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RECENT HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES

1865—1927.

BY

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The History of the American Frontier

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Revised and Enlarged Edition



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PREFACE

THIS book describes the transition of the United States from an agricultural civilization to one of industry, from a state of isolation to one of world eminence, from an America with European creditors to an America whose capital and influence penetrate the world. It is a history of the age we live in, taking up its story at the moment when the fighting of the Civil War ceased and the patriotic unities that had maintained the Nation were able to relax. It portrays the emergence of a new nation against the American background. None can as yet describe or foretell the ultimate shape which that new nation will assume; but it is already obvious that in the period since the Civil War we are dealing with a new era in American history, in which there is generally lacking the dominant and moulding influence of the open West. I have elsewhere considered this earlier theme in *The History of the American Frontier*: the parts of this present volume which most clearly present the contrast have to do with the rise and organization of an industrial society.

FREDERIC L. PAXSON

MADISON, WISCONSIN

CONTENTS

CHAPTER I. THE CONTROL OF THE UNION I

The right to secede — Changing status of the State — Fruits of victory — Meaning of Reconstruction — End of the Civil War — Restoration — Home rule — The army — Financial reconstruction — The Civil War in politics — Population of the sections — Lincoln's theory of the Union — The rival theories — Congress and Lincoln — Andrew Johnson — Republican radicals — Congress in control — The veto and the two thirds — Reconstruction Acts — Fourteenth Amendment — Tenure of office — Impeachment of Johnson — Grant — Bibliographical note.

CHAPTER II. READJUSTMENT 20

Civil War and the idea of nationality — Frontier and post-frontier — Far West — The mineral empire — The Indian problem — Sioux War of 1862 — Sand Creek, 1864 — Fort Phil Kearney, 1866 — Railroad-building and the Indians — Union Pacific — Middle Western development — Frontier finance — Deflation — Greenbacks — Greenback movement — The "Ohio Idea" — Election of 1868 — Railroad control — Panic of 1873 — Frontier economics — Jay Cooke — Granger movement — Diplomatic reconstruction — Mexico — Alabama claims — Santo Domingo and Alaska — Greeley and the Liberal Republicans — Crédit Mobilier — Frauds — Anti-Republican drift — Greenbackers — Tilden — Hayes — Electoral contest, 1876 — Bibliographical note.

CHAPTER III. AMERICAN THOUGHT 49

Education in the American life — Johns Hopkins and the educational renaissance — College education — The Morrill Act: educational endowment — Denominational colleges — The women's colleges — Southern education — Educational saturation — The new school of letters — The magazines — Mark Twain — Henry James — Children's literature — The negro theme — The European visitor — Era of the centennials — The frontier of history — Bibliographical note.

CHAPTER IV. STALWART AND HALF-BREED 65

The Hayes Administration — The Hayes policies — The Senate in revolt — Home Rule in the South — Status of the army — Canada — Mexico — Custer and the Sioux — Railroad strikes, 1877 — Labor movement — The "Molly Maguires" — Strikes of 1877 — New social theories — Factions of Republican Party — Hayes and the New York "stalwarts" — The Grant third-term boom — Blaine, Sherman, or Grant, 1880 — Garfield and Arthur — Greenback Party

— General Hancock and the Democrats — The Garfield Cabinet — Conkling and the patronage — Murder of Garfield — Chester A. Arthur — Bibliographical note.

CHAPTER V. THE MATERIAL BASIS 91

Economic realities — Silver coinage — The "crime of 1873" — Silver and the frontier — Free coinage demand — Bland-Allison Act, 1878 — Resumption of specie payments — The Greenback opposition — Organized discontent — Democrats and election frauds — Resumption, January 2, 1879 — The new prosperity — The continental railroads — Henry Villard — Disappearance of the frontier — Standard time — Railroad saturation — Star route frauds — Garfield and the Hubbell letter — Transportation and monopoly — John D. Rockefeller — Oil — Telegraph and telephone — Other inventions — The New South — The money kings — American society — Bibliographical note.

CHAPTER VI. GROVER CLEVELAND 120

Prosperity — Republican losses — The tariff situation — Tariff reform or free trade — Treasury surplus — The tariff an issue — Tariff Act of 1883 — Arthur's Administration — The spoils system — Civil service reform — John G. Carlisle — Butler and the reformers — James Gillespie Blaine — The Irish vote — Blaine and the Muligan letters — The "mugwump" threat — Blaine and Logan — Grover Cleveland — "Rum, Romanism, and rebellion" — Panic of 1884 — The death of U. S. Grant — The Cleveland Government — Pensions — Frauds in the public lands — Homestead system — Illegal enclosures — Forfeiture of the railroad land grants — Bibliographical note.

CHAPTER VII. THE FRONTIER AND ITS AFTERMATH 149

The cow country — Railroads and farm competition — Plains cattle — The "long drive" — Packing industries — Northern ranches — Enclosures — Organization of cattle-men — Railroad regulation — *Munn vs. Illinois*, 1877 — Interstate Commerce Act, 1887 — Department of Agriculture — Substitutes for the frontier outlet — The "Wild West" — The "Greatest Show on Earth" — Urbanization — Rise of sport — John L. Sullivan — Organized baseball — The country club — Bicycles — Tennis — The changing social outlook — Standard of life — Knights of Labor — Immigrant ideas — Henry George and the single tax — Labor parties — Western railroad strikes — Social visions — The crowded cities — Social relief — Bibliographical note.

CHAPTER VIII. THE PARTY OF PROTECTION 176

Cleveland and the "dead center" — Attacks on tariff system — The tariff a major issue — The Mills Bill Debate, 1888 — Cleveland renominated — Benjamin Harrison — Status of "reform" — The "rebel" flags — The Murchison letter — Ballot reform — The Harrison Administration — Reed and the Fifty-First Congress — The doctrine of protection — The McKinley Bill — Silver Purchase Bill, 1890 — Pensions — The attack on the trusts — Sherman Anti-Trust Bill, 1890 — Republican defeat, November, 1890 — Bibliographical note.

- CHAPTER IX. THE FARMERS' WEST 195
- Western demands on Congress — Development of the Territories — Dakota — Politics and statehood — The "Omnibus" Bill, 1889 — Oklahoma — Utah — Railroad saturation and overproduction — Farmers' Alliance — Hard times on the plains — Populism — Free silver — Southern alliances — Ocala Conference — Cincinnati Convention — The People's Party Convention, 1892 — The Harrison Administration — Chilean affair — Italian diplomatic breach — Blaine — Harrison and Reid — The nomination of Cleveland — Democratic victory, 1892 — Bibliographical note.
- CHAPTER X. THE PANIC OF 1893 222
- The falling price of silver — Status of Treasury — Panic of 1893 — The Democrats and the panic — Bimetallism — The gold reserve — Repeal of the Silver Purchase Act — Clash of classes — Party realignment — Chicago's World Fair, 1893 — Steel — The Homestead strike — Debs and the American Railway Union — The courts and the strikes — The army and the strikes — The Democratic program, 1893 — Altgeld, of Illinois — Growth of Populism — Disappearance of the surplus — The Cleveland bond issues — The Wilson Tariff Bill, 1894 — Income tax — Venezuela boundary dispute — The new navy — Bibliographical note.
- CHAPTER XI. PROTECTION AND THE GOLD STANDARD . . . 250
- The party issues — Protection — Hanna and McKinley — Nomination of McKinley — Democrats and free silver — The gold plank — William Jennings Bryan — The Populist Convention — The Gold Democrats — Canvass of 1896 — The "G.O.P." — Prosperity returns — John Sherman and John Hay — Alger — The Dingley Tariff Bill, 1897 — Reform in the "G.O.P." — Bibliographical note.
- CHAPTER XII. THE WAR WITH SPAIN 269
- Sherman in the State Department — Yellow journalism — Cuban insurrection, 1895 — Woodford at Madrid — The Maine destroyed — Naval mobilization — The war with Spain — Manila, May 1, 1898 — Hawaii and the Panama Canal — The army — The Fifty Million Act — Tampa — Sampson and the blockade of Cuba — Santiago invested — Shafter and the army — Advance on Santiago — Battle of July 1-3, 1898 — Naval battle of Santiago — Army morale — Armistice — The Peace Commission at Paris — The Philippines — Congressional election of 1898 — Rise of Theodore Roosevelt — Bibliographical note.
- CHAPTER XIII. THE AGE OF ROOSEVELT 298
- The new statesmen — Quay — Currency Act of 1900 — Prosperity and the trusts — Democrats in 1900 — McKinley and Roosevelt — Gold standard and imperialism — Murder of McKinley — Theodore Roosevelt — Reform in politics — Letters and sport — The new era — Contrasting theories of representation — The office of President — Hanna — Booker T. Washington — Strikes — Labor and public opinion — Bibliographical note.

- CHAPTER XIV. THE NEW IMPERIALISM 316
- Roosevelt, Hay, and Root — The "open door" — Panama Canal problems — Hay-Pauncefote Treaty, 1901 — Hay-Herran Treaty — The Panama secession — Goethals and the canal — Venezuela intervention — The Monroe Doctrine — Santo Domingo — Root in the War Department — Porto Rico — Cuba — The Philippines — Reorganization of War Department — General Staff — The world cruise — The fleet of 1907 — Taft in the War Department — Treaty of Portsmouth — Conference at Algeciras — Second Hague Conference — Declaration of London — Bibliographical note.
- CHAPTER XV. BUSINESS IN POLITICS 338
- Railroads and prosperity — Edward H. Harriman — Union and Southern Pacific merger — Northern Pacific panic, May 9, 1901 — Mergers — United States Steel Corporation — Integration — Sherman Anti-Trust Act — The Northern Securities Company — Anti-trust legislation, 1903 — Department of Commerce and Labor — Cuban reciprocity — Anthracite strike, 1902 — Elections of 1902 — Reform — Tariff reduction — Joseph G. Cannon — Hanna and the presidency — The "Wisconsin idea" — Roosevelt and Fairbanks — Alton B. Parker — Campaign contributions — Bibliographical note.
- CHAPTER XVI. MUCKRAKING AND THE NEW STANDARDS . 356
- Opportunity in America — Exposure of trusts — New journalism — S. S. McClure — Ida M. Tarbell — The muckrakers — Literary taste — Drama — Music — Religion and social spirit — Wealth and the Foundations — Trend of the Universities — Government by experts — Federal civil service — Bibliographical note.
- CHAPTER XVII. THE EXTENSION OF GOVERNMENT CONTROL 369
- Immigration — Northern Securities Case — Interstate commerce — The conservative Senate — The Hepburn Railroad Law — Pure Food Act — Oklahoma admitted — Roosevelt panic, 1907 — Aldrich-Vreeland Act — Conservation — Control of water rights — Forests — Conservation conference — Bureau of Mines — Bibliographical note.
- CHAPTER XVIII. WILLIAM HOWARD TAFT 387
- Republican factions — The third term — Taft and his rivals — Taft and Sherman, 1908 — Death of Grover Cleveland — Bryan and Kern — Hearst and Debs — Canvass of 1908 — William H. Taft — The Cabinet — Tariff problem — Payne-Aldrich Tariff, 1909 — The Sixteenth Amendment: Income tax — The insurgent Republicans — Western political revolt — The Ballinger controversy — Bibliographical note.
- CHAPTER XIX. INSURGENCY 405
- Schism — Cannon and "stand-pat" — Political reform — Seventeenth Amendment: direct election of Senators — Aim of insurgency — Fight on power of Speaker Cannon — Taft and progressive

policies — Arizona and New Mexico — Alaska — Railroad legislation — Postal savings — Isthmus affairs — Panama Canal — Latin-America — Canadian fisheries — The arbitration treaties — James Bryce — Carnegie and peace — Supreme Court — Return of Roosevelt — “New Nationalism” — A Democratic Congress — Champ Clark, Speaker — Canadian reciprocity — The Progressive Republicans — The fight on Taft — La Follette and the Progressives — Roosevelt a candidate — The convention and the direct primary — Renomination of Taft — Democratic opportunity — Woodrow Wilson — The Progressive Party — The canvass of 1912 — Election of Wilson — Bibliographical note.

CHAPTER XX. WOODROW WILSON 432

A minority President — Bryan and the Cabinet — Wilson policies — Re-arrangement of Congress — Underwood-Simmons Tariff — Finance — The money trust — Federal Reserve System — Continuous session — Anti-trust policies — Federal Trade Commission — Department of Labor — Children's Bureau — Workmen's compensation — Coöperation with the States — Seamen's Act — Critical journalism — The Philippines — Discipline — The Labor threat — Cost of living — Gompers and the Labor Movement — Socialism — Syndicalism — State Police — The I.W.W. — Pacifism — Americanization — Woman suffrage — Non-Partisan League — Bibliographical note.

CHAPTER XXI. “HE KEPT US OUT OF WAR” 462

Bryan and the Wilson Administration — Mexican affairs — The “Mobile Doctrine” — Canal diplomacy — Intervention at Vera Cruz — Repeal of toll exemption — Bryan peace treaties — Caribbean relations — The World War — Neutrality — Propaganda and public opinion — Emergency legislation — Democratic victory, 1914 — Neutral rights — Submarine warfare — The Lusitania — Wilson and preparedness — Pacifism — German intrigue — The Sussex Case — National Defense Act, 1916 — Naval program — The Progressives in 1916 — Nomination of Hughes — Hyphenism — Reëlection of Wilson and Marshall — Bibliographical note.

CHAPTER XXII. THE WAR OF 1917 493

The war in 1916 — German peace overture — Wilson and peace — German submarine warfare — The breach with Germany — Armed merchant ships — The “little group of willful men” — Senate closure — Russian Revolution — The war session of Congress — The Government in war time — Council of National Defense — Labor and socialism — Committee on Public Information — “Ships will win the war” — “Food will win the war” — Herbert C. Hoover — Production of munitions — Finance: “Pay as you go” — Loans to Allies — Officers and men — Selective service — Pershing and the A.E.F. — Foreign missions — The American army on the western front — Services of Supply — The National Army — Registration — Training camps — The Roosevelt Division — Espionage — Liability, allowance, allotment, insurance — Bibliographical note.

- CHAPTER XXIII. THE AMERICAN WAR GOVERNMENT:
 WORK OR FIGHT 525
- Embargo and neutral trade — War Trade Board — Alien Property Custodian — Food and Fuel control — War revenue — War expenses — Civil organization and coöperation — Anti-war — The crisis of the war — "Priority" — War Industries Board — War service committees — Transportation — Railroad administration — Demand for a Munitions Ministry — Overman Act — The war boards — The Battle of 1918 — Labor backs the war — Government activities — Labor policies — "Work or fight" — Baruch and the War Industries Board — Requirements — War Finance Corporation — Army reorganization — General Staff — Eighteen to forty-five draft — Bibliographical note.
- CHAPTER XXIV. PEACE AND THE LEAGUE 554
- Basis of peace — The Fourteen Points — International socialism — Russia withdraws — Coöperation among Allies — Inter-Ally Finance Council — Preparations for peace — Supreme War Council — The unified program — German drive, March, 1918 — Status of the A.E.F. — Battle of 1918 — Training the A.E.F. — Cantigny — The second Marne — Château-Thierry — Foch's counter-attack — The Allied offensives — The First American Army — Saint-Mihiel — Preparations for 1919 — The Meuse-Argonne — Collapse of Germany — The Armistice, November 11, 1918 — Congressional election, 1918 — Reorganization of Republican Party — Demobilization — The Peace Commission — Wilson in Europe — The "Big Four" — Covenant of the League of Nations — Reaction in the United States — American Legion — Economic demobilization — Bibliographical note.
- CHAPTER XXV. THE NEW ENVIRONMENT 587
- "Reconstruction" — Post-war society — Air, earth, and water — Aviation — Wireless — North and South Poles — Motor cars — Highways — The shifting life — Movies — Theaters — Standard of living — Literature of pessimism — Prohibition — Eighteenth Amendment — "Boot-legging" — Ku Klux Klan — Fundamentalism.
- CHAPTER XXVI. THE RETURN TO NORMALCY 606
- Self-determination — The Treaty of Versailles — The Senate and the treaty — Wilson and the Republican Congress — Collapse of Wilson — Unsettlement — Strikes of 1919 — Radicalism — Communism and socialism — The Nineteenth Amendment: woman suffrage — International finance — Esch-Cummins Railroad Act, 1920 — The Treaty issue in politics — The Hoover boom — Harding and Coolidge — The Army Act, 1920 — Merchant marine — Cox and Roosevelt — Deflation — Canvass of 1920 — Significance of election — Budget reform — The agricultural bloc — Veterans' bonus — The foreign debts — Public opinion — Colombia Treaty settlement — Yap and the mandates — End of World War — Limitation of armaments — Treaties of Washington — Bibliographical note.

CHAPTER XXVII. THE CONTROL OF THE GOVERNMENT . 637

The Harding majority — Philosophies of government — The “good men” theory — Government by experts — Class struggle — Western uneasiness — Elections of 1922 — Tariff, bonus, and budget — Farmer-Labor — The “Lame Duck” session — “Normalcy” — World unrest — Coolidge — Scandals — Immigration restriction — Coolidge and Dawes, 1924 — Davis and Bryan — La Follette — Election results — The new personnel — Cabinet rearrangements — The third term — Finance — Agricultural relief — Problem of the farmers’ surplus — McNary-Haugen Bill — Foreign policies — League of Nations — The foreign debts — World Court — Imperialism — Panama — Nicaragua — Mexico — China — Naval limitation — Lindbergh — Bibliographical note.

INDEX i

LIST OF MAPS

THE UNITED STATES IN 1870	<i>between pages</i> 20, 21
ORGANIZATION OF THE WEST, 1850-1854	23
THE CARIBBEAN	287
THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS	293
THE AMERICAN BASE IN FRANCE	517
THE BATTLE OF 1918	565
THE UNITED STATES IN 1920	<i>between pages</i> 588, 589

RECENT HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES

CHAPTER I

THE CONTROL OF THE UNION

FROM the close of the Revolution until the outbreak of the Civil War in 1861, there was never a time when, in one part of the United States or another, respectable and influential men were not ready to debate the success of the American experiment, and to balance the profits to be gained by staying in the Union with those to be anticipated in the event of a withdrawal. The right of withdrawal was at least an open question. Webster's oration upon "liberty and union, one and inseparable," thundered upon one side of it, but upon the other was the fact that weighty men had time and again expressed the belief that the States might properly be the judges of their own destiny. The Supreme Court had indeed laid down doctrines whose logical implication was the right of the Government of the United States to maintain its integrity by force; but business was not yet nationalized, nor had life ceased to be sectional with wide diversities of civilization prevailing among the various regions. In actual fact citizenship in the States was real, while citizenship in the United States had not yet been defined.

Abraham Lincoln, in the years of his presidency, discovered how many and how genuine were the doubts as to the power to coerce a protesting State. The fact that he maintained the Union by logic, by patriotism, by political manipulation, and by brute force gives his Administration its historical meaning. The Union was saved in 1865, and before another occasion could arise to test again the ability of a State or a region to withdraw from it, a new nation was

brought into existence in the United States, bound together with bonds that knew no lines between the States, and served by a citizenship whose nationality was defined in the Constitution itself, and whose preference was to call itself American. The habit of life, moreover, as the revolution in industry and communication drew the United States into a network of overlapping interests, made citizenship in any single State a less and less significant matter; while the State itself fell gradually away from its sovereign character, and irresistibly approached the status of an administrative subdivision. Many of the results of the Civil War are still subject for dispute; but there is no difference of opinion that the Union existed, and that the control of it was the vital matter in men's minds.

The facts of Reconstruction, and the living principles behind them, are to be understood only in the light of this primary problem of control. For three presidential administrations after Lincoln's death, from 1865 to 1877, there was a widespread fear that the fruits of victory might be lost, and that national destiny might fall within the control of those who had sought to wreck it. For three more administrations (1877-89) there was pretended fear of this, advanced for party purposes, but its hold was weak upon the generation of Americans who could not recall the struggle from Sumter to Appomattox. And half a century rolled round after the surrender of Lee to Grant without producing any Democratic candidate for the presidency who was able to win election on a clear issue, and without schismatic politics among the Republicans to help him. There was vindictive spirit displayed by the victorious North toward the beaten South; there were selfish interests masking behind patriotic make-up; but these, and most of their incidents, were subordinate to the fundamental fact that the winning of the Civil War entailed a responsibility to keep it won, and that in this responsibility the control of the Union through the control of its central Government was the largest single factor.

The period of Reconstruction has been badly named. The word in its normal meaning implies a restoration of that which had existed before the attempt at secession, but there was little of Reconstruction in this sense. The Constitution of the United States was modified by three amendments which altered much of its meaning; the life of the North and West advanced along new paths that were hardly visible before 1861; the South, bankrupt and discouraged, with a new social order forced upon it, adjusted itself to what was for it a revolution, and was obliged to see its planter aristocracy retreat before the advancing masters of industry and capital. But Reconstruction, however understood, began only when the war came to an end and ended only when the South had come again to share in the affairs of the Union as a full and free participant. If one could fix with accuracy the moment of the ending of the Civil War, he might determine the initial point in Reconstruction; but the Civil War did not end at any instant, and there is a long period of overlap with certain phases of life governed chiefly by the past, and certain others looking toward the future.

Meaning
of Recon-
struction

Around the margins of the Confederacy the Civil War began to end as soon as the victorious Union armies cleared away the power of the Confederate Government and maintained their lines permanently within the territory of seceded States. Western Virginia was liberated early in the Civil War, was reconstructed as the new State of West Virginia, and was admitted to the Union in the summer of 1863. Parts of Tennessee lay within the Union lines from an early date in 1862. Louisiana ceased to be an asset to the Confederacy after the occupation of New Orleans and the erection of a military government there, and became a liability when Vicksburg fell and the Mississippi River was restored to Union control. Other portions of the South had a phase of Reconstruction that began before it was certain who would win the war. And for all the South the surrender of the armies of Lee, on April 9, 1865, marked the last date upon which

End of the
Civil War

any Southerner could hope for victory. From this moment civil Reconstruction starts.

It was five years after the surrender of Lee before the last of the eleven States that had comprised the Confederacy was admitted to that share in the Union to which members of the United States are entitled. This was not a long period in comparison with the eight years, 1918-26, which Germany was required to wait after the World War before receiving full membership in the League of Nations. But it was a long time for a grown community of Americans to be deprived of full self-government. The conflict of policies between North and South, between factions in the North, and between the Congress of the United States and the President, that prolonged this period and made it more bitter than the Civil War itself, gives emphasis to these years as the period of political Reconstruction. Mississippi, Texas, and Georgia, last of the States, received full recognition from Congress only in the summer of 1870, and their Senators and Representatives were admitted to seats in Congress in the winter of 1871. Mere restoration was thus accomplished; but the governments prevailing in the Southern States were not yet entirely their own.

Home rule in the South was even longer delayed. The result of Reconstruction policies was to disfranchise much of the white population that had carried through the secession movement, and to create a political majority dominated by the freed negroes, led by white Republicans, and loyal to the party that claimed to have bestowed the freedom. But there could be no stable home rule with the literate South at the mercy of the blacks. In the five years after the completion of political restoration, the Southern whites asserted themselves, encouraged and freed by a growing conviction in the North that Reconstruction had gone too far. By an enterprising mixture of force and fraud, by an intimidation of negroes to keep them from voting and by a discovery of ways to keep from counting their votes when cast, State after

State overthrew black domination and carpet-bag rule. In 1876 the last of the States so freed themselves, and placed their political control in the hands of the steadier elements of the community, and came into home rule the following winter.

In proportion as the restoration of home rule became a fact, the military grip of the United States Government upon the Southern area was relaxed. After the demobilization of the volunteer part of the ^{The army} Civil War army, the regular army of the United States had as its two chief tasks the maintenance of peace on the western border, and the protection in the South of the new rights of the freedmen. It was an offensive novelty in the United States to have a permanent garrison residing in any part of the country with active local duties respecting the white population. The North disliked it and the South resented it. But this aftermath of the Civil War remained a fact for twelve years after the surrender of Lee. In 1877 President Hayes redistributed the troops of the remaining garrisons in the South, and the whole of the country was again under civilian rule. Not until this time can the military side of the Civil War be said to be completely at an end.

The financial derangements brought about by the Civil War lasted even longer than the anomaly of military rule. It is a debated question whether the use of ^{Financial} legal-tender greenbacks was an unavoidable ^{reconstruc-} means of financing the struggle. At any rate, ^{tion} in 1865, the greenbacks had depreciated so far below their theoretical value (and gold was therefore at so high a premium), that the high prices which the war must in any event have produced were magnified by the low value of the currency in which they were expressed. To deflate or not became an embarrassing political and sectional question. Deflation would probably have been impossible had not the United States maintained a high level of prosperity. The actual war was ten years gone before Congress, in 1875, passed a Resumption Act, directing the Treasury Depart-

ment to prepare to resume the redemption of greenbacks in gold in 1879; and not until this resumption of specie payments took place on January 2, 1879, was the Civil War over in this field of activity.

Another measure of the duration of the Civil War, in its control upon the imagination of the people, is to be found in the trend of politics. During the war itself, the Republican Party conducted the Administration, although it was obliged to mask itself as the Union Party in the presidential election of 1864 in order to secure the needed votes of war Democrats. The Democratic Party lost prestige as the party of opposition to the war. Its Southern members were discredited because of their activity in the Confederacy. And peace came with one of the major parties identified with the idea of Union and patriotism and the other with the idea of opposition and secession. It was a long time before this antithesis ceased to be a vote-getter in national elections. In the three elections, 1876, 1880, and 1884, the margins of Republican strength weakened, and the "bloody shirt" (as the war issue had come to be called) was waved with decreasing result. In 1884, for the first time since the election of James Buchanan, the Democratic Party, with all its disabilities, was given control of the Executive Government of the United States. By this time the new nation was proceeding at top speed along its new course, and the Civil War was becoming a matter of romantic recollection.

In this prolonged struggle for the control of the Union that had been maintained between 1861 and 1865, the weight of sections and their own internal differences were of prime importance.

Secession took place a few months after the census of 1860 had reported a total population of 31,443,321 for the United States. All but a few of these persons lived within the thirty-three States that comprised the Union; and only 9,149,215, or 29 per cent, resided in the eleven States that attempted to secede. The disproportion between the sections becomes even

The Civil
War in
politics

Population
of the
sections

greater when the negroes are disregarded, for there was a Union population of over twenty million against a white Confederate population of about five million. The disproportion increased. At the next census in 1870, the total population of 38,558,371 had grown 22 per cent in the decade; whereas the southern part of it was only 9,549,877, showing an increase of less than 4½ per cent. The price of the attempt to secede was not only defeat and rule by the victorious Union, but also a retardation of growth that increased the disproportion between the sections and gave to the North and West a preponderance that could control all matters of politics if only the votes of the North and West could be held together. The difficulties of doing this served to complicate the control of the Union during Reconstruction.

The reëlection of President Lincoln on the Union ticket in 1864 revealed the difficulties in holding North and West together, to control the South. In spite of the new name of his party, he received only 2,200,000 votes against the 1,800,000 that went to General George B. McClellan, the Democratic candidate. It was not unreasonable to suppose that if the South had been voting at this time it would have given to McClellan enough votes to swing his election. The proportions of the vote gave to Union politicians food for thought as to what might happen after the war in case the Confederate States should be allowed at once to resume their old relations in the Union. Whether this should occur, or not, had already been under discussion, and President Lincoln had been opposed by influential elements in his own party upon his theory of Reconstruction.

Lincoln believed that the Union was indissoluble; that it was hence intact; that the Confederate conspiracy was merely impeding the normal workings of the Federal Government and that whenever insurrection should cease the States would automatically revert to their usual but now disregarded rights. He thought that it was his function as President to suppress insurrection and enforce the law; and that when in his judg-

Lincoln's
theory of
the Union

ment the law was being properly enforced the States might be regarded as reconstructed. Upon this theory he acted, creating temporary governments in the rear of the Union armies in the South: and thus learning to know the great political powers of Andrew Johnson, of Tennessee, a Democrat and self-made Southerner, who, while Lincoln's Governor of Tennessee, revealed himself as a commanding Unionist. Johnson became Lincoln's associate upon the Union ticket of 1864, and Vice-President of the United States on March 4, 1865. If Tennessee was not still in the Union, it was hard to see how he could rightfully be Vice-President; if it was in the Union, it was as hard to understand how the exclusion of Tennessee Senators and Representatives from Congress could be lawful or constitutional.

The opponents of Lincoln in his own party fixed their eyes upon the practical consideration that it would be unreasonable for the Union majority to endanger their continued control of the Government by admitting the ex-Confederates at once. They had been willing to support Lincoln's theory of an indissoluble Union while it was a matter of coercing the secessionists; now they divided, and some of them viewed the South as conquered territory subject in all matters to the will of the conqueror, and quite outside the protection of the Constitution. Thaddeus Stevens, of Pennsylvania, inclined to this view, and had the radical Republicans of the House of Representatives generally with him in the years of contest that were to come. Others of the radicals, like Charles Sumner, of Massachusetts, who was to dominate the Senate, thought that by the act of insurrection the Confederate States had lost their character as States, had virtually committed State suicide, and had relapsed into the condition of Territories of the United States, from which Congress might readmit them to statehood, at pleasure, and on its own terms. A bill for Reconstruction, embodying the theory of the radical Republicans who proposed to hold tight to the control of the Union for the present, was brought forward

and passed by Congress in the summer before the election of 1864. It came to Lincoln late in the session, and he refused to sign or veto it; and it disappeared by the process of "pocket-veto." Its sponsors, Benjamin F. Wade, of Ohio, and Henry Winter Davis, of Massachusetts, attacked Lincoln in a public manifesto in August, 1864; maintaining that his conduct involved a "studied outrage on the legislative authority of the people." There was thus a wide breach between the points of view for nearly a year before Reconstruction upon a large scale became inevitable. The factional warfare was not revived at the short session of Congress beginning in December, 1864; and before the next Congress, the Thirty-Ninth, which had been elected with Lincoln in 1864, met for its first session, it was too late for his great power of accommodation to close the breach. In his second inaugural he urged the country to approach the problem "with malice toward none, with charity for all"; but before the national jubilation at Lee's surrender had run its course he was murdered, and Andrew Johnson, of Tennessee, was President of the United States. Between April 14, and the meeting of the Thirty-Ninth Congress in December, 1865, the law-making power of the United States was in recess, and the new President, with his large power as commander-in-chief of the army, was in complete control of the preliminary processes of Reconstruction.

It is as impossible to say what Lincoln would have done with Reconstruction had he lived, as it is to say what Woodrow Wilson would have done with the peace of the world had he continued through his presidency in the enjoyment of full power and mental strength. That Lincoln and Congress were at outs is certain; and that the Republican leaders in Congress were determined to hold tight to their control of the processes of Reconstruction had been made as clear to him as the intention of the Republican leaders of 1918 to dominate the peace was made clear to Wilson. But Lincoln was a master politician as well as a profound and humane statesman and might have found a means to minimize the disasters of

Congress
and
Lincoln

Reconstruction had the murderer spared him. His successor came embittered out of the poor-white class of the Old South, and had nothing in common with the Republican Party that elected him to the office of Vice-President except his intense loyalty to the Union. With the war tension over, his instincts were anti-Republican, and his very existence in the White House seemed to the Republicans to deprive them of the fruits of their victory in 1864. To this President Johnson added a violent temper, an inability to take punishment gracefully, and personal habits that were not worse than those of many of his contemporaries, but which caused serious misgivings now that he was President. It was commonly stated and believed that he was drunk when inaugurated Vice-President on March 4, 1865; and his vituperative harangues of political audiences, after he succeeded to the presidency, suggested to many that he was an undignified if not dangerous occupant of that office. The trend of historical investigation into his career has been steadily to elevate the conception of his fundamental character and statesmanship; but to his contemporaries and his political opponents he became a hated and implacable obstruction to the control of the Union by the party that prided itself on having won the war.

Andrew Johnson retained Lincoln's Cabinet, some of them until his term expired in 1869, and from William H. Seward, Secretary of State, he received loyal and continuous support. His policies were not much different from those that Lincoln had expressed, so far as actual Reconstruction was concerned. He believed it to be an executive function, and that Congress had no right to treat the Southern States as either "dead" or conquered. He began at once to organize provisional governments for the Confederate States, offering general pardon and amnesty to the ordinary members of the Confederacy on their taking oath of allegiance to the United States, and promising special pardons even to the leaders of the lost cause, upon special application. His proclamations directed the provisional governors to call conventions elected by the

loyal population of the South; and these conventions were to complete the work of Reconstruction by repealing their ordinances of secession and repudiating all debts created for Confederate purposes. The proposed Thirteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, which abolished slavery, was to be ratified.

The radical members of the Republican Party, in Congress and out, watched the steps in this presidential Reconstruction with growing anger and dismay, for there was nothing in it to indicate that leaders ^{Republican} radicals were to be punished, or that there was to be a period of probation before the very men who had fought against the Union should come back and resume their seats in Congress. It was thus a satisfaction to these radicals when the Southern conventions and legislatures appeared to be unaware that they were being treated with generosity or that the South had lost the war. The men who were elected were largely chosen from the pre-war governing group. They did indeed repudiate the Confederate debt and ratify the amendment abolishing slavery (which Seward proclaimed as in force, December 18, 1865); but they took up the question of reconstituting social relations in a spirit that affronted Northern opinion. Their new "black codes" and vagrancy laws, passed for the government of the former slaves and to replace the now obsolete slave codes, placed so many restrictions upon freedom of life for the negroes that they seemed to involve a substantial restoration of slavery itself. And by the time Congress met for its regular session in December, 1865, the radicals were more determined than ever to prevent presidential Reconstruction from succeeding.

Johnson defended his policy toward the South in his annual message to Congress; defended it so convincingly and so moderately as to arouse suspicion that he could not have written the message himself. It was later revealed that he did not write it, but that George Bancroft, a sturdy Democrat and the leading American historian of the day, had been called upon to do it for him. But it failed to con-

vince the Congress, whose leaders studied ways and means of defeating his intentions. As the strategy of control was examined, it was seen that it would be much easier to block Johnson than to enforce the theory of the radicals in Congress.

Under the Constitution, each house of Congress is sole judge of "the elections, returns, and qualifications" of its members. It is thereby impossible for any member-elect to exercise the powers of his office unless his colleagues permit him to take his seat; and every Southern delegation chosen under the terms of President Johnson's proclamations was thus at the mercy of the majority of members already in their seats. Through this strangle-hold of the situation, and through the power of Congress to control the expenditure of money, the limits in which Johnson could operate were narrow. On the other hand, any bill to regulate Reconstruction must run the gauntlet of the President's right to veto before it could become a law. Johnson was certain to veto any bill not to his liking; and unless a sure two-thirds in both houses could be found to override the veto, the positive will of Congress had no chance of becoming law. There were abundant votes available to override a veto in the House in the Thirty-Ninth Congress, now assembling in December, 1865; but in the Senate the margin of certain radical votes was so narrow that search was made for new radical Senators who might be added to the body; and for supporters of the President who might be ousted. A veto by Johnson in February, 1866, prevented passage of a bill to strengthen the Freedmen's Bureau, which was to protect the negroes against their old masters; the bill failed to pass over the veto on February 20th, and thereafter the hope for success of congressional Reconstruction was in abeyance until the two thirds majority in the Senate could be assured. The radicals were the more embittered because, in constituting his Southern State Governments, Johnson had not extended the franchise to the freedmen and permitted them to vote as citizens of the United States. Unless the freed-

men voted there was no hope of ever getting Republican majorities in any of the Southern States.

The fight between Johnson and the radical Republicans was bitter and discreditable on both sides, during the spring of 1866, while the latter were searching for their two thirds. Johnson talked of having fought traitors in the South and of being ready to fight them in the North, and singled out his chief opponents to attack them by name. The Senate majority tried in vain to secure the admission of Colorado or Nebraska, either of which would contribute two steady radical votes. Failing this it unseated a Democratic Senator from New Jersey, and took advantage of the sickness of other opponents of its new policy of "thorough." Wade of Ohio expressed the high temper of the majority of radicals: "If God Almighty has stricken one member so that he cannot be here to uphold the dictation of a despot, I thank Him for his interposition and I will take advantage of it if I can."

The struggle for supremacy ended April 6, 1866, when the two thirds had been secured, and a Civil Rights Bill, to protect the negro, was passed over the veto. From this date, Congress was in the saddle, and the radicals were in control of Congress, passing every essential law for the restoration of the Union over the veto of the President who was to enforce it. It is to the high credit of Johnson that in his administration of law and policy which he so bitterly disapproved, he acted so carefully that no serious flaws in his official conduct could be found by his enemies.

The program of Congress included a strengthening of the Freedmen's Bureau and the passage of a law to safeguard the civil rights of the former slaves. An additional amendment to the Constitution (the Fourteenth) was prepared and sent out for ratification. In this a definition of citizenship in the United States was for the first time enacted, including "all persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof." It was further provided that in case any State should deny the

right to vote to any class of citizens of the United States, the representation of such State in Congress should be proportionately reduced. In the November elections after this struggle between the two theories of Reconstruction the people seemed to side with Congress, and the effective radical majorities were increased. Congress met in December, 1866, confident of the public mandate to go ahead. It passed a law providing that the new Congress, the Fortieth, chosen in 1866, should meet on March 4, 1867, immediately upon the dissolution of the Thirty-Ninth; and proceeded to lay down the law upon the details of Reconstruction. In this it disregarded all that Johnson had done by his presidential authority.

The two Reconstruction Acts, of March 2 and March 23, 1867, provided a new method of erecting loyal governments in the Southern States. The army was to be Reconstruction Acts in charge, for no American possessed so much of the public confidence as Ulysses S. Grant, General Commanding the Army. There were to be five military districts to cover the Confederacy, each under an army officer. The district officers were to enroll the population, all of it, and to administer an oath of allegiance as the basis for a new registration of voters. New conventions were to be elected by these registered voters in each of the ten outstanding States (Tennessee had been readmitted in July, 1866, having acted promptly and wisely in its acceptance of the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments). The new conventions must adopt negro suffrage and the Fourteenth Amendment, and submit their revised State Constitutions to Congress after they had been ratified by a majority of the voters at a general election at which half the registered voters cast their ballots. Then, and only then, would Congress be willing to seat the Senators and Representatives from the reconstructed States.

There was grave doubt whether this procedure in Reconstruction was constitutional, but there was no Fourteenth Amendment doubt of the practical power of Congress to accomplish it. The Supreme Court, asked to intervene,

declined to sit in judgment upon the political powers of Congress. The Fourteenth Amendment by the method of its ratification indicated the nature of the dilemma. There were thirty-seven States in the Union, in fact or in theory, when the amendment was offered to them. In addition to the thirty-three present in 1860, Kansas had been taken in in 1861; West Virginia, by secession from Virginia, and with only a "constructive" assent from the State thus dismembered, in 1863; Nevada, for the deliberate purpose of increasing the loyal votes in the Senate, in 1864; and Nebraska, for a similar purpose after the two thirds had been secured, in 1867. Three quarters of this number, the number necessary to ratify an amendment, is twenty-eight; so many as this could not be secured from the twenty-seven loyal States; indeed, only twenty-three of these ratified the Fourteenth Amendment, negro suffrage being unpopular in Northern Democratic States. But six of the conventions of the ten States still deprived of participation in the Union ratified the new amendment, and were counted as so doing in Seward's proclamation of the Fourteenth Amendment in force, July 28, 1868. Yet none of these six was yet regarded as a State by Congress. By the end of the summer of 1868, eight of the Confederate States were again back in relationship to the Union: Tennessee, Arkansas, North Carolina, South Carolina, Louisiana, Georgia, Alabama, and Florida. Three, which were slow in accepting the terms dictated by Congress, were still under their military governments: Mississippi, Texas, and Virginia.

The power of the radical Republicans, determined to punish the South and to protect the Union from disloyalty, reached its crest in the spring of 1868. Military governors were ruling the old Confederacy and enfranchised negroes were sitting in the conventions of the South. The term "carpet-bagger" had come into existence, describing the Northern political adventurer who turned up in the South during Reconstruction, seeking office and advantage. The term "scalawag" appeared as well; applied to the Southern white who was willing to work in political union with the

negro voters and the carpet-baggers. Each was a term of reproach for a class proscribed by the white leaders of the South. And the ostracism they suffered appeared to Northern radicals to justify their radicalism.

Between Johnson and Congress the situation had become impossible. Not only had every step in congressional Reconstruction been defined and made mandatory in the laws of 1867, but the power of the President to remove officials was taken away by a Tenure-of-Office Act, whose chief purpose was to protect in the War Department Edwin M. Stanton, Secretary of War, who supported Congress against the President. The President "suspended" Stanton on August 12, 1867, while Congress was in recess, and turned the administration of the War Department over to Grant as Acting Secretary. Through Grant, and against Grant's judgment, the military commanders in the South were rearranged. When Johnson, as the Tenure-of-Office Act required, notified the Senate in December of Stanton's suspension, the Senate by a large majority refused to concur in the suspension, and Grant turned the War Department back to Stanton at once. This did Stanton no good, for the President dismissed him from the office in February, 1868, alleging that the Tenure-of-Office Act was an unconstitutional interference with his functions as President. It did Grant much good, for Johnson regarded his action as personal treachery, and attacked him so venomously in public as to bring clearly into the open the self-restraint and moderation with which Grant was conducting his difficult post in command of the army. On the eve of the presidential nominations this confirmed a drift toward Grant that was already impressive.

The defiance of Congress by President Johnson brought the indignation of the radicals to its highest pitch. The House of Representatives had been searching for many months for suitable grounds upon which to base charges that might lead to an impeachment of the President. On the day of Stanton's dismissal it was voted to impeach. And on February 25,

Impeachment of Johnson

1868, Thaddeus Stevens, looking sad and impressive, "though in truth," says Rhodes, "his heart must have been full of joy," presented the formal impeachment to the Senate. This was the crest of radical power. A little later, and in the same temper, Congress passed a special amendment to the Judiciary Act, changing the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court respecting appeals, in order to prevent a judicial decision by that body in a case (*Ex parte McCardle*) in which it might have been obliged to examine into the constitutionality of the Reconstruction Acts.

The impeachment trial before the Senate has no parallel among American State trials except perhaps the treason trial of Aaron Burr before John Marshall at Richmond in 1807. Never before had impeachment proceedings been directed against a President. The long bill drawn up by the House managers, and finally presented to the Senate, cited a wide range of alleged high crimes and misdemeanors, among which the flouting of the Tenure-of-Office Act took the lead. But most of the "crimes" were matters of political judgment or personal good taste; and upon the main charge the opinion of lawyers tended to uphold the course taken by the President. The radicals could not hold together the whole of the two thirds of the Senate through which they had carried on legislation since 1866. Some six Republicans, on the final vote, were unable to find the President guilty, and conviction failed by a single vote, on May 16, 1868. Never again could the radicals have assembled so large a vote, for the reaction from the policy of "thorough" was beginning.

The Republican Party nominated General Grant for the office of President a few days after it was clear that Johnson could not be removed. For Vice-President it selected the Speaker of the House, Schuyler ^{Grant} Colfax, of Indiana. The platform of the party denounced Andrew Johnson, "who has acted treacherously to the people who elected him," and congratulated the country upon the success of Congress in the "reconstruction of the States lately in rebellion"; but the note that caught the ear

of the public in the canvass of 1868 was the wise phrase of Grant, "Let us have peace." The Democratic Party struggled in its New York convention to find candidates not tainted by participation in secession or disloyalty to the Union. In Governor Horatio Seymour, of New York, and George H. Pendleton, of Ohio, it presented a ticket that carried only eight States in the election. Since six of these were outside the Confederacy and Grant carried all but two of the Confederate States that voted, it appeared on the surface that Reconstruction had succeeded in doing what was one of its purposes and had reorganized the South so that Republican majorities might be secured there. But Virginia, Mississippi, and Texas were not allowed to vote, and there was doubt about counting the vote of Georgia. The crisis of Northern determination to control the South had passed.

For eight years General Grant remained President of the United States in a period of shifting popular standards and of slackness of private life. The very qualities of character and determination that had made him a great commanding officer worked against him as constitutional head of a democratic republic. The simplicity of his soul and his implicit confidence in his friends placed him at the mercy of intrigue; and the war had brought to the surface of national life too many plausible men of military record who were capable of abusing any trust. There is yet no adequate biography to give a picture of his struggle to serve a country that he could not understand, in a way for which he was not trained. His character and personal integrity have met all tests, but at the expense of his political good sense. He was willing to coöperate with the relaxation of Northern control of Southern affairs, and this inevitably made possible a revival of Democratic influence throughout the country. The revival was quickened by abuses in governmental affairs, some of which he might have avoided had he known how, and by economic derangements brought about largely by the continued growth and expansion of the United States in spite of war. These are matters for con-

sideration by themselves in another place. Their result was to produce a schism among Republicans in the election of 1872, and near defeat, if not actual, in 1876.

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CHAPTER II

READJUSTMENT

THE Civil War filled the eye and captured the imagination of the generation of Americans that lived through it. It touched the individual life in every community. Soldiers were drawn for its purposes from nearly every family. There was an element of pride in the fact that America had now produced the greatest war since Napoleon fought the coalitions of Europe, and that the Civil War was one of the most desperate struggles known to history. Grant, its victor, and Lee, though its victim, ranked among the great captains; and their lesser associates never ceased to insist that their services in the struggle gave them special title to public esteem and office. It was impossible not to believe that such a war must have altered the character of the Government of the United States. It had indeed put a quietus upon the long-debated notion that secession was a peaceful possibility. And when change came upon the country in the next twenty years, in such a degree that there was a new national life to be recognized, it was almost automatically ascribed as the consequence of the Civil War.

The progress of historical study since the Civil War has had a tendency to lessen the belief in the war as the great Civil War prime cause of the new nationality in the and the United States. Nationality was in the air in idea of the next half-century. England came to think of itself as an empire. The German States were brought together to sustain the national aspirations of Prussia. Italy ceased to be a name and became a reality. Japan emerged out of the misty background of Asia. All of these would have come to the front of international life without the American struggle; and the United States could not have failed to come with them. There were, moreover, forces at work within the United States before the secession

120°

110°

100°



UNITED STATES 1870

SCALE OF MILES

0 100 200 300

State Capitals in this type

Denver

Cities of 50,000 or more inhabitants by solid dot.

EXPLANATION OF SHADING

 10,000 feet or over  6,000 to 10,000 feet


 2,000 to 6,000 feet

 Railroads

110°

100°

Long



90°

80°

60°

35°


25°

le West from Greenwich

90°

80°

Tropic of Cancer



was attempted, that kept at work in spite of being overshadowed between 1861 and 1865, whose natural end was an increasing emphasis upon the national element in American life, and an increasing program for the American Government. The old Federal Union was under continuous pressure to cease to be merely a moderator among the States, and to become an active power carrying on work for the direct benefit of the average citizen. The Constitution of 1787 proved to be amazingly flexible as the new demands made their appearance; but Constitution or no Constitution, the demands of industrial life and the clash of sectional or class interests would have had to be met. As usual, the direction of most of these demands, before the Civil War and after, was from Western sources toward the East.

There were two areas of the West, from which new demands and problems came. There had always been two, since the beginning. One was the actual frontier, where from day to day the appearance of the landscape was changing as the cabins of new settlers were built, as the cleared fields pushed aside the wilderness and as the native Indians were thrust away from the paths of American advance. The other was a sort of post-frontier, where the primitive improvements had mostly been completed, where the civilization of the log cabin was being displaced by more orderly farming life and the beginnings of local industry, but where most of the population could remember a frontier experience; and whence came crystallized demands upon the Government for relief and aid, backed by the political weight that had been given to the new or newish Western States.

Frontier
and post-
frontier


At the time of the secession of the South, the fringes of the Union stretched to the Pacific through a post-frontier that was destined to become the Middle West and a frontier that was already known as the Far West. About a third of the loyal population of the Union was to be found beyond Pittsburgh and the western boundary of Pennsylvania. In the seven States of the Northwest, Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, Michigan, Wisconsin, Iowa, and Minnesota,

the census of 1860 enumerated about 7,800,000. No one here had forgotten the frontier antecedents of the Northwest; and most of the middle-aged leaders of life and thought had felt the impress of the cabin or its equivalent. Towns like Cincinnati were old and well-to-do, but the region was a definite section and a post-frontier. It was growing with rapidity, running ahead of the average of the decade, which was twenty-two per cent for the whole country, and adding to itself thirty-eight per cent, making a total population for these States of about 10,800,000 in 1870. The frontier of the Far West covered the plains from the western boundaries of Minnesota and Iowa to California, Oregon, and the Pacific itself. The eight Territories of Dakota, Nebraska, Kansas, Colorado, New Mexico, Utah, Nevada, and Washington, as they were completed by the legislation of 1861, comprised the sparse population of 327,000 in 1860. With an increase of 160 per cent, they included 840,000 ten years later; three of them had been made States: Kansas, Nebraska, and Nevada; and new Territories of Idaho, Montana, Wyoming, and Arizona had been created out of parts of the larger Territories of 1861.

It was among the Territories of the Far West that the greatest changes of the decade of the Civil War took place.

Far West The schoolbooks of the day frequently described much of this area as being a part of the so-called American Desert; and within a few years of 1860 the War Department was engaged in experiments with various breeds of camels, hoping to find a beast of burden suited to American desert life. As late as 1854 the Rocky Mountains, which had belonged to the United States only since the Mexican War, had failed to develop assets of considerable advantage. They served as boundary line for the Western Territories of Washington (1853) and Utah (1850), and for the Eastern Territories of Kansas (1854), Nebraska (1854), and Dakota (1861). About 1858 it began to be suspected that the mountain country might have some value in itself when gold was found immediately to the east of California,

in Utah, and in western Kansas, near Pike's Peak. Two Territories, owing their creation to the hurried rush of gold-seekers to the new gold fields, made their appearance in 1861: Nevada was cut away from Utah, and Colorado was put together out of pieces of Utah, Nebraska, Kansas, and



New Mexico. Between these new Territories lay Utah, whose population and sobriety might well have entitled it to immediate statehood, had it not been for the unhappy revelation concerning plural marriages whose existence was openly avowed by the hierarchy of the Mormon Church August 28, 1852. The young Republican Party, in 1856, thundered against "those twin relics of barbarism, polygamy and slavery"; and it was forty years before the echo died away and Utah became a State.

The activity of prospectors in the Far West never ceased during the years of Civil War and Reconstruction. The

number involved was never large, but they rushed back and forth from diggings to diggings so as to give an impression of a multitude. Wherever they went, they ran ahead of law, for the Territories which they developed were huge in dimension and without many agencies of government. In the matter of land titles they took what they needed out of the public domain, and commonly found a means to preëempt their holdings when the General Land Office caught up with them. In the matter of mining claims, they organized self-governing mining districts, registered their claims, protected them with their own informal courts, and usually saw the legislatures willing to enact formally what they had generated informally. Much of the American mining law traces ancestry from these spontaneous mining districts. In their personal relationships they relied mostly upon their own strength and nerve. They went armed, ready to "die in their boots" if they must, but preferring to shoot the antagonist first. When crime and lawlessness around the camps became too bad for even their easy tolerance, they organized vigilance committees and administered prompt justice from which there was no appeal. They were quite capable of living with a minimum of law, but from the moment of any considerable gold or silver discovery and the resulting rush of prospectors to the new camp, they began to ask Congress for legislation to create new Territories, to give them better protection from the Indians, to build wagon roads, and to encourage the construction of railroads.

The rush of prospectors to Denver City and Carson City brought forth Colorado and Nevada Territories. In 1862 the chief centers of new discovery were farther north, among the tributaries of the Snake and the Missouri. In this northern part of the Continental Divide gold is widely scattered, although often in small amounts, and the camps were numerous. Around the junction of the Clearwater and Snake Rivers in eastern Washington Territory, mines were opened in the country of the Nez Percé Indians during 1862; and Congress cut away large parts of Dakota and

Washington to make Idaho Territory in 1863. Before Idaho was organized, it was already obsolete through the opening of new districts; and in 1864 Montana was taken out of it. In 1868 Wyoming was created, and the map of the United States was complete, except for the division of Dakota into two States which occurred some twenty years later.

New Mexico had its share of mining booms during the same years. Here there had been old silver mines known to the Spanish and revived just before the Civil War by American speculators. The hopes of the promoters of these mines had been quickened by the location of the route of the Overland Mail Service of 1858. The regular coaches ran to the Rio Grande, and followed the Gila River Valley into California. But the war brought an end to the development of mining communities in New Mexico until troops came into the country from California, prospecting as they came. The "California Column" of Colonel J. H. Carleton was raised on the Pacific Slope to coöperate with the Union forces in Colorado. The Confederate military outposts were pushed east of the Rio Grande, and New Mexico was held without great difficulty. There was greater difficulty in holding the troops in the campaign, for gold discoveries about the rivers flowing into the lower Colorado excited their imagination. In 1863, as the result of these discoveries in western New Mexico, the new Territory of Arizona was cut off, and a squad of federal officers came out from Washington to open a territorial capital at Tucson.

By 1868 all of the important changes had been made on the western map, and the new Territorial Governments were finding themselves and testing their powers in the Far West.

The Indians, as usual, paid a disproportionate share of the cost of these new developments. Nearly all of the mineral empire lay within Indian country, an-
ciently occupied by the tribes, and more re-
cently guaranteed to them by treaties with the United States Government. In Colorado and in Idaho the dispos-

The Indian problem

session was especially ruthless. All of the tribes of the plains, that lived on the flanks of the buffalo herd, felt the increased difficulty of living when emigrants by tens of thousands crossed their country. The direct contacts between the tribes and the emigrants were damaging to both; but the indirect consequence was Indian starvation, since the herds were depleted, scattered, and made more fearful of man. There is no reason for surprise at the growing restiveness of the plains tribes as the sixties advanced, or at the increasing hazard of life along the western borders of Kansas and Nebraska.

The Indian wars of the sixties present several sharp crises that reveal the problem without suggesting much as to its solution. In 1862 the Minnesota frontier was upset by a rising of the Sioux Indians, the Arapaho and Cheyenne of the central plains were on the warpath in 1864, the Western Sioux impeded the communication routes to the Montana mines in 1866, and in 1868 the problems rising from Indian congestion on the reservations of Indian Territory led to yet another serious war. Sporadic outbreaks in the seventies affected the Sioux again; and the Nez Percé, the Apache, and the Navajo tribes occasioned trouble in the eighties. It is clear to-day that most of these troubles were intimately associated with the closing of the open range and the disappearance of the frontier, but at the time they were acute problems of immediate concern.

The Sioux uprising of 1862 broke a general peace with the tribes that had generally prevailed since the close of the Mexican War. If it contained any lesson except the old one that Indians and white farmers could not live happily together, it was to illustrate the unhappy method by which the United States dealt with the tribes. There was a treaty of 1851 involved by which the tribes had made large cessions in the valley of the Minnesota River. Congress had been dilatory in paying for the lands, but the eager farmers preëmpted them at once. The Indian could not understand the equity of a situation in which he lost his lands upon signing and received his pay,

Sioux War
of 1862

if at all, only after several years of dispossession. The situation was even worse in this case, since, when the time came to pay, most of the tribal money was eaten up by debts that had been incurred by individual Indians before the treaties were signed in 1851. For several years the Indians of southwest Minnesota were uneasy, with the young braves dangerously restive, and the cleavage between "farmer" Indians and "blanket" Indians inviting civil war. In the autumn of 1862, simultaneously with Lee's invasion of the North in the Antietam campaign, the storm broke, exploding out of a local brawl and ending with the whole Minnesota frontier in flames and an extensive punitive campaign.

The plains tribes went on the warpath in 1864, driven to it largely by the increased difficulty of life when the overland trails were crowded with emigrants who destroyed and dispersed the game. The Pike's Peak mining camps had been built in territory assured to the Arapaho and Cheyenne by the Fort Laramie treaty of 1851. When the chill nights of autumn came, the warlike bands turned their attention to rations and blankets and began to drift in to the shelter of the United States posts in Colorado and to asseverate their peacefulness. At the same time the militant volunteers of Colorado Territory were called to arms by the governor, and a regiment was marched from Denver to the principal camp on the Arkansas River near the mouth of Sand Creek. In a surprise night attack upon Sand Creek, this camp, which was for the moment at least in ¹⁸⁶⁴ a condition of actual peace, Colonel Chivington and his men destroyed hundreds of Indians — braves, women, old men, and children — and occasioned a scandal that is still subject for critical study. How far the scandal was in his apparently murderous attack, and how far in criminal negligence on the part of the Bureau of Indian Affairs, is not entirely clear. But at the moment when the United States emerged from its struggle with the Confederacy it appeared to have on its hands a widespread Indian uprising.

The Arapaho and Cheyenne were punished, and attention shifted to the plains north of Colorado, where in 1865 attempts were made by the army to mark and protect a cut-off to the Montana mines, leaving the main overland trail not far above Fort Laramie and running thence northwardly to the Yellowstone, and thence westwardly to the camps between Helena and Bannock. This was a choice hunting preserve of the plains Sioux, and Red Cloud, their chief, made so serious a menace that the attempt to open the road was dropped in 1865, to be renewed in 1866. At this second attempt posts were built and garrisoned along the way, known variously as the Bozeman Trail and the Powder River Road; and near one of these posts, Fort Phil Kearney, a detachment of troops was led into ambush and killed to a man. In local parlance there was always a battle when Indians were killed, and a massacre when the whites were victims. The catastrophe again called attention to slack and unsuccessful management of the Indian problem.

Fort Phil
Kearney,
1866

The efforts of the Arapaho and Cheyenne to find new homes after the Sand Creek affair drew the center of interest to Indian Territory next, where General Sheridan had taken over command of the Western army and General Custer commanded a disciplinary column in 1868. Late in the fall of this year, Custer pursued these tribes to the Washita River, surprised them, and destroyed their camp.

The Indian situation needed reconstruction as much as did the South after 1865. A committee of Congress collected testimony as to responsibility for the disturbances, money was appropriated to feed the tribes and wean them from dangerous ways, new treaties were negotiated, a civilian Board of Indian Commissioners was erected to watch the conduct of the paid Indian agents, the church societies were allowed by President Grant to nominate agents to live with the Indians, and the consolidation of the roving tribes upon limited and designated reservations was hastened. The official language of both the avowed friends of the Indians, and the officers of Government admitted the full

responsibility of the Nation to the Indian wards, but as a practical problem no solution was reached.

The mining booms rank high among the causes of Indian uneasiness; and after them comes the building of railroads through the Indian country. Before the Civil War the western heads of the railroads reached the Missouri River above the great bend, at Saint Joseph. Local extensions began then, as Kansas became a State and population grew, to thrust beyond the Missouri. The idea of a national railroad to be built across the plains and mountains to the Pacific had an increasing attractiveness after the attempt to dismember the Union began. And out of every mining camp and every territorial capital of the Far West came insistent demands for railroad connection with the States.

Railroad-
building and
the Indians

Congress had under consideration, before secession, many such railroad projects. In 1862 it approved one of them, from Omaha and Council Bluffs, on the Missouri, to Sacramento in California. The line was to stick close to the main overland trail, to which route the Overland Mail had been transferred when Texas seceded and made the southern route impracticable, and over which the famous Pony Express was conducted in 1860 and 1861. The Union Pacific Company was to build the road across the plains and was to be met at the California line by the Central Pacific. Both roads and various of their branches were to receive a subsidy in the form of a grant of public lands and a loan of United States bonds. But neither of them was capable of much construction until the war was over and capital became available for such speculative investment. Toward the close of the war, in 1864, Congress authorized a second land-grant continental railroad from Lake Superior to Puget Sound. It followed this with a third from southwestern Missouri to southern California by the Santa Fe route, and a fourth from southwestern Arkansas by the El Paso route. Besides these, other roads more local in character received the offer of public lands as subsidy. And in the later sixties the plains were

Union
Pacific

swarming with surveying gangs and construction camps. Each of these was a new menace to Indian peace and a threat to the ancient order in which the Indian lived, wild and vagrant, upon the open country and its native game.

Only one of the continental railroads was completed during the period of Reconstruction, but this one, the Union Pacific, became symbolic of the economic enterprises to which the Far West was leading the United States. During the three years after 1865 its rail-heads were pushed into the plains from the Missouri River west; and into the Sierra Nevada and the Rockies from San Francisco Bay east. In 1869 they met at the northern tip of Great Salt Lake, and the country paused for a moment to celebrate a piece of national equipment that stands out among the facts in American transportation like the Erie Canal and the old National Road. Its nationalizing influence was inevitable; and when the other continental lines were finished, after 1881, the continental railroad net became a system that could not fail to exact national attention and thus to baffle state management. From the Far West came new problems to emphasize the archaic character of the Federal Government and to demand a kind of program that American politicians were not yet prepared to face.

The Middle West was at the same time generating problems of its own. Its development before the Civil War received a sharp and general check in 1857, when the European demand for American foods stopped suddenly and a panic revealed the scarcity of available capital for American development. Lincoln and Chase, his Secretary of the Treasury, have never received sufficient credit for taking over a national treasury with a deficit and financing out of it the most expensive war that had yet been seen. The surface disturbances of the war concealed from general view the fact that a revival in agriculture had begun early in Lincoln's Administration; and the war itself provided a strong market for whatever the Northwest could produce. Local railroads were built as the Civil War progressed; the trunk line railroads

between the Mississippi and New York equipped themselves to carry a national traffic on east and west lines; and northwest of Chicago and Saint Louis a new network of railroads spread itself over new farming areas. Chicago, which had been gaining on Saint Louis for two decades, was ready before Reconstruction was over to pass it in importance, and the railroads supplanted the rivers as carriers of the general commerce of the interior.

Every new region in the United States has been financed largely on borrowed money; money to pay for land, money to erect buildings whether private or public, ^{Frontier} money to launch new industries. And now that ^{finance} railroads had become a necessary part of public equipment, the enlarged demands of the Middle West upon the money markets of the East gave added strength to the intersectional organization of American finance. In the later sixties there was a general boom, with high hopes and a high interest rate. The practice of investment in securities was becoming more general than it had been, and for many investors the purchase of a few government bonds in the Civil War paved the way for general investment in stocks and bonds when the war was over. New York, Boston, and Philadelphia became more and more the markets where capital was to be procured, and Western development became more and more the profitable way of using Eastern accumulations of wealth.

The high prices produced by war scarcity and by the decline in the value of the paper money of the United States increased the apparent amount of money involved in each turnover and produced a situation in which the financial reconstruction of the country was a matter of delicate adjustment, too delicate for any political instruments available for President Johnson or President Grant. Financial reconstruction involved several distinct problems for the National Government. These included a reduction of the revenue to the demands of the peace establishment; a reduction in the war personnel of the Government in order to leave in public employ only those persons needed for an

economical transaction of normal public business; a simplification of the public debt, with its funding in a few long-time loans at reasonable rates of interest; and a deflation of the currency in order to restore its value to normal. The last of these problems was one that most directly touched the personal interest of every citizen who had a debt to pay, for deflation would certainly mean an increase in the buying value of the dollar and a proportionate decrease in price. It would mean that the goods-content of every debt would be increased in inverse ratio to the fall of prices brought about by deflation. How serious this might be depended upon the rapidity of deflation and the state of business while it lasted. Whether or not it was politically possible depended on whether the debt-payers were so grouped as to be likely to make a political issue of it or to block it for their own advantage. During the years of increasing inflation, from 1862 to 1865, the cost had fallen on the other side of society, the creditor class, whose property and income had been reduced every time the buying value of the dollar dropped a point. But this class represents always a minority of the people, and during the years of war these had no chance to secure redress. Deflation would affect injuriously the debtor majority. How far deflation would have had to go in order to restore prices to a normal level is indicated by the table of prices made in 1893 by the Aldrich Committee for the Senate, which show that from the price level of 100 in 1860 commodity prices had risen by 1865 to 216. Average wages had risen in the same years only to 143, and the wage-earner had as much to gain by deflation to the pre-war level as the capitalist had. The apparent burden of deflation seemed likely to fall upon the farmer. In the Middle West, in its post-frontier stage of development, the farmer gave the tone to the whole society, and what he desired was translated into the political demands of the section.

As Hugh McCulloch, Johnson's Secretary of the Treasury, took up the task of financial reconstruction in 1865, the net debt of the Union stood at \$2,758,000,000, on which

interest must be paid and for whose ultimate redemption provision must be made. A part of this debt, ^{Greenbacks} about \$433,000,000 consisted of the forced loan which had been floated every time the Government paid a bill in the legal tender greenbacks. These greenbacks were the money of the country, for coin had passed into retirement and the notes of the private banks had been taxed into oblivion. The decline in value of this money accounted for a large part of the high prices of 1865. A restoration of its value to par would bring prices down toward normal. It was McCulloch's desire to redeem this money as rapidly as possible and to get away from a fluctuating and depreciated currency. Congress, following slowly the lead of the Secretary of the Treasury, passed a law in April, 1866, allowing ten millions of the greenbacks to be withdrawn and destroyed within the next six months and four million dollars each month thereafter. The natural result of this, had the law continued in force, would have been, by reducing the amount of money in circulation, gradually to increase its value and to spread over a term of about eleven years the period of deflation. McCulloch was disappointed at being unable to bring complete deflation and the resumption of specie payments by the Treasury more promptly than this, but congressional opinion was cautious and became decidedly obstructive before 1866 was over.

It was on the post-frontier that the leaders in this obstruction made their appearance. Every American frontier has had a liability or susceptibility toward in- ^{Greenback}flation finance; of necessity, it seems, because ^{movement} every frontier has carried a high average burden of debt and has as a community been in debt to the older and wealthier sections of the United States. During the congressional elections of 1866 the politicians on the stump were required to explain the meaning and the result of this retirement of four million dollars of greenback money a month; and in proportion as they explained to an audience in the Middle West that the intention of this was to make the dollar dearer and to lower prices as well as to fulfill the obli-

gations of the United States, their audiences caught the point of the decline in prices, but failed to be impressed by the argument of public credit. Instead they reacted adversely to a policy that would make heavier the burden of their debts, and sought to find a reason why there should be no real obligation to resume specie payments at all. If resumption should be brought about, every holder of a government bond would be paid in money worth much more than the money he had lent. The bondholders were already wealthy. It was easy to make it appear that resumption was only a scheme of wealth to get what it had not lent and to load the burden on the back of the hard-working farmer. The greenbacks had been good enough to pay the poor boy enlisted in the army and risking his life as well; why should it not be good enough for the citizen who at most had risked his dollars and who would not in any event get back less than he lent? From objecting to any retirement of greenbacks it was easy for politicians in the Middle West to urge that more greenbacks ought to be issued, and that part or all of the national debt might honorably be paid in this sort of "lawful money." Here began a debate on currency and public credit that was

The "Ohio Idea" to continue with little abatement until the end of the century. In 1866 it took the form of the "Ohio Idea," vigorously stated by George H. Pendleton, an Ohio Congressman, and supported in varying degrees by most of the Representatives from the Western States. It was not violently opposed even in the Eastern States as yet, and the Congress elected in 1866 repealed in 1868 the contraction law after only forty-four millions of greenbacks had been withdrawn.

The wickedness of Wall Street and the New York bankers and speculators was an idea that won wide popularity in most parts of the United States. The speculations of Jay Gould and the gambling in gold seemed to be confirmations of the idea that resumption was only a plot of "bloated bondholders." The "Ohio Idea" spread through the Western membership of both parties. It met with accept-

ance in the South also, for here bankruptcy was a general condition, all the money of the Confederacy had ceased to have value, and the currents of what little trade there was drew the balances out of the South. For the time being its mental reaction was that of the debtor West.

With the South in view, for most of the seceded States were to vote in 1868, and with the hope of gaining support in the Middle West, the Democratic Party included the greenbacks in its New York platform of 1868. ^{Election of 1868} "Where the obligations of the Government do not expressly state upon their face, or the law under which they were issued does not provide, that they shall be paid in coin," the Democrats declared, "they ought, in right and in justice, to be paid in the lawful money of the United States." The Democratic candidate, Governor Horatio Seymour, repudiated this notion of paying off the war debt in paper; but the Republicans, having already denounced "all forms of repudiation as a national crime," made much of the alleged intention of their opponents. The first law to which General Grant put his name as President was an act to insure the public credit against this use of the greenbacks, and the United States was so prosperous in the boom of the later sixties that the "Ohio Idea" was little more heard of until the boom came to its end. But the materials for a Greenback political party were in solution in the Middle West, ready to be precipitated when hard times should come.

In addition to this willingness to support a cheap paper currency, the West and South were brought together by another idea of economic significance: the need of some sort of public control of railroads. ^{Railroad control} The opening of the Union Pacific and the initial work upon the other continental roads drew attention to the national character of the railroad system, while the special position of the Middle West made the questions of freight rates and railroad manners of first importance.

Prior to the Civil War, when the railroads were beginning to handle the great freights of the country, most of them

ran parallel to preëxisting routes of traffic. The highways, the navigable rivers, the lakes, and the coasting vessels offered a competition that prevented the development of any section of the country dependent upon railroads alone for the movement of its produce. The trunk line railroads, driven by the blockade of the Mississippi River to carry heavy freight over the mountains to the Atlantic, where little of it had heretofore gone, raised problems of competition and favoritism. But northwest of Chicago the prairie railroads, building out into Wisconsin, Iowa, and Minnesota, preceded in many cases settlement itself. They carried in the people and offered the only way of carrying out their grain and other staple produce. Rates were high, as high as the traffic would bear, and only the equally high prices of grain kept the burden and inequality of the rates from making an appeal to public opinion. Even when public opinion was aroused, there was no immediate redress in sight, for the railroads were private business in the eye of the law. Their charters in many cases gave them absolute power over their charges, and the famous Dartmouth College case (*Dartmouth College vs. Woodward*) stood in the court reports as a guarantee of the sanctity of contracts. The idea of public interference in private business had made little headway in America.

The prevalence of good times put off the day on which the greenback tendencies of the Middle West might break into politics, or the potential antagonism of the Upper Mississippi Valley to the railroads become a reality. In 1873 panic struck the United States and crystallized sentiment on both these subjects.

The causes of the panic of 1873 are clear enough. For a dozen years the United States had consumed wealth at a rate far beyond its capacity to produce it. The costs of the Civil War can only be guessed at. The accumulated debt at its close was but a small fraction of it. Great taxes had been raised and spent, much of the South had been destroyed down to the ground itself, and millions of men had been drawn from productive labor to serve in

the armies. Through all of these means, the amount of free capital that the United States would have produced from 1861 to 1873 was measurably reduced. After the Civil War, society in the United States moved to a new level of expenditure for private homes, public institutions, and educational establishments. All of these took money at a rate not seen before, and where they were non-productive of new wealth they represented an absolute drain upon the supply of free wealth. The continental railroads, and many of the improvements made by Eastern lines, consumed huge amounts of capital that were to be productive in the long run, but that in the immediate run represented another drain on this same supply of wealth.

Even the most industrious society produces only so much. Until close to the period of the Civil War it may be doubted whether the people of the United States had produced as much wealth as they ^{Frontier} _{economics} had consumed or invested. There were great debts borrowed abroad, and not always repaid. After the people had met the fixed and unavoidable charges for food, maintenance, clothing, and housing, there was little left for investment. Every new frontier region had been built up largely with money borrowed, always from sources in the East or in Europe. The time was approaching when American-owned wealth would catch up upon the outside debts, and leave the country ahead of the world; but Chase had found it necessary in financing the war to sell bonds abroad wherever he could find buyers. After the war the promoters of American investments sought to sell their securities abroad and succeeded in large amounts. Every year saw larger commitments and more earnest efforts to borrow in London, Amsterdam, Berlin, and Paris.

The Philadelphia banking house of Jay Cooke and Company led in the development of this international finance, and when in 1869 Cooke agreed to raise funds for the construction of the Northern Pacific Railroad he undertook a contract that could be completed only in case the European sources of capital should continue fluid. The Franco-

Prussian War of 1870 had a tendency to keep money at home. Hard times in central Europe in 1872 checked both the European ability to buy American food and the ability of European bankers to invest in American stocks and bonds. On September 18, 1873, Jay Cooke failed, and since he, more than any other banker, represented the foundations of security, his collapse unsettled the nerve of the country while his inability to pay his debts brought failure after failure. It became apparent that the American demand for capital to consume or invest had reached the limit for the time. For five years after the failure of Cooke depression ruled every aspect of American business. Prices declined because of the lack of buyers. And to the Western and Southern Americans it appeared that only their taxes, their debts, and their freight rates remained intact, untouched by the depression.

The threatening attack upon the railroads broke. There had been since 1867 a struggling farmer society known as the "Patrons of Husbandry," which had tried to enlist farmers in a coöperative organization for their own advantage. The local bodies of the Patrons of Husbandry were called "Granges" and were grouped by States into the State Granges, and these were federated in the National Grange. There was a ritual, and there were social meetings to which the women came. As the hard times after the panic of 1873 were spread over the West there came a corresponding activity among the Granges. Their membership grew and new Granges were established by the thousand, until all of the Northwest was affected by the new organization at whose meetings the constant theme was denunciation of the railroads because of their high and inflexible rates. The Grange, as such, kept out of politics; but the Grangers were citizens also, and many of them ran for office, always with antipathy to the railroads in their hearts.

As early as 1870 a new constitution in Illinois conferred upon the legislature of the State the power to fix the rates of railroads and grain elevators. Within the next three or

four years, as the depression deepened, Wisconsin, Iowa, and Minnesota, as well as Illinois, passed laws to fix or secure the fixing of maximum railroad rates. This seemed to the Eastern owners of the railroads to be confiscation and to involve a taking of private property without due process of law. It became necessary for the Granger States to defend their laws in court; but at last in 1877 the Supreme Court of the United States (in *Munn vs. Illinois*) upheld the doctrine that the railroads were quasi-public in character and that they were subject to regulation in the public interest. A new chapter in the meaning of American government was begun by this decision, but for the moment the cleavage between the East and the Middle West was widened and the inability of either section to understand the other was increased.

The Granger movement avoided party lines, so that neither of the great parties lent itself to a whole-hearted attitude on railroad control; but the Greenback movement was driven into direct politics by the panic of 1873.

While the Far West and the Middle West were readjusting themselves to growth and deflation, and while the rest of the United States was teaching itself how to live with Western militancy, the first term of President Grant came to an end. Those who thought it a great success were not numerous, even within his own party. The South was still far from reaching an equilibrium among the conflicting forces of Northern radicalism, home rule, negro aspiration, and economic collapse. American morale was weakened by the appearance of scandal on a large scale. The main lines of progress that were to dominate in the next few decades were not yet clearly outlined, and confusion and discouragement were commonly present in American thought.

Out of this confusion one set of facts stood in clear and satisfactory definiteness. The diplomatic situation had been improved and American relationships with other countries had pulled away from the bickerings of the war period. Much of this was due to the work of Grant and his Secretary of State, Hamilton

Diplomatic reconstruction.

Fish. The beginnings of this diplomatic reconstruction occurred under Andrew Johnson and William H. Seward. It was a creditable adjustment of vexatious and dangerous rival interests, and left American foreign affairs in a condition where they could be generally disregarded for more than two decades.

At the close of the Civil War in 1865, the United States had (1) by the rigor of its blockade of the South interfered with the trade of foreign countries and given rise to claims for damage; (2) developed an acute grievance against England because of, first, the extent of British sympathy for the Confederacy, and, second, the aid received in British ports by naval vessels operating under the Confederate flag; (3) been obliged by its domestic preoccupation to permit France under Napoleon III to carry out an intervention in Mexico and create there a new throne on which was seated an Austrian as emperor, under the name of Maximilian I. Each of these situations was capable of leading to another war; with the United States confident because of recent success and possessing a huge army and the largest of modern navies.

