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The Effect of the Uniform Bar Examination on Admissions, Diversity, Affordability, and Employment across Law Schools in the United States

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Abstract

The Uniform Bar Examination (UBE) is a multijurisdictional test that law students can use to gain admission to the bar in 37 states and territories. Despite this near-universal applicability and the potential of UBE to impact law schools' admissions, diversity, affordability, and employment outcomes, no research to date has examined the impacts of UBE. Equipped with a novel dataset that we make available to future researchers, we apply a difference-in-differences design to estimate these impacts by exploiting variation in UBE adoption timing across states. We find early evidence to suggest that law schools in UBE states benefitted by receiving more applications and having higher overall enrollments after UBE adoption.

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Data

The novel analytic dataset is available upon request from the authors and can be accompanied by documentation, a codebook, and R scripts for merging and analysis.

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Introduction

The Uniform Bar Examination (UBE) is a multijurisdictional test designed to assess a minimum core of legal knowledge and lawyering skills. Supported by the American Bar Association and the Conference of Chief Justices, UBE was first implemented in February 2011 in Missouri and North Dakota and has now reached 37 states and territories (National Council of Bar Examiners [NCBE], 2022). Proponents of UBE argue that the portability of scores across participating jurisdictions may improve law students' job prospects and professional mobility. Furthermore, the adoption of UBE may also lead to increased interest in pursuing a legal career or a diversification of the legal profession given expanded job prospects. In turn, these altered student pools and labor markets may incent changes in law schools' behaviors, including changes to admissions and pricing. Yet, despite the prevalence of UBE and these potential outcomes for students, institutions, and states, no research to date has documented its effects on law schools' application volumes, admissions decisions, diversity, affordability, bar passage rates, or the employment mobility of graduates.

Equipped with a novel law-school level dataset, we leverage a difference-in-differences approach to addresses this gap and provide a comprehensive examination of the effects of UBE adoption. We also pave way for future work by constructing and making available a new and unique dataset drawing from multiple sources. More broadly, our work contributes to understanding the intersection among state-level public policy, high-stakes professional licensing examinations, and graduate and professional education.

Background and Literature Review

For students seeking entry into many advanced professions, such as teaching, social work, health care, or law, their ability to work relies upon obtaining a license to practice. While specific licensing requirements vary across fields, individual state policies often require prospective applicants to pass a relevant exam, which provides basic quality assurance and accountability for the profession but could also impede mobility and access (Kleiner, 2005). Extant research has documented how licensing requirements and examinations in fields such as social work (Castex et al., 2019; Kim, 2022), teaching (Bennett et al., 2006; Goldhaber & Hansen, 2010; Petchauer, 2012), and school leadership (Grissom et al., 2017) may serve as barriers for entry into the profession among traditionally underrepresented groups. As such, state policies around licensing exams have real implications for diversifying a profession—a task that is particularly relevant for the legal profession, which remains about 50% less diverse than other professional occupations (Cunningham & Steele, 2015).

Given the high costs involved in pursuing a legal education, the bar examination is one of the highest-stakes licensing examinations. For students, failure to pass the bar can significantly thwart career prospects and cause financial distress—a burden compounded by high-levels of debt among law students (González Canché et al., 2019; Lee et al., 2020). Similarly, for law schools, school-level bar passage rates influence their reputation and rankings, as ensuring that graduates pass the bar often serves to measure whether law schools have successfully trained future lawyers. Despite its centrality, the validity and fairness of the bar examination have been debated. Critics argue that the bar exam overly emphasizes LSAT scores in law school admissions, leads to a test-focused curriculum, and creates barriers for underrepresented students as evidenced in disparate bar passage rates by race and gender (Trujillo, 2007). Another concern has been a lack of

portability across jurisdictions. Historically, students could only practice law in the state where they passed the bar examination, and this rigidity, combined with the already-high-stakes nature of the test, could have important implications for students' future career prospects (Honabach, 2014). Furthermore, the ability of graduates to recuperate high tuition costs for law school is often dependent on their earnings in the legal profession, which vary widely by locality and state (Baum, 2015).

