachers plays in the political dispute in countryside municipalities. Our case study showed that the hiring of temporary teachers has significant relevance in shaping the dynamics between the executive and legislative powers, and that the municipal school, especially in rural areas, is an important space of political dispute. It is under this perception – the municipal school as a space of political dispute – that the hiring of temporary teachers needs to be analyzed.

Another research question was to identify the players that participate in the process of hiring temporary teachers in Cametá and analyze how they realize this process. The research indicated a number of players that are networked, most notably the councilors, school principals (brokers, intermediaries), and temporary teachers. The perception of these players in relation to the hiring

process brought us back to the concept of *clientelism*, as the essential characteristics of this kind of reciprocal relationship were identified: longevity, diffuseness, face-to-face contact, and inequality.

In Brazil, as we have shown, there is a complex legal framework that aims to reduce to a minimum and residual level the number of temporary civil servants. Why is it so difficult to enforce this legislation? In this sense, the case of temporary teachers is paradigmatic. The literature still lacks explanations to understand why the phenomenon of the number of temporary teachers is significantly higher in rural schools than in urban schools. This study provides an explanatory possibility, which is the causal link between disputes for municipal political power and the hiring of these temporary teachers. Municipalized elementary school, at the imminent constitutionalization of the FUNDEB, seems to be an irreversible phenomenon, at least in the short term. Thus, to implement any public educational policy that depends on the municipal federated entity, it is essential to better understand the idiosyncrasies of social relations at the local level.

Clientelism, as an analytical category, is an important conceptual tool for the researcher of public policies in education implemented at the municipal level, especially in rural areas. The policy of hiring temporary teachers in Cametá was based on clientelistic relationships. We reiterate that this phenomenon needs to be understood conceptually in its microsociological dimension and cannot be confused with corruption or vote buying. It is a social practice of a long-lasting nature, grounded in a political culture that sustains it, involving a series of networked players, namely, councilors, school principals, and temporary teachers.

Understanding *clientelism* and its relationship with the policy of hiring temporary teachers as a microsociological phenomenon, however, does not mean stating that the research makes the non-compliance with the law a natural thing. The research showed that the temporary teacher, in Cametá, works in precarious conditions, is not protected by legislation, and that an entire legal framework is not complied with. In addition, the performance of the Public Prosecutor's Office proved to be insufficient in this scenario.

In addition, understanding that *clientelism* is the support of these hiring practices means that there is a social demand in rural sites for the maintenance of these practices. We asked at the beginning of this article why the existence of temporary teachers in Cametá is a persistent phenomenon. *Clientelism* is always a reciprocal relationship, although it is also hierarchical. Understanding the temporary teacher as a *client*, who demands employment and uses his bargaining power to achieve his goals, is essential for public policy makers, who cannot see teaching as separate from the lack of formal jobs, especially in rural areas. Educational policies need to be thought out together, in the sense of articulating initial training for persons residing in the rural area and stimulating the entrance of riverside dwellers and campesinos into the teaching profession through public competition. Otherwise, the tendency is that there is social demand for teacher employability through temporary contracts, since, as we have seen, teaching is one of the main types of formal occupation in the rural world since the implementation of the policy of funds and the municipalization of Elementary School.

References

- Almeida, R. de (2016). Estudo de caso: foco temático e diversidade metodológica. In Abdal, A., Oliveira, M. C. V., Ghezzi, D. R. & Júnior, J. S. (orgs.). *Métodos de pesquisa em ciências sociais: Bloco Qualitativo* (pp. 60-70). Sesc São Paulo/CEBRAP.
- Alves, Z. M. M. B.; Silva, M. H. G. F. D. (1992). Análise qualitativa de dados de entrevista: uma proposta. *Paideia*, 2, 61-69. <https://doi.org/10.1590/S0103-863X1992000200007>

