

**COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF PERFORMANCE BASED PAYMENT FOR
TEACHERS IN SANTIAGO DE CHILE AND STANDARD PAYMENT IN GUAYAQUIL
AND HOW CAN IT BE IMPLEMENTED IN GUAYAQUIL**

AUTHORS:

CARLOS SEMPETEGUI SEMINARIO

WILLIAM DAVID CORTEZ VALLEJO

JOEL ANDRES ZHUANG ZENG

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Abstract

Esta tesis investiga las dinámicas del sistema de pago basado en desempeño para maestros en Guayaquil y Santiago de Chile. Este sistema de pagos es considerado a afectar positivamente el desempeño de profesores y la calidad de educación. El principal objetivo de este trabajo de investigación fueron analizar los sistemas educacionales actuales en Santiago de Chile, identificar áreas potenciales de mejoras y explorar como puede ser aplicado en Guayaquil. Las teorías sugieren que los entornos culturales, educacionales, y económicos tienen un impacto en que tan efectivo estos sistemas sean. La metodología empleo un enfoque de método mixto, combinando análisis de datos cuantitativos con conocimientos cualitativos de entrevistas con maestros. En Guayaquil, este sistema de pagos no existe, pero un programa se ha hecho entre 2008-2012. Sin embargo, no mostro resultados coherentes (fue cancelado a mitad del camino). En Santiago de Chile, el sistema de pago por rendimiento ha funcionado efectivamente y sigue siendo implementado hasta el día de hoy. Respecto a esta ciudad, datos fueron coleccionados de estudios de la historia detrás de esta practica y porque funciona. Concluimos que el sistema de pagos por rendimiento puede dar un impacto positivo en el rendimiento de profesores y la calidad de educación en Guayaquil. Sugerimos agregar valor a este sistema de pagos para su ejecución en Guayaquil.

This thesis investigates the dynamics of performance-based payment systems for teachers in Guayaquil and Santiago de Chile. This payment system is considered to positively affect the performance of teachers and education quality. The main objective of this research paper was to analyze the existing educational systems in Santiago de Chile, identify potential areas for improvement, and explore how it can be applied to Guayaquil. The theories suggested that cultural, educational, and economic settings all have an impact on how effective these systems are. The methodology employed a mixed-method approach, combining quantitative data analysis with qualitative insights from interviews with teachers. In Guayaquil, this payment system does not exist, but a program has been made between 2008-2012. However, it showed no real results (it eventually got canceled midway through). In Santiago de Chile, the PBP has worked effectively and is still being implemented nowadays. Regarding this city, data was collected from studies of the story behind this practice and why it works. We conclude that the PBP can give a positive impact in the performance of teachers and education quality in Guayaquil. We suggest adding value to this payment system for its implementation in Guayaquil.

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Introduction

President Obama once stated, “We know that from the moment our kids enter school, the most important factor in their success – other than their parents – is the person standing in front of the classroom: the teacher” (Viscardi, 2014, as cited in Sommerfield, 2011). President Obama's comment emphasizes the crucial role that teachers play in shaping our children's future. Recognizing teachers' critical role in students' achievement, discussions about improving the education system have usually focused around developing effective strategies to inspire and reward teachers for their commitment and hard work. One popular solution is the concept of performance-based salary, which is a system that relates a teacher's salary directly to their efficiency in the classroom.

Performance-based payment, or PBP, can be defined as a contract which provides incentives for outcomes, this is, a worker is compensated for their contribution made to the business results (Essig, 2016, p. 6). Other names include ‘pay for performance’ or ‘outcome-based contracting’. It can be inferred that there is an increasing trend in manufacturing and service businesses across private to public sectors according to Selviaridis (2014, as cited in Hypko et al., 2010). However, “results” vary from various disciplines, such as health and social care (Selviaridis, 2014). Some of these practices are also applied to schools and teachers, although not as common to marketing businesses. For schools and universities, PBP embraces the idea of paying teachers based on how they perform in advancing their students’ educational achievement (Woessmann, 2011, p. 404).