UBE has been posed as one possible solution to the rigidity of the traditional bar exam. Unlike scores from the traditional bar, UBE scores are portable among participating jurisdictions, and states can set UBE score thresholds for admission to a respective bar. From a student's perspective, UBE not only enhances their mobility but also maximizes their opportunity for success. Because states have different criteria for a passing UBE score, students who have a failing UBE score in one jurisdiction could transfer their score to a district with a lower passing score (NCBE, 2017).[1] Furthermore, for the legal field, UBE creates a coherent assessment system that recognizes the multi-jurisdiction nature of how law is truly practiced (NCBE, 2017). Despite the growing adoption of UBE, no empirical work to date has rigorously examined its effects and implications. Prior works have instead investigated various factors that shape bar passage rates, such as LSAT scores, undergraduate GPA, law school rankings, and academic performance during law school (Farley et al., 2019; Rush & Matsuo, 2007), but each has examined factors at the institutional or student level, rather than testing the structural effects of state or systems level policy changes—like UBE adoption.

[1] There is meaningful variability in "passing" UBE scores across neighboring states in some regions. In the Southeast, a student cannot be admitted to the Tennessee bar with a 260; the state requires 270. However, they could practice in Alabama or Missouri where the minimum score is 260. Other nearby states (Kentucky and South Carolina) require a 266 or higher. Conversely, on the East coast, most states uniformly require a 266; on the West coast, a 270 (NCBE, 2022). These suggest the effective portability of UBE scores may vary by region.

Given the salience of the bar examination for students and law schools, we hypothesize that changes in bar examinations will have implications for students' decisions to apply and attend law school, as well as institutions' behaviors in the UBE era. If students are aware of UBE prior to law school enrollment—by way of law school admissions webpages or outreach events, law school search tools, or personal research—greater job market flexibility allowed by UBE may factor into students' decisions about whether to pursue legal education, thus not only influencing applications and enrollment but also impacting the composition of students who apply and enroll. Given that students of color have different experiences entering, engaging, persisting, and departing law school, the effect of UBE could also be heterogenous across student groups (Cunningham & Steele, 2015; Reynoso & Amron, 2002). For example, improved portability and universality of the bar examination may widen the pool of applications among traditionally underrepresented groups. This motivates a focus on race and gender and our disaggregation of data along these dimensions as they allow.

Furthermore, from an institutional perspective, changes in the bar examination may influence law schools' curricular and admission decisions, and thus lead to changes in admissions, affordability, and the number of degrees awarded (Trujillo, 2007). Finally, the adoption of UBE may not only impact graduates' mobility but may also have a direct influence on bar passage rates by fundamentally altering the exam or replacing existing within-state bar exams. Our study explores these possibilities by providing the first view into impacts of UBE adoption on law schools' application volumes, admissions decisions, diversity, affordability, bar passage rates, and employment outcomes.

Data

Our study collects and compiles data from four main sources into a new, unique dataset. First, we rely upon the Analytix database from AccessLex to collect information on law schools' admissions, bar passage rates, employment, financial aid, and student expenses. Second, we use the Integrated Postsecondary Education Data System (IPEDS) to collect additional institution-level characteristics, including sector/level, enrollment, and finance indicators. Third, we pull county-level characteristics relevant to educational attainment and employment from the U.S. Census American Community Survey (ACS): county-level racial demographics, educational attainment, economic indicators, and information on the legal job market (i.e., positions and earnings). Finally, we used information from NCBE to document whether and when each state adopted UBE. Table 1 presents the adoption timing of UBE across all states and additionally notes the number of law schools in our sample located within each state. We focus on the 2011-2018 period given the presence of consistent and available outcome data in Analytix and IPEDS and merge our files by each institution's Office of Postsecondary Education Identification number (OPEID) and year. We additionally merged data from ACS and NCBE by county or state name and year. In all, our data covers a wide range of institutional-level characteristics, county contexts, and state-month-year indicators of UBE adoption.