- Ambrosio, C. (2007). *Professores contratados e o processo pedagógico nas escolas públicas estaduais*. Dissertation (Master in Education). Universidade do Vale do Rio dos Sinos, Porto Alegre. Recovered from <http://www.repositorio.jesuita.org.br/handle/UNISINOS/1927>
- Antunes, M.V.M. & Hespanhol, R. A. M. (2014, October). As vilas (sedes distritais) no cenário contemporâneo: aspectos da relação campo-cidade. *Anais do IV Simpósio Cidades Médias e Pequenas da Bahia*. Salvador, BA, 4. <https://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/229289157.pdf>
- Araújo, G. C. (2005). *Município, Federação e Educação: História das Instituições e das Ideias Políticas no Brasil*. Thesis (Doctorate in Education), Universidade de São Paulo, São Paulo. Recovered from <https://teses.usp.br/teses/disponiveis/48/48134/tde-07062006-111854/pt-br.php>
- Arretche, M. (2012). *Democracia, federalismo e centralização no Brasil*. Rio de Janeiro: Editora FGV/Fiocruz.
- Auyero, J. (2011). Vidas e Política das Pessoas Pobres: as coisas que um etnógrafo político sabe (e não sabe) após 15 anos de trabalho de campo. *Sociologias*, 13(28), 126-164. <https://dx.doi.org/10.1590/S1517-45222011000300006>
- Auyero, J & Benzecry, C. (2017). The Practical Logic of Political Domination: Conceptualizing the Clientelist Habitus. *Sociological Theory*, 35(3), 179–199. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0735275117725767>
- Bahia, L H. N. (2003). *O poder do clientelismo: raízes e fundamentos da troca política*. Editora Renovar.
- Baquero, M. & Prá, J. (2007). *A Democracia brasileira e a cultura política no Rio Grande do Sul*. UFRGS.
- Basílio, J. R. (2010). *Tornar-se professor(a) na rede estadual de ensino de São Paulo: práticas de contratação e condição docente (1985-2013)*. Thesis (Doctorate in Education), Universidade Estadual de Campinas, Campinas. Recovered from: <http://repositorio.unicamp.br/handle/REPOSIP/305018>
- Bastos, G. B. (2017a). *O clientelismo político e o joio e o trigo da política municipal*. Dissertation (Master in Social Sciences), Universidade de Juiz de Fora, Juiz de Fora. Recovered from <http://repositorio.ufjf.br:8080/jspui/bitstream/ufjf/5856/1/giselebragabastos.pdf>
- Bastos, J. M. (2017b). *Plano Nacional de Formação de Professores da Educação Básica- PARFOR: Concepções, Diretrizes e Princípios Formativos*. Dissertation (Master in Education and Culture), Universidade Federal do Pará, Cametá. Recovered from <https://sigaa.ufpa.br/sigaa/verProducao?idProducao=257407&key=2b1ea91f2bde5608d7d82f8d56961470>
- Bezerra, M. O. (1999). *Em nome das “bases”: política, favor e dependência pessoal*. Relume Dumará.
- Bobbio, N. (2009). A grande dicotomia: público/privado. In Bobbio, N. *Estado, governo e sociedade: por uma teoria geral da política* (15th ed., cap. I, pp. 13-32). Paz e Terra.
- Bogdan, R. C. & Biklen, S. K. (1994). *Investigação qualitativa em educação: uma introdução à teoria e aos métodos*. Porto Editora.
- Brasil. (1988). *Constituição da República Federativa do Brasil*. Brasília-DF. Recovered from http://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/constituicao/constituicao.htm
- Brasil. (1996). *Lei nº 9.394, de 20 de dezembro de 1996. Estabelece as diretrizes e bases da educação nacional*. Brasília-DF. http://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/leis/19394.htm
- Brasil. (2010). *Decreto nº 7.352, de 4 de novembro de 2010. Dispõe sobre a Política Nacional de Educação do Campo e sobre o Programa Nacional de Educação na Reforma Agrária*. Brasília-DF. [https://www2.camara.leg.br/legin/fed/decret/2010/decreto-7352-4-novembro-2010-609343-norma-pe.html#:~:text=DECRETO%20N%C2%BA%207.352%2C%20DE%204,Educa%C3%A7%C3%A3o%20na%20Reforma%20Agr%C3%A1ria%20%2D%20PRONERA.&text=Vide%20Norma\(s\)%3A,%20%2D%20\(Revoga%C3%A7%C3%A3o%20Parcial\)](https://www2.camara.leg.br/legin/fed/decret/2010/decreto-7352-4-novembro-2010-609343-norma-pe.html#:~:text=DECRETO%20N%C2%BA%207.352%2C%20DE%204,Educa%C3%A7%C3%A3o%20na%20Reforma%20Agr%C3%A1ria%20%2D%20PRONERA.&text=Vide%20Norma(s)%3A,%20%2D%20(Revoga%C3%A7%C3%A3o%20Parcial))