A key determinant of school quality is teacher effectiveness according to Barrera-Osorio and Raju (2017, as cited in Hanushek & Rivkin, 2006). For many low-income countries, it is regarded in poor quality. Therefore, there has been some incentives to raise such programs across

underdeveloped countries. Very often, it is argued how a teacher's wage can be used as a proxy for their teacher quality, as mentioned by Dolton and Marcenaro-Gutierrez (2011). Nonetheless, the majority can agree that it is not always the case. Similarly, a teacher's wage is most of the times related to students' success (Dolton & Marcenaro-Gutierrez, 2011). Again, this is not believed to be true most of the times. Research has shown that it is hard to find a direct link between teacher wages and pupil outcomes due to teacher supply curves and being paid on the same scale (Dolton & Marcenaro-Gutierrez, 2011). One way to analyze the long-term effects of teacher-performance pay is by accomplishing a cross-country variation between those who do and do not use PBP (Woessmann, 2011, p. 405).

It is confirmed in multiple studies that levels of compensation and remuneration affects who decides to become a teacher, who stays and for how long by Dolton and Marcenaro-Gutierrez (2011, as cited in Odden & Kelley, 1997; Dolton, 1990, 2006; Dolton & van der Klaauw 1999). Without this motivation of a good payment, a student's attainment will get worse and worse, since there won't be motivated and qualified teachers. Naturally, good working conditions won't guarantee high-quality education (Dolton & Marcenaro-Gutierrez, 2011). In other words, a good payment is the first step towards students' attainment on the surface. Of course, there is a matter of subconscious measures taken into account for all these investigations, such as class size, budget, being a public or private school, criteria of evaluations, etc...

Unlike a retail store or a marketing campaign, measuring teacher output is quite complicated, since various activities are qualitative (Stedman & McCallion, 2001). Quantitative measures such as scores and exams are obvious to determine, but true quality can get very difficult. Likewise, most of the time, there are issues concerning the validity of tests, since it won't measure the full range of students' knowledge (Stedman & McCallion, 2001), but notably

‘memory’. There is also the notion of creating a desired behavior when it comes to PBP for teachers. A good example is made by Stedman & McCallion (2001); that is, if teachers are rewarded for reading skills among students, then they would only focus in that specific area of reading, with no improvements to other areas.

A well-educated workforce is essential for economic growth. As mentioned by Harvey-Beavis (2003, as cited in Odden, 2000), there is a strong link between quality of teaching and level of student outcomes, meaning that by having an incentive such as extra payment will contribute to the long-term economic prosperity as citizens will be more skilled and productive. Having a PBP system in schools would create a new labor market for teachers. This means that talented teachers would have greater opportunities where they are recognized and encourage retention (Harvey-Beavis, 2003). On the contrary, it also discourages the least capable teachers, and a new demand and supply market for professors is created. With this new ‘movement between schools’ among school-based rewards, it can increase the precision of resource allocation by having more clear organizational goals and resource alignment (Harvey-Beavis, 2003). This is due to the fact that now principals, directors, administrators, etc... are evaluating teachers more meticulously compared to a non-performance-based payment school. In a study from China (Wang et al., 2014, p. 436), it was concluded how inequality among teachers in different schools was reduced, nevertheless, inequality among teachers within the same school has increased.

In Latin America, the teacher’s salary structure can be summarized as the following: ‘equal pay is provided regardless of efforts and abilities’ (Mizala & Romaguera, 2004). In theory, it is more about seniority that determines any increase in pay, not the activities carried out. This means that in the teaching profession, loyalty, rather than actual performance, is

rewarded (Mizala & Romaguera, 2004, as cited in Liang, 1999). Generally, career development is associated with promotions that take the best teachers out of the classroom for other purposes. These opportunities happen regularly when those in higher positions leave their jobs, consequently, the outstanding teachers receive no incentive to perfect their skills (Mizala & Romaguera, 2004). Hence, economists have been insisting on reforming the teacher salary structures as a way to improve education quality.