All ABA-approved law schools are included in the Analytix dataset (n=205). We removed institutions in the territories (n=1, Puerto Rico), those that did not report to Analytix or IPEDS across the panel (n=8, new or closed institutions), and those that did not report at least two years of data to allow for linear interpolation of missing outcomes (n=23). Given our interest in the impacts of UBE adoption, we also removed institutions in states that adopted UBE before or after our panel (i.e., in 2011 or earlier or after 2019) to maintain comparisons between treated

institutions and never-treated institutions. The final analytic dataset consists of 123 law schools and includes observations from 2011-2018; 59 schools are located within UBE states (or in D.C.) and 64 in non-UBE states. Descriptive statistics on selected outcomes and covariates are presented in Table 2, and full data documentation, files, and codes for merging and analysis are available upon request.

Empirical Strategy

To estimate the causal effect of UBE adoption on our outcomes of interest, we leverage an extension of a difference-in-differences (DD) approach. We treat adoption of UBE by states as a natural experiment and exploit variation in this timing by observing institutions in states with UBE before and after adoption and between institutions in UBE and non-UBE states. Given variation in treatment timing, we leverage the DD estimator developed by Callaway and Sant'Anna (2020) that targets the group-time average treatment effect estimand and concurrently estimates event-study parameters. The group-time average treatment effect is a generalized average treatment effect on the treated (ATT) for units treated in time period g (group) at time t, formally shown by

(1) $$ATT(g,t) = E[Y_t(g) - Y_t(0) \mid G = g] .$$

This group-time average treatment effect can be identified for all $t \geq g$, conditional on X covariates, by comparing outcomes for units treated in time period g at time t to never-treated counterfactual units ($C = 1$) at the same time, such that

(2) $$ATT(g,t) = E\left[Y_t - Y_{g-1} \,\middle|\, X,\ G = g\right] - E\left[Y_t - Y_{g-1} \,\middle|\, X,\ C = 1\right] .$$

For all $t = 1, \ldots, \tau$ time periods, the group-time average treatment effect can then be aggregated for units treated in time period g across τ time periods as

(3) $$\theta_S(g) = \frac{1}{\tau - g + 1} \sum_{t=2}^{\tau} \mathbf{1}\{g \leq t\} ATT(g,t) ,$$

allowing impact estimates to be computed separately for units treated at each g period.

The overall treatment estimate can be derived by aggregating across groups with

$$\theta_S^O := \sum_{g=2}^{\tau} \theta_S(g) P(G = g) \,, \quad (4)$$

where θ_S^O is the overall effect of UBE adoption across all institutions in UBE states. Here, we also define treatment as the first academic year in which a UBE exam was administered, not the year in which the policy was adopted or announced.[2] For all estimates, we cluster standard errors at the state (treatment) level to control serial correlation in outcomes (Cameron & Miller, 2015), particularly given the salience of state policy and geography in shaping outcomes for students and institutions (González Canché, 2014, 2017, 2018; Odle, 2021; Odle & Delaney, 2022; Odle & Monday, 2021).

Findings

Results from the DD models are presented in Table 3 alongside 95% confidence intervals. Event-study plots are presented in Online Appendix Figure A1, , including tests of the DD parallel-trends assumption, which do not suggest any systematic differences between UBE and non-UBE states in the pre-treatment period for any outcome of interest.

Admissions. Results suggest state adoption of UBE increased the average number of applications received by a law school by nearly 17% ($e^{0.158} - 1$, approximately 490 more applications). This suggests that UBE adoption may increase prospective students' interest in law school and motivate application (or application to more schools). We do not, however, observe any impacts on selectivity or yield.