- Brasil. (2014). *Lei nº 13.005/2014. Aprova o Plano Nacional de Educação - PNE e dá outras providências*. Brasília-DF. <http://pne.mec.gov.br/18-planos-subnacionais-de-educacao/543-plano-nacional-de-educacao-lei-n-13-005-2014>
- Brito, V. L. A. (2013). O Plano Nacional de Educação e o ingresso dos profissionais do magistério da educação básica. *Educação & Sociedade*, 34(125), 1251–1267. <https://doi.org/10.1590/S0101-73302013000400012>
- Cainelli, C. M. de O. (2016). *Professores contratados por tempo determinado: sentimento de um inquilinato docente*. Dissertation (Master in Educational Practices and Management), Universidade Nove de Julho, São Paulo. Recovered from: <https://bibliotecatede.uninove.br/handle/tede/1261>
- Camargo, A. M. M. de, & Araújo, I. M. (2018). Expansão e interiorização das universidades federais no período de 2003 a 2014: perspectivas governamentais em debate. *Acta Scientiarum*, 40(1). <https://doi.org/10.4025/actascieduc.v40i1.37659>
- Cametá. (1994). *Lei nº 1.255 de 25 de maio de 1994. Dispõe sobre a contratação temporária de pessoal*. Cametá-PA.
- Cametá. (2007). *Lei nº 086, de 19 de junho de 2007, que dispõe sobre Plano Diretor do Município de Cametá e dá outras providências*. Cametá-PA.
- Cametá. (2012). *Lei nº 212/2012, de 21 de maio de 2012, que dispõe sobre a adequação da carreira da área de magistério e criação unificada do Plano de Cargos, Carreiras e Remuneração dos Profissionais da Educação Básica do município de Cametá-PA*. Cametá-PA.
- Cametá. (2013). *Concurso público - Edital N.º 001/2013*. Cametá-PA. https://portalfadesp.org.br/?page_id=1489
- Cametá. (2015). *Lei 274 de julho de 2015, Cria o Plano Municipal de Educação de Cametá para o decênio 2015 a 2024 em consonância com o art. 214 da Constituição Federal e do Plano Nacional de Educação (PNE), Lei nº 13.005 / 14) dá outras providências*. Cametá-PA.
- Cametá. (2018). *Decreto municipal 085/2018. Dispõe sobre a exoneração de servidores públicos temporários da estrutura da Prefeitura e de todas as secretarias e fundos constituídos no Município de Cametá, e dá outras providências*. Cametá-PA. <https://prefeituradecameta.pa.gov.br/decretos-junho2018/>
- Cametá. (2020). *Cametá City Hall website, Transparency Portal, Expenditure with Personnel, Payroll*. Cametá-PA. <http://www.webcard.inf.br/rpm/transparenciarh.aspx?idCNPJ=05105283000150>
- Carvalho, J. M. de (1997) Mandonismo, Coronelismo, Clientelismo: Uma discussão conceitual. *Dados*, 40(2). <https://doi.org/10.1590/S0011-52581997000200003>
- Creswell, J. W. (2010). *Projeto de pesquisa: métodos qualitativo, quantitativo e misto*. Porto Alegre: Artmed.
- Diolina, K. (2017). O professor temporário e o papel do coletivo: marcas da (des)vitalidade do métier. *Veredas - Revista de Estudos Linguísticos*, 21(3), 424-443. <https://doi.org/10.34019/1982-2243.2017.v21.28014>
- Emerson, R. M., Fretz, R. & Shaw, L. L. (1996). *Writing ethnographic notes*. University of Chicago Press.
- Faoro, R. (2001). *Os Donos do Poder: Formação do Patronato Político Brasileiro*. Editora Globo.
- Feldman, A. (2020). Pesquisa de política educacional a partir do município. *Notandum*, (53), 37-57. <https://doi.org/10.4025/notandum.vi53.51813>
- Fernandes, J. S. (2014). *O professor temporário e sua ação no ensino de geografia*. Dissertation (Master in Geography at Environmental Space Dynamics), Universidade Estadual de Londrina, Londrina. Recovered from: http://bdtd.ibict.br/vufind/Record/UUEL_5f3a8b9fdbe7d8d58190a6da94e8306c
- Ferreira, D. C. K. (2013). *Os professores temporários da educação básica da rede pública estadual do Paraná: a flexibilização das contratações e os impactos sobre as condições de trabalho docente*. Dissertation (Master