In 1996, Chile introduced the SNED. The ‘National Evaluation Performance System’ was created in Chile with the goal of identifying out-standing public or subsidized private schools (Mizala and Urquiola, 2013). It provides financial incentives and recognition of staff for the best performing schools every 2 years (Casassus, 2001). In other words, SNED is a program of economic incentives for schools. There are 3 steps in the SNED process. SNED works in the following manner:

First, schools are assigned into “homogenous groups” (Mizala and Urquiola, 2013). These are based on 3 traits:

- Rural or urban area
- Local region
- Type of schooling offering (primary only, primary and secondary, or special needs)

Then, they are grouped by socioeconomic status of their students.

Second, it now measures differences between schools in the same group with the SNED index.

Test scores and improvement levels receive weights of 37% and 28% respectively. The index breakdown is the following:

SNED Index (Sistema Nacional de Evaluación del Desempeño)

Factor (weighting %)	Indicators
Efectiveness (37%)	-SIMCE test score levels in Language and Math
Improvement (28%)	-Differences in results from Language and Math SIMCE scores (within the homogenous group)
Initiative (6%)	-School's educational activities and initiatives
Better working conditions (2%)	-School placement in the Ministry of Education inspecting system
Equality of Opportunity (22%)	-Repetition rates -Dropout rates
Parent/Teacher participation (5%)	-Information availability -Parent's perception of the school quality

Table 1 SNED Index, from Casassus (2001) and Mizala and Urquiola (2013)

As it can be seen, grades and improvements account for half of the criteria for academic achievement. When focusing on school performance, the aim is to identify the responsibility to what can be changed within the school, rather than looking at children's contrast and external circumstances in their life (Casassus, 2001). This approach enables the SNED to identify the extent of the school's responsibility for a student's performance level (which could be said to be half responsible).

Third, after obtaining scores from the SNED Index, each school in each homogenous group is ranked, and if they place within top 25% in their region, they are offered rewards and incentives.

The rewards last for 2 years. Teachers in the top 25% are given an annual bonus of 70% of the mean monthly salary of a full-time working teacher, which is about 1,000\$ (as of 2013). Besides, the winning schools are publicly recognized in press conferences and newspapers (Mizala and Urquiola, 2013).

In Ecuador, it is often compared and discussed how a teacher's salary and/or wage is relatively low compared to other professions. Besides, the teacher quality isn't that great either according to the majority of society, given its low or no teacher training to specialized tutors (DVV International, 2023, as cited in EPJA, n.d.). In higher education, there are large differences in pay between faculty teachers by respective fields. This means that for the current educational system, at least in Ecuador and the majority of countries, anyone can become said profession by showing up and doing the "bare minimum" (Viscardi, 2014). This explains why some students and authorities argue in favor of a payment tied to performance. There are indeed peer or principal evaluations carried out every now and then, but these tools also have their drawbacks (Lavy, 2007, p. 89). Traditionally, these procedures are superficial and relatively unstructured to simply just classify the individual teacher as satisfactory or unsatisfactory (Dee & Wyckoff, 2015, p. 270). It is often argued how raising the payment can also raise its education system level (although this is not always necessarily the case for some professors). Moreover, highlighted by Kim-Eng Lee and Ying Tan (2010, as cited in McKinsey, 2007), teacher quality is the biggest difference for student achievement and the most effective school system invested for

tutors. This is why a comparative analysis between schools from Ecuador without the PBP and foreign schools with PBP will be carried out.