Enrollment. Among law school enrollments, we find UBE adoption was associated with an 11% increase in total juris doctor (JD) enrollments, the equivalent of roughly 80 more students

[2] Online Appendix Table A1 presents estimates from models that introduce an additional one-year lag following each state's first UBE administration. The point estimates from our main results are substantively unchanged, though the standard errors for these lagged estimates are larger given fewer post-treatment years.

per institution. Online Appendix Table A2 presents enrollment estimates disaggregated by race and gender. We find suggestive evidence that UBE may have had larger effects on the enrollment of Asian and Black students than the overall population, but our estimates are too imprecisely estimated to draw firm conclusions.

Affordability. We measure affordability in two primary ways. First, we estimate impacts of UBE on full-time law school tuition rates for resident and non-resident students (separately). Second, we compute a direct measure of affordability—net price—by subtracting average grant awards for resident law students from the tuition and fees charged to them. We find that the adoption of UBE was not associated with any change in tuition rates or net price.

Bar Pass Rates. We do not find that UBE positively or negatively affected either state-level or institutional-level average bar passage rates.[3] We interpret this finding in a positive light to suggest that UBE is neither an easier exam (advantaging students in these states with higher pass rates) nor a harder exam (to disadvantage them compared to non-UBE peers). Thus, law schools in UBE and non-UBE states have similar bar passage rates for their cohorts, and states similarly enjoy equal pass rates.

Employment Mobility. We develop two measures for employment mobility of JD graduates. Analytix reports the top three states of employment of JD graduates, with associated counts of graduates employed in each state. Our first measure is therefore the number of JD graduates who work out of state. This likely represents a lower-bound estimate of employment mobility given that students may still be employed in a state that was not part of the top-three group. A second measures is the percent of the total cohort employed in one of these three out-of-

[3] Our data do not allow us to distinguish between pass rates for the UBE and other bar exams at the institutional level. Though UBE represents nearly 63% of all bar exams taken (NCBE, 2021), it is possible a student could take both the UBE and a state or jurisdictional bar exam or either one individually.

state locations. Across our sample, we find that roughly 12% of law graduates migrate out-of-state for work across UBE and non-UBE states. Following UBE adoption, we find no impacts on the number of students employed out of state (our preferred specification, i.e., the lower-bound estimate) but detect negligible reductions in the percent employed out of state by approximately 2.4 percentage points. Because we cannot observe all mobility flows and patterns of graduates, we interpret these findings with caution. It is possible that UBE increased out-of-state migration to states that are not within the top-three group, particularly if those states had lower "passing" scores. This could explain in part why we see a lower share of graduates working in the top-three states (because they are instead working in other, unobservable, out-of-state locations). Conversely, it is possible that UBE decreased out-of-state migration by allowing more portable students to receive higher out-of-state salary offers that they leverage to secure higher-paying, in-state jobs. In all, our results cannot conclusively point to clear impacts of UBE on law students' employment mobility, but even our limited scope suggests that some mobility patterns are affected.

Discussion and Implications

We estimated the causal effects of UBE on admissions, enrollment, affordability, bar passage rates, and employment mobility for graduates of law schools in the United States. This study filled gaps in the literature by providing the first comprehensive examination of the effects of UBE adoption while constructing a new and unique dataset available for future researchers.

Using a DD design, we found early evidence to suggest that institutions in states with UBE enjoy more applications and higher enrollments, with potentially greater impacts for Asian and Black students. These findings shed positive light on the UBE exam as a mechanism to improve prospective students' interest in and access to a legal education. We also found null effects in terms of nonresident tuition and net price, and no evidence of increased selectivity or decreased yield.

Overall, we interpret these findings as positive from the perspective of access and affordability. We also found null impacts on bar passage rates, which we may indicate that UBE neither lowers nor raises the difficulty the test.