The last of the three major difficulties was cleared away by Seward. Mexico had given cause of complaint on many occasions since the establishment of independence in 1821. Successive revolutions had resulted in the destruction of much property owned by foreigners, and the successive Governments had played fast and loose with the debts for whose payment the Mexican faith had been pledged by the various Governments. In 1861 the French Government, on behalf of its nationals possessing such claims against Mexico, induced England and Spain to coöperate in a military demonstration, for the avowed purpose of persuading the Juarez Government in Mexico to recognize and pay these claims. Behind the intervention was believed to be an intention of Napoleon III to take advantage of the Civil War and establish a French protectorate over Mexico, which would ordinarily have been resisted by the United States under the Monroe

Doctrine had the American Government been free to act. Seward watched with anxiety the invasion of Mexico in 1862, the occupation of the capital city in 1863, and the French manipulation of affairs that produced the coronation of Maximilian as emperor in 1864. Throughout it all, France continued to explain that there were no overt intentions against Mexican independence; and until 1865 the United States was compelled to content itself with replying that it hoped such to be the case.

With the return of peace in 1865, the situation was altered, and Johnson and Seward had military forces available that were adequate to any need. It was no longer necessary to temporize. Seward declined to recognize the Maximilian Government in the early summer, and in the autumn expressed American concern at the continued presence of a foreign army in Mexico. There was no occasion for direct threats or even for explicit reference to the Monroe Doctrine by name. Napoleon III realized the collapse of his scheme, withdrew his army in 1866, and in the following year the political puppet whom he had placed upon the Mexican throne was dislodged by the Mexican people and paid with his life for the ambitions of the Emperor of the French. The strategic position of the United States with reference to the principles embodied in the Monroe Doctrine was improved by this episode, because for the first time the military strength of the country had been enough to secure if necessary a fulfillment of the doctrine.

More difficult, and longer drawn out, were the questions arising from British action and thought during the Civil War. The early recognition of Confederate ^{Alabama} belligerency, in May, 1861, was probably an ^{claims} advantage to the United States, although resented by American opinion at the time. The success which the Confederate agents had in building and equipping war vessels in England for Confederate service, gave a more valid ground for complaint. The American Minister, Charles Francis Adams, protested this from the beginning; and with the

backing of Seward he declared it to constitute a violation of neutral duty and a ground for an ultimate American claim for indemnity for all shipping and property lost to the United States by the action of the Confederate cruisers, of which the *Alabama* was the most notorious. After 1865 he began the presentation of these claims, meeting with contempt in the British press and refusal by the British Government to admit even the principle of an obligation. The danger of a breach between the countries became real and was advertised by the wide American moral support to Irish agitators who passed over from the United States into Canada in 1867, in an insurrection in behalf of Irish freedom. The insurrection came to nothing, but England began to follow a new line of thought and to reflect upon the consequences to herself in some future war if the United States should permit an enemy of Britain to build and equip war vessels on American territory.

Late in Johnson's Administration a claims agreement was negotiated for the settlement of outstanding financial controversies between the United States and England, but this was wrecked in the United States Senate. Senator Charles Sumner led the opposition which held England responsible, through the cruisers, for a prolongation of the war. He asked for the payment in satisfaction of this national claim of a sum equal to a large fraction of the total cost of the Civil War. He hoped to substitute for this cash the cession of Canada to the United States.

Grant took office with the British claims unsettled and with no prospect of their settlement. He recommended in his first annual message that the United States itself investigate and pay all the claims involved and then present and collect the amount as a national claim against England. This was a threat whose result was to hasten the British drift to the idea that there must be a reconciliation with the United States, and that the precedent England had given would be dangerous if used against her.

In May, 1871, a treaty was signed in Washington in which England admitted a duty to prevent the unneutral

equipment of ships of war upon her territory, and agreed to submit to courts of arbitration the amount of the Alabama damages as well as other matters remaining unsettled between the countries, chiefly the ancient questions of the northwest boundary and the fisheries. The arbitration of the Alabama claims took place at Geneva in 1871-72, and the verdict favoring the American contention at once quieted a possible cause of war, laid a basis for future cordiality between the two countries, and defined the duties of a neutral country in the future more clearly than ever before.

In a minor way the Grant Administration saw an unsuccessful attempt on Grant's part to annex Santo Domingo to the United States, and a resolute and successful refusal to become involved in the struggle of Cuba for independence from Spain in the Ten Years' War, beginning in 1868. In 1867 Alaska had been bought from Russia without forethought under conditions that made its acquisition a matter of lasting mystery.

Santo
Domingo
and Alaska

The superior repute of the United States among the nations and its enhanced dignity went largely to the credit of President Grant, but these could not save the Republican Party from the impending split in 1872. The secessionists took to themselves the name of Liberal Republicans, and directed their attack upon the excesses of Reconstruction in the South and the scandals in the administration of the National Government. The North had by this time lost its zest for the coercion of the Southern States, where by now the white population was in the process of securing home rule.

Before either the Republican Convention or the Democratic was held, the Liberal Republicans nominated Horace Greeley, of New York, and B. Gratz Brown, of Missouri. The main desire of the seceders was to beat Grant, and the Democratic Party, having the same ambition, endorsed the Liberal Republican candidates at Baltimore, in July, 1872. It was a grotesque political combination, in which the Southern

Greeley
and the
Liberal
Republicans

Democrats gave their support to that Northern editor, Greeley, who perhaps more than any other Northerner had represented implacable hostility to slavery and the Confederacy. The coalition was without success, for Grant, renominated at Philadelphia, with Senator Henry Wilson, of Massachusetts, for Vice-President, was elected by larger majorities than those of 1868. Grant took office for his second term before the panic of 1873 occurred and before the most serious scandals that were to discredit his handling of affairs were brought to public attention.

On the eve of the election in 1872, the New York *Sun* discovered and printed papers that seemed to show an attempt at bribery of members of Congress by the promoters of the Union and Central Pacific Railroads. The acts in question went back to 1868, when the railroads were struggling to complete construction and the managers were fearful lest Congress should change the laws under which they worked. At that time, the actual builders of the Union Pacific, operating under the name of the *Crédit Mobilier of America*, sold stock in their corporation to a long list of public men, lending the buyers the money to pay for the stock and declaring such handsome dividends within a year that the loans could be paid for out of the earnings and a large profit could be made on an investment of nothing at all. The wide range of investors on this shady basis gives a picture of business and political ethics at the close of the Civil War. The scandal broke too late to affect the reëlection of Grant, but thereafter investigating committees of Congress took testimony and involved beyond repair the reputations of many public men. Before the *Crédit Mobilier* was forgotten came the whiskey fraud exposures in the Treasury Department and charges that involved even the private secretary of Grant in improper presents of diamond studs and teams of driving horses. Grant himself could never see why he should not receive and accept any gift that any person wished to give him, and his constant association with men under suspicion of bribery or worse was an injury to his reputation for

good judgment. His Secretary of War, W. W. Belknap, was discovered to have received bribe money from a contractor at a Western army post, and just as the House of Representatives brought impeachment charges against Belknap, Grant permitted the latter to resign and thus escape the necessity of facing trial by the Senate. Before the deluge of scandals was over, the suspicion of improper conduct had touched James G. Blaine, a Maine Congressman who was Republican Speaker of the House of Representatives from 1869 until the party lost control of the lower house in 1875. The anti-Republican drift of things that began at the moment of the highest pitch of radical power and bitterness in 1868, and that threatened Grant by the Liberal Republican movement in 1872, resulted in 1874 in an election of a House of Representatives with a Democratic majority. After this Congress, the Forty-Fourth, took office in 1875, there was a period of twenty-two years in which it was the normal condition that one house or the other was of a different political faith from the President. Save for short intervals beginning in 1881, 1889, and 1893, the American Government remained on "dead center" until William McKinley became President in 1897.

Frauds

The anti-Republican drift throughout the United States, the recovery of control of local governments in the South by the native white population, the distrust of the National Government as wealth-controlled by the Granger Middle West, and the increasing burden of scandal consolidated the hopes of the opponents of the Republican Party as they looked to 1876 and the successor to General Grant. The political organization of the Greenback Party took the lead.

Anti-Republican drift

Peter Cooper, of New York, an aged millionaire of radical temper, and General Sam F. Carey, of Ohio, a Western reforming enthusiast, received the nominations of a convention of the Greenback National Party in May, 1876. The coalescence of this movement had been in process since the panic of 1873. The broad swath

Greenbackers

of depression that followed the panic had increased the number of voters susceptible to the arguments of inflation finance. President Grant had shown himself impervious to the arguments of the Greenbackers in Congress and had vetoed in 1874 a bill to increase the volume of greenbacks outstanding. After their defeat at the elections of 1874, the Republican Congress, in its "lame duck" session of 1874-75 passed a bill setting the date for resumption in January, 1879, and the hopes of the Greenback Party were increased by this action definitely pledging the Republicans to the idea of hard money. "Brick" Pomeroy, a picturesque freelance journalist of the Middle West, accepted the nomination of Cooper and Carey in his *Democrat*, and endorsed the greenback issue: "To this work — to helping to care for the Rag Baby, as the gold gamblers sneeringly term the child of war and the saviour of the country, till it reaches Washington and drives the money-changers from the Temple of Liberty — we pledge the support of this paper," he wrote. The venerable Peter Cooper had no chance of election, but the defection among Western Republicans that he might cause gave special intensity to Democratic hopes.

The nominees of the Democrats, chosen at Saint Louis in 1876, were designed to take advantage of every element of unrest at Republican rule. Governor Samuel Tilden
J. Tilden, of New York, was a notable reformer of the government of his State and had lent real aid to the purging of the New York City government. His companion on the ticket, Thomas A. Hendricks, of Indiana, came from a doubtful State which his wide popularity might carry, and was himself a greenbacker in idea if not in party affiliation. The note of the campaign was to be reform.

The Republican Party might perhaps have nominated Blaine to succeed Grant had not Blaine's doubtful sense of propriety been exposed on the eve of the national convention. The Mulligan letters, which contained the most of the evidence upon his financial shifts and devices, were printed in the spring of 1876. They were read by Blaine himself

before the House of Representatives, in a dramatic scene which lost part of its exonerating force when it was shown that he had not read the whole of all the letters. A spell of sickness on the eve of the convention completed his unavailability.

Rutherford B. Hayes, thrice Governor of Ohio, was nominated by the Republicans, without enthusiasm. He had a clean personal repute and a good war record. Having won his State for himself in ^{Hayes} spite of the greenback tendencies, he was likely to be able to win it again. But the canvass of 1877 presented no sharp issue to the voters, nor were the candidates able to evoke general enthusiasm anywhere. The Civil War and Reconstruction were indeed over, but neither party had a program to offer for the new epoch of history. When the votes were finally cast there was as much doubt as to which candidate had been chosen as there had been about the issue of the election.

For several weeks after the election the United States debated its outcome. Tilden, on the face of things, received a popular plurality over Hayes. Of the 369 electoral votes, he carried 184 without ^{Electoral contest, 1876} doubt, while Hayes had 166 by as secure a title. The remaining 19 (cast by Florida, South Carolina, and Louisiana) were claimed by both candidates, and both claims appeared to be tainted by widespread fraud. Whether either claim was so fraudulent as to insure the contested 19 votes to the other was a matter of uncertainty; but unless Hayes could secure them all for himself, and with them the 185 votes constituting a majority, Tilden would become President. The Constitution required that when Congress should meet to hear the returns, the Vice-President should preside and should open the certificates of election from the several States, and that the votes should then be counted.

But the Constitution was silent as to who should do the counting or who should determine which of two doubtful returns to count. From each of the three contested States

there were two sets of returns each claiming to be authentic.

Failing to find in the Constitution a rule for determining such a contest as this, Congress made its own rule and created an Electoral Commission to which the doubtful cases were to be submitted. This body, fifteen in number, five each from Senate, House, and Supreme Court, failed as historians have since failed, fully to convince the United States that the claim of either party was sound. Honest men still differ in their beliefs. The members came out of the Commission as they went in, firm in the acceptance of their respective parties' claims; and since eight of the fifteen members were Republican the result was a decision giving all of the 19 contested votes to Hayes and ensuring his inauguration in 1877. The Far West and the Middle West, with all of their activity, failed to determine the outcome of the election. They presented demands, however, that were long to outlast the Greenback Party or the militant Grangers.

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CHAPTER III

AMERICAN THOUGHT

THE genuine spirit of America is elusive in the black days of financial stress and moral discontent that extended from the panic of 1873 until well after the inauguration of President Hayes. The historian turns in vain to any single set of actors to reveal it. The statesmen of the day, bewildered by the new ethical standards that rose to vex them, show few elements of real leadership. The men of wealth are no better representatives of their contemporaries. Astor, Stewart, and Vanderbilt, accumulators of the greatest of the American fortunes, died within a few months of each other, leaving their millions to self-conscious heirs who passed out of touch with average Americans as they tried to found social dynasties. Better indexes than these, to the ideals and aspirations of American life, are to be found among the men of learning who undertook to direct a new movement in public education until it assumed the proportions of an educational renaissance; and among the new school of men of letters who came upon the stage as the old New England guard passed off.

Education, as the primary duty of democracy, had always been recognized in the United States. The first action of the old Congress looking toward the use of the national estate had, in the Northwest Ordinance (1787), pledged public aid to the common schools, and when issues of immigration and localization arose thereafter, education appeared to provide the cure. "What are you going to do with all these things?" Thomas Huxley asked, at the opening of Johns Hopkins University in 1876: "You and your descendants will have to ascertain whether this great mass will hold together under the forms of a republic and the despotic reality of uni-

Education
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versal suffrage." The university that he was helping to launch was itself convincing evidence of the passion for education at all levels and in all directions that had begun to consume the American people during the Civil War, and that brought forth new enterprises every few months from 1865, when the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and Vassar College began their experiments, until the middle eighties when the university had been differentiated from the college, and the whole system of education was in full blast. College, university, normal, technical, and secondary education were at work upon the American character.

American education during the first century of independence was narrower in fact than in theory. It began in the district school, and ended there for most of the population. In the older communities colleges, generally under religious control, carried a few boys on to law, medicine, and theology. In the newer regions, where land grants had been pledged to public education, state seminaries and universities belied their name, and did the work of indifferent high schools. Of technical training there was almost none except in the United States Military Academy at West Point. Railroad and canal promoters turned thither for chief engineers, who made the surveys, and often retired from the army to manage the roads. George B. McClellan, after a young man's distinguished career in the regular army, was president of a railroad when the Civil War began.

The divorce between education and the affairs of the world grew clearer as science began to demand recognition in the thirties. Here and there a president saw the need for a wider angle in the collegiate vision. Francis Wayland realized it at Brown, whose presidency he assumed in 1826. Horace Mann, as secretary of the Massachusetts Board of Education, worked toward it after 1837. But the general mandate upon the college president was that he should be a father to his boys, and "by timely interference prevent bad habits, detect delinquencies, and administer reproof and punishment." The college faculties clung to the old precedents in the curriculum.

College education declined in general repute in the middle of the nineteenth century. Perhaps the crystallization of the course of studies, perhaps the rejection of science, perhaps the arrogance of the classics caused it; but whatever the reason there were fewer collegiate students in 1870 than in 1830. The studies of F. A. P. Barnard, who started Columbia upon a modern period when he assumed her presidency in 1864, give the estimate that in 1830 the United States had 645 such students per million of population, in 1850 only 497, and in 1869 but 392. An effort to arrest the decline — for there was no despair of education — brought religion, capital, and the frontier spirit into conjunction.

In the summer of 1862 Congress, having completed its homestead system and having for a dozen years contributed directly to the building of the Western railroads, passed the Morrill Act endowing in every State a land-grant college of agriculture and mechanic arts. Only a handful of the States already had such colleges, the Michigan Agricultural College (1857) at Lansing standing out as the earliest of its kind; but every State accepted the proposed lands and applied them shortly to an existent college, to the state university, or to a new creation. The universities of Wisconsin, California, Illinois, and Minnesota received impetus from this toward a new curriculum and standard. In New York the subsidy was added to the benefaction of Ezra Cornell whose university opened in 1868. In Pennsylvania the new state college was chiefly a school of agriculture. In Massachusetts the proceeds were divided between an agricultural college and the Institute of Technology.

The result of federal policy was most striking in the Western schools, but it was real throughout the whole Union. As the agricultural colleges were enlarged and strengthened, as they added experiment and research, and began in another generation to show positive results in discovery and invention, they tended to lessen the gap that had separated education and life before the Civil War.

The growth of education in state and land-grant universities stimulated the religious zeal that had dotted the country with its foundations since colonial days. In the East, Hicksite Friends opened their Swarthmore College in 1869, the Congregationalist college, Carleton, at Northfield, Minnesota, began work in 1870; the Boston University of the Methodists was a complete and going concern by 1873, as was the Episcopal University of the South at Sewanee, Tennessee, by 1876; and from this time until the munificence of John D. Rockefeller reopened the University of Chicago under Baptist rule in 1892 there was continuous pressure to stimulate the old and start new projects for education within the safeguards of religion.

The wealth of Americans flowed freely into all of these activities as public interest, deadened to politics in the seventies, turned more wholly to education as guarantee for the future. The average citizen resented the education tax less than any other tax. The private purse opened voluntarily to the religious college and the non-sectarian as well — to women, to negroes, to poor whites at the South, and to the new vocations.

Matthew Vassar was not the first to desire real college discipline for girls, but his college, opened at Poughkeepsie in 1865, is a great landmark in the education of women as well as a measuring-rod for their attainments. The long existence of its preparatory department proved the dearth of women prepared for college work. If the trustees exacted high entrance requirements they could not fill their dormitories, and the college would face financial disaster. If they filled up with preparatory students they learned that the discipline and type of teaching needed by girls of sixteen spoiled the college for its more mature students. Between the devil of bankruptcy and the deep sea of the young ladies' seminary they struggled along for many years, as did Wellesley, which opened on the outskirts of Boston in 1875. More fortunate in its financial arrangements was the college that grew from

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the gift of Sophia Smith, of Northampton, Massachusetts. This could afford to wait to test its conviction that girls could stand the strain of Greek as well as boys. It opened in 1875 with only fourteen freshmen, whom it allowed to ripen as genuine collegians, letting in a new class of freshmen each succeeding autumn and paying the full price for a high standard fully maintained. A decade later, when Bryn Mawr College opened its doors, the preparatory schools had caught up, and there was no talk of letting down the bars. Instead of this, Bryn Mawr could insist that its teachers be men of industry and research, professionally instead of accidentally drawn into their college work.

In the West the women had an easier entry into the field of higher education. Here the frontier had clarified the rights of women and here the colleges were new, lacking the tradition of exclusive masculinity; and here by 1870 it had become the general practice to co-educate the boys and girls. Women entered the men's collegiate course. In increasing instances the experiment of co-education was tried, with no bad consequences. Spurred by the activities of the women's colleges in the East and co-education in the West, Harvard and Columbia felt a need to extend their work. The "Annex" at Harvard offered its first courses in 1879 and developed into Radcliffe College a little later. At Columbia the admonitions of President Barnard to take like action were long in vain, but when the women at last got their college it received his name. In 1882 thirteen colleges and universities, all doing men's work for women, shared in the formation of the Association of Collegiate Alumnae.

The part education was to play in the rebuilding of the South impressed the imagination at an early date. Under the protection of the Freedmen's Bureau schools ^{Southern} were opened almost before the echoes of the ^{education} guns were silent. In 1867 George Peabody handed over to a group of notable trustees a fund to help the "more destitute portions of the Southern and Southwestern States of our Union." From this fund negro schools and normal

schools were aided and encouraged year after year. In 1875 a normal college at Nashville became the largest single venture of the fund, which, in another generation, passed its remaining assets to this college and wound up its work. John F. Slater, of Connecticut, inaugurated a friendly rivalry to Peabody when he set aside a million dollars in 1882 for "the uplifting of the lately emancipated people of the Southern States." Booker T. Washington began, with small equipment and a large vision, in 1881, his Tuskegee experiment of self-help for negroes.

The growth of professional education fills the same two decades after the Civil War. Agriculture, engineering, law, Educational and teaching shifted to a new basis of interest saturation and popularity. The normal schools multiplied and grew into the teachers' college. The high school entered upon its delicate mission mediating between the needs of the common school and the exactions of the overshadowing university. Its task grew in volume and difficulty as a prosperous nation sent ever larger numbers of its children into the high school, in which it had full confidence, and on into the university where its uncertainties were growing less. From 392 to the million of population, when Barnard examined the figures of higher education in 1869, the ratio of attendance rose to 1161 in 1880, to 1913 in 1900, and to nearly 5000 in 1925; with endowment, equipment, and public interest growing in proportion.

The renaissance of American education began simultaneously with the legislation of the sixties, which created the land-grant colleges in 1862 and a United States Bureau of Education in 1867. The stream of private benefactions that still flows unchecked began its run. Public leaders in education formed a new school of college teachers who were neither pedants nor pedagogues, but were statesmen in the best sense. Charles W. Eliot, beginning his reign at Harvard in 1869, was the most prominent of these, but at his side were White at Cornell and McCosh at Princeton (1868), Angell at Michigan and Porter at Yale (1871), Alice Freeman at Wellesley (1882), and Gilman at Johns Hopkins

(1876), Pepper at Pennsylvania (1881), and Northrop at Minnesota (1885); while the newly inspired universities were training Wilson, Lowell, James, Jordan, and Van Hise to take the lead a generation later.

At Johns Hopkins University the new education made its special imprint. The great teachers of the old colleges were drafted from the clergy, with only general preparation for their work. Beginning about the thirties there came now and then young men inspired with science and scholarship from the German universities. Only in the seventies did advanced work in America become possible. There were in 1850 eight graduate students recorded in the United States, said Ira Remsen in his Johns Hopkins inaugural in 1902; and in 1875 but 399. By 1900 there were 5668, in whose production and training no one had surpassed the predecessor of Remsen at Johns Hopkins — Daniel Coit Gilman.

It was Gilman who shaped the graduate university for which Johns Hopkins gave three and one half millions to Baltimore and the South, founding its leadership not upon a shell of buildings, but upon teachers and scholars. Here Gildersleeve and Martin and Adams trained the graduates who filtered into the new faculties of the eighties, and disturbed the tranquillity of the old with their ideas of research. Their inspiration was science and scholarship; not irreligious, but without religious bias. The inaugural orator, Thomas Huxley, in 1876, by his presence indicated the courage of Gilman's scientific conviction, for evolutionists were in disrepute and even Charles Darwin had not yet received his Cambridge LL.D. Science was on the program at Johns Hopkins, but not prayer; and to one who complained of the lack of the latter a clergyman aptly answered: "It was bad enough to invite Huxley. It were better to have asked God to be present. It would have been absurd to ask them both."

The warfare of science and religion was at its height when Rutherford Birchard Hayes became President of the United States, but society was clearly turning to education to solve

its problems. "What is the significance of all this activity?" asked Gilman at the opening of his university: "It is a reaching out for a better state of society than now exists; . . . it means a wish for less misery among the poor, less ignorance in schools, less bigotry in religion, less suffering in the hospital, less fraud in business, less folly in politics; it means more love of art, more lessons from history, more security in property, more health in cities, more virtue in the country, more wisdom in legislation; it implies more intelligence, more happiness, more religion."

The inspiring struggle to serve democracy with a new kind of education was slow in receiving full recognition from the public. It had to adapt a new ideal within a mediæval shell, and to bear the odium that conservatism generally accords to revolution. The universities and colleges did not as yet reach the masses of the people, but as they threw their tentacles down, to make circuits with the rising aspirations of greater numbers, they were opening a new chapter in American thought and idealism.

In the field of letters, there were beginnings, too; and a new generation of writers was broadening the base of American culture, reaching for new themes, and serving new classes. The older generation was about sung out, but its leaders held the center of the stage until their end. Behind them, the newer men were gathering up their strength for full blossoming when the period of transition should be over. In none of the figures of the younger group was the embodiment of the larger American spirit fuller or finer than in Samuel Langhorne Clemens (Mark Twain), writing at leisure in his quaint octagonal study upon a knoll at Quarry Farm, and putting on paper in the summer of 1874 the first draft of *Tom Sawyer* and *Life on the Mississippi*.

The pessimism of James Russell Lowell and Edwin Lawrence Godkin and their doubts as to the success of democracy were inspired by their realization that all America was not like New England, and were intensified by ideas from the West and South that looked

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to them like repudiation and decay. The *Atlantic Monthly*, founded in 1857, had become the literary vehicle of New England men of letters. There had been nothing like it in the past, and it had no rival. Its standards were those of the best intelligence the United States possessed, but its circulation, like that of the New York *Nation*, hardly reached beyond the acquaintances of its contributors. Lowell edited it at first, then Fields, and Howells, and in 1880 Thomas Bailey Aldrich took it in hand. Less literary, but more lively, its rival, *Harper's Monthly*, shared with it in the later seventies the leadership in American letters. The field was enlarged when in 1881 the old *Scribner's Monthly* became the *Century Magazine* under the editorship of Dr. J. G. Holland, and then of Richard Watson Gilder and Robert Underwood Johnson, whose inspiration sustained the new periodical for forty years. *Scribner's* itself was revived in 1886 to complete the quartette.

The widening of public taste, revealed by the literary periodicals that it supported, called soon for literary gossip as well as literature. The *Dial* was founded in Chicago in 1880, to purvey this gossip. The *Critic* began a year later with its office close to the centers of literary information in the East. The *Book-Buyer*, revived in 1884, was something more than a trade journal, and catered to the same new interest, while in due time *Current Literature* (1888) and the *Bookman* (1895) broadened and intensified the field.

American literature in the century just ended was limited in its appeal and its accomplishment, but its great and established figures were marked men — “the only position that has ever been acknowledged cheerfully by the American people,” as some one wrote in the *Atlantic* in 1881, “has been the small circle of first-class historians, poets, and scientists, Prescott, Motley, Ticknor, Agassiz, Bryant, Longfellow. . . .” The spirit of democracy tended to recognize an intellectual aristocracy even if it refrained from reading all its works, but the aristocracy was now one of old men with a gap in years between them and the oncoming generation.

Mark Twain was in 1877 just on the verge of recognition from America, with the *Adventures of Tom Sawyer* (1876) as his newest work, and with an English success that convinced New England of his importance. There is no truer description of the great plains and mining camps in the last decade before the advent of the railroad than he wrote in *Roughing It* (1872). His travels carried him to Europe, while European adventures were still novel, and *The Innocents Abroad* (1869) and *A Tramp Abroad* (1880) brought him an expanding circle of readers who knew they liked him, but were not sure that he was literature. The vital humor of *Jim Smiley and his Jumping Frog* (1865) continued to inspire his later writings, as well as his lectures on the lyceum circuit. Like the writers of the older generation, he told his story to audiences over all the country, and in 1872 he followed Artemus Ward to London, where his success was instant. New England was slow to admit him within its dignified circle. "The literary theories we accepted were New England theories," wrote Howells, who sat at an *Atlantic* desk after 1866; "the criticism we valued was New England criticism, or, more strictly speaking, Boston theories, Boston criticism."

Whittier and his contemporaries had done their work, but it was not until the middle of the following decade that America recognized their successors. By the time E. C. Stedman wrote his "Twilight of the Poets" (1885) for the *Century*, new names had risen to the head of the American list, while the public was finding enjoyment in a wider range of letters. The first fifteen names on a list of immortals compiled by the *Critic and Good Literature* in 1884 included only four of the older group: Holmes, Lowell, Whittier, and the historian Bancroft, who was now in his old age revising his monumental *History of the United States* and admitting to his intimacy the young men who were to be leaders in Washington letters in the next generation: Hay, Henry Adams, Clarence King, and Lodge.

The remaining names of the first fifteen were Howells,

Curtis, Aldrich, Harte, Stedman, White, Hale, Cable, James, Clemens, and Warner.

The men whose writings have since been accepted as the most expressive of the American character were recognized by their contemporaries as their work appeared. Henry James, with *The American* (1876), stepped at once into leadership as an exponent "of contemporary American life in fiction," and held the position until his death. William Dean Howells, who stood above him on the *Critic's* list of 1884, was gaining power as he used it in *The Lady of the Aroostook* (1879) and *A Modern Instance* (1882), until his *Rise of Silas Lapham* (1885) became perhaps the most distinctive portrait of Eastern society in the decade. Clemens was accepted without question as the years advanced. *Tom Sawyer* was followed by its companion tale, *The Adventures of Huckleberry Finn* (1885), which the *Athenæum* subsequently described as "one of the six greatest books ever written in America." His powers were steadily growing, and *The Prince and the Pauper* (1881) and *The Personal Recollections of Joan of Arc* (1895) revealed him in his broader sympathies, after he had outgrown the rôle of the professional humorist.

The themes of the American men of letters ran to portraiture and local color. "There is nothing definite in American society for the dramatist to get hold of," said a writer in the *Atlantic* in 1881, who had in mind the social uniformity dominant in the old American society. The lack of caste as a motive in fiction was filled in part by the appearance of the American girl as a novel species, untrammelled by social limitations and breezy with the expansiveness of the open country. Howells and Henry James used her with freedom, and the illustrators made out of her a definite literary type. The amazing popularity of General Lew Wallace's *Ben Hur* (1880) and F. Marion Crawford's *Mr. Isaacs* (1882) revealed the catholic tastes of a widening reading public.

The sharp change in the course of literary production was nowhere clearer than in literature for children. The

moral tracts of the mid-century and the sensational ro-
 Children's mances which Ned Buntline manufactured and
 literature literature Nick Carter continued were gradually dis-
 placed by literature of a different stripe. Howard Pyle
 brought out *The Merry Adventures of Robin Hood* (1883),
 popularizing a folk-lore and setting a new standard with his
 own illustrations. Frances Hodgson Burnett's *Little Lord
 Fauntleroy* (1886) added a new child to the personages of
 fiction. *St. Nicholas* (1873) and *Harper's Young People*
 (1879) began to produce much of the new children's litera-
 ture in periodical form, and were accepted in England nearly
 as freely as at home.

A search for local color carried Mark Twain to the west-
 ern fringe of civilization, where Bret Harte found treasures
 of a similar character, and where Helen Hunt
 The negro Jackson found the materials for *Ramona* (1884).
 theme The South was rediscovered at the same time and an "ethi-
 opiomania" ran its course through the early eighties, as
 negro songs and music had their day. The cult expressed
 itself sometimes in doggerel:

"Piano put away
 In de garret for to stay;
 De banjo am de music dat de gals am crazed about.
 De songs dat now dey choose
 Am 'spired by de colored muse,
 An' de ole kind o' poeckry am all played out."

Sometimes it was revealed in the popularity of negro play-
 ers and of white actors masquerading as such. Haverly's
 Mastodon Minstrels, with forty men in the cast, held the
 stage at Drury Lane in London in 1884, forty years after
 the first minstrel troupes had made their appearance, and
 serious students of negro lore took the trouble to debate
 in public whether the banjo was or was not the negro's in-
 strument.

Joel Chandler Harris brought the negroes into letters on
 a higher plane when he collected their folk-lore in *Uncle
 Remus, His Songs and Sayings* (1880). His popularity
 was shared by George W. Cable, whose *Granddissimes* (1880)

portrayed the creole life in old New Orleans. Cable soon had the descendants of the creoles buzzing around his ears, but the portrait seemed true to life to the rest of the country, and readings by the author were welcome everywhere. Judge Albion W. Tourgée's *A Fool's Errand* (1880) gave a less benevolent view of Southern life than Harris and Cable did, and was used as a campaign document against the mild treatment of the South begun by President Hayes.

America continued to be entertained by dialect literature such as Lowell had exploited long since in the *Biglow Papers*, and by professional humorists like Petroleum V. Nasby and Artemus Ward. James Whitcomb Riley stopped painting signs in Logansport and gave up his travels with a patent medicine troupe, and brought out in 1884 *The Old Swimmin' Hole, and Seven More Poems*. He soon began a long career upon the platform reading his dialect verse. In 1886 he traveled in company with Edgar Wilson (Bill) Nye, founder of the Laramie *Boomerang* (1881), and one of the most successful humorists.

The taste of the seventies and eighties was the product of the common schools inspired somewhat by the literary reputations of New England and led here and there by graduates of the aspiring new colleges. It made up in avidity what it lacked in discrimination and standards. When Richardson built Trinity Church in Boston for the congregation of Phillips Brooks, his adaptation of the romanesque type of architecture was imitated west to the Pacific. There was still enough provincialism for the United States to be keenly sensitive to what Europe thought about it. James Bryce from the early seventies was a repeated and welcome visitor as he gathered his materials for the *American Commonwealth* (1888). Thomas Huxley found ready audiences as he discussed "The Evidences of Evolution" on his American trip of 1876. Herbert Spencer, whose *Principles of Sociology* (1876) invented the science of that name, was welcomed in 1882. Matthew Arnold, in 1883, found "the blaring publicity" of New York beyond his expectations, but was grateful

The
European
visitor

for "the kindness and good-will of everybody." The English historian Edward A. Freeman wrote *Some Impressions of the United States* (1883), after a lecturing trip in 1881. He spoke at Lowell Institute in Boston, a century after the surrender at Yorktown, upon the English people in their three homes: Germany, Britain, and America; and gave to the historical seminar of Johns Hopkins University not only advice and interest, but the motto "History is past Politics and Politics present History." American curiosity was wide open, and there was a welcome even for Oscar Wilde, who lectured in 1882 on the English renaissance in "a fine æsthetic jargon . . . knee breeches, pumps, a white waistcoat, and white silk stockings."

The self-consciousness that led the United States to be interested in what others thought of it evoked a new curiosity as to the meaning of American history. The Centennial Era of the centennials Exposition in Philadelphia in 1876 was part of a series of patriotic centennials that continued until, in 1889, the one-hundredth anniversary of the inauguration of Washington was celebrated. The early years of this period brought out a flood of oratory on the Revolution, and Bancroft revised his *History of the United States* in a centennial edition. Interest was turned to other aspects of American history. In one field Francis Parkman was bringing to a conclusion his studies on the French in America and their struggle with the English in the eighteenth century. Henry Adams, lifting history to a new level of instruction at Harvard in the seventies and studying the lives of Albert Gallatin and John Randolph, settled down in the eighties to his nine-volume *History of the United States during the Administrations of Jefferson and Madison* (1889-91). In 1883 the first two volumes of the *History of the People of the United States* appeared. The author, John Bach McMaster, an obscure instructor in engineering at Princeton College, became immediately the holder at the University of Pennsylvania of one of the earliest chairs in American history to be created, and started in the United States a school of historians who saw the realities of history

in the whole life of the people rather than in the doings of kings and courts. In the autumn of 1884 a group of students interested in the historical revival, led by Herbert B. Adams, of Johns Hopkins University, and Andrew D. White organized the American Historical Association. The next year a Cleveland business man, James Ford Rhodes, who had already made himself financially independent, turned his affairs over to his brother-in-law, Marcus A. Hanna, and set out to write the story of the Civil War under the title *A History of the United States Since the Compromise of 1850*.

The frontier of history was pushed down through the nineteenth century under the new impulse. Its quality rose above the level of antiquarianism and the defense of democracy, that inspired most of the writings before the Civil War, and bore the impress of the higher scholarship of the graduate seminary at Johns Hopkins and the superior teaching elsewhere. A treatise on *Congressional Government* (1885), by Woodrow Wilson, one of the Johns Hopkins students, received immediate recognition. Another of the group carried the standards of scholarship into the West. Frederick Jackson Turner produced in Wisconsin in 1893 his essay on the *Significance of the Frontier in American History* with such compelling logic as to force a complete restatement of the facts in American history in the next quarter-century.

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CHAPTER IV

STALWART AND HALF-BREED

“LET us have peace,” was the hope of Grant when he accepted his first nomination for the presidency of the United States, but the obstacles that prevented a return of peace to the hearts and lives of his fellow-countrymen endured through the next eight years, and the hope unrealized remained to inspire his successor, Rutherford Birchard Hayes, nineteenth President of the Republic. When that successor took the public oath of office on Monday, March 5, 1877, there had been added to the irritation of the sections the exasperation of a party that believed the presidency to have been stolen. The most ardent of his adherents could make no surer case for his election than that his inauguration was in accordance with the law, and that with a free and honest vote his choice would have been assured. Only the fact that he, with Grant, believed the time had come for peace gave to his term a promise of good for the United States.

The Hayes
Administra-
tion

Peace or no peace, the United States was in 1877 tired of its past — though it had recently celebrated its centennial with enthusiasm — and eager to explore its future. War and panic and maladministration had left scars that needed healing. A reconciliation of its sections, a new organization for public and private affairs, a free religion, and a better education attracted and filled the public mind. While politicians scolded, the people turned their hearts against politics for a decade and found their vital interests in intellectual and economic reconstruction. It was the mission of Hayes, once in office, to facilitate this work. From the day he formed his Cabinet it was evident that a change had come.

The names of his advisers, undetermined until he reached Washington, and unannounced until he sent them to the

Senate, contained a promise for the future. William M. Evarts brought to the State Department great fame as a lawyer and the virtue that he was no man's man and was friendly to reformers. He was bitterly opposed by Senator Roscoe Conkling, confidant of Grant and leader of the New York Republican machine. The propriety of John Sherman's appointment to the Treasury was heightened by his long association with financial legislation in the Senate. In the War Department George W. McCrary, of Iowa, ousted Don Cameron, son of Simon and heir-apparent to the Republican political machine in Pennsylvania whose reappointment Conkling and the elder Cameron wished to force.

Richard M. Thompson, an old Whig spell-binder of Indiana, became Secretary of the Navy, succeeding Robeson, of New Jersey, whom the last House had not impeached for malfeasance only because the evidence against him fell short of the conclusive. At the Post-Office, which Conkling had wanted for Thomas C. Platt, his chief-of-staff, was David M. Key, who was a hostage of peace and an affront to party men because he was a Tennessean, an ex-Confederate, and even a Tilden Democrat. There had been talk of taking General Joe Johnston into the Cabinet, but Key was the final choice. The cup of bitterness was filled for the steersmen of radical Republicanism by the selection of Carl Schurz for the Interior Department. Schurz, a Liberal Republican of 1872, was a consistently active and earnest reformer. He succeeded Zachary Chandler, of Michigan, who, as chairman of the Republican National Committee in 1876, managed to direct a national campaign without having conference or correspondence with the candidate whom he elected. Judge Charles E. Devens, of Massachusetts, as Attorney-General, completed what Wendell Phillips, strong-mouthed as ever, soon denounced as the "slave-hound Cabinet." From Evarts to Devens the council list, equally displeasing to violent radicals and to men grown old in stalwart manipulation of the dominant party, proved what Schurz had written, that the Republican Party had "nominated a man

without knowing it," and that Hayes intended to establish peace. The pledge of Hayes in his inaugural repeated the earlier promise of his letter of acceptance that he would restore home rule to the South, clean up the national administration, and maintain the public credit. With advisers identified with each of these three tasks but with a Congress divided against itself, he set to work. The House of Representatives, Democratic since the election of 1874, was more anxious to embarrass the Administration than to do its work; and in the Republican Senate the President had few friends after he sent in his Cabinet list, Tuesday, March 6. There was an immediate outbreak of wrath at the treason to his party seen in the nominations. "The path of reform to which he [Hayes] is pledged," said the most important of Republican papers, the *New York Tribune*, "can go only over the ruins of the average Congressman's dearest interests." Blaine, new to the Senate, to which he had been appointed in 1876 after thirteen years in the House, led in the criticism of presidential policy and in defense of Republican control of the South. Conkling, as bitter an enemy as Blaine possessed, joined the attack less from disapproval of the Southern policy than from patronage resentment. Simon Cameron, chairman of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, was unable to stop the confirmation of Evarts and the rest, and resigned his seat in the Senate in disgust; but he showed that he still had power by making the pliant Pennsylvania legislature choose his son, J. Donald Cameron, as his successor. The members of the Cabinet received their confirmation with the people less interested than their leaders in the wrangle, but the President was left confronting a gloating opposition, a divided party, and the most difficult of civil tasks.

In eight of the Confederate States white control had been restored before Grant left the presidency. In the remaining three there were contests which made possible the duplicate electoral returns from Florida, South Carolina, and Louisiana, upon whose counting the

The Hayes
policies.

The Senate
in revolt

Home Rule
in the South

fate of the election turned in 1876. In two, Louisiana and South Carolina, the Republican State Governments held their control only because federal troops, stationed at their headquarters by Grant, deterred the Democratic claimants from seizing public office. The deterring influence was moral rather than physical, since of the whole regular army, listed in 1876 as 28,571 officers and men, only 5885 were within the limits of the Confederacy, and more than half of these were occupied with Indian and border patrol duties on the Texas plains. In New Orleans there were 232 clerks, officers, and men; in Columbia, 141.

The withdrawal of the last vestige of military control from the Southern States was bound up with the fate of the pretending Governments. In both South Carolina and Louisiana the canvass of 1876 produced fraud to fight "bull-dozing." Intimidation of negroes entitled to vote under the Fifteenth Amendment had matched fraud in counting the returns. In each State there were both official and contesting returns upon the presidential vote as well as upon the local vote. The Electoral Commission, declining to go behind the official record, had counted the official Republican vote in each instance; but the people themselves had organized Democratic State Governments in Louisiana and South Carolina, with Grant giving official countenance and protection in each case to the Republican claimants; to Stephen B. Packard in Louisiana and to David H. Chamberlain in South Carolina.

The Packard and Chamberlain Governments were both inaugurated under federal patronage, but during January and February, 1877, while Congress was working out the basis for the final presidential count, it became clear that the Democratic pretender governors, General Wade Hampton in South Carolina and Francis T. Nicholls in Louisiana, had the real support. There was no possibility of a unanimous decision upon the titles. Each house of Congress, sole judge under the Constitution of the returns of its own members, seated the claimants whom the majority desired, Democratic Representatives in one case, and Senators

chosen by the Republican legislatures in the other. The President could not please even Congress, let alone all the people, and accordingly he followed the course that Grant had already outlined for him before inauguration. Grant had protected the establishment of the Republican Governments, had maintained the peace, but had refrained from defending either Government as legitimate. Hayes found peace prevailing on March 4, and no sign of an insurrection that could warrant active interference by the Executive. "If all the people whose recognition amounts to anything refuse to recognize a state government, that government falls of its own weight," explained the *New York Independent*, which believed with Blaine that the legal title of Chamberlain and Packard was as good as that of Hayes. It frankly confessed, however, that it could not see "how the Federal Government can by a standing army take permanent care of a majority that cannot take care of itself." In this view the great body of Americans appears to have concurred. Some believed in the validity of each contestant, but most were also ready to leave the adjustment to be worked out by the people of the South.

The actual steps in disentanglement took some seven weeks. On April 3 the Secretary of War was ordered to remove the squad of troops from the Columbia State House to their barracks, and on April 20 similar orders cleared the situation at New Orleans. In neither case did insult or outrage follow the withdrawal. The effective opinion of the States in question upheld the Democratic Governments, as it had already done in every Southern State. The dispossessed governors came North to attend Republican conventions and pour their woes into willing ears, but the North was no longer ready to fight; the war was over. The South was solid and the United States had turned its mind from strife to the larger tasks of peace. In vain did Blaine shout in the Senate, "You discredit Packard and you discredit Hayes." In vain did he hope that "there shall be no authority in this land large enough or adventurous enough to compromise the honor of the national administration or

the good name of the great republican party that called that administration into existence.”

The army of the United States, fixed by law in the last year of the Grant Administration at a maximum strength of 25,000, was released from one of its duties by the Southern policy of President Hayes. It was no longer obliged to police the South. And its members were no longer certain of their livelihood, for the outgoing Congress in 1877 had deadlocked over the use of troops as posse for civil purposes, and the Democratic House had defeated the army appropriation bill rather than concede a duty to protect the voting rights of citizens or to defend the peace. From William Tecumseh Sherman at its head, down the long list of general officers whose names suggested a roster of Union victories, the army was hated in the South — and not loved even in the North. A special session of Congress to vote their pay was announced soon after the inauguration, but many more events were to draw notice to the army before October 15, 1877, when that Congress met.

With the remote world America was in profound peace, and the last of the settlements with Great Britain under the Treaty of Washington was nearly reached. This was the Halifax arbitration of the value to Canada of certain rights in the Saint Lawrence fisheries, claimed and wanted by New England. The award on November 23, 1877, failed to please the United States, but it at least closed one aspect of the case; while throughout Canada events were pointing toward a new relationship —annexation.

From an early period in the century all of Canada was conscious of the nearness of the United States, if only through the anti-American feelings of those exiled tories who, as United Empire Loyalists had been colonized in New Brunswick and Ontario after the Revolutionary War. Upper Canada had felt the nearness during the rebellion of 1837, when New York proved a convenient recruiting ground for rebels; and both Upper and Lower Canada served through the sixties as a base for

Confederate attacks upon the American border, or as an objective for Fenian raids by American Irishmen upon the territory of Great Britain. Beyond the Great Lakes the Canadian Northwest was nearer to Saint Paul than to any other center of population, and derived its annual supplies over the trail thence to Red River. Its urgent pressure forwarded the railroad construction that laid the foundations for the fortunes of Lord Strathcona and James J. Hill. The approaching completion of an American Pacific railway in the later sixties drove Canadians to urge a Pacific railway of their own, or, failing that, incorporation with America. The Dominion Act with its impetus to the imperial bond came simultaneously with the purchase of Alaska (1867) which made America Canada's neighbor at another corner. All through the seventies Canadian politics were filled with imperialism as the alternative to annexation. The latter policy had the valiant aid of Goldwin Smith, professor at Toronto and once regius professor at Oxford. Smith had been imported to the United States by Andrew D. White to aid in building the new university at Ithaca (Cornell), and had soon crossed the border to live in Canada, retaining meanwhile a wide acquaintance in and a keen understanding of America. A Canadian election of 1878 brought Sir John A. MacDonal'd and imperial protection back to power, but annexation and its various substitutes continued to clamor on the northern border for another fifteen years.

There was no talk of annexation coming out from Mexico. Here, instead, a new dictator was struggling to establish his government and to prevent the United States from acquiring an excuse for intervention. Porfirio Diaz proclaimed himself provisional president in November, 1876, and proceeded to demand immediate recognition from the United States through John W. Foster, the American Minister. It was the disposition of Grant to recognize at once, but Foster held off, discussing first the measure of control that the new president possessed over his army and his unenthusiastic subjects. Along the Mexico

Rio Grande this control was a matter of critical importance.

For many years before the revolution of 1876 the United States had complained of the inability of Mexico to police the stretch of territory from El Paso, where the Del Norte emerges from the mountain trough of New Mexico, to Brownsville and Matamoros, where it empties into the Gulf. West of El Paso was friction, more or less, but there were too few Americans to make it menacing. The Southern Pacific Railroad had not yet crossed the Colorado River into Arizona, and even bad Mexican "greasers" could do little damage there. But below El Paso were isolated tracts of settlement on each side of the river, which as yet no railroad touched or even approached, with a "dense chaparral of cactus, Spanish dagger, mesquite, and other similar plants" in the interstices where there was not actual desert. Here cattle thrived, and cattle thieves abounded who forded the river and ran off with American stock, too often leaving behind a trail of burning ranches, slaughtered owners, and mutilated women and children. "Our people are murdered," complained Governor Hubbard of Texas in 1878, "their property stolen, and, with but rare exceptions, our claims for redress are met with indifference, and our demands for fugitive thieves and murderers laughed to scorn from the opposite side of a shallow river, and almost within sight of their victims."

The recognition that Diaz demanded was deferred until April, 1878, and until new measures to protect the Texas border had been taken by President Hayes. Most of the regular troops remaining in the South in April, 1877, when they were finally detached from Southern police duty, were on the border of Texas, stewing in the sun and chasing bandits. Their attempts to secure coöperation with the Diaz troops were vain. On June 1, 1877, by order of Hayes, General Ord, who commanded in Texas, was directed to disregard the Rio Grande and to pursue thieves over the international boundary into Mexico. With solemn words the Mexican Government protested this invasion of its

sovereignty, but the raids soon lessened under the vigorous pursuits of Lieutenant-Colonel W. R. Shafter. The enemies of the Administration avowed that this was war, and that the South, in the saddle again, was desirous to redress the balance of the Union by forcible annexation. But Hayes stood firmly by his policy, and in his own good time gave recognition to the great Mexican dictator.

The Southern vote, clamoring in Congress for army reduction and getting it in 1876, fought the police duties of the army at the polls. It left the troops unpaid, yet nevertheless wanted this Texas patrol kept to the front and the cavalry regiments recruited for this purpose to full strength. Another Western duty in the summer of 1877 revealed again the dependence of the United States upon an army and the straits to which sectional politics had reduced it.

There had been no systematic Indian wars for several years before 1876, the campaigns between 1864 and 1868 and the peace negotiations of 1867 having Custer and the Sioux marked the end of a period of general restlessness. In 1876, however, the Dakota Sioux, exasperated by prospectors in the Black Hills region, gave pretext for a punitive campaign. A column under General Custer was destroyed on the Little Big Horn early in this enterprise, and Sitting Bull with his followers escaped to a refuge in Canada. Unwelcome guests, but not expelled from Canada, the Sioux braves were in 1877 negotiating for a return to the United States. In June the Nez Percés of Idaho followed them upon the war path.

The grievances of the Nez Percés were trespass and extortion, and excited the commiseration of even their official scourge, General O. O. Howard. They were guiltless victims, not of special malice but of the relentless frontier that had ever pushed over the obstructions in its way, and of the weakness of administration that left the army too small, and poorly adapted to the duties of an Indian police. In Canada the Royal Mounted Police had little trouble with their wards, doing with twos and threes what whole regiments of cavalry found trying tasks on the American side.

Toward Canada Chief Joseph of the Nez Percés started, once actual hostilities began in June, 1877. The raid started in the Clearwater country of Idaho; across that State and Montana, too, went the fugitive, with General Howard in pursuit until Chief Joseph was maneuvered into the arms of Colonel Nelson A. Miles in October. To re-enforce Howard it was necessary to send a regiment from Atlanta, Georgia, and unpaid at that. The public remained indifferent to General McClellan's plea that it cost nearly as much to transport troops such great distances as would keep a reasonable army on the ground.

The greatest of the military emergencies of 1877 occurred not on the border or among the sullen and outraged Indians, but in the most populous and wealthy region of the East, where outbreaks in July caused thoughtful men to ask whether government itself could last in the face of threatened revolution. The railroad strikes along the Baltimore and Ohio and the Pennsylvania lines, and extending to their neighbors, brought a new element into the American situation — that of a class struggle with revolutionary ideals fighting the existing order. Socialism and anarchy abroad, with the recollection of the excesses of communism in Paris after the last war, disturbed many minds. Turgenieff's *Virgin Soil* was among the newer books, through whose pages the reader could see into the vortex of social unrest.

The immediate cause of the railroad strikes of 1877 was a general reduction of wages, effective July 1, and occasioned by hard times with shrinking freight receipts. The panic of 1873 caught the American railroads overbuilt. The ensuing depression forced many of them into bankruptcy, to emerge from which they reorganized, sacrificing in turn stockholders, bondholders, and finally, employees. These last fought against the reduction, led by the Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers, and countenanced by labor so far as it was organized.

The labor movement, with its resulting stratification of society, left the United States almost untouched until the

middle of the nineteenth century. An agricultural people, with unlimited free land on its margin, expected the normal citizen in youth to work for his parents; then to work awhile for wages; then to marry and make a farm somewhere. There was never enough labor for the ordinary crafts of non-industrial society, and no man of industry was driven long to work at an uncongenial job. It accordingly happened that unions of laborers were local and temporary, few reaching wide or permanent organization before the Civil War. The crisis induced by high and fluctuating prices, as the currency dropped in the last year of the war to thirty-five cents on the dollar, and aggravated by the oversupply of labor as the armies returned to civil life, gave the shock that crystallized, out of society, organized labor on a large scale.

The organization of national trade unions developed far enough during the Civil War to make possible the consideration of a general federation. After various caucuses held by the unionists, a group of some fifty delegates of national crafts met at the Front Street Theater in Baltimore and formed a National Labor Union in August, 1866. For several years thereafter the annual congresses of this body considered the obtainable needs of labor, and struggled against the efforts of other agitators to graft their reforms upon the labor stem. The eight-hour day was an immediate objective, as were factory laws and statistical studies. In the meeting of 1867 the influence of German socialists was noted, and an idea of repudiating the national debt took root. The next year, with an estimated membership of 640,000 in member unions, the National Labor Union reached the crest of its importance. After this it lost its single devotion to labor problems. It flirted with women's rights, adopted an outright political program, and became forerunner to the independent party of Greenbackers that emerged in 1876. It lost its grip on labor as it broadened its aims. After 1872, when the National Labor Party and the National Prohibition Party were born simultaneously at Columbus, it died. But it set a pace for labor in the fat years of the later sixties; and in

the lean years after the panic of 1873 it was an inspiration for imitators.

The history of unionism is embedded in conscious secrecy during these years. Many employers dismissed known unionists on sight, and had favorable public opinion behind them. "If they [the National Labor Congress of 1868] could . . . banish from their discussion the idea of a necessary and inherent enmity between Capital and Labor, it would be a great step toward the end they seek," said Horace Greeley's paper. "Having left the service of the company," wrote another observer of a great strike, "they [the strikers] should have recognized the fact that they had no longer any interest in its action, and should have sought employment elsewhere." And a Wall Street journal, expressing the most stubborn of the anti-labor opinions, said, as late as 1877, "the only injustice a railroad can inflict upon its men is to neglect paying them."

With public opinion averse to their existence and approving their destruction, the promoters of unionism had the alternatives of secrecy or starvation; but the reclassification of society due to the entry of the factory could not but compel them to strive for better things. Too often they were injured by the confusion of darkness. The secrecy in which they must be cloaked was used by less worthy movements for less desirable ends. In Pennsylvania, among the anthracite miners, the discovery of a secret murderous society discredited for a time all labor organizations.

The "Molly Maguires" started a reign of terror in the anthracite region early in the sixties. The demand of the Eastern cities for hard coal attracted thither large quantities of unskilled labor, much of it Irish, during the sixties and early seventies. The social conditions in the mining towns were always bad, but the labor was so fluctuating in personnel and the distinction between the miner and his unskilled helpers so sharp, that unionism took root slowly. The "Mollies" tried to do by terror what unions might have done by open dealings. They beat and murdered unpopular foremen,

The
"Molly
Maguires"

bosses, or owners, and in their secret way they became an agent as often for private malice as for group action. Their reign was never even threatened until James McParlan, a courageous detective, entered the district in 1874.

McParlan, in disguise, became a "Mollie" and worked his way into the confidence of the inner ring of murderers. When the time was ripe, he turned in his evidence against the leaders. In May, 1876, he threw off his disguise and took the stand against one of them on trial for murder, and in his testimony let the people see the crime that had existed. Against intimidation, threat, and public pressure he continued his work for law and order, and the Governor of Pennsylvania, Hartranft, refused to call him off. In the end, Mauch Chunk and Pottsville were the scene of eleven hangings of the conspirators, the first executions in a series of murder scandals running freely since 1865. This was in June, 1877. It prepared the public mind to believe any bad tale about a secret order and to consider a union of workers as a menace to society. In the same weeks events were preparing for a general strike.

The organization of railroad employees came at an early stage in the union movement. They were a new and growing class. The engineers, firemen, and conductors were responsible and skilled. Their industry was receiving recognition as basic in national development, and the engineers since 1863 had been organized. In this year their national union, the Brotherhood of the Footboard, appeared, changing its name in 1864 to the Grand International Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers. In 1874, P. M. Arthur assumed direction of their affairs as grand master engineer. In April, 1877, came a strike on the Philadelphia and Reading, a coal-carrying road, whose president, Franklin M. Gowen, was at that moment acquiring, in his fight against the "Mollies" in his mines, an intolerance of all organization among his employees. No wage question was immediately involved, but Gowen announced in March that all his engineers must choose between the railroad and the Brotherhood. In response to this the engineers took their loco-

motives into the roundhouses at midnight, April 14, 1877, and went on strike. In both of these strikes non-union men took out the engines almost before their fires were cold, and detention of travel was slight. In July, however, President Hayes and the governors of four States called upon the troops at their command to control the violence incidental to the more ominous outbreak on the line of the Baltimore and Ohio.

No industrial uprising since the Chartist demonstration of 1848, when the old Duke of Wellington barricaded London against the mob, so greatly disturbed the comfortable elements of society as this strike that began in Baltimore and Martinsburg on Monday, July 16, 1877. The wage reductions effective on all the trunk lines were the occasion of the strike, and when the company tried to move its trains with non-union crews, their course was impeded by riotous mobs. Trains were stopped, crews were assaulted, cars and coaches were overturned, and arson was added to violence and murder. How far the strikers were personally guilty does not appear. In all the railroad towns there was sharp discontent because of slack times or unemployment. There were, too, crowds of boys and hoodlums. The tramp nuisance, much commented on in this summer, provided outcasts ready for violence and theft. And the result was outrage that recalled the Civil War and seemed to foretell another social cataclysm.

By Tuesday, July 17, Baltimore was under control, with trains running locally; but the Governors of Maryland and West Virginia had called out their militia and besought aid of the United States. Martinsburg was in possession of the mob. The next day Hayes, by proclamation, warned the mobs to cease obstruction, and squads of troops were scraped together from the thin Eastern garrisons and hurried to centers of disturbance. At Martinsburg the proclamation and the troops produced quiet by the 19th, but the disorder spread west and north to the Pennsylvania lines at Pittsburgh.

In Pennsylvania a new administrative rule of the railroad company for double-header trains requiring only one crew to do the work of two aggravated the trouble produced by wage reductions, and Thomas A. Scott, president of the road, became the object of attack. Governor Hartranft ordered the rioters around Pittsburgh to disperse on July 20; and on Saturday afternoon, July 21, General Brinton's Pennsylvania militia engaged the rioters in a pitched battle as they tried to clear the tracks in Pittsburgh. The next day was, indeed, a "bloody Sunday" in Pittsburgh, with mayor and sheriff helpless, the militia generally impotent, and the mob burning and shooting. The union depot was destroyed that afternoon.

In the following week, the wave of unrest spread to the Delaware, Lackawanna, and Western and west to Chicago. The New York Central was held loyal by a judicious bribe of \$100,000 which William H. Vanderbilt, who had just succeeded to the control of the great estate of his father, the "Commodore," had promised his men. In Chicago, on the 26th, the week ended in a pitched battle in Turner Hall, where the police broke up a meeting of alleged communists and ejected them from their meeting-place.

Through these eleven days the railroad riots advertised the opening of a new industrial epoch and affected every class of society. Labor leaders, while only occasionally defending violence, were united in denouncing the use of troops. A grand jury in Pittsburgh, instead of hunting out mob leaders for punishment, tried to secure conviction of the militia officers whose men, bewildered and badgered, had fired upon the rioters. It was observed that the militia were often unequal to the tasks of riot duty, whereas federal proclamations, supported by a mere handful of regulars, produced order at once. Republican leaders in general ceased for a time their attacks upon Hayes to castigate the South for its weakening of the army. Conservative citizens, fearful that this was only the opening gust of a social cyclone regretted the lack of a stronger national government.

The strikers themselves went quietly back to work after

their effort had wasted its strength in blind explosion. The bottom of the financial depression had been reached, and hereafter conditions generally improved for the men at work, while the dangerous army of the unemployed lessened as new jobs drew off its more industrious units. It was a squall, but not a revolution; the stability of government was affected not at all; and the opponents on both sides turned directly to popular institutions to record their claims. The operators appealed to legislatures to admit a doctrine of public responsibility for property lost through mob violence; the unionists for more favorable labor and militia laws. The "moral instinct of the people" had been the real vindicator of law and order.

The railroad strikes of 1877 gained nothing immediately for the workers but publicity and a keener feeling for the identity of their interests. Their leaders moved on along the course of superior organization, and a new order, the Knights of Labor, which had existed in seclusion since 1869, raised its head above the surface as a coördinating body. New immigrants added their influence to what agitators described as the war of classes, and many of them speedily rose to places of leadership because the workers of Europe had thought out the problems of social order more penetratingly than had Americans.

Socialism, against which Germany, Russia, and France were raising their weapons, entered America as an adjunct of the labor movement. Even the Roman Church, through an encyclical of Leo XIII in 1878, attacked "that sort of men who under the motley and all but barbarous terms and titles of Socialists, Communists, and Nihilists, are spread abroad throughout the world and, bound intimately together in baneful alliance, . . . strive to carry out their purpose . . . of uprooting the foundations of civilized society at large."

"It is a good sign," commented Lyman Abbott in the *Christian Union*, "that the Church of Christ, both Protestant and Roman, is turning its attention to the problems of social and political life." American society had ahead of

it a long period of education and study before it could understand the appeal of the workers or readjust its government to the needs of modern life. American political parties were still where the Civil War had left them, with city rings and sectional factions engaged in a continuous struggle to control the jobs.

The independent members of the Republican Party exerted a continuous influence after 1872, and by their threat to repeat the secession of that year brought pressure to bear upon the professional rulers of the party. The widespread corruption in national and local administrations, revealed or suggested by the exploits of Tweed, the gold conspiracy of Gould and Fisk, the *Crédit Mobilier* scandal, the whiskey ring, and the salary grab, kept them resolved to struggle against the election of spoilsmen to national office. In the spring of 1876 the meeting of the independents at the Fifth Avenue Hotel was a warning to the Republican Convention to be careful in its nomination. The selection of Hayes was acceptable to the independents, and his pledges to reform the national administration followed by his appointment of Carl Schurz as Secretary of the Interior found favor in their eyes.

Factions of
Republican
Party

The main body of the Republicans were "stalwart" or "half-breed," according to their preference for leaders. Senator Roscoe Conkling was the most prominent of the stalwart leaders, and included among his political intimates most of the men who had been identified with the two administrations of Grant. The half-breed faction commonly avowed an interest in reform as opposed to the open cynicism of many of the stalwarts. James G. Blaine, their most prominent leader, and John Sherman were less identified with machine politics and more with the substance of government than most of the stalwarts. Both groups were offensive to the independents, and both found reasons for an aversion to the political policies of Hayes, as the latter undertook to fulfill his pledge for good government.

The anger of the party leaders at the structure of the Cabinet was intensified by an executive order issued in

June, 1877, forbidding office-holders to take active share in party management. A bill to hinder the collection of assessments upon office-holders had been passed the summer before, but the new order struck at the best recognized fact in party organization. "The decision is undoubtedly the forerunner of the most important new departure in modern politics," said the *Chicago Tribune*. Public officials everywhere held party offices as national committeemen or as members of the party organization in the States. The political existence of many of these was tied up with the advantage they enjoyed from their dual capacity, and the summer conventions were watched for evidence as to the effectiveness of the reform. "He will need the zealous support of all good men of both parties," said the *New York Herald*. In New York, Alonzo Cornell, chairman of the State Republican Committee, defied the order, and continued to hold on to his office as naval officer of the port of New York. In Wisconsin Colonel E. W. Keyes, State Republican "boss" since the Civil War, treated it with more respect and abdicated his state chairmanship rather than be displaced from the post-office at Madison.

Public attention was directed to the New York Custom House by the insubordination of Cornell, and the knowledge that he and Chester A. Arthur, collector of the port, were stalwarts who stood high in the councils of Hayes and the New York Senator Conkling. The Treasury Department, "stalwarts" under whose administrative jurisdiction they fell, was in process of investigation by direction of Sherman, and was reported to be a nest of political appointees more interested in serving stalwart policies than in earning the salaries they received. It was rumored that the President had determined to displace both officials, and Senator Conkling hurried home from a European trip to dominate the New York Convention, and to fight the President. In December "we saw to it that the President's plan was foiled," said Thomas C. Platt, chief assistant of Conkling. The Senate refused to confirm the nominations of Theodore Roosevelt and L. B. Prince as successors to

Arthur and Cornell, and the stalwart officials continued at their posts until the close of the session in 1878, when Hayes summarily suspended them from office. Conkling denounced the suspension in fury as party treachery, but the Senate finally permitted the removal of the officers.

The breach between Hayes and the stalwarts was widened by the political martyrdom of Arthur and Cornell, but the independent Republicans were not drawn any closer to the President. In the Interior Department and the Treasury Schurz and Sherman were encouraged to make their appointments on the basis of merit, but the President found appointive offices for Florida and Louisiana Republicans whose jobs had been lost when he withdrew the troops from the South, and he temporarily closed the breach in the party by sending half-breed members of his Cabinet to help the Conkling forces in the New York campaign of 1878. "We shall not have a political millennium until the people want it" was the comment of *Leslie's* in 1877. The independents resented the President's inability to divorce himself completely from politics, and the personal isolation of Hayes continued to the end of his administration.

In September, 1879, General Ulysses S. Grant landed at San Francisco from his voyage around the world. His arrival followed a long series of stories of state receptions accorded him wherever he had gone. He was received not only with the honors of royalty due to an ex-President, but as the greatest soldier of his day. As he traveled east across the States, with public banquets and civic receptions at every stop, his popularity, tarnished when he left the White House, resumed its fullest luster. His former comrades in arms felt their political power for the first time seriously. The prolonged Democratic filibusters against paying the army and the enforcement of the law by federal troops increased the public's distrust of politicians and its regard for Grant. He formally completed his trip by a visit to Philadelphia on December 16, where he was entertained at a great celebration at the Union League Club under the direction of

The Grant
third-term
boom

Senator Don Cameron, his former Secretary of War; and the next day Cameron, with the fame of Grant at its height, took up the reorganization of the Republican National Committee in order to make the renomination of Grant possible in 1880. "The reasons urged for the renomination of General Grant," said *Harper's Weekly*, "are typified in a picture of a man on horseback withstanding a host of anarchists."

The Republican National Committee, when it met in Washington December 17, 1879, was without a head, since Zachary Chandler, its former chairman, had recently died. The friends of Grant took advantage of a vacant Pennsylvania seat on the committee to bring in Cameron. William H. Kemble, the Pennsylvania member whom Cameron replaced, the reputed author of the spoilsman's phrase, "addition, division, and silence," was under indictment for bribery, growing out of the Pittsburgh riots of 1877. Cameron was elected chairman of the committee at once, and with the support of Conkling and Logan laid the plans to control the Chicago Convention in the following June.

There was no thought of the renomination of Hayes to succeed himself. He had disclaimed a second term before starting on his first, and few wished him to reconsider his determination; nor did he give active support to any other aspirant for the nomination. Blaine and Sherman were both brought forward by their friends, Blaine, Sherman, or Grant, 1880 Sherman believing that the nomination was a fitting reward for his financial services, and Blaine stirring up again the antipathies aroused against him in 1876 when his similar aspirations had been impeded by scandals connected with his career as Speaker of the House of Representatives.

In the Chicago Convention Grant could have been nominated if it had been possible for the stalwart leaders to hold each state delegation to the unit rule. They Garfield and Arthur contended that the majority of a delegation from any State had the right to determine the vote of the whole delegation as a unit. This claim was beaten on the

floor of the convention after a persuasive speech against it by General James A. Garfield, Congressman and Senator-elect from Ohio, and floor manager for Sherman. With the unit rule beaten, Grant's "old guard" of 306 faithful delegates clung together in vain. Neither Sherman nor Blaine could command a majority of the convention, and after a long deadlock Garfield was nominated for the presidency on the thirty-sixth ballot.

Having nominated Garfield, a half-breed, the convention made overtures for party unity by nominating Chester A. Arthur as Vice-President. Goldwin Smith thought that the victory of Garfield represented "the purer and better part of the Republican Party," but the proceedings of the convention indicate that the majority was inspired chiefly by the desire to win. "We are not here, sir," said Flanagan, of Texas, whom the *Chicago Tribune* described as possessing "a truthful and ingenuous mind" — "We are not here, sir, for the purposes of providing offices for the democracy. . . . After we have won the race, as we will, we will give those who are entitled to positions office. What are we up here for?"

A week after the Republican Convention the Greenback Party nominated James B. Weaver, of Iowa, for the presidency. The *Chicago Tribune* reporter, im-pressed perhaps by his recollection of Barnum's ^{Greenback Party} Greatest Show on Earth that had exhibited the preceding week on the lake front, called it a "side-show, and a funny one. . . . It was an idiotic trinity, composed of Fiatists, Labor-Union Greenbackers, and foreign Communists, with Free-Lovers, Women-Suffragists, and fanatics of every description." The Greenback Convention at least knew what it wanted, which was more than could be said of the Democratic Party; which was still without a recognized leader except Tilden, who lay under the suspicion aroused by the cipher dispatches. At Cincinnati later in the month, the Democrats selected General Winfield Scott Hancock, "the Democratic Trojan horse," for their candidate; otherwise cynically described by the *New York Sun* as "a good man, weighing two hundred and fifty pounds."

There was no clear issue separating the two major parties, and the nomination of each ticket was determined chiefly by party availability. In General Hancock, the Democratic Party sought to evade the Republican charge of continued disloyalty, and to enjoy the advantages accruing from the nomination of a military hero. The canvass was one of orthodox oratory and party intrigue. Toward the end of October a letter was forged in the interests of the Democratic candidate and printed in the *New York Truth*. It purported to have been written by Garfield to a manufacturer named Morey favoring the employment of cheap Chinese labor throughout the West. It was widely used in spite of Garfield's denial of the fraud. The chairman of the Democratic National Committee affirmed its authenticity for a time. "Look out for Roorbacks" was the warning of the *New York Tribune*, cautioning the party to be on its guard against further fresh lies. The Maine elections coming in September stimulated more vigorous organization by the Republican Party in behalf of Garfield. Secretary Dorsey, of the Republican National Committee, went in person to Indiana to take charge of the State election there on October 12, and the swinging of this doubtful State into line was regarded as the political master-stroke of the campaign. His Republican friends gave him a famous banquet at Delmonico's a little later, where Grant was toastmaster and leaders of the party approved his methods and success. The speech of Arthur, openly alluding to corruption in the election, was greeted with satisfied laughter by the banqueters.

The difficult task of Garfield during the canvass, to keep in line the Conkling faction without losing the support of Blaine and his friends, was made more difficult after his election, when it was necessary for him to organize a Cabinet to please all tastes. Blaine became his Secretary of State and was his chief adviser. Overtures were made to the independents by the appointment of one of their number, Wayne MacVeagh, of Philadelphia, as Attorney-General. An old supporter of Conk-

ling, Postmaster Thomas L. James, of New York, was promoted to be Postmaster-General. The aversion of the Greenbackers in the West to the financial methods of New York was recognized by the appointment of William Windom, of Minnesota, as Secretary of the Treasury. The apparent harmony for which Garfield labored, lasted only until he ventured to send to the Senate his first personal nominations for offices in the State of New York; this precipitated a struggle with the Senators from that State over his right to control this patronage.

“Did you notice the nominations sent in yesterday? They mean business and strength,” wrote Mrs. James G. Blaine, March 24, 1881, commenting upon the nomination by President Garfield of a new collector of the port for New York. Until this date Garfield steered a middle course between the factions, and the stalwart Senators persuaded themselves that he would not interfere with their local control of patronage. The influence of Blaine in the Cabinet, however, as its only strong and seasoned political member, was growing every day. His long letters of advice to the President often contained sound counsel, but when the President chose to assert his power over offices at the center of Conkling’s political domain, he invited certain opposition. Conkling opposed the confirmation of the nomination at once, invoking senatorial courtesy on the ground that he had not been consulted in advance, while Garfield invited attention to the issue by withdrawing from the Senate other pending nominations in order to give prominence to this particular appointment. He said to John Hay, to whom he had offered the post of private secretary, “They may take him out of the Senate head first or feet first; *I will never withdraw him.*” For nearly two months Conkling and Platt successfully postponed the confirmation, but in May the Senate confirmed the appointments, yielding to a growing pressure of public opinion that upheld the contention of Garfield that the power of appointment belongs to the President and not to the Senator of any State.

On May 14 Conkling resigned his seat in the Senate in protest against this impairment of his senatorial prerogative, and hurried to Albany, where the New York Legislature was in session, hoping to be vindicated in his position and triumphantly reëlected. The junior Senator, Thomas C. Platt, resigned as well, earning thereby the nickname, "Me too," that clung to him for two decades, until he came to be known as the "Easy Boss." Vice-President Arthur went to Albany to assist in lobbying for his old associate, but the "quixotic quest of vindication" by the "Stalwart Jupiter" and his "little satellite" came to nothing. The New York Legislature was unmoved by the injured esteem of its Senators and reëlected neither of them. Platt withdrew for a period into private business; Conkling passed forever out of national politics, leaving behind him nothing that lasted except his cynical declaration that "when Doctor Johnson said that patriotism was the last refuge of a scoundrel, he ignored the enormous possibilities of the word 'reform.'"

The new Administration, fighting for its political life as that of Hayes had done, was at least not hampered by organized opposition in Congress. Here the Republican Party expected to be able to command majorities in both houses when they should convene in December, 1881. Before that date arrived the whole political situation was changed by the murderous attack made upon the President on July 2. Garfield was at the time on his way to a college reunion at Williamstown, Massachusetts. The murderer, Guiteau, shot him as he passed through the railway station to the train, and then ran noisily into the arms of a waiting policeman, who asked him why he had committed the act. His answer was, "I am a stalwart, and want Arthur for President." The later investigations that were made showed that Guiteau was probably a madman, and that he had earlier in the spring infested the White House seeking a job, which had been refused. His language that suggested a stalwart plot had no foundation in the acts of any but himself, but the mere

Conkling
and the
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Murder of
Garfield

fact that the life of a President lay at the mercy of an office-seeker, and that even a lunatic could justify murder on political grounds, served to advertise the futility of the struggle of the factions and the demoralizing nature of the fight for patronage.

Garfield lingered through the summer, reported as dying one day and as recovering the next, and the Government in Washington was forced to ponder the constitutional phrase "inability to discharge the powers and duties" of the presidency. The recess of Congress prevented any attempt at legislative action to interpret it. On September 19 Garfield died and Chester A. Arthur, who had first come into national prominence when Hayes attacked him as a spoilsman, took up the work of President of the United States. Within the next few weeks most of the members of Garfield's Cabinet were allowed to resign and were replaced by secretaries more congenial to the new President. Only one of the resigning statesmen left a perceptible gap. Blaine had brought force and personality into the State Department, and had seen the possibility of turning American foreign policy into an affirmative program. He carried on with vigor the controversy that Evarts started under Hayes with reference to the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty and American rights on the Isthmus of Panama. He revived the note of American coöperation that Simon Bolivar touched in 1825, and issued invitations for a Pan-American Congress to meet in Washington. He intervened in the war in South America and he brought foreign affairs into domestic politics by the anti-British tenor of his correspondence, which gained him wide popularity with the Irish vote. He retired into private life in December, 1881, residing in Washington and devoting himself to the composition of his *Twenty Years of Congress*. The successor of Blaine, Frelinghuysen, continued the policies as started except that the invitations for the Pan-American Congress were withdrawn.

The reorganization of the Cabinet, instead of being the first step toward a clean sweep of half-breeds out of office,

was substantially the last step taken. To the amazement of his former associates "Chet" Arthur was unwilling to proscribe the faction of Garfield. He never gained the regard of the half-breed group, nor the support of the independents, but he succeeded in turning against himself the opposition of the group that had followed Conkling. In his personal conduct he became one of the most dignified Presidents of the United States. Before the end of his administration, decay had weakened the powers of the stalwart ring, and issues connected with new problems in American life had begun to remould the character of the Republican Party.

