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**CREATING A GREAT PUBLIC UNIVERSITY:
THE HISTORY AND INFLUENCE OF SHARED GOVERNANCE AT
THE UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA**

October 2023*

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UC Berkeley

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ABSTRACT

Since establishing its first campus in 1868, the University of California (UC), California's land-grant university, developed into the nation's first multi-campus system in the United States, and is today widely recognized as the world's premier network of public research universities. This short essay provides an historical brief on the role that shared governance, and specifically the role of the Academic Senate, played in creating an academic culture of excellence and high achievement in pursuing its tripartite mission of teaching and learning, research and knowledge production, and public service. A key component in understanding the critical role of the Senate in UC's evolution from a single campus in Berkeley to now a ten-campus system is the university's unusual designation as a public trust in the state constitution that, beginning in 1879, protected the university at critical times from external political pressures and allowed the university to develop an internal academic culture guided by the Academic Senate. By the 1920s, the emergence of California's unique and innovative public system of higher education, with UC as the sole public provider of doctoral degrees and state funded research, also helps explain the ability of the UC system to maintain its mission and formulate what is termed a *One University* model. The Academic Senate has created coherency and shared values within UC, and a culture and expectation for faculty performance that is unique among universities around the world. This essay also offers a brief reflection on the Academic Senate's past influence, its current status, and prospective role. The overall intent is to provide context for the current academic community and higher education scholars regarding the past and future role of faculty in university governance and management, and what distinguishes UC in the pantheon of major research universities.

Keywords: University of California, Shared Governance, Institutional Autonomy, University Management

Four major features in the historical development of the University of California (UC) distinguish it from other major public research universities. The first is the university's unusual status as a constitutionally designated *public trust* -- a designation shared by only six other major American public universities which do not have the level of case law the UC has regarding its independence.¹

The second feature is UC's tradition of shared-governance facilitated in no small part by its high level of autonomy: the concept that faculty should share in the responsibility for guiding the operation and

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management of the university, while preserving the authority of its Board of Regents to ultimately set policy. In turn this led to a unique academic culture that placed a high value on faculty excellence, including a rigorous faculty driven process of pre- and post-tenure review and departmental assessment that sets UC apart historically from other major US universities.

Third is the pioneering emergence of UC as the nation's first multi-campus system, built around a unique *One University* model in which all its campuses, growing in number and academic programs with the population of the state, share the same teaching and learning, research and public service mission.

A fourth feature is UC's historically role in statute as the primary doctoral training and research university in a larger pioneering tripartite California system of higher education that includes a regional set of teaching intensive universities, what is now the California State University CSU system, and a robust network of local community colleges that afford the ability for students to transfer to four-year undergraduate degree programs.²

All of these four organizational features of California's land-grant university, combined with a massive investment by taxpayers to expand enrollment and academic programs, has resulted in a university enterprise of international distinction and vital service to the people of California. With the exception of the autonomy granted UC in the state's constitution in 1879, all have been profoundly shaped by the faculty and its representative body: the Academic Senate.

In no small part, the organization of the Senate at the systemwide and campus levels has also been a major force for creating coherency in the UC system in its fundamental academic practices, from admission, to faculty hiring and advancement, academic planning, and shared values that have helped distinguish California's land-grant university as the world's leading network of university campuses.

As with so many other aspects of the university's operation, the concept of shared governance has evolved over time, often in reaction to significant internal and external challenges. Reflecting the dynamics of decision-making within a growing and multi-campus university, the root of the contemporary notion of shared governance has emerged not only from the formal delegation of authority to the Senate, but also from informal modes of involving faculty in the management of the nation's largest land-grant university in enrollment and expanse of its academic and public service programs.

The following briefly outlines periods in the evolution of shared governance in the University of California. The intent is to provide context for current and future faculty, Regents, students and administrators regarding the historical role of faculty in university governance and management, and what distinguishes UC in the pantheon of major research universities.

A. Establishing a State University

In 1850, California's first state constitution provided the legislature with the ability to create a state university. It was not until 1868, however, that California passed a statute establishing the University of California -- just in time to benefit from the largesse of federal land-grants under the federal Morrill Act.

California's land-grant university, like all American universities and colleges, provided for a lay board that had authority over the activities of faculty and students. The American innovation of the lay board provided a public authority that removed sectarian influences, linked the operation of the university with the community it served, and provided a means to both reward and garner benefactors. But the device of the lay board also created an organizational structure that promised tension: with the rise of a

professional class of academicians, there would be long and continuing debates over the proper domain of faculty.

Based on the organization of several relatively new state universities, including Michigan and Iowa, the University of California's establishing law called for the establishment of an "Academic Senate" consisting of all faculty and deans, presided over by the president. The Senate, stated the 1868 Organic Act, was "created for the purpose of conducting the general administration of the University." The organization of the Senate and its relationship to the university president and the governing board, however, was the prerogative of the Regents.³

In the 19th century, an era that pre-dated the rise of the administrative class which is now crucial to the operation of the university, faculty served as both teachers and administrators. Yet their authority was extremely limited. The Regents, not the faculty, set educational policy in areas such as admissions and curriculum. Throughout the early years of the University, the Regents gave little direct power to the university's president. Persistent funding problems and political battles between the Regents and lawmakers in Sacramento -- particularly in the 1870s with proposals by the State Grange that the university be converted to a polytechnic -- led to a revolving door of university presidents and slowed the development of academic programs.

By the 1890s, the Berkeley campus was, as one Eastern paper derisively stated, "a weak institution with plenty of land, a college of broken-down buildings, [and] beggarly endowments."⁴ While it had emerging programs in agriculture and mining, it lacked the funding, reputation, and research prowess of America's new breed of research universities such as Cornell, Johns Hopkins, Michigan, and Wisconsin.

California's state university had, however, gained a new status that would eventually allow for innovations in its internal management. In 1879, key Regents served as delegates to California's second constitutional convention, helping to draft a successful amendment that designated the university as a *public trust* that essentially limited legislative powers to fiduciary matters. University supporters gained this victory by noting a similar status given three decades earlier to Michigan's state university, and by insisting that such autonomy would save the University of California from the partisan politics and rampant corruption that marked California's turbulent 1970s.

"The university," stated the new constitution, "shall be entirely independent of all political or sectarian influence and kept free therefrom in the appointment of its regents and in the administration of its affairs." Many of convention's delegates were harsh critics of the university, but they voted for the amendment because they distrusted the legislature more than they distrusted The Regents.⁵

Overtime, this *public trust* would not exclude the Board, and the university, from the vicissitudes of political interference, for the Board included the sitting governor and lieutenant governor, and political active Regents. But generally, the board, as intended, has been a bridge to the needs of a larger public as well as a protector of the university's autonomy.

B. President Wheeler and the "Berkeley Revolution"

The appointment of Benjamin Ide Wheeler (1899-1919) as the president of UC marked a new era in the expansion of funding, enrollment and academic programs. Wheeler agreed to come to Berkeley only if the Regents provided him with direct powers to manage its affairs. The Regents agreed, and in so doing, set into motion the eventual transformation of the University of California into one of the premier universities in the nation.

Wheeler faced dire financial problems upon his arrival: Growing enrollment demand among a quickly expanding California population, the decline of federal land-grant income, and meager state appropriations brought the first real consideration of establishing tuition. "The situation here at present is, I sometimes think, pathetic, and sometimes ludicrous," Wheeler wrote to the governor. "There is nothing comparable to it in the United States today. The students have come down like an avalanche. We have no elasticity in our budget by which to provide for them."⁶

Wheeler proceeded to gain the financial support of much of San Francisco's wealthy elite. But, perhaps more importantly, he succeeded in convincing lawmakers to provide the first major infusion of state funding for the university.