In terms of job mobility, we found no real impacts; however, future studies may be better situated to understand UBE impacts on JD degree completion and graduates' labor-market mobility given their ability to observe outcomes many years after UBE adoption. Furthermore, state-by-state variations in UBE adoptions may have also contributed to our findings. One of the key tenants of UBE adoption is the portability of scores across states, particularly for students who may receive a "failing" score in one state. However, because UBE "passing" scores vary more widely in some regions of the U.S., the potential for UBE to promote job mobility also varies and may explain, in part, why we find little evidence to suggest more graduates moved out-of-state following UBE adoption. While we provided an initial investigation of the effect of UBE on job mobility in aggregate terms, future research that observes migration flows between specific states may also add important insights.

Furthermore, while we find initial evidence suggesting that UBE's improved flexibility and portability may expand participation, further research is necessary to gain a fuller understanding of UBE's effects on diversifying access. A key assumption of our analysis is that UBE should incentivize students to apply to and enroll in law school if they are aware of improved job prospects given UBE, yet no measure of students' *a priori* knowledge of UBE exists. Given the high-stakes nature of the bar exam and the potential of UBE to support diversification of the legal profession, future work should seek to measure if students are aware of UBE and if this awareness is equal across racial and gender groups. From a practical standpoint, this also suggests that in order for UBE to diversify access to legal education,

changes in structural policy may need to be accompanied by additional outreach and advising support to help students know of UBE and its implications for their career prospects.

State-level licensing policies and high-stakes licensure examinations interact with graduate and professional educational programs to form pipelines into specific career fields. Through our investigation of the bar exam, one of the highest-stakes licensure examinations, we highlight both its potential and limitations in affecting access and mobility. Given that the legal field is one of the least diverse career fields (Cunningham & Steele, 2015), future research and policy aims should consider additional mechanism to further diversify the profession.

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TABLES

Table 1. *Analytic sample by group and state, including UBE implementation year.*

Treatment			Control	
State/Region	UBE Year	Institutions	State	Institutions
Arizona	2012	2	California	15
Colorado	2012	2	Florida	9
Connecticut	2017	3	Georgia	5
District of Columbia	2016	6	Hawaii	1
Idaho	2012	1	Indiana	3
Iowa	2016	2	Kentucky	3
Kansas	2016	2	Louisiana	4
Maine	2017	1	Michigan	4
Massachusetts	2018	7	Mississippi	2
Minnesota	2014	4	Pennsylvania	6
Montana	2013	1	Nevada	1
Nebraska	2013	2	South Dakota	1
New Hampshire	2014	1	Virginia	8
New Jersey	2017	2	Wisconsin	2
New Mexico	2016	1		
New York	2016	10		
Oregon	2017	3		
South Carolina	2017	2		
Utah	2013	2		
Vermont	2016	1		
Washington	2013	3		
West Virginia	2017	1		
n		59		64

Source: Analytix, IPEDS, and NCBE.

Notes: A total of 37 states plus the District of Columbia have adopted UBE. UBE Year identifies the year of the first UBE examination. Institutions are unique counts of law schools within each state in the dataset. Not all states have law schools in our analytic sample, so not all states may be represented here. Sample excludes state who adopted UBE in 2011 or earlier or in 2019 or later.

Table 2. *Descriptive statistics*.