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CHAPTER V

THE MATERIAL BASIS

THE rivalries of stalwart and half-breed Republicans, and the futile attempts of Democrats to dislodge them from the control of the National Government, were far from being the realities of American life under Hayes, Garfield, and Arthur. Men voted, more or less, on election days, and party committees intrigued in the intervals between them, but the major part of American interest and strength went into the establishment of prosperity, the adjustment of currency and debt, the completion of the national railroad system, the development of industry, and the modification of living conditions brought about by the transition from agriculture to industry. "The silver dollar has driven New York to almost hopeless lunacy," said the *Chicago Inter-Ocean* in 1877, as it commented upon the first of the acute economic problems to emerge.

The American silver dollar was in truth the "dollar of our daddies" in 1878. It had rarely been seen in circulation since Jackson's act in 1834 established its relative weight, or coinage ratio, at sixteen to one with gold. The original attempt of Hamilton in his financial report of 1791 to establish a bimetallic money, in which two metallic coins should circulate at the same value, was frustrated by the inability of the two metals selected, gold and silver, to maintain an unchanging commercial ratio with each other. Hamilton provided for their coinage at the ratio of fifteen to one, at which weights the gold dollar was a few cents more valuable than the silver dollar, and was speedily withdrawn from circulation. The ancient Gresham law, to the effect that bad money drives out good, or, otherwise stated, that when two moneys are in existence with the same nominal value, but with different intrinsic value, the more valuable will be hoarded, and the less val-

uable will remain in circulation and fix the value of the coin, was fully borne out by the experience of the United States under both Hamilton's law and Jackson's.

The change of coinage ratio to sixteen to one in 1834 was designed to bring it closer to the commercial ratio in order to keep both metals in simultaneous circulation. The result was merely to change the inequality. The silver dollar now became more valuable than its gold associate, and disappeared from use. Subsidiary coins of the value of fifty cents or less were deliberately made light weight in 1853, but being issued only as they were bought at par from the Treasury did not displace the gold in circulation. Because of the unreliability of bank-notes and the inconvenience of handling small gold coins, the American half-dollar was a favorite coin thereafter, but it was possible to grow to manhood before the Civil War without ever seeing a silver dollar of American coinage.

The Gresham law, which had driven gold out of circulation before 1834 and silver after that date, disposed of both metals early in the Civil War. The issuance of greenbacks by the United States was perhaps a necessary measure to enlarge the currency to meet the war demands upon it, but the legal-tender quality given to the greenbacks, which forced the creditor to accept them when offered to him by his debtor, resulted in both a rise of prices and a premium upon gold. The gold dollar passed out of circulation in a few days, the cheaper subsidiary silver passed out a little later, and the currency of the United States went upon a paper basis with small notes or "shin-plasters," postage stamps, and private tokens serving as small change. It was still upon this paper basis when Hayes was inaugurated and pledged himself to restore the financial credit of the United States.

In February, 1873, when no coins had been in circulation for a dozen years, and few silver dollars for nearly forty, The "crime of 1873" Congress revised its coinage laws, and the silver dollar, although not losing its legal standing, was dropped from the list of coins to be manufactured

freely at the mint upon the presentation of bullion. The price of silver was still above \$1.2929 per ounce, at which commercial rate the gold and silver dollars would have been equal in value. In later years Senator Stewart of Nevada persuaded himself that the law "was conceived for the sole purpose of clandestinely omitting the silver dollar from the list of coins," and Henry Demarest Lloyd, writing editorials for the *Chicago Tribune*, came to believe that it was "done secretly and stealthily to the profound ignorance of those who voted for it, and of the President who approved it." The act, however, had been pending in Congress for several sessions, with its content clear to any one who chose to read, and would never have been denounced as the "crime of 1873" if the price of silver had not declined sharply in that year, changing thereby the relative value of the two dollars and bringing loss to every one interested in the production of silver.

The decline in the value of silver beginning about 1873 was due to the same complex of causes that decreased the price of nearly all commodities in the last third of the nineteenth century. The extension of railroads into the West made it easier to reach the silver mines. The output of the Comstock lode in Nevada, which had been laboriously hauled to San Francisco under guard, was able to get to market by rail after 1869. New discoveries in chemistry and metallurgy and better practice in mining engineering came from the European laboratories and the American schools of technology. They tended to reduce the cost of extracting silver from the ore and brought into easy commercial use low grade and refractory ores hitherto of little value. The price of silver fell from normal forces affecting its cost of production. The fall was hastened by a lessening necessity for its use in commerce. Bank-checks and clearing-houses made it possible to transact much business without a physical transfer of money, while gold was less bulky and more convenient than silver for the settlement of large accounts.

The decline in the value of silver was further accelerated

by the discovery and development of new deposits. During the Civil War a succession of mining booms Silver and the frontier dotted the inland empire with transient camps, some of which became the foundations for the new Territories of Colorado, Nevada, Arizona, Idaho, and Montana. In 1868, as a consequence of the mining booms, Congress was able substantially to complete the territorial subdivision of the United States by the organization of Wyoming.

Dakota Territory, created in 1861 and reshaped in the next few years, was conceived as an agricultural community, with a farming population in its southeast corner. Its wheat lands in the valley of the Red River of the North were as yet only a promise, since there was no railroad to take the wheat to its market. The western half of Dakota was an Indian country in which in 1868 the Sioux Indians were assigned a permanent home. In the Black Hills at the heart of the Sioux reserve, in the southwest corner of the Territory, gold and silver were found in 1875, and in 1876 an army of prospectors overran the reservation. From Bismarck on the upper Missouri, where a railroad had arrived in 1873, and from Fort Pierre and Yankton, farther down the river, the miners followed routes to the Black Hills published by the War Department. An Indian outbreak and the massacre of Custer's men on the Little Big Horn was a consequence of the attrition between the races. The boundaries of the reserve were rearranged, and the towns of Deadwood, Custer, and Rapid City became the centers of an active mining community in 1877. The stage-coaches to Deadwood attracted much of the romantic interest that had gathered around the overland stages to California two decades earlier, and the flood of precious metal was swollen by the output of the mines. A bill to establish a Territory of Lincoln in the Black Hills region, with lands cut away from Dakota, Montana, and Wyoming, was recommended for passage in the Senate in 1878. The bonanza wheat farms of the Red River Valley aroused the simultaneous discussion of a Territory of Pembina.

New mines were discovered in Colorado to increase still further the production of silver. While the Atchison, Topeka, and Santa Fe was contesting with the Denver and Rio Grande the right to the exclusive use of the Royal Gorge for a railroad extending up the Arkansas River above Pueblo, new deposits were uncovered near the headwaters of that stream, and Leadville began to ship both ore and bullion to the world. By 1878 there was a population of 20,000 in the new silver camp, upsetting the political balance of Colorado and stimulating the demand for legislation to avert the consequences of the falling price of silver.

The silver dollar had been dropped from the coinage list only a few months when a demand appeared in the Western States to put it back and restore the free coinage of silver at the old ratio. In all of the mining States the demand was repeated, and men who, like Senator Stewart, had supported the Act of 1873 discovered now that it had been a crime. Bills to restore free silver were added to the group of financial measures looking toward the resumption of specie payments and the refunding of the Civil War debt, and were pressed insistently upon Congress. At the commercial rate existing at the end of 1877, it was possible to buy enough silver for a silver dollar for about ninety-three cents. The words "honest money" and "sound money" came to be used by persons who believed that the free coinage of silver dollars would bring a cheap dollar into circulation, under Gresham's law, with resulting loss to every one who was forced to receive it. "Honest money" was gold. "There seems to be a general agreement among monied classes that its [the free silver bill's] intent is dishonest," said the *Commercial and Financial Chronicle*. A newspaper poet in Norwich wrote:

"Now, Messrs. Congressmen, be just,
 Throw off the veil of thin pretense;
 Stamp on the lie — 'In God we trust
 For the remaining seven cents.'"

Richard Parks Bland, a Missouri Congressman, whose experience embraced that of the depressed South, the debtor

frontier, and the silver mining districts, carried a bill for the resumption of free silver coinage at the old ratio through the House of Representatives in 1877. He could never thereafter lose the nickname of "Silver Dollar" Bland. The majority of the House was Democratic, but the vote was bi-partisan, as it was in the Senate, where the majority was Republican. In the upper house Senator Allison of Iowa procured the adoption of an amendment limiting the character of the bill. As the Bland-Allison Act finally passed, it directed the Secretary of the Treasury to buy each month from two million dollars' worth to four million dollars' worth of silver and to coin it into standard silver dollars which should have the quality of legal tender.

The Bland-Allison Act ran counter to the financial policy of President Hayes and Secretary Sherman, who believed that it contained the elements of repudiation, since it was a deliberate action to lower the value of the standard dollar. Hayes adhered to his pledge to uphold the financial credit of the nation. He vetoed the law, but Congress passed it over his veto, February 28, 1878, by a sweeping bi-partisan majority. The influence of the silver States was behind the law as a measure of protection, and was reënforced by the conscious desire of the debtor West and South for more and cheaper money.

The legal-tender greenbacks of the Civil War constituted the basis of American currency at the close of the struggle and became the emblem of a movement that affected both great parties for twenty years after 1865. At the close of the Civil War the greenbacks were far below par, the premium on gold standing at 150 on the day of Lee's surrender, and the greenback dollar worth accordingly only sixty-seven cents in gold. The greenbacks issued by the Government at par had constituted a forced loan to the extent of nearly four hundred and fifty million dollars, and as they depreciated in value they worked a confiscation of property against every holder in whose hands their value declined. As the Treas-

Bland-Alli-
son Act,
1878

Resumption
of specie
payments

ury undertook to redeem the public faith and get rid of the greenbacks, their value rose. By June, 1868, they were worth seventy-one cents on the dollar. Their rise impressed upon every person who was in debt the fact that the real value of his debt was increased to that extent. The whole South was depressed with the debt and bankruptcy that the Civil War produced and Reconstruction increased. The Northwestern States were equally in debt, due to their speculative investments in developing a new frontier and increasing the improvements on their old property. A demand that the redemption of the greenbacks be discontinued originated in the Northwest and was known as the "Ohio idea." Congress yielded to the pressure and forbade further withdrawals of the greenbacks in 1868, while the Democratic Party in its national convention of that year adopted substantially a greenback plank.

Throughout the two administrations of General Grant the greenback movement was strongly supported by politicians in both parties, and the panic of 1873, with the lean financial years that followed it, filled the ranks of the discontented. An inflation bill for increasing the volume of greenbacks in circulation passed both houses of Congress in 1874, but was blocked by Grant's veto. The next year John Sherman, Senator from Ohio and chairman of the Committee on Finance, was the father of a bill for the resumption of specie payments, which became a law January 14, 1875. The date set for resumption was January 1, 1879, and meanwhile the Secretary of the Treasury was directed to accumulate a fund of gold to make resumption possible. The financial doctors disagreed as to the size of the fund necessary, but the Secretary was given power to accumulate a reasonable amount by borrowing or otherwise. The promise of resumption improved the credit of the United States and raised the value of the greenbacks in consequence so that they were worth eighty-nine cents in January, 1875, and ninety-six cents two years later, when Hayes became President in 1877 and appointed Senator Sherman Secretary of the Treasury.

The increasing certainty that resumption was likely to be accomplished led the Greenbackers to more aggressive action. They demanded that the redemption of the greenbacks be stopped, and that all the bonds of the Civil War that were described in the legislation as "payable in lawful money of the United States" should be redeemed in an additional issue of greenbacks, which would have the double advantage of increasing the greenbacks in circulation and so helping the debtor, and of getting rid of the public debt without raising by taxation the funds to satisfy it.

The strikes of 1877 brought new hopes to the leaders of the Greenback Party, who glimpsed a chance to unite the discontented elements of labor to the discontented farmers, and to produce as a result an agrarian-industrial party of reform, to fight the "bloated, moneyed aristocracy." The Greenback vote in 1876 was unimportant, but here and there in Maine, Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin local controversies made it possible for the Greenback Party to control the balance of power in 1877. Peter Cooper and Wendell Phillips joined in the call for a national convention to be held at Toledo February 22, 1878, to blend the two movements into a new party for which they chose the name "National." "Financial theories are as plenty as blackberries among delegates, and nearly every man has a pet scheme for the salvation of the country," wrote the *Cincinnati Commercial* of the convention. The delegates were described as "the rattle-brained publicists at Toledo" by the *New York Tribune*, which went on to say that "the gush of woman suffragists, the drivel of prairie financiers, and the rant of working-men's demagogues all tend to promote a spirit of pessimism on this side of the Atlantic." Editorials on the coming party, inspired by a remembrance of the commune at Paris and the strikes of 1877, called it "communism." However, in the elections of 1878 the aggregate of discontented votes for Greenback candidates in the several States ran beyond a million, and General Benjamin F. Butler, of Massachusetts,

always politically on the make, avowed a willingness to become the standard-bearer of the new National Labor-Greenback Party.

While the sections and classes were struggling with the panaceas for reform, President Hayes was confronting the difficulty of doing business with an unsympathetic Congress. His first steps in organizing his government alienated the leaders of his own party, while the House of Representatives was controlled by the Democrats with Samuel J. Randall, of Pennsylvania, as Speaker. The Democratic claim that Hayes was President by fraud was made more credible by the admissions of members of his own party. William E. Chandler, a member of the Republican National Committee, openly attacked the title of Hayes in a public letter to New Hampshire Republicans in December, 1877. The following May, Clarkson N. Potter, of New York, became chairman of a House committee that investigated the alleged frauds. The Democratic hopes that the investigation would uncover reasons for voiding the election and unseating Hayes were lessened as facts were accumulated by the Potter committee, and the Matthews committee that the Senate created simultaneously. The Western Union Telegraph Company was forced to submit its file of messages for examination, with the result that cipher dispatches were discovered, sent from Tilden's own house to Southern Democrats. These dispatches were deciphered by the New York *Tribune* and revealed an attempt on the part of some one to buy enough Hayes electors to seat Tilden. The charge of fraud became a boomerang against the Democrats, and Hayes, by his steadiness under attack and his adherence to his campaign pledges, gained increasing respect from the country at large.

The forces of discontent that gave birth to the National Party supported the silver miners' movement for free silver, which would have the same tendency as the greenbacks to increase the volume of money and lower its value. The overwhelming majorities by which the Bland-Allison Act

became a law showed the wide distribution of the forces of inflation, but had no effect upon a President who was already used to working without the approval of either his own party leaders or the opposition. Secretary Sherman continued to assemble his gold reserve to cover the redemption of the greenbacks. The international conference on silver made mandatory by the Bland-Allison Act was held in Paris in August, 1878, and was entirely fruitless. The advances of the American delegation in favor of an international agreement upon a bimetallic ratio were received with courtesy, but without result. Europe was too definitely pledged to the gold standard to be affected by American pressure to the contrary.

The price of greenbacks and the credit of the United States continued to rise with the preparations for re-
 Resumption, In December, 1878, the greenbacks
 January 2, reached par, and throughout the country there
 1879 were evidences of universal prosperity instead
 of the calamity that the Greenbackers had foretold. On
 January 2, 1879, the New York sub-treasury began to ex-
 change gold for greenbacks on demand, with a reserve of
 \$133,507,000 in coin to control the \$346,681,016 outstand-
 ing greenbacks. Resumption came without a shock, and
 the first day's experience indicated the correctness of Horace
 Greeley's view that "the way to resume is to resume."
 Instead of a long line of greenback-holders anxious for the
 redemption of their paper, holders of gold brought their
 metal in to exchange it for greenbacks. No one wanted
 gold when he was sure he could get it, nor was he willing to
 exchange any money of the United States for less than par.
 When Secretary Sherman wrote his annual report in Novem-
 ber, 1879, after ten months of resumption, he had redeemed
 only \$11,256,000 in notes, but had increased the coin re-
 serve in the Treasury to \$225,000,000.

National politics lost much of its hold on the people in
 The new the administrations of Hayes and Garfield, in
 prosperity both of which politicians seemed to be squab-
 bling for factional advantage and the spoils, and in which

few of the recognized leaders had any program to offer for the better adjustment of government to the facts of life. More interesting in all respects were the facts of life themselves, as the depression prevailing for five years after 1873 was replaced by normal conditions, and these in turn by increasing prosperity that burst into an era of lavish speculation while Arthur was President. Robert G. Ingersoll, perhaps the greatest orator of his day, spoke better than he knew when he declared in the Republican Convention of 1876 "that prosperity and resumption, when they come, must come together; that when they come, they will come hand in hand through the golden harvest fields; hand in hand by the whirling spindles and the turning wheels, hand in hand by the open furnace doors, hand in hand by the flaming forges, hand in hand by the chimneys filled with eager fire, greeted and grasped by the countless sons of toil."

Underneath the prosperity that prevailed in the decade of the eighties was confidence in the stability and credit of the Government. Resumption placed all money on a parity and destroyed the uncertainties that came with fluctuating currency. The supply of labor was recruited by increasing hordes of immigrants from Europe. Continuous falling prices made the dollar of the wage-earner go farther than expected every day. Economic leadership at the top was founded upon the completion of a transportation plant national in its extent, and upon mechanical invention that enlarged the list of human wants and increased the ease of satisfying them.

Most of the railroads of the United States in 1879 had been built in the preceding forty years and all of them had commonly been operated as private business on a competitive basis. One by one the regions of the United States were relieved from the limitations upon free communication established by the mountain ranges and the direction of river flow. The railroads cut across all obstacles and introduced new competitions with the older highways of trade. Before the Civil War, with thirty thousand miles

of track in operation, the East and the old Northwest were well supplied with railroads, and the South was partially provided. In the decade of the sixties the greatest railway changes were north and west of Chicago, and on the border of the Western plains, where the Union Pacific Railway was driven to the Pacific. The opening of this road in 1869 marks the beginning of the final chapter in the building of the railroad plant. The Eastern States were still separated from the Pacific slope by the great barrier of plains, mountains, and desert, but in the next fifteen years this space was crossed and recrossed until, by the end of 1883, the open frontier was gone forever, and the United States was equipped with a national railroad system of 110,414 miles that enabled every region in the country to find a market for its products and that worked continuously to lower the costs of delivery from maker to consumer.

In the years between 1869 and 1883, four continental railroads, all encouraged by grants of land from Congress, were carried to completion. The Northern Pacific was chartered in 1864 to run from Lake Superior to Puget Sound; the Atlantic and Pacific was to be built from southwestern Missouri to southern California and was chartered in 1866. The Texas Pacific, authorized in 1871, was the last of the land-grant continental railroads, and was proposed to be built from the junction point of Texas, Arkansas, and Louisiana, west to California. The Atchison, Topeka, and Santa Fe received a local land grant given by Congress to Kansas, and built southwest over the Santa Fe Trail and down the valley of the Rio Grande. All of these railroads were started before the panic of 1873, and the completion of all was delayed until the depression following that panic had spent its force.

The construction gangs of the continental railroads reappeared upon the high plains in the building seasons of 1878 and 1879. In the interval of depression, steel rails had increased in popularity and structural steel had begun to be available to take the place of timber and masonry.

The discoveries of Sir Henry Bessemer and the resulting processes for the commercial manufacture of steel took place in the preceding decade, but the output of the rolling mills was not sufficient for the needs of building before 1873. The use of steel wrought a revolution in the construction of bridges, in naval engineering, and in city architecture, but nowhere was the change more welcome than in railroad-building where the steel rail provided for the first time a safe and durable roadway for the rolling stock.

The Southern Pacific of California, although it had no continental franchise of its own, led in the completion of the Southern group of railroads. By 1883 its through trains were running over its tracks to the Colorado River, and thence east over three lines to the Mississippi. It established traffic arrangements with the Atchison, Topeka, and Santa Fe, which took its trains to Kansas City and Saint Louis; and with the Texas Pacific, which took them across the whole width of Texas from El Paso to Texarkana; and it acquired local lines in southern Texas through San Antonio and Houston to New Orleans.

The opening of the Southern continental railroads took place in 1882 and 1883. The successful operation of the lines called for a degree of team-work unusual on the railroads, notorious for their rate wars and their cut-throat competition. The Western magnates, drawn into the railroad business to build the Central Pacific, and staying in it to control the Southern Pacific and its eastern connections, desired to simplify their holdings. They secured in 1884 a charter from the State of Kentucky for a Southern Pacific Company which they operated as a holding corporation for their Western roads. They secured their charter as far away from the location of the railroads as they could so as to minimize the risk of public interference with their business. The Southern Pacific system, which emerged from their construction and manipulation, dominated the whole southwestern quarter of the United States.

Henry Villard, a journalist of German birth, played the most prominent part in the completion of the Northern Pacific Railway. Jay Cooke, the financier of the Civil War, and the best known American banker of the sixties, had undertaken to build this road and had been broken by it in 1873. From Duluth at the tip of Lake Superior it had been built to the Missouri River before the panic stopped it, and it had constructed a few miles in Washington near its terminal city of Tacoma. In 1879 construction was renewed from the Missouri River to the junction of the Columbia and Snake near old Fort Walla Walla. At this point Henry Villard, who had acquired control of the Oregon Railway and Navigation Company, began to exert pressure upon the Northern Pacific to secure favorable terms for his rail and steamship lines in the Northwest. He failed to secure these terms by open negotiation, but was able to raise a large sum among his New York friends to form a "blind pool" for a profitable private speculation. With the funds of the pool he bought secretly enough stock to control both the Northern Pacific and the Oregon Railway and Navigation Company and organized the Oregon and Trans-Continental as a holding company to manage it.

The Northern Pacific line was opened in September, 1883, but failed to arouse much comment because the news value of Pacific railroads had recently been lessened by the completion of the Southern Pacific links. Villard made a great celebration of it, with a special train and many invited guests, but his road traversed an unsettled country and was in financial trouble from the start.

The Denver and Rio Grande, working in coöperation with the Chicago, Burlington, and Quincy, opened another through service almost continental in its extent in the summer of 1883. Its tracks from Denver to Ogden followed the royal gorge of the Arkansas River, and in Ogden it made a connection with the Union Pacific and lines leading to the Northwest.

The continental frontier, first pierced by a railroad in

1869, was completely destroyed by 1884. Along six different lines, between New Orleans and Saint Paul, it had been made possible to cross the sometime American Desert to the Pacific States.

Disappearance of the frontier

No large portion of the United States remained beyond the reach of easy colonization. Instead of a waste that forbade national unity, and compelled at best a rudimentary civilization, a thousand plains stations beckoned for colonists and long lines of railroads bound the nation into an economic and political unit. That which General Sheridan had foreseen in 1882 was now a fact. He had written: "As the railroads overtook the successive lines of isolated frontier posts and settlements spread out over country no longer requiring military protection, the army vacated its temporary shelters and marched on into remote regions beyond, there to repeat and continue its pioneer work. In rear of the advancing line of troops the primitive 'dugouts' and cabins of the frontiersmen were steadily replaced by the tasteful houses, thrifty farms, neat villages, and busy towns of a people who knew how best to employ the vast resources of the great West. The civilization from the Atlantic is now reaching out toward that rapidly approaching it from the direction of the Pacific, the long intervening strip of territory, extending from the British possessions to Old Mexico, yearly growing narrower; finally the dividing lines will entirely disappear and the mingling settlements absorb the remnants of the once powerful Indian nations who, fifteen years ago, vainly attempted to forbid the destined progress of the age."

The completion of the continental railroads made possible the adoption of a reform long needed for the comfort of the traveling public. In England, with the limited distances, it had been possible to extend the time of Greenwich Observatory over the whole island without causing great inconvenience. In France the time of Paris had been made the standard time, but in the United States with a range of fifty degrees in longitude, meaning a difference in true time of some three hours be-

tween the oceans, no single standard could be adopted. Every railroad followed its own preference in adjusting its time-tables, and in cities like Pittsburgh, Chicago, and Saint Louis, where large numbers of railroads converged, each with its own system, the traveler needed to have his wits about him when he handled the railroad guides. A standard time convention held in the spring of 1883 found some fifty-six standards in use in the United States. Later in the year the owners of nearly eighty thousand miles of railroad agreed to the adoption of four zones, each uniformly operating on a single standard. On November 18, 1883, standard time came into existence.

With the continental railroads built, the transportation plant of the United States was substantially complete, and although its mileage increased somewhat, its future growth was one of detail and improvement of local service. About 1888 the point of "saturation" was reached with reference to railroad mileage and population. For the next twenty years the supply remained nearly constant with about 2600 miles per million of population. Thereafter, the mileage per million steadily declined, as the automobile cut into the business of transportation. The rapidity with which the continental roads were thrust across the plains and the mountains to the Pacific, following the trails of the overland emigrants and searching out the mining camps of the Western Territories, brought an unexpected strain upon both the General Land Office and the Post-Office Department, with the result that the latter broke down and became the victim of a notorious scandal in 1881, while the Land Office needed a thorough overhauling by the successor of Arthur.

The task of the Postmaster-General to deliver the mails was susceptible of routine administration in those parts of the country where the population was thickly spread in permanent residences. The mail service to the frontier was the most expensive and the most difficult, but the mail routes followed the wagon-roads of the farmers with considerable success. In the mining region of the Far West

there was no such certainty. At best the mines were hundreds of miles away from the larger centers of settled life. The transitory character of the mining camp made it possible for a city of ten thousand inhabitants to appear within a single month and to disappear as rapidly. The mining communities demanded a mail service sufficiently elastic to keep up with their shiftings from place to place, and Congress recognized this need by providing special treatment for the Western mail routes.

The practice of the Post-Office Department was to divide all mail routes into two classes, according as the pouches were carried by train or boat, or by some other conveyance. The latter group, indicated on the Post-Office's lists by stars, were known as the "star routes" and included those where services were rendered by wagon, stage-coach, or mail rider.

The longest and most important of the star routes served the remote settlements in the Western plains and mountains. They were subject to the sudden and unexpected demands of a shifting population that became more insistent as the population of the plains increased and as the advancing railroads encouraged wider settlement. The ordinary mail routes were advertised and let at fixed prices to the contractors who operated them, but in the case of the star routes the law permitted a readjustment of compensation without readvertising the route in case a need should arise for increased service or greater expedition. The Second Assistant Postmaster-General, whose duty it was to adjust the mail service to the fluctuating demands upon it, became in 1881 a central figure in the star route frauds.

For several years before 1881 Congress was irritated by the fact that the financial needs of the star routes could not be anticipated, and that the office was being operated without reference to available funds, but in reliance upon deficiency appropriations. In the post-office hearings testimony was taken to show the uncertainties of the service and the impossibility of reducing it to schedule. The star routes were investigated in 1878 and shown to be in an

unsatisfactory condition, partly because of the financial irresponsibility of the frontier mail contractors. Washington became conscious of a group of consistent bidders for the star routes, among whom the most prominent were Stephen W. Dorsey and various of his relatives. Dorsey was a former Senator from Arkansas, and as secretary of the Republican National Committee he managed Garfield's campaign in 1880.

Thomas J. Brady, in charge of the star routes as Second Assistant Postmaster-General, was under suspicion of mismanagement and extravagance in 1880, and resigned his office under pressure from the President in April, 1881, while the Senate was deadlocked over the New York Custom House appointment. The charge against Brady, as rumor popularly stated it, was that he had acted in collusion with a ring of political star route contractors, of which Dorsey was the chief; that the favored contractors had put in fictitious bids for the star routes and had secured the contracts because their bids were below the actual cost of the service to any honest contractor; that upon receiving the contracts they had by collusion and fraud produced evidence in favor of accelerating the mails or of increasing the service over their routes, and that Brady had criminally raised the compensation to an unreasonable amount. In 134 routes originally awarded at \$143,169, the compensation was thus raised to \$622,808. After raising the compensation the favored contractors sublet the routes and divided the profits among themselves. It was charged that they had also contributed generously to the Republican campaign funds. "It is difficult to believe," said the stalwart Chicago *Inter-Ocean*, "that he [Brady] was not in league with a set of unscrupulous contractors to defraud the Government."

Brady resigned under pressure, denying his guilt; and Washington gossip was informed that he would never be prosecuted because Garfield was himself involved and because Brady possessed letters that would involve others in his downfall. A few

Garfield and
the Hubbell
letter

days after his retirement, a letter written by Garfield while a candidate, to the chairman of the Republican campaign committee, was given to the press, and it was threatened that more would follow. This was the Hubbell letter, written in a dark moment of the campaign, when party funds were low, and there was doubt as to whether the stalwarts would support the ticket. "My dear Hubbell," wrote Garfield from Mentor, August 23, 1880, "Yours of the 19th instant is received. Please say to Brady that I hope he will give us all the assistance possible. I think he can help effectively. Please tell me how the departments are doing." The murder of Garfield before the trial of Brady prevented further revelations if indeed there were any to be made, but Attorney-General MacVeagh proceeded to prepare the cases, employing in the work Benjamin Harrison Brewster, whom Arthur selected to succeed him as Attorney-General. The trial and conviction of Guiteau was dragging out its fifty-three days of unseemly court-room conduct when the first of the star route cases came to trial in Washington and was dismissed on technical grounds. One of the accused, M. C. Rerdell, a former private secretary of Dorsey, had already confessed his guilt and filed affidavits showing the nature of the fraud.

A Washington grand jury indicted Dorsey and Brady and several others in February, 1882, and suits against individual contractors were brought locally throughout the country. The trial took place in the summer with Robert G. Ingersoll defending the accused, two of whom, minor accomplices, were found guilty. The conviction was set aside by the court and a new trial was arranged for the summer of 1883, Dorsey meanwhile publishing a long public statement of his innocence on December 1, 1882, as well as numerous letters tending to show his political intimacy with General Garfield. He resigned as secretary of the Republican National Committee in January, 1883, and was finally acquitted in June in spite of the testimony of Rerdell. None of the principals of the star route frauds was ever convicted, but the testimony throws a strong light

upon the conditions prevailing in the Far West in the last days of the old frontier, and upon the character of the civil service that President Hayes had tried in vain to reform.

The completion of the national railroad system brought forces into operation that tended to reduce prices in the years that followed, and made it possible for business to take advantage of the wider markets that were made available. In March, 1881, Howells published, in the *Atlantic Monthly*, "The Story of a Great Monopoly," by Henry Demarest Lloyd, which was the "first volley" in a national attack upon monopolies. The article was so widely read that it took seven editions of the *Atlantic* to meet the demand, while the Standard Oil Company, which was the subject of the story, took a leadership among the unpopular monopolies that it has never lost.

The petroleum industry began about 1859, when ways were found to refine the crude petroleum that existed in widely spread deposits in the Appalachian region, and to burn for illuminating purposes the kerosene that resulted. The kerosene lamp lengthened the day throughout the civilized world and speedily drove out of use the candles and the animal oils upon which society had formerly been forced to rely. The dim and flickering flame of the gaslight continued to be adapted and improved, but the new lamp filled such a genuine want that it created a universal market for petroleum.

Between 1860 and 1880 the petroleum industry passed through its speculative stages, while John D. Rockefeller, of Cleveland, and his associates gained control of most of the refineries. The business was essentially one of monopoly because of the heavy investment necessary before the oil could be transported with economy, and the cheapness of transport after the investment had been made. In the oil regions any farmer could sink his wells and produce crude petroleum at the well mouth at low cost. In the early years this was carried in barrels from the well mouth to the

refinery and thence to the retailer. The oil was cheap and the barrels were costly, and the difficulties of storage and transportation controlled the price of oil. Tank-cars were invented a little later at greater initial cost, but with greater economies in operation, while the owner of tank-cars was able to bargain to advantage with the trunk-line railroads for the business of hauling them to tidewater. The New York Central, the Erie, the Lackawanna, the Pennsylvania, and the Baltimore and Ohio all reached the oil region and scrambled for the business, offering special advantages and rebates to secure the traffic of the larger shippers. These special rates made it possible for the larger shippers to grow still larger, and none of the refiners excelled Rockefeller in skill and ingenuity in gaining advantage from the unstable railroad rates.

As public opinion turned against special rates and rebates in the later seventies, the pipe-line from oil-field to refinery, and thence to distributing points, with ^{Oil} pumping-stations *en route*, was invented to take over much of the traffic of the tank-cars. These pipe-lines still further increased the costs of construction, yet made possible more sweeping economies in the delivery of oil. The most vexatious portion of the business from the standpoint of the operators was the great number of rival companies and their various competing policies. In January, 1882, Rockefeller brought about a combination in the oil business, whereby the stock in the competing companies was turned over to be managed by a board of trustees. He dominated this board, and the trust that it created produced immediate harmony in the oil-refining business, which was recognized at once in spite of the fact that the agreement itself was kept secret for several years.

The oil monopoly raised a problem in politics that tended to dim the recognition of the importance of kerosene in making life more livable. Another monopoly, openly launched in January, 1881, brought into single hands another of the newer inventions, the electric telegraph.

The story of Samuel F. B. Morse and his persistent

struggle to secure the adoption of the telegraph and to re-
 Telegraph and telephone tain control of its operation is one of the most
 inspiring tales in the field of industry. After
 its experimental period the telegraph became a
 reality in 1844, and spread its network of wires over the
 nation in the next few years. Like the early railroad lines,
 telegraph wires were stretched piecemeal by a multitude of
 rival companies. At the end of the seventies consolidation
 of the rival companies had progressed so far that three
 organizations, the Western Union, the American Union,
 and the Atlantic and Pacific controlled most of the lines.
 In January, 1881, Jay Gould and William H. Vanderbilt
 brought about the consolidation of these three companies
 in the Western Union, and the newspapers of the country
 bitterly described themselves as in the clutches of a mon-
 ster monopoly.

Neither the telegraph nor its sister instrument was dis-
 covered as the result of a scientific search. The former re-
 sulted from a random reflection of a portrait painter; the
 latter was the work of a teacher of the deaf, Alexander
 Graham Bell, who reached it through his interest in acous-
 tics. The basic patent of the Bell telephone was filed in
 February, 1876, and at the Philadelphia Centennial the
 interesting toy was on exhibition, where it aroused the ex-
 cited admiration of the Emperor Dom Pedro of Brazil.
 With the assistance of Theodore N. Vail, Bell put his
 patent into commercial use and before the end of the decade
 commercial exchanges made their appearance in the larger
 cities. There were 444,000 instruments in use in 1890, the
 Bell Telephone companies had approached the condition of
 monopoly, but the habits of business had undergone a
 greater change than has been produced by any other in-
 strument except the typewriter.

The invention of a practical writing machine was not due
 to chance, but to long experiments by many inventors, in
 which Charles Latham Sholes was the first to be success-
 ful. By 1874 he had devised a machine with movable
 types that would actually write, and soon after 1880 several

typewriters were on the market. It took many years for the typewriter to overcome the prejudice in favor of the written word in polite and formal correspondence, but its easy popularity in the business office encouraged inventors to try to adapt the idea to typesetting. Mark Twain, who spent money freely when he had it, wasted a fortune in this search, backing the wrong inventor of a typesetting machine. Other inventions that increased the ease of communication and widened the influence of the individual in business were the half-tone process that made it possible to reproduce photographs and other illustrations, and the photographic dry plate, which appeared in 1878 and brought the camera within reach of every one.

The increasing use of electricity stimulated the experiments that were made by Thomas A. Edison to perfect the incandescent light. In his laboratory at Menlo Park, New Jersey, he carried out a long series of experiments in a deliberate search for the right filament and the proper structure of the glass bulb. The arc light was already here and there in use, but was noisy in operation and gave at best only a flickering light. Edison was successful in 1879, and at the end of the year introduced a perfected light. The significance of the incandescent light was instantly seen. Gas companies became apprehensive as to their future revenues. A decade later, when plans were being laid for the decoration of the World's Fair at Chicago, it was possible to rely upon the incandescent bulbs not only for illumination, but for artistic and easily controlled effects of light. The phonograph that Edison designed earlier than this was a workable toy, but developed less rapidly.

The new inventions, gaining popularity for themselves in the early eighties, ran parallel to a wider use of older inventions. The sewing machine fell in price due to the expiration of its basic patent rights in 1877, agricultural machinery continued to be improved and to be used upon an ever-wider scale, while the manufacture of the new devices brought more factories into existence and increased

the congestion in the cities. The home became more comfortable, with the oil lamp and the sewing machine; and into newer homes was brought the luxury of the telephone and incandescent lights, as the central stations were built to provide these services. The increasing size of the cities raised the problem of rapid transit, with New York, because of its peculiar topography, leading in the search for improvements in transportation. The horse-cars and omnibuses that provided the first organized traffic in the cities came to be regarded as too slow and clumsy. Elevated railroads were experimented with in the interests of speed and safety, and before 1880 were in operation in New York. A bridge across the East River to Brooklyn, much desired for a similar reason, was built during this decade and was formally opened to traffic in May, 1883. Edison was by this date experimenting with a trolley-car driven by electricity, while other inventors were hoping to solve the problem by means of cables run in underground conduits.

The Middle and Eastern States underwent the greatest change as the industrial reorganization advanced. The Western States were most affected by the railway growth. The Southern States in these same years of business revival showed signs of recovery from the depression of the Civil-War period, and started upon an independent economic life. The Southern railroads were nearly extinct in 1865, and their rebuilding ran through many years. The construction of great railroad bridges across the Mississippi at Saint Louis in 1874 and at Memphis in 1892 gives the limits for the period in which the South revived. The old plantation as it was known before the war disappeared in the economic revolution, and in its place came a shrinkage in the size of farms and an increase in the number of tenant farmers. These farmers, white or black, still devoted themselves chiefly to the cultivation of cotton, and carried a burden of debt as heavy as that of the pioneer farmer in the Western States. The debt of the Southern farmer held him to the cultivation of a single crop; loans were made by the general

The New
South

storekeeper in the form of credit advances secured by notes upon the forthcoming cotton crop, and it was to the interest of the creditor to secure as large a crop as possible in order to safeguard his loans.

The credit system of the South was a burden upon its development, but in spite of it a new spirit was visible in the former Confederacy. A Cotton States' Exposition was held at New Orleans in 1884 to celebrate the hundredth anniversary of the earliest cotton exports from the South. The exhibits revealed the economic regeneration that was under way. In the next few years the development of the railroad systems induced a more diversified agriculture. The cotton lands of Texas were brought into use, and their competition reduced the prosperity of the older cotton States, driving these to better agriculture and the cultivation of additional crops.

The social life of the South was still determined by the presence of its negro population. The unwillingness of the white inhabitants to be ruled by the negro vote brought about a practical nullification of the Civil War amendments to the Constitution. The right of the negro to vote was taken away from him by fraud or force, as home rule was reëstablished in the early seventies. The civil rights conferred upon the freedman by the Fourteenth Amendment and enforced by subsequent acts of Congress were declared by the Supreme Court in the Civil Rights Cases of 1884 not to include the right to equality of social treatment. In 1890 Mississippi adopted an educational test as a qualification for suffrage and as a means of disfranchising the negro without violating the Fifteenth Amendment, and the other Southern States soon followed suit. The South as a whole was recovering its self-confidence, but it had become politically a region of a single party.

The change in business, whether through new inventions or through the reorganization of old industries, gave opportunities for the accumulation of private fortunes on a scale hitherto unknown in the United States. A group of money kings arose, whose wealth

appeared to challenge the success of the existing social order, and whose personal conduct absorbed public attention to an increasing extent.

The earlier American fortunes were ordinarily the result of commerce or banking. In 1877 Commodore Cornelius Vanderbilt died and within a few months he was followed by John Jacob Astor and A. T. Stewart, who with him were regarded as the richest men in America. The three estates thus passed on to other hands were typical of different methods of accumulation. Two had been acquired, one had been inherited. The original John Jacob Astor, a German peddler, came to America near the close of the Revolution and was soon identified with the organization of the fur trade in the Northwest. His gains, according to popular tradition, were invested in New York real estate and formed the nucleus of an estate that grew in value as New York City spread up Manhattan Island toward the Bronx. By 1877 it was the greatest of American inherited properties and was becoming the foundation of a notable family.

Stewart and Vanderbilt made their own fortunes. The former, an Irish immigrant, was a general merchant, and before his death his New York store was started upon the course of development that produced the great department store of the next decade. Cornelius Vanderbilt earned his honorary title of "commodore" by operating steamboat lines in the waters around New York. About 1867 he turned his savings into railroad securities and soon was the dominating master of the New York Central. His son, William K. Vanderbilt, took on the guidance of the business before his father's death, and later defended the will, in which the Commodore had held most of his wealth together and passed it on to the favorite son. The younger Vanderbilt carried the New York Central lines through the strikes of 1877 with a minimum of interruption, and in 1882 became identified with one of the famous phrases in American business. The Pennsylvania Railroad had just started a new fast train to Chicago and when Vanderbilt was asked what the New York Central would do to meet the public

expectation of a rival train, he replied briefly (so the reporter insisted), "The public be damned." The phrase gained a wide and embarrassing circulation and was given interpretations not intended by its user, but did not misrepresent the practical attitude of most railroads and many other great industrial enterprises of its day.

The newer fortunes, whose owners were now working themselves into the public eye, were often too huge to have been accumulated by the efforts of a single man, and were in many cases the results of successful speculation or of well-directed team-work. Jay Gould and Thomas A. Scott were representative of the railroad group. The latter, president of the Pennsylvania Railroad, was also identified with many Western roads and was engaged in 1878 in an effort to secure the land subsidy voted to the Texas Pacific Railway in 1871, but forfeited through non-construction. The New York *Sun* insinuated that the Texas Pacific pool had induced the Southern States to accept Hayes as President without revolt on the promise that Congress would do something for the Texas Pacific. Scott at least was occupied in the construction and operation of railroads. Jay Gould's connection with them was chiefly speculative.

Gould gained his place before the public as one of the gold conspirators who tried in 1869 to corner the market and raise the premium on gold. A decade later he was associated with the reorganization of the Union Pacific and the Kansas Pacific as they struggled to get on their feet after the depression of the seventies, and a little later he put the Wabash system together. In 1880 he was suspected of being the principal financial supporter of James G. Blaine. He died in 1892, turning his whole estate into family channels.

Andrew Carnegie and John D. Rockefeller assembled fortunes in this decade, founding them upon team-work and the exploitation of natural resources. Each was believed capable of ruthless competition, but each was the center of a group of associates that added to the resources of the country. Oil and steel were brought into a new relation-

ship with society as the industrial revolution progressed, and the profits that accrued as the Standard Oil companies and the Carnegie Steel interests rose to national ascendancy were largely the result of a service actually rendered.

The American millionaire became a figure in all the capitals of the world, as well as in American society, and received a full-length portrait in the *Rise of Silas Lapham* (1885). The ambition to found families was early recognized, and as the great wealth of millionaires made it difficult for poorer persons to associate with them, they flocked by themselves at Saratoga Springs and Newport, and gave the incentive for the development of winter resorts in Florida and southern California. Their social habits were constantly under criticism by a public that regarded them with a mixture of pride and exasperation. In 1886 a group of wealthy New Yorkers opened a residence colony of their own at Tuxedo Park, on the former estate of Pierre Lorillard, where they built a casino, and playgrounds, and cottages, and acquired the distinction without knowing it of bringing the country club into American life.

The plainer Americans, admitting no inferiority and irritated when travelers spoke of the middle and the lower classes, organized recreation of their own as the cities became too congested for comfort. The population of New York City discovered Coney Island in 1876 on an attractive beach that had been unoccupied a few years before, and the drive thither from Brooklyn was crowded with trotting horses and showy carriages while steamboat lines and special railroads moved the larger crowds. Cape May, famous before the Civil War as a summer resort, was now outclassed by Atlantic City, whose nearness to Philadelphia made it an easy outlet for the city crowd.

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CHAPTER VI

GROVER CLEVELAND

WIDESPREAD prosperity followed the resumption of specie payments in 1879. Railroads and factories provided constant demand for labor, while the former opened up great areas of public domain for purposes of farming. The fall in prices, that had seemed a menace to the existence of the farmer in the days of the depression, ceased to worry him in the good years that followed. The parties of protest, born of hard times, dwindled between 1878 and 1882, and lost most of their supporters except the incorrigible idealists, who were unwilling to put up with the compromises of the larger parties and persisted in hoping that a third party might be the vehicle of real reform.

In the congressional elections of 1882, the Democratic Party rushed to the attack with party capital derived from the misfortunes of the Republicans, and here and there, where factional controversy existed in Republican communities, there was unearned political profit for Democratic and Greenback candidates. President Arthur was performing his duties in partial isolation, with his former stalwart friends chilled by his desertion, and the independents not satisfied of his complete repentance. The star route frauds were at the height of their notoriety, and were used to show a demoralized condition in Republican administration. The varied attempts of the Administration to save its party were turned to its disadvantage. The Secretary of the Treasury, Charles A. Folger, was nominated for governor of New York and was supported vigorously by the Administration, with the result that he was treated as a machine candidate and was beaten by a relatively unknown man, Grover Cleveland, who stood as the champion of reform.

The Republican congressional campaign was managed

by the same J. A. Hubbell, of Michigan, to whom Garfield had written his unwise letter in 1880. In a series of circulars which Democratic papers copied widely, he called upon the federal office-holders for assessments to the party funds, and declared that these were voluntary, when taxed with violation of the anti-assessment law of 1876.

The appeal for reform attracted much attention. Hubbell himself lost his seat in Congress, and a Democratic House of Representatives, chosen to take office in 1883, became in the short session of 1882-83, an admonition to the Republicans to pass what laws they could before they lost control. A revision of the tariff was the most pressing of their necessities, for there were signs that the Democratic Party was demanding a reform in the revenue system, and that good Republicans were unwilling to defend it. "There are stupendous interests in America which have grown into monopolies through the artificial nurture of the tariff," said the stalwart *New York Herald*. The Secretary of the Treasury saw it from a different angle, and wrote in his annual report of 1882, "What now perplexes the Secretary is not wherefrom he may get revenue and enough for the pressing needs of the Government, but whereby he shall turn back into the flow of business the more than enough for those needs that has been withdrawn from the people."

The tariff situation in 1882 had come about as much by accident as by design, and in its immediate operation was the heritage of financial reconstruction. The Morrill tariff of 1861, passed by a Republican Congress in the last days of the administration of James Buchanan, was a moderately protective measure, and provided the background for all tariff legislation of the next two decades. The details and rates of this tariff were greatly changed through the necessities of the Civil War, and it was discovered that the internal revenue taxes and the tariff rates must be adjusted in harmony with each other. The situation produced by the Morrill tariff was changed for many American manufacturers when they were compelled to pay the heavy internal taxes levied upon

incomes, trades, and manufactured goods before 1865. Their European competitors, who could not be required to bear similar burdens, received an advantage in the competitive market. Congress yielded to the pressure of manufacturers to restore the equilibrium of trade by increasing tariff rates in order to balance the burden placed upon domestic manufacturers by the internal revenues. Every time the internal taxes were increased during the war, Congress was called upon to increase the tariff rates as well, and in 1865 both sources were yielding revenues beyond anything hitherto known in American experience. The tariff in that year brought in \$84,000,000; the internal revenue, \$209,000,000.

The program of financial reconstruction called for the re-establishment of public credit and the redemption of the greenbacks, as well as the lowering of revenues to a peace basis. In reducing the revenues the difficulties were uneven. The internal taxes had no friends, and public opinion generally approved the reduction and elimination of the income and stamp taxes, and the other forms of excise that had been borne as a patriotic duty. Tariff revision was attended with great difficulty. At each suggestion of this, manufacturers hurried to Washington to protest against the injury to their business that would occur if the rates were lowered, and Congressmen made common cause with each other to protect their constituents from such losses.

By 1873 most of the internal revenue taxes had been withdrawn, leaving industry protected not only by the original rates of the Morrill tariff, but by the additional compensatory rates that had been added to offset the internal war taxes. In many cases there was now no justification for these extra rates, which had come to give an unintended and accidental protection; but as a matter of practical politics it was difficult to get rid of them because they were intimately tied up with the personal profit of influential citizens.

A flat reduction of ten per cent in tariff rates was voted by Congress in 1872. This was less than the amount of the accidental protection, but seemed to be more than the

country could bear when a few months later the panic of 1873 made hard times universal, reducing American purchases abroad, and lowering the national revenue until it was insufficient for the needs of the Government. By 1879, when prosperity came back, most persons had forgotten that the tariff rates had not existed forever. The tariff question was entirely out of politics, and manufacturers enjoyed almost unchallenged the extra profits conferred on them by the accident of financial reconstruction.

There had been some theoretical opposition to the tariff and protection even through the period of depression, and the principles of free trade were advanced by a group of economists among whom David A. Wells, Edward Atkinson, and William Graham Sumner were the leaders. Their teachings aroused indignant rejoinders from practical business men. "In nothing is it easier to show stupidity than in the framing of a tariff law," wrote Joseph Wharton, one of the most important of the Pennsylvania ironmasters, who founded a school of finance and economy in the University of Pennsylvania in 1881 to teach what he regarded as sound views of finance. There was a conference of free-traders held in Saratoga, in 1877, that attributed the prevailing depression to the interference with freedom of trade caused by the tariff. In Congress in 1878 Fernando Wood, of New York, brought in a Democratic measure to lower the rates. Among the junior Republican Congressmen on his committee was William McKinley, of Ohio, whose appointment to the Committee on Ways and Means Garfield had secured, and who had been advised by President Hayes to study the tariff and grow up with it.

The new national prosperity was early shown in an increase of national revenue. There was a Treasury surplus of \$100,000,000 in 1881 and of \$145,000,000 in 1882. Thereafter through the decade the surplus continued in varying amounts, averaging \$104,000,000 per year. President Garfield died before he had a chance to make to Congress any recommendation upon the reduc-

Tariff re-
form or
free trade

Treasury
surplus

tion of the revenue in order to lessen surplus or to remove the abuses that were charged against it. In the closing days of his campaign the revenue system and the protection which was a part of it showed signs of coming back into politics.

The barren political debate of 1880 was more significant after the Democratic candidate, Hancock, expressed himself upon the tariff. Speaking at Paterson, New Jersey, on October 7, in reply to an inquiry for his opinion he said: "The tariff is a local question. The same question was brought up once in my native place in Pennsylvania. It is a matter that the general Government seldom cares to interfere with, and nothing is likely ever to be done that will interfere with the industries of the country." In the few days of the canvass that remained the tariff was much discussed, but without extensive preparation on either side. Much sensitiveness was shown in manufacturing communities. "General Hancock posts himself for a political greenhorn," said the *New York Tribune*. "Was there ever such twaddle shown? . . . [Is] a man who considers the tariff question as merely local . . . fit to become the first citizen of the United States?" Democratic pressure upon this theme increased as Republican irritability was revealed.

Upon recommendation of Arthur, Congress created a tariff commission in 1882 to suggest action, and the defeat incurred by the Republican Party in the following autumn made it desirable to act at once. John L. Hayes, the chairman of the commission, was identified with the woolen industry and most of his associates were connected with other fields of manufacture. There were few experts available for appointment who knew anything about the details of tariff and yet were not identified with interests affected by it. The *New York Herald* described the commission as "the product of the manufacturers' machine, and it is almost certain that from first to last it will dance to the music of the party that 'protects' American labor." The report of the commission, presented to Congress in Sep-

tember, 1882, recommended a considerable reduction in tariff rates, and Congress undertook the passage of a general bill to bring this about.

The tariff of 1883 was passed under conditions that brought out the difficulties of passing laws that affected business profits. It was enacted in the short session and the two houses worked upon it simultaneously, each drafting an independent bill. The Senate attached its draft to a bill that had already passed the House of Representatives for the further reduction of the internal revenue. The need for a reduction of the rates in order to lower the surplus revenue was voiced by the Administration. It was obstructed by the lobbies of the manufacturers, all of them more interested in protecting the profits of their several businesses than in making any scientific revision of the tariff. These latter were aided by general arguments advancing the theory of protection as such. Canada had in 1879 adopted a system of protection on a basis resembling that of Henry Clay and his American system. The German tariff of 1879 was based upon the same assumption.

The arguments that had been heard in the tariff debates of the middle of the century were brought back into the discussion before the debate was ended, but appear to have had less influence than the representations of the manufacturers. In neither party was there anything approaching uniformity of opinion, although the Republicans had an old tradition in favor of protection as well as most of the manufacturers who desired it. Randall, of Pennsylvania, former Democratic Speaker and now leader of the minority, was as far away from his party associate, Beck, of Kentucky, as the Republican "Pigiron" Kelley, of Pennsylvania, was from his Republican colleague, Kasson, of Iowa. Regardless of party, Congressmen responded to the interests of their districts, and the tariff that became a law in March, 1883, failed to provide the reduction that Arthur had urged. It was treasured by the Democratic opposition as another evidence of the incapacity of the Republican Party, and was used as

additional campaign material for the approaching national election.

The political course of Arthur surprised his critics if it did not conciliate them. In 1882 he vetoed a rivers and harbors bill that was filled as usual with "political pork." He vetoed a Chinese exclusion bill that disregarded the existing treaty with the Chinese Government. He approved a law in March, 1882, for the more vigorous suppression of polygamy in the Mormon Territory, Utah. The Edmunds Act, which was directed at this condition, disqualified polygamists for office, jury service, or the franchise, and created a special commission to take over much of the power of government in the Territory until this should be accomplished. The President startled both his friends and his critics by giving genuine support to a bill for the reform of the national civil service.

The spoils system against which the advocates of civil service reform directed their attacks, became entrenched in the American Government in the second quarter of the nineteenth century. It was a device discovered by groups of politicians working in the larger Eastern States about 1825. In New York and Pennsylvania political machines were put together, cemented by the use of public offices. Party workers were rewarded by appointments to office, office-holders were expected to continue acting for the organization, and looked upon each election with certainty that if their efforts failed they could not hope to hold their positions. The phrase of William H. Marcy, "to the victors belong the spoils," was an apt expression of the spirit of the system and was not surpassed in cynical frankness by Kemble's maxim, "addition, division, and silence." When the Democratic politicians, who had turned their machines to the support of Andrew Jackson, came into control of the national administration in 1829, they renovated the Government by making heavy inroads among the office-holders and rewarding the supporters of Jackson.

For forty years after 1829 few Americans complained of

the spoils system. Politicians who lost their jobs were sore at their defeat, but yielded to the maxim of Marcy with such philosophy as they could command. Reform for all parties was a thing to be attained by turning the rascals of the other party out of office. Some politicians were more adept than others in manipulating the spoils, but few disowned the system. Presidents complained of the waste in time involved in listening to office-seekers and their friends. Lincoln protested against the burden in the months when the Union seemed to be falling apart, and likened himself to the hotel clerk whose upper floors were in flames and who was compelled to continue to rent new rooms instead of putting out the fire; but for four years Lincoln used the offices to sustain the Union against the Confederacy.

Little is heard of reform in the civil service until the death of Lincoln threw the presidential patronage into the hands of Andrew Johnson. As a loyal Tennessee War Democrat Johnson strengthened the ticket in 1864, when the Republican organization called itself the Union Party, and appealed for the votes of all loyalists. Within a few months after the death of Lincoln political warfare had been declared between Johnson and the radical majority that controlled Congress. According to the precedents of a generation the radical majority, successful in 1864, was entitled to use the national offices for its own purposes. Johnson's determination to use them in erecting a presidential machine aroused an opposition which in March, 1867, passed the Tenure of Office Bill over his veto. The President was permitted to suspend an officer from service, but not to remove him unless the Senate concurred in the removal. The new law made it difficult for a President to remove his enemies from office, while the Senate by its power to withhold confirmation of appointments built up a system by which each Senator in the majority party expected to nominate the federal officers appointed within his State. Johnson fought the Tenure of Office Act in vain, Grant protested against it, and Hayes forced the system into the open by his determination to remove

Civil
service
reform

Arthur and Cornell against the will of Roscoe Conkling. A group of civil service reformers gained a hearing for the first time, as they pointed out the injury to the National Government that was inflicted whenever an officer was appointed for party reasons instead of for character and capacity. Thomas A. Jenckes, a Congressman from Rhode Island, urged the removal of the offices from politics in the middle of the sixties, and the reform was taken up by Godkin in the *New York Nation*, and by George William Curtis in *Harper's Weekly*. The Republican platform of 1868 assented to it in theory and President Grant was given a small sum for the inauguration of a merit system.

The administrative scandals while Grant was President gave additional prominence to the need for the reform. The party leaders generally opposed it; Conkling sneered at it openly as "snivel service" reform. Their opposition to it was increased when Hayes gave Carl Schurz a chance to experiment with it in the Indian Bureau, but there was no hope of a public interest that would compel the passage of an effective law when Hayes left office.

The murder of Garfield, the star route frauds, and the Democratic victory of 1882 on the platform of reform, produced a situation that silenced the open enemies of the movement and made its enactment not only possible, but politically necessary. A bill, drawn up by Senator George W. Pendleton, of Ohio, with the approval of the Civil Service Reform Association, became a law in January, 1883. It provided for a non-partisan commission of three, holding office for an indefinite term, with power to prepare by examination eligible lists of candidates for such offices as might be turned over to the commission.

Dorman B. Eaton, secretary of the Civil Service Reform Association, was appointed by Arthur to inaugurate the operation of the law. Some thirteen thousand offices were placed in the classified service in the first year of the commission. Under succeeding Presidents the number was steadily increased as well as its proportion to the whole body of civil servants. By the end of the century one hundred

thousand offices were thus safeguarded, and a decade later, a quarter of a million.

The reform of the civil service, accomplished because of the effect of notorious scandals, could not have been delayed long after 1883. The new technical duties assumed by the United States Government were in need of trained and permanent staffs that could never have been assembled under the old system. Government by experts was not yet in question, but demands were being made upon government beyond the capacity of mere politicians.

John G. Carlisle, a Democratic Congressman elected from Kentucky in 1876, was chosen Speaker of the House of Representatives when the Forty-Eighth Con-
gress assembled in December, 1883. His election
followed a controversy within the Democratic Party in which the rising issue of the protective tariff played the chief part. His leading opponent, Samuel J. Randall, was a protectionist from Pennsylvania, and had been Speaker of the Democratic Congresses of the preceding decade, when the tariff issue had been quiescent. The discussions begun in 1880 continued through the tariff legislation of 1883, and, stimulated by the surplus in the National Treasury, revived in Southern Democrats their old antipathy to a protective tariff. The fact that many Republicans desired tariff reform added to the advantage of organizing a new Congress on this basis. Randall was defeated for reëlection, and with Carlisle in the chair the South came back into control of the Democratic Party. It was impossible to pass a Democratic tariff with Arthur as President, but the threat of one increased the determination of Northern manufacturers to secure the nomination of a candidate in 1884 who could be counted upon to defend the existing system.

Before either of the large national conventions was held, Benjamin F. Butler had been nominated by two of the minor parties. The fusion of the greenback and
labor elements attempted in 1878 was not suc-
cessful in bringing the reformers together or in
establishing an important national party. A growing op-

John G.
Carlisle

Butler
and the
reformers

position to monopoly revived the hopes of a third-party protest based upon the failure of the Democratic and Republican organizations to take necessary action. On May 14, 1884, an anti-monopoly convention met at Chicago and two weeks later the remnants of the National Greenback-Labor Party convened at Indianapolis. The political poverty of the movement and its dearth of candidates was shown by the nomination of Butler by both organizations.

“Ben” Butler aroused much stormy difference of opinion throughout his political career. A prominent Democratic lawyer in Boston before the Civil War, he became a political major-general, whose service in command of troops in Virginia was regarded as grossly incompetent. His career at New Orleans established order there, but was notorious. Doubts as to his honesty were widespread and were strengthened by a brusqueness in his manner and the cynical opinions constantly attributed to him. As a member of Congress he expressed an open contempt for measures of reform, and when the “better” elements of society turned against him, he declared himself the friend of the workingman. He struggled repeatedly for the governorship of Massachusetts, and was victorious in the election of 1882, in which the Republican Party was disrupted everywhere. As Governor of Massachusetts his notoriety was increased by the refusal of Harvard College to confer upon him the honorary degree that it usually bestowed upon governors of the State. Having left the Republican Party on the charge that it was faithless to the common citizen, and having suffered indignity from the intellectuals of his own State, he entered the canvass for the Democratic nomination as President on the issue of reform. He had earlier expressed his attitude upon the way to seek office: not as a maiden coyly and reluctantly, but as a widow who knows her own mind; and as “the widow” in politics Butler figured in the cartoons of his day. He invited the early nominations that he received from the smaller parties, but withheld acceptance of them, hoping to secure endorsement from the Democratic Party.

The strongest Republican candidate for the nomination was James Gillespie Blaine, who had a wider influence than any other leader of his party, and who was not opposed by any personality of great importance. President Arthur desired renomination and had support from the professional office-holding class; and deserved even more because of the character of his administration. John Sherman was still hopeful of receiving the distinction, but neither of these possessed the magnetism of Blaine, or the power to interest Americans *en masse*.

James
Gillespie
Blaine

In his twenty years of political life Blaine had identified himself with the major issues that his party supported, without originating them. He entered Congress at the beginning of the Civil War, and established a parliamentary leadership that made him Speaker and kept him in that post for six years. His charm of manner made him personal friends and he cultivated the politician's gift of recognizing them on sight. Always an eloquent speaker, he was most successful upon themes arising from the Civil War. His short service as Secretary of State under Garfield was long enough for him to show a deliberate policy, jingoistic in part, but including the constructive notion of coöperation among the Americas. After 1881 he lived generally in Washington, working upon his *Twenty Years of Congress* (1884) and strengthening his hold upon the Republican Party as one who could bring back the glories of the past.

Among the special qualifications of Blaine was the fact that he had many friends and followers in a racial group that was usually Democratic — the Irish voters. The Irish came into America in sufficient numbers to affect the balance of parties during the Mexican War and later. Their tendency to settle in the cities brought them within reach of the overtures of city bosses who controlled the local Democratic machines, and their natural gift for party manipulation made them active workers from the start. A generation after the first wave of the Irish came, a second emigration was started, stimulated by the agricultural depression that prevailed in England and

The Irish
vote

Ireland about 1879. The new Irish immigrants like the older filled the Eastern cities and brought with them to the United States their vigorous dislike for their mother country.

In all the Irish immigration, poverty and suffering at home acted as a stimulus. Non-resident ownership of their farms by English landlords was a constant provocative of misunderstanding and hard feeling. In 1879 the Irish Land League was organized by Michael Davitt, Charles Stewart Parnell, and their associates to fight the absentee landlord in the interest of an Irish ownership of Ireland. The movement aroused bitterness in England and fear among those whose property was threatened, but in the United States it was welcomed by Irish-Americans, many of whom were both able and willing to help the cause. Parnell was in the United States in 1880 raising funds for the Land League, and was welcomed not only by the Irish, but also by American politicians who either sympathized with the Irish protest or desired the Irish vote. Blaine was one of the few Republican leaders to attract the Irish. The fact that his mother was an Irish Catholic was widely advertised. As Secretary of State he was sufficiently anti-British to interest the Irish, and he gave them special grounds for support by his vigor in working to get out of jail in Ireland those Irish-Americans who had returned to the old country to agitate in favor of the Land League. "The feeling is gaining ground in this country that Ireland is one of the United States," said the *New York Tribune* in 1882. The *Chicago Inter-Ocean* had already remarked that "this is the political bummers' chance."

After the passage of the Coercion Act in March, 1881, the Irish Land League was broken up in Ireland, and the aim of the movement was shifted to home rule. The murder of Cavendish and Burke in the following year, and the prominence of the dynamiters among the Irish, advertised the movement still further. In April, 1883, a great convention was held in Philadelphia on the call of the Irish National League. Patrick Egan, of Dublin, former treas-

urer of the Land League, who had been spirited out of Ireland, made his first American appearance on this occasion, and Democratic leaders welcomed the opportunity to address the body.

The organization attained by the Irish-Americans for their own sentimental and reminiscent purposes was a continuous temptation to American politicians to try to seize it for party purposes; and Blaine's special hold upon the Irish might have secured his nomination without any opposition had it not been for the objection of a group of independent Republicans desirous of reform, but distrusting him as its agent.

Twice before 1884 Blaine had almost had his fingers upon the coveted nomination. In 1876, while he was a leading candidate, rumors were heard in Washington that damaging letters existed that would destroy his character if published. On April 24 he denounced certain of the charges that connected him with the improper ownership of railroad bonds, and his friends believed that he had silenced them; but the stories continued, and it became known that a man named Mulligan had come into possession of incriminating letters. Blaine visited Mulligan at his hotel, took the letters from him, and on June 5 read them in the House, interpreting as he went along. His spirit and courage won for him an immediate parliamentary victory over the forces of detraction, but five days later he was overcome by a sunstroke, and when the Republican Convention met he was in no physical condition to be nominated for the presidency.

Blaine
and the
Mulligan
letters

Much of the opposition to Blaine in 1880 was founded upon the belief that the Mulligan letters revealed misconduct on his part. Blaine confessed they revealed poverty and an attempt to eke out his income by a sale of railroad securities on a commission basis. The charge that was most difficult to explain away was that Blaine, while Speaker in 1869, and presiding over a debate upon a land grant for the little Rock and Fort Smith Railroad, had shown the promoters of that land grant how to save their measure from

defeat in Congress. The *Congressional Globe* and the testimony presented established the fact of this assistance. A few days later, as one of the Mulligan letters revealed, Blaine was writing to one Fisher, who was interested in this transaction, asking to be admitted to the enterprise and promising that he would not prove a "deadhead" in the business. Subsequently Blaine obtained a contract for selling securities of this railroad upon profitable terms. The other letters showed that the venture was unsuccessful, and that hard feeling was developed not only among the speculators, but also among those constituents of Blaine who bought the securities upon his recommendation. It was not shown that he had been bribed to perform any public act, but it was clear that he had asked to be rewarded by the beneficiaries of his official conduct, and that he had been willing while Speaker to trade upon the prestige of his office. He was at least dangerously near the margin of public honesty, and when the demand for a higher standard of public conduct was created by the scandals of the early seventies, he was never able to square his former practice with the new code.

As it became clear in 1884 that Blaine was the strongest candidate for the Republican nomination, the group of independent Republicans revived their hostility to him and let it be known that he could not receive the support of the whole party. They were described by machine leaders as "parlor and clear election-day Republicans," and were given the nickname "mugwumps," for which the *New York Sun* provided an Indian etymology, translating the term as "big bug, or swell head." Their "holier than thou" attitude was denounced by politicians with whose plans they interfered, but in New York and New England they had a strong influence over the selection of the party delegates to the convention at Chicago.

Henry Cabot Lodge, of Massachusetts, and Theodore Roosevelt, of New York, made their initial national appearance as leaders of this movement against the nomination of

The "mugwump" threat

Blaine. Lodge, fresh from his study at Harvard College, where he had lectured on history for several years in the later seventies, was acclaimed as an early instance of a new phenomenon, the scholar in politics. Roosevelt had completed three sessions of the New York Assembly, and though not yet twenty-six years of age, had made himself a leader of the party delegation. *Harper's Weekly* came to the support of the mugwump protest. The *Nation* aided it, and a large number of Republican newspapers showed a disposition to sympathize with it.

When the Republican Convention met in Chicago on June 3, 1884, it was probable that a nomination of Blaine would be followed by some kind of party dis- Blaine and affection. The opposing forces were strong Logan enough to secure the election of their own temporary chairman, but were not able to merge their strength on any single candidate. The choice of the mugwumps, Senator George F. Edmunds, of Vermont, was not a candidate who could inspire personal enthusiasm even among his friends, and was described as the "presidential glacier" by his opponents. Blaine was nominated in spite of the continued opposition of the independents and received, as his companion on the ticket, General John A. Logan, a Grant supporter of 1880, who was supposed to have the same hold on the Grand Army of the Republic that Blaine held over the Irish vote.

The defeated opponents of Blaine were forced to choose between leaving the party and supporting a candidate whom they believed to be unworthy. Roosevelt and Lodge took the latter course; the others, led by Horace White and George W. Curtis, returned to New York, discussing plans for a party schism, and held conferences within the next few days upon the best way to beat Blaine. The simplest method was to induce the Democratic Party, whose convention would be held on July 8, to nominate a candidate whom they could support as an honest man and a genuine reformer. Their attention had already been drawn to Governor Grover Cleveland, of New York.

Grover Cleveland, a middle-aged small-town lawyer, emerged from civic obscurity when elected mayor of Buffalo in 1881 upon a reform ticket. A year later, when the Democratic Party needed a suitable candidate to oppose Secretary of the Treasury Folger, the leaders induced the convention to accept Cleveland as a candidate for governor. He won by a surprisingly large majority, and made civil service reform a chief issue in the campaign and acted upon it after his election. As Governor he aroused the hostility of the Tammany Democrats in New York City by his refusal to be a machine man and by supporting non-partisan measures for municipal government. His fighting qualities and his slow, stubborn sincerity gained him immediate rank as a leader in a party that had developed few national figures since the Civil War. The mugwumps intimated that they would support him if nominated, and thus influenced the Democratic nomination, since that party was willing to nominate anybody to win. The Tammany delegates protested in vain against the nomination, giving point to the rejoinder of General Bragg, who declared that "we love him for the enemies he has made." He was nominated for the presidency, with Hendricks for the vice-presidency.

The canvass of 1884 was one of personality rather than one of principle. Neither platform made an issue of any single theme. Republicans still harped on the untrustworthiness of Democrats, and Democrats pledged themselves to all measures of reform that might embarrass Republicans. The Republican platform statement on the tariff was less emphatic than the determination of party leaders to maintain the system. The civil service legislation of 1883 had lessened the value of public offices as a means of cementing party organization, and had made it difficult to raise party funds by the old methods of assessment upon office-holders. The campaign fund of 1884 was sought from manufacturers who were interested in maintaining the tariff without any change or in rearranging the rates. B. F. Jones, of Pittsburgh, a steel manufacturer

and a friend of Blaine, was made chairman of the Republican National Committee to direct the fight.

The mugwump attack upon the political character of Blaine encouraged Republican party organs to search for something discreditable in the character of Cleveland. Toward the end of July they found it in a charge of improper relations maintained eight years earlier with a Buffalo woman, and immediately they described him "as a notorious libertine and profligate." Democratic journals rejoined with attacks upon the correctness of Blaine's marriage, but were silenced by Blaine's statement of facts and Cleveland's refusal to countenance their move. The personalities of the campaign became more disgraceful as the canvass advanced, and increased the number of voters dissatisfied with either candidate.

Butler accepted the third-party nominations after Cleveland had been chosen by the Democrats, and carried on his candidacy with the New York *Sun* as his chief supporter. It was openly charged that the Republican Party was paying the expenses of his campaign, in order to detach votes from Cleveland. Republicans, on the other hand, unwilling to support Blaine and unable to vote for Cleveland, showed a willingness to throw their votes away upon ex-Governor St. John of Kansas, whom the Prohibition Party nominated on July 23. St. John was denounced as a "stool-pigeon," whose canvass was intended to weaken Blaine.

A few days before the election the supporters of Blaine arranged for a meeting of clergymen at the Fifth Avenue Hotel to endorse the character of the Republican candidate. The senior member of the group, a Catholic priest, who had been expected to make the address, failed to appear, and a Protestant clergyman named Burchard took his place. Blaine, tired by the campaign and thinking over his speech in reply, failed to follow the speaker or to notice when he described contemptuously the Democratic Party as the supporters of "rum, Romanism, and rebellion." "I am the last man in

the United States who would make a disrespectful allusion to another man's religion," Blaine declared, when the evil was done and it was too late to stop it. The Democratic papers spread the phrase "rum, Romanism, and rebellion" broadcast; some even put the words into Blaine's own mouth in spite of his denial and Burchard's abject contrition. It is impossible to say how far the Irish vote upon which Blaine counted was repelled by the apparent insult. When the ballots were finally counted, Cleveland and Hendricks were elected by a plurality of 23,000 over Blaine and Logan; though with a minority of all the votes cast. The small pluralities by which Cleveland carried various Irish precincts in New York gave plausibility to the assertion that Blaine might well have been elected had there been no Burchard episode.

The wave of prosperity begun about 1879 was temporarily checked by financial troubles in the year of Cleveland's election. A panic in May, 1884, produced numerous failures affecting chiefly the stock gamblers in Wall Street. Several banks collapsed and numerous brokers were involved, including the firm of Grant and Ward, whose fate aroused wide public interest because General Grant was its figure-head. Grant went into business after his failure to secure the nomination in 1880, and attached himself to a firm of brokers, knowing nothing of the trade and little about his partners. The collapse of his firm was due to their incompetence and dishonesty. They had fraudulently promoted their business by alleging that Grant's position enabled them to control valuable government contracts. "The failure," said the *Nation*, "is the most colossal that ever took place among merely private firms in the United States and one of the most disgraceful. . . . The misfortune of the position into which General Grant allowed himself to get is, that it enables people to libel him with impunity." No one believed that Grant was himself guilty of misconduct, but his losses called attention to the panic and to the unsatisfactory condition of American finance.

The Bland-Allison Act of 1878 had been in force for six years, in every month of which the Secretary of the Treasury had been obliged to buy at least two million dollars' worth of silver bullion to be coined into standard dollars at the ratio of sixteen to one, and which were to be legal tender. Each Secretary had protested against the law as weakening the stability of national credit. The cheap silver dollars thus coined, which were worth eighty-five cents in 1884, were unpopular; and since few citizens called for them, they were left reposing in the Treasury vaults. The Government had the power to force them into circulation, but refrained from doing so because unwilling to promote such depreciation in the currency. The large annual surplus was great enough to provide for the purchase of this silver and to allow it to be stored away unused; but as the silver assets in the Treasury exceeded those of gold at the time of the panic, a fear developed that ultimately the United States would have to force the use of the cheap dollars. The *Topeka Commonwealth* complained of the existence of five thousand tons of silver dollars in the Treasury, "and yet neither party has the courage to say that the coinage should stop, because the bonanza kings have bullion to sell, and there are demagogues who cry for cheap money." A convention of silver miners held in Denver in January, 1885, demanded free coinage; Cleveland at once announced his approval of Arthur's recommendation that the coinage should be stopped. The fear of cheap money, intensified by the suspicion that the partners of Grant were not the only financial crooks at large, helped to retard recovery from the crisis.

The panic brought Grant into the public eye once more, with the scandals of his Administration forgotten, and with universal affection as the dominant note. His poverty, for he turned all of his property over to his creditors at once, aroused general sympathy. One of the Vanderbilts advanced funds for his immediate need, for the repayment of which Grant insisted upon pledging his war trophies and the valuable gifts he had

The death
of U. S.
Grant

received upon his trip around the world. Ill health was added to his misfortune, and as the rumor spread that his life was soon to end, Congress revived the office of General of the Army of the United States, and Arthur issued the commission in Grant's name as one of his last public acts. Grant had meanwhile discovered a means of earning money. At the request of the editors of the *Century* he prepared an article on the battle of Shiloh, which was published in February, 1885. In the next six months he completed on a sick bed the manuscript of his *Personal Memoirs* that earned a fortune for his family and that took rank at once among the greatest military narratives. He died in July, 1885.

The Democratic Party returned to only partial control of the Government in 1885. Its President was a Northern Democrat, selected because of his ability to widen the schism in the Republican Party. The House of Representatives was under the control of Southern Democrats, who reelected John G. Carlisle as Speaker when Congress reassembled in December. The Senate remained Republican throughout the administration, making it impossible for party legislation to be enacted, but favoring somewhat the passage of non-partisan laws that had to do with the management of the national estate.

The Cabinet of Cleveland had at its head Thomas F. Bayard, of Delaware, a Senator since 1869, who had been a candidate for the presidential nomination in 1880 and 1884. His father had preceded him in the Senate, and his family had been famous in the state and national administrations since independence. Under his direction the United States withdrew from the aggressive attitude assumed by Blaine with respect to the isthmian canal, and accepted the status of joint interest as agreed upon in the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty. The remaining members of the Cabinet were untested leaders, necessarily so, since their party had been so long in opposition. Daniel Manning, Secretary of the Treasury, was a New York journalist. William C. Whit-

ney, Secretary of the Navy, was a New York anti-Tammany lawyer and son-in-law of Senator Payne, a Standard Oil magnate from Ohio. Lamar, the Secretary of the Interior, and Garland, the Attorney-General, had been Confederate officers. William F. Vilas, of Wisconsin, whose oration at a reunion of the Army of the Tennessee had made him a leading member of his party, was made Postmaster-General. There was nothing in the personnel of the Cabinet to give a clue as to what its policies would be.