In an agreement made with Governor Hiram Johnson's administration (a one-time student at Berkeley) and the state legislature, state funding to the University would no longer be based on a percentage of taxable property. At that time the state's primary source of revenue). Henceforth funding would be based on enrollment workload, following the new model of funding public schools in California. Consistent state investment in the university allowed for a dramatic expansion of enrollment, and the hiring of new and talented faculty. As a result, UC emerged as the largest higher education institution in the nation, surpassing the enrollment of the University of Michigan.

Encouraged by a rapidly expanding standard of living, improved high schools, and the demand for skilled technicians and professionals in the state's growing economy, more and more high school graduates sought to enter Berkeley. Wheeler wanted to meet much of this enrollment demand, not only because it would expand the role of the university in California society, but also because it justified the expansion of academic programs and offered an opportunity to improve the quality and reputation of the Berkeley campus. During Wheeler's tenure (ending in 1919), student enrollment grew a staggering 378 percent, from 2,533, to 12,227, despite the establishment of more rigorous admissions policies.

Wheeler and other leading University officials and faculty, including Professor Alexis Lange in the School of Education, advocated for a variety of methods to reduce enrollment demand at Berkeley. Foremost was the proposal by Lange, and supported by Wheeler and key legislators, to create the nation's first network of public junior colleges with the ability of graduates to then enter Berkeley at the junior year.

The invention of the junior colleges offered a means to significantly expand educational opportunities within the vast geographic boundaries of California. Combined with the growth in the University and the rise of the regional college movement (what would emerge as the California State University), the junior college bolstered the number of high school students going to college. By the 1920s, California had not only the largest number of students enrolled in public higher education of any state in the Union, but the nation's highest college-going rate.

The birth and evolution of California's pioneering tripartite system of public higher education (a topic discussed later) also purposefully shifted enrollment demand away from the University of California, allowing the institution to maintain a highly selective admissions policy. It also allowed the Regents, University officials and faculty to pursue the relatively new model of the American research university focused on teaching, research and public service, and the concept that these were symbiotic missions, intertwined and self-reinforcing.

Public investment and enrollment growth in the University during Wheeler's tenure provided the context for major changes in the university's internal organization. Reflecting his training in the German university

system, President Wheeler elevated the role of research in the hiring, promotion and dismissal of faculty. He also integrated greater faculty involvement in managing university affairs.

Previously, the Academic Senate and the faculty of the university had been limited primarily to routine matters, such as recommending degrees and acting on student discipline cases. In 1881, for example, a committee of the Regents drastically reorganized the curriculum of the university, and declared several professorships vacant.

Wheeler convinced the Regents that faculty were not simply employees of the state, but members of an academic community engaged in a free-market of teaching and research. Recalling the role of faculty at the University of Heidelberg, he argued that the faculty should be primarily responsible for setting educational policy. Wheeler called on faculty, now growing in numbers, to make major changes in the administrative structure of the university.

Working with faculty and with the approval of the Regents, by 1915 Wheeler created some twenty new departments, reorganized graduate education to include a “graduate division,” as well as divided the university’s curriculum into lower and upper division courses, created matriculation agreements with the state’s normal schools and with the emerging (and pioneering) system of junior colleges, and adopted a system of peer review for hiring and promotion of faculty. Wheeler also created a faculty committee for the allocation of research funds, and a faculty editorial board to oversee the university press to elevate the quality and quantity of its publications.

The faculty’s expanding role in university management was not, however, codified in university policy; it was conferred by Wheeler and hinged, in turn, on his relationship with the Regents. The most important change in the nature of shared governance was still to come. It occurred in 1920 under difficult circumstances at the end of Wheeler’s tenure, and resulted in a historic statement regarding the organization and authority of the Academic Senate.

Several factors led to what is known by historians of American higher education as the *Berkeley Revolution*. Wheeler’s commanding presence during the first fifteen years of his tenure began to fade. For one, his sympathies with German institutions, and his open regret of America’s entrance into World War I, garnered considerable public criticism from Regents and faculty. A significant decline in Wheeler’s health also led to a decline in his prestige and leadership abilities. In this context, ambitious faculty, many of whom had engaged in the founding of the American Association of University Professors in 1915, sought an even greater role in university affairs.

Reacting to Wheeler’s decline and to a formal proposal offered by the leadership of the Academic Senate, the Regents then took an unusual path: during Wheeler’s last year in office (1918-19) the Regents placed the actual power of the Presidency in the hands of an “Administrative Board,” consisting of three faculty members who were all elevated to the title of dean.

The Administrative Board proved to be a disaster. The onset of a post-war recession, combined with a surge in enrollment of returning veterans and the disarray among the board brought confusion regarding the future of the university. In reaction, the Academic Senate convened a special meeting, and by a vote of 132 to 13 passed a Memorial (an official declaration) for submittal to the Regents. It asked that the faculty be given direct authority to organize the Senate and choose its leaders; that the Senate then be given more formal powers regarding educational policy; and that the Senate be consulted in the selection of a university president.

James K. Moffitt, a graduate of Berkeley, lawyer and major university benefactor, chaired a Regent's subcommittee that negotiated an agreement which was endorsed by the board as a whole, and placed in the Standing Orders of the Regents in June, 1920.

This agreement formalized the role of the president and his/her relationship with the Regents and the faculty. It also provided both direct and indirect powers of shared governance to the Academic Senate. Subject to the approval of the Regents, the Senate was to determine the conditions of admissions for certificates, and degrees -- aspects of the previous powers held by the faculty. But there were also new responsibilities vested in the Senate, and more specifically in the faculty, that are today the keys to its current system of shared governance. The Senate was to:

- Advise the president on all "appointments, promotions, demotions, and dismissals" of professors, and on the appointment of deans.
- Advise the president regarding "changes in the educational policy of the university."
- Advise the President regarding budget issues.
- Perhaps most importantly, to choose its own committees and organization "in such a manner as it may determine."

The agreement was a watershed in the general development of American higher education, creating an organizational structure of governance that would serve as a model for other major public and private universities. California, however, was not the first to formalize this structure in the United States, (one that had antecedents in British universities), but took it the farthest.

C. An Academic Culture of Accountability, Self-Improvement and Nurturing

The Berkeley Revolution and subsequent capacity building by UC faculty thru the Academic Senate created a "remarkable democratic system of academic government in which California faculty," once explained historian Walton E. Bean, "acquired a greater influence in the educational aspects of university administration than any other faculty in the United States. Indeed, the faculty virtually became a part of the administration."⁷

Following the Berkeley Revolution, the Academic Senate went thru a process of reorganization that included new committees to direct and manage university admissions standards and accreditation of state high schools (the Board of Admissions and Relations with Schools, or BOARS), and another on Budget and Intradepartmental Relations (BIR) to focus on a review of all new faculty hires and to establish a system of tenure and periodic post-tenure review.

In persuading The Regents to adopt the concept of tenure, UC was following the 1915 guidelines of the recently established American Association of University Professors that linked tenure with academic freedom and the vitality of the academic profession.⁸

BIR focused on creating a system of regular reviews regarding the teaching, research, and public service performance of faculty that could have been more appropriately called a committee on academic personnel. There was, however, a budgetary aspect of the consultative process and advice given to the president (and later campus chancellors). Faculty positions are one of the most valuable and sought after resources. New faculty positions sought by departments now included a faculty "ladder" with "steps" and pay scales for successful faculty to climb from the ranks of Assistant Professor, to Associate Professor, and then to full Professor.⁹

Prior to 1920, UC's process for faculty hiring and promotion was largely in the hands of the president and the Board of Regents, with no process of formal review – a pattern that was widespread in most public and private universities well into the 1950s. At Berkeley, and therefore at the other campuses as UC grew in enrollment, the era of the autocratic president was over. The Senate quickly became the primary path for assessing faculty performance and recruitment.