	Treatment (n=59)		Control (n=64)		Balance
	Mean	SD	Mean	SD	*p*
Outcomes					
Applications	2,868.70	2,361.20	2,974.80	1,715.00	0.778
Admissions Rate	0.39	0.14	0.37	0.15	0.476
Yield	0.28	0.12	0.29	0.11	0.879
Total J.D. Enrollment	742.64	406.42	764.17	437.00	0.778
FT Law Resident Tuition	37,085.00	13,414.00	36,181.00	12,458.00	0.700
Net Price	23,675.00	10,793.00	22,484.00	8,854.90	0.507
State Bar Pass Rate	0.83	0.12	0.79	0.06	0.021
School Bar Pass Rate	0.84	0.15	0.81	0.12	0.234
N Graduates Employed Out-of-State	33.32	48.25	23.19	27.08	0.159
% Graduates Employed Out-of-State	0.13	0.10	0.10	0.09	0.144
Covariates					
Locale: Rural	0.03	0.18	0.08	0.27	0.287
Locale: Town	0.03	0.18	0.05	0.21	0.717
Locale: Suburb	0.05	0.22	0.22	0.42	0.006
Locale: City	0.88	0.33	0.66	0.48	0.003
Institution FTE	16,565.00	13,900.00	16,620.00	13,685.00	0.983
Cohort 75th UG GPA	3.64	0.15	3.61	0.19	0.332
Cohort 75th LSAT Score	161.47	5.67	159.97	6.09	0.158
Percent Receiving Grants	50.55	13.01	46.98	21.64	0.265
Percent Law Minority Faculty	0.13	0.11	0.15	0.11	0.298
County: Percent BA+	0.40	0.10	0.34	0.10	0.003
County: Median Legal Earnings	87,204.00	30,159.00	80,819.00	21,962.00	0.186
County: N Legal Professions	10,157.00	11,653.00	11,047.00	16,924.00	0.733
County: Unemployment Rate	0.08	0.02	0.09	0.02	0.019

Source: Authors' calculations from ACS, Analytix, IPEDS, and NCBE.
Notes: Data are for 2011, the first panel year. Balance test reports p-value on *t*-test for significant differences.

Table 3. *Difference-in-differences estimates of impact of UBE adoption, by outcome category.*

Admissions	Applications [1] 0.1578* (0.0795) [0.0020, 0.3137]	Admission Rate [2] 0.0195 (0.0192) [-0.0182, 0.0572]	Yield [2] -0.0162 (0.0278) [-0.0706, 0.0382]
J.D. Enrollment	Total [1] 0.1060* (0.0494) [0.0092, 0.2028]		
Affordability	Resident Tuition [1] -0.0388 (0.0286) [-0.0949, 0.0173]	Nonresident Tuition [1] -0.0280 (0.0390) [-0.1044, 0.0485]	Net Price [1] -0.0702 (0.3364) [-0.7296, 0.5892]
Bar Passage	State Pass Rate [2] 0.0166 (0.0309) [-0.0440, 0.0772]	School Pass Rate [2] 0.0098 (0.0596) [-0.1070, 0.1266]	
Mobility	Employed Out of State [1] -0.1213 (0.1370) [-0.3898, 0.1471]	Employed Out of State [2] -0.0243* (0.0091) [-0.0420, -0.0065]	

Source: Authors' calculations from ACS, Analytix, IPEDS, and NCBE: 2011-2018.
Notes: [1] log(N) or log($). [2] percent (%). * $p < .05$. N = 984 (campus-by-year). Table reports coefficients, state-level cluster-robust standard errors (in parentheses), and 95% confidence intervals [in brackets]. All models include full covariate controls: institutional locale and overall FTE, law school cohort undergraduate GPA and LSAT score, full-time resident (or non-resident) law tuition rates, percent of law students receiving grants, law school admissions rate, percent of law faculty from racial-minority groups, and county-level educational attainment rate (BA+), median earnings for legal professions, number of legal occupations, and unemployment rate. Estimates generated from Callaway and Sant'Anna (2020) DD estimator.