The Republican campaign charges of disloyalty in the Democratic Party had included repeated assertions that the Democratic Party proposed to vote national pensions for Confederate veterans who had tried to break the Union. The votes of former Union soldiers were asked to prevent such treason, and to make possible continued generous treatment of the loyal veterans. The attitude of the Cleveland Administration with reference to pensions was watched for signs of hostility to the men who saved the Union. Cleveland's record as a candidate had been seriously attacked because he had not enlisted in the Civil War, although of military age, but this attack had been weakened by the fact that Blaine of similar age was equally without a military record. The Grand Army of the Republic, which was formed in April, 1866, at Springfield, Illinois, now became the official representative of the veterans of the Civil War. Its growth had been slow for a decade, until after Congress passed an arrears of pensions bill in 1879.

The military pension system of the United States was founded upon the principle that disability incurred in the service entitled the veteran to a pension from the Government. The number of pensioners after the Civil War reached a total of 242,755 by 1879. In this year Hayes against his better judgment signed a law providing that every pensioner was entitled to receive his annuity not from the date of the award, but from the date of mustering out. Every pensioner on the rolls thus became entitled to receive arrears of pension to cover the interval between his

discharge and the beginning of regular payment, running to a total of hundreds or even thousands of dollars in individual cases. The financial effect of this law had not even been estimated at the date of its passage. In addition to the back payments entailed, new pensioners appeared upon the rolls in large numbers, tempted by the heavy and increasing bonus of arrears. Pension attorneys, who secured the affidavits and prepared the papers, charged extortionate fees against the arrears, and were incited to hunt out possible pensioners and induce them to file their claims. Some of the firms of attorneys published private newspapers for propaganda work among the soldiers, and all of them encouraged the expansion and development of the Grand Army of the Republic, which was not for them a patriotic order, but a machine for detecting the presence of new pensioners and for bringing political pressure in favor of even greater liberality. For its members the Grand Army was a patriotic and devotional society; the claims attorneys used it to increase their profits. The membership of the Grand Army grew rapidly after 1879. Corporal James Tanner became its commander in 1882, and a campaign was started for the passage of a new general law for the payment of pensions based not upon disability in the service, but upon subsequent disability or upon service alone. A dependents' pension bill vetoed by Cleveland in 1887 brought him under the displeasure of the promoters of such legislation.

The private pension bill was a greater abuse than the general legislation because in hundreds of cases individuals not entitled to pension by any general rule obtained the friendly intervention of their Congressmen to secure the favor by direct special legislation. The private bills included cases of deserters with the effrontery to seek aid from the country they had betrayed; and trumped-up cases, where the evidence frequently showed reasons why the pension should not be granted. Many of them covered cases that had been disallowed by the Commissioner of Pensions for cause. Cleveland was the first President to examine the private pension bills critically and to veto those that

were unworthy. Toward the end of his Administration he vetoed them by the score, arousing professed indignation among Republicans, who claimed that the vetoes revealed lack of interest in the soldier. The Republican Party pledged itself to more generous treatment, and redeemed the promise, after Harrison had made Corporal Tanner Commissioner of Pensions, by passing a dependents' pension law in 1890.

The willingness of Cleveland to perform ungracious acts of public honesty led him to undertake a reform of the administration of the General Land Office, which had been wide open since the passage of the Homestead Law, and which had been administered "to the advantage of speculation and monopoly, private and corporate, rather than in the public interest." "I am satisfied," said Sparks, the Commissioner of the Land Office, "that thousands of claims without foundation in law or equity, involving millions of acres of public land, had been annually passed to patent upon the single proposition that nobody but the Government had any adverse interests." "Cleveland seems determined that the rich shall obey the laws as well as the poor," said the *Idaho Avalanche*.

Frauds in
the public
lands

The national estate of the United States came into existence when the original States ceded their surplus lands to Congress to be used for the benefit of the Union and for the creation of additional States. Subsequent purchases added to the area of the public domain thus created. Except for the thirteen original States and Vermont, Kentucky, and Tennessee, the first three to be admitted plus Maine, West Virginia, and Texas, making nineteen in all, the United States itself provided the land upon which its commonwealths were erected. In disposing of the land to individual owners, two general policies prevailed; the earlier, a tidewater policy, framed under the dominance of the original States, offered lands for sale and assumed that there would be profits accruing from the process to be used for national advantage.

In 1841 the West itself became the controlling element in land distribution, marking its arrival by the passage of a general preëmption law that recognized that the settler who made a farm out of virgin land was a public benefactor entitled to a reward. Squatters who were found in residence when any tract of public land was placed on the market were allowed to buy their land at a minimum price in advance of the public auction sale. The West continued to ask for still more liberal treatment of the settler, and in 1862 Congress accepted the principle of the Homestead Act, whereby the citizen who made his farm and lived upon it for a term of years was given title to it free of charge.

The Homestead Law drew the attention of all the world to the free lands of the West, and after the Civil War the Homestead system continental railroads made them easily accessible. The rush of population swamped the General Land Office, as it did the Post-Office, and both broke down, partly through fraud and partly through the lack of an intelligent civil service. Abuses in the land system were noted in the three administrations preceding Cleveland's, and became more imposing as the area of free land dwindled around 1885.

The principal abuses that needed to be corrected included frauds in the homestead system, fraudulent preëmption, theft of public land by illegal enclosures, theft of the natural resources, timber or mineral, and the fraudulent attempts of railroads to secure their land grants without complying with the terms of the award.

The theory of the land laws was that the lands were to be disposed of in small tracts for immediate occupancy and cultivation. Everything was done to make it difficult to acquire land for speculative purposes or to build up large holdings. The system worked well in farming regions in the Mississippi Valley, but on the Western plains, where large areas were without sufficient rainfall, it made no provision for the only way in which the lands could be used. Here the lands were needed in large acreage for grazing and

timber purposes and could not well be used in section tracts or less.

The Homestead and Preëmption Laws were repeatedly violated in the interest of persons who were building up large estates on the public domain. Sparks, the new Commissioner of the General Land Office, took office toward the end of March, 1885, and a few days later began his attack upon fraudulent and collusive entries, by suspending final action upon any of the Western entries until the cases could be reëxamined. Every entry on the public domain was founded upon local testimony and filed at a local office, where it was possible that the local agents might be in collusion with fraud. Only by means of inspection directed from Washington could these frauds be detected. The affidavits showing that the land had been cultivated needed to be checked up by inspection to determine whether this was a fact. Proof that residences had been built needed to be cross-examined. In more than one case the entrymen of four adjacent quarter sections erected one small and temporary sod house over the common corner of the four sections, after which each of them separately swore to the existence of a dwelling upon his section.

The Homestead Law permitted the entryman who did not desire to serve out the required period of residence, to commute his claim and purchase the land on the basis of preëmption. In a multitude of cases these commutations were made at the earliest legal date, and local deed books showed that adjacent sections were all immediately transferred to a single holder, who thus became the owner of a greater acreage than the law permitted. It was common gossip on the plains that new employees on the ranches were induced to file homestead or preëmption claims on adjoining territory, and sell the claim to the owner. This sort of collusive work constituted a fraud upon the Government which could not be detected except by inspection. The number of inspectors authorized by law was so small that the order of Sparks, holding up the final passage of claims until they were examined, filled the office with

thousands of pending cases. The protests of honest entrymen against this proceeding were mingled with those of the land robbers, whose work was interfered with.

The illegal enclosure of public lands involved nearly five million acres in known cases before Cleveland became President. In February, 1885, Arthur signed a law for the removal of fences from the public domain. In some cases tracts of several thousand acres were enclosed in wire fences by the cattle-men without a shadow of legal title. In other instances the encloser would acquire title to a string of sections through which passed a stream suitable for purposes of stock-watering, and would then enclose the grazing lands of the neighborhood that still belonged to the Government. The sanctity of the fence was such that this illegal possession prevented honest homesteaders from entering on the lands thus enclosed. Some States upheld the theft and even exacted taxes from the illegal holders of such lands. Mail-carriers on the plains reported to the Postmaster-General that they were sometimes forced to deviate from the direct trail as much as twenty or thirty miles because of the existence of a fence. They were afraid to cut the wire and go across the enclosure because of threats made by the fence-builders. In August, 1885, Cleveland issued a proclamation against the illegal enclosures, and agents of the Land Office were turned loose against the fences.

The theft of natural resources from the public domain was universal, but a more important cause of loss was the fact that the land laws did not make proper provision for the use of timber, minerals, and fuel. Great stores of unused timber, mineral wealth, and water power passed unintentionally into private hands, by means of the homestead and preëmption entries. The system that was designed to aid the citizen farmer was perverted to the use of the wealthy monopolist.

The failure of the continental railroads to complete the construction of their lines in accordance with the terms of their land grants brought up the question of auditing

these grants and returning the unearned balances to the public domain. In 1882 the time limit of the last outstanding grant expired. This was the grant of the Texas Pacific, which, like the Atlantic and Pacific, whose time limit expired in 1878, had hardly begun the guaranteed construction. The struggle of the interested roads to secure unearned lands or to gain extensions of time, or to procure the transfer of the lands to other roads actually built in the vicinity, was met by an attempt in Congress to forfeit them entirely. The courts held that the unearned grants could not be returned to the public domain for private entry without additional legislation. The accounts had not been kept with accuracy and there was legal question as to whether the roads were entitled to receive any land opposite even their completed mileage, if they failed to finish the whole line on time. The issuance of further lands was brought to an end by Arthur. Under Cleveland Congress declared forfeited the unearned grants and in 1888 the Democrats boasted in their campaign textbook that Cleveland had restored fifty-one million acres of railway land to the public domain.

Forfeiture of
the railroad
land grants

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CHAPTER VII

THE FRONTIER AND ITS AFTERMATH

THE American bonanza kings, whose sudden fortunes, derived from the mines of California and Colorado, startled society after the Civil War, had as later rivals the cattle kings, who entered society with the first great fortunes derived from agricultural pursuits since those of the cotton planters of the old South. Their appearance and their later disappearance were due to the interplay of forces that began to operate when the continental railroads reached the eastern margin of the great plains and that weakened when the completion of these railroads had destroyed the open range. The cow country, where the cattle kings had their domain, played no part in American life before 1865, and by 1890 it was gone forever, after bringing a new phase of civilization into existence and letting loose new movements in society.

The food supply of the United States, ordinarily the least of its troubles, was generally provided by regions near to the place of consumption. A few commodities not produced within the United States or raised there in insufficient amount, like sugar, tea, and coffee, were always imported. The plantation South preferred to devote much of its attention to its staple crops, cotton and tobacco, and imported flour and wheat from other sections of the Union. Cincinnati supplied a great Southern market, and became "Porkopolis" before the Civil War. It retained permanently its important trades in fats and their by-products. But most of America raised its own food, ground its wheat in the local mill, and lived on a narrow but sufficient diet of local origin.

One influence of the railroads was to broaden the diet and to introduce direct competition among the farmers. The center of the wheat industry swung toward the north-

west, from central New York to the prairies of Illinois and Iowa, and thence, with the completion of the Railroads and farm competition Northern Pacific Railroad (1883), and the Canadian Pacific (1885), to the Red River country and the region beyond the Great Lakes. The water power near the junction of the Minnesota and the Mississippi Rivers provided the basis for the flour industries of Saint Paul and Minneapolis, which were aided by the ownership of the patent rights for the roller process, and became a center of world supply before 1880. The refrigerator cars introduced in the later sixties widened the market for the citrus fruits of Florida and California, and made possible an all-year-round traffic in fresh meat and vegetables that relieved the United States from the dominance of seasonal foods and salt meats. The great plains, not yet occupied by farmers, became the basis of a wholesale cattle industry.

About 1866 it was discovered that cattle could winter on the northern plains without shelter and be better fitted for butchering than before the exposure. The wild Plains cattle of the plains of central Texas flourished in the milder climate in huge herds, but were slight and stringy, and were slaughtered chiefly for their hides during the sixties, when the buffalo herd was being extinguished to supply the demand for buffalo robes. But the long-horned, long-enduring Texas cow, though making poor beef, was the mother of sturdy calves, and when the strain was crossed by Hereford or shorthorn sires, the calves could be fattened into prime beef while losing little of the power of endurance of the native stock.

The Union Pacific Railroad building west across Nebraska reached the open plains in 1866, just as it was discovered that cattle could winter there. One of its stations, Ogallala, was utilized by the new industry as a convenient shipping-point for plains-fed stock. As the trade developed, the cattle were bred upon the Texas plains between Fort Worth and the Rio Grande. They roamed, unfenced and with little care, until each spring they were rounded up at convenient centers by the owners of the several herds, and

as the young calves trotted after their mothers toward the great pens, they were seized and branded with the brand of the owner. The heifers and the mothers were turned loose again. The young steers were kept together and were sold to Northern cattlemen.

The "long drive" began in central Texas and ran a little west of north through the panhandle of Texas and the Cherokee country adjoining it into Kansas and thence to Ogallala and the railroad in Nebraska. A little later, when the Northern Pacific had been constructed to the Yellowstone, the stations of Glendive and Miles City on that river lengthened the drive and reduced the importance of Ogallala. The herds of cattle left the round-up camp in the custody of gangs of cowboys, who steered them slowly up the drive. At Dodge City in southwestern Kansas, where the Atchison, Topeka, and Santa Fe Railroad touched the old Spanish boundary at the one-hundredth meridian, the Southern cowboys often turned their charges over to the crews provided by the Northern buyers, who guarded the herds to their destination.

Every year after 1866 larger herds were bred in Texas and driven north, living on the public domain, grazing on Government grass, and costing their owners only the trifling charge for stock-tending. It was possible to ship the fattened animals to the slaughter-houses at Chicago and Kansas City, and make great profits for the cattle-men at the same time that the beef was distributed to the East and to Europe at prices lower than local beef could be obtained. Fresh meat became a more important item of American food than it had ever been before. The agricultural depression in Europe in the later seventies was intensified by the competition of the cheap American foods.

Beef became a new article of commerce and brought into existence new forms of commercial organization that intensified the cry against monopoly. In every American city of importance the local slaughter-house had been a problem because it was a necessary evil. Always offensive to the neighborhood, there was no way of

doing without it, but its presence was commonly restricted by local ordinances. In Chicago in 1865 the numerous local stockyards were merged into a single union stockyard on the western margin of the city, and there it was proposed to concentrate the local traffic. Almost immediately there began the endless procession of stock-cars laden with Western steers that were to force the conversion of the butchers' business into a national industry. The stockyards district was of necessity enlarged. To the slaughter-houses there was added a chain of packing-houses, where the meat that could not be refrigerated and shipped fresh was tinned or converted into some other form of preserved meat. The ice machine and the tin-can machine were active agents in the development of the new trade. Around the packing-houses there arose a network of by-product factories that utilized the hides and hair, the horns and hoofs, and even the blood of the animals, and increased in number and variety as industrial chemistry solved the new problems of manufacture. The Chicago stockyards district became the center of a world of its own, where the names of Armour, Swift, Hammond, Morris, Libby, and McNeal represented the forces of control, and where unskilled labor of foreign extraction did much of the work.

The invasion of Chicago beef was resented by local butchers, who formed protective associations in all parts of the United States and tried in vain to stay the revolution in their industry. The cry of monopoly was raised against the packers, not only by the butchers who could not meet their competition, but by the stock-men, who believed that illegal combinations held down the price of steers. The railroads welcomed the new industry, which created a demand for transportation, but soon found themselves obliged to meet the dickering propensities of the packers, as they were already obliged to meet those of the oil monopoly. By playing off one road against the other, the larger packers secured for themselves special rates and rebates, and drove from the business many of their less skillful competitors.

The Eastern butchers could only scold against the mono-

poly. Their trade in its older form was doomed to speedy extinction. The cattle-men on the Western plains were more able to take steps to fight the packers' monopoly, and there arose in Nebraska and Dakota great ^{Northern} ranches where the cattle, driven up from the ^{ranches} plains, were held for the market. In the first decade of the cow country the cattle were shipped East as soon as stock cars could be had at Ogallala or Glendive to handle them. When the Chicago price was high, the cars were hard to get. When the market broke, the cowmen had no option but to ship their steers and to accept the price fixed by the packers at the Chicago yards. By fencing in a ranch along the Northern Pacific, it was possible to reduce the cost of stock-tending and to hold the steers without great loss for a year or more. The fact that the land law provided no means for the acquisition of such ranches did not prevent their growth. Some of them were bought openly from the railroads, but others were acquired in collusion or abuse of the Homestead and Preëmption Laws, or were deliberately fenced in without a shadow of right. Eastern capital was drawn into the profitable business, until by 1885 there were more cattle on the plains than the market could absorb, and the industry was threatened by losses due to glutting the market. Most famous among the Northern ranches was that at Chimney Butte on the Little Missouri in Dakota, which Theodore Roosevelt bought while he was in the New York Assembly, and which remained his playground throughout the decade.

From its beginning in 1866 the cattle industry on the open plains developed until by 1880 it was world-famous and European capitalists began to invest in ranches of their own. The sympathy with Ireland in her land controversies made these holdings a matter of public concern in the United States, and some observers thought they could detect a danger of alien landlordism in America. The real danger was the destruction of the industry by its own internal processes.

Every year after 1866 the flood of homesteaders washed

farther out upon the plains, and the fences of the farmers — or “nesters,” as the cowboys called them — narrowed the eastern limits of the range. Every year the enclosures restricted the freedom of the “long drive.” The wire fences broke up the unity of the grazing lands, and the efforts of the cowmen themselves to enclose northern ranges made it more difficult to drive their stock. As the open drive was restricted, experiments were made in shipping the cattle north, but the natural courses of the railroads did not serve this traffic. By 1884 still another obstruction appeared. As early as 1879 the British Government forbade the importation of American cattle on the ground that they were often diseased, and in addition to being unfit for consumption, were likely to contaminate the British herds. Texas fever came to be talked about, together with hoof-and-mouth disease and tuberculosis. The State of Kansas passed a quarantine law in 1885, forbidding the driving of Texas cattle into the State, and guards with shotguns patrolled the border of the State, to maintain the law. The next year Colorado passed a similar law and effectively closed the drive.

Associations of cattle-men saw the impending termination of the business. In 1884 they held two conventions, one at Chicago where the stock-men were chiefly concerned with the new dairy interests of Illinois and Wisconsin, and one at Saint Louis, where the Western dealers discussed their future. In the latter convention they turned instinctively to Washington, as the frontier has always done. They presented a request for the erection of a national cattle trail from central Texas to the Canadian line, wide enough for the herds to find abundant pastures and forever to be withheld from private entry or state restriction. “As the Indian gave way to the pioneer,” said a speaker at one of the cattle conventions, “so must the cowboy go before the settler, and the ranch take the place of the range until the eight million acres of land now grazed by cattle shall teem with villages and model farms for the cultivation of refined cattle cared for, not by cow-

Enclosures

Organiza-
tion of
cattle-men

boys with revolvers, but cowboys with brains." After 1885 the cow country was gone and the beef industry underwent a long reorganization.

The charges of the cattle-men that the railroads treated them unfairly and that the packers operated a selfish monopoly added to the complaints that grew in volume through the eighties and that led toward an assertion of national power over the railroads. The fact that the continental systems were substantially complete by 1884 and that the country was beginning to regret its generosity in the land grants gave further impetus to the same movement. The Senate in 1885 yielded to the pressure. A select committee on interstate commerce, with Shelby M. Cullom, of Illinois, as chairman, was directed to make inquiries into the needs for regulation and the methods of accomplishing it.

The earliest important movement for railroad regulation in the interest of fair play and of the community served by the road, arose in the States northwest of Chicago about 1873. The membership of the Patrons of Husbandry began to grow after 1870. In the ensuing state elections candidates found it prudent to avow their interest in the regulation of the railroad rates, which was the chief subject of discussion in the Granger gatherings. State laws were passed, culminating in the Potter Law of Wisconsin in 1874, which asserted the right of the Commonwealth to regulate the railroads' charge for service. The railroads of the Granger district ignored the legislation when they could and fought the Granger laws with all the legal powers at their disposal. Most of the laws were faulty, being based upon hostility to the roads, rather than upon an understanding of their business, but the Supreme Court of Wisconsin approved the theory of the Potter Law, and in March, 1877, the Supreme Court of the United States in a series of Granger cases upheld the common-law right of a State to regulate its railroads. The case of *Munn vs. Illinois* was the basic case in connection with which the decision was handed down.

Railroad
regulation

Munn vs.
Illinois,
1877

Most of the States followed the precedent of the Granger legislatures and passed rate-fixing laws or created railroad commissions before 1885. The problem was gradually lifted out of the field of class politics into that of economic investigation. In the Windom Report made to the Senate in 1873, and the Hepburn Report made to the New York Legislature at the end of the decade, and in the annual reports of the various railroad commissions, data were accumulated upon which to found the conviction that the railroads needed to be regulated, and that no single State was powerful enough to do it. In a case decided in 1885 the Supreme Court reached this latter conclusion, and declared that the regulation by a State of any portion of an interstate journey was an infringement upon the exclusive powers of Congress over interstate commerce. The whole machinery of regulation was thus threatened. The completion of the continental railroads at the same time broadened the conviction of a need for regulation, and the Cullom committee, reporting in January, 1886, made a similar recommendation to Congress.

An Interstate Commerce Act was passed in February, 1887, forbidding combinations among the railroads and creating a non-partisan Interstate Commerce Commission to investigate and report upon grievances against the roads. The pooling of freight receipts by competing roads was prohibited, and they were forbidden to charge more for a short haul than for a longer haul over the same track in the same direction. The attempt to force the roads to compete with each other for their business was in part nullified by this "long-and-short-haul clause," because since no two roads between competing points rendered their service under precisely the same conditions, it was sometimes impossible for the longer road to compete for through traffic without fixing a rate for its long-haul service which would have been ruinous if applied to its whole business. Judge Thomas M. Cooley, of Michigan, became the guiding spirit of the Interstate Commerce Commission, and formulated the principles

Interstate
Commerce
Act, 1887

upon which it operated until its powers were revised in 1906.

Another non-partisan measure inspired by the importance of the agricultural problem was the creation of a Department of Agriculture with a seat in the Cabinet. There had been a department of that name since 1862, but with subordinate rank under the Interior Department. It was enlarged in 1884 by the addition of a Bureau of Animal Industry for the purpose of controlling cattle disease and lessening the danger of its spread. Cleveland signed the bill creating a new department, of which ex-Governor Jeremiah M. Rusk, of Wisconsin, was appointed Secretary by President Harrison. In 1890 it was given the duty to inspect cattle and fresh meat offered for export. The reluctance of European Governments to concede the sanitary character of American foods forced this action upon Congress. The consequence of the inspection service was an extension of the technical duties of the United States, and was one of the facts tending to change the nature of the National Government.

Further examination of the remaining natural resources was authorized at the same time. Ten years earlier the survey work of the Interior and War Departments had been combined in the Geological Survey in the Department of the Interior. Under the direction of Clarence King and Major J. W. Powell it turned the resources of science upon public lands. Powell's report upon the arid regions was followed in 1889 by appropriations for the survey of all the sites available for the construction of reservoirs and irrigation projects. The Preëmption Law, whose abuse was an old nuisance, was repealed in 1891.

The spirit of the open frontier passed out of American life forever in the decade of the eighties, leaving behind it survivals that lasted for another generation, and inducing the development of substitutes to take its place. The frontier while it lasted was a social safety-valve that prevented the rise of social pressure or class antagonism to the danger point. Not only upon the

Department
of Agri-
culture

Substitutes
for the
frontier
outlet

western margin of the United States, but in every State farm land was either free or cheap. The abundance of land invited each generation to enlarge the area of settlement and erect new homes. There was no chance for the socially discontented to become numerous or ominous. No oppressed lower class could be created in a community in which any young man with reasonable nerve and luck might hope to be an independent farmer before he was thirty. All American society was close to its frontier origin, and the man of affairs, wherever he found himself, normally looked back to his boyhood on the farm.

The influence of universal farm life with independence within easy reach of all gave its peculiar aspect to the American character. The more picturesque life upon the actual frontier provided the theme that men of letters grasped in the second quarter of the century. James Fenimore Cooper with his romances of the frontier made himself a lasting place in American letters. His *Deerslayer* and *Chingachgook* were unreal portraits, but they coincided with what his Eastern readers thought the West to be, and perpetuated the spirit of the frontier life.

In one form or another this spirit permeated American society, and when the creative force was stopped, its survivals carried on the legend. In December, 1887, a group of the young men who had hunted on the buffalo range and had followed the rear guard of American big game into the mountains organized the Boone and Crockett Club, through which they cherished a memory of the past and a love of outdoor life. A few years later they exhibited at the Chicago World's Fair a frontiersman's log cabin set on an island in its typical surroundings. "The club felt very strongly," wrote Theodore Roosevelt, one of its members, "that the life of the pioneer settler, the life of the man who struck out into the wilderness as part of the vanguard of civilization, and made his living largely in warfare with the wild game, represented a phase of our history so characteristic and yet so evanescent that it would be a mistake not to have it represented. . . . There is nothing in the history

of any other nation which quite corresponds to it." Roosevelt set to work to write the history of the frontier in his *Winning of the West* (1889-96), and a more genuine plainsman than he dramatized it.

Colonel William F. Cody, known through a generation in Europe and America as "Buffalo Bill," grew to boyhood on the margin of the plains. At the age of fourteen he was rider on the pony express which carried the mails in less than eight days across the plains from Saint Joseph on the Missouri to Sacramento. He later became a professional hunter providing fresh buffalo meat by contract to the construction camps of the Union Pacific Railroad while it was building across Nebraska, and when the road was done, he was in demand as guide and friend for Eastern sportsmen and distinguished foreigners, who wished to hunt big game and see the West.

About 1872 Cody went upon the stage, acting in cheap Western melodramas whose Indians were all painted white men. In 1883 he turned manager and organized a larger venture, gathering at his ranch on the North Platte cowboys and mustangs as well as real Indians borrowed from the reservation. Here he created his Wild West Show with its open-air presentation of cowboy life. His performance leaped into immediate popularity. In 1887 he took it to London to exhibit at the American Exposition there in the Jubilee year of Queen Victoria, and earned even greater popularity than at home. The novel life aroused the interest of the youthful royalties gathered in London that summer. Command performances were frequent and Cody returned their hospitalities with Western barbecues in the big arena. Alexandra, then Princess of Wales, came repeatedly with her children, and like the rest of royalty insisted upon riding around the arena in the Deadwood coach during the Indian attack. So long as it was possible to obtain real Indians and cowboys, the popularity of the Wild West Show continued, and when Cody died in 1917 his rivals were still imitating his performance and moving-picture actors without number had seized upon his theme.

The Wild West Show preserved a part of the disappearing life with the technique derived from an even greater spectacle, then at its height — P. T. Barnum's "Greatest Show on Earth" "Greatest Show on Earth." It was the mission of Barnum, who turned his Yankee ingenuity to the trade of showman in 1835, to make amusement and recreation respectable. The Puritan ideals and the frontier simplicity of American life had restricted the development of public amusements. The theater was unimportant outside the cities and in bad repute within them, but there existed in most of the population sufficient means to patronize whatever entertainments might arouse their interest. Barnum, with genius for both entertainment and advertising, became a great figure in New York with his American Museum. His exploitation of the dwarf Tom Thumb and his later importation of the Swedish singer Jenny Lind in 1850 were typical successes in his career. Out of his museum and menagerie there developed a traveling circus that he put upon the road in 1871, and that ten years later was famous under its boasting name, with three rings under the main top and with gigantic side-shows. His importation of Jumbo in 1882 failed to produce an international clash as *Punch* feared, but led to violent and profitable publicity. His royal Burmese white elephant, imported a little later, was white enough to be unusual, but not white enough to be profitable, and popularized the phrase "white elephant" in the rich American vernacular.

In the fifty years during which Barnum was prominent before the public, American life lost its rural simplicity and city populations came into existence, living a narrower and less satisfying life than that of the farm, and craving new outlets to restore their spiritual balance. Farm life had given opportunities for a rounded development that was denied not only to the inhabitant of the city tenements, but even to the city well-to-do. The latter now organized their country clubs, yacht clubs, and athletic clubs, while the former became willing supporters of public recreation and organized sport.

The rise of sport in America in the years between the Centennial Exposition in Philadelphia in 1876 and the World's Fair at Chicago in 1893 is due in part to a read-justment of American life from rural to urban conditions, and provides some of the outlets that replaced those of pioneer life as the frontier was closing down. Before the Civil War there was little sport in America. The Turnverein members had imported group gymnastics from Germany. There was some racing of both horses and boats, and there was much hunting on a small scale, but sport was generally only an afterthought and a by-product. The breed of race-horses that Diomed, winner of the English Derby of 1780, started in Virginia in his old age, contributed to the development of the American thoroughbred and the permanent interest in racing stock. In 1866 the American Jockey Club was opened on the outskirts of New York, and was followed by similar race-tracks that made racing a spectators' sport, entertaining the city population and discredited by the gamblers who infested it. Robert Bonner, who owned the race horse Maud S. when her records beat the world, found the burden of proof still against him, as the public asked why a man of known respectability should devote so much of his attention to sport.

The America's cup was brought to the United States from the royal yacht races held at Cowes in 1851, and induced a long series of English sportsmen to attempt to take it back. During the eighties the Atalanta (1881), the Genesta (1885), the Galatea (1886), and the Thistle (1887) made the attempt in vain, and a generation later the famous cup was still in the hands of the New York Yacht Club, and the hope of its recovery was still alive in Britain.

Promoters of sport as a spectacle found that it could be made to pay, with city audiences anxious for a chance to contribute to its support. In 1878 an English sportsman, Sir John Astley, offered a purse of £500 and a championship belt worth £100 more to establish a championship for a six days' go-as-you-please race. Walking races among professional pedestrians had been popular for some years,

but had been marred by the inability of referees to maintain any effective definition of walking. The Astley belt was competed for in London and was won by a Chicago Irishman named O'Leary, who covered 520 miles in six days. The trophy was defended four times before the end of 1879, and other similar races had ample patronage.

The interest in walking races was surpassed by the re-
 John L. Sullivan pugilists who followed the profession. The fight
 of John C. Heenan against the English cham-
 pion, Sayers, in 1860 was the last of the great fights of the
 old school before promoters built arenas and commercial-
 ized the pastime. About 1880 a Boston Irishman, John L.
 Sullivan, began to attract interest by his engaging personal-
 ity and his genius for slugging. In February, 1882, he won
 the championship of America from one Paddy Ryan, and
 thereafter repeatedly drew audiences that crowded the
 arena at Madison Square Garden. Like Buffalo Bill he went
 to England for the Jubilee in 1887, where his conduct when
 he met the Prince of Wales and treated him as an equal was
 widely noticed. Sullivan differed from many of the pro-
 fessional fighters in his willingness to take punishment as
 well as to give it. In 1889 a bout was arranged between
 him and Jake Kilrain for a new diamond belt offered by the
 editor of the *Police Gazette*, and what they called the heavy-
 weight championship of the world. He won this fight — to
 have it sung later by Vachel Lindsay:

“And . . .
 John L. Sullivan,
 The strong boy
 Of Boston,
 Broke every single rib of Jake Kilrain.”

His admirers talked of running him for Congress on the Democratic ticket; but he went on a boxing tour to Australia instead and came back to lose his title to a new winner, James J. Corbett, in 1892. The popularity of boxing was well established, with the protests of the refined and tender-hearted more than overborne by the interest of

those who liked to watch it or participate. Theodore Roosevelt engaged in public boxing while an undergraduate at Harvard, boxed with fighters whenever he had a chance at the White House or elsewhere, and maintained a personal friendship with John L. Sullivan throughout his life.

The National League of baseball clubs was formed in 1876 with eight member teams: Boston, Hartford, Chicago, Saint Louis, Louisville, Cincinnati, the Mutuals ^{Organized} (New York), and the Athletics (Philadelphia). ^{baseball} It marked the transition of baseball from a players' sport, loosely organized though widely enjoyed, into a profitable spectators' sport. Baseball evolved from earlier games of ball played, some of them, between the Mexican and Civil Wars. There was an organization of baseball players as early as 1858, who enjoyed the game with a soft ball and without gloves, masks, or protectors. The Civil War stimulated the game. It brought together groups of young men who sought recreation in their off hours, and taught the game to men from all sections, who carried it home with them after demobilization. In the later sixties local baseball clubs sprang into existence in all parts of the United States and the Cincinnati Red Stockings, a strictly professional team, went on tour in 1869 with great profit to themselves. The deliberate organization of leagues of traveling clubs followed in due course.

As a spectators' game baseball had no equal. The city ball parks operated as vents where the surplus enthusiasm of the crowds upon the bleachers was released with much noise but a minimum of danger. An American Association of clubs appeared in 1882 to be a rival of the National League, and minor or "bush" leagues grew up among groups of cities everywhere. Albert G. Spalding was the best-known patron of the game. He helped to organize the National League, won the pennant year after year with his Chicago team, and in 1889 took two full teams on a tour around the world. A year earlier than this, DeWolf Hopper — who tells the story in *Once a Clown, always a Clown* (1926) — started toward immortality, as the baseball

classic, the doggerel of *Casey at the Bat*. Baseball was the only game of the sort whose vogue was universal. Cricket, of similar fame in England, was an exotic in America. It was played a little on the fields around Boston, New York, and Philadelphia, and Dr. S. Weir Mitchell remembered to have played it as early as 1845. Philadelphia developed a group of country clubs where cricket was the leading sport, and occasionally visiting teams from Canada or England were invited for a contest. The "gentlemen of Philadelphia" in September, 1885, for the first time beat eleven Britishers with an eleven of Americans.

Baseball and cricket occupied the border-land between the spectators' sport and that of the participants. The city crowds wanted both recreation and entertainment, and those who could afford it joined with their friends to make it possible. Boys who went to college found football and baseball, rowing and track athletics, waiting for them. The Intercollegiate Athletic Association came into existence in 1876 as did the National Amateur Athletic Association of America. These societies drew the line between amateur and professional sport, and endeavored to secure control over the former, and to maintain a real distinction between those who played games for fun and those who performed for money. Fields were acquired on the unbuilt margins of the cities, where the games were played.

The country club
Club-houses were provided with dressing-rooms and baths, and before long other conveniences made their appearance in the form of general club-houses for non-playing members, women's club-houses, and, occasionally, even junior buildings for the children of members. The athletic club became the center of recreation in many a community and evolved easily and naturally into the country club. A decade later, however, when golf was imported into the United States, and two decades later, when the motor car had made its appearance, the country club developed its largest usefulness.

The participants' sports increased in number and variety as the population grew that needed them. About

1863 one Plimpton invented the roller skate and bred a mania that raged endemic among the youth and intermittently epidemic among adults thereafter. Halls were converted into skating rinks and great buildings were erected for skating. The range of the sport was widened when concrete sidewalks and asphalt streets appeared in the early eighties. Six days' skating races were profitable for their promoters, and a record of 1090 miles was made in such a race in 1885. Women and girls took to the pastime, causing their elders to grieve over the demoralization of the growing generation.

Croquet made its appearance as a mild sport in the same years, and had a wide popularity because of the simplicity of its equipment. The handful of players who treated it as a game of skill rather than as a pastime began their national conventions in 1879, and persisted in them at the permanent grounds of the National Croquet Association at Norwich, Connecticut.

The improvements in city streets and country roads made possible the rapid adoption of the bicycle. Contrivances of this sort were experimented with for many years before the machine with its large front wheel, Bicycles its slender steel spokes, and its rubber tires assumed a standard form. Colonel A. A. Pope, of Hartford, Connecticut, imported English bicycles in 1878, and began to copy and improve upon them. Bicycle clubs were organized whose members adopted uniforms and rode together in a body. Club "runs" to near-by resorts became a common form of amusement, while occasionally the more stalwart members of the organizations undertook their "century runs" upon a single day. In 1880 the delegates of twenty-nine bicycle clubs organized the League of American Wheelmen which for nearly twenty years took a leading position in the field of amateur sport. The progress of invention soon made bicycling safer and adapted it to the use of women by the introduction of the safety bicycle. This machine, chain-driven and with wheels of equal size, appeared in the catalogues of 1887. The pneumatic rubber tire that followed it

in a few more years completed the basic structure of the modern bicycle.

Lawn tennis, the only genuine rival of baseball and bicycling as American sports, was deliberately invented in England and was imported to America about 1875.

Tennis courts were built on private lawns and in the new athletic clubs, and inspired a great increase in the number of the latter. A national association was organized in 1881 and began its series of annual tournaments at Newport. A women's national championship tournament appeared in 1890, and in the next decade the American girl invaded England and there held her own against all comers.

The new interest in sport developed most rapidly in the regions where the open country life first disappeared. The games were taken up with an avidity that speedily made them more than an outlet for repressed spirits, and turned them into a positive expression of a new side of American life. They spread from the cities where they were indispensable to the small towns where they were less needed. Not only the rich patronized them, but people of moderate means enjoyed them and were able to pay for them. City governments provided them at public cost for the poorer classes. The prosperity of the eighties was enough to provide a wide and immediate following for sport or anything else that appeared to be worth while.

The closing frontier removed a safety valve that for a century had retarded social explosion due to over-pressure, and the rise of sport to some extent provided a substitute method of relief; but greater changes were occasioned by the disappearance of free lands than those which were simply of the body and the spirit. The ease with which economic independence could be obtained steadily declined, and the typical citizen lost the expectations hitherto prevailing that he could be financially independent in his early middle age. It became more difficult to go into agriculture. Expanding industry brought into existence cities filled with factory workers whose future was often bounded by the factory walls.

The changing social outlook

The labor problem took on a new importance as the hope of individual independence weakened. The factory produced class consciousness among the workers, who could see the sharp contrast between their lives and those of their employers, without seeing a way of bettering their condition except by organization.

The contrast between the comforts and resources of the few and those of the bulk of the population became sharper than it ever had been. In earlier periods wealth had been distributed with greater equality, and ^{Standard of life} there had been fewer luxuries or enjoyments that money could buy. The new inventions and recreations were now brought within reach of the well-to-do, and men of means found opportunity in the shifting industry to increase their wealth. It gave the worker little satisfaction to know that he was probably better off than men in his position had ever been before. The prices of commodities in 1890 were less than half those that prevailed in 1865, and were actually lower than those of 1860 before the Civil War. The declining curve of prices after 1865 made life easier for the middle class and the wage-earners living on fixed incomes. This advantage was increased by the fact that wages were rising, those of 1890 averaging 68 per cent above those of 1860. With prices falling and wages rising, the wage-earner had no grievance as he looked behind him. His grievance lay before him, as he looked into the future and saw a small fraction of the population enjoying advantages hitherto unknown, whose attainment lay beyond his reach.

The National Labor Union of 1866 ran its course until it blundered into politics and died trying to absorb the green-back doctrine. The Knights of Labor represented the next serious attempt to develop con- ^{Knights of Labor}sciousness among workingmen, and to organize them on a national scale. Its existence for over ten years as a secret society of which the public was vaguely and nervously conscious carried it through the panic of 1873 and the period of the railroad strikes. At the beginning of the next decade it threw aside the cloak of secrecy and became the

open spokesman of all labor. Its basis of organization was the individual workman, regardless of his craft, and it admitted all workers but lawyers, bankers, and saloon-keepers. Its theory of organization was a threat to that of the trade union that was working for solidarity in the various crafts. In 1881 a federation of organized trade and labor unions was organized in Pittsburgh to preserve the autonomy of local union, and yet provide a national organization. The American Federation of Labor, as this body came to be known, had a limited success until 1887, the Knights of Labor, meanwhile, remaining the more prominent organization. One general activity of the Knights of Labor was its promotion of a statistical study of the conditions of labor. In 1891, said Senator Aldrich in the preface to his report on prices, "there was no data in existence by which the actual or relative status of wage-earners could at any time be accurately measured." A National Bureau of Labor was created by Congress in 1884, to assist in this study, and thirty-one States had somewhat similar bureaus by 1893. The Knights desired to secure the post of Commissioner of Labor for their Grand Master Workman Terence V. Powderly, but Arthur instead appointed a distinguished economist, Carroll D. Wright. The annual report of the Bureau became a mine of information on the labor movement. In 1887 and again in 1894 and 1901, it was devoted especially to a summary of strikes and lockouts. Increasing knowledge coupled with an actually improving status increased the uneasiness of labor instead of moderating it. The panic of 1884 left temporary depression in its wake that distorted the curves of wages and prices for a brief interval. In 1885 Powderly discussed "the army of the discontented" in the *North American Review*, and believed that at the moment there were two million workmen unemployed. There appeared to be a lack of correlation when farmers complained of overproduction and falling prices and labor thought itself unable to get along.

The prosperity that was insufficient for American workmen attracted immigrants in increasing numbers after 1878,

until in the year 1882 they totaled 788,992. To many of these the condition of labor in America was better than their expectation, but they quickly absorbed the discontent of organized American labor in addition to alien ideals that they imported and propagated in the United States.

Between 1878 and 1890 the German Government proscribed the Socialists, forcing them under cover and into secrecy, and driving the more enterprising of them to migration. Compulsory military service increased the volume of European emigration. The repressive policy of Russia bred anarchy and nihilism among the working-classes and further increased the stream of population attracted by the prosperity of the United States. The arrival in America of immigrants who knew neither Republican nor Democrat, but who avowed themselves to be followers of Karl Marx or of the exponents of anarchy, jarred the complacency of the United States as it regarded American institutions. The names of the new schools of thought were freely used without differentiation. Violence and murder were their earmarks for the public. The railroad strikes of 1877 caused dismay to those who thought them the beginning of a communistic revolt. From unshakable conviction of the merits of American institutions, many persons had passed to a panicky fear of any individual however unimportant who advocated a change, whether by evolution or by revolution. In May, 1886, after a period of strikes, egged-on by exuberant oratory from a group of foreign anarchists, there was a riot in the Haymarket in Chicago and bombs were thrown, resulting in the death of several policemen. The trials of the anarchists for murder and the execution of several of them were generally accepted as a proper defense of society. The Haymarket riots were described by *Leslie's* as "the most significant event that has occurred in this country since Sumter was fired on."

The army of the discontented offered a continuous invitation to the builders of new parties, still seeking for the right moment to unite the forces of discontent and those

of reform. The New York mayoralty campaign of 1886 tested the temper of the day.

Henry George, who was the candidate of the Labor-Democracy for mayor of New York in 1886 had become a national figure in the seven years since the publication of his *Progress and Poverty*. The theory of the single tax expounded in this volume became immediately popular in Ireland, where the alien ownership of land was producing civil war. George was recognized in Britain before America would listen to him. His books were read and his addresses were welcomed by large audiences. The labor and anti-monopoly forces in New York made him their candidate in September, 1886. Patrick Ford with his *Irish World* brought him support from the New York Irish. He had the open support of Terence V. Powderly, of the Knights of Labor, as well as that of Samuel Gompers, of the American Federation of Labor. The older parties were driven to heroic exertions to save the day. The Democratic Party nominated Abram S. Hewitt, as strong a man as it possessed, who had been chairman of the Democratic National Committee in 1876 and a member of Congress, and who was in the abnormal position of being at once a wealthy iron-master and a free-trade Democrat. The Republican Party nominated Theodore Roosevelt, whose fighting qualities more than offset his lack of years. Hewitt was elected, but the friends of George believed that his more than sixty thousand votes contained the nucleus of a new political party.

The United Labor Party was formed in August, 1887, by the group that worked with George the year before. Most of its members were sympathetic with the doctrine of the single tax, but the convention suppressed the Socialists who tried to capture the organization. Six months earlier there had been an industrial labor conference at Indianapolis, dominated by Western reformers and the remnants of the old Greenback organization. This convention thought "every day brings tidings of the uprisings of the people" and formed a Union Labor Party. Each

group of reformers hoped to bring about a merger of agricultural and industrial labor, as the Greenback Nationals had tried to do in 1878.

The depression after 1884 was productive of complaints against the existing order that took form not only in new social theories and parties, but also in open strikes. Jay Gould reduced the wages of the shopmen and machinists on his Wabash road early in 1885 and brought on a strike that began in the Sedalia shops of the Missouri Pacific in March. Somewhat to the surprise of the strikers, they won their demands with the support of the governors of the Southwestern States and the local railroad commissioners. The men were encouraged to continue and complete their organization. District assemblies of the Knights of Labor appeared throughout the Missouri Pacific system, and in March, 1886, local assemblies of the Knights under the leadership of Martin Irons renewed the warfare. The strike was disavowed by the Knights of Labor, which as an organization did business in other ways. There was, however, no means by which the national organization could control the irregular acts of its local assemblies, and Irons for a time became a dictator in the Southwest. Jay Gould was at the height of his unpopularity and the strikers believed that because of this public sympathy would side with them.

Gould defeated the hopes of the strikers by turning public sympathy against them. Instead of trying to run his trains, he brought them back to the yards, when the strikers did not burn them on the way, and left them there. Within a day or two southern Kansas and the region southwest of it realized their dependence upon continued freight service. Coal and food ran low. Political pressure was brought upon the governors to end the strike, while Powderly disavowed it. The outlaw assemblies were held responsible for the disorder, and the strike out of which it grew was declared by the Commissioner of Labor to be ill-judged and without proper cause. It was completely lost.

The Knights of Labor declined in strength and popularity

after the Missouri Pacific strike. The attempt at solidarity of all labor antagonized the leaders of the trades. The American Federation began to grow rapidly, encouraging its member unions to develop themselves as far as possible, and becoming itself a clearing-house for the common needs of labor. The organization of 1881 was revised in 1886.

The renewed uneasiness of labor and reform, instead of producing a demand for "a strong President" as it did in 1878, stimulated an examination of the workings of American government. The one hundredth anniversary of the Federal Constitution, celebrated in 1889, became the occasion of a general discussion of the changes in society. During these ceremonies Bishop Henry C. Potter preached a scathing sermon upon the decay in morals to a congregation that included the President of the United States. Edward Bellamy wrote a romance, *Looking Backward* (1889), in which his hero was thrown into a prolonged slumber on Memorial Day, 1887, to awake in the year 2000, and to wonder at the new society. Bellamy followed the trend to monopoly to its logical fullness, and described an Arcadia of state socialism. His tale appealed to spirits discontented with the realities of life, and there came a little crop of Bellamistic societies, whose members talked of forming communities in which to live a communistic life. A different picture drawn from the same society was given by Paul Leicester Ford in *The Honorable Peter Stirling* (1894), who described the foundations of the power of the city boss and used episodes that made the life of his hero somewhat resemble that of Grover Cleveland.

While politicians, reformers, and labor organizers were working on the problems of the city wage-earner, the daily life of that individual was an object of wide concern. The cities of the eighties were piled helter-skelter within the limits of what had been hardly more than country towns. The census of the United States shows 25 cities of fifty thousand in 1870, 35 in 1880, and 58 in 1890. New York City in these twenty years in-

Social
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The
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cities

creased from 942,292 to 1,515,301, Philadelphia from 674,022 to 1,046,964, Chicago from 298,977 to 1,099,850. The increase in houses was in every case less rapid than that in city population. The poorer newcomers crowded in tenements, and it was small wonder that the city boss, with his annual free picnic for his constituents, could win their hearts and sway their votes. The city political organizations acquired a degree of cohesion hitherto unknown in American politics, and their steadiness gave to the national party organizations an ability to resist the disintegrating influences of reform. The cities became the scene of easy political corruption. On every hand the needs of the community called for water companies, gas companies, electric lighting, rapid transit, and railroad terminals. The franchises of the community possessed great value for promoters who could gain possession of them, and the city councils in the presence of these agents of business were under constant pressure to betray the interests of the people.

The condition of the less fortunate members of society crowded in the city slums constituted a two-edged problem. Their misery and lack of opportunity appealed to the compassion of every one who knew them, while the future of society in the hands of voters who had grown to manhood amid the conditions of the slums was a matter of deep concern. When Jacob Riis published in 1890 the record of his observations as a journalist on the East Side in New York under the title *How the Other Half Lives*, he aroused both amazement and incredulity.

The conditions arising from modern city congestion were experienced in Europe earlier than in the United States and were approached from both standpoints, of ^{Social relief} the body and of the soul. The spasmodic revival work conducted with effect by Moody and Sankey in the later seventies in New York was supplemented by the permanent revival work of the Salvation Army. This organization beginning in the English slums in 1865 stuck persistently to its task. The first edition of its *War Cry* appeared in 1879. Its activities were extended to the United

States, and carried on amid jeers and misunderstandings, but "the hallelujah circus" lasted in spite of the sneers.

The name of Arnold Toynbee is connected with the movement that began in England to take lay workers into the slums and to help their inhabitants by methods other than religious. The interest of Toynbee in the work was aroused in part by the English lectures of Henry George. After his death Toynbee Hall was founded in the East End of London, and here a group of university men went into the region of the notorious White Chapel Road like any other missionaries into a strange society.

The settlement idea was brought to America after the opening of Toynbee Hall. Americans who would have denied the existence of a need looked around them and were frightened by what they saw. The New York College Settlement was opened in the fall of 1889; a few days after it a group of Western college women, with Jane Addams at their head, opened Hull House in Chicago. Lillian D. Wald, one of the early group of workers in New York, has described in autobiographic form *The House on Henry Street* (1915), with which she was connected. The new ideas spread rapidly, and before the end of the century more than a hundred settlements of similar character had been created to spread the happiness of modern life more uniformly among the people.

Charity was refounded upon a new theory. The giving to others for the benefit of the giver appeared to be inadequate. The interest of society in the welfare of all its members and in being protected against the underdevelopment of any of them was the foundation of new movements for charity organization and coöperation among the charitable agencies. The new science of sociology was studied for the light it might throw upon these problems. Social workers found themselves working for the same ends as the professed advocates of labor. In both groups there was steady development of a conviction that democracy on the old basis had had its day with the passing of the rural ideal, and that under the conditions of modern industry democratic free-

dom of opportunity would be lost unless the people as a whole intervened to save themselves as individuals. By 1890 the United States was no longer a nation of relative equality, but showed all the signs of approaching social stratification. The degree with which this fact was unrecognized by the spokesmen of reform is one of the measures of the survival of the belief in the doctrine of equal opportunity.

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CHAPTER VIII

THE PARTY OF PROTECTION

AT no time between 1885 and 1889 did Grover Cleveland have both houses of Congress in political agreement with him. The Democrats failed to gain the Senate in 1884, and repeated the failure in 1886. The President never received the prestige that comes from the enactment of party measures. His own party came to regard him as less than a success, while the Republicans viewed him as the obstacle between themselves and full control of the Government. His tendency to rely upon his own judgment increased with his isolation. In December, 1887, he took all parties by surprise by devoting the whole of his annual message to the need for tariff reform.

The attack upon the protective tariff system advanced along three lines after the chance injection of the issue into the canvass of 1880, and the failure of Congress, under Arthur, really to revise it. The social reformers denounced it as class legislation that gave special privileges to the monopolies that were already menacing. Political economists, filled with the theories of Adam Smith, criticized it as an improper interference with free trade among the nations. Practical politicians saw in it the cause for a swelling surplus in the National Treasury that either tempted Congress into extravagance or took from the people funds not needed for the purposes of government. Cleveland was impressed by all three arguments, but most of all by the last. In his third annual message he called Congress to its duty and his party to leadership, in cutting down the revenues to the amount needed to maintain the Government.

Many of the wisest of the tariff reformers advised against an attempt at reduction at this time. There was no prospect that a bill could be passed against the opposition of a

Republican Senate. George W. Curtis, Carl Schurz, and E. L. Godkin believed that it was more important to reëlect Cleveland in 1888 than to force the tariff issue in 1887, and feared that the result of Cleveland's act would be to split the Democrats and improve the fighting spirit of the Republicans. Neither free trade nor tariff reform was accepted unanimously in the Democratic Party, which had recognized the protectionist Randall as its parliamentary leader until 1883.

The tariff reform message of Cleveland was accepted by the Republican leaders as a call to battle. James G. Blaine was abroad when it was read, but instantly an interview with him at Paris appeared in which he denounced free trade. The Republican Na-
The tariff
a major
issue
 tional Committee met in Washington on December 8, 1887, to issue the call for its next convention. The committeemen welcomed the issue as one upon which they were ready to fight, and the chairman, B. F. Jones, announced that Blaine could have the nomination if he wanted it. The aggressive in the tariff debate had been conducted by Democrats thus far. It was now seized by Republicans, who held it for the next ten years.

Neo-Republicanism was a name suggested for the Republican Party as its leaders took up the movement for extreme protection, and advanced under the arguments formulated by Henry Clay for the American system. Throughout the debate over the tariff of 1883 the party leaders had conceded that the tariff as it existed was indefensible. There was no excuse for the "accidental" duties and it was imperative to reduce the surplus. The change in party attitude visible by 1888 was a natural result of the industrial changes since the panic of 1873, and the fall of prices.

Overproduction and falling prices were among the results of railroad construction and mechanical invention. The welfare of the wage-earner was improved; his wages were increased while prices fell. But the producing classes, farmers and manufacturers, watched with regret the de-

clining market value of their output, and listened readily to the suggestions for raising prices. The manufacturer connected his loss with European competition. When London *Punch* printed a cartoon describing Cleveland as "English, quite English, you know," on account of his tariff reform ideas, it strengthened the manufacturers' belief that free trade was un-American, and that the route to greater prosperity lay through protection. When Cleveland urged a tariff policy whose consequence would be to encourage the importation of more foreign goods, through lower duties, the manufacturers turned to their own party and financed the fight against him. Most of them lived in the North and East, and belonged to the party that was dominant in that region. The voice of the Republican tariff reformers was drowned by the noise of Republican protectionists. When a New York City convention nominated Roosevelt for mayor in 1886, a protest was raised against him charging that he had belonged to a college free trade club. Chauncey M. Depew, who presided, anointed the sore spot with a jest, and defended the young man's privilege to make mistakes and repent them. The Republican party organization was swung from apology for the tariff and promise of amendment to its affirmative advocacy.

Roger Q. Mills, of Texas, appointed chairman of the House Committee on Ways and Means by Speaker Carlisle, was a tariff reformer, and approached, in his theoretical views, what the tariff advocates described as free trade. Under his direction the Democratic majority of the committee prepared a tariff bill that contemplated a reduction of \$50,000,000 in the customs receipts. The House began to debate it in April, 1888, and Mills's attack upon the existing tariff situation as the result of Republican class legislation was met by William McKinley, of Ohio. McKinley was now minority leader on the committee, and was supported by Thomas B. Reed and "Pig Iron" Kelley, of Pennsylvania, in denouncing the bill as a "star chamber" measure which the majority members had drawn up in secret. "Neither employers nor em-

The Mills
Bill debate,
1888

ployed could view with indifference the hasty manner in which modification of a protective tariff, upon which depended their fortunes and their daily earnings, was made by men fitted neither by association nor experience for the task," wrote Walker Blaine in the *North American Review*. The six Southerners among the eight Democratic members of the committee were charged with a sectional attack upon the industrial life of the nation. Before the tariff passed the House, the national conventions were held to nominate candidates for the approaching election.

The Democratic Convention met in Saint Louis on June 5, 1888, with the Administration forces in control, though not able to dominate it in every way. Cleveland was renominated without serious dissent, in spite of the opposition from his own State, where Governor David B. Hill had gained control of the Democratic machine and was using it for his own purposes. Allen G. Thurman was nominated for Vice-President, Hendricks having died in office. Cleveland was able to secure the election of his candidate for chairman of the convention, Patrick Collins, of Boston, a prominent Irish leader whose influence offset that of Patrick Ford and Patrick Egan who had led many Irish-Americans to Blaine in 1884. He was not able to force the convention to endorse the Mills Bill by name, although his friends overrode the objections of the Democratic protectionists, and adopted a plank approving tariff revision.

The Republican Party convened at Chicago two weeks after the Democratic meeting, with the new spirit of protection in the ascendant, and with no leader in sight except James G. Blaine. In the discussion of the tariff since the preceding December, Blaine had led the attack from Europe, and he was still abroad when the convention met. In 1884 he had embarrassed his campaign at the last moment by accepting a banquet at Delmonico's from Astor, Sage, Gould, and other money kings. He was now in Scotland on a coaching trip with Andrew Carnegie, from whose residence he kept up a cable correspondence

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tion

Benjamin
Harrison

with his friends in the Chicago Convention. He was not the most available candidate, and knew it. The mugwump charges, anent the Mulligan letters and his conduct as Speaker, had not been silenced and were certain to break out again if he should resume his candidacy. His friends, loyal to the end, were not ready to concede this, and held the convention in session into its second week while they clung to the hope that he would consent to run.

With Blaine eliminated, the Republican field was wide open. John Sherman, with his usual support of Southern delegates, was still ambitious; but there was no unanimity among his Ohio colleagues, and both Foraker and McKinley were mentioned in rivalry to him. New York supported a favorite son for a time, in the person of Chauncey M. Depew. Allison, of Iowa, and Alger, of Michigan, were both active aspirants; Indiana furnished Walter Q. Gresham and Benjamin Harrison.

The Gresham candidacy was the hope of the surviving mugwumps, who had made no attempt to perpetuate a party organization, and who had generally reverted to their Republican allegiance after 1884. Some had remained with the Democrats, attracted by Cleveland's leadership against the tariff, but their number was small because it was their general impression that in administering the civil service Cleveland had done less well than they expected, and many of them regarded him as a failure. The attitude of Gresham against the tariff drew to him such Republicans as regretted the new party trend.

As the convention week dragged on, Harrison grew in strength, but the week-end passed without a choice. He received the nomination on the following Monday, after Blaine had repeated his refusal to run, and had advised his friends to turn their support to Harrison. Levi P. Morton, of New York, was nominated with him. "Harrison lived near the center of population and was almost a composite photograph of the nation's want," wrote one of his admirers. "He was neither Granger nor anti-Granger. He had good running qualities of another kind. He had

a home and cherished it. He had all the homely qualities which are the best gift to an American who seeks for office by the popular vote. He had a good record. He had an ancestry, but did not depend on it." With the scandals of 1884 in view the nomination of Harrison was an insurance policy for the party. His personal life was above any reproach; his party record as Senator was good; he stood high in one of the most doubtful States; and his grandfather, William Henry Harrison, still aroused affections in the Northwest that resembled those for Andrew Jackson.

The Republican platform was written by the advocates of high protection in spite of protests from the West that the Mississippi Valley was not devoted to it. The Western view, summed up in the *Chicago Tribune*, a low tariff, Republican paper, stated the opinion:

"Protection, in a nutshell, means
A right for certain classes;
A little law that intervenes
To help them rob the masses.
The rich may put their prices high;
The poor shall be compelled to buy."

The manufacturers had gained control of the Republican party organization, and upon their recommendation a little later the Republican National Committee chose Senator Matthew Stanley Quay as chairman and campaign manager.

The Mills Bill served as a convenient text until the canvass was nearly over. It was passed by the House during July and in the Senate was given open hearings by the Committee on Finance. At these hearings manufacturers who objected to any lowering of the tariff rates brought forward their testimony. The advocates of reduction, less well organized, made a less important showing than the manufacturers. The open hearings were emphasized by Republicans in contrast to the secrecy in which the original bill had been prepared. A few days before election the hearings on the bill were dropped, and Congress adjourned so that its members might participate in the closing days of the campaign. No real reduction had been possible with

the Republican Party in control of the Senate; the Democratic measure merely provided a text for partisan debate.

The attack upon the Democratic Party for its failure to carry out the reforms it promised produced new discussions of the civil service. Republican critics quoted the Democratic platforms since 1872 with their pledges of devotion to civil service reform. The party in office had been beset with demands for jobs from Democrats who had had no chance to enjoy the federal patronage since 1860. Cleveland had upheld the work of the Civil Service Commission, and had increased the number of offices in the classified civil service. He had, however, taken the view that outside this service there were many officers who "were appointed solely on partisan grounds" and who had "forfeited all just claim to retention, because they have used their places for party purposes in disregard to their duty to the people, and because, instead of being decent public servants, they have proved themselves offensive partisans and unscrupulous manipulators of local party management." Postmaster-General Vilas had been permitted to remove large numbers of Republican postmasters in the old fashion.

The echoes of the Civil War were not absent during the debate, although they were subsiding every year. The former Confederates in Cleveland's Cabinet aroused some resentment, and the charge was often made that the Democratic Government was under the control of the "rebel brigadiers." It was held that in his pension vetoes Cleveland "showed lack of sympathy with the pensioners"; and he gave offense "to the patriotic public sentiment of the country in going fishing on Decoration Day." Worse than this he ordered the return to the Southern States of battle-flags captured during the Civil War. It was too early for the veterans of that struggle to accept this with complacency, and one of them, Joseph B. Foraker, strengthened his campaign for governor in Ohio in 1887 by his public declaration that "no rebel flags will be surrendered while I am governor."

The United States, as usual, was nearly evenly divided upon the issues. In the three preceding elections the victorious candidates had been chosen by slight popular majorities. Indiana and Ohio had now ceased to hold their State elections earlier than the national election, and the country accordingly lacked these indices to the temper of the times. Indiana remained, however, a doubtful State, which both parties made great efforts to carry. The Republican campaign treasurer, W. W. Dudley, received wide notoriety from a letter in which he was alleged to have advised local workers in Indiana to organize their "floating voters" in "blocks of five" and to vote them under the eye of trustworthy lieutenants. The letter was denounced as bogus, but seems at least to be typical of party methods.

The British Minister at Washington, Sir Lionel Sackville-West, fell into a trap set for him by a Republican worker. He received a letter written by an alleged nat-
uralized Englishman who signed himself Murch-
ison and asked how he might best vote so as to make his vote of use to Great Britain. With an indiscretion matched only by Blaine's failure to notice the remark of Dr. Burchard, Sackville-West replied that a vote for Cleveland would support the British policy of free trade. His letter became known in October, and he was immediately dismissed as *persona non grata*, but no dismissal could overcome the injury of his remark. Free trade was denounced as un-American and pro-British. British gold was alleged to be behind the Democratic Party, and votes were turned against the Democratic ticket.

Benjamin Harrison was elected on November 6, 1888, and with him there was chosen a Congress Republican in both its branches. The election was so close, however, that the victor received less than a majority of the votes cast; but the Cleveland plurality was wasted on huge majorities in Democratic States, while the Harrison minority was widely distributed so that it carried the electoral college. In New York the presidential vote was given to Harrison, while Cleveland's Democratic rival, David B. Hill, was

chosen as governor, under circumstances that suggested a corrupt bargain between the local Democratic and Republican State machines.

The scandals of Indiana and New York, whether the individuals mentioned were guilty as charged or not, drew attention to a condition in politics in grievous need of improvement. In most States all of the machinery used in making nominations for office was outside the law, and was operated by party organizations with no penalties for corruption and no remedy for the cheated party members. Even the provision of ballots to be used upon election day was a private matter, and the State began its control at the ballot-box in which these were deposited. It was possible to buy votes, whether in "blocks of five" or otherwise, to place the desired ballot in the hands of voters, and to require them to hold the ballot so that it might be visible to the watcher at the polls until it was safely deposited in the ballot-box. It was possible by careful watching to observe which ticket was voted by any voter. Democrats alleged that in manufacturing towns the mill-owners compelled their employees to vote the Republican ticket under penalty of dismissal.

The abuses in the election system became more visible in these elections in which the vote was nearly evenly divided and in which elections turned largely upon party organization and political tricks. "We should so shape our governmental system," wrote Theodore Roosevelt in the *Century* in November, 1886, "that the action required by the voters should be as simple and direct as possible, and should not need to be taken any more often than is necessary. Governmental power should be concentrated in the hands of a very few men, who would be so conspicuous that no citizen could help knowing all about them; and the elections should not come too frequently." A movement for a secret ballot, which the State instead of the party should provide, made its appearance about 1885. Massachusetts passed such a bill in 1888 and Governor Hill vetoed one in New York in the same year. The system had orig-

Ballot
reform

inated in Australia thirty years earlier and had spread thence into England, and now appealed to the United States as a means of elevating the standards of elections. The action of Massachusetts was followed by nine other States in 1889, by seven more in 1890, and by eighteen in 1891. Before the next presidential election the reform was national in its scope and neither the purchase of votes nor the intimidation of voters ever recurred on the scale in which they existed before the adoption of the Australian ballot.

James G. Blaine was more prominent during the canvass of 1888 than was Benjamin Harrison, the candidate, and received the reward of his unquestioned party leadership in the appointment as Secretary of State. In the management of the campaign it was clear that Republican manufacturers were providing the campaign funds and that they expected action from the new Government in the direction of the extension of the protective system. The rest of the Cabinet was made up of party workers loyal to protection. William L. Windom was made Secretary of the Treasury, although Thomas C. Platt declared the post had been promised to him. Most of the other members were unknown in national affairs; but one, John Wanamaker, of Philadelphia, who was appointed Postmaster-General, occasioned considerable remonstrance. Wanamaker was described by *Harper's Weekly* as the purveyor of money to be spent by Quay and Dudley. In the closing days of the canvass he was believed to have raised nearly four hundred thousand dollars for the party treasury, extracting the funds from his manufacturing acquaintances who feared interference with their tariff rates. The editor of the New York *Tribune* was made Minister to France and Corporal Tanner was made Commissioner of Pensions.

The election of 1888 resulted in Republican majorities in both houses in the Fifty-First Congress, but left the majorities so small that party business could be transacted only in case it was possible to keep the whole majority continuously at work. In

The Harrison Administration

Reed and the Fifty-First Congress

the Senate with 47 Republicans against 37 Democrats the margin was large enough for safe operation. In the House of Representatives, with 170 votes the Republicans possessed only 5 more than the absolute majority necessary to produce a quorum. Under the practice in the House the quorum was determined by the number of members who answered on a roll-call. When the Mills Bill was introduced in November, 1888, the Republican members, under the leadership of Thomas B. Reed, of Maine, sat silently in their seats during the roll-call and compelled the Democrats to provide the whole quorum out of their own membership before they could proceed to business. If this practice were now turned against the Republican majority the result would be impotence in the House whenever six Republicans were absent. The practice was a scandal, sanctified by long continuance.

Thomas B. Reed was elected Speaker with the support of most of his party votes, after a caucus in which the nomination had been contested by Joseph G. Cannon, William McKinley, and David B. Henderson. Reed raised McKinley to the chairmanship of the Committee on Ways and Means, and determined upon his policy in case the minority should impede a new revision of the tariff by a filibuster against a quorum. The test occurred on January 29, 1890, when the minority remained silent during a roll-call, and the Speaker directed the clerk of the House to record the names of the Democrats not voting and to count them present. The ruling was autocratic and revolutionary and precipitated a parliamentary riot among its Democratic victims, who leaped angrily to their feet to insist that they were not present. With inflexible good humor Reed observed that they appeared to be present and continued to count their names. After some days' discussion the ruling of the chair was upheld and the House rules were changed, abolishing the old abuse. Reed received the nickname "Czar," and earned it in so far as he used his power as Speaker and as chairman of the Committee on Rules to prevent a minority of the House from interfering with the performance of its

business by the majority. The McKinley tariff was taken up as the first important party measure.

There was reasonable room for doubt as to the nature of the mandate of 1888, since Cleveland received a majority of the votes cast, while Harrison was elected President. But there was no doubt as to the intention of the Republican Party to regard the election as a victory for the new dominant issue. “We are uncompromisingly in favor of the American system of protection,” said their party platform. “We protest against its destruction as proposed by the President and his party. They serve the interests of Europe; we will support the interests of America.” The new measure that McKinley reported to the House represented the first attempt to apply the principle of protection systematically. Burrows, of Michigan, expressed the party intent:

The doctrine of protection

If there is any article on the free list in this bill the like of which, by fair and adequate protection, could be produced in this country in sufficient quantities to meet the home demand, it is an oversight on the part of the majority of the committee, and, if it can be pointed out, we will move that it be transferred to the dutiable list and given such protection as will insure its production in this country.

If there is a single article on the dutiable list where the duty is so low as to expose the like domestic industry to a ruinous foreign competition and thus endanger its permanency, it has but to be indicated to secure such measure of protection as will insure its safety.

If the proposed rate of duty on any article on the dutiable list is in excess of what is required to give fair and adequate protection to the competing domestic industry, none will be more ready than the majority of your committee to reduce the rate to the level of such requirement.

The McKinley Bill passed through the usual phases of tariff construction; passed by the House in one form, it was rewritten in the Senate and became a law in still a third guise after a thoroughgoing revision in the conference committee. It contained novel features in its final form with reference to agriculture, infant industries, and reciprocity.

The agricultural schedules were promised in 1888 to hold in line discontented farmers in the West. The lukewarmness of the Mississippi Valley toward protection was largely inspired by its dependence upon staple crops. Its complaint that the tariff was for the benefit of the manufacturers was now met by the adoption of rates to protect American food from foreign competition. Since almost no food was imported that could be raised in the United States at all, these schedules were chiefly political in their intention. Sugar, however, was placed upon the free list because, by abolishing the revenue derived from it, the surplus could be lowered about fifty million dollars a year. The sugar duty was the largest single item in the tariff revenue and the easiest to control. In order to prevent free sugar from working injury to the American producers, who raised about one eighth of the national supply, a bounty of two cents a pound was provided for these, with the additional advantage of lowering the surplus still further.

The Republican theory that every commodity that could be produced in the United States must be protected, reached its logical extension in the treatment not only of infant industries, but of the unborn. For over half a century protectionists had described the national advantage of encouraging the beginnings of manufacture in order that the infant industries might ultimately be able to supply the nation and make it independent of the outside world. The party of Cleveland declared that "the tariff is a tax" and that this protective rate increased the cost to the American purchaser for the selfish benefit of the manufacturer. The Republican Party officially denied this charge and sought to prove that the foreign manufacturer paid the duty, taking it out of the profits he would otherwise have extorted from the American public without altering the retail price. The treatment of tin plate carried the protective theory to the extreme. This industry was developing rapidly because of the growing use of tin containers for the preservation of food, but the British manufacturer had maintained his monopoly of the manufacture of tin plate despite the wide

distribution of both tin and steel in the United States. The McKinley Bill provided a duty upon tin plate to be made effective at the discretion of the President when enough American mills should have been established to mark the birth of a new infant industry.

The "Chinese wall" of protection drawn around American industry by this act brought disappointment to many independent observers. "This McKinley Bill," The McKinley Bill wrote Goldwin Smith, who had worked twenty years for the annexation of Canada, only to see protection prevail on either side of the border, "is a sad relapse and a great disgrace to democracy . . . at the same time it is right to say that Protectionism in the United States is kept up as much by sheer dint of bribery as by perversion of popular opinion." James Russell Lowell regarded it as "the first experiment a really intelligent people have ever tried to make one blade of grass grow where two grew before, by means of legislation." The extremity of the act aroused the fears of the Secretary of State lest it interfere with his cherished policy of closer relations with the Latin republics. His idea of promoting American coöperation had led to the issuance of an invitation for a Pan-American Congress during his first term as Secretary of State in 1881. Arthur cancelled the invitation; but Congress authorized its renewal and when Blaine returned to power the conference was pending. In October, 1889, the delegates of the southern republics met in Washington to discuss their common interests. It was futile to talk about developing trade relations while preventing them through the imposition of prohibitive tariffs. The South American exports were in many cases raw materials similar to those of the United States. At Blaine's insistence reciprocal arrangements were authorized to be made for the interchange of such commodities, and provision was made for levying special duties against such countries as did not participate in reciprocity.

While the McKinley Bill was still under debate a new aspect of protection appeared in the demand of silver mine-

owners that their output be protected like the output of Eastern manufacturers. In the Senate there were enough silver Republicans to make a non-partisan majority in favor of the restoration of the free coinage of silver. A bill for free coinage passed the Senate in June and Western Republicans united in the threat that unless something were done for silver, the silver Republicans would kill the McKinley Bill and block the party purpose. The Treasury had spent to date, under the Bland-Allison Law of 1878, \$308,000,000 in the purchase of silver bullion, out of which it had been able to coin \$378,000,000 standard but depreciated silver dollars. The demand of the silver miners for more aid led to the drafting of a compromise law, which bore the name of John Sherman and provided that every month the Secretary of the Treasury should purchase 4,500,000 ounces of silver, paying for the same with a new issue of legal-tender Treasury notes. The amount specified was intended to represent the total American production of silver. With the passage of the Silver Act, the obstruction to the McKinley Bill ceased and it was signed October 1, 1890.

The appropriations of the Fifty-First Congress helped to reduce the surplus that had embarrassed every administration for a decade. For the first time the appropriations exceeded a billion dollars for the biennium. Congress was lavish in its expenditures for salaries and public buildings. Its additions to the pension laws met the demands of the organized veterans of the Civil War, and still further reduced the surplus. President Harrison's first choice as Commissioner of Pensions, Corporal Tanner, had long been a persistent advocate of generous treatment of the pensioners. As Commissioner his policy was, wherever possible, to grant new pensions or increase old ones, regardless of law. He was soon removed from office, but his successor, too, was an advocate of liberality. The party was pledged to reverse Cleveland's attitude of suspicion of pensioners, and Congress passed in June, 1890, a Dependents' Pension Bill for the relief of

veterans who were incapacitated, whether because of their military service or not. Before the Fifty-First Congress had completed its appropriations, the surplus ceased to cause anxiety, and in its place there was uneasiness as to the continued ability of the Treasury to do business without forcing the cheap silver dollars into use.

The close connection between the Republican Party and the manufacturing interests was a cause of increasing suspicion that weakened the party in the West. The anti-monopoly movement was bringing the business interests into disrepute, and the word "trust" was acquiring a sinister meaning in popular usage. Andrew Carnegie decried "the bugaboo of trusts" in the *North American Review* in 1889, but the apprehension could not be dispelled by mere denial. In his opinion the so-called trusts were the outgrowth of overproduction and the ensuing low prices, and were a necessary attempt to regulate competition in such a period. A growing public opinion, on the contrary, believed that the trusts were huge combinations aiming at monopoly, and saw objections to them along economic, social, and political lines.

The economic arguments against the trusts treated them as agents of extortion, which deprived the public of the advantages of free competition. The maxim that "competition is the life of trade" provided a theory upon which the common-law doctrine rested. The public was entitled to free competition among its servants, and the individual participating in that competition had a right to immunity from combinations and conspiracies among his competitors. Interference by such conspiracies with free competition was actionable under the common law. They were magnified in importance when the industries operated as giants and brought the force of their conspiracy against individual competitors.

The attack
on the
trusts

The social objection to the trusts was inspired in part by an unwillingness to accept the changes in the nature of American life. The independence of the individual farmer

was an ideal increasingly difficult to realize as manufactures and transportation were reorganized. The great railroad company or manufacturing corporation provided occupation for a multitude of salaried subordinates who would have been their own masters under earlier American conditions. The number of independent manufacturers and merchants was being further decreased by their inability to meet the new competition. Men who desired to remain independent were forced to give up the fight. Butchers were forced to become distributors for the Chicago packers. Small merchants were forced to become section chiefs in the great department stores. The whole trend of organization was to reduce the number of men in positions of entire independence and to increase the number who operated as cogs in some machine. There was a growing fear that this change would work an injury in American life, and the middle eighties were filled with complaints against the trusts. Here and there a writer like Edward Bellamy supported the drift toward monopoly, but the more common attitude was one of regret and hostility.

The political consequences of the trusts were suspected and feared more than they were visibly perceived. Beginning with the railroad lobbies working for their land grants, the large corporations had appeared to expect favors from legislative bodies. They had been able to raise funds to influence legislation and opinion. The belief that they were guilty of common bribery was supported by occasional established instances and was increased by the belief that they had both the funds and the willingness to be corrupt. In some States the affairs of a single corporation were fairly comparable with those of the State itself. The Southern Pacific Railroad Company in California and the Pennsylvania Railroad in Pennsylvania were common scapegoats. A fear pervaded the country that the people were losing control of their own institutions and that the trusts were gaining it. The Republican Party was particularly subject to the suspicion of being under these influences.