Three other internal practices contributed to UC unusual academic culture, again empowered by the university's autonomy and collaboration with its board and future presidents, in particular Robert Gordon Sproul (1930 – 1958) and his successor, Clark Kerr (1958 – 1966).

First was the early adoption of a rigorous post-tenure review process that included an “ad hoc” committee usually of five “peer” members on a campus: two or more from different academic fields, and multiple reviews of faculty performance.

Most universities, public and private, and well into the 1960s took a civil service viewpoint of promotion, largely based on the time they held their faculty position. Even today, the majority of universities in the US, and internationally, employ intensive reviews to achieving tenure only at the juncture of being promoted to the Assistant level, and then the promotion to Associate and again promotion to full Professor. Most also claim to have post-tenure review process but it is often minimal and at the discretion of deans or other academic administrators. At UC, and elsewhere, the review process has, at important junctures, required recommendation letters from faculty outside of their home campus.

As observed by C. Judson King in his book on UC's system of accountability and quality management, the early development of this faculty appointment and promotion system is perhaps “the single most identifiable factor underlying the success and stature of the university.”¹⁰ During the Sproul years, a broad interpretation emerged that faculty, even as the emphasis on research gained favor as the distinguishing factor in an academic's career, needed to perform well in teaching/mentoring and public service as well, taking into account the varied talent of faculty, the discipline they worked in, and that the university had escalating expectations on performance for faculty who are successfully promoted. This created an on-going incentive and academic culture that promotes high performance in all realms of faculty responsibility.¹¹

Second, by the 1950s, Berkeley and the other UC campuses, and unlike many other major research intensive universities seeking prestige, also sought to fill faculty positions largely at the entry-level, associate professor level, and then attempting to nurture talent. With some exceptions, such as the early years of developing UC San Diego, it was unusual to recruit at the senior level. More recently, that conceptual model has faded somewhat.

And a third practice is UC's early adoption of a regular process of “Program Review” for all academic departments and programs. Dating back to the 1960s, and perhaps earlier, Berkeley and UCLA, and the other campuses as they came into existence, employed the practice of regular reviews of academic programs (e.g., departments and schools) every eight or more years through a process of collaboration with academic administrators, usually the provost's office, and the campus division of the Senate.

D. The California Idea – Building a Coherent Mass Higher Education System and UC

As noted previously, significantly benefiting and empowering UC as it emerged as a multi-campus system was not only its unusual level of autonomy, but the building of a coherent network of public community

colleges (originally known as junior colleges) and a regional set of teaching colleges that later emerged as comprehensive undergraduate campuses (what is today the California State University system).

This tripartite system largely emerged by the 1920s, with distinct missions for each: local colleges offering Associate of Arts degrees transferable to the junior year at Berkeley and what became UCLA, as well as vocational and adult education courses; a teaching intensive set of public regional colleges; and UC as the state's graduate and doctoral training institution, equally devoted to teaching/mentoring, research and public service. As a result, California was the first in the US, indeed the world, to design a mass higher education system that linked the various public education segments, including an ability for students to enter a local junior college and then transfer to UC or a state college, or one of California's private institutions. UC faculty also acted as the accreditation body for both public high schools and junior colleges.

UC faculty and academic leadership were major players in developing this system – what I have called *The California Idea*.¹² UC advocated for establishing junior colleges and to facilitate the transfer function, Berkeley faculty established criteria for a “Associate of Arts degree,” and, as noted earlier, reorganized the curriculum at Berkeley to lower and upper divisions.

California's invention of the network of junior colleges, and the transfer function, greatly promoted socio-economic mobility. State and local support for creating this tripartite system grew over time, funding nearly two new community colleges a year between 1910 and 1960, as well as new four-year campuses. By the 1930s and into the 1950s, around 40 percent of all undergraduates at the Berkeley and Los Angeles campuses were transfer students – actually exceeding entering freshman for a time in the post-World War II period.¹³

The tripartite system greatly benefited UC. It helped justify California having a research intensive state university that was highly selective in admissions relative to other major state universities at the time, and with students able to enter the university at the junior year. Students who might not meet UC admissions requirements, or had economic or other practical reasons not to move to Berkeley, or UCLA, had another chance later to enter the university.

It was also a highly efficient system in terms of both access and containing costs for California. The geographically dispersed junior colleges and later the state colleges, both with generally lower operating costs than UC, would fulfill the seemingly insatiable appetite of Californians for access to higher education. As a result of California's pioneering tripartite structure, the state consistently had among the highest college-going rates in the nation.

In 1960, the California Master Plan for Higher Education strengthened this existing tripartite system. Many contemporary observers of California's system see the Master Plan as some sort of biblical event: a divine creation by the savant of American higher education, Clark Kerr, who gave birth to the state's tripartite structure. Further, the Master Plan is often touted as California's first commitment to providing open access to all high school graduates to a community college, and to any others who can benefit from some form of postsecondary education.

Yet California's famed Master Plan was none of these things. Indeed, the most notable achievement of those who negotiated the Master Plan is what they preserved and, conversely, what they avoided: the threat by disgruntled lawmakers, including Governor Pat Brown, to totally reorganize California's existing tripartite system under a single governing board that would have fundamentally changed the coherence and trajectory of the UC system.

California's Master Plan was the result of heated negotiations between representatives of the state's public institutions, and, in the end, consolidated numerous statues into one (the Donahoe Act), and resulted in some 60 agreements between the segments, including plans for new campus development, that strengthened the state's existing higher education system. This included:

- Preserving UC's sole role in doctoral education and state supported research, as well as its selective undergraduate admissions policies.
- Removing the "state colleges" (soon to renamed CSU) from the California Board of Education and establishing today's CSU Board of Trustees.
- As the state's population continued to grow, a shift of more students to the California Community Colleges. This would be accomplished by reducing UC's freshman admissions pool from the approximately top 15 percent of high school graduate, to today's current 12.5 percent (as defined by BOARS). Similarly, CSU shrank its admissions pool from approximately the top 44 percent to today's 33.5 percent. More selective admissions was largely justified as a path to reduce future costs of projected enrollment demand, with the Community Colleges, as noted previously, having much lower operating costs on a per student basis.

The Master Plan essentially ended a rapidly escalating turf war between the University of California and the growing number of state colleges presidents, supported by local lawmakers, who sought state sanction and funding for research and doctoral programs. The plan, with the support of then Governor Pat Brown, also ended a growing predilection of many lawmakers to seek new state college campuses independently and without considering long-term statewide needs or costs. California had been on the brink of moving from a coherent higher education system, with relatively ordered expansion that matched the overall population growth in the state, to an open market, chaotic process of policymaking.

The Master Plan compromise returned order to enrollment planning and program expansion. Its recommendation led to the establishment of a new Coordinating Council (later reorganized as the California Postsecondary Education Commission, later defunded by Governor Jerry Brown) to monitor the implementation of aspects of the plan, collect data and analyze performance of the various segments, vet new campus development and proposed academic programs such as new professional schools, and coordinate policies and legislation that affected public and private higher education in the state. In turn, the plan helped solidified state funding support for UC, remained relatively stable on a per student basis until the early 1970s.