- in Education), Universidade Federal do Paraná, Curitiba. Recovered from: <https://acervodigital.ufpr.br/handle/1884/30365>
- Ferreira, D. C. K. & Abreu, C. B. de M. (2014). Professores temporários: flexibilização das contratações e condições de trabalho docente. *Trabalho & Educação*, 23 (2), 129-139. <https://periodicos.ufmg.br/index.php/trabedu/article/view/9163/6587>
- Ferreira, G. S. (2016). *A Condição de Trabalho do Professor Temporário da Rede Municipal de Ensino de Fortaleza – CE*. Dissertation (Master in Psychology), Universidade de Fortaleza, Fortaleza. Recovered from: <https://uol.unifor.br/oul/ObraBdtdSiteTrazer.do?method=trazer&ns=true&obraCodigo=101921>
- Filho, G. A. (1994). Clientelismo e política no Brasil: revisitando velhos problemas. *Novos Estudos*, 1 (38), 225-240.
- Gesqui, L. C. (2009, October). Formação e condições de professores eventuais atuantes na rede pública estadual. *Anais da 32ª Reunião Anual da Associação Nacional de Pós-Graduação e Pesquisa em Educação*. Caxambú, MG, Brasil, 32. Recovered from: <http://www.anped.org.br/sites/default/files/gt08-5344-int.pdf>
- Gouveia, A. B. & Souza, A. R. (2015). Política de fundos em perspectiva histórica: mudanças de concepção da política na transição Fundef e Fundeb. *Em Aberto*, 28(93), 45-65. <https://doi.org/10.24109/2176-6673.emaberto.28i93.2457>
- Graham, R. (1990). *Patronage and politics in nineteenth-century Brazil*. Stanford University Press.
- Hilgers, T. (2011). Clientelism and conceptual stretching: Differentiating among concepts and among analytical levels. *Theory and Society*, 40(5), 567-588. Doi: 10.1007/s11186-011-9152-6
- Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatística. (2010). *Censo Demográfico*. Brasília-DF. <https://cidades.ibge.gov.br/brasil/pa/cameta/panorama>
- Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatística. (2017a). *Cadastro Central de Empresas – 2017*. Brasília-DF. <https://sidra.ibge.gov.br/pesquisa/cepre/tabelas/brasil/2017>
- Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatística. (2017b). *Produto Interno Bruto dos Municípios 2002-2017*. Brasília-DF. <https://sidra.ibge.gov.br/pesquisa/pib-munic/tabelas>
- Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatística. (2017c). *Classificação e caracterização dos espaços rurais e urbanos do Brasil : uma primeira aproximação*. IBGE.
- Kuschnir, K. (2007). Antropologia e política. *Revista Brasileira de Ciências Sociais*, 22(64), 163-167. <https://dx.doi.org/10.1590/S0102-69092007000200014>
- Leal, V. N. (1997). *Coronelismo, enxada e voto (O município e o regime representativo no Brasil)*. (3rd ed). Nova Fronteira.
- Lopez, F. G. (2004). A política cotidiana dos vereadores e as relações entre o executivo e o legislativo em âmbito municipal: o caso do município de Araruama. *Revista de Sociologia Política*, 22, 153-177. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1590/S0104-44782004000100012>.
- Marques, M. J. (2006). *A figura do professor com contrato temporário: um estudo de caso no Lícen do Conjunto Ceará*. Dissertation (Professional Master in Public Policy Evaluation), Universidade Federal do Ceará, Fortaleza. Recovered from <http://www.repositorio.ufc.br/handle/riufc/5909>
- Ministério da Educação & Fundo Nacional do Desenvolvimento da Educação. (2016). *Orçamentos Públicos em Educação (SIOPE). Relatório resumido de execução orçamentária (RREO), anexo X*. Brasília-DF. R <https://www.fnde.gov.br/siope/relatorioRREOMunicipal2006.do>
- Ministério da Educação, & Instituto Nacional de Estudos e Pesquisas Educacionais Anísio Teixeira. (2018). *Censo Escolar 2007-2018*. Brasília-DF. <https://dadoseducacionais.c3sl.ufpr.br/#/>