The Sherman Anti-Trust Bill, an outgrowth of anti-

trust sentiment, became a law in July, 1890. It extended the principle of the common law to interstate traffic and forbade combinations and conspiracies in restraint of trade in commerce among the States. It was made possible for an injured competitor to sue a trust for damages; or for a defendant, sued by the trust, to prove that his prosecutor was a trust and quash the proceedings; or for the Government itself to proceed against the trust to procure its dissolution. The votes that passed the law were less partisan than those that passed the tariff. The corporations had friends in both parties who desired to ward off adverse action. A chance letter from one of their Democratic friends written to Chauncey M. Depew strayed into the papers in 1889. The writer was begging for a railroad pass and justified his plea, "although you are a Republican and I am a Democrat, we do not differ much in regard to our views in connection with corporate property, and I may be able to serve these interests should I pull through again."

Sherman
Anti-Trust
Bill, 1890

The Republican docket of 1890 was full of important laws with definitive measures respecting tariff, trusts, silver, and pensions, and with a new high-water mark in appropriations. The list, with the several groups of dissenters produced by each statute, would have endangered the stability of a party well-founded on a large majority. For a party whose President had been chosen by a minority of votes, it was calamitous. The debate over the tariff, which Cleveland had precipitated in 1887, and which the Republican organization had forced to the front thereafter, believing it to be a battle-cry of victory, had been slow in producing results. The Cleveland doctrine took increasing hold in the Agricultural West, where depression had succeeded the boom period of the early eighties. As the date approached for the McKinley Bill to become effective, the city retail stores, even including that of John Wanamaker, the Post-master-General, urged their buyers to "purchase now before the price goes up." The belief that the tariff was a tax paid by the consumer took

Republican
defeat, No-
vember, 1890

hold of the whole country and in the Congressional election that followed the adjournment of Congress in 1890 a landslide of discontented voters forced the Republican Party out of power. Only 88 Republicans were elected to the new Congress, which included 236 Democrats and 8 members of a new third party, that called itself the Farmers' Alliance and that presented a baffling problem for the deliberations of politicians.

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE

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CHAPTER IX

THE FARMERS' WEST

THE Sherman Silver Purchase Act of 1890 owed its passage to a "hold-up" in Congress, engineered by Republican Congressmen from the Western States. It was not the first occasion on which the frontier had demanded and obtained legislation satisfactory to itself, but at no preceding time had there been so large a group of new Western members present in a single Congress. Six new States were received into the Union between November, 1889, and July, 1890. North Dakota and South Dakota, Washington and Montana constituted a group admitted under an omnibus act signed by Cleveland in February, 1889. Idaho and Wyoming, which failed to secure authorization in the same act, made constitutions without authority for doing so and were admitted in the summer of 1890. The narrow Republican majority in each house made that party peculiarly susceptible to the admission of new States, whose Congressional delegations were likely to be Republican. Of the twelve Senators and seven Representatives allotted to the six new States, all but one voted with the dominant party. Their support on party issues demanded and received its reward, with the result that the silver issue was advanced in importance until it threatened to displace the tariff.

Western
demands on
Congress

The State of Colorado, admitted as the thirty-eighth State in the centennial year, 1876, was still in 1890 the farthest west of the main body of States. The old frontier of States as it existed before the Civil War with its western border touching the plains along the boundaries of Minnesota, Iowa, Missouri, Arkansas, and Texas, represented the limits to which agriculture was able to expand without artificial aid. The three Territories of Kansas, Nebraska, and Colorado, projecting west from the middle of this line,

owed their admission to the need for Republican votes in reconstruction and to the demands of the miners in Colorado. Their initial population was small, but the railroads that crossed them from east to west, Union Pacific, Burlington, Kansas Pacific, and Santa Fe, had lands to sell and stimulated their settlement by organized promotion. With the revival of business in 1879, home-seekers turned toward this triangle of young States. Omaha, Kansas City, and Denver developed new importance as distributing centers. In connection with the cattle industry and with the influence of the Western prairie farmers they brought a new political pressure in Congress.

The Far Western States of 1880 had not been changed since the admission of Nevada as a rotten borough in 1864. There was no excuse for Nevada except that Lincoln needed Republican votes to strengthen the Union majority in Congress. Nevada, Oregon, and California were separated from the other organized States of the Union by a huge, irregular tract of public domain that extended across half the width of the continent along the Canadian line, and that covered the Mexican border between the Colorado and the Rio Grande. There were eight Territorial Governments within this area, five in the Northwest — Dakota, Montana, Wyoming, Idaho, and Washington. Two in the Southwest — New Mexico and Arizona — were scarcely less primitive than they had been at the date of their conquest in 1846. The barrier was narrowest between Colorado and Nevada where the Mormon hierarchy of Utah covered a Territory and retarded its admission into the Union.

In the earlier decades of frontier advance the prevailing growth had occurred along a narrow strip on the western edge of the last frontier. In each generation since the planting of the seaboard colonies the new frontier was settled by the children of the old, and as the new frontier ripened into social consciousness its children were got ready to repeat the process. The systematic advance of the frontier was checked at the western border of Missouri by lack of easy transportation, by the diminishing fertility of the land upon

the plains, and by the popular belief in the existence of the "Great American Desert." West of Missouri the agricultural frontier did not advance unaided. When the aid came in the form of free homesteads to advertise the West and continental railroads to lessen its distances, the result was a scattering of effort. The frontier line disappeared from the map after 1880. In its place the farther west was dotted with irregular settlements whose location was determined by natural resources or communications. From all of these there early came demands for the abolition of the territorial status and for admission into the Union.

The Southwest Territories were the least affected by the incentives to colonization, and with a population relatively stationary were the weakest of the statehood projects. New Mexico, with nearly three times the population of Arizona, had 153,000 inhabitants in 1890, and the preponderance of Mexicans among these weakened the force of her intermittent demands for admission.

Develop-
ment of the
Territories

The five Northwest Territories more than trebled in the decade, the population rising from 301,000 in 1880 to 1,136,000 in 1890. Within their limits 8673 miles of railroad were completed in this decade. From the valley of the Red River of the North to the banks of the Columbia and the shores of Puget Sound, clusters of inhabitants were spread along the lines of the Northern Pacific, and the Great Northern which James J. Hill was thrusting through the same country. In Dakota and Washington there were already organized movements for statehood earlier than 1880. By the date of their admission Dakota had over half a million inhabitants and Washington 349,000.

In the struggle for the admission of Territories after Colorado, Dakota was the usual text upon which arguments were based. Largest in population and nearest the East, if she might not come in, no Territory could hope for entrance. Her demands for statehood were shaped by the geographic facts that produced a geographic sectionalism within her borders. There was no good reason

Dakota

for most of the boundary lines given to the Western Territories. They were arbitrary and rectangular. Those of Dakota included three isolated areas of divergent economic interests. Oldest of these was the Yankton country in the southeast corner. Next in prominence was the northeast corner, where Red River wheat became the staple product of a region singularly fitted for its production. Until nearly 1890 each of these sections had less in common with the other than with the city of Chicago through which each maintained its contacts with the outside world. The mining region in the Black Hills in the southwest corner found an outlet through Cheyenne and the Union Pacific and constituted a third center of sectionalism in the Territory.

Long before statehood was in sight the Territory was intent upon division before admission, and was thinking generously of its future as two States. Educational and penal institutions were established in pairs, making provision for the northern and southern halves of the Territory. The capital of the Territory was shifted from Yankton to Bismarck, where the Northern Pacific crossed the Missouri River. Here Henry Villard, while celebrating the completion of his road in 1883, stopped long enough to lay the cornerstone of the prairie capital. "The confidence of these Westerns is superb," wrote James Bryce, who was a guest on Villard's special train. "Men seem to live in the future rather than in the present: not that they fail to work while it is called to-day, but that they see the country not merely as it is, but as it will be twenty, fifty, a hundred years hence, when the seedlings shall have grown to forest trees."

The Western demand for new States was stronger than the disposition of Congress to admit them. From 1876 until 1889 Congress was at no time under the control of a single party except for the two years between 1881 and 1883. The Northwest Territories were all settled in years in which the Republican Party was dominant and in which its plea for party regularity received

strong response from men who had lived through the period of the Civil War. The probability that they would add Republican votes to Congress created a Democratic reluctance to admit them. Dakota at least might have been admitted in 1883, when the Republican Party was in full control of Congress, had not Senator Hale, of Maine, obstructed its admission on the ground that one of its counties had repudiated an issue of railroad bonds. In its zeal for rail connection with Chicago, Yankton County borrowed money to further the construction of the Southern Dakota Railroad. When the local population became dissatisfied with the attitude of the railway toward the county, it convinced itself that the owners of the bonds were culpable and defaulted on its interest payments. When the bondholders sought for judgments against the county officers, these resigned. A complacent legislature changed the law so as to permit of easy resignations, and for some years county officers after their appointment met by stealth to levy taxes and then resigned to dodge the process-server. Hale's objection was sufficient to exclude Dakota in 1883, while Democratic opposition from the House continued the exclusion for six more years.

The demand for statehood from Dakota and the other Territories was never long absent from Washington. The territorial delegates in Congress made repeated speeches upon their territory, population, and virtues. An unauthorized constitution was framed in Dakota in 1883, and a second with the approval of the Territorial Legislature in 1885. Wheat farming was booming in the eastern counties, the cattle industry was at its height in the bad lands on the western border. To the north, in Canada, the Canadian Pacific was completed in 1885; and the economic future of the northern plains was secure before Congress could be prevailed upon to authorize statehood action.

The defeat of Cleveland in 1888 served notice that after one more short session of Congress the Republican Party would come into complete control of the National Government. After March 4, 1889, it would be within the power

of the Republican majority to admit any or all of the Territories, and they were likely to increase their strength wherever new States could do it. With this prospect in view a movement originated in the Democratic House of Representatives, in the session after the election, to pass an omnibus bill in which the Democratic Territory of New Mexico should be joined to the inevitable Republican Territories. Dakota and Washington presented the best cases for admission; Montana had framed a spontaneous constitution in 1884, and was much in the public mind because of the notoriety of the Cœur d'Alène mining boom. New Mexico made the fourth member included in the omnibus bill, which was passed by the House in January, 1889. The Democratic attempt to include New Mexico was blocked by the same tactics that Democrats had used against the Northern Territories. With complete freedom of action in sight there was no need for Republicans to concede anything to Democrats. New Mexico was stricken out, Dakota was divided, and Cleveland finally approved a Republican bill for the admission of North and South Dakota, Montana and Washington.

In the summer of 1889 these omnibus States completed their constitutions, drawing upon their inherited experience and the spirit of the times for their details. The traditional form of the American State was repeated in every instance. The prevailing temper showed itself in a multitude of restrictions upon the officers of government, in numerous articles upon railroads and corporations that reflected the universal hostility against monopoly, and in detailed specifications that made each constitution a virtual code of laws. The complex constitutions were described by Francis Newton Thorpe as striking documents in a momentous "case of the American People *versus* Themselves." The four States were admitted by proclamation in November, 1889, and Idaho and Wyoming were allowed to join them in the following summer. "Living men," Owen Wister has written of the process that was then under way — "Living men,

The "Omni-
bus" Bill,
1889

not very old yet, have seen the Indian on the war-path, the buffalo stopping the train, the cowboy driving his cattle, the herder watching his sheep, the government irrigation dam, and the automobile — have seen every one of these slides which progress puts for a moment into its magic-lantern and removes to replace with a new one.”

With the admission of the omnibus States the number of Territories was reduced to three, New Mexico, Arizona, and Utah, in addition to the tract of land under an irregular status known as Indian Territory. The same influences that quickened the life on the Western plains brought pressure upon the United States to dissolve the Indian tribes and to throw their territory open to public entry. The Territory of Oklahoma was created by an act of May, 1890, including an irregular tract in the western end of Indian Territory.

The old Indian country was brought into existence by law upon the recommendation of President James Monroe, who urged that the American desert be set aside forever as the home of the Indian. The treaties ^{Oklahoma} made between 1825 and 1841 transferred most of the eastern Indians to reservations west of the Missouri, where Indians were protected against the damage done by contact with the whites by the Intercourse Act of 1834. The new policy failed to settle the Indian problem and became only one of its transitory stages. The overland trails pierced the Indian country in all directions, and when these were followed by the continental railroads, the policy was definitely abandoned. New reserves were brought into existence in southern Dakota, and in the area between Kansas and Texas, which was the sole remaining part of the original Indian country. The tribes living here, the so-called five civilized tribes, Cherokee, Creek, Choctaw, Chickasaw, and Seminole, were punished for their adherence to the Confederacy by the forfeiture of their western lands in the valleys of the Canadian and Red Rivers.

The tribes that originally lived on the buffalo range were given reserves in these forfeited lands, but the difficulty of

maintaining their rights of ownership increased as the area of free land lessened. Here were some of the most attractive lands on the continent, and the acreage was far in excess of any use which the Indians could make of it. Cattle-men were allowed to lease the grazing rights from the tribes that owned them, and advanced the contention that because of their lease they had the right to exclude other cattle-men from driving their stock from Texas across the Indian country toward Kansas and the north. Individual squatters evaded the federal troops and established themselves upon choice spots in the desired country. Its Indian name, Oklahoma, "the beautiful land," began soon to be heard, and squatters set up the contention that certain areas of the forfeited lands that had not been assigned to other tribes were open to entry under the general land laws. In April, 1879, Hayes was obliged to remove by force organized bands of squatters who had congregated along the northern boundary of Indian Territory, at Caldwell and Arkansas City, and had publicly attempted to preëempt the lands. The inadequacy of federal law in the Indian country made it impossible to do more to the trespassers than to escort them out, feeding them army rations meanwhile. Nearly every year from 1879 to 1889 the attempt to occupy Oklahoma was repeated and the ejection followed. Arthur and Cleveland both proclaimed against it.

In 1887 preparations for the eventual opening of the Territory were begun in connection with the Dawes Act for extinguishing tribal sovereignty to the land. Under the act each Indian received an individual allotment and the surplus lands were purchased from the tribe by the United States and turned into the public domain. One of the last laws that Cleveland signed authorized his successor to issue a proclamation opening these Oklahoma lands to settlement. A cordon of federal troops was drawn around the boundaries of the country to prevent "sooners" from entering in advance and preëmpting the choicest tracts. The official race began on April 22, 1889, and within a few hours Guthrie and Oklahoma City had sprung into existence as tent

colonies, speculation had begun in building lots, and long queues of entrymen awaited their turn at the federal land offices. There was no Territorial Government as yet. The Oklahoma settlers were obliged to rely upon their native respect for law, supplemented here and there by federal troops. A year later the Territory was formally organized and Oklahoma was started toward ultimate admission.

Utah had completed forty years of territorial life when Oklahoma was created and would have been admitted at a much earlier date had it not been for the in-stitution of polygamy maintained there under ^{Utah} the sanction of the Mormon Church. In 1862 Congress forbade polygamy by law, but the act remained a dead letter in the Territory, where plural marriage was not only sanctioned but encouraged by the Church. It was impossible to procure either indictment or conviction by juries drawn by Mormon officials and made up of Mormons. For twenty years gentiles in Utah complained of the hierarchy that dominated the Territory. The Edmunds Law of 1882 approached the problem from a new angle. In addition to providing penalties for polygamists it disqualified them for jury service, public office, and the franchise. It threw the administration of the Territory into the hands of the gentiles and created a federal commission of five to supervise the enforcement of the law.

In spite of protests from the Mormon Church, the Edmunds Law was enforced with the approval of American public opinion. The leaders of the Church with numerous plural families were convicted and sentenced, while each year brought into the Territory more non-Mormon settlers. The prosperity of the irrigated counties in Utah gave an impetus to irrigation in all the arid regions. In 1890 the Church gave up the fight. The revelation concerning plural marriage, which had been officially published in 1852, was as officially withdrawn. The public attitude of the Church became that of discouraging new plural marriages and of adhering to the law. The older heads of plural families generally stuck to them and took the consequences, but in the

younger generation polygamy became uncommon. President Harrison accepted the change of policy, issued a general amnesty to former offenders, and Congress in 1894 empowered Utah to become a State. The property of the Mormon Church which had been seized as a punitive measure was restored in 1893. Utah was admitted in 1896.

The new States of the Far West reflected in their institutions the liberal ideas that were fighting in vain for recognition elsewhere in the country. Most notable among these was woman suffrage. Wyoming accepted the principle in its constitution of 1890 and Colorado adopted it by referendum in 1893. The new State of Utah accepted it from the start, and in November, 1896, Idaho became the fourth of the suffrage States. The movement had already been the objective of active reformers for half a century and now entered into the realm of practical politics. It was fourteen years before the next State, Washington, was added to the list. After 1910 opposition to woman suffrage rapidly diminished and it became a generally accepted fact.

The social changes of the eighties brought statehood to seven Territories and internal reconstruction to the near-by States. In 1880 the United States comprised three regions of nearly equal size, the old States, the Territories, and the frontier States that bordered on the Territories. In these frontier States there were still free land and abundant opportunity. In Kansas, Nebraska, and Colorado the actual changes of the decade were most extensive and the resulting shift in social needs and political ideals was most severe.

The railroads built more than eleven thousand miles of track in these three States between 1880 and 1890, and in this region the results of artificial stimulation produced the greatest immigration. More than a million and a quarter new inhabitants appeared in them, most of them living on the farm and engaging with feverish haste in the erection of homes, towns, railroads, and the material things of life. Wheat and corn were the staple commodities of this region. The sugar beet

Railroad
saturation
and over-
production

began to appear toward the end of the period, but in general the farmers devoted most of their efforts to their standard crops. There was thrown upon the world a greater mass of food than could be immediately absorbed. By 1886 the cattle industry, that flourished just before the farmers came, had passed the period of its greatest profit. The falling price of meat due to unregulated production was followed by falling prices of other agricultural products. The readiness with which the manufacturers turned to Congress for relief and asked for protection to improve their market was paralleled among the farmers by a similar demand to raise the prices of their output.

The steady decline of prices hit with greatest severity the industries in which arrangements were made over long periods and in which quick readjustments to a change in prices were most difficult. The Western and Southern farmers equally were dependent for their prosperity upon a market price that could not even be estimated when they prepared their fields and sowed their crops. The manufacturer could if need be store his output or reduce costs by laying off his hands. The farmer with a single crop had no such relief and must in general stick to his crop and sell it for what the market offered. The few facilities for storing cotton in the South were not controlled by farmers or managed in their interests. The Northern grain elevators had been objects of hostility to the farmers who patronized them since the Granger period. There appeared early in the eighties movements in the Northwest and South that looked, as the Grange had done, to the better organization of the farmers. The manufacturers had their home markets club and abundant means to advertise their desires. The agrarian movements were carried on by lesser men and showed in their course the poverty and political inexperience of most of their supporters.

The origin of the Farmers' Alliances that appeared in most of the Western States before 1880 is to be found in the continuing consciousness of farmers' problems. The Grange had passed the crest of its

importance; and the Alliance movement which succeeded it was a spontaneous growth from local conditions rather than an expansion of a national organization. In October, 1880, the National Farmers' Alliance held a mass convention in Chicago and completed a loose federal organization. No credentials appear to have been required at this convention and its permanent chairman permitted any one to participate who desired. The motive inspiring its three hundred delegates closely resembled that which inspired the Greenback Party in the same year. It was an anti-monopoly, anti-railroad body that hoped to accomplish results through economic coöperation rather than politics. When the organization held its next annual convention in 1881, the delegates reported the existence of about one thousand local alliances with Kansas and Nebraska having the greatest number.

The social side of the alliances was similar to that of the Grange. In a few instances, where local leadership was strong, farmers' coöperative movements were developed and maintained general stores or grain elevators for the benefit of their members. The movement was so informal and the leadership so little known that the records of its growth are difficult to trace. Many of its members were identified also with the Greenback Party, and in their correspondence the common aims of the two movements are sometimes discussed. "The Farmers are waking up as they have not done since the Grange Movement," wrote one of them in 1882; — "our County alliance is getting into working order, and I see calls in all directions for a revival of the Alliance Movement." "We are untrammelled advocates of Reform, with Rep. proclivities," wrote another to Luman H. Weller, who was running for Congress in Iowa on the Greenback ticket. Jesse Harper, an original member of the Republican Party, was speaking continuously for the Alliance in the South and West. "I am speaking for the poor man's party," he wrote to Weller, "hence do not charge much. Ten dollars a day and all expenses." From Nebraska another leader wrote to Weller: "We have some

150 farmer Alliances formed in the State. A fair proportion in your district. Monopoly candidates must stand from under as far as the Alliances are concerned. If you are a distinctively farmers' candidate and your opponent a R.R. attorney or a Monop. candidate, I could perhaps be of some service to you."

The National Alliance reported the existence of 2700 local alliances in 1883, and its leaders took an active part in the reform activities started by the Union Labor Party in anticipation of the election of 1888. "Every day brings tidings of the uprising of the people," wrote one of Weller's correspondents in 1886. Another observed that "God is killing all the Old Party Leaders pretty fast. My Prayer is he will take Cleveland, Manning, Blaine & John Sherman. Then we may have some hope financially [*sic*] in America." The activities of the leaders of the Alliance and of the Knights of Labor became closely interlocked. The National Farmers' Alliance developed its greatest strength among the Southern States, while Northern farmers tended to join the Farmers' Alliance and Industrial Union. The warfare between these two bodies was largely a partisan struggle of leaders for individual advantage, but the Alliance was kept alive among the farmers. Thirty-five thousand members were claimed by the alliances in the summer of 1888 and fifty thousand in 1889.

The hopes with which farmers settled along the lines of the land-grant railroads in the early eighties turned to dismay before the decade ended. The agricultural settlements had been worked too far west in Kansas and Nebraska; and there, as well as in eastern Colorado and parts of Dakota, homesteads were encroaching on the semi-arid plains. In ordinary years the rainfall west of central Kansas is too scanty to sustain farming. From year to year, however, the average fluctuates. In the early eighties there was a series of years of excessive rainfall that produced good crops nearly all the way to Denver. The new regions filled up with newcomers who had no earlier knowledge of the country, and there were few

Hard times
on the
plains

old inhabitants to shake their heads at the possibility of farming on the high plains. The law of averages reasserted itself about 1887 with the result that the crops received even less than normal rainfall and dried up early in the summers. Local economists, who had fancied that the "new science of meteorology had changed the climate and increased the rainfall," learned their mistake. Membership and activity in all the organizations that appealed to discontented farmers increased as the decade neared its end. The attempt to put together a Union Labor Party with a solid backing of workers, whether industrial or rural, was a failure in 1888, but the materials for making such a party became more numerous. The Knights of Labor, declining from the importance formerly held as the official spokesman of the labor movement, encouraged the overtures for a union with the farmers and Grand Master Workman Powderly was a constant figure at the farmers' gatherings.

Both parties made efforts to secure the support of the discontented. The Republican guarantee of protection for farm products in 1888 increased the difficulty with which the farmers maintained their identity as a separate movement, and "*traitors* in disguise" made continual efforts to dump the Union Labor Party into one or the other of the larger organizations.

In the autumn of 1889 the movement of protest gained more momentum and started in upon a train of events that led to the creation of an important new third party. In the period of agricultural depression the farmers of this new frontier learned a lesson that hard times have brought out in every frontier region, that the payment of debt is less exciting and more painful than the incurring of it. Every American frontier community has been short of capital and in need of credit which must be obtained from wealthier regions. The country west of Missouri and north of Texas was settled by farmers most of whom were in debt for the cost of migration and the purchase of land, machinery, and stock. The per capita debt was heavier than on earlier frontiers because the old sim-

plicity of life was gone. The frontier family was less content in a cabin than its parents had been, and insisted upon a house. There were railroads to be built, schools to be constructed, water systems to be installed, and machinery to be bought. The credit agencies were maintained partly by the banks, but largely by mortgage companies that lent Eastern money on Western farm security, charging interest at the rate of ten to fourteen per cent in addition to a premium for making the loan at all. The average farmer was in debt beyond his reasonable expectation of ability to pay. Hard times destroyed the last vestige of the expectation. Facing bankruptcy and depressed by falling prices, the Western farmer was susceptible to the economic theories of those who believed that conditions could be bettered by making money more plentiful and lowering the value of the dollar.

Free silver was still the hope of the miners who produced that metal. In 1890 they found themselves in a political situation in which they held the balance of ^{Free silver} power in Congress and procured the passage of the Sherman Silver Purchase Act. Their propaganda for free silver was maintained continuously. Copies of their pamphlets were sent into the newspaper offices and were brought to the attention of the assemblies of the Knights of Labor and the farmers' societies. In November, 1889, a conference of free-silver advocates was held at St. Louis on the call of the mining stock exchange of that city. It was a miners' movement to raise the price of silver by promoting its use as currency. The word "bimetallism" began to be used more widely by the advocates of silver coinage who believed that there was some way whereby the Gresham law might be kept from operating and gold and silver dollars be kept circulating side by side, with relative weights of sixteen to one. There were some who believed that Congress could by law establish the relative values of silver and gold; others, less confident of national power in this direction, thought they could be established by international agreement. The silver miner in general persuaded himself

that the result of free silver or bimetallism would be to restore the price of silver to the commercial ratio of sixteen to one. Their purpose of advocating free silver was to raise the price of their commodity. If this were not accomplished free silver for them would be a failure.

In making overtures to the Farmers' Alliance for support the silver producers invited aid from a social group whose motive in supporting free silver was the direct opposite of their own. The only reason why the debtor farmer should support free silver was to raise prices by lowering the value of a dollar. Free coinage might accomplish this in either of two ways. If the Gresham law operated and the cheap silver dollar became a medium of exchange, prices would rise in inverse ratio to the depreciation of the coin. If, however, the Gresham law failed to operate and both coins by some miracle of legislation remained in circulation, the purchasing value of the dollar would still be lowered by the addition of so many silver dollars to the total money of the country. If prices rose for either of these reasons, the alliances would gain advantage from free silver only in proportion as the silver miners lost it.

The leaders of the Farmers' Alliance joined the miners in the Saint Louis convention, and in officially adopting free coinage espoused a movement that ultimately submerged their other demands for reform. They held a second convention at Saint Louis in December, 1889, in which it was attempted to subordinate the local differences of the Northern and Southern alliances and to make out of them one huge agrarian organization.

The Southern farmers were as susceptible to the ideas of inflation as were the Western alliances. The annual cotton crop was still financed by crop mortgages with the local storekeeper as banker. The Western debt, or investment on capital account, was matched in the South by debt created for current maintenance. For the same reasons that once induced the South to support the Greenback movement, that section now produced wide support for free silver; but its attitude toward organization

for accomplishing results was different from that of the Northwest. Conscious of its race problem, Southern opinion feared new movements that might seriously divide the vote of the white population. The Southern alliances preferred to get results by pressure in the Democratic primaries. The Western alliances had no hope of working through the Republican Party and saw their advantage only through the organization of an independent party. The attempt at a merger in 1889 was unsuccessful, and the matter went over for another year. The conditions meanwhile throughout the West were steadily becoming worse. General Miles in 1890 commented upon the "terrible results" of drought in many States and believed that "should this impending evil continue for a series of years, no man can anticipate what may follow."

The passage of the McKinley Bill in October, 1890, was the shot that exploded the forces of Western discontent. The Republican majority in the lower house was wiped out and a new majority of Democrats was created who owed their seats to the dissension caused by the alliances in the Republican ranks and to the discontent upon which the alliances were based. Ocala conference When the annual convention of the alliances met at Ocala, Florida, in December, 1890, the results of the election were all in, and the time appeared to be ripe to consolidate the gains in a new party organization. "It occurs to me," said the chairman of one of the local meetings, "that we are the people, and under the name of the 'People's Party' everybody can rally." From a different source one of the Knights of Labor suggested "that they call it the 'Nationalist Republican Party,'" adding, "we are trying to nationalize the Republic, not only its politics, but its whole system of production, distribution and exchange. . . . 'We the People!' was the cry of the Sans Culottes during the horrors of the Robespierre revolution, and the taint of that horror will stick; don't conjure it up now."

The Ocala conference failed to bring the rival farmers' organizations and the Knights of Labor into a union, but

a group of its delegates after its adjournment signed the call for a meeting to be held at Cincinnati in May, 1891, to form a third political party. The "conglomerate conference" was held as called. The new party, which was to be known as the "People's Party" or the "Populist," in spite of prudential considerations among its founders, already had a Senator-elect, Peffer, who had been chosen by the Kansas Legislature to succeed the more distinguished John J. Ingalls, for whom reform had been "an iridescent dream."

The leaders at Cincinnati were Ignatius Donnelly, of Minnesota, and General James B. Weaver, of Iowa, who had been the Greenback candidate for President in 1880. The convention turned the farmers' movement into a political party, in spite of the obstruction of the Democratic alliances in the South, and created the usual national committee for the People's Party. The New Orleans *Times-Democrat* described it as "a gathering of all the political odds and ends," and the New York *Nation*, whose sagacity weakened when it dealt with Western themes, believed "it is not likely that the managers of either of the great political parties will give much serious thought henceforth to the 'People's Party' which was organized in Cincinnati."

The enthusiasm with which the leaders of the Cincinnati convention were greeted at home changed the notion that the movement was unimportant. A national conference called at Cincinnati met at Saint Louis on February 22, 1892, to consider plans for a convention to nominate candidates in the ensuing campaign. The Chicago *Tribune*, aware of the political danger, began to attack them as "calamity howlers" and as "knaves" who sought to deceive simpletons by a rotten platform and a debased currency.

The national convention of the People's Party met in Omaha in July, 1892, to nominate a candidate around whom it might be possible to rally the discontented forces of agriculture and industry. The business depression still continued and added every

People's
Party Con-
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month new converts to the farmers' cause. Men were less important than principles in the convention, which finally nominated James B. Weaver, of Iowa, as its candidate after considering the possibility of Republican dissenters like Judge Walter Q. Gresham, of Indiana, or silver advocates like Senator William M. Stewart, of Nevada.

The Populist platform, based upon discontent among the "plain people," recited a long list of grievances, "in the midst of a nation brought to the verge of moral, political, and material ruin. Corruption dominates the ballot-box, the legislature, the Congress, and touches even the ermine of the bench. The people are demoralized; most of the States have been compelled to isolate the voters at the polling-places to prevent universal intimidation or bribery. The newspapers are largely subsidized or muzzled; public opinion silenced; business prostrated; our homes covered with mortgages; labor impoverished; and the land concentrating in the hands of the capitalists. The urban workmen are denied the right of organization for self-protection; imported pauperized labor beats down their wages; a hireling standing army, unrecognized by our laws, is established to shoot them down, and they are rapidly degenerating into European conditions. The fruits of the toil of millions are boldly stolen to build up colossal fortunes for a few, unprecedented in the history of mankind; and the possessors of these, in turn, despise the republic and endanger liberty. From the same prolific womb of governmental injustice we breed the two great classes of tramps and millionaires."

The demonetization of silver stood at the head of the grievances which the Populists declared their intention to correct. "A vast conspiracy against mankind has been organized . . . and the supply of currency is purposely abridged to fatten usurers, bankrupt enterprise, and enslave industry." They demanded monetary reforms including "free and unlimited coinage of silver and gold at the present legal ratio of sixteen to one," an increase in the circulating medium to the amount of fifty dollars per capita, a national currency to be lent by the Government at two

per cent, and a graduated income tax, as well as postal savings banks. A second group of demands declared for the Government ownership of railroads, telegraph and telephone. A third group demanded the suppression of alien ownership of land, and appealed to the single-tax followers of Henry George by asserting that land "is the heritage of the people, and should not be monopolized for speculative purposes." In an addendum to the platform the party expressed its belief in the Australian ballot, reduction of taxation, liberal pensions, an eight-hour day, the initiative and referendum, a single term for the President, and the direct election of United States Senators. It condemned protection, national subsidies to private corporations in any form, and Pinkerton detectives. Tom Watson, one of its vigorous Southern supporters, characterized the demands as "Not a Revolt; it is a Revolution."

While the farmers' movement was crystallizing into the People's Party the Administration of Benjamin Harrison was running a lukewarm course. Its crushing defeat in the Congressional elections of 1890 discouraged the hopes of Republican success in 1892. The Democratic Fifty-Second Congress chose Charles F. Crisp, of Georgia, as its Speaker in 1891 with a Republican minority supporting Reed, and with Thomas E. Watson, of Georgia, securing votes of eight Farmers' Alliance members. A few days before the Fifty-Second Congress met, a threat of war startled the United States. In Chile, where Blaine had sent as Minister his Irish supporter, Patrick Egan, a revolution took place in the summer of 1891. The open sympathy of Egan with Balmaceda, who like himself was anti-English in his views, and who was overturned by the revolt, made the American Minister *persona non grata* with the new Government. On October 16 a group of American seamen ashore at Valparaiso were attacked, and in the course of the ensuing correspondence a note from the new Foreign Secretary was offensive to the American Government. A sharp discussion with the new Government, of which Montt

The Harrison Administration

Chilean affair

was installed as President in December, led to an unexpected ultimatum delivered by Harrison and transmitted to Congress January 25, 1892. An apology was peremptorily demanded under threat of war. On the same day a voluntary disavowal was received in the State Department and was being decoded while Congress listened to the ultimatum. The episode was unimportant save as to its possible consequences, and was probably induced by Egan's unfitness for his office. It served to attract attention to the ease with which the President might drag the nation into war and the inadequacy of existing means with which to fight.

A diplomatic breach with Italy in which the United States was the offender occurred earlier in 1891, following an exasperating controversy in which Italian immigrants were arrayed against the New Orleans police. A group of Italians, under suspicion of murder in New Orleans, but acquitted by the local police authorities, were lynched by a mob on March 14. Popular feeling ran high because of the belief that the lynched Italians were the guiding spirits of a secret society that had sought to terrify the New Orleans police by murder and assault. The Italian Minister, Fava, denounced the local authorities as "recreant to their duty" for their failure to safeguard the prisoners, and asserted the right "to demand and obtain the punishment of the murderers and an indemnity for the victims." This demand was made in brusque fashion under threat of severance of diplomatic relations and Fava was withdrawn from Washington when the United States was unable to give instant compliance. Blaine wrote to Governor Nicholls, of Louisiana, that "the Government of the United States must give to the subjects of friendly powers a security which it demands for our own citizens when temporarily under a foreign jurisdiction." It was, however, easier to admit responsibility than to obtain redress for the injured or punishment for the guilty. No machinery existed by which the United States Government could compel the State to punish any one or to bear the burden of its share of the international duties of the Na-

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tional Government. Harrison decried the brusque manner of the Italian Government, but forgot to moderate his own manner when Chile became the offender. The matter was ultimately patched up under the precedent afforded by the Lopez riot of 1851. The President maintained that foreigners were entitled to no better protection than that afforded to American citizens, but Congress, upon his recommendation and out of sympathy with the persons injured, indemnified their heirs.

The relations between the President and Secretary Blaine attracted increasing attention as the convention of 1892 drew near. In a letter written in February Blaine stated that he was not a candidate, but his loyal friends continued to hope that he would yield and insisted upon the need for a more popular nominee than Harrison. The unusual success of Harrison on the stump was in sharp contrast to his unpopularity in his own office. In his personal relationships with the party leaders his manners were irritating. He offended reformers by appointing to office a long list of Republican editors, party hacks, and personal associates. The leading party workers were not conciliated, for they got too little. The wave of ballot reform sweeping over the country was changing the conditions under which campaigns should be fought. The Civil Service Commission was allowed to grow in influence and Harrison appointed Theodore Roosevelt as one of the Commissioners and upheld him in a vigorous and well-advertised fight to save the civil service. Blaine curtly resigned from the Cabinet three days before the Republican Convention assembled and gave hope to his supporters that he would accept a nomination.

The Republican Convention at Minneapolis was under the influence of anti-Blaine men who, however, had no enthusiasm for Harrison. "B. Harrison would be dead to start with," wrote Speaker Reed, who was himself a minor candidate. There was nearly as much support for William McKinley as there was for Blaine, but their combined strength did not prevent the renomination

of Harrison on the first ballot. In spite of its defeat in 1890, the Republican Party reaffirmed "the American doctrine of protection. . . . We believe that all articles which cannot be produced in the United States, except luxuries, should be admitted free of duty, and that on all imports coming into competition with the products of American labor there should be levied duties equal to the difference between wages abroad and at home." The party demanded bimetallism, but insisted that "every dollar, paper or coin, issued by the Government, shall be as good as any other." White-law Reid was nominated as Vice-President.

The retirement of Blaine from Harrison's Cabinet closed his public career. Death had broken up his family within the few months preceding, and his own ill-health terminated his life a few months later. Through his whole public career he had been within reach of the largest success without ever grasping it. He began in a generation whose standards of political practice were those of the business and society to which they belonged. He allowed himself to be placed in positions which could never be explained when a changing code of public ethics became operative in his later life. His gift of leadership and his vision of a harmonious western hemisphere were sufficiently marked to enhance the tragedy of his failure to deserve and win the greatest rewards in public life.

Grover Cleveland left the White House in 1889 and took up the practice of law in New York City with his political career apparently at an end. He had succeeded in compelling an unruly party to accept his leadership and had been beaten upon his own issue at the polls. No other President so defeated had come back into national office except John Quincy Adams, whose long membership in the House of Representatives was more nearly a new and independent career than a continuation of his earlier public life. In Cleveland's case the rule was changed. Within the next two years after his defeat his following for tariff reform was increased in number and was strengthened by the support of the forces of general discon-

The nomi-
nation of
Cleveland

tent. After 1890 there was widening recognition that he had been the leader of the attack upon the tariff. There was no desire among professional politicians to have him back in politics, for, like Harrison, he had been stubborn and unaccommodating. Too much a party man to please reformers and too little for the politicians, his appeal to the voters at large increased in strength, and was measured by the calls upon him to discuss national problems before popular audiences. Before the end of 1891 his personal friends were corresponding on a large scale in the hope of organizing a popular movement of approval so as to compel his renomination by the Democratic Party in 1892. Hill, of New York, added to the vogue of Cleveland by showing fear of it. At his dictation the New York convention to nominate delegates to the Democratic National Convention was summoned three months ahead of time and endorsed Hill for the presidency in the vain attempt to head off the Cleveland movement. The New York *World*, the leader of the Democratic dailies, advised against the snap convention. Hill's manifest uneasiness strengthened the Cleveland movement, as well as the fact that Hill's opposition might be construed as an endorsement of Cleveland's merits.

The Democratic Convention at Chicago contained a wide diversity of opinion upon the issues of the day. The tendency of Populism and the Alliance movement was to separate Republican converts from that party, but to create a populist element within the Democrats. Governor Boies, of Iowa, had a following for the nomination, because, with Populist support, he had been elected in 1889 and 1891 to the leadership of a State normally Republican. Single-taxers and free-traders sought to influence the convention. Tom Johnson, of Cleveland, one of their leaders and an intimate adviser of Henry George, devoted himself to defeating the hopes of Eastern Democrats for a straddle on the tariff. Later, as member of Congress, he used his "leave to print" in order to read Henry George's volume on *Protection or Free Trade* into the *Congressional Record*; and he used his frank to circulate more than a million copies of it before election.

At the close of the convention he was told by William C. Whitney, Cleveland's first Secretary of the Navy, "I would rather have seen Cleveland defeated than to have had that fool free-trade plank adopted."

Devotion to Cleveland was the unifying sentiment of the convention. He was nominated on the first ballot with the party leaders in New York and Maryland, David B. Hill and Arthur P. Gorman, openly disgruntled, and with the Populist members of the party dissatisfied by his attitude on the currency. The nomination of Adlai E. Stevenson, of Illinois, a free-silver advocate, for the vice-presidency, only partly appeased the latter group.

A "force" bill that had been urged by Republicans in the preceding Congress served to stiffen the Democratic ranks among the Southern States in the canvass of 1892. The measure was inspired by Northern resentment at the exclusion of the negro from the franchise. With open defiance of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments, the South prevented the negro from exercising his right to vote. Before 1890 most negroes accepted the inevitable and gave up the attempt to vote, thus reducing the opposition to the Southern Democratic Party to a negligible minority. In the close elections from 1876 to 1888 the North bewailed the loss of the Republican votes that the negro might have cast. The Republican platform of 1888 charged "that the present administration and the Democratic majority in Congress owe their existence to the suppression of the ballot by a criminal nullification of the Constitution and laws of the United States." Under the leadership of Henry Cabot Lodge and with the support of Northern Republican leaders a force bill to protect the negroes in their right to vote passed the House in 1890. It was dropped in the Senate in the following session after the party reverses of November. The South kept its memory alive by asserting that the reelection of Harrison would be followed by enactment of such a law. The Southern States began to follow the example of Mississippi in accomplishing virtual disfranchisement of the negro by means of an education test.

The lifeless canvass of 1892 was due to lack of general enthusiasm for Harrison, uncertainty as to the operation of the new secret ballot laws which were in effect in some thirty-five States, and the discouragement from inroads of Populism among the Republican farmers. In several of the Western States the new party was clearly preparing to take possession of the whole local government. "Any man in the country standing upon the doctrine of high protection would have been defeated," said Senator Shelby M. Cullom. "The people sat down upon the McKinley Tariff Bill, and they have never gotten up. They were thoroughly imbued with the feeling that the party did not do right in revising the tariff up instead of down."

Cleveland was reëlected in November by a slight plurality over Harrison because of the Populist secession. The vote for Weaver was 1,040,886. In six States, all of them Northern or Western, the Populist Party picked up twenty-two electoral votes. In many others the Populist vote, drawn from the Republican total, threw the victory to Democratic candidates. What was true of the presidency was true of Congress; because of the schism the Democrats gained the Senate and retained control of the House.

For the first time since the Civil War the United States National Government was entirely in the hands of Democrats when Cleveland was reinaugurated in 1893. The new majority was in no sense homogeneous, but included around its Democratic nucleus anti-tariff Republicans from the East, anti-monopoly Republicans from the West, and dissatisfied Republican reformers like Wayne MacVeagh, Carl Schurz, and Walter Q. Gresham. "Mr. Cleveland had recognized in the last election a public movement almost equivalent to the creation of a new party," said the *Christian Union* in comment upon his Cabinet list. Official announcement of the personnel of the new Government was made early in February. Gresham, who had been a Republican until within a few months, was made Secretary of State. John G. Carlisle, the free-trade leader of the Democratic

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Party in the House, was appointed to the Treasury, while Daniel Lamont, private secretary in Cleveland's first term, became Secretary of War. Under Lamont the function of private secretary had been elevated to a new level. The demands upon the time and attention of the President had been accentuated because of the long period in which the party had been out of power. Lamont protected the President with an urbanity and decision that brought him immediate recognition. The Navy Department was entrusted to Hilary A. Herbert, of Alabama, who had been in Congress for twenty years and had recently acted as chairman of the Committee on Naval Affairs of the House. Richard Olney, of Massachusetts, became Attorney-General. The pledge of Cleveland in his second inaugural was to accomplish the reformation of the tariff, to prevent the further debasement of the currency, and to continue the reform of the civil service.

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CHAPTER X

THE PANIC OF 1893

THE silver dollar was worth sixty-five cents in gold when Cleveland was reinaugurated. In accordance with the Bland-Allison Act, and the Sherman Act which succeeded it, some 417,000,000 silver dollars had been coined since 1878. Of these, \$362,000,000 were in Treasury vaults, in addition to uncoined silver bought under these acts and amounting to \$118,000,000. The silver dollars accumulated in the Treasury, unused because of the inconvenience with which they were handled and a growing public reluctance to accept depreciated money. Unlike the greenbacks these were not protected by a public promise to redeem them in gold, and only the unwillingness of each National Administration since Hayes to force them upon the public, and the surplus revenue that made such action unnecessary, averted the catastrophe of a depreciated standard. Western farmers who demanded free silver showed no willingness to use the silver money already on hand. Leaders in the demand were frequently embarrassed by the exposure of the fact that while calling loudly for free silver, they wrote into their own mortgage contracts clauses calling for repayment in standard gold coin.

When John G. Carlisle took over the Treasury Department the cash balance in the Treasury was a source of apprehension. President Harrison and Secretary Foster, said the *Nation* in its issue preceding the inauguration, "are watching the dollars in the Treasury with unconcealed anxiety, and hoping against hope that March 4 will come without an actual crash." The decline in imports due to Western and Southern hard times had reduced the revenue from the tariff. The silver provisions of the McKinley Bill reduced it still further. Appropriations were consuming it more rapidly than ever before, and it seemed likely that in

the fiscal year 1893 there would be an actual national deficit.

The quality of the money included in the Treasury balance was as discouraging as its amount. Silver dollars, which the public would not use willingly and which were in vicarious circulation (through silver certificates) only because the small denominations of Treasury notes had been withdrawn, became each month a larger proportion of the balance. The old custom of making most of the payments to the Treasury in the form of gold had ceased. Debtors of the Government everywhere took advantage of the unwillingness of Treasury officials to force silver into circulation and began to sort out from their currency on hand gold, which they hoarded, while they paid their silver and paper to the Government. The percentage of gold receipts was declining.

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Treasury

Every month the Sherman Act not only increased the amount of cheap silver money as the Bland-Allison Act had done, but also reduced the gold balance in the Treasury upon which the stability of the currency, like an inverted pyramid, depended. The gold reserve which Secretary Sherman had put together in anticipation of resumption in 1879 was carried on the Treasury balance thereafter as a separate item. Amounting to about one hundred million dollars, it came to be accepted as a low-water mark below which the gold could not be allowed to fall without endangering the standard of currency. In the last months of the Harrison Administration the commercial world observed the decline of the Treasury balance and the decreasing proportion of gold that it contained, and before Harrison left office it was for some weeks a matter of chance alone whether he could preserve the hundred-million-dollar gold reserve intact. A few weeks after Carlisle took over the Treasury the shrinking of the gold reserve below this mark became the visible index of financial panic.

The chief elements in the panic of 1893 were financial apprehension and over-investment. The former of these was inspired by the fear that the gold dollar would cease to be the standard of value and that

Panic of
1893

in its place a depreciated silver dollar or, even worse, an issue of irredeemable paper, might force gold to a premium as had been done during the Civil War. The attempt at bimetallism was still a failure. The relative weight of the gold and silver dollars, fixed at sixteen to one in 1835, had no effect upon the market value of the metals. The bullion value of the silver dollar had declined steadily since 1873. Both dollars were still legal tender, but most of the silver was in the Treasury instead of in circulation. Every owner of invested capital had financial reason to fear the change from gold to silver standard which would reduce the value of his dollars in proportion to the depreciation of silver. Persons living on fixed salaries and all wage-earners were in a similar condition. If such a shift were produced unavoidably, it would cause irremediable catastrophe; if produced deliberately, it would be repudiation and a crime.

Nervousness as to the safety of the gold standard was most pronounced in the Eastern and Middle States, and was intensified after 1890 by two strong forces. The increase of silver money and the decline of the gold reserve were ominous external symptoms of weakness. The swelling Western demand for free silver, which stood at the head of the list of social panaceas, was still more ominous, as revealing a popular intent that might be successful. Fear of free silver, as it became more general, stimulated an increased hoarding of gold and by this accelerated the shift toward the silver basis.

Over-investment had by 1890 produced in the United States an unsound condition that would have compelled liquidation of debts and an ensuing depression even if there had been no currency apprehensions to unsettle the nerves of business. Since 1873 the United States had passed through one of the economic cycles that revolved at irregular intervals through the nineteenth century. The years 1819, 1837, 1857, and 1873 marked the completion of earlier revolutions, and the United States was in 1890 rapidly approaching the end of another period and the need to balance its books and begin again.

With falling prices and rising wages typical of the period after 1873 the level of social welfare in America was higher than it ever had been. But with new inventions and greater ease in fulfilling old needs the demand for comfort and luxury was steadily growing. The farmer boy, bred to the simplicity of the country, expected to live better when he moved to town. The comforts of the city became available on the farm through the enticing advertising pages of the farm papers and the catalogues of the mail-order houses. There were better opportunities to educate the children in the State universities and the enlarged Eastern colleges. There were railroads to be built, farms to be paid for and stocked, cities to be extended into their suburbs. The increasing annual accumulation of wealth was met by more rapidly increasing demands for expenditure and investment. Nearly every year after 1879 saw heavier pressure upon the resources available for permanent investment, and brought nearer the date at which new projects would have to stop through lack of capital, at which going projects would be forced to get along upon smaller loans, and at which bankruptcy would confront not only speculative business, but every business that depended upon continued credit.

The cycles of prosperity and panic have always been determined by the ratio of production of wealth to its use and investment. They have been further modified by psychological conditions. In the years of business depression after 1873, men held themselves down to safe and sane business, and took few avoidable risks. The gains of business were small, but relatively sure. In the next five years the accumulated savings of a scared and frugal society began to press for means of safe investment, and promoters of new ventures, assured by their avoidance of failure in the careful years, regained their nerve. About the date of resumption money became available for enterprises that were well endorsed. Men of good repute, like Henry Villard, could obtain funds even for unmentioned ends, and the enlarged profits of business both increased the available capital and encouraged the spirit to risk again. The failure

of Grant and Ward in 1884 revealed the existence of speculators of doubtful honor, but did not check the movement for speculative investment. The rumors of great fortunes to be made in mines or in railroads, in manufacture or in cattle-raising, brought within reach of business the isolated savings of cautious individuals and kept filled up that fund out of which every new venture must be financed. In the long run no permanent investment can be made except it be paid for out of the capital that some one has produced and saved. That fund is not without limit, and after a dozen years of speculation society is warranted in suspecting that it may have approached the margin. When the margin is reached, and there is no longer capital available for the former scale of speculation or investment, something must yield. And if at this moment some financial accident scares the world, and men generally try to save some of their property by selling part of it at a forced sale, no one can foretell the extent of the panic that may ensue.

The panic of 1873 was precipitated by the failure of Jay Cooke. That of 1857 came after the collapse of the Ohio Life and Trust Company. In 1893, after three years of warning and agricultural depression, with fear as to the value of all property aroused by the danger of the silver basis, the panic was precipitated by the failure of the gold reserve to keep above the level of \$100,000,000.

The Democratic Party, organized around the issue of tariff reform, was unprepared to meet the issue presented by a financial panic caused by dread of a silver currency. Like the Republican Party, it had avoided a clear expression of views upon the currency, and had adhered to safe and unmeaning phrases that all money must be of equal value and that there must be no discrimination against one of the traditional metals. Both parties included voters who desired free silver, whether from the hope of raising its price or that of decreasing the value of the dollar; and both contained others to whom free silver was anathema.

In 1892, with the People's Party calling for "free and un-

limited coinage of silver and gold" and a circulation of fifty dollars per capita, the Republicans asked for "the use of both gold and silver as standard money . . . so that the purchasing and debt-paying power of the dollar, whether of silver, gold, or paper, shall be at all times equal." The Democrats called "the Republican legislation known as the Sherman Act of 1890" a "cowardly makeshift," and also held "to the coinage of both gold and silver without discrimination against either metal," but insisted that all of either variety of money, as well as paper, must be kept at par in coin. Neither party ventured to say how any nation could coin both metals freely and yet avoid the fact that two dollars of unequal value are not the same. With vague phrases which any advocate might twist into at least a partial endorsement of his own demand, the two great parties dodged the issue of the currency.

International agreement was again invoked to try to accomplish what could not be done by the United States alone. The suggestion that the two dollars be brought together in value by putting more silver ^{Bimetallism} into the silver coin until it was worth a dollar in gold was rejected. Such policy would defeat the aim of the mine-owners who wanted a higher price for their bullion; and of the farmer inflationists who wanted cheaper money. It being clearly impossible for the United States by law to raise the price of silver, a monetary conference was convened at Brussels upon invitation of the United States to consider fixing such price by international action. Twenty nations were present in the conference that sat in November, 1892; but their long discussions only brought out the fact that most of the important nations had adopted the gold standard, and were satisfied with it. Like the preceding meetings of 1878 and 1881, this conference took no action to help the United States out of its currency dilemma.

Neither party was pledged to a clear policy respecting silver in 1892, but there was no doubt where Cleveland stood. Before he was first inaugurated in 1885 he went out of his way to show his belief in the gold standard and the

necessity to hold the country upon a gold basis. By administrative acts he prevented the Bland-Allison dollars from driving gold to a premium. The same policy was followed by his successor, who urged in vain the repeal of the Sherman Act. With panic confronting the new Administration in 1893, and with Cleveland clear upon the action needed, the Democratic majority that had been organized to revise a tariff was called upon to reëstablish the currency upon a safe basis. It had no mandate upon this, and no agreement among its members. It faced wreck upon a new problem before it had time even to consider the work for which it had been preparing since 1887.

The gold reserve fell below \$100,000,000 on April 21, 1893. The alternatives before the Treasury were to borrow gold and thus maintain the reserve, or to pay the obligations of the United States in any lawful money, gold, silver, or paper, and permit the cheapest form of the currency to shift the value of the dollar to its own basis. Gresham's law, that bad money drives out good, had operated too often for there to be any doubt as to the consequence of paying public debts in silver. On the other hand, if gold were borrowed, the necessary publicity of this remedy would increase the nervousness and accelerate the run upon the Treasury for the redemption of paper in gold. And every month by law the Treasury was forced to buy four and a half million ounces of silver, and pay for it in another issue of legal-tender notes. Not until August did the gold reserve get back to its normal amount, and in the meantime financial advice and political maneuver were focused upon the Sherman Act.

Commercial failures were numerous during the spring of 1893, beginning with that of the Reading Railroad in January. As nervousness increased, banks contracted their loans, and speculators unloaded their holdings to save themselves or were sold out to cover their margins. In May there was a stampede for safety, with failures of brokers, banks, railroads, and industrials on every hand. The New York Clearing-House resorted to the use of certificates

instead of currency to settle balances, while the report in June that the mints of India had ceased the coinage of silver tended to lower the price of that metal still further and make panic worse. On June 30 Cleveland summoned Congress to meet in special session on August 7, 1893, to repeal the Silver Purchase Act.

Not until nearly thirty years later did it become common knowledge that at the crisis of the panic the life of Cleveland was in danger. Many years later the surgeon, Dr. W. W. Keen, who was called in to operate, told of the grave condition affecting the roof of Cleveland's mouth, and the hesitation with which an operation which might affect his life was undertaken. Secrecy was observed at the time because of the belief that knowledge of the President's condition, with a Vice-President, Adlai Stevenson, who believed in free silver, in the offing, would make the panic worse. Between the call for the special session and the date of its meeting Cleveland left Washington, ostensibly for a cruise on the yacht of New York friends. The operation took place while the yacht lay at anchor in the East River, and Cleveland was then protected from public observation at his home on Buzzard's Bay until he had recovered from its effects.

A storm of political dissatisfaction broke upon the President when his intention to call a special session was made known. To the silver Democrats of the West and South the act seemed like apostasy to the interests of the common people. Charles S. Thomas, of Denver, in an open letter to Secretary Carlisle charged him with abandoning these interests and demanded that the Government take advantage of its privilege to pay debts in any kind of lawful money and force the silver dollars into circulation. Governor Davis H. Waite, of Colorado, whom the Populists had elected in the preceding year, announced that it would be the duty of his State to coin silver dollars at the old ratio on its own account and make them legal tender, and indulged in rhetoric that made him nationally famous after a silver convention in July, where

Repeal of
the Silver
Purchase
Act

he declared, "It is better, infinitely better, that blood should flow to the horses' bridles rather than our national liberties should be destroyed." On August 1 the silver forces met in convention in Chicago. The representatives of the mine-owners were present, "Bloody-Bridles" Waite was there, with Ignatius Donnelly, a spokesman of the Populists, and Terence V. Powderly, of the Knights of Labor. The convention denied that the Sherman Act was the cause of the hard times and ascribed them to the "crime of 1873," a conspiracy of the moneyed classes to outlaw silver, and by limiting new coinage to gold, a single metal, to raise the value of the dollar for their own advantage.

Crisp was reëlected Speaker when Congress assembled on August 7, over Reed, the Republican leader, and Simpson, of Kansas, who was supported by seven Populists' votes. Elected the preceding year "to change our tariff policy from a protective to a revenue basis," Congress was now obliged by the panic to change also the financial policy of the country, for which neither party was prepared. Reed and most of the minority members responded to the demand of the President that the Sherman Act be repealed, and with the gold Democrats, made a majority that passed the repeal bill through the House before the end of August.

The acute panic of 1893 was ended when the action of the House of Representatives indicated that the repeal was to be accomplished. The resulting confidence that the National Administration would not be a party to the depreciation of the currency strengthened the nerve of business. Depression continued for at least four years, but the violent liquidation was over. The leadership of the President not only held Congress to the repeal, but carried the issue into the party conventions of the year. In Nebraska J. Sterling Morton, Secretary of Agriculture, and a strong gold Democrat, sought endorsement of the policy of Cleveland at the Democratic Convention in October. He was opposed by a silver faction in the convention under the leadership of Congressman William Jennings Bryan, whom the *Outlook* described as the finest orator and best thinker

among the free-trade and the free-silver Democrats. When Bryan was beaten in the convention and announced his shift to Populism, it commented, "There is no man in the West whose change of political affiliation is of greater consequence." The repeal of the Sherman Act was signed on November 1, after Bland and Bryan had tried in vain to operate a filibuster against it. "Eighteen months ago," said the *Nation*, "the coolest observers thought the chances favored free coinage, and we certainly escaped from it only by the narrowest squeak."

The controversy over free silver precipitated another episode in the age-long controversy between those with money and those without. In its simplest form free silver was a device whose widest appeal was to farmers burdened with the debts incurred in the speculative decade just ended and exasperated by the continuous downward trend of prices. Wheat, corn, and cotton, each the chief financial reliance of a great and uniform section of the United States, were all so low as to endanger the stability of their respective regions. Free silver promised certainly to increase the amount of currency and probably to lower the value of the dollar. It was easy to convince the debtor section of the country that the falling prices were due to the conspiracy to raise the price of gold.

The opposition to free silver was as instinctive among the prosperous elements in society as belief in free silver was among the debtor farmers. The strong probability that free silver would bring the Gresham law into operation, drive gold to a premium, and lower the purchasing value of the dollar, inspired fear amounting to terror and panic throughout the East and North. In these regions free silver appeared to be repudiation and deliberate dishonesty. The social cleavage between debtor and creditor classes exposed by the free-silver movement was intensified by the fact of a sectional division along similar lines. The North was predisposed to the gold standard in spite of party. The South and West, in spite of party, were against it.

The currency dispute involved more than the financial

interests of either class. In a technical way, like the greenback controversy, it involved an examination of existing laws with a view to determining the rights of the Government of the United States under its statutes. The discretionary power of the Government to use "lawful money" in meeting its obligations, and to determine by law what should constitute lawful money, was made clear by a study of the currency legislation. Either silver or greenbacks might be used to meet most of the obligations, without infringing any existing law.

Behind the question of the legal right lay the larger questions of moral right and of financial expediency. Most Americans in the heat of the argument were too warmly biased by their selfish interests to be detached judges of the larger issues. It was only a minority which approached the controversy without bias toward class or subjection to self-interest. These in general took the view that Grant had taken of the greenbacks and the public debt, and that Hamilton had taken of the Revolutionary debt which he found outstanding when he became Secretary of the Treasury under Washington. From the grounds of highest public expediency it was wise policy for the Government never to take advantage of a technicality in its own interest, and to interpret its obligations in the broadest way. Public credit depends upon public expectation that it will be generously maintained. For the Government deliberately to force cheap money into circulation appeared to these not only a crime against honesty, but a costly departure from sound expediency. It was deplorable that currency should fluctuate in value, but it would be criminal to produce such fluctuation for the purpose of transferring wealth from one social class to another.

The realignment of parties with free silver as the dominant issue began with the repeal of the Sherman Law. It was impeded by the fact that free silver was only one of a long list of reforms urged for the benefit of the plain people, and that many of these reforms were inherently sound. The widespread commercial depression

Party re-
alignment

affected the forces of industry as well as those of agriculture. While farmers felt that they had lost their market, workmen knew that they had lost their jobs. The existing discontent was wider than the distribution of any single class, and the discontented readily believed that the Government was in league with those who would exploit the interests of the people.

The World's Columbian Exposition was opened in Chicago in May, 1893, under conditions resembling those amid which the Centennial Exhibition had been held in Philadelphia, in 1876. Hard times prevented each from realizing its fullest success as a public spectacle. A comparison of the exhibits, however, shows the long distance that the United States had traveled in less than two decades. The ugly, straggling warehouses built in Fairmount Park to house the Centennial bore no resemblance to the wonder city that sprang into life around the lagoons at Jackson Park. In their very framework the buildings were a measure of the revolution. Structural steel made possible at Chicago new effects in size and shape. The plaster decorations, here used for the first time on a large scale, concealed the skeletons and gave them the appearance of marble palaces. At night they were outlined by living fire with incandescent lamps, while searchlights played upon them from all directions. For the first time American architecture achieved an international triumph.

The contents of the buildings were as significant as their exteriors. In the fields of electricity and transportation they showed the vast change since the last world's fair. The trains of Pullman and Wagner palace cars revealed a luxury in travel that was new. Serious visitors relieved the weariness of observation by attending the conferences that were held on all conceivable subjects. The more frivolous spent their moments in relaxation along the "Midway," where they found amusements ranging from Buffalo Bill's "Wild West" to the "Streets of Cairo." The fair was less than a complete success because of the effects of the panic of 1893.

Chicago's
World Fair,
1893

The open revolt of the farmers against the conditions of their economic life was paralleled by that of labor, whose unrest was intensified by the depression and panic. In the spring of 1892 the *Nation* commented upon a strike among the steel workers in the Pittsburgh district and was impressed by the novel fact that public sympathy for the strikers appeared among all classes of society. The well-to-do had generally regarded the earlier strikes as revolutionary outbreaks. Public opinion was changing because — the *Nation* thought — of an awakening to the abuses incident to a protective system under the domination of manufacturers.

The Pittsburgh strikes of 1892 affected the Homestead Works of Andrew Carnegie. Since the close of the Civil

Steel War the steel industries had undergone great changes due to the new methods of making steel and its wholesale application in industry. The steel rail for the first time provided the steam railroads with an adequate bearing surface for their rolling stock, and enabled them to increase the size and weight of locomotives and cars, to lengthen the train and increase its tonnage capacity. One of the contributory causes of the strikes of 1877 was the growing practice of running double-header trains, with two locomotives, but only one crew of trainmen. The resulting economy was coveted by the railroads, but the trainmen's unions fought the economy because it lessened the number of jobs.

With steel available the railroads were rebuilt after 1879, and the new electric roads that supplanted horse-cars in city streets used steel rails from their inception. Bridges and trestles were remodeled with the new material. Wood, iron, and stone became only supplementary to steel, while cantilever bridges made it possible to carry the tracks over obstacles that had hitherto been impassable. The car-ferry lost its vogue as a means of crossing rivers. The Brooklyn Bridge was the best known of the new monuments of transportation, and in most of the large cities new terminals with huge steel train sheds made their appearance.

City architecture entered upon a new era with the appearance of the steel truss. The limit of height in stone or brick construction had long been reached in the cities of Europe, and even the wide use of the passenger elevator did not greatly increase it. The height was determined by the space available for foundations and supporting walls, and after six or seven stories had been piled up these became so wide that further building was prohibited. The steel frame made it possible to reduce the foundation area, and hang the walls upon the metal skeleton instead of thickening them to bear the burden. The maximum height rose at once, and before 1890 office buildings appeared in New York, described by contemporaries as "sky-scrapers." The twelve or fourteen stories of the first sky-scrapers were but the beginning of changes that altered not only the fundamental conditions of city life, but created unlimited demand for steel shapes.

Naval architecture underwent similar changes between 1865 and 1890. The wooden ship that had formerly carried the commerce of the world was forced into a subordinate position first by iron vessels and then by steel. The navies of the world were similarly transformed after the duel between the Monitor and the Merrimac exhibited the fighting strength of the ironclad. Before 1880 the United States had no steel works capable of manufacturing the heavy plates of steel that were used as defensive armament or the huge ingots out of which great naval guns were forged and turned. Before 1890 the steel industry was ready for each of these tasks.

Pittsburgh became the center of the steel industry during the eighties because of its fortunate position with reference to deposits of iron and coal and of the network of rail and water routes that gave cheap and competitive transportation. The steel industry did not show as much trend toward monopoly as did petroleum. There was no single factor whose control enabled any one group of individuals to dominate the industry. Wealth and power were acquired by the men most skillful in handling the various

factors of labor, raw materials, and transportation. Among these, Andrew Carnegie rose to the leading position.

The unionization of the steel industry was begun sporadically in the later sixties when the Sons of Vulcan and other craft unions appeared among the mills. In 1876 The Homestead strike several of these unions were merged in the Amalgamated Association of Iron and Steel Workers. In 1892 this Association began a strike in the Homestead plant of the Carnegie Steel Company.

Carnegie was in Europe when the strike broke out, and his works were under the direct management of one of his younger associates, Henry Clay Frick. Had Carnegie been present the strike might have been compromised, since his general policy was one of conciliation toward his men. Frick, however, refused to yield. The demands of the Association were in part for recognition by the company and in part against a reduction of the wages for piece-work. The latter controversy was common in all industries because of the rapid substitution of machinery for human labor. When the piece-worker was aided by the machine, he desired the same rate with a resulting increased wage due to the use of the machine. The employer's tendency was to lower the piece-rate so as to leave the weekly wages of the workman where they had been.

In the course of the Homestead strike the Amalgamated Association picketed the works, while Frick surrounded them with a mob-proof fence and prepared to bring in non-union men or scabs to break the strike. As an additional measure of defense he employed the Pinkerton Detective Agency to furnish guards for the mills. On July 6, 1892, a pitched battle occurred in which strikers and their sympathizers attacked a boatload of Pinkerton detectives who were being convoyed up the river to the works. The Governor of Pennsylvania called out the militia to maintain order and the use of private guards was denounced by most of the sympathizers with the strikers.

Public sympathy was turned against the strike by an event for which the Amalgamated Association had no re-

sponsibility. An anarchist named Berkman forced his way into Frick's office and sought to assassinate him with knife and revolver. The outrage occurred at the crisis of the strike. In the wave of revulsion against it the union lost its cause.

The Homestead strike played a large part in the election of 1892, serving as a text for those who sought to turn labor against the Republican Party and to prove a corrupt alliance between wealth and the forces of the Government. It was claimed that the Republican Party was insincere in its habitual tariff argument. The two defenses of protection were to make America independent of Europe and to protect the American workman against the competition of low-grade immigrant labor. The Democratic orator now attacked the party for maltreating and shooting up the workman for whom it professed so warm an interest.

The depression of 1893 made employment scarce and resulted in attempts by employers to lower wages. In 1894 the most notable of the strikes against the lower-
 ing of wages occurred in the environs of Chicago where the Pullman Palace Car Company had
 built a model village for its hands at Pullman. The wage reductions carried out by the Pullman Company were aggravated by the fact that the workmen lived in dwellings owned by the company, and dealt at company stores. A strike broke out in May for the restoration of the old wage scale. It was supported by the officers of the American Railway Union, which, under the leadership of Eugene V. Debs, was endeavoring to organize all workmen on the railroads. When the Pullman Company refused to arbitrate the strike the union declared a boycott upon Pullman cars and ordered its members not to haul them over the lines of any railroad. In the last week of June, 1894, the boycott came into active operation with attendant disorder in the trainyards of Chicago. The companies appealed to the federal courts and obtained an injunction forbidding the American Railway Union to interfere with the running of trains. Debs disregarded the order and was thrown into jail for contempt

of court. The disorder in the yards continued, and a call was made for federal troops to maintain order, but Governor Altgeld, of Illinois, declined to issue the call for troops and insisted that he had the matter well in hand.

When the disorder in the trainyards interfered with the regular running of the United States mails, President Cleveland intervened on his own account and ordered federal troops from Fort Sheridan to Chicago to insure their unimpeded carriage.

Out of the industrial disputes between 1892 and 1894 there arose wide discussion of the defense of society against disorder. Government by injunction and the use of troops were both defended and denounced. They were denounced by those who saw in them a corrupt alliance against which Henry D. Lloyd launched his economic tract *Wealth against Commonwealth* (1894). The courts were attacked as reactionary and servile supporters of organized wealth. The use of the injunction and troops was defended by those who saw a primary issue in the maintenance of order and believed that without order as a condition precedent all society would suffer, the wage-earner most of all.

The place of the court in the American system of government became more prominent as business became interstate in its character and took on new forms of combination. In the legislative field Congress and the State legislatures were passing regulatory laws under strong public pressure. The old right of private property as protected by the common law underwent modifications as the police power of the State was extended in new directions. It was no new thing for the courts to declare acts void as unconstitutional, but there had been no occasion for numerous decisions of this sort until the Government entered the broad field of regulation of business. Critics of the courts because they intervened in labor disputes found themselves joined by other critics who thought the courts perverse and reactionary and an obstruction to the social advance of government.

The means of defense, whether internal or external, had

changed little in the half-century ending in 1894. Local order was maintained by police forces that were, in nearly every important city, in corrupt alliance with the party machine. Individual members of the forces showed themselves repeatedly capable of acts of heroism, but law-breaking was countenanced, vice was protected, and bosses levied regular tribute upon the activities of the underworld. The Lexow Commission in New York stripped the concealment from the police system in that city and made possible in 1894 one of the spasmodic revolts of decent society against corruption. Theodore Roosevelt became police commissioner there under a new city administration, and with Jacob Riis as his Boswell sought to remove the force from politics. The condition in the New York police department differed only in degree from that in other cities. In the rural districts there was no organized police at all and public order depended upon the law-abiding instincts of the community reënforced by an occasional sheriff's posse.

Outside of half a dozen larger cities there existed no permanent force capable of quelling serious outbreaks. When trouble occurred the governor was called upon to summon the militia to the scene of the disturbance, but the militia was commonly so unprepared and ill-disciplined that its presence before a mob made the situation worse. Only in the great industrial States in which the calls for strike service were relatively numerous was the militia well enough trained to be of use. Since strikes constituted almost the only occasion for its use, it easily became an object of the distrust of organized labor. In one of the strikes of 1893 the local controversy approached a condition of a petty civil war when a sheriff's posse in Colorado sought to quiet striking miners in Cripple Creek and Governor Waite called out the militia to arrest the posse.

The army
and the
strikes

The United States Army, as the last recourse for defense in an emergency, ranked high in public esteem. The regular soldiers were disciplined and self-restrained and aroused fewer antipathies than militiamen. The army was not

materially changed from its condition when Hayes withdrew it from the Southern States. In 1894 it comprised 2136 officers and 25,772 men, and the bureaus in the War Department which directed it had performed their customary operations with little change through two decades. The line of great commanders was running down. The title of General of the Army, conferred upon Grant and Sherman, lapsed with them, although it was temporarily revived for Grant's benefit shortly before his death. After Grant and Sherman the command of the army passed into Sheridan's hands, and on his death in 1888 the list of great names ends. Schofield, and then Miles, exercised command for the next fifteen years, but there were no more great heroes of the Civil War to lend the luster of their names to the office of commanding general.

In his second inaugural address Cleveland laid greatest stress upon two problems before his Administration, one, the immediate need, was the maintenance of a "sound and stable currency"; the second, which was the main purpose of his campaign, was to correct "the injustice of maintaining protection for protection's sake." Before it was possible to take up his major task, the emergency of the panic of 1893 drove him to demand the repeal of the Silver Purchase Act. This was accomplished on November 1, by which date the most acute period of the crisis was over. When Congress reassembled in December to consider the tariff bill, which William L. Wilson was ready to report, the organism of the party was so wrenched because of the silver controversy that it was in no condition to function smoothly upon tariff revision.

At least four sets of obstructive facts stood before the President as he prepared to induce his party to redeem its pledge to revise the tariff. The political consequences of industrial unrest told against him. The direct effect of the repeal of the Sherman Silver Purchase Act was to weaken the party unity from within. The growth of Populism operated from without the party to seduce Democrats from their allegiance, and finally the panic itself was a weapon

The Demo-
cratic pro-
gram, 1893

to be used with telling effect by the Republican Party now in opposition.

Industrial unrest had contributed to Cleveland's election, but its continuance after his inauguration worked to his detriment. The mass of unemployed workmen tended to hold him responsible for their distress. Altgeld, of Illinois

The promptness with which the President intervened during the Pullman strikes brought down upon his head the wrath of labor radicals and of liberal Democrats. John P. Altgeld, of Illinois, gave voice to the protest against what he believed to be federal usurpation in State affairs. He had already drawn attention to his extreme liberalism by pardoning a group of the anarchists convicted after the Chicago riots of 1886. His protests revealed a lack of unity within the Democratic Party. The character of the unrest is illustrated by the movement originated by Jacob S. Coxey, of Massillon, Ohio, who invited the unemployed to start with him on Easter Sunday, 1894, to march upon Washington and to carry to Congress in person their demands for relief. Little detachments of "Coxey's army" started from numerous parts of the United States and ultimately arrived in Washington, where the Capitol police arrested them for walking on the grass around the Capitol. Their protest fizzled to the level of comic opera, but the grievance did not evaporate with the movement.

The repeal of the Silver Purchase Act snapped many of the party relationships that had been prepared with reference to tariff revision. Until 1893 the party had tried to avoid bringing the silver issue into politics, and had formulated ambiguous and inconsistent platform planks upon the subject. The desire for free silver, however, was nearly unanimous among Southern and Western Democrats, many of whom lost their confidence in Cleveland when they thought of him as the agent of Wall Street and in league with the "gold-bugs."

The appeal of Populism was strengthened by the success of the People's Party in the election of 1892. This was most marked among the Western States, where fusion

tickets were placed in the field and elected by a Populist-Democratic combination. The program of Populism embraced a long list of genuine reforms, overshadowed by the demand for silver inflation. It was cardinal doctrine with the Populists that both great parties, derelict in their duties, had sold out the interests of the common people. Professional politicians were under the ban, as having been guilty of deception and betrayal. The Populists who were nominated for office were, as a consequence, inexperienced men. Their honesty and devotion to reform were generally unquestioned, but their experience in the practical management of government was slight. They at least were a protest to double-dealing. "It has become much the fashion to run candidates on two or more diverse platforms, so they can be for a gold standard in one locality, free coinage of silver in another, and something else elsewhere," wrote an Iowa Congressman upon the general situation. In their conduct of office the inexperience of Populist officials made them the butt of Eastern paragraphers. Waite, of Colorado, whose frequent use of militia and whose high-flown language opened him to attack, was perhaps most widely known. But Peffer, of Kansas, and "Sockless" Jerry Simpson were burlesqued and ridiculed, while their sincere attempts to carry out the Populist reforms were sneered at and opposed. Said the *New York Nation*, which was never able to appreciate either their provocation or their aims, "the whole course of Populist reasoning and action in Kansas has betokened rascality rather than ignorance."

The panic that Harrison evaded with dexterity and passed on to Cleveland was due chiefly to a long train of events for which neither party as such was responsible. It was used, however, as a reason for attacking the Democratic Party, which was in office when it broke. In later years, as Republican stump speakers became more hazy in their recollection of the sequence of events, it was habitually charged that the panic of 1893 was due to the Democratic tariff of 1894. Burrows, of Michigan, expressed the same

idea before that tariff was passed: "I confidently assert that if the election of 1892 had resulted in the retention of the Republican Party in power, accompanied as it would have been with the assurance of the continuance of the American policy of Protection, the effect upon the public revenues as well as the general prosperity of the country would have been entirely reversed."