E. An Evolving Relationship – the Emergence of the One University Model

From the base of authority granted in 1920, the Regents and the president increasingly came to rely on the Academic Senate to build a university of international recognition. The Senate proved a critical component, as noted, for maintaining quality academic programs as the university grew in enrollment and faculty, and in the number of campuses. Based in part on the innovation of enrollment-based budgeting brokered by President Wheeler in 1911 with then Governor Hiram Johnson, the number of new faculty hires quickly climbed in succeeding decades, declining only briefly during eras of war and economic decline.

The 1920 agreement between the Regents and faculty provided a general mechanism for managing the university and establishing the concept of a *One University* model in which UC would expand in the number of campuses, all sharing the mission of teaching and learning, research, and public service, and,

most importantly, a coherent governance and quality assurance system anchored by the Academic Senate.

Attempting to make sense of the acquisition of what became UCLA and how the university might expand with new campuses as California continued to grow in population and political demands on the university, President Robert Gordon Sproul (1930-1958) argued for a *One University* model (see accompanying figure).

As Patricia Pelfrey wrote in her CSHE paper on the history of this model and its importance, Sproul “feared that local political pressures from the growing southern part of the state would split the University into two separate institutions, one at Berkeley and one at Los Angeles. In a message he took far and wide around the state, Sproul proclaimed that the University might be geographically scattered up and down California, but it was nonetheless impossible to think of it as anything but one undivided center of learning. Removal of any part would destroy the integrity of the whole.”¹⁴

UC could have evolved to have campuses with different roles and status – as many on the Berkeley campus argued for. But Sproul, and eventually the Regents and Senate leaders saw advantage in each campus having an approximately equal missions. Older and newer campuses would pursue strengths and programs of their own, buttressed by an assessment process offered by the new concept of a UCwide Academic Senate body, and campus “divisions” of the Senate.

While Berkeley continued to hold considerable political sway within the UC system, and with the Board of Regents and lawmakers, there was no official “flagship” campus. Again, this is a unique feature of the UC multi-campus system that emerged early as it grew in enrollment and programs. Beginning largely in the 1950s, most

other states essentially attempted to make sense of their growing number of public campuses with vastly different missions and placed them under a single board. New York, Pennsylvania, Wisconsin, Texas (although with a separate board for UT and the A&M systems) followed a version of this path.

Key Elements of UC’s One University Model

- UCwide organization: Single governing board (The Regents), systemwide Office of the President and a Northern and Southern section of the Academic Senate (by 1963 reorganized into a single UCwide Senate body, with campus “divisions”).
- UC President acts as the *planner in chief* for the UC system whose office represents UC for budget and policy issues in Sacramento – acts as the public face of the system.
- A Multi-Campus University - Each Campus Shares UC’s Mission – teaching/learning, research and public service – and claim on state funding.
- UCwide Academic Personal Policies – hiring and advancement are primarily the role of the Academic Senate, shared with Chancellor/campus Provost.
- UCwide admissions policies – set at the UCwide level by the Academic Senate, administered by each campus.
- Shared student fee, tuition and financial aid policies.

Establishment of UC Campuses

- **Berkeley** – 1868 started in Oakland and opening of new campus in along Strawberry Creek in 1872.
- **San Francisco** – 1873 absorbs Toland Medical College as an affiliate of Berkeley; 1949 becomes a general medical campus of the UC system
- **Los Angeles** – 1919 absorbing the state teacher’s college in Los Angeles as UC’s “southern branch”; doctorate programs established in 1936.
- **Santa Barbara** – 1944 absorbing the state teacher’s college, becoming a general campus in 1958 offering the doctorate.
- **Davis** – 1951 opening of College of Letter and Sciences; previously an agricultural research station, UC Berkeley experimental farm; becoming a general campus in 1958.
- **Riverside** – 1954 opening of College of Letter and Sciences; previously a citrus research station.
- **San Diego** – 1959 opening of College of Letter and Sciences; previously a marine research station.
- **Irvine** – 1965 opens as a general campus.
- **Santa Cruz** – 1965 opens as a general campus.
- **Merced** – 2005 opens as a general campus.

The growing complexity of managing the university, plus eras of fiscal difficulties, further elevated the role of the Academic Senate in university management. For example, in the midst of the Great Depression, the university's new president, Robert Gordon Sproul, sought Senate advice and gained consent, including cuts in faculty salaries, for dealing with a 26 percent decrease in university funding from the state.

During World War II, Sproul worked with Senate leaders to convene the first "All-University Faculty Conference" to consider the challenges of the post-war era for the university. This conference, Sproul later noted, was intended to "pull together a war-scattered and war-torn teaching staff, and to enable it to give unhurried time and undisturbed thought to intelligent planning."¹⁵

The meeting of faculty representatives from the various campuses became an annual event for some four decades, and focused on such issues as the role of the university in the state economy, the growth and direction of federal research funding, the future of liberal arts education, the value of university autonomy in the constitution, and the role of shared governance in university affairs – a tradition largely lost by the 1970s, although UC President David Gardner did convene a similar faculty conference in the 1980s to debate establishing up to three new campuses.

Reflecting the decentralized nature of decision-making within a growing and multi-campus university community, the creation of an independent and self-governing Senate also led to significant conflicts between it, university presidents and the Board of Regents, as well as stirred disagreements within the ranks of faculty themselves.

One of these conflicts reached crisis proportions when in 1949 the Regents decided to impose a loyalty oath as a condition of university employment. In the post-World War II Red Scare, the Regents, on the advice of President Sproul, attempted to include an oath in anticipation of a similar requirement for all state employees. Most faculty had few qualms over signing an oath. But many faculty objected vehemently to university faculty being subject to an oath before it was made a state requirement. A special Senate committee stated that it would reinforce the stereotype of the university as a haven for subversives. For others, it appeared to be an initial salvo against the idea of academic freedom and the hard-won system of tenure.

The Regents ignored the advice of the Senate, however, and invoked the oath. Some faculty charged that the concept of shared governance had disappeared under the weight of political expediency. In 1950, 32 faculty were fired for not signing the oath, and numerous faculty resigned. Since the 1920s, as noted previously, a form of tenure existed at UC, but faculty still held year-to-year contracts – unlike many other major public universities by that time. Activist regents, and a calcitrant Sproul regretfully attempting to

All-Faculty UC Conferences 1944 – 1963

- 1944 – Postwar University Conference
- 1947 – The Relation of the University to the State
- 1948 – How Can the Educational Effectiveness of the University Be Improved?
- 1949 – The University of California in the Next Ten Years
- 1950 – Problems and Opportunities of the Large University – e.g., led to sections for large lecture classes
- 1951 – The Graduate Academic Function of the University
- 1952 – The Function of the Upper Division in the University
- 1953 – The Faculty and the Educational Policies of the University
- 1954 – How to Appraise the Value of the University to Society
- 1955 – The University of California Student: 1945-65
- 1956 – The Role of the University in Higher Education in California
- 1957 – Quality of Education in Relation to Numbers
- 1958 – University of California Retrospective and Prospective
- 1959 – Autonomy and Centralization in the State-Wide University
- 1960 – The Research Function of the University
- 1961 – The University in a Period of Growth
- 1962 – New and Continuing Problems in an Expanding University
- 1963 – The Student and the Quality of His[Her] Intellectual Environment in the University

navigate what was a statewide, and nationwide, anti-communist crusade, simply ignored the commitment to tenure.