- Moraes, D., & Oliveira, D. (2019). Análise jurídica da contratação temporária de professores no município de Vila Velha-ES. *Revista Espaço Transdisciplinar*, 1(01), 53-62. Recovered from <http://periodicosnovomilenio.com.br/index.php/transdisciplinar/article/view/45>
- Nascimento, C. B. (2014). *Professores em regime de contrato temporário: uma análise do impacto no rendimento dos alunos das escolas públicas estaduais do Ceará*. Dissertation (Master in Economy), Universidade Federal do Ceará, Fortaleza. Recovered from: <http://www.repositorio.ufc.br/handle/riufc/15096>
- Nauroski, E. A. (2014). *Trabalho docente e subjetividade: a condição dos professores temporários (PSS) no Paraná*. Thesis (Doctorate in Sociology), Universidade Federal do Paraná, Curitiba. Recovered from: <https://acervodigital.ufpr.br/handle/1884/38054>
- Neris Nogueira, A. C., Furtado, D. C., Furtado, D. C., Simões, A., Figueiredo, D. S., Pereira, J. A. G., & Pereira, E. C. S. (2011). Diagnóstico da comunidade de agricultores familiares de Ajó, Cametá-Pará. *Revista Brasileira De Agropecuária Sustentável*, 1(1). <https://doi.org/10.21206/rbas.v1i1.8>
- Neto, J. Q., & Pinto, J. M. de R. (2016). O perfil dos docentes não concursados na rede estadual de ensino de São Paulo. *Fineduca – Revista de Financiamento da Educação*, 6(10). <https://seer.ufrgs.br/fineduca/article/view/68141>
- Novaes, L. C. (2010). A formação des(continuada) dos professores temporários: provisoriedade e qualidade de ensino. *Revista Diálogo Educacional*, 10(30), 247-265. <https://periodicos.pucpr.br/index.php/dialogoeducacional/article/view/2392>
- Palmeira, M. & Goldman, M. (Orgs.) (1996). *Antropologia, voto e representação Política*. Contra Capa Livraria.
- Pará. (2015). *Lei n. 8.186, de 23 de junho de 2015. Aprova o Plano Estadual de Educação - PEE e dá outras providências*. Belém-PA. <http://biblioteca.mppa.mp.br/ph182/capas/lei.pdf>
- Partido dos Trabalhadores. (2020). *Partido dos Trabalhadores website. PT Area*. <https://pt.org.br/>
- Pase, H. L., Muller, M. & Morais, J. A. (2012). O clientelismo nos pequenos municípios brasileiros. *Pensamento Plural*, 10, 181 – 199. <http://pensamentoplural.ufpel.edu.br/edicoes/10/08.pdf>
- Queiroz, M. I. P. de. (1976). *O Mandonismo local na vida política brasileira e outros ensaios*. Alfa-Ômega.
- Ribeiro, R. N. da S., Santana, A. C. de & Tourinho, M. M. (2004). Análise exploratória da socioeconomia de sistemas agroflorestais em várzea flúvio-marinha, Cametá-Pará, Brasil. *Revista de Economia e Sociologia Rural*, 42(1), 133-152. <https://doi.org/10.1590/S0103-20032004000100007>
- Santos, J. P. S. (2016). *Professores temporários da rede estadual de São Paulo: análise da política de pessoal da perspectiva orçamentária*. Dissertation (Master in Education), Universidade Federal de São Paulo, Guarulhos. Recovered from: <http://repositorio.unifesp.br/handle/11600/39226>
- Secretaria do Tesouro Nacional (2019). *FINBRA – Finanças do Brasil – Dados Contábeis dos Municípios 1997-2019*. Brasília-DF, 2018. Recovered from <http://www.tesouro.fazenda.gov.br/contas-aneis> e https://siconfi.tesouro.gov.br/siconfi/pages/public/consulta_finbra/finbra_list.jsf
- Seki, A. K., Souza, A. G. de, Gomes, F. A. & Evangelista, O. (2017). Professor temporário: um passageiro permanente na Educação Básica brasileira. *Práxis Educativa*, 12(3), 942-959. <https://doi.org/10.5212/PraxEduc.v.12i3.014>
- Sousa, M. P. S. de (2011). *Expansão da educação superior no Pará: programas Expandir e Reuni e a composição de quadros docente dos campi da Universidade Federal do Pará (2001-2010)*. Dissertation (Master in Sustainable Development of Humid Tropics), Universidade Federal do Pará, Belém. Recovered from: <http://repositorio.ufpa.br/jspui/handle/2011/3338>
- Souza, A. G. de. (2018). *Professor temporário: situações da docência em Educação Física na Rede Municipal de Ensino de Florianópolis (2011/2017)*. Dissertation (Master in Education), Universidade Federal