The natural consequence of the panic made tariff revision difficult if not impossible. The national surplus disappeared, declining from \$57,000,000 in 1890 to \$37,000,000 in 1891, \$9,000,000 in 1892, and \$2,000,000 in 1893. In the fiscal year ending June 30, 1894, there was a deficit of \$69,000,000. The causes which drove the Treasury into deficit finance were contributed to by the heavy appropriations of Reed's billion-dollar Congress, by the elimination of the sugar duties from the McKinley Bill, and by the normal cessation of imports that accompanies every panic. The customs duties under the McKinley tariff were \$219,000,000 in 1891, \$177,000,000 in 1892, \$203,000,000 in 1893, and \$131,000,000 in 1894.

By the end of 1893 it was a problem for Secretary Carlisle to find funds for the running expenses of the Government. It was a task of different character to keep enough gold in the Treasury to make possible the exchange of gold for other forms of money at the option of the customer. In January, 1894, he reverted to the Resumption Act of 1875 and took advantage of its unrepealed provisions for borrowing gold in order to create a gold reserve. Under this law John Sherman financed resumption in 1879. Carlisle now invited bids for a bond issue of \$50,000,000, whose proceeds were to strengthen the gold reserve. In subsequent issues of \$50,000,000 borrowed and \$62,000,000 paid out directly in the purchase of gold, the indebtedness created to maintain the reserve was increased to \$162,000,000. The task was vexatious and burdensome. The Silver Purchase Act had been repealed and had accordingly ceased to encourage the withdrawal of gold from the Treasury. But the Civil

Disappearance of the surplus

The Cleveland bond issues

War greenbacks were still in circulation and by law were re-issued when received by the Treasury. Instead of being redeemed once and for all in gold, they were reissued and were repeatedly turned in for redemption; and as long as lack of confidence prevailed they were a continuous drain upon the reserve. The bond issues were only a palliative. Relief came of itself as times gradually became more prosperous.

The Democratic borrowing to maintain the gold reserve was attacked by Populists and silver Democrats as subservience to Wall Street. J. Pierpont Morgan, who negotiated the loans, gained the complete confidence of President Cleveland in the transaction, but gained for himself the position of dominant exponent of the banking interests. Until his death in 1913 he remained the leader in American finance. Republicans refused to believe that the bond issues were for the sole purpose of sustaining the gold reserve, and attacked Cleveland for increasing the national debt in time of peace, and for demanding a reduction of the tariff when there was already a deficit in the Treasury.

William L. Wilson opened the tariff debate in January, 1894, and carried his measure through the House in the following month in the form of an honest reduction of the tariff. In the Senate, where the party lines were closer, and where the Western Democrats already believed that Cleveland had become the tool of big business, there was open revolt against the bill. Republicans attacked it with ridicule as they had done in 1888, and charged an incapacity in Democrats to construct a tariff. "The framers of the Wilson Bill having classified hydraulic hose . . . among articles of wearing apparel," said one of the Republican Senators, "no doubt will remodel that extraordinary measure so as to include hydraulic rams and spinning-mules in the live-stock schedule." A group of Democratic Senators openly allied themselves with the Republican minority to defeat the revision. Arthur Pue Gorman, of Maryland, and Calvin Brice, of Ohio, led in the breach and made it more glaring, because each of them had been chairman of the Democratic National Committee.

The Wilson
Tariff Bill,
1894

With Southern and Western party leaders fighting him on the silver issue, and with Eastern leaders in rebellion over the tariff, Cleveland became a President without a party. The Wilson Bill emerged from the Senate as an ordinary log-rolling, tariff-tinkering measure, bearing no resemblance to the party pledge upon which Cleveland had been elected. In its later stages Cleveland intervened in the hope of checking the revolt. In an open letter to Wilson he renewed the arguments of his tariff message of 1887 and described the pending measure as "party perfidy and party dishonor." Cleveland refused to sign the Wilson Bill. He allowed it to become a law without his signature because of the financial condition of the Treasury and the lack of prospect of a better bill. His open indignation made his personal breach with the Democratic protectionists permanent.

The greatest novelty included in the Wilson Bill was a provision for an income tax inserted in response to a demand of the Populists, and drafted in part by William J. Bryan, who was one of the junior ^{Income tax} members of the Committee on Ways and Means. In the scheme of Populism an income tax was not only a means for raising a revenue, but was also a device for correcting inequalities in the distribution of wealth. By increasing the rate progressively upon large incomes wealth was to be made to carry a heavy share of national expense. The measure was fought in Congress and outside as class legislation. In spite of the fact that income taxes had been used throughout the Civil War, the constitutionality of this new measure was tested in the Supreme Court. The Constitution requires that direct taxes be allotted among the States according to their population. In this income tax there was no such allotment and none could have been made, since the great incomes which were the objective of the measure were concentrated in a few large cities in the East. The Supreme Court in 1895 overturned the income tax because of its unconstitutionality, and brought itself thereby within the range of Populist fire directed against

the alleged conspiracy of business to control the Government.

In the fall elections of 1894 the Republican Party was returned to power in Congress with a huge majority in the House and a plurality over the Democrats in the Senate. The panic and the Wilson Bill were the main objects of attack. The Republican leaders invaded Wilson's West Virginia district, where Stephen B. Elkins directed the movement to defeat the nominal author of the bill. Ex-President Harrison took part in the attack, as did McKinley, who had himself been ousted from Congress after the passage of his tariff measure. Wilson was defeated for reëlection and at the same time a reaction against Populism removed from office its most prominent leaders.

In the latter half of Cleveland's Administration the conduct of the Government was reduced to formal terms as always when Congress and the President are at variance on politics. In December, 1895, there was temporarily revived a spirit of unity because of a vigorous diplomatic attack made upon Great Britain in a minor South American case. The boundary between Venezuela and British Guiana had been a source of irritation for many years, and Venezuela had more than once invited the friendly offices of the United States to protect her against the encroachment of her more powerful neighbor. Cleveland took up the discussion through Richard Olney, who had in 1895 become Secretary of State upon the death of Gresham, and urged upon England an arbitration which that country was unwilling to concede. In the course of the correspondence Olney avowed a special American right and interest in the problems of the Western Hemisphere, basing his claim upon the Monroe Doctrine. The British Government repudiated the idea and an *impasse* was reached in the autumn. On December 17, 1895, after Cleveland had sent a routine message at the opening of Congress a few days earlier, he startled the world with a special message on Venezuela. In this he asked for authority to make a study of the merits of the boundary contro-

Venezuela
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dispute

versy with a view to intervention to maintain that boundary which should be sustained by law and fact. He recognized that this might produce a conflict with England which he was ready if necessary to undertake.

The sharp language of the Venezuela message bewildered both friends and critics of the President. Godkin, who had supported him in the *Nation* thus far, now turned against him. Republicans charged that it was only a partisan trick to strengthen his Administration; Populists believed that it was a part of the Wall Street conspiracy, and that the temporary panic which followed the news of the message was deliberately planned for the benefit of speculators. Cleveland himself appears to have believed that sharp language would produce not war, but compromise, and the ensuing facts sustained this belief. The American commissioners to study the Venezuela boundary were given every chance to examine the records of the British Foreign Office itself, as they investigated their subject. In the following winter, partly as the result of the shock caused by a serious contemplation of a war between England and the United States, a general treaty of arbitration was signed by Olney and Lord Pauncefote. A few weeks later, in February, 1897, England agreed with Venezuela to arbitrate the boundary dispute. The arbitration treaty with the United States aroused opposition in the Senate and was first amended to death and then defeated. But the cordial relations between England and the United States were strengthened rather than weakened by the episode.

If it had been necessary for Cleveland to resort to force to defend his attitude upon Venezuela, he would have had as weapons an uncompleted system of coast defenses on the Atlantic planned by Secretary Endicott's board in 1886, a regular army of little over 25,000, a national guard of varying degrees of unpreparedness, and one modern battleship. "The utterly defenseless condition of our seacoast . . . is now well understood by every civilized nation in the world," wrote Secretary Endicott in 1886. The naval vessels were openly jeered at in the comic papers. "A man who will go

right out on the water in an American man-of-war doesn't know what fear is," said *Leslie's* in 1882, when the first steps were being taken to rebuild the navy.

The new navy
 followed, and popular indifference prevented the addition of new ships. While the rest of the world was experimenting with armored cruisers and heavy guns in the seventies, the United States was content to rely upon the obsolete vessels that had been modern in 1865. In 1882 there was no American warship fit to go to war. In this year, however, Congress authorized the preparation of plans for a group of steel cruisers and in subsequent acts the birth of a new navy was authorized. A new American industry had to be created before the navy could appear. The ideas of protection, that were crying more insistently for economic independence of Europe, forbade the purchase of a navy abroad. It accordingly became necessary to provide armor-plate mills and gun foundries as well as to design the steel hulls that were to bear the ordnance. Three little unprotected cruisers, the *Atlanta*, *Chicago*, *Charleston*, and a lighter craft, the *Dolphin*, "constituted the first attempt of the Navy Department for many years to construct a war vessel up to the modern requirements." The earliest of the cruisers was commissioned in 1887. In the autumn of this year the *Atlanta* and the *Dolphin* engaged in what were called maneuvers in an attack at Newport, where a Naval War College had been brought into existence in 1885.

From its first units of unprotected light cruisers the naval program developed into armored cruisers, and then to battleships, whose plate and guns were manufactured in the United States. The *Indiana* was the earliest of the new craft to be commissioned, coming into active service in November, 1895. The *Massachusetts*, *Oregon*, and *Iowa* were under construction in the yards, but would have been unavailable had war occurred with England in 1895.

A part of the scheme for modernizing the navy included a

Naval War College for the post-graduate instruction of naval officers. Stephen B. Luce was detailed to command the new enterprise, which opened its first session in 1885. The greatest service of Luce, who organized the college, was to summon thither Alfred Thayer Mahan, who at the age of forty-five "was drifting on the lines of simple respectability as aimlessly as any one very well could." Mahan took his duties seriously, began to lecture on naval history in the fall of 1886, and a few years later produced, in *The Influence of Sea-Power upon History* (1890), the most important contribution of his generation to the philosophy of national strength.

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CHAPTER XI

PROTECTION AND THE GOLD STANDARD

THE "stirring events in our foreign relations" that occurred during the Administration of Cleveland involved the President in much controversy and reënforced the efforts to place the navy upon a modern basis, but had no "influence in shaping the canvass of 1896, or in determining its result." Before the Congress chosen in November, 1894, took its seat, Cleveland had lost the hold over his party to which his reëlection was due and had become an executive unable to direct the course of current affairs. The opposition party was intent upon assembling the partisan materials to be used in regaining national control; the Democracy was hopelessly split and without a leader; and along the western horizon the gathering power of the People's Party threatened to retire one of the two major parties into obscurity.

Protection was the bond that held the Republican Party organization together after 1887. Until the date of Cleveland's memorable tariff message it was a general custom to apologize for the tariff as it had by accident become. From that date the party tactics changed, and the intent was openly avowed to make protection more systematic and complete than it had ever been. The defeat of Cleveland in 1888 made it possible for this purpose to be executed in the McKinley Bill of 1890; the defeat of Republican candidates in the ensuing elections raised a doubt as to the degree in which the people approved the policy, but only strengthened the determination of the Republican organization to perfect its own articulation upon this issue. For the first time since plantation economics controlled the policy of the Democratic Party in the middle of the century, a situation had arisen in which the success of one party appeared to be synony-

The party
issues

mous with the business success of a group of powerful interests. The protected manufacturer connected his prosperity with the tariff schedules. His financial interest in the result of elections and the tariff alterations that might follow them developed an extensive source of campaign contributions to the Republican treasury. The efforts of John Wanamaker in raising funds from Eastern manufacturers who feared the success of Cleveland in 1888 had been antedated several years by those of Marcus A. Hanna, of Cleveland, who was raising funds earlier in the decade on the theory that the manufacturer had an insurable interest in Republican success.

The set-back of 1890 and the further rebuff of 1892 postponed, but did not weaken, the Republican hopes for a continuance of the McKinley idea. In defense of ^{Protection} protection the arguments became standardized before 1895. Clay's argument for an American system was accepted *in toto*. The protectionist regarded it as discreditable that the United States should import any commodity susceptible of production in America. Time had added to the arguments of Clay a second principle, that the American standard of life must not be endangered by the competition of foreign countries with a lower scale of welfare. As the arguments were used upon the stump, the protection of the American workman against the "pauper labor" of Europe was made the dominant motive for the policy. Free trade was described as a British trick to secure foreign markets for British manufactures, and the Democratic policy of tariff reform was attacked as unpatriotic and un-American. The Cobden Club, a British free-trade organization, was named repeatedly in the tariff debates from 1884 to 1892, always with the charge that it was the agency whereby British gold aided the proposals of the Democratic Party. The unfortunate letter of Sackville-West to Murchison in 1888 was all that most Republicans needed to prove this point.

The McKinley Bill precipitated disaster upon the Republican Party, but produced a martyr for its rehabilita-

tion. William McKinley, author of the bill, and the most adequate of Republican legislators on protection, was defeated for reelection in 1890. To the country at large it appeared that he had been marked for slaughter because of his tariff leadership but the fact was that McKinley had been selected for defeat long before his measure became a law. The close balance of Ohio politics produced in the eighties an alternation of Democratic and Republican control, with the result that four successive apportionment acts were passed under the census of 1880. In each of these the party in control of the legislature sought to gerrymander the congressional districts so as to gain more Congressmen than the proportional vote of the party would warrant. In such an act passed by a Democratic legislature, McKinley's home county, in which a Republican majority was assured, was attached to a group of adjacent Democratic counties whose aggregate Democratic pluralities were known to be great enough to procure a Democratic majority for the new district. McKinley was gerrymandered out of his seat, but was a good enough martyr for party purposes. He was elected governor of Ohio the following year and reelected two years later. When the panic of 1893 brought distress to all the country, it was ascribed to the rejection of the policies to which his name was attached, and his friends urged him for the presidency as "the advance agent of prosperity."

Marcus A. Hanna was the chief promoter of McKinley's political fortunes. Drawn to him by the unusual affection Hanna and McKinley that McKinley inspired among his associates, Hanna devoted his time, his money, and his political shrewdness to the advancement of his friend's cause. The other Ohio statesmen who had ambitions for the presidency, Joseph B. Foraker and John Sherman, were forced aside, while McKinley was groomed for the campaign of 1896 as the martyr of the McKinley Bill and the spokesman of protection.

The devices by which Hanna gained popular favor for McKinley appear to have been those of the successful pol-

itician of the school of Dorsey, Quay, and Platt. In those aspects of the campaign in which personal influence could be effective, McKinley's charm of manner could be trusted to produce results. The accumulation of potential delegates to the Republican Convention of 1896 was begun long before the State conventions were named to choose them. Since there was no Republican President in office, the Southern delegates were procurable for any candidate who might be able to reach them. In successive winters Hanna established his home in the South, where Governor McKinley was repeatedly his guest, while Southern politicians were exposed to his influence. Before the Republican Convention was assembled at Saint Louis on June 16, 1896, McKinley's nomination was assured; and it was confirmed by that body upon its first ballot.

Nomina-
tion of
McKinley

Thomas B. Reed ran second to McKinley in the convention. His supporters, who were more numerous than the delegates voting for him would indicate, included Republicans who distrusted the methods of the party organization as well as those who disliked the identification of the party with protection. The other minor candidates, Quay, Wharton, and Allison, were favorite sons whose support would probably not have lasted long after the first ballot. Garrett A. Hobart, of New Jersey, was selected as Vice-President.

The nomination of McKinley was a foregone conclusion, but as the date for the Republican Convention approached, popular interest weakened in the protective tariff and became absorbed in the newer issue of free silver. Upon this latter theme the party had never taken a specific stand. Its platforms had been uncertain or evasive, and had been written to make it possible for the party to retain the support of both free-silver men and their opponents. The attitude of the Republican Party on the silver question, now that one could not longer be avoided, was determined by two sets of factors, the probable conduct of the Democrats and the opinions of individual Republicans.

Most of the delegates to the Democratic Convention had been selected before the Republicans met, with instructions to support the resumption of the free coinage of silver at the ratio of sixteen to one. It was certain that Democracy would take this attitude in spite of disapproval by President Cleveland and his Cabinet. With a Democratic platform outspoken for free silver, it would be impracticable for Republicans to evade the issue any longer, while within the Republican Party were a large majority of those voters to whom free silver appeared to be malignant repudiation and dishonesty. The strength of free silver was in the South and West, where the converts to Populism were the most numerous. In the North and East, where capital was more abundant, and where its possessors were already likely to be Republican, lay the opposition to it. Easterners laid aside their discussions of the tariff for the time being in order to meet the more alarming crisis. The opposition to free silver insisted that the Republican Party take as explicit an attitude as the Democrats were about to take, and upon the other side.

The Republican coinage plank began with a generality for sound money and claimed credit because that party procured "the enactment of a law providing for the resumption of specie payments in 1879; since then every dollar has been as good as gold. We are unalterably opposed to every measure calculated to debase our currency or impair the credit of our country. We are, therefore, opposed to the free coinage of silver, except by international agreement . . . and until such agreement can be obtained, the existing gold standard must be preserved. All our silver and paper currency must be maintained at parity with gold, and we favor all measures designed to maintain inviolably the obligations of the United States and all our money, whether coin or paper, at the present standard, the standard of the most enlightened nations of the earth." The crisis that thus made silver a party issue weakened the availability of McKinley as a candidate, since he had never

been especially identified with the currency question and had incidentally made speeches that could be used against him by the advocates of free silver. As the crisis loomed he maintained a discreet and unbroken silence until his protectionist friends had procured his nomination. As a candidate he gave support to the gold standard.

The adoption of the Republican gold plank brought about an open breach in the convention. Thirty-four delegates followed Senator Henry M. Teller, of Colorado, in a formal protest and left the convention in a body. In the Western States, to which most of the bolting delegates belonged, it appeared that the Republican Party had sold its soul to selfish interests. The belief there was profound that silver had been demonetized by a conspiracy of money-lenders, and that the restoration of free coinage was necessary to undo a crime against humanity.

The Republican split over free silver intensified the certainty that the Democratic Party would support it. In the organization of the Democratic Convention meeting July 7 in Chicago, the free-silver forces repudiated the attempts of the National Committee to steer them away from the chosen issue, and increased their voting strength by unseating a gold-standard delegation from Nebraska in favor of its free-silver contestants. By a vote of 628 to 301, the party demanded "the free and unlimited coinage of both silver and gold at the present legal ratio of 16 to 1 without waiting for the aid or consent of any other nation. We demand that the standard silver dollar shall be of full legal tender, equally with gold, for all debts, public and private, and we favor such legislation as will prevent in the future the demonetization of any kind of legal-tender money by private contract. . . . We declare that the act of 1873 demonetizing silver without the knowledge or approval of the American people has resulted in the appreciation of gold and a corresponding fall in the prices of commodities produced by the people; a heavy increase in the burden of taxation and of all debts, public and private; the enrichment of the money-lending class at home and abroad;

the prostration of industry and impoverishment of the people.”

Fifteen candidates received votes on the first ballot for the nomination, while 178 delegates who disapproved the platform refused to vote at all. Of the leading candidates, two possessed the prominence that belonged to men who had been Democratic governors of Republican States, Robert E. Pattison, of Pennsylvania, and Horace Boies, of Iowa. A third, who was a leader on the first ballot, was Richard P. Bland, of Missouri, who had been sponsor of free silver for nearly twenty years. A fourth was the leader of the victorious Nebraska free-silver delegation, William J. Bryan. In his four years in Congress, 1891–95, Bryan had become known as an effective and persuasive speaker. He had early supported free silver as a measure of social reform, and after the expiration of his term in Congress he had led in the organized movement to convert his party to free silver. He had supported the program of the People’s Party without admitting that he ceased to be a Democrat. When his delegation was finally seated in the Chicago Convention, it fell to him to close the debate upon a plank offered by a minority of the Committee on Resolutions that repudiated free silver and commended “the honesty, the economy, courage, and fidelity of the present Democratic Administration.” This was on the third day of the convention with the delegates hot and weary, with the old party leaders hopelessly outvoted, and the headless minority bewildered by the possession of power without leadership. “An opportunity to close such a debate had never come to me before,” wrote Bryan when he described the contest, “and I doubt if as good an opportunity had ever come to any other person during this generation.” The voice of the young orator, for he was only thirty-six years of age, penetrated every corner of the convention hall, while his stage presence captured the attention of the weary delegations and held it throughout his repetition of the substance of a glowing speech that he had for years been making on the stump. It was new to the dele-

gates and was as new to national politics as were Bryan's name and face. It ended with a peroration now famous in campaign oratory: "If they dare to come out in the open field and defend the gold standard as a good thing, we will fight them to the uttermost. Having behind us the producing masses of this nation and the world, supported by the commercial interests, the laboring interests, and the toilers everywhere, we will answer their demand for a gold standard by saying to them: You shall not press down upon the brow of labor this crown of thorns, you shall not crucify mankind upon a cross of gold." On the fourth ballot Bryan took the lead; on the fifth he was within twelve votes of the requisite two thirds to nominate him; and these were secured by transfer without another roll-call. Arthur Sewall, of Maine, was nominated as his companion on the ticket.

The hopes of Populism to become a new great party were destroyed by the action of the major parties in accepting the silver issue. On July 22 two conventions The Populist Convention met at Saint Louis, one calling itself a National Silver Party, and the other the People's Party. There was no need for the former body to do anything but concur in the Democratic stand, and to endorse its nominations. The Populists, however, were faced with problems affecting the future of the party. "If we fuse, we are sunk," wrote one of the Populist leaders, who added, "If we don't fuse, all the silver men will leave us for the more powerful Democrats." For the real leaders of the party, who sought an extensive program of reform, this was a tragedy. The majority of the convention, drawing their inspiration from the single measure of free silver, voted for fusion with the Democrats and concurrence in their nomination. A middle-of-the-road movement of genuine Populists opposed fusion of any sort in the hope of maintaining party existence. The platform, repeating and elaborating that of 1892, was carried first. The Vice-President was nominated next, for even the fusion Populists opposed Sewall, who was a wealthy Maine ship-builder. Thomas E. Watson, of Georgia, was chosen for

this post after the first ballot, and subsequently Bryan was nominated for the presidency over four minor candidates, Norton, Debs, Donnelly, and Coxey.

The campaign of 1896 was fought upon the issue of the gold standard or free silver, with the forces of class and section arrayed against each other as in no other canvass except 1860. Party lines were abandoned. Even the Prohibitionists split and placed gold and silver tickets in the field. The bolt of the mining delegates from the Republican Party was followed by that of the advocates of gold from the Democratic Party. On September 2 there convened at Indianapolis a hastily assembled convention of Democrats who would neither support a Republican candidate nor accept the regular Democratic ticket. "The declarations of the Chicago convention," it declared, "attack individual freedom, the right of private contract, the independence of the judiciary, and the authority of the President to enforce Federal laws. They advocate a reckless attempt to increase the price of silver by legislation, to the debasement of our monetary standard, and threaten unlimited issues of paper money by the Government. They abandon for Republican allies the Democratic cause of tariff reform, to court the favor of protectionists to their fiscal heresy." The Gold Democratic Convention endorsed the "fidelity, patriotism, and courage" of Cleveland, and nominated a ticket consisting of John M. Palmer, of Illinois, and Simon B. Buckner, of Kentucky. Cleveland and members of his Cabinet supported this ticket.

The fight of classes in the campaign was intensified by education and the use of funds. The decision about free silver turned in the last analysis upon an economic argument, the technicalities of which were too stubborn to be removed by ordinary platform oratory. The class appeal in favor of free silver was met by class appeal against it. Both party organizations sought to secure the deciding votes from the minority susceptible of being reached by better arguments. Hanna was made chairman of the Republican National Committee and util-

ized the large funds made available by his old allies, the manufacturers, and by new allies in the form of banks and insurance companies who feared repudiation. Campaign speakers were for the first time deliberately trained to carry an argument to the people and to gain a victory based upon conviction. Bryan was himself the most persuasive speaker for his party and spread panic in Republican centers, which he invaded on his speaking tour. "Probably no man in civil life has succeeded in inspiring so much terror, without taking life," said the *Nation*, when the vote was in. McKinley, with a more conventional campaign technique, remained quietly at his Canton home, receiving visiting delegations from week to week, while his managers bore the gospel of sound money to the people. He was elected by an absolute majority of the vote cast, and with an electoral vote of 271 to 176.

The Republican Party that was returned to power on March 4, 1897, possessed a definiteness of purpose and a closely knit organization that make it stand ^{The} out among national parties in their periods of "G.O.P." ascendancy. Its record in the Civil War, still an asset in any campaign, entitled its spokesmen to refer to it in glowing terms as the "Grand Old Party." The initial letters of the nickname, "G.O.P.," now possessed a connotation that had reference to the present in addition to the past. The purpose of the party organization was to advance the interests of its members and thereby the interests of the nation. Under the impact of two great issues in a single decade, one aspect of those interests had been forged into a keen and weighted determination. The demands for tariff reform and free silver had driven into the Republican organization nearly all citizens who were in a position to suffer from European competition or domestic inflation. The holders of property as a body were Republican, and it is impossible to disentangle the complex of motives, selfish and patriotic, that held them there. The best judgment of history and economics has approved the fight for the maintenance of the gold standard. It has been less cer-

tain upon the elemental merits of the tariff. But whatever the motives in individual cases, the result of the long fight over these two issues was to bring to power in the G.O.P. strong-willed men of financial power and political resource who felt themselves vindicated and approved by the defeat of Bryan.

The bitterness of the campaign disappeared so rapidly as to arouse suspicion that it was only stage play. Explanations for the subsidence of passion are to be found in the assurance that the currency would not be depreciated, and in the vision of prosperity that turned much of the bitterness of the discontented classes into hope. McKinley had been advertised by his friends as the "advance agent of prosperity." The prosperity which he heralded was visible, even before he was elected, in bumper crops and rising prices for them. Populism was never a real party, but was rather a temporary accumulation of the discontented whose strongest bond of union disappeared as individual Populists became solvent members of society. The general recovery from the panic of 1893 began to be visible in the summer of 1896 and increasingly thereafter weakened the forces of discontent and enabled Republican leaders to take pride in their success in dispelling hard times.

The cycle of falling prices that began in 1865 reached the dip of its curve about 1895 and started to ascend once more.

Prosperity returns In so far as the low prices were due to the scarcity of money and its appreciation in value, there was a tendency to offset this in the train of events which began in the summer of 1896 when a group of prospectors found placer gold along the tributaries of the Yukon River near the boundary that separates Canada from Alaska. The Klondike gold fields became known to the world in time for a rush of miners to hurry there in 1897. Out of the Klondike in the next two decades came a flood of gold that was reënforced by other streams from South Africa, Australia, the United States, and elsewhere. The annual gold production of the world averaged \$132,000,000 for the fifteen years before 1896 and rose to \$337,000,000 for

the fifteen years that followed. The increase in gold lowered its value and operated both to increase the amount of money in existence and to depreciate the dollar. Prices started upward about 1896, and as they rose, bringing visible inflation with them, they further weakened the power of the party movement for cheap money.

The Cabinet of William McKinley was built around the ideas of party regularity and financial solidity. McKinley himself had been an unwelcome candidate in the eyes of many supporters of the gold standard because of his late conversion to that doctrine. Hobart, his Vice-President, was too sound on this to admit of any doubt. The earliest offer of a Cabinet post was tendered to Marcus A. Hanna, whom McKinley's biographer describes as a magnificent "political general — square, efficient, and resourceful." The invitation was rejected, for Hanna preferred a freer position for himself. Thus far he had been content to exert political influence from outside the lines of office. He now desired to become Senator from Ohio, and when John Sherman was made Secretary of State, that desire became practicable. Hanna was appointed to the Senate by Governor Bushnell, of Ohio, in the vacancy created by Sherman's resignation. Sherman as Secretary of State gave to the new Administration the prestige of one who had been the wisest financial statesman in the party.

The career of John Sherman was nearly at an end when he entered upon this final chapter. For a long generation he had been a figure in national affairs, and for two decades a reasonable aspirant for the presidency. Under his hand the resumption bill had been framed and resumption itself administered. There were rumors now that his health was gone and that mental decay had set in. These rumors were so strong that McKinley felt forced to deny their truth as late as February, 1897. He persisted, nevertheless, in appointing Sherman, whose actual mental condition soon confirmed the rumors. William R. Day, of Canton, an old personal friend of the President, was made Assistant Secretary of State to

John
Sherman
and John
Hay

carry the bulk of Sherman's burdens and later to succeed him.

The connecting link between the new Republican Party and the old was John Hay, who began life as Lincoln's private secretary and who now was sent as Ambassador to London, where he relieved Thomas F. Bayard, of Delaware. Due to the efforts of Hay, more than to those of any other individual, the party and the nation possessed the great heritage of Abraham Lincoln. The first Republican President had died in 1865, with the terms of peace unsettled and with his own party in revolt against him. The monumental biography that Nicolay and Hay produced, and that ran serially in the *Century* through four years in the middle eighties, revealed the character and idealism of Lincoln and brought him into the little inner group of great Americans. Hay, whose acquaintance in America and abroad had few equals, had been in England shortly before his appointment as Ambassador, and had there taken occasion to give friendly, informal advice to the British Government to adjust its differences with Cleveland over Venezuela and not to expect that McKinley would weaken from the position of his predecessor.

For Secretary of the Treasury McKinley chose Lyman P. Gage, of Chicago, a prominent banker who had led in the long agitation to defend the gold standard in the Middle West. It was impossible to hope for Congressional action in support of the gold standard at once. The Fifty-Fifth Congress, elected with McKinley, was a Republican body in both houses, but in the Senate that majority was available only on measures not connected with the currency, for a group of silver Republican Senators held the balance of power. The appointment of Gage was accepted as a guarantee of the determination of the Administration to support the gold standard. During 1898 a monetary conference was held at Indianapolis, where was begun a serious and protracted national study in the elements of a sound currency.

The rest of the Cabinet was composed of self-made and

substantial men, chosen largely because of their importance to the party. By the accident of events public attention was later turned to Russell A. Alger, of ^{Alger} Michigan, who became Secretary of War. Alger had emerged from the Civil War at the age of twenty-nine with the brevet rank of major-general of volunteers. He had then become a manufacturer and had engaged in the profitable work of exploiting timber resources of northern Michigan. By 1888 he had been governor of Michigan and had become a prominent favorite son in the Republican Convention of that year. He was identified with big business, the protected industries and the trusts, and was a reasonable appointee in the Republican Party as it was organized in 1897.

With the Senate majority still favoring free silver, it was impracticable to carry out at once the currency mandate of 1896, but the submerged purpose of the party to revise the Wilson Bill came to the surface immediately after election. A few gold-standard tariff reformers protested bitterly that it was a betrayal of confidence to use the Republican majority for tariff purposes, but the official spokesmen of the party declared that the mandate of the election was for the tariff as well as gold. Before Cleveland left office, it was officially announced that among McKinley's earliest acts would be a call for a special session to revise the tariff. Congress assembled in accordance with this intent on March 15, 1897, and Reed, who was reelected as Speaker, refused to appoint any committees of the House except those connected with the legislative program.

Nelson R. Dingley, of Maine, introduced the new tariff bill that passed the House after two weeks' perfunctory debate. The draft had been framed and partially debated during the preceding session of ^{The Dingley} Congress, and the preliminary touches had been ^{Tariff Bill,} given it in the recess between March 4 and March 15. Its ¹⁸⁹⁷ passage was aided by the fact that there was still a deficit in the National Treasury. In 1894 the United States ran behind \$69,000,000, and drew upon the surplus to that ex-

tent. The deficit of 1895 was \$42,000,000; 1896, \$25,000,000, and 1897, \$18,000,000. The need for extra revenue was such as to strengthen every appeal for higher rates.

In the rewriting of the Dingley Bill that took place while it was pending in the Senate, the representatives of manufacturing interests possessed the greatest influence. The general character of the measure had been determined upon in advance. Only the amount of protection to be extended remained in doubt, and this was settled upon the representations of the industries affected. The chief of the Bureau of Statistics, Worthington C. Ford, asserted during the debates that the protective rates were being made so high as to be prohibitory, with the result that the bill would produce insufficient revenue for the Government. He observed that the whole fiscal policy was changing from one of revenue with incidental protection to one of protection with incidental revenue. The bill became a law in July, 1897, as the most thorough-going protective measure in American history. It was passed, complained Laughlin and Willis, "with a striking disregard of all legislative proprieties and bolstered up by the feeling of security based on a knowledge that the conservative classes of the country had received a terrible fright."

The Dingley tariff was the fruit of the complete identification of the Republican Party with the interests of business. For nearly fifteen years after its passage the organization of the party remained firm enough to withstand all attacks directed against it from without. The country continued prosperous and the party of prosperity held its power. The Democratic opposition remained weak and disorganized as Cleveland had left it. The absence of an effective opposition is responsible for many of the political phenomena between 1897 and 1911.

Due to the double split produced by Cleveland and Bryan, permanent animosities were sown among the leaders of the party, and the disconnected factions lost their power to hold the Republican majority to a definite course. The effective influences tending to divert the Republican Party

to a new program came from within and were increased by the feeling of security created by the Democratic collapse.

The People's Party, with its broad program of reform, inspired interest far beyond its capacity to gain votes. Neither of the larger parties was receptive to new ideas or welcomed their exponents. Neither party, whether it talked of tariff or of currency, had a program that frankly faced the changes brought into society by the recent revolution in communication and manufacture. The old doctrine of individual freedom had made it possible for a few individuals to exploit the natural resources of the country and to appropriate a disproportionate share of the freedom for themselves. Neither of the parties and few of the older politicians had any vision of the changes that must be made to restore a reasonable degree of opportunity to the tenant farmer and the tenement workman. In the great cities, boss rule was still defiant, and much of the organic strength of both parties depended upon corrupt manipulation of votes and selfish use of the power derived from this manipulation. Quay, Platt, and Hanna had succeeded to the leadership formerly exercised by Conkling, Cameron, and Blaine, but brought little change for the better in their understanding of the duties of the modern state.

In the People's Party the protest against this indifference of the party organizations became a matter of religion. Both parties, in its belief, were corrupt and un-
 responsive. Measures that were designed to
 broaden the opportunities of life or to break the
 power of the bosses were accepted without criticism or examination and incorporated in the miscellaneous catalogue of reforms that constituted the Populist platform. The interest in these reforms was widely spread among citizens of no political activity and gained earnest converts among young Republican politicians who found their aspirations checked by the compact machinery of the G.O.P. The stress of the currency campaign kept party regularity well to the fore until 1896, but thereafter signs are visible of a counter-reformation within the Republican Party working

Reform
 in the
 "G.O.P."

to detach it from its close alliance with business and to make it more truly a party of the people.

The attack of the Populists upon the mechanics of the great parties resolved itself into the demand for specific reforms including the direct election of Senators and an increase in direct control over government by the people. The initiative and the referendum seemed adapted to correct the abuses due to improper control of the legislatures of the States. The control of State legislation was an avowed policy of the railroads and the larger corporations. Most commonly it took the form of dissuading the legislatures from passing antagonistic laws. The railroad managers who employed their lobbyists declared that this was necessary to prevent blackmail, and asserted that unscrupulous legislators introduced hostile legislation for the sole purpose of having it bought off. In spite of the fact that railroad commissions had been numerous for more than twenty years, little had been done to equalize rates or to impose a fair burden of taxation upon railroad property. The distrust of legislatures revealed itself in long and minute State constitutions. If the people could act directly, it was hoped that some of the abuses might be avoided. The advocates of initiative and referendum had this end in view.

The direct primary was urged, as early as 1897, as an additional means of safeguarding the Government against bosses and corrupt interests. In that year Robert M. La Follette advanced a general program for direct nominations for office, including even the presidency. La Follette had already served three terms in Congress where his ready mastery of figures made him one of the most serviceable of Republican members on the Committee on Ways and Means. Defeated for reelection in 1890, he suffered with the Republican Government of Wisconsin because of the attempt of that Government to compel a wider use of the English language in the schools. He soon came back into politics and was beaten for the nomination as governor in 1896 by what he regarded as a corrupt manipulation of delegates against him. His reform of the convention system

was based upon his own experience with it. And as he renewed his efforts for the nomination in 1898 and 1900, keeping up continuously a hot fire upon the nomination system, he attracted to his reform other leaders who like him were disappointed because of their inability to beat the machine.

The leaders of reform were Republican after 1896, as they had generally been Democratic or Populist in the years immediately preceding. With little encouragement from the G.O.P., they were heartened by an increasing interest among the people at large. By 1900, in which year La Follette succeeded in securing both nomination and election as governor of his State, the leaders of the counter-reformation began to make an impression upon the party by their local successes. They worked under the handicap of national prosperity, and struggled for the attention of a people who had forgotten the pangs of the panic of 1893, and had been distracted from affairs domestic by the glitter of unexpected and successful foreign war.

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CHAPTER XII

THE WAR WITH SPAIN

THE venerable John Sherman, of Ohio, chief of McKinley's Cabinet, had been selected as Secretary of State because his years of experience as a financial statesman had qualified him to undertake the difficult negotiation of an agreement for international bi-
metallism, to which the Republican Party had pledged itself in 1896. A secondary reason for his appointment lay in the fact that Marcus Alonzo Hanna, of Cleveland, chairman of the Republican National Committee, and astute guardian of McKinley's aspirations, desired to enter the Senate. It was not certain in advance that Governor Horace Bushnell would consent to gratify this aspiration, for the rifts among Ohio politicians ran deep into their political organizations, but the matter worked out as desired, and Hanna assumed the senatorship as Sherman undertook the tasks of foreign secretary.

Sherman in
the State
Department

Among the minor pledges of the Republican Party in 1896 was a plank promising action toward the ending of a painful revolution then in progress on the Island of Cuba. But few imagined that this revolution contained the germs of war, nor could Sherman have been named as foreign secretary with Cuba as a major subject for prospective diplomacy. On the theme of Cuba, Sherman as a Senator had often expressed himself in language unmeasured and severe, upon evidence no weightier than that contained in the headlines of the daily yellow press.

Coincident with the Cuban revolt a new journalism had developed on both sides of the Atlantic. Alfred Charles Harmsworth had taken over the *Daily Mail* in London, and William Randolph Hearst had acquired control of the *New York Journal*. With similar tactics both of these editors had developed a journalism of

Yellow
journalism

sentimentality and exaggeration, and the latter had seized upon the events of the Cuban insurrection with a purpose to manufacture from them a war with Spain.

It was in February, 1895, that insurgents in the eastern end of Cuba revived the guerrilla warfare that had been suspended for seventeen years, since the close of the ten years' war. Spanish administration in Cuba had not improved in the intervening years. Havana, as the center of culture and capital of the island, had lorded it over the backwoods regions of the eastern provinces. Madrid had failed to take seriously the problem of colonial responsibility at a time when the rest of western Europe was awakening not only to a national appreciation of the value of colonies, but also to an acceptance of a duty in advance of exploitation.

The insurgents of 1895, badly armed and poorly organized, were unable to maintain in Cuba anything resembling a *de facto* government. Early in the outbreak their leader, Gomez, inaugurated a policy of devastation and directed the destruction of the sugar-cane and mills of the Spanish loyalists. Upon this pretext a strong-armed military governor, General Valeriano Weyler, was sent out from Spain to conquer peace. At Weyler's command the rebellious population, and even the merely suspected population of the infected districts, were swept away from their homes and concentrated in observation camps. Here in barbed-wire enclosures they were allowed to sicken, starve, and die uncared for. Across the whole width of the island toward its eastern end, he cleared a broad band from its jungle entanglements and built a wire fence or *trocha* which he patrolled constantly in the hope of confining the marauding patriot bands within their provinces north of Santiago. The horrors incidental to this campaign of suppression were seized upon and exploited by the press. The excesses of the Cuban patriots were extenuated or ignored, while those of the Spanish army were displayed as evidence of inherent corruption, deception, and incapacity.

The revolutionary government had no real existence on

the island, but a handful of its leaders, safely living in New York, formed a Cuban junta that pretended to be a government and borrowed money where it could. It bought arms and ammunition in the United States, as it was entitled to do under the law of nations, and ran them into Cuban ports by stealth. The Spanish Government denied the existence of an actual war, maintained that she was dealing with only an aggravated riot; and hence was unable to suppress this munitions trade by the exercise of the belligerent rights of blockade, contraband, and search. As a consequence her naval vessels, whatever their suspicions, could make no interference with the traffic outside of the Cuban three-mile limit. The remembrance of the *Virginius* correspondence of 1873 suggested the unwisdom of attacks on vessels flying the American flag. It was, however, entirely impossible to control the whole Cuban coast, and numerous cargoes of weapons reached their destination. The Spanish Government, suffering from the traffic which it was too feeble to prevent, took the attitude that it was the business of the United States to stop it. Cleveland and Olney consistently repelled this claim, while at the same time warning American sympathizers not to go beyond their lawful rights, and not to start within the limits of the United States those military expeditions against a friendly power that international law forbids.

Within the United States public sympathy with Cuba permeated all parties, and repeated attempts were made in Congress to force upon the President a recognition of Cuban belligerency. To this suggested interference in the affairs of Spain, Cleveland interposed as stubborn a denial as he did to the Spanish demand that the United States police the Cuban waters for her benefit.

President McKinley took over an exasperating problem, but one of second magnitude. The tasks of organizing a Cabinet and seeing the Dingley Bill through Congress delayed the day when the Administration could give serious attention to the pacification of Cuba. In September General Stewart L. Woodford ar-
Woodford
at Madrid

rived in Madrid to succeed Hannis Taylor as Minister to Spain, and let it be known among his diplomatic colleagues there "that before Congress should meet in December, some means must be found whereby this struggle may be put in the sure way of being peacefully and finally ended." The friendly offices for mediation which he offered were repelled by the Spanish Government with the comment that it was the duty of the United States to stop the trade in arms; and the declaration that if this were done, peace would follow of itself. The Conservative Government which Woodford found in power in Madrid was overturned in October and was replaced by the Ministry of Sagasta. A little later in the autumn, Weyler was recalled from Cuba and a more moderate governor was sent out in his place. On November 25, 1897, the Queen-Regent extended the Spanish Constitution to Cuba, and established a system of autonomy therein. But it seemed clear to General Woodford that no Spaniard knew what the word "autonomy" implied; and on the island it was acceptable to neither faction. The insurgents in Cuba hooted the idea of less than independence, and were distressed that the friendly United States should have seemed to ask it. The Spanish loyalists resented the concession, and were angry at the United States for seeming to have forced it.

In the winter of 1897-98, the first steps were taken to establish autonomy in practice, with such disturbing consequences that General Fitzhugh Lee, the American consul-general in Havana, expressed a desire for the moral security that would come from the presence of an American warship in the harbor. Toward the middle of January mobs in Havana, rioting against autonomy, were uncertain whether their defiance should be directed against the Spanish Government or the American consul-general, and on February 15 the United States cruiser *Maine*, that had been detached from the Atlantic squadron and sent to Cuba at Lee's request, was destroyed at her anchorage in Havana Harbor by an explosion, the responsibility for which has not been fixed.

The *Maine*
destroyed

The destruction of the Maine shocked the American conscience already disturbed over the sufferings of Cuba, and many respectable leaders, in addition to the yellow press, shouted the cry, "Remember the Maine, and down with Spain," and demanded a war of vengeance.

Only a few days before the catastrophe, which seemed to reveal deep treachery of Spanish character, occurred a slighter event discreditable to Spanish manners. Dupuy de Lôme, Spanish Minister in Washington, impressed by the rising tide of American sentiment, and fearful that neither Sherman nor McKinley could withstand it or desired to, had written a private letter to a Cuban friend in which he characterized the President as a supine and spineless politician, and had suggested the desirability of apparent but unreal compliance by Spain with the American demands. The publication in facsimile of this letter filched from the Havana post-office by an insurgent spy, and acquired by an American reporter, ended the usefulness of de Lôme in Washington. It also discredited, in advance of the destruction of the Maine, anything that Spain might say or do respecting the Maine accident or Cuba.

The diplomatic course of Spain after the explosion was to urge investigation and arbitration in order to fix responsibility. This was declined, and in the ensuing weeks naval boards of inquiry sat separately for Spain and the United States, and reached contradictory conclusions. The Spanish board, examining in detail only the surrounding floor of the harbor, for the doctrine of extraterritoriality kept them outside the warship's hull, reported that the Maine was destroyed by an internal explosion. The American board, diving into the mangled hull of the Maine, but not allowed to trespass on Spanish territory in exploration of the harbor, ascribed the destruction to an external mine. Before either of the inconclusive reports was ready for publication, events had drifted on. The Spanish Government had shown an inability to act rapidly enough in Cuba to satisfy the enraged American opinion, while in the United States an uprising in his own party, brought bluntly to his attention by Vice-

President Hobart, convinced McKinley of the impossibility of avoiding intervention. Woodford thought until the last that if it had not been for Congress, everything that Cuba gained could have been brought about by gradual Spanish yielding "without firing a shot or losing a single life." On April 11 President McKinley transmitted to Congress the whole problem in the certainty that only war could be its outcome.

The navy of the United States was fully mobilized for war four days after the message went to Congress. It was a new Naval mobilization navy untested by combat, though officered in part by veterans of the Civil War, and administered by Secretary John D. Long, of Massachusetts, with the enthusiastic coöperation of Theodore Roosevelt as Assistant Secretary. The birth of the new navy had been of interest in America for more than fifteen years. First authorized in 1882 when the warships of the Civil War were rotting in their honorable old age, its first battleship, the *Indiana*, went to sea in 1895. A handful of the new units had been sent to Kiel in that year to assist in the ceremonies at the opening of the new German canal from the Baltic. Already Europe had acclaimed the fact that an American naval captain, Alfred Thayer Mahan, had revolutionized the theory of naval warfare by his epoch-making volume on the influence of sea-power on history. Between the *Atlanta* and the *Indiana*, the armored vessels of intermediate weight, *New York*, *Brooklyn*, *Texas*, *Maine*, with some protected cruisers had gone into commission. Following the *Indiana*, the *Massachusetts*, *Oregon*, and *Iowa* had slightly increased the number of modern battleships. These with the minor vessels had been mobilized by the Navy Department early in 1898, at about the time when the dispatch of the *Maine* to Havana indicated the wisdom of preparation for any eventuality. The vessels in the Atlantic were brought together near the capes of the Chesapeake, and on March 27 Captain W. T. Sampson was given command of the whole North Atlantic squadron. In the Pacific there were only vessels of the more obsolete classes

with the exception of the Oregon which found herself isolated on the North Pacific coast. The Oregon was brought to San Francisco Bay, docked and scraped at Mare Island, and hurried off on her lonely voyage to the Atlantic. No other fact had ever stimulated so keenly American zest for a canal at Panama.

The vessels on the Asiatic station had recently received a new commander, after a fortunate selection which was due less to merit than to politics. Assistant Secretary Roosevelt was responsible for the detail of George Dewey to this post, but it was only through the political pressure of Senator Redfield Proctor that he became aware of the existence and merits of this officer. In the navy as in the army dry rot had been the consequence of the ageing of Civil War veterans and the indifference of the public and Congress. There had been an abrupt departure from naval precedent when Roosevelt insisted upon diligence in gun-pointing and target practice. In advance of the message of April 11, he had taken the responsibility of ordering Dewey to proceed to Hongkong, there to clean ship and outfit, and thence in the event of war to proceed to Manila and destroy the Spanish Asiatic fleet. In the selection of George Dewey he lighted upon a commander with a mind as aggressive as his own.

The President's message of April 11, 1898, was commonly regarded as a war message, and in Congress the only serious debate had to do with the form that the action The war with Spain should take and the immediate effect of it upon the lives and safety of Americans in Cuba. For some days action was delayed to permit General Lee to communicate with Americans on the island in order to bring them within reach of safety. The speeches that were made bring out the fact that the purpose of American action was peace and freedom for the Island of Cuba. No considerable group of people or politicians talked of annexation or conquest.

The resolutions that were finally passed give testimony to the inchoate form of the revolt that was under way.

After three years of insurrection there was as yet no Cuban government in existence entitled to even *de facto* recognition. The people of Cuba were recognized as entitled to freedom, which Congress pledged itself to bring about, disclaiming "any disposition or intention to exercise sovereignty, jurisdiction, or control over said island except for the pacification thereof"; and the President was directed to this end to make immediate demands on Spain for withdrawal from Cuba, and to follow refusal of withdrawal by armed intervention. The final passage of the resolutions on the 20th of April was accepted by Spain as an act of war. The Spanish Minister in Washington at once demanded and received his passports, and an ultimatum cabled to Woodford for delivery at Madrid was never presented because of his dismissal by the Spanish Government. By a subsequent resolution Congress declared that a state of war began on April 21; a blockade of Cuba was ordered on April 22, and on the same day Congress followed its usual course in military preparation by enacting a law for the creation of an army after the war had been declared.

Three days after the beginning of the war, on April 24, a British proclamation of neutrality made it impossible for Manila, Dewey to continue at Hongkong the outfitting of his fleet. The war itself had brought into operation the orders he had received from Secretary Roosevelt. On the 25th he withdrew from Hongkong for a near-by harbor, and a few hours later on his flagship the *Olympia* started for Manila Bay. Williams, the former consul at Manila, came upon the flagship on the 27th, the day on which Matanzas, on the Cuban coast, was bombarded by vessels from the Atlantic squadron, with resulting casualties, if one may trust the Spanish governor, of a single mule. On the early morning of May 1, the *Olympia* led the American squadron in through the capes at the mouth of Manila Bay, passing over anchored mines that ought to have destroyed it, and under guns on shore emplacements that ought to have controlled the entrance. It found the Spanish fleet drawn up along the water-front of Manila and in leisurely

fashion, against only an unexpectedly perfunctory defense, destroyed the fleet and placed Manila at the mercy of the American commander whenever he should receive military forces with which to occupy it.

The date of victory at Manila marks the entry of the United States against its will upon an imperial course. It marks by chance another entry toward a similar destiny, less unintended. While Dewey was battering the Spanish ships, off Manila, Prince William of Wied, at a meeting at the Hotel Bristol, in the city of Berlin, was laying the foundations of the German Navy League whose function was to be to show the German Empire the pathway to a new glory. The seizure of Kiau-chau had already established Germany in a promising field of Asiatic expansion whose fertility the accidental arrival of the United States most gravely threatened.

The immediate consequence of Dewey's victory at Manila was a need for an occupying army. The Spanish fleet had been destroyed and Manila was within reach, but the Spanish land forces still occupied Luzon and the adjacent islands, and there were no troops at Dewey's disposal for grasping the fruits of victory. The Spanish forces were already engaged, in the Philippines as in Cuba, in putting down a native revolt. A prominent native leader, Emilio Aguinaldo, whom the war found in exile in China, was brought back to the islands by Dewey for the purpose of keeping the revolt alive. The first specific demand upon the War Department was for an expeditionary force, which was speedily assembled in San Francisco under General Wesley Merritt, and which on August 13, 1898, occupied the city of Manila by assault.

As in the case of the voyage of the Oregon, the operations in the Philippines brought an old movement to final fruition. The Oregon constituted an object-lesson whose teachings made the Panama Canal imperative. The possession of Manila revealed the strategic importance of the Hawaiian Islands. A movement for the annexation of these islands, arising locally in their Ameri-

Hawaii and
the Panama
Canal

can population, had been encouraged by President Harrison and snubbed by Cleveland. President McKinley negotiated a treaty for its consummation in 1897, but the Senate failed to ratify it. On July 7, 1898, Congress took the project out of the hands of the Senate, and passed a joint resolution as a consequence of which the Republic of Hawaii was annexed to the United States. On June 14, 1900, it was given status as a Territory of the United States.

Congress had begun its debate upon the formation of an army during the concluding weeks of the diplomatic discussion with Spain. It was conceded that the basis must be the regular army, which on April 1 comprised 2143 officers and 26,040 enlisted men, the organized National Guard of the States, and volunteers. The regular army was on April 26 authorized to be raised in strength to 62,597. The volunteer army was authorized four days earlier, and upon April 23 President McKinley issued a call for 125,000 volunteers apportioned among the States. By August, when mobilization was complete, the volunteer army comprised 8785 officers and 207,244 men.

The volunteer law authorized the President to accept three volunteer regiments of cavalry. Of these the most important was raised by Leonard Wood, a captain in the Medical Corps, who was to be "advanced within a few months from attending surgeon to major-general of volunteers," and who was actively supported by his friend, Assistant Secretary of the Navy Roosevelt. The regiment was recruited among the outdoor men who perpetuated the tradition of the frontier marksman whom Roosevelt described in his *Winning of the West*. Under the nickname of the "Rough Riders" it became the most widely known single unit in the war.

Not until after the passage of the army bills in April did the War Department hold itself at liberty to begin specific preparations for war. The regular army was as usual diffused on duty throughout the country. The Secretary of War, General Russell A. Alger, of Michigan, had been chosen because of his political importance to the Hanna-

McKinley organization. His Civil War record had been so dubious that McKinley had deferred appointment until Senator Julius C. Burrows, of Michigan, had personally investigated and underwritten it. The army itself was under command of General Nelson A. Miles, senior major-general with long years of Indian police experience on the plains and the recollection of a lad's gallant services in the Civil War. The administrative bureaus of the War Department were in command of elderly officers whose business routine had been unbroken for years. The line officers of the army and the enlisted men were well trained and effective in their work, but no general plans for any war existed in the department, nor was there a planning agency fit to work them out. The normal consequence of an army under command of its senior officers, with the rule of seniority generally applied, was an army under the command of its least flexible and most irascible leaders, whose careers were already behind them.

One of the statutes passed by Congress in anticipation of war was an appropriation of fifty million dollars, on March 9 "for national defense and for each and every purpose connected therewith, to be expended at the discretion of the President." This fund was expended largely in guarding the coast and strengthening the navy. It was ruled, said Secretary Alger, that the accumulation of military supplies by the army was offensive rather than defensive, and his establishment accordingly watched the approach of the crisis without funds or authority to prepare to meet it. The passage of the army bills and the calls for volunteers precipitated immediate action and expansion that strained the administrative capacity of the War Department's bureaus. General Merritt's expeditionary force was got ready first, and then units of the regular army were mobilized at Tampa to constitute the nucleus of an army for Cuban invasion, while the volunteer forces were mostly assembled in training camp at Chickamauga.

The First Volunteer Cavalry selected San Antonio as its

mobilizing point, and proceeded thence to join the regulars
 at Tampa. Its senior officers were thoroughly
 familiar with the channels which led to action in
 the departments, and secured for their volunteer force the
 greatest of military opportunities. General William R.
 Shafter, from Michigan, as were also his influential friends
 Secretary Alger and Senator Burrows, was given command
 of the invading army, which was about 17,000 strong by the
 first of June. Shafter's camp at Tampa lay at the end of a
 single-track railroad, and was a rising winter resort of the
 Florida west coast. Hither trainloads of troops and sup-
 plies were shipped sometimes without orders or bills of lad-
 ing. The war correspondents crowded the veranda of the
 great resort hotel waiting for something to happen and de-
 scribing, as incisively as they dared, the confusion of a plan-
 less mobilization. General Adna R. Chaffee, later chief of
 staff, but then lieutenant-colonel of the Third Cavalry, in
 charge of a division, witnessed at Tampa "the complete
 breaking down of the quartermaster and commissary de-
 partments." The medical department did not break down
 until it reached the field.

The immediate objective of the army of invasion remained
 to be determined as events developed. There were plans
 for raiding the Cuban coast, and for an invasion of the Ha-
 vana district the following winter, after the new recruits
 had received their training; but before the end of May the
 activities of the navy had revealed a special need for co-
 operation by the army.

Before the outbreak of the war the navy had mobilized
 in the Chesapeake. Captain W. T. Sampson had been ele-
 vated to the command of the North Atlantic fleet,
 and a portion of his force had been grouped as a
 flying squadron for patrol work under the com-
 mand of Commodore Winfield S. Schley. On paper the
 Spanish fleet excelled the American fleet in major units,
 tonnage, and broadside strength. It was known that no
 considerable naval force was in the Caribbean, and that
 Admiral Cervera was gathering his fleet at the Cape Verde

Islands, with a destination unannounced but certain. As Mahan had pointed out a decade earlier, the effective radius of a modern fleet was the bunker capacity of its units, while its speed was determined by that of its slowest member. The strategy board on which Mahan was now sitting was rightly convinced that Cervera could have no destination except some Spanish port in Cuba or Porto Rico, with the former more probable since he carried supplies for the army in Havana. No fleet could cross the Atlantic and be ready for immediate maneuver against the enemy, and the Spanish fleet could not hope to find the facilities for recoaling and repair except at the Spanish ports of San Juan, in Porto Rico, or Havana, Cienfuegos, or Santiago, in Cuba. With entire certainty the Navy Department prepared to intercept the Spanish fleet which sailed on April 29, and to destroy it at sea before it reached shelter in a Spanish colonial port.

Under the command of Sampson, the North Atlantic fleet maintained the blockade of Cuban waters, where, after her thrilling trip, the Oregon joined it on May 24; the flying squadron under Schley was detailed to patrol the southern coast of Cuba, and left Key West for that duty on May 19. The rest of Sampson's command, under his immediate control, watched the passages leading to Cuba from the north between Porto Rico and the Florida channel.

The strategic certainty of the Navy Department was disturbed by the nervousness of the seaboard cities. From Savannah to Portland there was apprehension of a Spanish bombardment. Mythical Spanish warships were daily reported in the newspapers, and nearly as often delegations of Congressmen waited upon the Secretary of the Navy to remind him of his duty to protect their constituents. The political pressure was so great that at least apparent compliance had to follow, and various unseaworthy gunboats manned with little more than minimum crews for navigation alone, were dispatched to lie offshore and give comfort to the nervous souls of seaboard citizens.

The patrol of the Cuban coast from May 19 until June 1 became at a later date the occasion for a naval investiga-

tion which made public many of the facts of the naval war. Its chief intent was frustrated by the fact that on May 19, as Schley set sail from Key West, Cervera steamed into the landlocked harbor of Santiago. The news of his safe arrival in Cuba remained a secret for some hours, and even when rumor of it had leaked into the United States it was impossible at once to establish communication with the ships at sea. Scout cruisers were hurried out, carrying first the rumor, then news when the rumor was confirmed, then specific orders to Schley to proceed at top speed to Santiago and blockade the port. Yet it was not until the morning of May 29 that any obstruction to the emergence of Cervera's fleet was consciously established. In these ten days there was nothing to prevent a coaling of the fleet and a raid, perhaps successful, against the North Atlantic coast — nothing except the fact, then unknown, that the Spanish fleet was in no condition either to raid or fight.

The cruise of the flying squadron from Key West proceeded leisurely around the western end of Cuba with the Santiago invested idea of visiting first the port of Cienfuegos, which was one of the conceivable objectives of the Spanish fleet. As the cruiser Brooklyn approached port, flying the flag of the squadron commander, noises were heard that were interpreted as gun-fire in honor of Cervera's safe arrival there. Even Sampson believed at this time that Cienfuegos would bear watching. For two days, from May 22 to May 24, the flying squadron kept up its blockade of Cienfuegos without learning whether the enemy was there or not. The harbor was landlocked and no methods were devised to explore its recesses. On the 24th, on receipt of orders indicating that Santiago might be the place, Schley resumed his cruise toward the east. He arrived off Santiago on the evening of the 26th, perhaps in sight of the anchorage at which the Spanish warships had lain for seven days. Neither Schley's force, nor scout cruisers from Sampson's fleet, confirmed by observation the rumor that Cervera was in Santiago. The next day with his bunkers running low of coal, and with a heavy sea interfering with recoaling from

the colliers, Schley decided to return to Key West, sending a message to the Navy Department of his inability to remain on station. When the weather moderated, he changed his mind and remained off Santiago. On the 28th he coaled his ships there, while at Washington an agonized Navy Department, knowing that Cervera's fleet was unwatched, was uncertain as to Schley's station or intention. Sampson, learning of the confusion upon one of his returns to Key West from a patrolling dash along the north shore of Cuba, hurried off to Santiago, where meanwhile Schley had on May 29 sighted the Spanish fleet. Admiral Sampson arrived off Santiago June 1, and on the next day issued a general order for the maintenance of a blockade, assigning each vessel to its station with directions as to its course in case Cervera should bring his squadron out, and invite a fleet engagement by turning to the east or to the west.

From this date Schley had no duties in command. By day the larger warships lay offshore in a wide arch watching the opening between the cliffs that command and conceal the harbor. At night the line drew farther in toward shore, and the battleships took turns in occupying a position directly in front of the entrance and focusing their new naval weapon, the searchlight, upon the cliffs. In the intervals between the battleships and cruisers that were stationed from east to west, in the order New York, Indiana, Oregon, Iowa, Texas, and Brooklyn, were the smaller units of the fleet, cruisers, converted yachts, and other irregular warships. On June 7, Guantanamo Bay, some forty miles east of Santiago, was occupied by Marines in anticipation of its possible use as an invading point. Thereafter while the blockade lasted, the various warships in their turn left their stations and steamed to Guantanamo to coal.

No attempt was made to force the channel at Santiago and engage the Spanish fleet at anchor as Dewey had done at Manila. Dewey, indeed, had received the high rewards for heroic disregard of danger, and was finally given the rank of Admiral of the Navy for life. But specific orders were

issued after his engagement that there should be no more of its type. Sampson was under instructions not to risk the loss of any of his irreplaceable battleships in "the bombardment of fortifications." The doctrine of "Damn the torpedoes. Go ahead!" was Farragut's at Mobile and Dewey's at Manila, but was not a doctrine for a weak navy in the face of a superior adversary.

As soon as Sampson established his effective blockade at Santiago, he appealed to Washington for a military force to occupy the land fortifications of the harbor, and either Shafter and the army to enable the American fleet to enter in safety or to drive the Spanish out. On May 30 orders were issued to General Shafter to proceed on transports to Cuba and to join the fleet off Santiago. The first week in June was occupied by a scurrying aboard transports at Tampa, and on the 7th the convoy was ready to set sail. The rumor of the presence of a mythical Spanish warship cruising in the Gulf delayed the sailing until June 14. Six days later, after an uneventful voyage, a junction of the forces took place, and Sampson and Shafter entered into conference upon the line of action.

The plan of Sampson, which he believed to have been accepted at the conference, involved a landing of troops near the entrance to the harbor, after which the Spanish forces were to be expelled from the hills and fortifications overlooking the channel. This would make it possible to proceed later with a joint attack upon the fleet and the Spanish land forces. On the 3d of June an attempt had been made to prevent the egress of the Spanish fleet by sinking a collier, the Merrimac, across the narrows of the channel. The effort partially failed, but the cool young commander who attempted it, Richmond P. Hobson, became one of the popular heroes of the war. It is uncertain what the effect of success would have been upon the strategy of the combined forces.

General Shafter left the conference of June 20 believing that he had made it clear that his intention was to make a landing east of the harbor "and march on Santiago." He

proceeded, to the dismay of Sampson, to act upon this intention.

After the conference with his commanders on June 21, Shafter published brief orders which were to govern the landing the following day. With negligible resistance from the Spanish forces, and with the assistance of the boats from the fleet (which Long had offered and Alger had curtly declined a few days earlier), a disembarkation was made along a mining railroad from Siboney to Daiquiri several miles east of the channel, and some eighteen miles south-east of Santiago by the direct trail through the tropical jungle. The first troops to land cleared the adjacent hills of sharpshooters, and most of the forces were on shore before the end of the 23d. From Siboney, the narrow and much-worn trail through the jungle loam led toward the Spanish entrenchments and entanglements east and south of Santiago. Without orders on the night of the 23d the troops swarmed inland along this path. The nature of the terrain made it less important that most of the cavalry horse had been left behind at Tampa together with many of the ambulances of the medical department and other wheeled vehicles belonging to the supply service. Along a jungle path only a pack-mule could advance with comfort. The morning of the 24th found the head of the column deployed along the line of hills marked by a junction in the trails at a point known to the Cubans as Las Guasimas. The Rough Riders were here too, dismounted but enterprising, for they had marched all night without orders and unchecked by superior command, in order to select for themselves a good fighting place upon the front. The correspondents and the military reports differ as to whether the column was ambushed or expected the engagement that the Spanish outposts offered at Las Guasimas, but here on the 24th was the first military encounter of importance with nearly a thousand American troops involved, fighting rather blindly in the forest, and with some seventy casualties which fell most heavily upon Colonel Wood's First Volunteer Cavalry.

During the next week General Shafter established con-

trol over his army and prepared for his Santiago campaign independent of Sampson's force. From Siboney to the fortifications around Santiago there extended a dense forest with no improved roads and with only one important direct trail. Shortly before reaching the Spanish trenches and wire entanglements, the forest gave way to an open valley through which the San Juan River flowed southwestward, and along the western ridge of which the Spanish station had been taken. General Shafter prepared for a direct attack along the line of this road, and for an enveloping movement headed at the Santiago waterworks at El Caney, some six miles up the San Juan above the crossing of the trail. The army was entirely ashore by the 25th, and in the remaining days of June its units were sorted out, and its brigade commanders were given their tasks in connection with the general advance which was to take place on the night preceding July 1. The Spanish forces made no serious attempt to interfere with these preparations, but instead discussed with the Government at Havana the course to be taken in defense and the possibility of saving a portion of the fleet through flight.


On the evening of June 30 the regiments got into position, with Shafter sick in his tent behind the lines at El Pozo, and deriving his information at second-hand. Lawton on the right of the line moved early in the evening for his detour by another jungle trail against El Caney and the Spanish block-houses defending it. Early on the morning of July 1 the double attack opened. Its strategy was partly defeated at the start by a stubborn Spanish resistance at El Caney. Lawton, instead of wiping out the Spanish left and rejoining the main American column early in the day, was detained at El Caney until late in the afternoon, and came back into line the following morning after thirty-six weary hours.

The advance against the hills beyond the San Juan took place as arranged. The trenches here were assaulted and taken. The Rough Riders, now under the command of Colonel Roosevelt, charged at the right of the main column, having their chief engage-

Battle of
July 1-3,
1898

The Caribbean

Scale of Miles



ment at Kettle Hill, somewhat northeast of the San Juan hills. That night the American forces occupied and reversed the Spanish trenches. On the 2d of July the engagement continued with considerable rifle fire all day, and by evening Shafter began to wonder whether he would be able to retain the ground he had seized. The possibility of a withdrawal was discussed with Washington, while Sampson was appealed to to force the channel, engage the Spanish fleet, and create a diversion in the Spanish rear. Arrangements were made for a conference at Siboney on the morning of the 3d, in order that the two commanders might reconstruct their plan of action.

The successful assault upon the land defenses of Santiago convinced the Spanish authorities of the certainty of defeat. Upon July 2 Admiral Cervera was ordered to take his fleet to sea, and to run the risk of total destruction in the hope that some of the units might escape. He had known before leaving Spain, and had made record of the fact, that he was being sent to defeat. The Spanish Ministry of Marine had known that his fleet was hardly seaworthy, and in no sense ready for an engagement. The heavy guns of his largest ship were not mounted in the turrets, but were carried as cargo in the hold. The fleet was sent to sea because of insistence on the part of Spanish opinion, and because the Ministry feared that the monarchy could not stand an open confession of naval incapacity. Defeat in battle would be less of a blow.

The American battle fleet was, as usual, drawn up facing the entrance to the harbor at daybreak on Sunday, July 3. Naval battle of Santiago At about eight o'clock Sampson started off in the New York, from his station near the right of the line, for his conference with Shafter. At nine-thirty-five the lookouts on the Brooklyn sighted the first vessel of the Spanish column coming out. It turned sharply to the west and within the next few minutes the naval fight was on.

Every American commander had his orders from Admiral Sampson as to his conduct in such a battle, and the vessels immediately closed in to hold the Spanish fleet against the

shore, and to destroy it there. Commodore Schley, on the bridge of the Brooklyn, assumed that the departure of Sampson had left him as the senior in command of the fleet. He signaled orders to the other vessels, which appear to have been ignored. The emerging column headed for a few minutes directly at the Brooklyn, which lay southwest of the entrance. Instead of swerving to the left and taking immediately a westward course parallel to the Spanish fleet, Schley ordered and the Brooklyn executed a loop to the right, and nearly rammed the Texas, its right-hand neighbor, that was closing in according to its orders. After completing the circuit to the right that carried it away from the danger of being rammed by the outcoming squadron, the Brooklyn swerved back into the line of pursuit and speedily took the lead. Sampson meanwhile had proceeded some six miles east from his station before the flight was observed, and turning brought up the rear of the pursuit rapidly overtaking the rest of his warships. The Oregon, Brooklyn, and Texas did the bulk of the damage in the chase, and one by one the Spanish ships were beached and burned. The chase ended some forty-three miles west of Santiago, when the last of the fugitives turned her nose in shore for safety at about half-past two. The flagship arrived on the scene to receive the surrender as Schley was preparing to receive it, and a little later that night Sampson's report of the engagement took the wires ahead of the reports which Schley had wished to send.

The overwhelming victory at sea reversed the whole military situation, and in the following fortnight Shafter entered into correspondence with the Spanish ^{Army} commanders for an unconditional surrender of ^{morale} their forces. This occurred July 17, when the formal capitulation was carried out. The surrender was received by an American army riddled with fever and in danger of extermination from tropical diseases within the next few weeks. The army had been landed in the tropics at the beginning of the hottest season, in uniforms which had been designed for winters on the western plains. Group sanitation was

yet in its infancy, and the medical department was unprovided with medicines and hospital facilities for the treatment of malaria, dysentery, and yellow fever. There was some question as to whether the fighting morale of the army could last until the capitulation of Santiago. Thereafter it speedily broke down. On August 3 a "round robin" was prepared under the leadership of volunteer officers who had no military careers to hope for, asserting that the army must be withdrawn to a cooler climate at once in order to be saved. The regular officers, who were prevented by the bonds of discipline from taking the lead in this sort of action, were nevertheless nearly unanimous as to its need. The responsibility was largely Colonel Roosevelt's, and upon him fell much of the criticism when the protest was given to the Associated Press before it was turned over to military channels for transmission to Washington. The protest accomplished its purpose. On August 8 the expeditionary force started for a new camp at Montauk Point on Long Island. Of the total force, that had been increased by this time to about 25,000, four fifths were sick when they landed in the United States.

The third of the expeditionary forces was put together after the battle of Santiago, under the command of General Miles. It was ordered to proceed to Porto Rico. Preceded by the war correspondents, who, like the army, found the Porto Ricans passive and indifferent, it accomplished its purpose only to be halted on the eve of its first engagement by notification that the war was over.

Negotiations for an armistice and peace were opened by Spain through Jules Cambon, the French Ambassador at Washington, a few days after the capitulation of Santiago. He found in the State Department a new Secretary and a definite program. John Sherman had given way to William R. Day, an old personal associate of the President, who had been Assistant Secretary of State since the formation of the Administration. As the relations with Spain had become more difficult, Judge Day had quietly taken over more and more of the detail work in the

Armistice

Department, with the approval of McKinley, but to the great chagrin of his immediate chief. Sherman was incapacitated by age and health for his duties, and finally resigned on April 25, when he found his Assistant Secretary actually summoned to Cabinet meetings. Judge Day met the proposal for an armistice with a demand for the withdrawal of Spain from the Western Hemisphere. The draft of a protocol to be followed by a conference on peace was handed to Cambon on August 10. Two days later he signed it on behalf of Spain, and the Adjutant-General hurried copies of it by telegraph to the three commanders in the field, to Shafter at Santiago, to Miles at Ponce, and to Merritt at Manila. Before it arrived at the last post, Merritt had on the day following its signature stormed and occupied the city of Manila.


The first problem which was taken up by the peace commissioners when they convened at Paris, October 1, 1898, was presented by this post-armistice capture of the city of Manila. The American Government refused to accede to the demand that the *status quo* of August 12 be restored, but it accepted the principle that the islands had not been conquered and that their status was subject to negotiation.

The Peace
Commission
at Paris


The American Commission included four Republicans, Day, Davis, Frye, and Reid, and one Democrat, Judge George Gray. Day had withdrawn from the State Department to accept the chairmanship. To fill his place President McKinley recalled from London the American Ambassador, John Hay. Since early boyhood John Hay had been familiar with the intimate workings of Republican Governments. As one of Lincoln's private secretaries, he had come to know Washington in war-time, and later he was Assistant Secretary of State under President Hayes. As a man of letters he had been prominent for thirty years. "If there is a man in the country who is handy with his intellectuals," wrote E. S. Martin, "Colonel Hay is that person; but he has been a lucky man, too." He had written verse that he regarded as too amusing and popular for

his dignity. His anonymous novel, *The Bread-Winners*, was the best seller of 1884. As the joint biographer of Lincoln with John J. Nicolay he had helped to establish the great reputation of a national leader. In London as Ambassador he had shared the credit for keeping England friendly throughout the Spanish War. He now for the first time in his life came into great responsibility, as part of a Government before which the vistas of world influence had opened, and which was ready to give instant adhesion to a new idea of empire, the doctrine of the open door.

The instructions of the peace commissioners were definite as far as the American campaigns were concerned. Cuba was to be set free without encumbrance, and the Philippines Porto Rico was to be ceded to the United States. The Philippine Islands constituted a new problem for which public opinion was not yet ready, and which the Protocol of August 12 had deferred for consideration at Paris. As the autumn advanced the factors controlling their destiny proved to turn upon relative disadvantages rather than benefits. No thought of conquest in the Philippines or elsewhere preceded the Spanish War, and no serious desire to begin a colonial system was in evidence. The most definite body of public opinion was fundamentally opposed to colonial control as un-American and undemocratic; but against the disadvantages involved in holding the Philippines McKinley weighed the greater dangers to their people in letting them go. The combined force of Aguinaldo's insurrection and Dewey's victory had broken down the Spanish power beyond repair. The insurgents, although they pretended to maintain a provisional government, had even fewer elements of stability than were in Cuba. Independence was unthinkable. The obvious desires of at least one great power, Germany, to maneuver the United States out of the position which Dewey had grasped, suggested that freedom for the Filipinos would be of short duration. On October 25 McKinley wrote to Day, "There is a very general feeling that the United States, whatever it might prefer as to the Philippines, is in a situation where it cannot



PHILIPPINE ISLANDS



let go." On the following day specific instructions were cabled to the peace commissioners, that while the President was sensible of the grave responsibilities involved, the United States must retain the whole of the Philippine archipelago.

After brushing aside the Spanish contention as to the Philippine *status quo*, the commissioners took up the next contentions that Cuba must be transferred to the United States rather than simply abandoned by Spain, and that the Cuban debt must go with the island. Both of these claims were rejected, and by the end of October it seemed doubtful whether the Spanish Commissioners could be brought to agree to a treaty. The demand for the cession of the Philippine Islands, formally presented on November 1, increased the danger of deadlock, which was finally avoided by the concession that the transfer of the islands was not based upon conquest, but was in lieu of cash indemnity for war costs, and by the added willingness to reimburse Spain to the extent of twenty million dollars for her cash outlay upon the Philippine Islands. On December 10, 1898, the treaty was signed at Paris, and early in January was transmitted to the Senate, for approval by the constitutional two thirds.

The wave of feeling against the retention of the islands mounted steadily through the autumn of 1898, and received the support of most of those in both parties who had opposed the war, and of an additional group of Republicans, who feared national decay as a consequence of empire and were speedily known as "anti-imperialists." A large proportion of the Democratic Party opposed the Republican policies which had permitted the war and its consequences. The congressional election of November, 1898, made it possible to measure these forces of dissatisfaction and estimate the political consequences of the war.