Antagonism existed not only between faculty and the Regents, but among faculty leaders and their non-signing colleagues, recalled David Gardner in his study of the controversy.¹⁶ “The whole sorry story of the oath is one of confusion and repudiations, acerbity and bitterness,” asserted Russell H. Fitzgibbon in his brief history of the Academic Senate, with “more concern at times with procedural than substantive aspects The scar tissue was hard and durable.”¹⁷ Faculty participation in the Senate declined significantly as faculty temporarily resigned themselves to the perception that their role in university affairs was greatly diminished.

But under Sproul, and later Kerr, there was a pattern of recovery and renewed faith in shared governance. Those that were fired were reinstated, due in part to a successful lawsuit. A number of fired faculty subsequently had extremely successful careers at UC – including future UC President David Saxon, a young physicist when he refused to sign the Loyalty Oath.

The invention of the All-UC Faculty conferences and the value Sproul and later Kerr placed on faculty consultation and collaboration helped guide UC through a period of rapid enrollment expansion and reorganization. Once Kerr became president, he also pushed to end the year-to-year contracts and make tenure conform with the practices outlined by the AAUP justified in part because of the rigorous post-tenure review process.

The history of the University of California has included many other serious debates over the operation, role and future of California’s public universities. The election of Governor Ronald Reagan in 1966 was based, in part, on a campaign promise to “clean-up the mess at Berkeley.” In his first months as governor, Reagan and other Regents agreed that president Clark Kerr should have taken stronger action against protesting students. Reagan also proposed a 10 percent cut in university funding and the imposition of tuition. Kerr opposed both proposals. At his first meeting as Governor, Reagan and the other Regents voted 14 to 8 for Kerr’s dismissal.

Faculty stood strongly behind Kerr who had, despite the difficulties of the free-speech movement, helped negotiate the 1960 Master Plan, garnered huge increases in state funding, and helped to reorganize and decentralize the Office of the President, including giving greater management authority to chancellors and the campus divisions of the Academic Senate.¹⁸

The circumstance of Kerr’s ouster, and the tumultuous politics of the 1960s, did not directly threaten the concept of shared governance. Most faculty clearly understood the constitutional authority of the Regents to hire and fire the university president. But the Regents’ action did add to a general and strong sentiment of disunity within the university community.

F. Reorganizing the University

Clark Kerr’s dismissal came at the end of a tenure that fostered the most significant organizational changes in the University’s history, with a profound impact on the process of shared governance.

Under Kerr’s leadership, between 1958 and 1964, both the administrative structure and the organization of the Academic Senate were altered to give greater coherence to the University’s multi-campus, *One University* system, to provide chancellor’s faculty more authority at the campus level, and to provide improved equity in the distribution of state funds to the campuses. Included were three general reforms:

- ***Budget Equity***

Because of the University's unusual status as a public trust, California state government provided funding for instruction and research (I&R) costs in a lump sum payment each year. In other states, legislators had more direct authority over how those funds were distributed and spent within their respective public universities. UC, and specifically the Board of Regents and the President, had the autonomy to distribute these dollars as they saw fit, with relatively few restrictions.

Before the early 1960s, the Office of the President distributed these funds on a year to year basis, and while there was a relation to student enrollment at individual campuses, both Berkeley and UCLA tended to garner the vast majority of funds.

The development of new campuses presented a challenge that required a systematic approach to the distribution of state funds. Kerr and the Regents agreed to a formula that would provide a steady flow of funds to new campuses, while also protecting Berkeley and UCLA. The distribution of state funds generated by enrollment would be according to the level of instruction. Lower division instruction would generate the smallest amount of state funding; allocations were then higher for upper division instruction, and higher yet again for master's students. The highest allocation was for doctoral students. The rationale was that costs increased as the level of the instruction went up. Graduate training was not only the costliest in terms of the amount of time faculty needed to devote to teaching and mentoring students, but also because it related to the research activity of the University. Core funding support for research was thus directly tied to the instructional mission of the University.

Conceptually, this model provided a level playing field for all campuses of the University of California -- although there were a number of caveats created to support special needs of campuses. While the enrollment surge at new campuses helped subsidize the graduate and research programs at Berkeley and UCLA because of their already high percentages of enrollment at the graduate level, each campus had the potential to gain similar funding support. This model provided an incentive for the new campuses to develop graduate programs, and to mature into strong research universities.

- ***Universitywide and Campus Administrations***

Kerr and the Regents agreed to give more direct authority to the individual campuses -- including Berkeley, Los Angeles, San Francisco, and general campuses at Santa Barbara, Davis, Riverside, San Diego, and eventually the new campuses planned in Santa Cruz and Irvine. This included the transfer of responsibility and staff to the campuses in areas vital to their day-to-day operation. The staff in the Office of the President was reduced by 26 percent in less than a two-year period by the establishment of chancellorships at the other campuses other than Berkeley and UCLA, where that position was already in place.

Campus business officers, as well as the deans, now reported to the campus chancellors and had access to budgetary information previously controlled by the president and Sproul's long-time associate and Vice-President for Budget, Jim Corley. Chancellors, for example, could now approve research grants, contracts, and the transfer of funds. Campuses also gained control over graduate education, replacing the administrative structure of northern and southern deans, reporting directly to the university president, and reflecting the structure of the Academic Senate established in the 1930s.

These organizational changes gave the UC presidency a greater ability to focus on major issues confronting the University, while also providing new mechanisms for developing collaborative working relationship with the campus administrators. Kerr filled the position of Vice President - Academic Affairs, vacant since

1948, to help expand the consultative process with both the campus administrations and the Academic Senate –which would be an essential component for guiding the subsequent and massive expansion in enrollment and academic programs.

Between 1960 and 1975, it was projected that the University would grow from 49,000 students to over 130,000. Kerr also established a Council of Chancellors to meet regularly with the President, both to garner input and to coordinate activities, and urged a corresponding reorganization of the Academic Senate.

- ***A Divisional Model for the Academic Senate***

Kerr helped to initiate major changes in the Senate’s organization to assist in policy development and to reflect the shift of greater authority to the campuses. What had been a Northern and Southern sectional division of the Senate proved cumbersome as the University grew in size, and it also accentuated rivalries, not only between Berkeley and what was now called UCLA, but also between the hegemony of these two campuses and the emerging campuses in each section. Meetings were held either at Berkeley or UCLA, and membership on universitywide and sectional committees was apportioned by the number of faculty. Faculty at the new campuses, for example Santa Barbara, were not even regarded as full-members of the Academic Senate, and hence could not participate in Senate committees until 1955.

Further, while universitywide committees existed to formulate universitywide policies and positions, including an “Academic Council” established in 1950 to iron out differences, the Northern and Southern sections would at times become embroiled in major disagreements. The precursor to today’s Academic Council was, as observed in a 1953 study on “Faculty Self-Government and Administrative Organization,” the “capstone of the state-wide committee system,” charged with arbitrating such disagreements, among other things.¹⁹ But the process of reaching consensus was often overly lengthy, delaying important decisions.