As Dolton and Mercenaro-Gutierrez (2011) have mentioned, it is possible to learn the relationship between teacher quality (or wage) with students' outcomes with cross-national comparisons unlike individual countries, since each has their own similar payment regulations and influences. One benefit from executing a PBP system for teachers is that eventually it will be a respected status job and hence the status of teaching (Dolton & Marcenaro-Gutierrez, 2011). For a country like Ecuador, this can greatly enhance its current pedagogic system, although it can backfire since not always a PBP will produce good results, but induce more stress and teachers' relationship/trust with each other (Stedman & McCallion, 2001).

Research Methodology

This study employs a mixed-method research methodology to comprehensively examine and compare the outcomes of Guayaquil's standard-based teacher payment system with the performance-based payment system in Santiago de Chile. A mixed-method approach involves both quantitative and qualitative document analysis for a comprehensive grasp of the issues, but problems can develop when the researcher seeks to describe how the two aspects connect to one another (Doyle et., al, 2009, as cited in Tashakkori & Creswell, 2007). It also enables the investigator to answer different kinds of questions than the questions that could be answered by quantitative or qualitative techniques alone (Kajamaa et., al, 2020).

We will gather primary quantitative data to investigate the opinions towards performance-based incentives on student achievement in another country. This data will include test scores, graduation rates, and teacher performance assessments. Additionally, structured interviews were conducted with teachers to gain insights into how performance-based salary systems influence teacher performance and motivation. The interviews were made to three teachers: Francisco Samuel Mendoza Moreira who works at 'Universidad Laica Eloy Alfaro de Manabí' (public) with 19 years of experience, John Harry Ibáñez from 'Unidad Educativa bilingüe liceo Albonor' (private school) with 42 years of experience, and Christian Antonio de la Cruz Jimenez from 'Colegio La Inmaculada' with 23 years of experience. This qualitative data will enable the researcher to link the philosophical underpinning of the study to the research design (Kajamaa et., al, 2020, as cited in Hesse-Biber, 2010). Regression models will be used to examine the relationship between performance-based salary and student outcomes while considering relevant variables.

The selection of Santiago de Chile will be based on several criteria, including economic factors, similarity in educational systems, and the presence of a performance-based payment system. Secondary data sources such as publications, policy papers, and academic research will be analyzed to provide context and background knowledge on PBP systems in both countries. These sources will provide valuable context and background information on PBP systems in Santiago de Chile. We will conduct an in-depth review of policy documents and teacher contracts in this foreign city. This analysis will enable us to understand the creation and implementation of performance-based remuneration systems in these nations.

Based on economic data, similarity in educational systems, and the presence of a performance-based payment system, a comparative analysis will be conducted. To evaluate the similarities and differences in the effects of performance-based payments on education and their potential economic repercussions in Ecuador and the chosen comparison country, a cross-comparative analysis will be carried out.

Ethical considerations, including informed consent and data privacy, will be strictly adhered to throughout the data collection process.

Results

From a study in Indonesia by Sirait (2016), a function model for education production for estimating student achievement was established. Although there are many questions and assumptions regarding this, as achievement is a hard concept to define, it embraces the factors of student family background, school resources, community factors, etc... It can be shown as:

$$A_{it} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 XX_{it} + \beta_2 XX_{2it} + \beta_3 XX_{3it} + \beta_4 XX_{4it} + \beta_5 XX_{5it} + \beta_6 XX_{6it} + \beta_7 XX_{7it} + \beta_8 XX_{8it} + \beta_9 XX_{9it} + \beta_{10} XX_{10it} + E_{it}$$

Where:

A_{it} : student achievement

i: student i

t: at time t (grade)

XX_1 : teacher evaluation score

XX_2 : teacher experience

XX_3 : teacher education background

XX_4 : student enrolment

XX_5 : family spending on education

XX_6 : district government on education

XX_7 : electricity access

XX_8 : unemployment gap

XX_9 : morbidity rate

XX_{10} : poverty gap

It has been well studied that teacher performance goes along with students' achievement. There are Value-added models for estimating student achievement with a set of given educational inputs. However, this study wants to explore the differences regarding normal performance and incentive pay performance. As student achievement and be read as teacher performance, then it can be rewritten as:

$$Y_{it} = \alpha_0 + \alpha_1 XX_{it} + \dots + \alpha_5 XX_{5it} + E_{it}$$

where:

Y: teacher performance for students 'i' at grade t

XX₁: average grades of students 'i' from grade t

XX₂: teachers income level

XX₃: years of experience

XX₄: educational background (bachelor, third degree title or fourth degree title)

XX₅: teacher's evaluation rating

'Y' is the teacher's performance and it is determined based on 5 main elements of grades, income level, years of experience, educational background and teacher's evaluation ratings. All of these have something in common, being quantifiable. Grades is perhaps the most crucial factor that the vast majority of society uses to tell whether a teacher is capable or not. Income level (or salary) will influence a teacher in how they will carry out their activities, what level of fulfillment they expect to offer and shape their execution dynamics. Usually, high income level teachers will stand out in performance as compared to a low-income level professor. Years of experience speaks by itself. As each year goes by, a professor can easily recognize mistakes, read the room faster, what materials are not needed and so on. Teaching experience is also positively associated with students' achievement (Kini & Podolsky, 2016). Moreover, besides student's grades, they are also more likely to do better in other measures of success, such as school

attendance. Investigations done has demonstrated that students with less exposure to qualified teachers are far less likely of achieving academic success than those with more (Ugorji Iheanachor, 2007). Similarly, it could be the teacher's classroom practices that doesn't help students get good grades (brought by lack of teacher background). Last is teacher's evaluation rating. As mentioned before here how ratings can be superficial sometimes or most of the times, it is a very light indicator for teacher's effectiveness (as sometimes students don't take it seriously). Kornell and Hausman (2016) have suggested how there is a small positive relationship between ratings and first course performance. They mentioned that better teachers do get a small higher rating. Once again, it is superficial as surveys/evaluation are designed differently across institutions, the number of responses, neutral responses, etc...

Naturally, there are many other factors or variables that do influence a teacher's performance environment. However, some are debatable and not an easy task to quantify. Just like a student's achievement, a teacher's performance depends on a complex interplay of factors within and outside the classroom (Ugorji Iheanachor, 2007).

One of the factors that would motivate a teacher from one of our interviews conducted was receiving free capacitation for professors. Most would agree on this matter and can be put in the regression model if authorities are accepting these scenarios. Another answer from another teacher was about exchange programs among teachers. This is, after working for some period of time, a teacher would travel abroad and get an idea of learning the new country they are in and its practices. These sorts of practices would motivate this teacher to do better besides money.

Due to lack of data and accessibility, an execution of the model couldn't be carried out (measured with actual values). Nonetheless, if the student achievement model by Sirait (2016) was effective and served as a base for many to support their research, then the 5 chosen elements

plus a few others (such as improvements in infrastructures like Chile) can contribute as a guide given all the range of years of experience, database of grades, predictor variables, and updated teachers rating. Besides, Chile has proven this system to be quite effective and it is still ongoing. Chile and Ecuador do show some resemblance in education, economy, business, and culture.

There are some significant similarities between Guayaquil and Santiago de Chile in terms of their educational systems and economic importance. With an important contribution to Ecuador 's commercial GDP, Guayaquil is a prominent economic center. More than 75% of Ecuador 's international trade is handled by its main port, highlighting its crucial importance in the country's economic activity (Cámara de Comercio de Guayaquil, 2019). Guayaquil represents more than 20% of the national Gross Domestic Product, making it an engine of growth in Ecuador (Ministerio de Economía y Finanzas, n.d.).

On the other hand, Santiago plays a significant role in the economy of Chile. The city of Santiago alone accounted for 48% of Chile's GDP (Rodriguez and Winchester, 2001). One of the most developed nations in Latin America, Chile has a wide range of industries, including manufacturing, agriculture, and mining. Over one-third of the world's copper output comes from the mining industry in Chile, which is the backbone of the country's economy (Santander, n.d.).