As a result of the election the Republican majority in both houses was increased. The forces which had made for free-silver votes two years earlier had materially weakened

with the improvement of business conditions. The war had been most popular throughout the Middle West, and brought back to the Republican Party votes that had been lost for several years. Democratic campaigners warned their audiences against the dangers of imperialism, while Republican opponents pointed out that the military victory could be retained and a satisfactory treaty negotiated only by the support of the Administration that had won the war.

Before the first of the year there was a real question whether the treaty could be ratified. Demobilization of the army had proceeded rapidly, and there was a suggestion of scandal in nearly every field of war activity. The advocates of Schley and Sampson were mutually conscious of injustice to their favorite. Secretary Alger was denounced as incompetent. The administration of Shafter was under fire. The Quartermaster's department was under charge of criminal inadequacy. A strong minority in the dominant party opposed the terms of peace, while the Democratic opposition responded freely to the arguments of William J. Bryan against imperialism. The treaty was sent to the Senate in January, and was ratified after five weeks' debate, by a bare two thirds. The uncertainty up until the final vote would have resulted in defeat had not Bryan taken the attitude that the treaty must not be repudiated and that any injustices created by it must be corrected subsequently by the United States. He turned his party toward the idea of ultimate independence for the Philippines.

Within the Republican Party there was serious dissent with Hoar, of Massachusetts, in the lead; but the junior Senator from that State, Henry Cabot Lodge, spoke for the view that prevailed in final ratification: "We must either ratify the treaty or reject it. . . . The President cannot be sent back across the Atlantic in the person of his commissioners, hat in hand, to say to Spain with bated breath, 'I am here in obedience to the mandate of a minority of one third of the Senate to tell you that we have been too victorious, and that you have yielded us too much.'"

The campaign of 1898 brought out the one permanent

hero of the Spanish War. Theodore Roosevelt had already aroused the interest of progressive citizens because of his devotion to clean government, and of hero-lovers because of his continuous and breezy appeals. His regiment had brought him a larger fame. His defense of the health and safety of the troops at Santiago had incurred the displeasure of the McKinley Government and War Department, but had widened his personal popularity. He returned to the hospital camp at Montauk Point on Long Island a colonel in khaki and a national figure.

There had been no experience in New York politics so refreshing as that of 1898 since Grover Cleveland, the mayor of Buffalo, in 1882 became reform candidate for governor. The community, tired of the tricks of machine politics, whose notoriety had been increased by the recent experiences of New York City, turned with eagerness to the new personality. The managers of the Republican Party found it necessary to lay aside their slate and to appear to welcome Colonel Roosevelt as their candidate for governor. His canvass for that office was his first experience in a general and personal appeal for votes. From the rear platform of his special train he carried the campaign into all corners of the State, and early in 1899 was installed victorious at Albany "standing by the Ten Commandments to the very best of his ability, and humping himself to promote fair play."

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CHAPTER XIII

THE AGE OF ROOSEVELT

No American President has dealt with Congress more happily than William McKinley did. His long service in the lower house had familiarized him with the methods of lawmaking and the habits of Congress. His special field of Congressional interest, the protective tariff, is one in which the price of success is a high ability in compromise. The tact, sympathy, and unselfishness that he had developed while reconciling rival and antagonistic claims for protection served him well when he was removed to the other end of Pennsylvania Avenue, and presided over the nation.

The election of 1898 strengthened the tendency already visible when McKinley was elected two years earlier.

The new
statesmen Hanna in the Senate stood for a new type of commercial statesman. Quay, the master manipulator of Pennsylvania politics, had sat as junior Senator since 1887, a worthy junior to Don Cameron. Upon the retirement of Cameron, Quay became senior Senator, and assisted in the election of his political heir apparent, Boies Penrose. From New York, Senator Thomas Collier Platt, "the easy boss," came back in 1897. His earlier career in the Senate had been unexpectedly ended when he resigned with Conkling in a fit of petulance because of Garfield's assertion of the rights of the President. As a business politician no Senator stood higher than Platt. Joseph B. Foraker, of Ohio, a tested "spell-binder," strong in the Civil War tradition, came within the same group.

In 1899 Quay's second term expired, and he failed of re-election because he was under trial on charge of gross misapplication of Pennsylvania State funds. His
Quay attorneys pleaded the statute of limitations and he was acquitted, yet the legislature declined to reelect him. Upon the adjournment of that body, there being an unfilled

vacancy in the Pennsylvania delegation, Governor Stone appointed Quay as Senator, and in the following winter Quay's Republican colleagues in the Senate were driven to the embarrassing necessity of deciding whether to seat him or reject him. By a vote of thirty-three to thirty-two admission was refused him.

A distasteful atmosphere of business in politics swept across the country. In New York the Democratic boss, Richard Croker, had shown a disposition which indicated that "moral obliviousness" was not confined to either party. "My theory is this," he said, "to the victors belong the spoils. We win. We expect every one to stand by us. Because men are loyal to us, you call that plunder. I have to make a living, the same as you."

The second Congress of McKinley found the Republican majorities increased, the Administration enriched by the reputation of a successful foreign war, and the votes provided for the complete fulfillment of the pledge of 1896. Sound money, or the gold standard, had been elected in that year, but there were enough silver Republican votes in the Senate to prevent the passage of a gold-standard law. The promised effort to negotiate for international bimetallism had been in vain because Europe was uninterested. In the winter of 1899 a new currency act was formulated.

The great free-silver debate, that was part of the Populist protest against hard times, illustrated the old truth that connects inflation movements with debtor frontiers. The same truth had been frequently illustrated from the beginning of American history. The debate also revealed the clear defects of the currency and credit situation, and the fact that the national banking system had been better adapted to uphold the credit of Civil War bonds than to maintain a flexible and adequate currency. The sub-treasury system was exposed as an unnecessary hoarding device to keep real money out of circulation. Free silver was beaten in 1896, but it was still necessary to establish the principle of the gold standard by law and to devise an adequate system for federal finance. This latter need

remained unsatisfied till 1913 — but votes were available, in the Currency Act of March 14, 1900, to specify gold as the standard of value, to legalize the gold reserve at \$150,000,000, and to require the Treasury to maintain all the lawful money of the United States at a parity with gold. It was not clear that the Treasury could do this if a severe crisis should develop, since the gold reserve was many times exceeded by the aggregate of the redeemable currency, which included the Civil War greenbacks (\$346,000,000), the Treasury notes of 1890 (\$76,000,000), and the silver, coined or bullion (\$643,000,000), every dollar of which lacked fifty-three cents of being worth its face in gold. The national bank notes (\$331,000,000), based entirely upon the credit of the United States, were an added burden upon the gold reserve.

The demand for free silver ceased before the passage of the Currency Act. It was fundamentally a hard-times demand and the hard times had yielded to prosperity. The financial crisis of 1893 passed its crest when Cleveland won his victory over the forces of immediate inflation, and secured the repeal of the Sherman Silver Purchase Act. The depression that followed the crisis coincided with the years of the greatest Populist success, 1893–96. The supplies of capital ready for investment had been exhausted in the speculative splurges of the later eighties. Until additional capital was accumulated, by the unromantic and painful methods of economy, there could be neither new investments nor the resumption of enterprises under way in 1893.

Banks failed in the period of depression, and with them went railroads, manufacturers, and merchants. Financial sobriety was the rule in Cleveland's second administration, while the Populists were clamoring for the salvation of mankind through the issuance of more cheap money. The Western farmers who were the mainstay of Populism weakened in their support when large harvests in 1896 coincided with a strong market for their grain. The farmer who was out of debt had little desire for repudiation or inflation. The prosperity that the Republican organizers promised

was visible even before the first election of McKinley, and was rampant long before his second nomination. The dinner pail of labor was full, so full indeed that the industrial difficulties that existed everywhere failed to make a deep impression on the minds of voters.

A revival of the trust movement accompanied the new prosperity. The economies due to concentration in control, standardizing of goods, and the elimination of overhead charges, made it profitable for industry to combine on a large scale, as it emerged from the stagnant conditions of the middle nineties. The union movement in the field of labor was developed at the same time. In the universities economists began with a fresh intentness to study the fundamental processes of business. The inauguration of one of the economists, Arthur Twining Hadley, as president of Yale in 1899, broke a long tradition of theological presidencies and emphasized the connection between education and modern life. The romancers felt the spell of the new movement. Bellamy in 1888 had published *Looking Backward*, his vision of the state socialism that he believed to be impending. H. G. Wells brought out, in 1899, *When the Sleeper Wakes*, and foretold a society entirely dominated by organized finance. Congress in 1898 appointed an industrial commission whose nineteen volumes of report and hearings show the tendencies of business at the close of the nineteenth century. In the fall of 1899 representatives of business and government met with professional students of economics in the Chicago conference on trusts, to consider the nature of the problem and the methods of controlling it. The Socialist Party, organized at Indianapolis through the fusion of minor groups, launched its specific theory for the reorganization of society, and nominated a labor leader, Eugene V. Debs, for President in March, 1900.

Prosperity
and the
trusts

The presidential election of 1900 came upon a country inspired by its wide prosperity, controlled by a dominant party organization that was founded upon that prosperity, conscious of the approach of the new relationship with the

rest of the world, and recognizing a need for the readjustment of social relationships. The preliminaries of the campaign were offered by the minor parties as they strove to state their issues and attract attention. The Socialist nomination aroused less interest than the last struggles of the Populists.

“The first of America’s Populists was Daniel Shays,” said *Leslie’s* in the summer of 1900; “the last of them will be Wharton Barker and Ignatius Donnelly.” The movement of discontent that rolled up the accumulated grievances of the later eighties and polled over a million votes in 1892 had lost its chance to maintain an independent existence when it concurred in the Democratic nomination of Bryan in 1896. It lost both its organization and its following. The “middle-of-the-road” Populists struggled stubbornly for an independent existence, but in vain. “The party is gone past redemption,” wrote one of its disheartened chairmen, in September, 1900. Its principles were in a way of acceptance by the larger parties, but free silver had lost its appeal upon the masses that had demanded it in 1896.

The Democratic Party, meeting in national convention at Kansas City on July 4, 1900, found no difficulty in retaining the ascendancy it established over the Democrats in 1900 Populists in 1896. The convention shouted manfully for ex-Senator David B. Hill, Democratic boss of New York, whom Platt had driven from the Senate, but it voted for Bryan. E. L. Godkin in moments of despondency recognized Bryan’s established leadership in the party, looking upon him as “a medicine which the country will probably have to take some day.” The gold Democratic organization that had been formed by the Administration leaders in 1896 had faded to an empty shadow. The only serious problem which confronted the Democratic Convention was the relative stress to be placed upon the old and weakening issue of free silver, and the new and rising principle of anti-imperialism. In the end the platform stood for both, and Bryan, declining to recognize that free silver had ceased to be the dominant issue, destroyed whatever

hopes there might have been of a successful fight against imperialism. His speech of acceptance, made at Indianapolis in August, was devoted chiefly to imperialism, and served as a textbook to the anti-imperialists throughout the canvass.

There was as little uncertainty over the presidential candidate in the Republican Party as in the Democratic. William McKinley had no considerable opposition to fight. There were some murmurings against him among those who had supported the claims of Thomas B. Reed in 1896, and who believed that his Government was too closely identified with the conservation of business. But the murmurings were hopeless against a candidate who stood well with Congress, was popular with the people, and whose strength was intensified by the glamour of things done in war and still doing in the rehabilitation of Cuba. At the Philadelphia Convention, which met on June 19, the Republican National Committee under Senator Hanna was in command of the presidential nomination.

McKinley
and
Roosevelt

In the case of the Republican vice-presidency there was difference of desires. Garrett A. Hobart, of New Jersey, McKinley's first Vice-President, had been a genuine asset to the Administration, but had died in office. The wishes of the President and Senator Hanna for a successor who should work harmoniously with the Administration led them first to Elihu Root, who declined to be drawn away from his reorganization of the War Department. Root had been summoned to this in the summer of 1899, when McKinley yielded to external pressure and called for the resignation of Secretary Alger. After Root, John D. Long seems to have been the Administration's choice, but the movement for Long was stopped by the appearance of a spontaneous demand from the body of the party.

"I hope you will not allow the convention to be stampered to Roosevelt for Vice-President," said McKinley (as quoted by Senator Foraker). The repute of Roosevelt, rising continuously since his election as Governor of

New York, threatened to upset the well-balanced party machine. Some Republicans had even talked of discarding McKinley in his favor, and Roosevelt had begun to consider the distribution of patronage, should this occur. He had not been among the McKinley supporters of 1896, and his aggressive leadership among the critics of the War Department in front of Santiago had created a personal unwillingness to have him on the ticket. Governor Roosevelt agreed in substance with McKinley on this point. "I should like to be governor for another term," he wrote to Senator Platt. "The Vice-Presidency is not . . . an office in which a man who is still vigorous and not past middle life has much chance of doing anything."

The denials of Governor Roosevelt that he was a candidate for the vice-presidency were repeated at frequent intervals during the spring of 1900, but failed to check the popular desire for his services. This popularity fell in well with the personal wishes of party leaders in Pennsylvania and New York. Quay, just refused his seat in the Senate by a majority that included Senator Hanna, was not averse to embarrassing the party organization that had allowed him to be humiliated. Platt in New York had managed to maintain harmonious public relationships with the governor, but was willing to back him as a candidate for almost any position outside of New York. During the days of the convention Colonel Roosevelt was in Philadelphia at the head of the New York delegation, wearing his campaign hat, visiting the headquarters of the other State delegations in turn, and noisily protesting his unwillingness to be sacrificed as Vice-President. From the records available in the biographies of Hay, Foraker, and McKinley, it seems that the reluctance to be Vice-President was mingled with a willingness to show McKinley that he could be Vice-President if he so desired. A private wire to the White House carried the story of the Roosevelt boom, and at the end the Administration bowed as gracefully as could be to the unanimous will of the party.

During the ensuing canvass President McKinley adhered

to the tactics that he had followed in the previous campaign. He maintained the dignity and poise suitable to his own character and becoming, according to past precedent, in the presidency. Bryan took to the stump as usual, but this time he aroused no fears in the hearts of his opponents, and he was trailed back and forth across the continent by as good a campaigner as himself. The National Committee made Colonel Roosevelt speak more than three hundred times during the canvass. In the heart of Populism in Denver he denounced free silver, and everywhere he inspired the hopes of those who were longing for a higher level in party politics.

Public opinion was badly split by the old issue and the new. The problem of imperialism cut across the boundaries that divided the free-silver advocates from those of the gold standard. Until late in the campaign a group of distinguished gold-standard anti-imperialists wavered before the choice of evils. Many of them, believing that imperialism was more closely connected with the future of democracy than any currency controversy, voted for Bryan; but these were more than offset by the gains of the Republican Party due to the prestige that came from a successful and prosperous administration. As the canvass advanced, the argument of the full dinner pail increased its grip upon the average voter. On election day the prosperity that had been promised in McKinley's first campaign secured a decisive victory for him in his second.

Gold stand-
ard and
imperialism

The winter of 1900, with the presidency settled, with all fears of repudiation expelled, and with four more years of administrative continuity assured, has had no equal among periods of industrial confidence. Both capital and labor looked forward to a future of unchecked development, and the organizations of both the trusts and the unions were increased in size and projected into new fields. The feeling of assurance pervading the country was partly based upon the absence of any disturbing national program. The two things for which the Republican Party had perfected its

organization in 1896 had been accomplished. The Dingley tariff of 1897 was producing an abundant revenue. The gold standard had been proclaimed as the official basis of national commerce. No great legislative programs involving fundamental change were pending. The national need for a canal at Panama was within reach of gratification. The defects in administrative organization that the Spanish War had disclosed were in process of correction under the wise control of Elihu Root. John Hay was extending American ideals of fair play across the Pacific.

The inaugural ceremony of March 4, 1901, was the most imposing ceremonial of its kind that had been seen, but lacked significance as a public event. The Cabinet of McKinley needed no reorganization and received none. The second term seemed likely to inspire only the uninteresting annals of a happy people. This happiness was increased when toward the end of March the insurgent leader Aguinaldo was taken prisoner, bringing the Philippine revolt so nearly to an end that it was possible to think of establishing civil government in the islands.

The assassination of McKinley at Buffalo in September, 1901, destroyed this certainty at a single stroke. It brought into the presidency on September 14 a new personality that spoke for a later generation and a different era. It removed the basis for the rigid political organization of which Senator Hanna was the chief engineer, and opened the way for aspiring politicians in the Middle West to push upon the party councils their demands that a program of national and social betterment be formulated and adopted.

Theodore Roosevelt was not yet forty-three years of age when he took his oath as President on September 14, 1901, but he had behind him already nearly twenty years of prominent political life. In personal appearance and behavior he still showed the jubilation and enthusiasm of youth, but in experience of affairs and political sagacity he was as old as most of his seniors in the party. His origin, and his career thus far, were as un-

usual in American politics as the remaining eighteen years of his life were to be.

Born in 1858, his infancy was passed during the Administration of the self-made rail-splitter, Abraham Lincoln. He left Harvard College as his party was electing Garfield and glorying in the fact that the candidate had begun his life upon the towpath. The self-made man, born in the cabin, and ripening in the full opportunity of American democracy was still the type American. Roosevelt had none of this in his experience. He was born in affluence, educated in a social group whose position had been secure for generations, and he was launched into life free to determine for himself whether he would make money or leave behind him a career of accomplishment in public work.

In the fall of 1881, "finding it would not interfere much with my law" Roosevelt accepted a nomination to the New York Assembly, and described himself as "a Reform in 'political hack.'" politics At no time thereafter was he ever really out of politics, and at every stage his name was identified with the advance of self-government. Three years as a young man in the New York Assembly made him a national figure — "A light-footed, agile, nervous, yet prompt boy, with light-brown, slightly curling hair, blue eyes and an eye-glass, and ready to rise and speak with a clear, sharp, boyish voice." He had already shown a capacity to oppose the short-haired, noisy toughs of Tammany with an equally short-haired and noisy virtue. Before he was thirty, when there was talk of having his party silence him, the professionally humorous *Puck* became serious when it remarked that "silencing is a process which requires at least two persons." He led the New York delegation to the National Republican Convention in 1884, and was equally true to his standards when he opposed the nomination of Blaine and when he supported the party ticket through the canvass. His later career as Civil Service Commissioner brought him for six years into the inner circle of Washington life, and made an uninspiring and ex-

perimental national office a center of activity for better government. His next two years as Police Commissioner in New York City gave a new range to his knowledge of society, and his return to Washington in 1897 as Assistant Secretary of the Navy brought him new opportunities for action. He was at once a reformer and a party man, laying down his platform at the beginning of his career: "A man cannot act both without and within the party; he can do either, but he cannot possibly do both."

The political experience of the new President was broader than his age indicated, and bore little resemblance to that of any earlier President. On the other sides of Letters and sport his life he was equally different. He was a successful man of letters, a painstaking amateur scientist, and a lover of the world of sport. In the field of letters, he had begun to write immediately upon leaving college, expressing himself in works of history and the records of his outdoor experiences. His *Naval War of 1812* and his *Winning of the West* made him the equal of any contemporary American historian of his age. His *Hunting Trips of a Ranchman* was an early number in a series that was to carry him eventually to the heart of Africa and to the Brazilian River of Doubt.

The outdoor life of Roosevelt reclaimed him from a weak childhood and made him a rugged man. As President he shocked many of his conventional associates by inviting prize-fighters to the White House and openly enjoying the opportunity to box and wrestle with them. He subsequently paid for this devotion with the loss of one of his eyes, a loss that he could ill afford, for his eyes were always weak, as his ever-present spectacles bore witness. As a naturalist he observed both broadly and accurately, and had begun to pick as his friends men whose interests in science and the world outdoors could run with his. As a charter member of the Boone and Crockett Club that was formed in 1887 he paid his tribute to the romance of big game, and tempered his zest as a sportsman with a regard for wild life as a science. The legend of the presidency in

frock coat, silk hat, and impenetrable dignity was to be turned upon another course.

When the oath of office was administered to President Roosevelt he immediately announced that it would be his "aim to continue absolutely unbroken the policies of President McKinley for the peace, prosperity, and honor of our beloved country." He urged the members of the Cabinet to retain their positions under him, and took up the business on the President's desk with celerity, decision, and confidence in his subordinates.

It was nevertheless the turning-point between two eras. The Republican Party had fulfilled its purpose, and was not yet pledged to the elements of any new program. Before McKinley died the Supreme Court had upheld the constitutionality of the Foraker Act, and the colonial government depending upon it. The gold standard was established, and a protective tariff was bringing in adequate revenue from the imports of a prosperous country. The next few years under any President must have meant a reshaping of party organization and an accommodation to the new issues that were locally appearing. Under Roosevelt it took a course unbelievable had McKinley lived.

Two theories of representation have struggled to control in the Government of the United States, and these two theories met in the Administrations which ended and began on September 14, 1901. According to one of the theories, for which there is no better example than President McKinley, the will of the people is entitled to instant translation into action when it has manifested itself. It was easy for men who had been Republicans during the Civil War to believe that the party was always right, and that it possessed a monopoly of virtue and patriotism. The natural consequence of this belief was straight party loyalty with an almost complete unwillingness to scratch the party ticket. With this went a strong tendency to be convinced of the correctness of any course toward which the majority was tending or any view

The new era

Contrasting theories of representation

which it espoused. When President McKinley shifted with the opinion of his party from a tolerance of free silver to an insistent advocacy of the gold standard, he illustrated this tendency. His honest sincerity was without question, and his reverence for the party was supreme. When on April 11, 1898, he turned the Spanish situation over to Congress, after he had struggled against an entry into war, which he still deplored, he again acted on the theory that the will of the party is the highest law.

The other theory of representation places its emphasis upon the fact that during his period of office it is the duty of the representative to act in behalf of his constituents. Placed in a position where his knowledge of the facts of government is superior to that of any other citizen, this theory holds that the representative has no right to be guided by their clamor, but must shape his course as trustee according to the facts, and stand or fall upon his success in leading his constituents to follow him. The one theory in the hands of shifty politicians leads to the career of a demagogue or to abuse of office; the other tends to develop the personal side of government and the high responsibility of the administrator.

The significance of the change in Presidents as the turning-point in history was apparent as President Roosevelt began to indicate his own attitude on public questions without waiting to ascertain whether the party organization or the people were in agreement with him. He assumed the duty of positive leadership as Andrew Jackson had assumed it, and as Hayes and Cleveland had tried to do it. The President in his Administration took a new place in the structure of the party and in the nation.

The position of the President in the party organization has varied according to issues and personalities. By the close of the Civil War the standard type of party organization had been evolved. A national party had come to mean the group of citizens who were likely to vote together in a national election. Each party once in four years met in full session through its representatives in

the national nominating convention. Here for four or five days delegates fresh from the body of the voters canvassed their party issues and the personalities of leadership. The last ordinary act of a national convention was, and still is, to receive from the delegation of every State its nomination of a member to sit upon the National Committee which during the four-year interval acted as a sort of trustee for the party interests. The chairman chosen by this National Committee was the tactical commander-in-chief of the campaign.

The relations of the candidate to the National Committee and its chairman shifted during the period 1876 to 1904. Throughout the half-dozen campaigns at the end of the last century the national chairman really ran the party. In the Hayes campaign he seems not to have been on speaking terms with the candidate; and the national committeemen who could control their regular reëlection from their States came to regard themselves as constituting the real party, and looked upon a President's attempt to assert himself as insubordination and trespass.

In the later eighties the custom arose of deferring the selection of chairman until the candidate had had a chance to express his wishes. Hanna, as McKinley's ^{Hanna} manager, was a natural choice as chairman of the National Committee, and brought that post into a position of great influence. One of the first practical questions for President Roosevelt was that of determining his relations with the chairman whom he found in office. Roosevelt had never been a supporter of McKinley, and both he and Hanna knew that the latter had wished to keep him off the ticket in 1900. Both were too well seasoned as campaigners to fight without need, but both were aware of the impending struggle in the party for control. Their differences were political, not personal. The Washington correspondents soon reported the zest with which the President ate Sunday breakfasts with "Uncle Mark" at his home in the Cameron house on LaFayette Square, but no one expected the position of leadership, assumed by the na-

tional chairman, to last long without a struggle. The President was somewhat nervous as to the outcome, but did not evade the issue. When in 1902 the friends of Hanna in Ohio were reluctant to endorse Roosevelt for another term, the President stated the matter bluntly as a leader: "Those who favor my administration and nomination will endorse them, and those who do not will oppose them." Since the canvass of 1900 the relative position of the national chairman has steadily declined from commander-in-chief to chief of staff, and thence to political secretary for the candidate. The President has tended to become the responsible leader of his party.

The political situation in 1901 was full of opportunity for a President who was willing to assume responsibility, and whose party possessed a perfected working organization, but lacked a specific platform for the future. On the day of his accession Roosevelt wrote to Booker T. Washington, at Tuskegee, inviting him to come to Washington to consult upon Republican appointments in the South. The desire to undermine the one-party system of the South had been the ambition of earlier Republican Presidents, and is still their hope. With Roosevelt it led to an attempt to improve the personnel of federal office-holders in Democratic States. It led also to an unforeseen attack.

Dr. Washington, the ablest negro educator of his day, came to Washington to see the President in October, 1901. When their business outlasted the morning hours the President kept him at the White House for luncheon, a fact which scandalized opinion in the South, and made it more difficult for Roosevelt to carry out his policy of breaking down the barriers. It was long before this luncheon was forgotten; but the Roosevelt policy of bringing to the White House any citizens who could be of use to the President, or who interested him, was established for the next eight years. The powerful zest for life that made Roosevelt an historian and a naturalist as well as a statesman, at the age of forty, led him to bring within his circle all sorts and conditions of guests. The White House became the center of a

charmed circle where the President talked freely to all of the intimacies of politics and diplomacy, and kept his interests alive by bringing to his table the world that he could no longer easily visit.

The prosperous winter of 1900-01 was marked by huge extension of corporation activities, and acute struggles between capital and labor. Only an obtuse mind ^{Strikes} could have ignored the fact that the nation was speedily to be involved one way or another in the controversy. The changes in corporate organization were disturbing to the minds of many, but the inconveniences due to strikes affected the disposition of perhaps larger numbers.

The last pronounced period of strikes had been associated with the panic of 1893. The Homestead strike that preceded the panic, the Pullman strike that followed it, and the violent miners' strike at Cripple Creek had been partially forgotten in the years of depression when labor was too keen to get a job to cavil at its terms. The new prosperity brought pressure upon production in the basic industries and revived the social conditions in which organized labor can flourish. The United Mine Workers of America, calling out 150,000 anthracite miners in eastern Pennsylvania, opened a new period of economic clash.

The organization of the miners had lagged behind that of other industries because of the transitory character of much of the labor and the high percentage of unskilled foreigners involved. The last upheavals in the coal regions, in which the "Molly Maguires" carried out their reign of terror, long delayed any successful attempt to bring the coal miners together. John Mitchell took charge of the strike in the anthracite region, announced a limited series of demands, and maintained a discipline over his followers unusual in labor controversies. He kept his men sober, he dissuaded them from congregating in public places, established friendly relations with public opinion, and secured useful political assistance.

Senator Hanna, who was then managing the Republican campaign, had good reason to be anxious for industrial

peace. The argument of the full dinner pail would have lost its force if a great strike were being fought in a basic industry upon election day. Political pressure was brought upon the owners, who yielded in October, with the result that the United Mine Workers of America acquired the great prestige of a successful strike, and John Mitchell was enabled to proceed to the speedy organization of all of the mining region. It was common supposition that there would be another and larger strike before long, with the recognition of the union as its dominant issue.

In the following summer the steel industry was threatened with an upset that might interfere with the whole course of industrial expansion. The Amalgamated Association of Iron and Steel Workers that had fought and lost the Homestead strike in 1892 had been reorganized after the panic. In the summer of 1901 it prepared to strike chiefly for the recognition of the union, and received the promise of moral support from the American Federation of Labor of which Samuel Gompers had long been chief. The strike began in the first week of August and collapsed after a month. The steel industries that were involved met it in many cases by the relatively simple process of transferring the contracts affected by the strike to remote mills not affected or not unionized.

Two symptoms were revealed by these two strikes. The first indicated that it was possible for a labor body if well organized and discreetly managed to gain the sympathy of the public and to win its case. The other revealed the fact that in at least one great industry centralization had proceeded so far that labor had no chance against corporate organization. The United States Steel Corporation that had nullified the desires of this second Homestead strike was in itself a new-born organization and had been in existence but a few months. The opinion of the public was attracted by both of these facts. The coal strike had not proceeded far enough for public inconvenience to overbalance interest in the strikers' cause. The tactical strength of the Steel Corporation was a matter

Labor and
public
opinion

of some alarm. At least two issues were ready for presentation in the party councils.

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CHAPTER XIV

THE NEW IMPERIALISM

IN the internal affairs of the Administration, President Roosevelt was little hampered by policies that had been established by his predecessor. He found difficulties because the business connections and preferences of members of the Republican Party made it easier to go in some directions than in others, but the selection of a final policy was his own. In his foreign relationships he inherited two great secretaries and a group of well-established principles to which he gave consistent support. Hay in the State Department and Root in the War Department were well entered upon their tasks before McKinley died, and remained to work them out.

John Hay began his term as Secretary of State in 1898, in time to carry on the correspondence with the peace commissioners in Paris. In his first few weeks the decision was made by President McKinley that led to the retention of the Philippines and the acceptance of the share of the "white man's burden" entailed thereby. In the earliest correspondence with the peace commissioners while this policy was still undetermined, the principle upon which the United States proposed to act was laid down. Whether Luzon alone was to be retained or the whole archipelago, the islands were to be administered without peculiar advantages to the United States, upon the principle of the "open door." This principle was novel in the Orient, where China was falling to pieces and great European powers were eagerly acquiring national concessions and special spheres of influence. Germany at Kiau-chau, England at Wei-Hai-Wei, Russia at Port Arthur, had all since the close of the China-Japanese War in 1895 exercised a privilege that they denied Japan, the victor in that war.

The conclusion of the Treaty of Paris, and its final ratification, transferred the affairs of the Philippine Islands to the desk of the Secretary of War, but left the United States predisposed to an extension of the doctrine of the "open door." The early history of American relations with China and Japan made this policy of disinterestedness a thing to be expected of the American Government.

The application of the open-door policy to China was made in September, 1899, while the European powers were still engaged in the partition of China. The United States urged this policy as a matter of fairness to themselves and to China, and it was not easy for any other nation to formulate respectable reasons for rejecting it. In the following spring, when Chinese revolutionists, the "Boxers," broke into open revolt demanding the extermination of the "foreign devils," the sincerity of the policy was brought to test. Peking was invested by the rebels, and the foreign embassies were cut off from the world outside. The United States, with a legation in the beleaguered city, became involved in the attempts at rescue. The American troops in the Philippine Islands made American assistance readily available. A joint intervention for the forcible relief of Peking was organized at once.

The ordinary consequence of such interventions in Chinese affairs had been the visitation upon China of severe national penalties, and the acquisition by the intervening powers of new and exclusive compensatory rights. On July 3, 1900, while General Chaffee was preparing for the actual invasion, Hay issued a circular to the powers on the aims of the relief expedition. Whatever concealed aspirations any of the interested powers may have had, they were forced under cover when the United States pointed out its understanding that the expedition was for the release of the legations and that the doctrine of the open door would prevail in the final settlement with China. With as good a grace as possible, the coöperating powers avowed this benevolent intention to be their own, and it

became Hay's mission to hold them to their pledge. Before Chaffee had been many days in China he found it necessary to transmit a protest to the German generalissimo of the expedition, complaining of the German looting of the Royal Observatory at Peking. The astronomical instruments involved ultimately found themselves upon pedestals in Prussian public places. The differences between profession and conduct illustrated thereby gave reality to the American task.

In China the United States operated with a minimum of national interest. Nearer at home the effect of the Spanish War had been to precipitate interest in a waterway between the Atlantic and the Pacific. The idea was ancient, and had been under active negotiation for half a century. The Clayton-Bulwer Treaty of 1850, which still governed the relationship of the United States and Great Britain to the canal, provided that "neither the one nor the other would ever obtain or maintain for itself any exclusive control," or "ever erect or maintain any fortifications commanding the same," or "occupy or fortify or colonize or assume or exercise any dominion" in the immediate vicinity of the waterway. When negotiated in 1850 the treaty marked a victory for the United States in that it placed a check upon the probable colonial expansion of England. In the next generation the American view of the situation developed. The Civil War added to national self-confidence, and when President Hayes reached the conclusion that the canal must forever be a part of the American shore-line, the country had forgotten that the treaty was originally a limitation of British power and believed it a curtailment of the privileges of the United States. Evarts, Blaine, and Frelinghuysen tried in succession and in vain to persuade England to free the United States from the restrictions laid by the treaty. Hay, when he now took the matter up, found that Lord Pauncefote represented a more accommodating government. Early in 1900 he negotiated a treaty whereby the obstacles to construction by the United States

Panama
Canal
problems

Government were eliminated and the canal, to which the principle of the open door was applied, was given the status of guaranteed neutrality. To his great chagrin the United States Senate was insistent upon making the canal an exclusive advantage and amended the treaty to death.

President Roosevelt found the canal business at a standstill, but resumed the negotiation in an attempt to solve it on a basis acceptable to the Senate. The British Government, still accommodating, showed no disposition to encroach upon the indefinite area covered by the Monroe Doctrine, and Lord Pauncefote signed, on November 18, 1901, a second treaty which the Senate immediately approved. Every British claim to interest in the region of the canal was surrendered, with the single exception that the canal should be open without discrimination to the vessels of all nations observing the rules prescribed for its use. The United States made a unilateral guarantee of the neutrality of the canal, and was left entirely free to select its own means for its maintenance.

Hay-
Pauncefote
Treaty, 1901

Each year after 1900 the United States became more closely involved in the intricacies of world politics, and each year brought closer the date at which the United States would be free from the restrictions placed upon its policies by the lack of a waterway across the Isthmus of Panama. The negotiations with England with reference to the new canal were concluded in 1901 upon terms which left the United States free to choose the means and methods of construction. Immediately Hay took up with the Republic of Colombia negotiations for the transfer of the rights that were controlled by the French Canal Company at Panama, and Congress took up the question of route and method of construction. As the debate progressed in Congress the advocates of a route by way of the San Juan River and Lake Nicaragua came to open issue with the friends of the Panama Canal, who were headed by Senator Hanna and President Roosevelt. Unable to command a vote in Congress for either route, it was agreed in June,

1902, that the President should have authority to select the place in which to build the canal.

Early in 1903 Hay signed with the Colombian Minister, Herran, an agreement authorizing the United States to take over the French concession at Panama, and to control the zone through which the canal should run. There had already been excitement and dismay among the owners of the French company because of a recommendation from a commission of engineers headed by Rear-Admiral John G. Walker that the extortionate price demanded by the canal company for its property made it preferable for the United States to turn from Panama and build at Nicaragua. The French company immediately discovered that forty million dollars would be a suitable price instead of one hundred and twenty millions. The Walker commission changed its recommendation accordingly, and the signature of the Hay-Herran Treaty was regarded as removing the last of the diplomatic obstacles. In the Senate, however, Senator Morgan, of Alabama, who believed in the Nicaragua route, led a filibuster that prevented ratification in the current session. The President immediately called a special session of the Senate in March, 1903, at which the Hay-Herran Treaty was ratified.

There was no satisfaction with the treaty in Colombia, where the opponents of the Administration that had negotiated it charged variously that ten millions cash and an annuity of two hundred and fifty thousand dollars a year was not a sufficient price for the right of way; that it was unconstitutional to grant the exclusive jurisdiction over the canal zone involved in the treaty; and that it was President Marroquin's intention to appropriate the sum for private purposes rather than to turn it into the Treasury. For one reason or another action by the Colombian Congress was delayed throughout the summer of 1903, and that body adjourned at the end of October permitting the treaty to die without action.

While Colombia delayed to pledge herself with reference to the canal, American opinion fretted, and the French

owners of the concession despaired, because in 1904 their rights would lapse and the unfinished enterprise would revert to the ownership of Colombia in accordance with the terms of their contract. In the autumn President Roosevelt prepared a message for Congress recommending the seizure of the canal zone by the United States on the ground that the work contemplated was in the interests of "collective civilization." About the same time he wrote a private letter expressing a wish that the State of Panama would secede from Colombia and negotiate directly for the canal rights, but declared that his official position debarred him from acting toward this end.

The French Canal Company was already acting in the same direction. Its agent, Bunau-Varilla, visited Washington and learned that if public disorder arose on ^{The Panama} the isthmus the United States would regard it ^{secession} as its duty under a treaty with New Granada (Colombia) of 1846 to intervene to maintain order, even though this intervention should restrain Colombia from suppressing her insurgents. This was as much as the inhabitants of Panama desired. On November 3, 1903, a quick and bloodless revolt took place, the independence of the isthmus was proclaimed, an American naval force prevented the landing of Colombian troops to put it down, and Roosevelt's message advocating seizure became unnecessary. A few days later the Republic of Panama was recognized at Washington, and by a treaty of November 18, 1903, conceded to the United States everything that Colombia had refused.

Roosevelt continued until his death to defend the equity of his treatment of Colombia. He acted immediately upon the new condition created by the Panama treaty, and in the spring of 1904 began the work of actual construction of the canal. On the engineering side there was sharp difference of opinion respecting the merits of a sea-level canal or one with locks. The latter type was determined upon because of the less cost and shorter period required for construction. The French company had already done much of the preliminary excavation, but had learned little about

sanitation in the tropics. Its European engineers and workmen had died like flies in the huts along the route of the canal. The sanitary renovation of the Zone was among the earliest of the American tasks and in this Colonel Gorgas applied what had been learned in Cuba, until the healthful conditions of the Zone became, in the opinion of Sir Frederick Treves, a triumph for preventive medicine.

The administrative control of construction was vexatious because the task called for executive direction, while Congress wished the control to be through a commission. One engineer after another resigned the task until finally George W. Goethals, a major in the regular army, was made chairman and chief engineer in 1907. The rest of the members of the commission were appointed by the President, subject to their promise never to disagree with the chairman; by which means the commission was turned into an executive agency. "Damn the law. I want the canal built," Roosevelt is said to have remarked to Goethals as he entrusted him with the task. Five times before 1910 Taft went to Panama to inspect the progress of the work of construction, and in 1906 Roosevelt himself established a new precedent for Presidents by leaving the territory of the United States in order to visit the work that he had so vigorously advanced.

Before Hay had succeeded in procuring a promise of coöperation from the owner of the territory upon which the canal was to be dug, new problems of national control in its vicinity produced a sharp appeal to the principles of the Monroe Doctrine. On December 20, 1902, Great Britain, Germany, and Italy joined in a blockade of the ports of Venezuela, after denying that a state of war existed. The claims upon which the three powers were acting were such as always exist against the uncertain Latin republics. A train of successful revolutions in Venezuela had produced numerous valid bills for damages against that Government, and an atmosphere in which fraudulent and inflated claims could flourish. After long and futile attempts at satisfaction from Venezuela, the

three countries whose subjects had suffered losses had recourse to force, having previously satisfied themselves that President Roosevelt did not interpret the Monroe Doctrine as guaranteeing any nation against punishment for misconduct. The first attempt of the intervening powers was to maintain a "pacific blockade," exercising belligerent rights, although denying that a war existed. The American Government refused to pay any attention to such a limited act, whereupon, on December 20, the blockade was made regular and complete.

Although the intervention professed to have in view only the collection of debts, President Roosevelt regarded it as an attempt on the part of Germany to test the firmness of the United States with reference to the Monroe Doctrine, and the degree to which it would be safe to undertake a policy of South American expansion. He determined to force the controversy to adjudication at The Hague. Here in the conference of 1899 the United States had assumed an active leadership in the formation of a tribunal for the voluntary settlement of international disputes. Few cases had been brought to The Hague. The suggestion of the President that this controversy was suitable for such adjudication produced no action at Berlin until the whole American fleet under Admiral Dewey was assembled for maneuvers in the Caribbean Sea, and von Holleben, the German Ambassador, was bluntly informed that the United States would intervene to defend Venezuela unless arbitration were accepted. The President consented to write a friendly note to the Kaiser, praising his activity in behalf of peace, in case such arbitration were requested. The note was ultimately written. The Kaiser yielded, but von Holleben was replaced by Baron Speck von Sternberg, who as an old and intimate friend of Roosevelt might be expected to get better results at Washington, and the arbitration proceeded. At the time, the public was unaware of the nearness of this breach with Germany, as it was unaware of the movements launched in the same period for welding Germans in America into an organized and us-

able body devoted to the culture of the Fatherland. The visit of Prince Henry of Prussia early in 1902 and the development of the National German-American Alliance were fragments in this new policy.

The German intervention in Venezuela was disposed of without war, but it brought out clearly the dilemma into which adherence to the Monroe Doctrine might at any moment force the United States. There existed no good reason why great European Powers should surrender their claims against American republics merely because the Monroe Doctrine barred them from forcible action in collecting their debts. If the United States should permit forcible collection, and its natural consequence in the seizure and operation of the Latin American custom houses, the Monroe Doctrine would be endangered. If it should prevent such intervention and collection, the European creditors were certain to press their claim against the United States. The United States was unwilling to guarantee the payment of such debts; it was equally unwilling to risk their collection by force. When the Republic of Santo Domingo appeared to be drifting into a deadlock with its foreign creditors, President Roosevelt devised a new method of treatment, in the hope of avoiding absolute default and the possibility of another risky crisis of intervention.

In 1905 an agreement was negotiated with Santo Domingo whereby the control of the customs revenues was entrusted voluntarily to officials named by the United States, who were to collect the duties and pay them over to the creditors of the Dominican Government upon an agreed scale. By this device it was hoped that the leakage of revenue through dishonesty and mismanagement might be lessened. Indeed, in the next few years the forty-five per cent that Santo Domingo received from the American comptroller was greater than the whole revenue that had ever been turned in by native officers: and the fifty-five per cent set aside for the creditors speedily reduced the debts to order. In the process the United States unavoidably

incurred the hostility of the plundering politicians whose revenues had been separated from them; and their complaint that by the collection agreement the liberties of Santo Domingo were being intruded upon tended to conceal the real status of affairs.

The Santo Domingo Agreement of 1905 had difficulties with the United States Senate, which feared that here was impending some sort of American financial imperialism. Even though assembled in special session in 1905, the Senate declined to ratify the treaty. The President, however, since no one could control him in this direction, proceeded to name Americans who were allowed by Santo Domingo to carry out the contract. Two years later, with changes that removed much of the opposition of the Senators, the treaty was ratified. The Santo Domingo Agreement was an attempt to reach a reasonable balance among the conflicting forces of the Monroe Doctrine, the strategic conditions of national safety, the defense of the Panama Canal, the tendency of American capital to seek investment outside the United States, and the property interests of Europeans in the Latin countries. It prepared the way for a new "dollar diplomacy" and a great though irregular extension of American authority around the shores of the Caribbean Sea.

While Hay was at work in the State Department steady-
ing the new relationships which war had brought upon the
United States, Root in the War Department took
over the administration of the American colonies
and the reorganization of the military establish-
ment.

Root in the
War
Department

Porto Rico came under American control as spiritlessly
as it had lived under Spain. The military government
found no difficulty in establishing authority, and
in April, 1900, President McKinley signed the
Foraker Act under which Charles H. Allen was installed as
the first civil governor of the island. The revenues of the
island were for a time enhanced by customs duties collected
on American trade to the extent of fifteen per cent of the

Porto Rico

Dingley tariff rates. This apparent violation of the constitutional guarantee of unimpeded trade within the United States gave rise to the Supreme Court cases *DeLima vs. Bidwell*, and *Downes vs. Bidwell*, in connection with which the insular policy was upheld. After 1901 free trade with Porto Rico was established.

Cuba became the scene of an unusual international experiment. By the Treaty of Paris the Spanish title was entirely relinquished, and by the ultimatum Cuba the United States had already pledged itself to secure independence for the Cubans. The volunteer armies were withdrawn from Cuba in the autumn of 1898, leaving behind them a garrison composed chiefly of regular troops. The commanding officer of the military division of Cuba acted also as governor of the civil population. Among the tasks confronting him, two were imperative. The sanitary rehabilitation of the island was necessary if Americans were to live there, and the creation of civil institutions was indispensable before they could depart. Late in 1899 Leonard Wood, by this time a major-general of volunteers, and soon to be given a similar rank in the regular establishment, succeeded General Brooke in command of the island. He had previously been in command of the province of Santiago, and had encouraged there the experiments that finally placed yellow fever on the list of preventable scourges. As soon as it was discovered that the disease was transmitted by the bite of an infected mosquito, it became possible to isolate the patients, eradicate the mosquito, and make yellow fever unnecessary. William C. Gorgas, later surgeon-general of the army, rose to deserved prominence in this work.

The organization of civil government was well advanced before McKinley died. A constitutional convention assembled at Havana, in November, 1900. It proceeded under the direction of General Wood to draft the basic law which was shortly adopted by the people. On May 20, 1902, the first Cuban President was installed under his own flag, and the American troops were withdrawn. Cuba came into pos-

session of an independence limited only by restrictions against self-destruction and an American guarantee of law and order.

Civil government in the Philippine Islands was delayed by the insurrection of Aguinaldo that broke out on February 4, 1899, and that ran its course until its leader was taken prisoner by Frederick Funston ^{The Philippines} in March, 1901. A few days later the insurgent leader took an oath of allegiance to the United States, which he continued to respect, and it became possible to lessen the military force and to begin the process of transferring political authority to the Filipinos. An early commission for the study of Philippine affairs under President Schurman, of Cornell, was in operation during 1899, adding greatly to the scanty knowledge of the new domain. In April, 1900, when the Administration desired that peace might be established before election day, a second commission was created under the presidency of Judge William Howard Taft, of Cincinnati. During the next year this commission studied and visited the islands and laid its plans for the inauguration of a civil government. On more than one occasion the difference in point of view between General MacArthur, who as military commander in the islands was trying to put down insurrection, and Judge Taft, whose duties were distinctly civilian, became so pointed that they could be resolved only by Secretary Root or President McKinley himself. On July 4, 1901, Judge Taft was installed as civil governor at Manila, but it still required special executive action to lodge him in the local seat of authority, the old royal palace of Mindanao, and to get the military commander out. Under his direction as civil governor peace was extended and local self-government was gradually applied. In 1904 Judge Taft was recalled to Washington to succeed Root as Secretary of War, but in 1907 he was able to fulfill his promise to the Filipinos, and return to Manila to install the first legislative assembly of the islands.

Before Root turned over the War Department to Judge Taft he had completed a drastic program of internal re-

organization. One of his successors, in 1912, declared that
 Reorganiza-
 tion of War
 Department “until after the Spanish War there was no pro-
 vision in our military establishment for any-
 body whose duty it should be to study the or-
 ganization of the army or to make plans for it.” In 1886
 Secretary Endicott had declared, “When a second lieuten-
 ant enters the service . . . the rigid examination . . . is made
 the necessary condition for the commission, but this once
 passed . . . the officer can, and but too frequently does,
 close his books and his studies; and if he does not overwork
 or expose himself . . . he is certain, under the operation of
 compulsory retirement, to reach the highest grade open to
 seniority in his arm of the service.” In his first annual
 report in 1899 Root urged upon Congress a reorganization
 of the militia, since no one expected that the regulars would
 ever fight alone, and a reorganization of the regulars to pro-
 vide for the better training of officers and the preparation
 of war plans. Congress was induced to respond with laws
 carrying both appropriations and legal authority. On
 November 27, 1901, the Army War College was opened in
 Washington under the presidency of Tasker H. Bliss, as
 a post-graduate school for officers, and a little later Con-
 gress provided the funds for the stately building on the
 lower Potomac, whose terrace William II subsequently
 adorned with an heroic statue of his ancestor, Frederick the
 Great.

At Fort Leavenworth, Root revived and enlarged the old
 service schools, and the Staff College for the technical train-
 ing of officers in their professional arms of the service. When
 a few of the officer students detailed to receive this instruc-
 tion failed to take it seriously, their conviction by court
 martial received the brief comment of Root, “I think the
 duty will be more clearly understood hereafter.”

The Military Academy, at West Point was enlarged to
 make possible the training of the larger number of officers
 required by the slightly enlarged regular army. The re-
 building of its plant on a monumental scale was begun in
 1902, an even century after its creation. “I think,” said

President Roosevelt at the centennial exercises, "it is going to be a great deal harder to be a first-class officer in the future than it has been in the past."

Early in 1903 Root's program of military legislation was completed by the passage of a new militia act, and the creation of a General Staff Corps for the army. On August 8 of that year Nelson A. Miles was ^{General Staff} retired as the last of the distinguished series of major-generals commanding the army, and was succeeded by the General Staff of which General S. B. M. Young became the first chief.

Army reorganization and colonial expansion did not draw the attention of the Administration away from the need to keep the navy abreast of the times. Only four modern battleships had been available in the Spanish War. To these, others were added at the rate of one or two a year, building up a new fleet of battleships that was believed to be adequate until England launched the Dreadnaught in February, 1906, and opened a new chapter in competitive naval armament. Not until the Delaware went into commission in 1910 did the United States possess one of the newest models, but its fleet of pre-dreadnaught battleships had been able to make a memorable demonstration in 1907. The national policy in which these elements played their part was a coördinated scheme, at whose head stood Root's administrative work. "The new militia law and the General Staff measure," said the President as he took credit for the series of achievements, "will in the end quite transform our military conditions."

Toward the end of his second term, President Roosevelt made a notable display of the reorganized navy of the United States, and a gesture in the broad field ^{The world} of foreign relationships into which the United ^{cruise} States had been drawn. On December 16, 1907, a fleet of modern American battleships left the Capes of the Chesapeake for a voyage around the Americas to northern Pacific waters and with the ultimate intent to cruise around the world. The navy of 1907, much stronger than the new navy

whose units behaved so well in the Spanish War, was now able to send to sea the heaviest battle flotilla that the world had seen. Sixteen new battleships under Robley D. Evans, who had commanded the Iowa at Santiago, with the accompanying tenders and supply ships, tested out the organization of the Navy Department and the fidelity of the work that had been done since 1895. In February, 1909, the fleet returned intact and triumphant, having completed a demonstration that impressed every foreign office in the world, and strengthened the general interest in the new rules of naval warfare, which were signed on February 26, 1909, by delegates at the international naval conference at London.

The significance of the circumnavigation of the world by the new fleet of battleships was variously interpreted as a menace of war and an act of peace. The project was undertaken on Roosevelt's responsibility alone. When the fleet started no funds had been appropriated to take it across the Pacific, or even to bring it back from the Pacific waters to which the President had sent it. Its mission to the Orient was ostensibly a friendly visit, but the President was by no means certain that it would not be attacked, and had prepared the fleet for fighting. He had observed what he interpreted to be an air of truculence in the correspondence of Japan, and had been advised by informal friends that the time would come when Japan would contest American power in the Philippines and at Hawaii. If Japan should seize this moment to declare war, he believed there would be a national advantage in being ready for it. If there should be no attack, he believed it equally advantageous to have made a demonstration of strength in Oriental waters. At the time, however, the public was left to draw its own inferences as to the meaning of the venture, and, as it worked out, the voyage was provocative of friendly international relationships, and revealed an un-hoped-for capacity in the naval organization.

The fleet of 1907, though able to make the most impressive naval demonstration yet seen, was none the less nearly

obsolete. The great powers had ceased laying down the keels of vessels of the battleship class, and were instead experimenting with dreadnaughts. In July, 1908, a Navy Department conference at Newport worked in secret upon the designs for four new dreadnaughts, and when the keels of these were laid, North Dakota, Delaware, Utah, and Florida, it was believed that no better ships were under construction anywhere. The first of these was commissioned in 1910. By the end of 1916 thirteen were in commission and four more were building, and the great armada of 1907 had become at best a second line. Within the Navy Department improvement in organization progressed with naval architecture. The almost complete independence of the several bureaus lessened the capacity for team-work, and developed all of the forces for inertia. This was under continuous fire from naval reformers. In 1915 a new Bureau of Naval Operations was created to act as a general staff for the navy under command of William S. Benson, with the rank of admiral.

Reorganization proceeded in the War Department as in the navy. Under the General Staff Act of February 14, 1903, it was sought to increase the efficiency of the army by the organization of a corps whose duty should be to prepare war plans and supervise their execution. The new procedure had to fight its way against the opposition of the older officers, and the political interference occasioned by their friends in Congress. Year after year, however, the schools at Fort Leavenworth and the War College in Washington graduated their little groups of army specialists. The soft and pleasant jobs in Washington, at the War Department, were taken away from their permanent holders, who had come to be looked upon in army circles as the "Manchu" caste. A new regulation that forbade officers to stay on administrative detail away from their troops for more than four years out of six, weakened the power of the "Manchus." One of the officers in this favored group, it was declared, had been on a single staff duty for forty-three years. With the consistent support of President

Roosevelt and his secretaries, the new type of officer and of army organization was given a chance to establish itself. Every year the older type became less numerous through retirements, and every year a large percentage of the young men had a new conception of their duties. General S. B. M. Young, the first chief of staff, was succeeded by Adna R. Chaffee, and he in succession by John C. Bates, J. Franklin Bell, Leonard Wood, William W. Wotherspoon, and Hugh L. Scott, who was in office at the entry into the World War in 1917. It was not possible in these years to produce from Congress a more thoroughgoing army act than Root had evoked while Secretary of War, but within the General Staff there was developed an idea of what an army ought to be that was ready for the test in 1917, and was not found wanting.

When Root retired from the Cabinet in 1904, his job done, Roosevelt recalled William Howard Taft from the Philippine Islands to take his place as Secretary of War. Under Taft's administration the Philippines had been progressing toward orderly government and self-government. Natives of the islands were admitted to seats upon the governing commission, and plans were laid for the ultimate establishment of a native assembly. Judge Taft was successful not only in pacifying the islanders, but in carrying on a negotiation with the Vatican. At the date of the Treaty of Paris a large proportion of the area of the Philippine Islands was owned by various orders of the Catholic Church. Through the diplomatic negotiation of Taft the title to these was settled by agreement in 1903. The sanitary work in Cuba was duplicated in the Philippines, and the establishment of schools upon the American plan was followed by a revival of the ancient university at Manila. A new generation was started with no recollection of Spanish rule, speaking English and conscious of the processes of American government. The erection of the Filipino Assembly in 1907 was followed by a steady increase in the proportion of Filipinos in Government offices and on the Council. By 1916 the local control

Taft in the
War
Department

of insular affairs was in every direction in the hands of native islanders.

World politics continued to call for American intervention as Roosevelt rebuilt the tools of national defense. The Treaty of Portsmouth, signed on September 5, 1905, drew the United States into world affairs as moderator, and gained for Roosevelt the following year the award of the Nobel prize for services to the cause of peace.

The war between Japan and Russia that was ended in this treaty broke out in 1904, with Japan assuming the aggressive to prevent the continuous encroachment of Russia. Ten years earlier Japan had shown her strength as a modern military power by crushing the resistance of China within a few weeks. The Treaty of Shimonoseki, in 1895, brought her little reward, since the European powers exerted pressure to moderate her terms. In the next few years they extended their own holdings in northern China, and Russia pushed to completion her railroad to the Pacific. With its main line running to a terminus at Vladivostok, Russia laid hands upon Manchuria and built a branch line extending to Port Arthur. Repeated pledges to return Manchuria to China were followed by repeated acts for the strengthening of the defenses of Port Arthur. In February, 1904, Japan declared war against Russia, and John Hay began diplomatic pressure to limit the area of hostilities and to safeguard China through a recognition of her neutrality and her "administrative entity" by both belligerents. By the spring of 1905 Japan gained notable victories over Russia, whose army operated at a disadvantage at the terminus of the single-track Siberian railway, and whose naval force collapsed. The successes of Japan brought both her material and her financial resources to the verge of exhaustion. Both belligerents were anxious for peace if it could be obtained without seeming to invite it.

On June 8, 1905, began the negotiation of a peace. "I first satisfied myself," said Roosevelt, "that each side wished me to act, but that, naturally and properly, each

side was exceedingly anxious that the other side should not believe that the action was taken on its initiative. I then sent an identical note to the two powers." The movement thus started advanced rapidly toward consummation. Commissioners were appointed on both sides to negotiate peace, and through the summer of 1905 they sat at the Portsmouth Navy Yard, in New Hampshire, after a formal reception on the presidential yacht, *Mayflower*, at Oyster Bay. More than once during the conference the danger of a deadlock appeared, but as the weeks advanced the President exerted continuous pressure to produce an agreement. Japan found England willing to renew the treaty of alliance of 1902; and Russia, experimenting with self-government and the first phases of revolution, felt the need of peace. The conclusion of the treaty prepared the way for a resumption by the powers of the negotiation begun at The Hague in 1899, but before the Second Hague Conference convened, Europe was brought to the verge of war by the crisis at Morocco.

The status of Morocco involved the interests of England, France, and Germany. England and France had agreed in 1904 that France should be responsible for the maintenance of order there. The German Empire, anxious to break up the new friendly relations between England and France, insisted upon independence for Morocco, or international control. In March, 1905, the Emperor visited the Sultan at Tangier "to make it known that I am determined to do all in my power to safeguard efficaciously the interests of Germany in Morocco." The result of this dramatic "rattling of the saber" was a general conference on the Moroccan question held at Algeciras in January, 1906. The work of the conference has an important bearing upon European rivalries that were already leading Europe toward a general war. The United States was represented, and may even have caused the conference; the newly acquired interest in world politics was recognized by the rest of the powers; and the Administration recognized the American share in the responsibility for international peace.

The first conference at The Hague adjourned in 1899 in the hope that it might be followed by a second conference which should continue its discussion of the laws of war, the reduction of armaments, and the arbitration of controversies. The court of justice created by the conference was seldom used until the United States appeared there as a litigant in the controversy with Mexico over the Pious fund, and induced the European powers to bring thither their claims against Venezuela. President Roosevelt determined in 1904 to summon a second conference, and Hay issued a preliminary note to that effect, but the Russo-Japanese War made the date inappropriate, while Russia indicated a desire to invite the conference. Upon the signature of the Treaty of Portsmouth, the Russian ambassador, Baron Rosen, brought up the matter, with the result that on June 15, 1907, the delegates convened at The Hague. Among the topics suggested for discussion the limitation of armaments was the most important. England, just embarking upon the construction of the early dreadnaughts, was anxious to reach some agreement to lessen the cost of the naval rivalry. The American delegates, headed by Joseph H. Choate, were ready to support this movement, but the continental powers were found to be unwilling to entrust their safety to anything but their own armed forces. The Algeciras episode intensified the French fear of German attack, while in Germany the military party was deliberately relying upon war and conquest as a means of securing national advantage. The American delegation presented the old American ideal of the exemption of private property from capture at sea. The South American delegations supported the doctrine of their publicist, Drago, that the forcible collection of private international debts must be forbidden.

The work of the second conference was summed up in several conventions relating to the pacific settlement of international disputes, the Drago doctrine, and the laws of war. An attempt to create a real court of arbitral justice was defeated by the inability of the conference to agree

Second
Hague
Conference

upon the selection of its judges. It was determined to hold a conference upon maritime warfare in the near future, and to hold a third great conference at The Hague at a suitable date.

The naval conference was initiated by Great Britain in 1908 and convened in the following winter with ten naval powers represented. The Declaration of London that it formulated was proposed to the world in 1909 as an interpretation of the "generally recognized principles of international law." Its seventy articles covered blockade, contraband, unneutral service, enemy character, and search. It was never ratified, even England withholding its formal approval, but it was accepted as a statement of the general trend of international maritime law.

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CHAPTER XV

BUSINESS IN POLITICS

AMONG the destructive results of the panic of 1893 was the bankruptcy of many of the great railroads. These had been overbuilt during the preceding decade. The railways to the Pacific had been multiplied, for speculative purposes, beyond any reasonable prospect of need, and these new lines collapsed upon themselves as business fell away and credit became difficult to obtain. There is no clearer indication of reviving prosperity after 1896 than the systematic emergence of these roads from the hands of their receivers, and their reorganization in larger systems than had hitherto been known. By 1901 the period of reorganization was so well advanced that the plight of the railroads became less interesting than the effect of their combinations upon public welfare. In February, 1901, announcement was made of a merger of Southern Pacific lines that went beyond any precedent in railroad finance.

The Southern Pacific merger was largely the result of the financial genius of Edward H. Harriman, whose reputation was well established as a builder of roads. It was founded upon one of his successful reconstructions, by which the Union Pacific system had been resuscitated by him after the panic of 1893 and converted into a valuable property.

After the completion of its main line in 1869, the owners of the Union Pacific system became aware of the fact that their property was not a unit. East of the Great Salt Lake the Union Pacific stretched across the plains to Council Bluffs, and found itself dependent for its through business upon the Central Pacific that ran west from the Great Salt Lake to Sacramento Bay. The opportunities of the two roads were unequal since the Union Pacific had few

near affiliations or friends, while the Central Pacific was dominated by a group of active California capitalists who were equally in control of the network of lines known as the Southern Pacific. Leland Stanford and Collis P. Huntington were the best known of the group. Their boldness as railroad promoters was matched by their skill in securing favors from Congress and the Western States. Before 1885 they were in possession of working agreements over the Santa Fe and Texas Pacific roads, as well as their own main line through Yuma, El Paso, San Antonio, and Houston to New Orleans.

It was natural that little traffic found its way from the Central Pacific to the Union Pacific, if it could as well be routed over one of the southern lines. The Union Pacific, manipulated by Jay Gould in the eighties, was driven to organize a system of dependent lines for itself, and piled up a trackage of about seventy-six hundred miles before the panic of 1893 flattened it out. When Harriman gained control of the Union Pacific after the panic, the system was run down, and was reputed to consist of no more than two streaks of rust across the plains. He rebuilt the line, straightening curves and cutting down the grades, and constructing finally a gigantic causeway across the northern tip of the Great Salt Lake. He reassembled the mileage under his influence by rental, absorption, or friendly agreement.

The Southern Pacific system and the reorganized Union Pacific covered the whole southwestern quarter of the United States. During 1900 it became known that the Huntington holdings in the Southern Pacific were in the market for sale. Harriman saw the opportunity to merge the two railroad empires. The purchase was announced in February; the Union Pacific borrowed money on a special issue of bonds, and with the proceeds of the loan became the owner of its former rival. The absorption of more than fifteen thousand miles of track under a single management, and subject to the control of Harriman, was a big enough fact to fix

Union and
Southern
Pacific
merger

public attention upon the new period of financial concentration.

The news of the merger of the two Southwestern systems had not yet lost its novelty when the New York Stock Exchange gave evidence of a mysterious activity in the affairs of another continental line, the Northern Pacific. Henry Villard had finished this line in 1883. The four Territories that it traversed, North Dakota, Montana, Idaho, and Washington, became States in 1890-91, but their population was too sparse to safeguard the road against failure. In its immediate neighborhood it was by no means supreme. In the Granger area at its eastern end the railroad net of the Chicago, Burlington & Quincy served wide areas with local facilities. Its western end found itself in direct competition with the new line, the Great Northern that James J. Hill pushed through in 1893. The Great Northern, which paralleled the Northern Pacific throughout its whole length, was the result of the persistent enterprise of its promoter, who had observed the failures of the Northern Pacific, to profit by them. He drove his last spike in January, 1893, and eight months later the Northern Pacific became insolvent.

An unexpected activity in Northern Pacific stocks in the spring of 1901 suggested that something might be on foot
 Northern Pacific
 panic, May
 9, 1901
 respecting these Northern roads, whose dominance in the Northwest was as complete as that of the Harriman lines over the Southwest. On May 9, 1901, the stock market broke under heavy speculation with no Northern Pacific stock in sight, and with speculators, who had sold it short, in vain running their offerings up to a thousand dollars per share. The panic was confined largely to professional brokers and had no bearing on the general financial strength of the country. When the confusion had subsided, it was discovered that financial interests behind the Great Northern and the Burlington, James J. Hill and J. Pierpont Morgan and their associates, had undertaken to pick up a control of Northern Pacific at the same time that E. H. Harriman had determined to

attach it to his Union Pacific holdings. The battle of the financial giants added to the impression that financial doings were assuming such dimensions as to have a direct though uncertain effect on public interests.

In most of the railroad systems of the country mergers were under way that were less startling in magnitude than those of the Far West, but resembled them in that the financial control involved generally ^{Mergers} originated not far from Wall Street. Industrial combinations had the same tendency to centralize in New York, and these within the last few months had shown the same disposition as the railway combinations to grow in size. The Standard Oil Company had for more than twenty years been the chief text for speakers who decried the trusts. Its habits as a corporation had been displayed in the court records of many States, and invariably it had been able to meet an industrial or a legal rebuff by a new legal or industrial device, as effective as the old and at least not yet declared unlawful.

In the same month in which the Harriman merger was announced, the name of Andrew Carnegie threatened to eclipse that of John D. Rockefeller as a pro- ^{United} moter of monopoly. The United States Steel ^{States Steel} Corporation was launched with an aggregate ^{Corporation} capitalization of eleven hundred million dollars and with a clear tendency not only toward consolidation, but toward the kind of industrial independence that the railroads were working for. Each of the great railroad systems was struggling to bring within itself terminal points for its heaviest traffic, so as to lessen its dependence upon neighboring lines and to escape the wastes of competition. Concentration in industry had in the Standard Oil Company gone as far as it could. The new Steel Corporation was more truly described by the word "integration."

Most of the classic trusts were concerned with a single commodity. They eliminated competition as their output increased in volume, and approached more or less nearly the total consumption of the country, whether of oil or

sugar or whiskey or tobacco or any of the other commodities involved; but each trust as it eliminated its rivals in the same industry developed new and equally intense rivalry at different points. The producers of its raw material, the railways that transported its goods, and the buyers that absorbed its output, offered a competition that only increased in bitterness as the trust increased in size.

The trusts of 1901 tried to integrate under their control the related processes as well as the terminal associates of the industry. In the United States Steel Corporation integration was nearly complete. More than two hundred and fifty separate companies, using about half of the total ore produced in the United States, were brought together. The integration began with the ore companies that owned the raw material, and maintained continuously in the field their gangs of prospectors who searched the hidden places of the earth for more deposits. Coal companies were included, and were selected with reference to their location, their capacity, and the chemical availability of their product. Coal and ore railroads, as well as the lines of ore steamers on the Great Lakes, reduced the dependence of the corporation upon competitive carriers. Smelting mills, steel furnaces, rolling mills, and factories for the final manufacture of iron and steel in all the finished forms completed the integrated organization that seemed to be as nearly independent as any corporation could be.

In the summer of 1901 the new Steel Corporation came into conflict with organized labor, and was able to win without even a serious fight. There was no doubt but that the prosperity that had been so earnestly desired in the election of 1900 had fully arrived, but there was genuine question as to what to do with it. The statute books of the several States were crowded with ineffective laws that had been passed to preserve competition and to prevent monopoly, but the only federal statute was the Sherman Anti-Trust Act of 1890, and this was commonly regarded as moribund. No National

Sherman
Anti-Trust
Act

Administration could fail to take cognizance of the business trend that produced such economic organizations as the Steel Corporation and the Harriman merger, but President Roosevelt found little in the recorded policies of his predecessor to guide him to positive action. The history of the Sherman Act, however, in its eleven years of activity, was rich in its negative evidences upon the control of business by the Government.

The Sherman Act forbade combinations or conspiracies in restraint of trade among the several States, and might be invoked by the Government itself in a public prosecution, by a private suitor who avowed himself injured by such combination, or by the defendant in any suit brought against him by a combination illegal because of this conspiracy. Down to 1901 it had been involved in some forty litigations, of which nearly half were brought by the Government against minor offenders, and in which no jurist but William Howard Taft had gained any considerable prominence. No attempt had been made to break up any of the great trusts on the ground that its very existence was in violation of the law. The panic of 1893 and its consequences had extended over half of the lifetime of the law, and in these years the practice of business had been too circumspect and cautious to give unusual affront. Henry Demarest Lloyd wrote his *Wealth against Commonwealth* in 1894, in an attempt to prove that a crisis in government was approaching; but wealth was chastened, and commonwealths were adverse to adding troubles where they were already too numerous, and no great public reaction followed to stimulate a wider use of the Sherman Law.

The political weakness of the Harrison Administration would have made it difficult for that President to have enforced the law with vigor: The attack of the Populists, threatening all capital with repudiation, drove Cleveland in his second term into affiliations with responsible business that were likely to lessen his disposition to become an anti-trust crusader. The party and faction of William McKinley avowedly represented the demand that Government

make it possible for business to exist, and McKinley died before the full tendency of the new trust movement had displayed itself. What he might have done had he lived is conjectural. A revision of his cherished views on the tariff was in his mind when the assassin struck him, but he sketched no course that could guide his successor. In neither party organization had there been strong tendency to distrust or impede the management of business.

The death of McKinley produced no shock in business, and the mergers that were under way continued through the autumn of 1901. The uncertainty as to what was happening in the case of Northern Pacific in the May panic was removed when it became known that the Harriman forces had been defeated, and Hill and Morgan had been victorious. In November the group of owners of the three railroads that together dominated the Northwestern States organized their holdings to safeguard their control. The law forbade the direct merging of the lines under the ownership of any one of them, and the only really important Supreme Court decision on the Sherman Act — the trans-Missouri freight case — had held that the prohibitions of the law extended to railroads as well as to industrial combinations. The Northern Securities Company of New Jersey was chartered to act as a holding company and take over the stock in the several roads. The complacent corporation laws of New Jersey made it easy for companies to operate with large powers under merely casual scrutiny. It was argued by the attorneys of the owners that a company could not conspire with itself, and that acts that might be illegal if performed by separate corporations became legal when these corporations had acquired a common owner. Before Christmas, 1901, the Northwestern States from Minnesota to the ocean were in action in their alarm at what they regarded as the menace of a railroad monopoly. Some of these States could still remember their activities a generation earlier in the Granger movement, and could recall the fact that the federal courts first recognized the full liability of a railroad company to

public control in the Granger cases that they had brought. Conferences were held among the officials of the States involved, where they discussed ways and means for meeting the attack. In the White House the movement was watched with interest and appreciation. The President called upon his Attorney-General, Philander C. Knox, for an opinion as to the legality of the Northern Securities Company, and whether the device of a holding company succeeded in evading the prohibition against conspiracy.

The appointment of Knox as Attorney-General had been criticized because his professional connections as a Pittsburgh lawyer made him appear to be the servant of big business. When he undertook to study the legality of this case, the Sherman Law was substantially, as Cullom, the author of the first Interstate Commerce Act declared, "a dead letter." On March 10, 1902, however, the National Government intervened in the situation in which the Northwestern States found themselves at a disadvantage, and Attorney-General Knox, by direction of the President, filed his petition for the outlawry of the Northern Securities Company.

From this moment a new economic policy was taken on. The Government intervened to protect the people from the operations of big business. As soon as Congress adjourned in the summer of 1902, Roosevelt went upon a speaking tour directing his attention to those "great corporations commonly called trusts." The *Outlook*, that knew well of what it wrote, declared a little later that the "peculiar popularity of Theodore Roosevelt dates from the beginning of his campaign for the regulation of the trusts in the summer of 1902." In the following session of Congress three acts were passed looking toward the more effective control of trusts. The Expedition Act of February 11, 1903, made it possible to prosecute with firmness and quick results. Federal suits of this character were given precedence on the dockets of the courts, and the creation of special trial courts to hear Gov-

Anti-trust
legislation,
1903

ernment prosecutions was provided for. The Northern Securities Case speedily found itself in one of these.

A few days after the Expedition Act, the Elkins Anti-Rebate Act struck at one of the most persistent and pernicious practices of the railroads. Many of the trusts were believed to have gained their dominance as the result of secret and unfair rebates on the carriage of their freight. The Department of Commerce and Labor was created on February 14, 1903, to provide a member in the Cabinet whose duty it should be to watch over the interests of the people in their economic relationships. The Commissioner of Labor, who had existed for nineteen years in the Interior Department, was brought into the new department with a going organization. A new Bureau of Corporations with duties to keep watch over business was entrusted to James R. Garfield, son of the former President, while George B. Cortelyou, who had risen from stenographer to Cleveland to private secretary to McKinley, entered the Cabinet as the new Secretary. Cortelyou's office, remarked the *Nation*, was the President's personal department, and a governmental field that was new and all his own.

Before the first session of his first Congress adjourned, in the summer of 1902, Roosevelt had taken his stand with reference to big business, had assisted in the launching of the new Cuban Republic, and had threatened to precipitate a controversy over the protective tariff because of his interest in reciprocity with Cuba.

There was some danger that Cuba, independent of Spain, and under its own government, would be worse off than before the Spanish War. Spain had at least given the colony a privileged position in her own trade. This was lost. A dependent Cuba belonging to the United States might have expected to share in the advantages of the free trade that was extended to Porto Rico, but free Cuba was a foreign country outside the law. Its Government immediately endeavored to negotiate for easy trade relations with the United States, and received the spir-

ited support of Roosevelt, to whom this was a matter of elementary fairness. The project was injured in the public mind by the fact that free trade in sugar was welcomed by the Sugar Trust; it was blocked in Congress by the stubborn antagonism of the "beet-sugar insurgents," who refused to permit a Cuban competition with their own domestic product. There were also some members who were quite willing to let Roosevelt learn that he could not expect Congress always to do his bidding. In June the President sent in a vigorous message on the subject, but failed to get action. Reciprocity with Cuba became one of the themes which he took with him upon his speaking trip.

Popular nervousness over the expansion of the trusts grew during the summer of 1902 and was paralleled in the Republican Party by an uneasiness as to the President's probable attitude toward business. ^{Anthracite strike, 1902} But a greater uneasiness, steadily increasing, had to do with the comfort of the approaching winter, for the second great strike of the anthracite miners had been under way since the middle of May and showed no prospect of yielding.

The leadership of John Mitchell in the strike of 1900 consolidated his power, increased the influence of the United Mine Workers, and engendered among the mine-owners a feeling that their situation was in danger. The impending contest involved more than the conditions of labor, and looked toward a complete recognition of the union, but was met by an inflexible refusal to accept the doctrine of the "closed shop." There was no presidential canvass on to weaken the strategic position of the owners. "The rights and interests of the laboring man," wrote George F. Baer, who became the chief spokesman of the operators, "will be protected and cared for — not by the labor agitators, but by the Christian men to whom God in His infinite wisdom has given the control of the property interests of this country, and upon the successful management of which so much depends."

With a public already suspicious of big business, Baer's letter, claiming that the capitalists were viceroys of Provi-

dence, had a wide and unexpected circulation. It gave the cue for cartoons without number, and from it may be traced the growth of sentiment that made it possible for the President to make another advance in policy.

The strike continued through the summer with the workers under steady discipline and with a minimum of lawlessness around the mines. Public sympathy was not alienated by the misconduct of miners. The unions showed a capacity to hold out and a deadlock threatened the country with a winter without coal. On October 3 Roosevelt summoned the presidents of the coal companies and Mitchell to a conference at the White House. He had already determined that if the deadlock could be broken in no other way he would "send in the United States Army to take possession of the coal fields." He had discussed the details of this with General Scofield, and intimated his intention to Senator Quay. It was a part of his intention to appoint a commission under ex-President Cleveland to "decide on the rights of the case" while the army got out the coal. The White House conference was turbulent. The coal presidents got angry, and Roosevelt confessed that "he behaved very badly himself, and that Mitchell was the only one who kept his temper and his head."

The demand of the President was for an immediate resumption of mining, accompanied by an examination into the merits of the controversy by a public commission. As the deadlock continued, there appeared repeatedly all over the country angry assertions of a new third interest in the controversy. The interest of the public was avowed to be superior to that of either miners or operators. Conservative business tended to criticize the President for forcing himself into a struggle in whose determination he had no legal rights. The great majority, however, expressed satisfaction at his intervention, and looked to Roosevelt with increasing confidence as the only agent who could conserve the public interest. On October 13 the operators yielded; work was soon resumed, and a commission was set to study the problem. The approaching fall elections found the

National Administration headed upon the policy toward labor indicated by the anthracite strike, and the public discussing whether or not the party had started upon a new career.