Four major changes were incorporated by 1963 following an extensive review conducted by the Senate’s leadership and guided by the All-UC Faculty conferences. In turn, these changes provide the framework for the contemporary organization of the Academic Senate:

- **Campus Divisions:** The Northern and Southern Sections of the Academic Senate were disbanded, and divisions were created for each campus with their own network of committees. Reflecting the historical role of the UC president as the head of the Academic Senate (essentially, a faculty member who is also an administrator), Sproul had chaired all meetings of the Northern and Southern sections. The new divisional model provided a chair for each campus chosen from the faculty, and clear autonomy from both the universitywide and campus administrations. The role of the UC president, and his or her role in the Senate’s affairs, remarked Russell H. Fitzgibbon in his 1968 study of the Senate, “hence became more honorific than operative.”²⁰
- **Academic Assembly:** A new Universitywide Academic Assembly was established with proportional representation from each of the campus divisions, with the authority to pass changes in the Bylaws and Regulations of the Senate, and resolutions and memorials to the President. As proposed by the Committee on Reorganization of the Academic Senate in 1961, the Assembly would have two purposes: one to advise the President, “either in response to inquiries from him or in response to opinion emanating from one or more of the campuses,” and to enact changes to the Bylaws and Regulations. The Assembly should also:

in no way override the autonomy of the various campuses or undermine the authority of the several Chancellors. Presumably, it would be concerned with such issues as the definition of

*tenure, University admissions, transfer, and dismissal policies, and decisions concerning membership and voting rights in the Academic Senate. Its members should strive to bring into harmony conflicting attitudes on the various campuses, insofar as those attitudes threaten the well-being of the Statewide University.*²¹

- **Equal Representation:** Universitywide Committees were to continue, but their number increased and their membership was determined by an equal representation from each division. They would also report annually to the Assembly and be, in effect, sub-committees of the Assembly, charged under the Senate's Bylaws and Regulations, with purview and responsibility to advise in distinct areas of policy.
- **Executive Body of the Senate:** The Academic Council, established in 1950, would continue to function as the executive body of the universitywide Senate. As noted in its charge, the Council would "study problems of over-all concern to the University," and make recommendations to the President. But it was now also charged to direct activities of the Assembly and the universitywide committees, with its membership to include the chairs of the new divisions and select universitywide committees, and with its members also serving on the Assembly.

These reforms came at an important juncture in the history of US. There was a real fear of anarchy as the campuses grew in size and autonomy. Perhaps to a greater extent than the President or the Regents, it was argued, the Universitywide Senate was to be the "means of preserving a common policy and uniform standards for the University."²²

The organizational changes of the late 1950s and early 1960s provided an effective model for managing the University's multi-campus system, allowing for both a significant level of autonomy for each of the campuses, and a *One University vision*.

G. Building New Campuses – The Critical Role of the Academic Senate

As reflected in the 1961 and 1962 All University Conferences, one of the critical questions was how to manage the establishment, growth and maturation of new campuses, as UC grew with the state population and its social contract to students from the top 12.5 percent of all public high school graduates. New campuses had no critical mass of faculty at the outset to take on the duties of the Senate in managing the academic development and affairs.²³

In part as a result of the conference, in late 1962 "Special Advisory Committees" of the Academic Senate were established for each of the new campuses at San Diego, Santa Cruz, and Irvine and that included five to six members on each committee. Their appointments were made by President Kerr in the Fall of 1962 in consultation with the Senate's Committee on Committees. With the exception of San Diego which already had an established academic program linked to the Scripps Institute of Oceanography and a School of Science and Engineering (established in 1958 as the Institute of Technology and Engineering), members came from faculty at other UC campuses.

The practical purpose of these Special committees was the creation of a Universitywide entity to help with academic planning, recruitment and hiring of faculty and other policy areas, which traditionally were under the purview of the Academic Senate. In the midst of a general process of decentralization in the university, committees would help form a bridge toward an effective Division on each of the new campuses to parallel the increased power and authority of the new Chancellors.

But they also served the purpose of gaining widespread faculty participation in developing the new campuses, and ingraining into the culture of the new campuses “senate participation from the beginning.” The advisory committees also offered a strategic means to alter the control of Berkeley and UCLA in the academic program and personnel process. UC Riverside provided one case example where the provincial concerns of one campus (UCLA which directed the academic personnel process) sometimes proved a hindrance to building the autonomy and programs of new campuses.²⁴

This model of early integration of faculty into the development of new campuses informed the process for the development and opening of UC Merced in Fall 2005.²⁵

H. UC’s Contemporary Model of Shared Governance

The accompanying Figures 1 and 2, one showing enrollment, another faculty numbers by rank, provide indicators of the massive growth of the UC system over time. While the strains of such growth were significant, the organizational structure, based in large part on the university’s system of shared governance, also provided, as noted previously, the foundation for an increase in the overall quality of the system -- not just of the oldest and most mature campuses. This is a remarkable accomplishment that is reflected in national and global rankings, and more specifically the attention of practitioners, scholars, and policymakers from throughout the world.

This organizational structure retained one of the UC’s greatest strengths: the two general and at times overlapping spheres of policymaking under the Regents, the Academic Senate and the universitywide and campus administrations. Through this structure, the President, and in turn the Universitywide administration, gained influence regarding the agenda for the Regents, and the process of setting universitywide policy by the board.

By the early 1970s, a legislative review of the California Master Plan recommended the addition of faculty and student representation on the Board of Regents to give “greater credibility with its constituency.”²⁶ A subsequent constitutional amendment in 1974 provided the Regents with the ability to appoint student and faculty

Figure 1: Undergraduate and Graduate Student Enrollment






Figure 2: UC Faculty By Rank



representatives -- the first change in Regent membership since the addition of an alumni representative in 1918.²⁷

Today, the organization of the University of California, and the role of the Senate, reflect the history of the University of California and a shared governance system that date, in one way or another, to its founding in 1868, the impact of the Berkeley Revolution, and the growth of new campuses and the divisional structure that emerged in the 1960s.

Figure 3 provides an outline of these relationships, starting with the Regents, the President and his or her office, the chancellors as the academic administrative head of each campus. The Academic Senate is designated by The Regents as an independent and self-organized body of the faculty that includes the university-wide Academic Assembly as its legislative body, and the Academic Council as its executive body with over twenty universitywide committees that, in turn, include representatives of the campus Academic Senate divisions.




The UC Board of Regents retains ultimate responsibility and full authority to determine the mission of the institution within the constraints of state policies and government funding mandates. Shared governance, however, has its greatest meaning not in the relationship of the faculty to the Regents, but historically in the relationship of the faculty, through the Senate, to the university president and the campus chancellors and their administrations.

Figure 4 provides an attempt to outline that relationship and UC's shared governance model, including the designated responsibilities of the Academic Senate and those of academic administrators, and areas of shared responsibility.

Under this model, the Academic Senate has historically had direct or shared authority regarding all academic activities of a university, including the oversight of academic programs and curriculum, a strong advisory capacity to the campus chancellor regarding faculty appointments, determination of admission standards and practices where there is institutional discretion, and consultative rights for major budget decisions related to academic programs.

Campus chancellors and academic administrators have the primary decision making authority in all issues related to the institution's budget, and effective management of university operations that support

academic activities. They act as the primary liaison between the UC president and stakeholders. The campus chancellors should also provide a strategic vision for universities and ideas for new initiatives, yet always in a consultative manner with university faculty and other members of the academic community.



But it is also important to note the role of the faculty, thru the Senate, has limitations. Consultation by campus chancellors on, for example budget issues affecting academic programs, or even the final decision to appoint or advance a faculty member, one of the most critical decisions for a campus, can be accepted, modified, or denied. The complexities of managing a university are many. There are many subtleties and nuances to shared governance built on relationships and sense of shared purpose and respect.

I. Shared Governance in Retrospect and Prospective

A long-term commitment to shared governance, and a culture of self-reflection and improvement, are the major reasons behind the University of California's status as one of the great university systems in the world. That tradition has endured not because it ensures consensus, but because it is fundamental to a deliberative discussion of the university's role in society and in the management of its important affairs.