Regarding education, both cities demonstrate a dedication to offering easily accessible educational possibilities. Ten years are given for basic education in Ecuador, which is broken down into four levels: basic preparatory, basic elementary, middle basic, and upper basic. This system, which is accessible to citizens and foreigners, represents a comprehensive approach to education, covering basic, bachelor, and higher education levels. Meanwhile, there are two cycles in Chile's educational system: the first cycle, which covers grades 1-4, and the second cycle, which covers grades 5-8 (Soto Pérez, 2023). There are four educational levels in Chile:

Preschool, Basic, Middle, and Higher. The first three levels are required to be completed, making a total of 12 years of school necessary—8 years for basic education and 4 years for secondary education. Interestingly, both nations stress that education is required for kids six years of age and above, demonstrating their dedication to offering opportunities for fundamental learning.

Discussion

As a very curious topic to explore and execute given the resources and data, we would like to hint and propose to educational establishments whether be universities, schools, intensive courses, etc... to carry out a performance-based payment and see the results for themselves. One limitation about the nature of a PBP system is that the teaching profession itself is to help students grow and develop, so measuring performance by grades and evaluations won't tell much in this sense. Besides, we are assuming it is the teacher always responsible for the student's output, which isn't the case the majority of times. The PBP system has also been carried out in other countries such as the US and South Korea. In the US, it has proven to be effective. Results may vary from research to research as it is a subjective study and costly if being implemented. However, both countries are different from Guayaquil and its methodologies. Chile and Guayaquil are similar to some extent and we believe that if a PBP is enforced (even for a short period of time and/or for a few schools) education quality can drastically increase. Of course, some incentives may vary and can be added to the PBP system, as money isn't the only motivation factor for work. There are various alternatives to improve education levels but we think this is a worthy approach.

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Annex

*Interview with Francisco Mendoza
From 'Universidad Laica Eloy Alfaro de Manabi'
19 years of experience*

William: Thank you very much. Well, to start with the interview, and not to take up much of your time, first of all, your name is Francisco Mendoza?

Francisco: My name is Francisco Samuel Mendoza Moreira.

William: Perfect. Can you tell me what institution you work at?

Francisco: At Universidad Laica Eloy Alfaro of Manabi.

William: Perfect. How many years have you been an educator? In general.

Francisco: How long am I teaching? Let me calculate. 19 years...

William: 19 years?

Francisco: yes

William: perfect, and in case you have any kind of master's degree or PhD

Francisco: I have 4 master's degrees I have 2 PhD and 2 specializations

William: Perfect here I ask you, how would you describe...

Francisco: Three master's degrees. Three master's degrees

William: ah, I see...

Francisco: Three master's degrees, two specializations, a diploma, and two doctorates.

William: Very good, quite a lot. Now, how would you describe the current payment system of teachers in Ecuador?

Francisco: Unfair. In reality, the model of... the model of... remuneration of teachers is not based on their production, their production and activity, but only based on their promotion. And

many times, it's not possible to really... distinguish who really works and who doesn't. I mean, we have conflicting work areas. That means that some teachers have more work than others, but in the end, we earn the same. I mean, it shouldn't work just by nominations, there should be a system of results, that allows us to value the work of the teachers according to what they are really doing.

William: Very good, perfect. And in your opinion, what are the strengths and weaknesses of the existing payment structure based on... Sorry, what are the strengths and weaknesses in the payment structure based on performance?

Francisco: I don't understand the question.

William: What do you think would be the strengths and weaknesses of the payments based on performance?

Francisco: I think it has many strengths because it stimulates the teacher, it makes him feel compensated depending on what he does, of what it does and as a weakness we would have to have a very advanced academic management system to really be able to determine who deserves and who does not deserve a payment or improve their payment. At least in the public sector, which I belong to, it would be a tremendous complication.

William: Ah, okay. So, in this case, he has more strengths than weaknesses.