- de Santa Catarina, Florianópolis. Recovered from:
<https://gipe.paginas.ufsc.br/files/2018/05/artur-gomes-de-souza-pdf.pdf>
- Souza, J. (2015) *A tolice da inteligência brasileira: ou como o país se deixa manipular pela elite*. LeYa.
- Souza, M. N. de. (2011). *Condições de trabalho e remuneração docente: o caso do professor temporário na rede estadual de ensino do Paraná*. Dissertation (Master in Education), Universidade Federal do Parana, Curitiba. Recovered from: <https://acervodigital.ufpr.br/handle/1884/25654>
- Stokes, S., Dunnig, T., Nazareno M. & Brusco, V. (2013). *Brokers, voters and clientelism: the puzzle of distributive politics*. Cambridge University Press.
- Tribunal Regional Eleitoral do Pará. (2020). *Sistema de Informação das Zonas Eleitorais (infozonas)*. Belém-PA. <http://www.tre-pa.jus.br/o-tre/zonas-eleitorais/dados-das-zonas-infozonas>
- Weber, M. (1999). *Economia e sociedade: fundamentos da sociologia compreensiva*. Brasília/São Paulo: Editora Universidade de Brasília/Imprensa Oficial do Estado de São Paulo.
- Werle, F. (2005) *O nacional e o local: ingerência e permeabilidade na educação brasileira*. USF.
- Volpato, A. L. S., Bordignon, F. T., Cattaneo, M. B. & Cunha, A. P. (2019). A ilegalidade das contratações de professores temporários da Escola Municipal Professor Antônio Rohden de Braço do Norte/SS no período de 2015-2018. *Constituição & Justiça: Estudos e Reflexões*, 3(2), 79-104. Recovered from
<http://periodicos.unibave.net/index.php/constituicaojustica/issue/view/25/showToc>
- Williams, C. M. (2004). Surveys Sociais: do desenho à análise. In T. May, *Pesquisa social: questões, métodos e processos* (3rd ed., cap. 6, pp. 109-144). Artmed.

About the Authors

Ariel Feldman

Universidade Federal do Pará

ariel@ufpa.br

ORCID: <https://orcid.org/0000-0002-8894-8554>

Master's and Doctorate degree in History. Professor of the Postgraduate Program in Education and Culture (PPGEDUC) and of the Faculdade de História do Tocantins (FACHTO), of the Universidade Federal do Pará (UFPA), University Campus of Tocantins/Cametá. Coordinator of the Research Group in Municipal Education (GPEM).

Daihana Maria dos Santos Costa

Universidade Federal do Pará

daihanamaria18@gmail.com

ORCID: <https://orcid.org/0000-0003-2055-4388>

Graduated with degree in Pedagogy and expert in Institutional Psycho-pedagogy. Master degree student of the Postgraduate Program in Education and Culture (PPGEDUC) and of the Universidade Federal do Pará (UFPA), University Campus of Tocantins/Cametá. Researcher of the Research Group in Municipal Education (GPEM).

education policy analysis archives

Volume 29 Number 80

June 7, 2021

ISSN 1068-2341



Readers are free to copy, display, distribute, and adapt this article, as long as the work is attributed to the author(s) and **Education Policy Analysis Archives**, the changes are identified, and the same license applies to the derivative work. More details of this Creative Commons license are available at <https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/>. **EPAA** is published by the Mary Lou Fulton Institute and Graduate School of Education at Arizona State University. Articles are indexed in CIRC (Clasificación Integrada de Revistas Científicas, Spain), DIALNET (Spain), [Directory of Open Access Journals](#), EBSCO Education Research Complete, ERIC, Education Full Text (H.W. Wilson), QUALIS A1 (Brazil), SCImago Journal Rank, SCOPUS, SOCOLAR (China).

About the EPAA/AAPE Editorial Team: <https://epaa.asu.edu/ojs/about/editorialTeam>

Please send errata notes to Audrey Amrein-Beardsley at audrey.beardsley@asu.edu

Join EPAA's Facebook community at <https://www.facebook.com/EPAAAPE> and Twitter feed @epaa_aape.