Despite his domineering management style, President Robert Gordon Sproul, reflecting on UC's emergence under the *One University* model, understood that shared governance was crucial in creating effective university leadership. "No function of the university president [or chancellor] is more important than maintaining close relations with the faculty," he wrote in 1953. The Academic Senate, Sproul remarked, became more important as the university grew in size and in the complexity of its role in society. Without strong faculty input, opinions and advice, "the titular head of the organization often suffers from something like oxygen starvation, with such characteristic symptoms as failing vision, and gait slowed down to a shamble, and weaving from side to side with little forward motion."²⁸

Apart from such direct effects, shared governance provides an additional important benefit: the maintenance of morale and an *esprit de cour* within the academic community. "The process of consultation," wrote John J. Corson in 1941, "strengthens the allegiance to the institution and their individual zeal and satisfaction."

In retrospect, there have been great disparities in the effectiveness of shared governance over time: it has provided the context for harmony over the future of the university and a catalyst for reform; at other times it has been a focal point of disagreement and conflict within the university. Generally, shared governance has tended to break down on controversial issues.

The Senate is a representative body that is built on consultation and deliberation and cannot always represent a consensus view among the vast and growing number of faculty. This is one reason that the Senate leadership declined an offer in 1974 by The Regents, via a state constitutional amendment, not to have a vote on the board; instead, it was agreed that the Chair of the the Academic Council would henceforth sit as a non-voting member.

Among the controversies and policy challenges that have strained or weakened the concept of shared governance included the Loyalty Oath controversy discussed previously, which in turn eventually led to more formal policies in the late 1950s for faculty tenure; the Free Speech Movement in the mid-1960s that led to the firing of UC president Clark Kerr; Vietnam and civil rights protests; UC eventual endowment divestments in South Africa in the early 1990s that contributed to a world-wide movement to end apartheid there; and the 1996 controversial decision by The Regents to eliminate gender, race and ethnicity criteria in admissions and faculty hiring, despite opposition by UCwide Senate committees and leadership.

It is also important to note that shared governance at UC has generated criticism that the faculty, through the Senate, have too much power and are often too slow and laborious in its deliberations – a source of frustration for those attempted to guide the university through seemingly never ending troubled budgetary waters.²⁹

At the same time, more recent assessments on the vibrancy of shared governance within UC by past Academic Council chairs, and others, are that it is generally healthy at the UCwide level, working with both the president's office and The Regents, but with significant problems at the campus level.

Since 2008, the Academic Council Chair has produced a brief report to the UC president on the state of shared governance. A recent report noted that many chancellors and their administrators are often not deliberating with the Senate on key strategic issues, like enrollment planning, before presenting plans to the Regents.³⁰


The 2023 decision by UCLA to depart from the Pac12 Conference, affecting not only student athletes but implications for budgets at other campuses, was also made with no Senate input at the divisional and UCwide levels. The challenges of dealing with a global pandemic, and the transition to online courses and other mitigations, and now a return to a new normal, also brought sometimes strained relations between the Senate and campus administrators. In a survey of UC faculty, COVID mitigations had a significant effect on their ability to pursue research and a detrimental impact on mentoring and teaching.³¹ Student learning and mental health also took a toll. The recovery from a global pandemic is an ongoing project.

Scale is also a significant concern. While California has appeared to stabilize in its population, long-term projections are for growth. As part of a compact with Governor Newsom, a 2022 UC enrollment plan seeks to enroll an additional 20,000 students by 2030.

As the university continues to grow in enrollment and programs, and demands by the public for various services and roles in addressing socio-economic issues increases, the complexity of managing UC will multiply. Shepherding a large and still growing multi-campus system is made more challenging due to the

rising student-to-faculty ratios. In the early 1960s, the student-to-ladder ranked faculty ratios was about 14 to one; today, the ratio of students to faculty is closer to 25 to one, one result of a long-term declining investment by the state on a per-student basis.

Figure 5 shows two trends over time: UC undergraduates as a percentage of all enrollment that infers a decline in the ratio of graduate enrollment (UC has among the lowest percentage of graduate students at about 22 percent when compared to comparative public and private research intensive universities); and the percentage of ladder ranked faculty among all faculty, with stability achieved after the 1960 Master Plan, but a significant decline starting in 1990 that marks the beginning of a long-term disinvestment by the state.




This decline in the ratio of ladder ranked faculty reflects a rapid growth in the number of non-Senate Lecturers and relatively slow growth in the number of Senate Faculty. This trend is throughout the system, with Berkeley and Los Angeles having the largest growth in non-Senate academic staff.³²

At the same time, there has been slow but steady growth in the number of women faculty. In 2021, women represented about 38 percent of all ladder ranked faculty, with significant variation among the disciplines).

The background of faculty is more diverse today than any other time in the university's history, yet still only about 13.4 percent are from university underrepresented groups based on a rubric focused on California's rapidly changing demography. It is important to note that, however, that the pool for talented faculty, and graduate students, is a worldwide market. Non-US citizens now represent nearly 29 percent of all faculty.³³ Their international backgrounds and experiences greatly enrich UC and should help lead to a more expansive understanding of diversity.

Figure 6: UC Growth in UCwide Administrators, Campus Administration, and Faculty



In contrast to the earlier period in UC's history, administrative staff now outnumber faculty and other academic personnel nearly three to one (see Figure6). Some of this growth in staff relates to the expanding

research productivity of faculty, particularly in the sciences that require an infrastructure of personnel (note that the federal government is now the largest single source of income for UC).

But the growth in the number of administrators and other employees also reflects the growing costs of meeting federal and state regulatory mandates, significant growth in student services and public engagement units like tech transfer that did not exist some forty years ago, increased capital investment and service centers and related staffing, and similar rising costs related to operating a research intensive university.

In short, the UC community is starkly different in its composition compared to earlier decades. Not only are faculty a significantly smaller percentage of the entire university community, but also the proliferation of administrators and staff is part of a broader expansion of the purview and power of campus administrative bureaucracies, more often than not at the expense of faculty governance, and not just at UC.

Faculty affinity to academic disciplines, and one might also conjuncture declining institutional memory, also makes it a challenge to elevate a collective sense among faculty of *One University*. As one Academic Council Chair noted in 2022, there is a need for “rejuvenating the Senate by increasing its visibility on the campuses and systemwide and restoring a commitment to Senate service. Many of the divisional Senates are having trouble filling committees. While Senate leaders are elected representatives of the faculty, our work is often invisible to the faculty.”³⁴

Looking to the future, among the issues to consider related to shared governance are the following macro-questions projected population growth of California, the state’s socio-economic dynamics, including the attention to addressing inequality and continued flows of immigration, and California’s economic and political future. For example:

- **Master Plan Enrollment Commitments:** As noted, in the long-term, California is expected to grow in population and in labor needs. How can the University continue to meet a version of its social contract to enroll the Master Plan admissions pool of accepting the top 12.5 percent of the state’s high school graduates without a dramatic expansion of existing campuses, or new campuses, or new forms of “delivering” on-line education?³⁵ The development of Artificial Intelligence may also alter the labor market, the demand for higher education, as well as teaching and learning at UC. These are all issues on which the Senate needs to deliberate.
- **Broad Notions of Diversity:** What pathways can the Senate seek to achieve greater socio-economic, ethnic, racial, gender, international, geographic, and political and intellectual viewpoint diversity among the student body, faculty and administrators?
- **One University Model:** How will the *One University model* evolve relative to the central powers of the Regents and the Office of the President and the campuses?³⁶
- **Re-Evaluating Senate Membership:** Is the Senate’s membership, which largely excludes in its modern form a growing population of researchers who are evaluated by the Senate on the same criteria as faculty minus teaching, as well as long-term lecturers and adjunct faculty, still relevant?
- **Reinvigorating Faculty Participation in the Senate and University Management:** Related, how can the Senate divisions generate broad participation among faculty, young and old?