Francisco: Yes.

William: Ah, yes, perfect. And here, can you share any positive experience or challenge you have encountered with the current system?

Francisco: When I entered the university, my nominal salary was \$720. I was a teacher with a master's degree at that time. I was a full-time teacher at the university. I earned \$640 at school. The difference in salary was only \$80. Obviously, the difference in work was a lot. So, we made a movement of teachers to ask for our salaries to be improved and to be homologated with the then newly born Ruling of Career and Evaluation, which allowed us, the youngest teachers, to have a salary that at least covers our minimum needs of training and, of course, the needs of any worker, to pay the bills, the internet, basic services, mobilization, teachers have some training needs that are not covered by our salary. For example, the postgraduates that we have to continue doing, the training, courses, our publications, all of this is out of our salary. So, that's what I was referring to when I was talking about payment for efficiency. The more you invest, the more you train, the more you produce, the better you should earn.

William: Right, so in this case it was unfair to invest more in your work and receive the same compensation as someone who doesn't invest anything.

Francisco: Exactly. Basically, teachers are the only professionals, not only university professors, but also teachers of the national system. We are the only state officials who put our money, our resources, to work. Because if you go to an office, they give you your computer, but if you are a teacher, you have nothing. We barely have a cubicle to put our personal computer

William: So, they don't give you any tools.

Francisco: We buy our markers, we buy our books, some of my colleagues have their own cables to connect to the computers. We load our adapters on the internet, so basically, from our salary everything we need to work comes out as needed. And obviously there are those who assume it as if I don't give anything, because I don't give anything either. And don't even worry, it's just that one lives stressed because he lacks everything for the class.

William: Of course, they don't give everything, they only give the minimum.

Francisco: The necessary, I think. And sometimes not only the necessary, I think the minimum, that would be correct.

William: Yes. Well, in this case I also wanted to ask you, how do you think the current payment system based on performance influences motivation and work satisfaction of teachers?

Francisco: Well, if the system paid me for what I invested, obviously I would continue to invest, but those of us who have a motivation that is beyond the salary, even if they don't pay us more, we keep doing things for our students or for our professional performance, but the natural, secular thing that happens in the public system at least, is that if they paid us as the influence of our performance, I think the teachers would have better challenge themselves to have a better salary. There are teachers that reach their maximum salary and they do not want to publish, investigate or do a course, because it is no longer useful to them, it is no longer useful for them to scale. So, until there comes the effort to be a professional.

William: Ah, perfect. And here you want, well, do you know any specific metric used in the assessment of performance that you find particularly effective or ineffective? or inefficient?

Francisco: Some metrics. There are some metrics, but only the scale. The scale measures the number of publications we have, the hours of training we have, but to go from one level to another, what counts the most is how long you are in a category. For example, I have been eight years without them improving my salary. And although I have many merits, I don't have a lot of

financial resources to improve my salary, I just don't meet the requirements at the moment. So, it's time, production, training, but the requirements are so minimal that any person can achieve them. You can find a teacher that does research, produces, that has a good scientific production evaluated by the same criteria as the one published in Condorito. Because there is no differentiating metric based on performance, but on the verification of a requirement. So, that is the flaw that the salary system has in Ecuador, which should be more efficient and less compliance-oriented.

William: Sure, so instead of meeting certain requirements, it would be more to meet, I mean, to give more than one should give.

Francisco: Efficiency. Efficiency and performance.

William: Correct. So, there are also professional development opportunities linked to the payment system based on performance. If so, how effective are they?

Francisco: No, as I told you, the system is requirements, not efficiency. So I can be a bad teacher, I can be here sitting in my cubicle without doing anything, and after I have completed my 40 hours and I deliver the documents that they ask me, that's it. But it is not that there is a process of efficiency, it's not an evaluation based on how much I contribute to the mission of the institution, but how much I fulfill what they ask me on paper.