APPENDIX

Table A1. *Lagged difference-in-differences estimates of impact of UBE adoption.*

Treatment at *t* =	0	+1
Applications [1]	0.1578*	0.1349
	(0.0795)	(0.0749)
Admission Rate [2]	0.0195	0.0318
	(0.0192)	(0.0255)
Yield [2]	-0.0162	-0.0126
	(0.0278)	(0.0229)
J.D. Enrollment [1]	0.1060*	0.1127
	(0.0494)	(0.0591)
Resident Tuition [1]	-0.0388	-0.0335
	(0.0286)	(0.0277)
Nonresident Tuition [1]	-0.0280	-0.0356
	(0.0390)	(0.0686)
Net Price [1]	-0.0702	-0.0577
	(0.3364)	(0.4178)
State Pass Rate [2]	0.0166	0.0230
	(0.0309)	(0.0379)
School Pass Rate [2]	0.0098	0.0079
	(0.0596)	(0.0527)
Employed Out of State (N) [1]	-0.1213	-0.0093
	(0.1370)	(0.1066)
Employed Out of State (%) [2]	-0.0243*	-0.0143
	(0.0091)	(0.0116)

Source: Authors' calculations from ACS, Analytix, IPEDS, and NCBE: 2011-2018.
Notes: [1] log(N) or log($). [2] percent (%). * $p < .05$. N = 984 (campus-by-year). Table reports coefficients and state-level cluster-robust standard errors (in parentheses). All models include full covariate controls: institutional locale and overall FTE, law school cohort undergraduate GPA and LSAT score, full-time resident (or non-resident) law tuition rates, percent of law students receiving grants, law school admissions rate, percent of law faculty from racial-minority groups, and county-level educational attainment rate (BA+), median earnings for legal professions, number of legal occupations, and unemployment rate. Estimates generated from Callaway and Sant'Anna (2020) DD estimator. Treatment at *t*=0 defined as the first academic year in which UBE was *administered* within a state; +1 represents an additional academic-year lag.

Table A2. *Difference-in-differences estimates of impact of UBE adoption on J.D. enrollment, overall, by race, and by gender.*

J.D. Enrollment	Total	BIPOC	Hispanic
	0.1060*	0.0994	0.0008
	(0.0494)	(0.2062)	(0.1213)
	[0.0092, 0.2028]	[-0.3046, 0.5035]	[-0.2369, 0.2385]
	Black	Asian	Female
	0.1970	0.1895	0.0974*
	(0.4235)	(0.2429)	(0.0478)
	[-0.6330, 1.0270]	[-0.2866, 0.6656]	[0.0037, 0.1912]

Source: Authors' calculations from ACS, Analytix, IPEDS, and NCBE: 2011-2018.
Notes: Outcomes are log(N). * $p < .05$. N = 984 (campus-by-year). Table reports coefficients, state-level cluster-robust standard errors (in parentheses), and 95% confidence intervals [in brackets]. All models include full covariate controls: institutional locale and overall FTE, law school cohort undergraduate GPA and LSAT score, full-time resident (or non-resident) law tuition rates, percent of law students receiving grants, law school admissions rate, percent of law faculty from racial-minority groups, and county-level educational attainment rate (BA+), median earnings for legal professions, number of legal occupations, and unemployment rate. Estimates generated from Callaway and Sant'Anna (2020) DD estimator. BIPOC includes all non-white students.

Figure A1. *Event-study estimates of UBE adoption.*



Source: Authors' calculations from ACS, Analytix, IPEDS, and NCBE: 2011-2018.
Notes: Figures plot group-time average treatment effect point estimates at different lengths of exposure, bounded by 95% confidence intervals. X-axis is years from UBE adoption. Orange points identify pre-treatment; teal is post-treatment. Plots produced via Callaway and Sant'Anna (2020) DD estimator.

Figure A1 (Continued). *Event-study estimates of UBE adoption.*



Source: Authors' calculations from ACS, Analytix, IPEDS, and NCBE: 2011-2018.
Notes: Figures plot group-time average treatment effect point estimates at different lengths of exposure, bounded by 95% confidence intervals. X-axis is years from UBE adoption. Orange points identify pre-treatment; teal is post-treatment. Plots produced via Callaway and Sant'Anna (2020) DD estimator.