- **Senate Representation on the Board of Regents:** Should the Senate revisit the decision back in 1974 not to have the Senate’s representatives on the Board of Regents as a voting member?

In short, is UC’s system of shared governance still fit for purpose?

Certainly, shared governance has added to the complexity of decision-making. Foremost, it has proven an important and evolving tool established by the Regents for the management of the University of California -- a tool that works best in an atmosphere of respect and understanding of the differing roles of faculty, students, administrators, and The Board of Regents.

ENDNOTES

- ¹ In their 1973 study, Glenny and Dalglish identified seven states (California, Colorado, Georgia, Idaho, Michigan, Minnesota, and Oklahoma) with constitutional autonomy provisions. California, Michigan, and Minnesota, are generally viewed as the “Big Three” in terms of constitutional autonomy. Other states have provisions in their constitutions for selected public universities, but case law in those states has generally determined that that status is limited and granting state legislatures power over policies such as admissions and increasingly curriculum interventions. See Hutchens, Neal H., “Preserving the Independence of Public Higher Education: An Examination of State Constitutional Autonomy Provisions for Public Colleges And Universities” (2009), Educational Policy Studies and Evaluation Faculty Publications. Vol. 1.
- ² Note that the California State University (CSU) network of over 20 campuses was allowed to offer mutually agreed joint doctoral degree with UC as part of the 1960 Master Plan compromise; more recently, CSU was granted authority to independently offer professional doctoral degrees in a few selected areas, including education and audiology, and currently there is legislation offered to now give the CSU Board of Trustees independent authority to offer the doctorate.
- ³ *An Act to Create and Organize the University of California*, California Statutes, March 23, 1868.
- ⁴ *Utica Observer*, October 4, 1901.
- ⁵ See John Aubrey Douglass, *The California Idea and American Higher Education* (Stanford University Press, 2000 and 2007).
- ⁶ Cited in Clark Kerr, “Remarks by President Kerr: Ninety-Second Charter Day Ceremonies,” March 21, 1960, University of California, Berkeley, UCA.
- ⁷ See Eighth All-University Faculty Conference, “The Two Structures: Faculty Self-Government and Administrative Organization,” April, 1953.
- ⁸ 1915 Declaration of Principles on Academic Freedom and Academic Tenure, American Association of University Professors.
- ⁹ By the early 1920s, the committee had, as noted by chemist Joel Hildebrand, “set up criteria for the ranks in the academic ladders” and “what criteria and length of period of service” for each step. Cited in C. Judson King, *The University of California: Creating, Nurturing, and Maintaining Academic Quality in a Public University Setting*, Center for Studies in Higher Education, University of California – Berkeley, 2018.
- ¹⁰ *Ibid.* p. 441.
- ¹¹ Ellen Switkes, “University of California Peer Review System and Post-Tenure Review Evaluation,” *Innovative Higher Education*, Vol 24, No.1, Fall 1999.
- ¹² Douglass, *The California Idea and American Higher Education*, *op cited.*
- ¹³ See John Aubrey Douglass, *The Conditions for Admission: Access, Equity and the Social Contract of Public Universities* (Stanford University Press, 2007) p. 89.
- ¹⁴ See Patricia A. Pelfrey, *The One-University Idea and Its Futures*, Center for Studies in Higher Education, Research and Occasional Paper Series, CSHE 6.16 (June 2016)
- ¹⁵ *Ibid.*
- ¹⁶ David P. Gardner, *The California Oath Controversy* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1967) 169.
- ¹⁷ Russell H. Fitzgibbon, *The Academic Senate of the University of California* (Berkeley: Office of the President, University of California, 1968) 41.
- ¹⁸ For more on the Master Plan see John A. Douglass “Brokering the 1960 Master Plan: Pat Brown and the Promise of California Higher Education,” a special issue of *California Politics and Policy* focusing on the administration of Governor Edmund “Pat” Brown, 1997.
- ¹⁹ Report of the Study Committee No. 1., “The Two Structures: Faculty Self-Government and Administrative Organization,” chaired by Ewald T. Grether, and presented at the Eighth All-University Faculty Conference, April/May, 1953.
- ²⁰ Russell H. Fitzgibbon, *The Academic Senate of the University of California* (Berkeley: Office of the President, University of California, 1968) 53.
- ²¹ Report of the Study Committee No. 4, “The Reorganization of the Academic Senate,” chaired by Sidney Cameron, and presented at the Sixteenth All-University Faculty Conference, March, 1961.

²² *Ibid.*

²³ *All-UC Faculty Conference, "The University in a Period of Growth,"* UC Davis, March 27-29, 1961. It was at this conference reorganization of the Academic Senate was proposed, with each campus developing its own Divisional structure with equal responsibilities, and a universitywide Senate structure with representation from each Division and an Academic Assembly.

²⁴ In a 1968 interview, Clark Kerr explained that, "There was, in the early times, a sense of jealousy [at] UCLA about Irvine, which may even continue to this day -- also, the same about San Diego. . . UCLA was concerned that Irvine and San Diego might take some of the play way from it in southern California. And also, there was a sensitivity, politically, particularly on the part of the chancellor. He was very conscious of the political position of UCLA, and sort of doubtful whether he wanted the competition in southern California . . ." Clark Kerr, July 12, 1968, interview with Samuel McCulloch, Center for Studies in Higher Education Archive.

²⁵ See John Aubrey Douglass, "Planning New UC Campuses in the 1960s: The Role of Universitywide Academic Senate Special Advisory Committee: Preliminary Brief," UCwide Academic Senate Office, October 20, 1998.

²⁶ Report of the Joint Committee on the Master Plan for Higher Education, California Legislature, 1973; Constitutional Amendment passed November 5, 1974.

²⁷ This section of the brief is based on the following report, John A. Douglass, "Brief on the Historical Development of the UC Academic Senate and the Universitywide Administration," Submitted to the Task Force on Governance: Panel 2 on Shared Governance, August 18, 1997.

²⁸ Robert Gordon Sproul, speech before the Eighth All-University Faculty Conference, "The Two Structures: Faculty Self-Government and Administrative Organization," April, 1953.

²⁹ See Daniel L. Simmons "Shared Governance in the University of California – An Overview, 1995.

³⁰ Academic Council Chair Robert Horwitz to UC President Michael Drake, "Report on the State of Shared Governance at the University of California, 2021-22, September 16, 2022.

³¹ UCwide Academic Senate, "Continuing Impact of the COVID-19 Pandemic on UC Faculty and Instruction in the 2021-22 Academic Year," September 2022.

³² Universitywide Committee on Planning and Budget, "UCPB Report on Faculty Hiring," UCwide Academic Senate, September 29, 2022.

³³ UC Office of the President, "University of California 2022-2023 Advancing Faculty Diversity: Preliminary Report," September 2022.

³⁴ 2022-23 Newsletter: UC Systemwide Academic Senate Overview. Academic Council Chair Susan Cochran, September 14, 2022

³⁵ For a discussion related to enrollment and budget options, see John Aubrey Douglass and Zachary Bleemer, *Approaching a Tipping Point?: A History and Prospectus of Funding for the University of California*. UC Cliometric History Project, Center for Studies in Higher Education, Goldman School of Public Policy, August 2018.

³⁶ See Pelfrey, "One University Idea" *op cited* for a discussion on past and current debates on the future of this defining model of UC.