William: So here in Ecuador there is nothing that measures any type of performance.

Francisco: In the public sector no, we have an evaluation of performance but that measures the fulfillment. But as I told you, I can send you to do those papers, maybe they will pay me if I do them or not, but it doesn't matter if I contribute or not, the mission of the university is simply to fulfill papers.

William: Ah, and it is simply to do the work and that's it, it doesn't matter if you do it well or not.

Francisco: It doesn't matter if you do it well or not.

William: And how do you think the current system considers and rewards the teaching methods or the research contributions?

Francisco: It doesn't consider them. At least not in the public, as I was saying. I can publish an article in a magazine, Patito, and my partner can publish in a high impact magazine and will have the same price. For a while we will go up the ladder, for adding the number of publications. But

not because it is about efficiency or quality of the production.

William: And according to your experience, do you think that the payment system based on performance promotes a fair and equitable treatment among teachers?

Francisco: Of course, because with more efficiency, we will have more performance of the professors, that is, we will have more commitment to the professors to improve their quality of life and not only to meet requirements, as you said. I think the result is good.

William: And for example, if it is that in the relationship between teachers, between colleagues, don't you think that this payment based on performance can affect the relationship between colleagues?

Francisco: I don't think so, because generally, if it is explained well that everything is about how much you work, obviously the one who works less than the other will have less salary.

William: Of course, so you don't think it affects the relationship between teachers?

Francisco: No, because it would help them to be more efficient. It would help them to look for alliances to be able to improve their work.

William: Ah, great. So, it would complement each other more.

Francisco: I think so.

William: Okay. And how do you provide feedback to the teachers about their performance and how could this feedback be improved?

Francisco: The teachers are evaluated every semester, as I told you, there is an evaluation of performance in which our students value our performance as teachers. But the problem is that complementary to that is the evaluation of fulfillment. How many books you gave, how many things you gave, but it doesn't matter if you filled everyone there and in reality no one benefited from that, it doesn't matter, it doesn't matter that you fulfill. That is, it is an evaluation, more than the performance, of fulfillment. And that is the problem of that evaluation. It doesn't measure the efficiency of the teacher, but rather the delivery of products established in a rubric.

William: So it's not so much about performance, but more about complying with what is written. And how do you think the system could better support the professional growth and professional development of the teachers?

Francisco: Creating space for the development of the teachers.

William: And are there examples of other countries or institutions that you think offer valuable ideas to improve the payment system based on the performance in Ecuador?

Francisco: There are private universities that do have a performance evaluation system and depending on what you produce, you have increases in salary, but particularly in the public sector, it is all a ladder.

William: In the public sector.

Francisco: Yes.

William: And what role does the student's evaluation to teachers play in the process of evaluation of performance? How can it be improved?

Francisco: I think that if students' evaluation were more objective and with better criterias well organized we can assure that teachers will have improvements in their planning, their class activity. But because it is a fulfillment evaluation they ask you if you arrived early, if you covered your subjects. So, there is not a great documentation possible in that process of teacher evaluation.

William: And how the Performance Based Payment can be designed to promote a positive and collaborative culture within teachers?

Francisco: Everything should originate from our tasks as teachers. We have planned a semester. Based on that planning we should establish objectives that we have to achieve. If you achieve them you have a good salary, if not your salary should be checked. This is something from MBR, Management By Results. If I propose to write something of high impact and then write it you get the same salary, but if you achieve it they will check your salary. But it does not work that way.

William: Here is totally different.

Francisco: Here you can keep all the semester doing nothing and they are not going to tell you anything. There is no incentive to improve the student's education.

William: Last question. What incentives will make you feel motivated to improve your performance?

Francisco: Well, for us it is important to have time for our research activities. Our university

states that the more you produce the less the workload you will have. It means we will have certain freedom to do other activities and that is a good incentive for us. The problem is that it is not applied. On the other hand, it is the increase in salary that the evaluation really allows to achieve better ranks.