Four consecutive Republican Congresses were chosen in the four elections prior to 1902. The Republican Party approached the election of this year with confidence based upon its long tenure of office and its perfected party machine, and faced only those doubts that were indicated by the effect Roosevelt's new policies might have and the degree to which local leaders might dominate their regions. The tenure of the National Republican organization had been long enough for the development of local movements that now possessed considerable strength within the party.

In Iowa, New York, and Texas recent movements indicated a popular desire to break away from partisan control of local government. New York City, in the fall election of 1901, experienced another of its periodic revulsions against Tammany control, and elected Seth Low as mayor, at the head of a reform administration. The prospect of better government for Greater New York, for the city had now been extended over the adjacent communities, was an index to movements of similar character throughout the country.

In Cleveland a violent revulsion in politics brought Tom L. Johnson into office as mayor in the spring of 1901, on a program looking toward a broadening of city activities. Johnson had begun life in active business, and had made himself a fortune as an operator of street railways. About 1890 he had a short period in Congress. The outstanding feature in his intellectual life was his reading of Henry George's *Progress and Poverty*, and his conversion to its doctrines. In Cleveland he worked for municipal ownership of the street railways, and for the extension of civic services as "Golden-Rule" Jones had done in Toledo, and as Brand Whitlock was to continue in Toledo, after 1906. The constructive side of Populism was struggling to the surface in the spirit of these

men. The "Texas idea," that was just beginning to take hold, was advanced by the great flood which left Galveston desolate in 1900 and forced upon that city heroic efforts in reconstruction. It had for its view the divorce of municipal government from politics through the substitution of a commission form of government.

The lack of satisfaction with prevailing political methods was closely paralleled by dissatisfaction with political ideals. The "Iowa idea," launched in the Republican Convention in that State in July, 1902, showed that the party could not expect permanent docility even in the heart of its geographical area. The Iowa Republicans, headed by Governor Albert B. Cummins, questioned the wisdom of the extremes of protection, and accepted the dictum that the tariff was the mother of trusts. In the convention of 1902 the Iowa Republicans demanded a revision of the tariff in order to prevent shelter to monopoly, and approved Roosevelt's language with reference to trust control. Roosevelt took the cue from this manifestation of public opinion, and in his public speeches in the autumn urged a revision that should maintain the principle of protection and yet keep the tariff schedules flexible so that they might be subject to change by the expert advice of a non-partisan commission, which he advocated.

The revolt against the tariff and the belief that the President would support it struck at the heart of Republican doctrine. The party was not pledged to any course respecting the trusts, but the tariff idea had been its basic creed since the reorganization of the machine by Jones, Quay, and Hanna.

On November 4, 1902, the Republican Party elected its fifth consecutive Congress, but with a reduced majority. "The lesson it teaches to the Republican Party," was the comment of the *Outlook*, "is that, if it would retain the support of the voters, it should follow the President's lead in modifying the tariff and establishing more rigid public control of the operations of the trusts."

The party heresies in Iowa produced a national conse-

quence of much importance. David B. Henderson, of Iowa, Congressman from the Dubuque district, announced in the summer of 1902 that he would not be a candidate to succeed himself. Since he was Speaker of the House of Representatives, this meant that in the new Congress a successor must be found. He had succeeded Thomas B. Reed, when the latter dropped out in 1899, dissatisfied with his party's trend. Henderson was identified with the movement for high protection that Governor Cummins questioned. His opponents said that he could not have been renominated had he desired.

When the new Congress met in 1903 the lesson of the "Iowa idea" had no influence upon the conduct of the Republican majority. Joseph G. Cannon, of Illinois, a sturdy Republican, with an appearance ^{Joseph G. Cannon} reminiscent of the tradition of Lincoln and with no question in his heart as to the merit of the tariff, was chosen to be Speaker. He had already sat in fourteen Congresses, and nearly thirty years previously he had been described as speaking "with an eloquence that was untutored, but very effective. . . . He spoke of the hayseed in his hair, and under the magic touch of his voice that hayseed glowed around his head like the halo of the martyrs." Before his first session as Speaker was over, the *Outlook* commented upon his "equal mixture of drollery, ruggedness, frankness, and common sense," and asserted that he had "established a personal relationship with the members of the House of Representatives quite unique."

The leadership of Cannon respecting the tariff was in a different direction from that advised by President Roosevelt, but the latter kept on cordial terms with "Uncle Joe," the Speaker. The question of the party nominations for 1904 was arousing comment at the date of Cannon's election, and the group of Republicans that decried the influence that Roosevelt was exerting over the party was hopefully casting about for a candidate stronger with the people and acceptable to themselves. This candidate they found in Senator Marcus Alonzo Hanna.

Mark Hanna was "the full flower of the spirit of commercialism in politics." Twenty years before his successful generalship landed McKinley in the White House he had been identified with his party in Ohio, but had devoted most of his attention to his private business. After 1897 he became a public figure. Opposition cartoonists caricatured him as bloated business, branded with the dollar mark, but before 1900 his personal appearance and his shrewd wisdom had begun to contribute to his reputation as a statesman. Unused to public speaking when he entered the Senate, he learned the trade and became an acceptable speaker on national affairs. Everywhere he went he gained the positive interest of conservative society, and lessened the hostility of others. His intervention in the coal strike of 1900 left him with a genuine interest in the problems of labor, to which his active membership in the new National Civic Federation soon bore witness. Before the death of McKinley Southern Republicans had begun to talk of him as a conservative Republican candidate for 1904.

Hanna was never really a candidate for the nomination, but did not effectually withdraw his name from discussion. He allowed the uncertainty as to his intentions to worry Roosevelt, who was frankly a candidate for renomination to succeed himself. Even if there had been ambitions, Hanna knew they could not be realized because of an incurable disease. He died on February 15, 1904, bringing to an end all of the hopes that stirred among those who desired to elect some other President than Roosevelt. Other than Hanna there was no possible competitor for the Republican nomination.

Between the death of Hanna and the opening of the Republican Convention on June 21, most of the evidences of party difference were eliminated. The conservative leaders gave their support to the President, to Root for temporary chairman, and to Cannon for permanent chairman. Jacob Riis published in serial form his laudatory biography, *Theodore Roosevelt the Citizen*; Francis E. Leupp brought out *The*

Man Roosevelt. The conservatives accepted Roosevelt, the rank and file of the party acclaimed him, and he himself paid the price by postponing his demands for revision of the tariff and for other unsettling policies.

The conservative decision of the President was made clear by the treatment of Wisconsin Republicans at the convention. In Wisconsin, like Iowa, there had been uneasiness at organization control. Robert M. La Follette, after three terms in Congress, had advanced his claim to be governor on a platform of tax reform, direct primaries, and corporation control. In 1896 and again in 1898 he was beaten at the Republican Convention. In 1900 he gained the nomination and was elected governor for the first of three terms.

The Wisconsin legislation between 1900 and 1905 laid the foundations of the "Wisconsin idea," beginning with primary legislation and railway control. As a "champion of the people's rights," Governor La Follette desired to head the Wisconsin delegation to the Republican Convention. A bolting Republican State Convention selected a different delegation, dominated by the two Senators from the State, and Henry C. Payne, who was Roosevelt's Postmaster-General. The Republican National Convention excluded the regular delegation and seated the conservative bolting group. After 1904 it was always possible for critics of President Roosevelt to use this discrimination against a reform Republican as evidence of political insincerity.

The Republican ticket was completed by the nomination of Charles W. Fairbanks for Vice-President, and the selection of George B. Cortelyou as chairman of the Republican National Committee.

The Democratic Convention at Saint Louis had no obvious candidate or issue. The new policies of President Roosevelt had attracted the interest of many voters who had supported Bryan in the last two campaigns. Bryan himself was not a candidate, but stood outside the ring to let the convention do its best without him. Populism had ceased to be a vital force. The middle-

The
"Wisconsin
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Roosevelt
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Alton B.
Parker

of-the-road Populists held a national convention that emphasized their unimportance. The Democratic Convention heeded neither the Populists' appeals for the observance of their ancient faith nor the journalistic efforts of William Randolph Hearst to secure the nomination for himself. The final selection was Judge Alton B. Parker, of New York, whose earlier political affiliations had been with the faction of David B. Hill. Some regarded his nomination as the end of Democratic rule by "a minority who were enslaved while in a hypnotic trance." This impression was strengthened by a sensational telegram to the convention, in which Judge Parker notified his party of his repudiation of the Bryan doctrine of free silver. The political depression of the Democrats is measured by the fact that some of them talked seriously of a fourth nomination of Grover Cleveland, as the only person who could beat Roosevelt.

The struggle for the votes in 1904 was one-sided in that the personality of Judge Parker was no match for that of President Roosevelt. The Democratic Party had no principles that were not more attractively stated in either the Republican platform or the speeches of the President, and the country was still rioting in the prosperity that had dominated the preceding campaign. Not until the last of the canvass did any matter of genuine interest appear. Then came an episode, as a consequence of which, says John Hay, Judge Parker "was called a liar, and a malignant liar, and a knowing and conscious liar," by the President.

The issue involved had been hinted at by Democratic speakers throughout the canvass. They had complained that Cortelyou, Roosevelt's campaign manager, had as Secretary of Commerce and Labor been in a position through his Bureau of Corporations to examine the private accounts of big business. They charged that the great corporations were giving freely to the Republican campaign fund, and they insinuated as directly as they dared that in his connection there was an opportunity for possible blackmail. On the last day of October Judge Parker, speaking in Madison Square Garden, de-

Campaign
contribu-
tions

nounced Cortelyou's campaign fund as a scandal and repeated the insinuation as to his methods. To this President Roosevelt replied in a resounding and indignant denial of the fact and the inference. Whether the Democratic inference of blackmail was correct or not, the fact was that great corporations, following their usual practice, had made large gifts. George W. Perkins soon admitted making a contribution of nearly fifty thousand dollars on behalf of the New York Life Insurance Company, and other contributions were subsequently brought to light in the Senate investigation of 1912. In 1907 Congress forbade any federal corporation to contribute to any campaign fund, and any corporation to contribute toward the election of a President, a Senator, or a Representative.

The attack of Judge Parker created a ripple of interest, but was more than offset, for the time being, by Roosevelt's denial and his appeal to "all men of common sense" and "all honest men." No President had ever received so large a majority as Roosevelt did in 1904. Eugene V. Debs, the Socialist candidate, ran third with six hundred thousand votes.

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In studying the presidential elections after 1900, one misses the *Annual Cyclopaedia*, which ceased publication, and which had no adequate successor. The valuable E. Stanwood, *History of the Presidency* (1898), received in 1912 a second volume covering the elections of 1900, 1904, and 1908.

CHAPTER XVI

MUCKRAKING AND THE NEW STANDARDS

THE attack upon big business directed by Roosevelt in 1902 and 1903 was the first and the heaviest of the shocks that destroyed the complacency of the American spirit and introduced a period of suspicion and distrust. The America of the nineties was impregnated with what some critics described as gross materialism. The history of the nation had seen the rewards of life fall to the individual with spirit and ingenuity. The frontier ideal had everywhere prevailed, and had gloried in the successful surmounting of obstacles. The road from the log cabin to the White House had been traveled more than once, and the other road that led to wealth and business influence was beaten broad and smooth. Public opinion looked upon the successful man as a desirable asset in society. Individuals looked forward to success for themselves as a reasonable expectation, and the resulting popular confidence in personal achievement produced a spirit of complacency in the presence of material comfort. The inspiring careers of the captains of the industrial development lost much of their luster as the spirit got abroad that business was corrupt, and that success was often founded upon unfair practices.

Before the mechanism for the control of trusts could be created, the public had to be shown that the trusts were bad enough to need control. Criminal prosecutions and public attacks directed from the seats of the mighty helped to accomplish this. The period of suspicion was hastened by the advent of a literature of exposure that dragged unsightly practices from the seclusion of private business and invested them with a public interest. It was a short step for public opinion, from its stand that the trust must obey the law, to its next stand that, in a great strike, the interests of the direct combatants were less than

Opportunity
in America

Exposure
of trusts

those of the general public; and from this to its new position that all business that affected the public was the public's business.

The Roosevelt Administration witnessed the development of the literature of exposure as it passed from sensation to sensation, and ended in a riot among the unsightly facts that suggested the name of "muckraking" to cover the process. It beheld as well an improvement in standards of taste and a broadening of appreciation in literature and art. It saw also a revival of interest in education and in the sciences that bear upon the facts of life. The practice of government began to change, under the influence of non-political experts whose decisions were more and more based upon scholarly judgments, and whose number increased with each new function of supervision assumed by the United States.

A new national journalism was the vehicle of the muckrakers. The American newspaper passed through one stage in its development with the group of editors that flourished after the Civil War — Greeley and Reid, Bowles, Halstead, Horace White, and Henry Watter-<sup>New jour-
nalism</sup>son. The vogue of the personal editors weakened in the eighties as changed habits in advertising and modern methods of handling news through the press associations threw their influence in favor of local and colorless journalism founded upon the interests of the business office. In the nineties no American journal had an influence such as Horace Greeley exerted for a generation with his weekly *Tribune*. The new journals of local gossip founded by Hearst and his imitators substituted thrill and flavor for influence and sound knowledge, and did little to help in the formation of an enlightened public opinion.

The mechanical devices of the printing trade made possible new results in the printing of periodicals. The half-tone process and the zinc etching made their appearance in the eighties, followed by illustration on a scale of accuracy and beauty hitherto unknown. The improvements in transportation increased the range and ease of

distribution, and prepared the way for a type of journalism that was represented by *McClure's Magazine*, in 1893.

The story of the ten-cent magazines has to do with the widening of interest in forms of literature higher than the daily press. The old literary magazines kept to their policy and their higher prices in spite of the new competition. The *Atlantic*, *Harper's Monthly*, *Century*, and *Scribner's Magazine* had established definite reputations before S. S. McClure organized the invasion of their field. *McClure's Monthly*, *Munsey's*, and *The Cosmopolitan* were the chief members of the young periodical group that reached out for the news-stand trade at a nominal price, and that sought for literary wares of interest to the new clientèle.

The limitations of this clientèle are discussed in the autobiography of S. S. McClure. The range included the S. S. great middle class capable of larger interests
McClure than the ephemeral daily press could satisfy, yet not up to as high standards as the readers of the *Atlantic* and *Harper's*. The *Century Magazine* had come in contact with this class to its great financial profit when in the eighties it ran its two serials, the "Biography of Lincoln," by Nicolay and Hay, and the "Battles and Leaders of the Civil War," by the leaders themselves. The new cheap magazines made deliberate search for articles that should be universal in their appeal, and hence marketable over the whole country. They needed also to be obvious in their significance, for the profits of the business depended upon reaching a public unaccustomed to serious reading. A thrill of some sort was indispensable. The yellow journals were already flourishing upon the appetite of society for exciting news. The ideal material for the new periodicals combined universality with obvious clearness, and some of the element that came to be known as "punch."

McClure was the leader among the new periodical journalists and early in his career discovered the greatest of his
Ida M. co-editors, Ida M. Tarbell. Two serials by this
Tarbell young historian, covering the lives of Lincoln and Napoleon, exploited the growing interest in Lincoln's

democracy and in the centennial of Bonaparte. McClure sensed immediately the fact that business contained the themes for stories once the attention of the public was directed to the conduct of business. In 1903 Miss Tarbell began to publish in *McClure's Magazine* her "History of the Standard Oil Company," which was documented and criticized as a sound piece of historical investigation, and which proved to lay the foundation for a new period of national thought. It began in a serious way the literature of exposure.

From making serious studies in the habits of business to muckraking for the sake of the muck carried the new journalism through a period of four years. The little group of monthlies, supplemented by *Collier's Weekly*, did the burden of pioneer work in responsible exposure. They commonly safeguarded themselves before publication by accumulating evidence that might be an adequate defense if their victims brought suit for libel, but their trail was followed by irresponsible sensation-mongers attracted only by the thrills of exposure and the profits of huge circulation. Among the most prominent of the products of the new literature were Lincoln Steffens's *Shame of the Cities*, Thomas Lawson's *Frenzied Finance*, and the revelations on patent medicine and its advertising that *Collier's Weekly* published.

Fiction was brought into the ranks to serve the muckrakers. Cut-throat speculation furnished the theme for Frank Norris's *Octopus* (1901); the offenses of the meat-packers inspired Upton Sinclair's *Jungle* (1906), while the political intrigues of railroads and big business were used by Winston Churchill in *Coniston* (1906).

Exposure was both useful and profitable while it maintained its connection with reality. As the months went on much of it became irresponsible, and at once created among its readers a desire for excitement and highly seasoned news, and destroyed the good balance of their judgment. The worship of success with which the critics had reproached American opinion in the

nineties was transmuted into suspicion and social hatred. Epithets came to be substituted for constructive analysis, and Roosevelt had not got far into his second term before muckraking had become an obstruction to reform instead of its ally. In April, 1906, having occasion to deliver an address at the corner-stone laying of the new office building for the House of Representatives, the President sought to slow down the movement that he himself had so greatly stimulated. He called for a halt in muckraking, pointing out what John Bunyan had known when he used the phrase, that muck is of use only when it serves to fertilize the land — not when it is gathered for its own sake. The time had come, he declared, to turn to constructive work to remedy the evils that had been exposed. The reality of these evils was too true to be denied. Charles E. Hughes found them permeating the business of insurance; Joseph W. Folk uncovered them in the Middle West; Garfield in his public office showed the unfair practices that prevailed in the transportation of petroleum. "What we have been witnessing," declared the venerable Washington Gladden, "is a new Apocalypse, an uncovering of the iniquity of the land. . . . We have found that no society can march hellward faster than a democracy under the banner of unbridled individualism."

American literary taste and appreciation, distorted by the one-sided activities of the muckrakers, was nevertheless surer of itself in the twentieth century than it had been two decades earlier. No European visitor could start as wide a ripple of irritation or self-examination in 1905 as Matthew Arnold and James Bryce did in their day. The correspondence of President Roosevelt with Sir George Otto Trevelyan, the historian of the American Revolution, reveals the degree to which the best of the English had come to understand America; while America took itself as an established fact, and a growing number of Americans lived in the intellectual currents of the whole world, accepting and valuing ideals without much reference to their origin. It was still possible for a foreigner, like Maxim

Literary
taste

Gorky, to weaken his standing in an instant by a departure from the accepted American code of morals; but where he failed a hundred others succeeded in gaining the approval of the country.

Ellen Terry and Sir Henry Irving were for a generation living evidence of the standard taste that disregarded the Atlantic Ocean. From his first appearance in ^{Drama} America in 1883 until the end of the century, he, or they — for they frequently appeared together — won unvarying popularity for their presentations of romantic drama. Irving found Edwin Booth at the top of his career when he first appeared, Joseph Jefferson already well established as “Bob Acres” and “Rip Van Winkle,” Richard Mansfield just starting a long career with a success in *A Parisian Romance*, the younger Sothorn taking over some of his father’s glory, and Denman Thompson reaching the middle tones of American life in the perennial *Old Homestead*. Year after year, as Irving and Terry returned to the American theaters in their Shakespearean revivals, they found the personnel changing and the standard rising. It ceased to be true, as Henry Ward Beecher once suggested, that “the only amusements tolerated by the American Church were Banking and the Currency.” John Drew, Nat C. Goodwin, and Francis Wilson established themselves in their fields of social comedy and farce, while Julia Marlowe, Maude Adams, and Ethel Barrymore brought charm and delicacy into a profession that had long needed it.

Edwin Booth died in 1893, after having turned his home and much of his fortune over to his profession, in the form of the Players’ Club, which he founded in New York. For a decade more Joseph Jefferson took his place as dean of the American stage, yielding the position on his death to Edward H. Sothorn and Julia Marlowe. By the end of the first decade of the new century, while taste was becoming standardized throughout the English-speaking world, the rivals of the old drama were forcing doubts as to its survival. In the lighter forms the pageantry of the old *Black Crook*, that ran for a generation as a New York recreation for

country visitors, yielded to vaudeville and musical comedy. The melodious entertainment of comic opera, whose *Pinafore* and *Mikado* set the eighties to humming tunes, suffered with the drama. Lottie Collins, with her noisy *Ta-ra-ra-boom-de-ay*, and Anna Held and Yvette Guilbert, with their foreign accent and their songs of shady suggestion, brought the standards of the European music-halls to America in the nineties. The moving pictures began in the next decade to cheapen dramatic art and to popularize its substitutes.

The historian of the drama might perhaps show that the amount of interest in the highest forms of theatrical art steadily increased, but seemed proportionately less because of the multitude of cheap and inferior productions that grew even more rapidly as city populations with money to spend became more dense and numerous. The best acting was, perhaps, not declining below the standard of the Booths; musical appreciation was being created and improved on every hand. The work of Theodore Thomas laid the foundations of American music in the East in the seventies and in the West in the eighties. His orchestra in Chicago made that city a musical center after the World's Fair; while the Boston Symphony Orchestra, under the persistent patronage of Major Henry L. Higginson, maintained standards creditable anywhere. In the city amusement parks, gaining rapidly in popularity as electric transportation made it possible to reach them, music found additional patrons, and orchestras and bands multiplied. John Philip Sousa and Walter Damrosch helped to increase the popular understanding of good music. The father of the latter, Leopold Damrosch, was one of the early pioneers in the task.

Grand opera became fashionable before it became popular in the United States. The opening of Henry E. Abbey's Metropolitan Opera House in New York in 1883 was one of the early landmarks in its development, and coincided within a few months with the first presentation of Wagner's *Parsifal* at Bayreuth. Thomas and Damrosch were

already playing most of the Wagnerian scores to concert audiences before the importation of foreign singers made their operatic production practicable in the United States. It was a long distance from Barnum's exploitation of Jenny Lind, in 1850, to the grand opera season in New York in the nineties, with its huge subscription list and its display of millinery. The extension of the capacity to appreciate the best in music moved more rapidly in the next two decades as the phonograph in its various forms carried musical education far beyond the widest of the concert audiences. The operatic singers found the profits of their profession vastly increased by the clientèle created by the phonograph.

By the side of the broadening taste in matters of artistic appreciation there was a broadening of the religious spirit in America. The Church in the twentieth cen-
Religion
and social
spirit
 tury seemed to be developing its social implications and subordinating its doctrinal. There were no conceded leaders of the relative eminence of Phillips Brooks or Henry Ward Beecher, whose churches were almost national monuments twenty years earlier. The emotional side of religion that had been represented by Moody and Sankey was continued by Billy Sunday and his imitators. But religious thought, in the pulpit and outside it, had come under the influence of science and sociology. Inter-denominational respect and tolerance had succeeded theological bickering. The institutional church was an accomplished fact, and derived powerful support from non-sectarian bodies like the Young Men's Christian Association and the Young Women's Christian Association. Heresy trials became so rare as to appear anomalous, and church papers generally lost both acidity and colorless piety, while some, like the *Independent* and the *Christian Union*, branched out into broader journalism. A growing zeal for social service gave strength to the movement for political reform.

The indignation at the trend of business, upon which the muckrakers fattened, coincided with a new feeling of re-

sponsibility for the public welfare on behalf of the very offenders who were denounced. Both John D. Rockefeller and Andrew Carnegie became notable leaders in the encouragement of new movements in education, while a multitude of other benefactors enlarged the endowments of universities and colleges.

For Andrew Carnegie the flotation of the United States Steel Corporation marked a transition from captain of industry to sage and benefactor. He was already identified with an educational movement which showed itself in the raising of a multitude of libraries bearing his name. In January, 1902, he turned over a clear gift of ten million dollars to the Carnegie Institution of Washington for the encouragement of research. There had been a question in his mind as to whether he should create a new institution as Johns Hopkins did, or revivify an old one, as Rockefeller did with the University of Chicago. The final decision, in which Daniel C. Gilman had a large share, was to create an institution to advance those aspects of research that found difficulty in being cultivated in existing institutions. The scientific bureaus organized in the Carnegie Institution were soon at work upon a range of studies that spread from the European sources of the history of the United States to the deflection of the needle toward the magnetic pole.

In 1905 Carnegie set aside a second fund to be administered for the improvement of teaching by the Carnegie Foundation. A system of professorial pensions and retiring allowances was brought into existence by this means. A little later he created a Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, and before he died, in 1919, he had approached his ambition to die poor by consecrating the great bulk of his wealth to the Carnegie Corporation (1911) with a mandate to keep his other endowments supplied with funds.

The Southern Education Board, created in 1901 with Robert C. Ogden as its guiding spirit, was an outgrowth of the Northern interest in Southern education already ex-

pressed in the Peabody and Slater funds. In 1903 the General Education Board was incorporated on the initiative of the Rockefellers to assist by encouragement and gift in the development of education by private means. The Rockefeller Institute (1901) devoted itself to the laboratory study of medical problems, and the Rockefeller Foundation (1913) drew to itself in 1917 one of the most inspiring of the University presidents, George E. Vincent, to develop its universal campaign for social betterment.

The new university presidents of the first decade of the twentieth century gave evidence to the growing determination that higher education should solve the ^{Trend of the} specific problems. A great scientist at Johns ^{Universities} Hopkins, Ira Remsen (1902), continued the tradition of pure research that Gilman had established. At Columbia University, Nicholas Murray Butler (1902) turned his broad humanitarian culture to the service of education. At Wisconsin Charles Richard Van Hise (1903) came as a great economic geologist to help solve the problems on the borderline of government and science. At Princeton a layman, Woodrow Wilson (1902), took up the burden for the cultivation of democratic ideals. "I have studied the history of America," he said in his inaugural; "I have seen her grow great in the paths of liberty and of progress by following after great ideals. Every concrete thing that she has done has seemed to rise out of some abstract principle, some vision of the mind. The greatest victories have been the victories of peace [and] of humanity."

In the mind of the muckraker the injustices of the economic system were ascribable to the unrestrained cupidity and criminal designs of wealth. The point of view was not far different from that of organized socialism that put its first presidential ticket in the field in 1900, and endeavored thereafter to show that capitalism lay at the root of all evil. It is not necessary for the historian to accept this easy diagnosis of the conditions that were revealed by investigations and prosecutions. Government was undergoing a change in both its purpose and method, and it would have

been difficult, with the best and most conscientious of intentions, to have avoided much of the injustice that accompanied the industrial revolution.

Steadily since the close of the Civil War the business of government — city, state, or national — had increased in volume and in scope. One after another the people entrusted to their representatives tasks they had formerly performed themselves, like water supply and drainage, as well as tasks that had gone unperformed in the earlier stages of American organization, like food inspection and the reclamation of arid lands. Not until 1883 was the principle definitely accepted that the tenure of public office by the civil servant must be connected with capacity and a proper fulfillment of duties. The amount of work to be done steadily increased, while the technical portion of it became every year a larger part of the whole.

With the approval of the people Government entered into a field in which decisions could not be reached by political argument, and in which proper action could be based only upon technical skill. The conclusions of the bacteriologists and the plant pathologists in the Government service could have no connection with practical politics, yet all American legislative bodies in the nineteenth century were organized chiefly for the purpose of reaching political decisions. Before Government could readjust itself to the new idea that made it the protector of individual liberty and opportunity, it was necessary to devise new methods in legislation in order to make it possible for political legislatures to direct scientific or technical operations.

Congress and the legislatures gradually and almost unconsciously changed their habits. The public debate became less important than the committee hearing. Before the committees, experts in the various fields of government made their appearance to explain the reasonableness of the programs that were recommended. These programs in increasing degree depended upon the integrity of the scholarship of expert civil servants. The process was under way

Government by experts

during the muckraking epoch, but both legislators and experts had much to learn before the final position of both in the new scheme could be established. A clean heart and a love for the people was not an adequate preparation for regulating the railroads, nor was the most expert scientific attainment a guarantee of wisdom in the direction of public policy. The germ of the British Parliament, the mother of American legislatures, was provided in ancient local financial juries that heard testimony and rendered verdicts. History was in a way repeating itself as the twentieth-century legislatures learned to sit in judgment over the technical plans brought up to them from the administrative departments of government. What the muckraker ascribed to guilty manipulation may in part have been due to guilt, but has a simpler explanation in the fact that industry had grown more rapidly than the theory of the state.

When Roosevelt became President, the executive civil service cost the United States about one hundred and thirty millions a year in salaries, and included 235,766 ^{Federal civil service} positions, of which 108,967 were classified and under the control of the Civil Service Commission. The number thus protected included most of the responsible positions, the unclassified places being open chiefly to unskilled and low-paid routine workers. In the next sixteen years before the World War overturned the civil service, and inflated all offices beyond recognition, the expanding functions of government increased much more rapidly than population. In 1917 the Civil Service Commission controlled and safeguarded 326,899 positions in the executive civil service out of a total of 517,805. In these years the debates in Congress as revealed in the *Congressional Record* lose something of their value to the historian, but their loss is more than supplied by the testimony and reports of Congressional hearings and investigations. The United States was launched upon a period in which Government control was to be extended not only over the ordinary acts of life, but over the unused resources of national existence.

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE

The "literature of exposure," which gave the special literary flavor to the period of the muckrakers, had for its earliest distinguished example Ida M. Tarbell, *History of the Standard Oil Company* (1904), which was first published in *McClure's Magazine*. This monthly magazine was pioneer in the muckraking movement, the ideals of which are displayed in S. S. McClure, *Autobiography* (1914). The other "ten cent" magazines, and *Collier's Weekly* contributed freely to the movement. E. A. Ross, *Changing America* (1912), is a survey of the new trend by a distinguished sociologist. J. R. Day, *The Raid on Prosperity* (1907), defends the men and institutions that were under attack, but its title is more striking than its content.

In the changing standards of life and thought, the *Ladies' Home Journal* is a leading exhibit, which is partially interpreted by *The Americanization of Edward Bok* (1920). It has been skillfully used as a source in M. Sullivan, *Our Times* (1926).

CHAPTER XVII

THE EXTENSION OF GOVERNMENT CONTROL

THE anti-trust legislation of 1903 was accepted as a recognition by the Government of the problems before it, and as an earnest of new laws to come. The Expedition ^{Immigration} Act made it easier for the Government to enforce existing laws when prosecution was deemed necessary, and the Bureau of Corporations soon provided data for preliminary opinions as to both legislation and prosecution. The Bureau of Labor made a continuous study of the relations of labor to industry. A Bureau of Immigration was brought into the Department of Commerce and Labor, and a new general immigration law was passed in 1907. The close relationship between immigration and labor, recognized in the work of these bureaus, was affected by the changing nature of the immigrant. The "bird-of-passage" was increasing in number, and the proportion from the races of southern Europe was steadily growing. The wholesome migration from northern Europe that had brought the Irish, the Germans, and the Scandinavians to the United States had stopped. Between 1900 and 1914 the annual totals of immigration ranged from 448,572 to 1,285,349, of which northern Europe contributed about thirty-five per cent. The southern immigrant became Americanized less easily than his North Europe predecessors. He remained isolated in racial groups as unskilled labor for a longer period. He showed less tendency to make a career for himself and his family out of the American opportunity, and had a constant disposition to live a subnormal economic life, accumulate his surplus earnings, and return with them to his original home.

The interest of Roosevelt in the drafting and passage of necessary legislation was continually expressed. The election of 1904 added to his prestige, and weakened the powers

of the opposition. Speaking at the Union League Club in Philadelphia, in 1905, he described the task as one for the preservation of equal opportunity for rich and poor: "There must be no hurry, but there must also be no halt." He had already succeeded, in connection with the Northern Securities prosecution, in proving that the Sherman Law possessed some teeth, and was less moribund than had been believed.

The inauguration of the Northern Securities prosecution in 1902 was pushed steadily by Knox, and under the Expedition Act was transferred to a special trial court, whose decision in favor of the Government was concurred in by the Supreme Court in March, 1904. The guilty corporation was ordered to disband and disgorge. Among the claims of the President in the campaign of this year was that of having proved himself a successful "trust-buster." The business interests involved looked at it from a different angle. It was too bad, thought James J. Hill, "to have to fight for our lives against the political adventurers who have never done anything but pose and draw a salary." Within both parties, but chiefly within the Republican, there developed a group of irreconcilable conservatives, many of whom had hoped for Hanna in 1904, who continued increasingly to oppose Roosevelt and all his works.

The Northern Securities case proved that successful prosecutions were possible, but not that the problems of concentration could be solved in this manner. The offense of the company lay in the merging in a single ownership of the control of stock of three great rival railway systems. When the company disbanded by order of the Supreme Court, this stock was distributed among the owners of the Northern Securities stock, each of them receiving shares of the Great Northern, the Northern Pacific, and the Chicago, Burlington & Quincy in proportion to the number of shares he owned in the Northern Securities Company. As a consequence of this the actual ownership of the three railroads did not change. The same group of individuals who

had controlled them through the Northern Securities Company continued to control them as private individuals. Experience soon showed that by "gentlemen's agreement" it was as easy for these owners to manage their property in harmony as it had been through the vehicle of a holding corporation. The guilty trust was broken up by law, but the fact of consolidation remained as large as ever.

In the discussions of trust and railroad control that ran parallel to the Northern Securities prosecution, from 1902 to 1906, the question emerges as to whether the solution of the trust problem lay in the Sherman Act method of prohibition or in some other method involving the elimination of unfair practices, while recognizing the consolidations themselves as reasonable. The experience of twenty years could point to no sure case in which the anti-trust laws had succeeded in breaking up consolidation and restoring free competition among small units. Practical economists began to question whether the advantages of combination could be repealed by statute. The continued reliance of Government on prosecution, however, was made necessary by an irritable public opinion, excited by the facts of the muckrakers, led on in many cases by irresponsible reformers, and anxious to see somebody punished for what were regarded as the sins of society.

The railway laws of 1903 were preliminary to a general revision of the Interstate Commerce Act of 1887. Like the Sherman Act, the Interstate Commerce Act Interstate commerce aimed to maintain free competition among the railroads. For many years the Interstate Commerce Commission continued to add new facts to the American knowledge of the railroad problem, and in these same years, unimpeded by the law, the great railway systems of the eighties had matured, and the still greater systems of 1901 and 1902 had been launched. The law was to be revised and Congress busied itself with the content of the revision.

The President's messages of 1904 and 1905 contained repeated demands for the enlargement of the Interstate Commerce Commission. The general popularity of these

demands is proved by the multitude of railroad laws brought in by Congressmen anxious to please the people of their districts. Most of the bills drafted were conceived in ignorance and bad temper, as the original Granger laws had been, and languished permanently in the committees to which they were referred. Congress was slow in learning the lesson that technical economic problems could be solved only on the basis of technical economic knowledge. In the session of 1904 and 1905 one of the railroad bills received the almost unanimous support of the House of Representatives. This Esch-Townsend Act was passed by a vote of 326 to 17, and gave to the Interstate Commerce Commission the power to fix the rates of transportation. It was received in the Senate in February, 1905, and there met with a delay that exasperated the angry opponents of the trusts, who relieved their feelings by attacking the "treason" and the "menace" of the United States Senate.

The conservatism of the Senate was built into it by the Constitution for the purpose of creating an independent agency willing and able to withstand gusts of public opinion. Yet whenever the Senate has fulfilled the original intention of its creators, it has met with obloquy. It was here charged with being in the employ of the trusts. The process that had sent successful men of affairs to the Senate in the nineties, and brought it under the domination of a group like Aldrich of Rhode Island, Platt of New York, Quay and Penrose of Pennsylvania, Hanna of Ohio, and Spooner of Wisconsin, was obviously open to the attack that was now pressed. The eager advocates of immediate railroad legislation denounced the conservatism of these Senators as service to big business and to the machine. One of the new Senators, elected in January, 1905, and seated in 1906, assumed the open leadership against this group. This was Robert M. La Follette, who, fresh from a successful program of legislation for corporation control in Wisconsin, began as Senator to attack the corporations in season and out, to propound constructive theories for their control, and to join

The con-
servative
Senate

with the Democrats in demanding roll-calls on votes whenever possible. In the long vacations, as he traveled on Chautauqua circuits talking to the common people on public affairs, he read these roll-calls with telling effect, strengthening as he did it the popular idea of the existence of a machine, of the power of vested interest, and of infidelity among the people's representatives.

Unhurried and hardly influenced by the pressure from outside, the Senate directed the Committee on Interstate Commerce to sit during the recess of 1905 and accumulate data upon the problems that needed more adequate control. In the following winter this report was available in five great volumes, the President had renewed his advocacy of legislation, a new flood of private bills indicated the desire of Congressmen to clear their records before their constituents, and some of the bolder legislators claimed that their panaceas had the tacit support of the White House. It was dangerous for Congressmen to go too far in this direction of claiming approval in advance. The political method of the President was swift and effective. Again and again he defended himself by denying the correctness of statements of his associates. His denunciation of Judge Parker in 1904 was a typical instance. E. H. Harriman was later brought within the group, and the cartoonists derived much pleasure from their literary creation, the "Ananias Club," into which no man was admitted until the President had openly called him a liar. But the desire of Congressmen to appear to be associated with the President in his attacks upon big business kept many of them walking in the danger zone.

In the spring of 1906 the Hepburn Bill took shape as the railroad measure that was to be passed. During its last stages, a report from the Bureau of Corporations on the traffic in petroleum brought convincing evidence as to the need for more power in Government, whether the ultimate aim was to be to destroy the trust or to control it. A concluding debate brought up the question of the relation of railway control

The Hepburn Railroad Law

to the course of justice. The bill as proposed vested in the Interstate Commerce Commission the power to fix rates. Critics of this declared that such action might easily become confiscatory, and that rates might be fixed so low as to require the roads to do business at a loss. This, said Knox, who had withdrawn from the Cabinet to become Senator from Pennsylvania, would involve a violation of the "due process" clause of the Constitution. The most successful of the anti-trust jurists, he now led the demand for insertion in the bill of a recognized right of judicial review whereby the railroads should be entitled to bring the fairness of an established rate before the courts. The Senate accepted his doctrine. Three times the measure went to conference before the two houses could agree, and the bill could become a law on June 29, 1906.

The Hepburn Act widely extended Government control over railroads. Among its most significant clauses from the standpoint of regulation was one that empowered the Interstate Commerce Commission to establish uniform systems of accounting, and to prescribe what books the roads should keep, and how they should keep them. A lack of genuine comparative knowledge on railroad problems impeded railroad control from the start, since no two roads kept identical accounts, and none permitted public scrutiny. The organization of the new accounting systems was worked out in the next few years under the direction of Professor Henry Carter Adams, who had long been associated with the Commission as statistician. Adams was himself a protégé of Thomas Mortimer Cooley, of Michigan, who had done much to define the functions of the Interstate Commerce Commission in its early years.

As it became clear that legislation for control must be expected, railroad practice was generally modified in the direction of improvement of manners and the elimination of abuses. The old practice of the railroads' law offices to fight everything was displaced by a new desire to compromise and avoid trouble. The Hepburn Act forbade the issuance of private passes, and contributed directly to the

cessation of an old abuse. The railroads had ever been the victims of petty graft by public men who demanded free transportation for themselves. National conventions expected to be brought together on free passes. Editors regarded them as among the perquisites of their business, and even among the reform and anti-monopoly extremists it is possible to point to individuals who expected the railroads to transport them without charge. The muckrakers believed that the pass system was a form of petty bribery. In any event it was a fraud upon the stockholders that now rapidly disappeared.

With the passage of the railroad law the United States entered upon a decade of legislation for the extension of its powers of control. A second law passed in June, 1906, projected federal power in a new and ^{Pure Food} _{Act} unexpected direction, for the protection of the public health. With the change in habits of life brought about by the revolution in communication and manufacture in the eighties, population drifted from the farms to the cities, and the manufacture of food went far along its course from the domestic basis to the factory basis. In the meat industries the development of the packing companies went hand in hand with the rise of the cow country. The refusal of Europe to permit the importation of American meats on the ground that they were unfit for food gave the incentive to create, in 1884, the Bureau of Animal Husbandry to inaugurate a policy of federal meat inspection. The creation of the Department of Agriculture in 1889 and the broadening of meat inspection in 1891 are steps in the progressive extension of public control over the food of the country. The industrial changes, to which the packers contributed, continued without stop. Factory food displaced home-cooked food, and the grocer came to carry a steadily increasing portion of his stock in proprietary packages instead of bulk. The cereal foods came into line before the Spanish War. Clever inventions brought into the market shredded wheat, grapenuts, and corn flakes, while campaigns of national advertising, brightened with

doggerel and cartoon, produced a market for the package foods.

The growth of the food industries was attended by risks foreseen from an early period. The factory provided no substitute for the vigilance of the good housewife in protecting the quality of food and the standards of preparation, or in controlling the use of adulterants. A mild interest in legislation within this field can be traced for many years. The muckrakers' exploitation of the packing-houses brought it within the realm of practical politics in 1906, and legislation to protect the purity of food and drugs was placed upon the statutes within the control of the Department of Agriculture. The scientific determination of the value of foods and the influence of adulterants and preservatives was still to be worked out and manufacturers were still to be convinced that the public would consume as readily a jam containing artificial coloring and synthetic flavor as the same jam dishonestly labeled as a pure fruit product. The detailed and technical work involved in a successful assertion of a policy of food control brought into every household a fuller recognition of the new functions of Government.

In 1907 Congress paused in its task of constructive legislation long enough to terminate an old problem by the Oklahoma admission of a new State. Nearly a century before, Congress had entered upon a policy of Indian consolidation upon the western frontier. The Indian Country was legalized in 1830, placed under the control of an Indian Commissioner in 1832, and safeguarded by the Indian Intercourse Act of 1834. No sooner had the Indian Country been clearly established than the process of reducing its area by the creation of new States was begun. After 1854 it was reduced to a tract nearly surrounded by the States of Kansas, Arkansas, and Texas, and thereafter it was generally though incorrectly known as the "Indian Territory."

The fertile lands between the Red River and the Arkansas, dedicated to the Indians in the thirties, aroused the cupidity of white settlers half a century later. President

after President proclaimed against the illegal invasion of the area. After the Civil War, as a penalty for sympathizing with the Confederacy, the Indians forfeited a portion of their lands. In the later eighties they sold still more in the process whereby their own holdings were reduced to a basis of severalty. In the early nineties the lands of Oklahoma were opened and the white invasion brought into existence a new territory, that before 1900 had aspirations to become a state. A long dispute over the basis of statehood was waged in the next five years. Should there be one State or two, Indian Territory and Oklahoma, or an amalgamation? In June, 1906, Congress finally passed an enabling act for a single State, and in the winter of 1906-07 the people of Oklahoma gathered in their constitutional convention.

There is no shorter route to an understanding of the constitutional ideals of any period in American history than through the study of the debates whereby new State constitutions are created. Every new State has drawn its first citizens chiefly from the young and enthusiastic classes of its neighboring States. These have invariably begun their work with the fundamental acceptance of the underlying bases of American government, and have built upon them a structure embodying the ideals of the moment. The Oklahoma constitution was long, specific, and radical. It recognized the duty of the State to extend a protecting control over its citizens. It was approved by Bryan with his Populistic background, and was criticized by Taft, now Secretary of War, from the standpoint of the conservative judge. It contained as its novelty in government a scheme for the public guarantee of bank deposits, and became the forty-sixth State in the Union by proclamation of the President November 16, 1907.

The period of prosperity ushered in by President McKinley outlasted the terms of his Republican successors, Roosevelt and Taft. Not until 1913 was there any ^{Roosevelt} general depression in the United States that ^{panic, 1907} threatened to bring business to a standstill. From time to time there were flurries in the stock market that were more

truly ascribable to over-speculation than to adversity. The brief crisis of May, 1901, was occasioned by stock gambling incidental to a struggle for the control of the Northern Pacific Railway. In October, 1907, there came a somewhat larger panic that was ascribed by its sufferers to the meddling of Roosevelt with business, and was called the "Roosevelt panic."

The open trouble began with the suspension of the Knickerbocker Trust Company in New York on October 22. During the next few days there was uncertainty as to the extent to which the collapse might go. A string of Eastern speculative ventures, in whose management there had been an element of fraud, broke down, but the clearing-houses of the great cities managed to limit the range of suffering. Banks in general restricted their payments to depositors to their minimum cash necessities, and large numbers of checks were made payable only through the clearing-houses. For the time being there was an almost complete suspension of credit, and much hoarding of money by private holders. The critics of the President scolded at "Theodore the meddler" and the *New York Sun* gave wide circulation to the motto of business: "Let us alone."

Whether Roosevelt was responsible or not, the panic advertised the fact that the Currency Act of 1900 had failed to stabilize the currency. It had provided a policy in its enunciation of the gold standard, but had made no step toward providing either a currency flexible enough to expand and contract with the drains upon it, or a credit system properly safeguarding the use of speculative and commercial capital. The part played by the clearing-houses in mitigating the effects of the panic was both extra-legal and salutary. By restricting the payment of checks except through the clearing-houses it was possible to carry on large transactions without drawing upon the limited supply of currency. Solvent banks that found themselves without sufficient currency to meet the unexpected demands were allowed to resort to clearing-house loans for which

they put up as collateral approved securities that could not be marketed at once. With their clearing-house loans they were allowed to pay the balances for which they had no cash.

The emergency method tided the country through the period of panic, and in the following year Congress attempted to meet a portion of the need by passing the Aldrich-Vreeland Act, whereby it was made possible in times of emergency to procure and pay for a special emergency currency. The Treasury Department printed and kept ready for issuance several hundred million dollars of this currency to be issued upon collateral when another emergency should arise. The Aldrich-Vreeland Act did something to increase the elasticity of the currency supply, but did not touch the question of the safeguarding of credit. A monetary commission presided over by Senator Nelson W. Aldrich was, however, created to study the fundamentals of financial legislation. The report of this commission was ready for the public in 1912.

Aldrich-
Vreeland
Act

The "Roosevelt panic" was a sharp reminder of the defects in the financial system, but those who hoped that it might restrain the President in his attacks upon business were disappointed. The policies looking toward the extension of Government control were pressed steadily toward their legislative goals, while in the conservation of national resources Roosevelt discovered and popularized a wide range over which Government powers, if they existed, might be spread.

The dominant influence that made America different from the rest of the world in its first century of independence was the possession of an easily accessible open frontier into which society could expand at will. Natural resources were plentiful and nearly free. Timber was so abundant as to be an obstruction to the pioneer. Soil was so fertile that the wheat farmer and the cotton planter used up its fertility by single cropping, and developed new farms as they discarded old ones. Not until the open frontier disappeared, about 1890, was there any

Conserva-
tion

general fear that the resources of nature were not limitless. Thereafter the idea slowly developed that American society would one day approach the position already reached by most of the countries of Europe, in which it would need to administer its resources, not only that posterity might be provided for, but in order that it might secure a fair distribution for its living citizens. Most of the land suitable for general farming purposes was already in private hands before the end of the nineteenth century. Water, whether used for irrigation, for power, or for transportation, was assuming new importance. The timber resources of the nation were closely involved with the problems of water supply and land, and had been slashed and wasted until economists could estimate the number of years when they should disappear. The mineral resources were undergoing a continuous process of consumption and waste. Metals, coal, and oil presented different aspects of the same problem of conserving the supply and procuring the maximum use. Movements in all of these fields of activity came to a focus in Roosevelt's second term.

The Homestead Law of 1862 gives the character to the last phase of the occupation of American farm lands by farmers. Working upon the doctrine that the frontiersman who makes a farm renders a public service, the United States proceeded to give homes to citizens willing to cultivate them. Before the panic of 1893 most of the desirable lands had been taken up, and many subsequent homestead entries appeared to be partly fraudulent in character. There was a provision in the Homestead Law whereby the homesteader could pay a minimum cash price for his farm and be relieved of the obligations he had incurred, and be free to sell the farm. An increasing proportion of commuted homesteads, whose entrymen often exercised the privilege to commute at the earliest possible date, and sold immediately to great timber, grazing, or mining corporations, proved that the law was being used for the erection of corporate holdings instead of farms for citizens. The *bona-fide* farmer had difficulty in finding suitable farms, but there remained

abundant land in the Far West, rich in promise if its aridity could be overcome.

There was slight interest in irrigation until after the open farms had been exhausted. The creation of the United States Geological Survey in 1879 brought together for the first time a group of Government scientists interested in, and competent to devise schemes for the reclamation of the arid lands. The peculiar fertility of many of these lands lay in the fact that they were in a region of constant sunshine where crops could grow for more than a normal number of days per year; and also in that, having little rainfall, the accumulated fertility of the soil had not been washed away. About 1889 Congress authorized a survey of irrigation sites in the United States, which Major J. W. Powell, of the Geological Survey, carried out.

Control of
water
rights

The construction of irrigation works was a financial and engineering task beyond the capacity of the pioneer farmer. Small groups of associated farmers could do something, but in general there was needed permanent direction and large means procurable only through great corporations. When Roosevelt became President there was pending in Congress a measure looking toward Government participation in this work, led by Senator Francis G. Newlands, of Nevada. Western Congressmen were urging the creation of a reclamation fund to be appropriated by the United States, and to be used for the construction of dams, tunnels, and ditches. The costs of construction were to be assessed over the farms brought under ditch in each irrigation project, and as the individual farmer bought his farm and paid off the debt, his payments were to go into the revolving fund for reinvestment. The Newlands Bill became a law June 17, 1902, at once an extension of governmental control over a huge scientific engineering task, and an assertion of a new interest in the use of the natural resources that remained. By 1909 nearly eight thousand farms had actually been brought under ditch and new projects were in course of development throughout the arid region. In 1903 Presi-

dent Roosevelt appointed a commission to study the nature of the remaining public lands and to report upon their proper treatment.

The work of the Reclamation Service developed the importance of dam-sites and water power, which were soon shown to be entangled with the use of the inland waterways for transportation. The Bureau of Corporations made it its business to study the ownership of water power, and discovered that not only was there potential water power sufficient to meet all the mechanical needs of the United States, thus relieving the drain on coal and oil, but that undeveloped sites were rapidly being acquired by the General Electric, the Westinghouse, and other corporations interested in hydro-electric power. In many cases the control of this lay outside the power of the United States. Water rights lying within single States and disconnected with the public domain called for State control or none, but there was work to be done in showing the difference between proper and improper methods of control, and in the passage of a suitable law for water powers belonging to the Government. The dam built across the Mississippi River at Keokuk brought to the fore both the complex nature of the water problem and its relation to inland navigation.

The building of the dam at Keokuk called attention to the fact that the old glory of the Mississippi had faded away, and that in the fifty years elapsed since the completion of the first bridge across it at Davenport, the railroad had possessed itself of the heavy traffic that the river had borne. Mark Twain, at the summit of his glory, and honored with the degree of D.Litt. of Oxford, escorted the presidential party that cruised down the Mississippi after the ceremonies at the site of the Keokuk dam; but the river traffic that he had known in his youth, and perpetuated in *Tom Sawyer* and *Life on the Mississippi*, was nothing but a reminiscence. Along the line of the Mississippi and the Ohio local interests from time to time urged that the steamboat commerce be revived. The Mississippi itself had been brought under physical control by the United States.

Levees had been constructed at all the danger points, the channels at the mouth had been made clear, and there was nothing to prevent a revival of the steamboat trade. This, it was suggested, might serve both to offer an effective competition to the railroads and to reduce the consumption of coal for transportation. In March, 1907, Roosevelt appointed an Inland Waterways Commission to survey these unused transportation routes and to report upon their revival.

Out of the work of the Inland Waterways Commission there arose the suggestion that the problem of conserving the natural resources was too large for any one commission, too intricate for any single group of ^{Forests} scientists, and too close to the public interest to be solved without the full concurrence of all sections and parties. The chief of the forestry service, Gifford Pinchot, had much to do with the formulation of the suggestion. An intimate friend of Roosevelt, he was one of the inner group with whom the President played tennis and indulged in cross-country tramps, and he had for many years brought into the service of the Government an understanding of the best foreign practice in the administration of forests. Congress had, in 1891, authorized the President to withdraw the forest lands from entry in the public domain. By the close of Harrison's Administration there were 17,564,800 acres in the national forest. Cleveland increased the forest reserves to 18,993,280 acres, McKinley to 46,828,449, while Roosevelt multiplied the area several fold, and increased the total to 172,230,233 acres before he left office. The forests were so closely involved in the problems of river flow, soil waste, and timber conservation, that it was natural for the forestry group to assume a leadership in the new movement.

On May 13, 1908, there met at the White House a conference to which the governors of all the States ^{Conservation conference} had been invited, and which most of them attended accompanied by scientific advisers, business men, and political leaders. For three days this con-

ference maintained its sessions, and continued its discussions of the natural resources of the United States and the problems involved in their management. Never before had the governors been gathered for a national purpose, and there were numerous suggestions that out of this meeting there might arise a sort of house of governors to supplement the deliberations of Congress. Members of Congress watched the conference with much suspicion, because of their unfamiliarity with the subject-matter under discussion, and their fear that new policies in conservation might upset political and business interests of long standing. They showed this suspicion in their treatment of the conservation movement.

A few days after the White House conference had advertised at once the new national movement and Roosevelt's interest in it, the President appointed a National Conservation Commission of forty-nine members selected about equally from the fields of politics, industry, and science. This commission organized in the autumn of 1908 for a study of the minerals, waters, forests, and soils of the United States. In more than forty States local conservation commissions were appointed and in operation before the end of 1909 supplementing by their studies the work of the national commission. In December, the commission held a national conference before which a draft of its report was presented, and early in 1909 President Roosevelt transmitted this report to Congress.

The work of the commission revealed the political methods of Roosevelt, and the suspicions prevailing in Congress. The commission was appointed without legal authority, and served without compensation. Since Congress had provided no funds for its clerical assistance, Roosevelt directed each of the executive departments when called upon by the commission to provide the information it desired. In this way it was possible for the commission to include in its report three volumes of technical papers on the different resources. Congress, however, jealous of its prerogatives and suspicious of the work in question, re-

fused an appropriation to provide wide circulation to the report. The President declared in January, 1909, that the "underlying principle of conservation" was "the application of common sense to common problems for the common good." But Congress attached to one of the appropriation bills a proviso forbidding the executive departments in the future to render scientific assistance to such a commission as this.

The National Conservation Commission attracted wide attention to the problem before it. Among the special immediate needs that it pointed out was legislation to control the mining of coal. Throughout a large extent of the public domain coal deposits were known or suspected to exist. The early land laws had provided for the classification of public lands as coal lands or agricultural, but no attempt had been made to prevent the occupation of lands as agricultural when their value was chiefly with reference to their underlying coal. From the reports of the General Land Office it appeared that large areas of coal lands were being alienated as agricultural lands, and that the Homestead Law was being perverted by collusion between entrymen and speculators whereby great coal interests were being built up in private hands, and the United States was being deprived of this portion of its common heritage. In 1909 Congress modified the land laws so as to provide for the separate sale of the agricultural, timber, and mineral resources of the land, and the next year the Bureau of Mines was created to give systematic study to the problems connected with this industry.

Once the importance of conservation had come to his attention, Roosevelt exerted his powers to protect the public interest. He had no lawful power to dispose properly of the timber or mineral lands, or of water rights, but he at least had power to determine what public lands should remain on the market for open entry. He accordingly proceeded with surveys to discover the resources of the remaining public lands. He entrusted to the recognized powers of the Forestry and Reclamation Services whatever was suit-

able for them, and the remaining acreage he withdrew from entry with the intention of holding it in the national domain until Congress should take action to safeguard the public interest. In his later writings he regarded his work for conservation as the most important of his Administration. Its effect upon public opinion was to raise new hopes of effective governmental action, and to add to the uncertainties with which business regarded the future. The trend of Government control had already established the fact that business must expect to be supervised. The idea of conservation suggested that great fields hitherto open to private exploitation were hereafter to be closed. Public interest had been asserted as a factor to be respected in all business, and to this was now added the interests of posterity.

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CHAPTER XVIII

WILLIAM HOWARD TAFT

THE Sixtieth Congress, the last of the Roosevelt Administration, sat from 1907 to 1909. The acts passed and those that it rejected indicated clearly the trend of events within the Republican Party as the time ^{Republican factions} approached for another presidential election. The breach that had been healed in 1904, after the death of Hanna, was now wide open, as "stand-pat" Republicans strove to bring about the nomination of a conservative candidate, and to put an end to the period of executive action and interference with business. Manners as well as policies were involved in the breach. The aggressive assurance of Roosevelt angered his enemies and was trying even to his friends. The rapidity with which he reached decisions and acted upon them startled and embarrassed many of his associates. The readiness with which he called men liars and asserted that all honest men agreed with him alienated within his own party many who would have preferred to act in harmony with him.

The succession in 1908 was not complicated by any prospect that Roosevelt would again be a candidate. During the campaign of 1904 there had been much mild ^{The third term} discussion as to how he would stand with reference to the national tradition against three terms. Technically his first period as President was McKinley's term and not his own. On election night, after enough returns were in to indicate that his vote had run away from Judge Parker, and that his election was assured, he voluntarily answered the question in these words: "On the 4th of March next I shall have served three and a half years, and this three and a half years constitutes my first term. The wise custom which limits the President to two terms regards the substance and not the form, and under no cir-

cumstances will I be a candidate for or accept another nomination." Repeatedly in the next eight years he regretted this announcement, but he found the leaders of his party ready to take him at his word.

For twelve years, by 1909, individual party leaders had been submerged beneath the personalities of McKinley and Roosevelt, and the rigor of party discipline. The enthusiasm with which public opinion, regardless of parties, approved the "Roosevelt policies" made it difficult for other individuals than Roosevelt to command attention. The list of possibilities discussed in the months preceding the campaign reveals the diversity of opinion that had developed within the dominant party.

The leading names among the "stand-pat" candidates were Joseph G. Cannon, Charles W. Fairbanks, and Joseph Taft and his Benson Foraker. Cannon was now Speaker in rivals his third term, and possessed a wide and homely popularity together with the complete confidence of conservative Republicans. Fairbanks was Vice-President, an austere-appearing Indiana politician, who made no claim to popularity and enjoyed none. Foraker, of Ohio, was among the last of the spell-binders of the Civil War régime. Belonging to the generation of Garfield, Hanna, and McKinley, Foraker saw himself for more than twenty years within reach of national preferment and just missing it. His hopes as a nominee of the available type were forcibly deferred when McKinley became the "advance agent of prosperity" in the early nineties. When Hanna desired to enter politics as Senator, Foraker found himself again forced to step aside. In the fall of 1907 he formally stated his candidacy, and announced himself as favoring the tariff and the independence of the Senate, and as opposing railway rate regulation and the liberal construction of the Constitution. Once more he found himself with ambitions blocked by another Ohio leader, William Howard Taft.

Not a candidate himself, President Roosevelt was in a position to throw the nomination nearly as he pleased. The trend of politics made it easy for a President of influence to

exert strong pressure on the National Convention. The Republican Party maintained a political organization throughout the South from which it neither expected nor received electoral votes. In Republican administrations the handful of Southern Republicans received their reward in federal appointments. Roosevelt appears to have been in conference on this theme on the first day of his presidency. Whether the Republican appointees were good or bad, they could not be representative of the people among whom they served, and when they elected themselves as delegates to the national nominating convention, they tended to bring into that body a block of votes subservient to the President to whom they owed their jobs. Possessing these delegates to start with, and with a wide popular approval of his policies, Roosevelt was able to block the hopes of candidates whom he disliked and advance those of his friends.

Three names were most commonly mentioned as likely to secure the support of the President, Charles Evans Hughes, William Howard Taft, and Elihu Root whom Roosevelt regarded as the ablest man he had known in public life. The reconstruction of the War Department and the administrative organization of the new colonies were accomplished by Root. As Secretary of State he had taken over the difficult problems that were pending when John Hay surrendered his portfolio. In the Orient he proved himself a firm and tactful negotiator, reaching a general understanding with Japan about her immigration into the United States and her relations with China. In 1907 he visited the Latin-American countries to interpret in a friendly way the position of the United States and to moderate their suspicions that had been stirred up by the Panama affair. But whatever his strength, he was unavailable to receive presidential support for the nomination. His whole life until 1899 had been spent as a corporation lawyer in New York, and his business affiliations were regarded as too vulnerable to permit him to be nominated upon a Roosevelt platform. He accepted instead election

to the Senate from New York, entering upon his term in 1909. The friends of Governor Charles E. Hughes, of New York, hoped that he might receive presidential endorsement. Governor Hughes was a practicing attorney in New York City when in 1905 he was called upon to act as counsel for the Armstrong Committee of the New York Legislature, appointed to investigate the conduct and management of the insurance companies. He speedily became the responsible director of the investigation, showing unusual skill in extracting facts from reluctant witnesses, and in uncovering the distasteful story of the intrigue of business in politics. Before the investigation was completed he was suggested as mayor of New York City, which he declined to consider; but in 1906 he was nominated for governor by a convention in which there was no delegate instructed for him, and no partisan politician who desired him. In the following election he defeated William Randolph Hearst; and he took office with the magnates of his party hostile to him. His career as governor made him a marked national figure. No Republican had given more convincing proof of his determination to establish the people in control of their government and the government in control of business malpractice. Roosevelt was unwilling to support him for the nomination because he believed him too independent of the party organization, and disliked his tendency to play a lone hand.

William Howard Taft was announced as Roosevelt's choice in 1907. For nearly twenty years his career as an administrator and judge had brought him into intimate contact with two sides of government.

Taft and
Sherman,
1908

A son of Judge Alphonso Taft, of Cincinnati, who had sat in Grant's Cabinet for a time, he had been an honor man at Yale and a judge in the superior court of Ohio before Harrison made him Solicitor-General in the Department of Justice at the age of thirty-three. Before McKinley sent him to the Philippines ten years later, Taft had lived in Washington and had sat upon the federal bench. In the labor controversies of the nineties he showed judi-

cial courage in asserting the powers of Government over the obstructions of organized labor, and a little later his decisions brought the trusts within the jurisdiction of the Sherman Act. Roosevelt while Vice-President described him as a suitable governor of the Philippines, asserting that that task called for all the qualifications that would make a good President or a sound Chief Justice. It was toward the Supreme Court that Taft's own inclinations pointed, but he was forced twice to let the opportunity go because of administrative duties in hand in the islands or the War Department. Never did a group of statesmen work more harmoniously than Roosevelt with Root and Taft. "Athos" and "Porthos" were the nicknames of his favorite secretaries, used sometimes in their informal correspondence; and it requires little imagination to ascribe to Roosevelt the name of the hero of the *Three Musketeers* — "D'Artagnan."

At times between 1905 and 1909 Taft was described as the traveling secretary of the President because of the frequency with which he was sent to represent Roosevelt on political missions, or to "sit on the lid" — a task for which his figure seemed to make him singularly appropriate. He was officially in charge of the American intervention in Cuba, 1906-09; he often visited the Panama Canal to report on progress in construction; he carried on negotiations with the Vatican in Rome, made visits of courtesy in Japan, and opened the Philippine Assembly in 1907. As a presidential candidate he was doubly strong. He had become an intimate agent of the Roosevelt program and a supporter of its policies, which made him acceptable as a progressive leader. On the other hand, as judge and administrator he had shown a firmness and a judicial temper that brought to him the confidence of those conservatives who thought Roosevelt too impulsive. His candidacy was pushed persistently by the President as the date for the Republican Convention approached, and according to the rumor among the Washington correspondents, the matter was clinched by asseverations from the White House of "Taft or me."

The Republican nominations of 1908 were made at Chicago with Roosevelt in complete control of the convention. The platform had been prepared in Washington and was given to the press even before the convention met. Conservative Republicans found no opportunity to organize their hostility to Roosevelt, and the progressive Republicans had no chance to incorporate any planks not acceptable to the President. Taft was nominated on the first ballot; James Schoolcraft Sherman, a conservative New York Republican, who had sat in nine Congresses, was nominated as Vice-President. The friends of Hughes were unable to make any impression on the convention, and in the autumn Hughes was renominated and reelected governor of New York.

Between the Republican and Democratic National Conventions Grover Cleveland died, on June 24, 1908. The last eleven years of his life had carried him into a position of dignity and popularity. He retired to Princeton upon leaving the White House in 1897 and there engaged in literary enterprises and public service. The esteem which both parties denied him as President came to him out of office. In 1904 there was even talk among Democrats who especially feared Bryan of urging him for another Democratic nomination. He gave no countenance to this, however, and continued until the end to be an unconventional, rugged, and honest adviser of his fellow-countrymen.

At the Democratic Convention which met in Denver in July, the Roosevelt policies were as popular as in the Republican Party. Many of the measures that had recently received executive approval were among those suggested or advocated by the Populists. The figure of Bryan that had terrified the owners of property in 1896 had ceased entirely to alarm, and Bryan himself was completely in control. The South and West were united for him, and the opposition to his renomination among Eastern Democrats was discredited by the fact that the Tammany organization was against him. Judge Parker, the last candidate, was at the convention in command of

Death of
Grover
Cleveland

Bryan and
Kern

the conservative delegates, who were defeated and ignored by the convention. Reporters who measured popularity by noise noted that the Denver Convention applauded its nominee Bryan for eighty-seven minutes, whereas the name of Roosevelt had received only forty-six minutes' applause at Chicago. John W. Kern, of Indiana, was nominated for Vice-President.

The minor parties of 1908 presented numerous and unimportant tickets. William Randolph Hearst, a consistent Democratic opponent of Bryan, formed his ^{Hearst and} Independence Party, and nominated him- ^{Debs} self for President. The Populist Party had nearly disappeared. "You ask me what we are to do," wrote Thomas E. Watson after he had received the Populist nomination for the presidency. "Frankly, I don't know. The Democratic Party is chaotic; the Republican Party is becoming so; the Populist Party is dead, and we are all at sea." A handful of former Populists, still clinging to the hope of a union of agricultural and industrial discontent, tried to form a new American Party, and nominated Wharton Barker for the presidency, but the American Party "died a-borning," wrote its vice-presidential candidate, "Calamity" Weller, of Iowa. "The only difficulty was we could not raise money enough to put it on its feet and keep it there until it could run the race with decent and enticing respectability."

The Socialists renominated Eugene V. Debs, but ran an unimportant third in the canvass, with 421,000 votes. The effort of its leaders to attract the vote of organized labor was persistent. The *New York Call*, founded as a daily May 30, 1908, with this in view, interpreted the news of the day from a Socialist slant. The Western Federation of Miners had been captured by the Socialist leaders, but organized labor in general followed the course urged by Samuel Gompers, head of the American Federation of Labor, which was to support their friends, punish their enemies, and keep out of politics as a body.

The point over which labor was fighting in 1908 was the attitude of the courts toward strikes. For fifteen years,

since Debs was jailed for contempt in the Pullman strike of 1893, the practice had increased of forbidding, by injunction, acts that the unions regarded as necessary. The sympathetic strike, boycott, and interference with business by picketing and intimidation, were at various times forbidden by this practice, and violators of the injunctions, imprisoned for contempt of court, found themselves with slight legal redress. Opposition to what the unions described as government by injunction pervaded the ranks of organized labor. Gompers himself was involved in contempt proceedings with the Supreme Court, arising from the Buck Stove and Range Case. At Chicago he appeared before the Republican Committee on Platform, seeking an anti-injunction plank, and was rebuffed. At Denver he was better treated, and when the Democratic Party included a protest against injunctions in its platform, Gompers came out in support of Bryan and the Democratic ticket, urging labor to follow him and reward its friends, thus beginning a sort of alliance with the Democratic Party that lasted until the World War.

The presidential canvass of 1908 was carried out in good temper so far as the chief candidates were concerned. Canvass of 1908 Bryan, rehabilitated by Roosevelt's support of many of his policies, contested with Taft as to which leader and party might the better carry out the program upon which both ostensibly agreed. "The time is ripe," he wrote, "for an appeal to the moral sense of the nation; the time is ripe for the arraignment of the plutocratic tendencies of the Republican Party before the bar of public conscience; and the Democratic Party was never in better position than now to make this appeal."

No episode of the canvass was as sharp in a personal way as Roosevelt's denunciation of Parker in 1904. An effort to discredit Taft as a Unitarian was rebuked by a letter from Roosevelt upon religion and politics that silenced those who were trying to inject denominational theology into the campaign. An attempt to make political capital out of a casual remark by Taft with reference to General Grant was

equally unsuccessful. A forged letter bearing the signature of Grover Cleveland, and announcing his preference for Taft over Bryan, aroused a ripple of interest, but had no result. Only Hearst succeeded in diverting public attention to irrelevant matters.

In the middle of September, while Hearst was campaigning for himself as a candidate of the Independence Party, he read into his speeches letters that some one had stolen from the files of the Standard Oil Company. However he got them, they cut into both great parties alike. Haskell, the Oklahoma member of the Democratic National Committee and its treasurer, was shown to have had such business relations with the Standard Oil Company as to prevent his further use by a party that denounced monopoly. J. B. Foraker, of Ohio, one of the Stalwart Republican contestants for the nomination, was similarly caught in the exposure. Foraker maintained with angry insistence the correctness of his relation, and it was a commonplace that he had never even pretended to desire Government control over business; but he, too, speedily retired from public life. The public temper that the muckrakers had produced and that the Roosevelt attacks upon the habits of business had intensified, was dominant in both parties. Whether voting for Taft or Bryan, the bulk of the voters desired a further extension of the policies of Government control.

Taft and Sherman were chosen in an election that revealed an unusual amount of independent voting. Democratic governors were elected in four of the States that the Republican ticket carried for the presidency. The signs indicated that neither party organization retained its usual control over the loyalty of its members. Only the "Solid South" remained thoroughly regular. Here the process of disfranchising the negro by constitutional amendment was brought near to completion when Georgia, in October, 1908, adopted a suffrage amendment establishing a new educational qualification for the franchise that barred most negroes. The Democratic Party continued in complete control of the Southern vote. Such political debates as there

were, were restricted to the primaries of that party. On election day the outcome was known in advance, and only a handful of voters cast their ballots.

The main issue in the election was the relative responsibility of Taft or Bryan.

“Never before in our time has the entry of a new President into office marked so slight a break politically between William H. the present and the past,” said the New York Taft *Tribune*, as it commented upon the installation of Judge Taft on March 4, 1909. The new Administration was regarded as a continuation of the old, and Taft in his inaugural frankly accepted the duty of upholding the policies of Roosevelt. He pledged himself to bring forward as soon as possible amendments to the Sherman Act for the improvement of public control over trusts, and officially announced his intention to call the Sixty-First Congress — the eighth consecutive Republican Congress — in an early special session to revise the tariff. There was no denunciation in his message, but through it there ran the belief that the work ahead would call for creative and constructive legislation of the highest order.

Roosevelt left Washington for Oyster Bay immediately after the inaugural ceremony, creating a new precedent by not returning to the White House with his successor. The ceremonies themselves, held in the Senate Chamber because of a heavy storm, were of necessity simple in character, and the throngs of visitors and attendant governors with their trains found their opportunities for display curtailed. The last days of the preceding Administration had been turbulent, with Congress indignant at Roosevelt, and with an unseemly discussion of governmental practices emphasizing the fact that for the time being Roosevelt's hold over the politicians of his party had been broken. There was a new temper in Washington politics from the date of the inauguration, while Colonel Roosevelt in Oyster Bay kept his hands off the policies of Taft, and tested the camping outfit with which he proposed shortly to hunt big game in Africa. Not until the summer of 1910 was it pos-

sible for politicians to get his ear. He plunged into the jungle with the parting statement that any interview purporting to reveal his views might safely be regarded as untrue.

The Taft Cabinet was dominated by careful lawyers. Philander C. Knox, formerly Attorney-General and now Senator from Pennsylvania, resigned his seat to ^{The} become Secretary of State. Two members of ^{Cabinet} the outgoing Cabinet were retained, Meyer, who was transferred from the Post-Office to the Navy, and James Wilson, who had been Secretary of Agriculture for three Administrations. As Postmaster-General Taft appointed Frank H. Hitchcock, chairman of the Republican National Committee, and manager of his campaign. Hitchcock, like Cortelyou, had risen in the civil service and gained preferment by attracting the attention of the President.

Before Congress met in its special session on March 15, 1909, there had been comment as to whether it would be practicable for it to perform the tasks expected of it. At no time had the liberal Republicans controlled the organization of the House of Representatives. Cannon, Speaker since 1903, had the full confidence of the "stand-pat" group, among which the demand for tariff revision and trust control had made slight impression. The effect of the agitation of the last eight years was to arouse popular expectations, but also to stimulate the opposition of interests that had something to lose by the new policies. A little had been done in the control of corporations, and Government authority had been widely extended in new fields, but the basic laws were still to be constructed and enacted.

From 1880 until 1896 the Republican Party became more and more completely a party of protection. Leaders like Hanna frankly demanded campaign contribu- ^{Tariff} tions commensurate with the profits that manu- ^{problem} facturers expected to get. In 1888 one of the rare campaigns with a real issue sharply separating the parties was fought, over protection; and when public interest drifted toward currency problems in the nineties, Hanna kept the

party organization true to the tariff. McKinley as President broadened his view of world problems, and came to appreciate, what James G. Blaine had clearly seen, that the Chinese wall of the protective tariff acts as a restriction upon foreign trade. In his last public speech at Buffalo, at the exposition in honor of the Pan-American idea, he urged the adoption of a liberal policy of reciprocity.

Other reasons than those of foreign trade weakened the hold of protection upon the Republican Party in the next eight years. The farmers of the Middle West reverted to their old belief that tariffs helped the manufacturer more than the farmer. In the McKinley Bill there had been a deliberate attempt to satisfy this feeling by including a schedule on agricultural imports, but since agricultural imports were then and continued to be relatively unimportant, the concession failed to stop the anti-tariff drift. About 1900 the tariff was connected with the idea of monopoly. The belief spread that special tariff privileges lay at the foundation of big business, and one of the magnates of the Sugar Trust openly called the tariff the "mother of trusts."

In 1902 the "Iowa idea," to the effect that tariff rates ought to be reduced, started a reaction that was continuous thereafter. In Wisconsin and Minnesota it took root, and its advocates made common cause with other local leaders who desired to convert the party organization into a more active agent against the trusts. Between 1902 and 1904 Roosevelt showed that he was attracted by the idea of revision, but after the death of Hanna he made temporary peace with the conservatives and thereafter had little to say about tariff revision except that, as his second term advanced, he indicated that it would be a task for his successor.

The Republican Convention of 1908 pledged the next Administration to a revision of the tariff. In the canvass, Judge Taft took the pledge seriously and promised not only a revision, but a revision downward. Between election and inauguration he visited Washington to confer with the party leaders and to urge that the Committee on Ways and

Means begin the gathering of materials for a tariff revision to be handed over to the new committee after the 4th of March. In November tariff hearings began, and before Roosevelt went out of office a draft had been prepared in secrecy, and was nearly ready to be introduced in the new Congress. Whether or not it could be introduced was problematical until after the organization of the lower house. A group of Republican Congressmen had already started a revolt against the Speaker, the rules, and the party policy, and there were enough of these insurgents to control the organization of the House if they could induce the Democrats to work with them. They failed in this attempt, and Cannon was nominated by the Republican caucus and reelected. A little later, when they opposed the readoption of the House rules, enough Eastern Democrats voted with the Republicans to insure the maintenance of the old policy. A conservative Speaker appointed Sereno E. Payne chairman of the Committee on Ways and Means, and the latter introduced a tariff bill on the third day of the session.

The original bill was somewhat better than the tariff revisionists had dared to hope for, and passed the House after three weeks of debate. Its content was, however, unimportant, since the Senate proposed to rewrite it entirely, and Senator Nelson W. Aldrich kept the Committee on Finance in almost continuous session to deliberate upon the Senate proposals. The bill went to the Senate on April 9, and was ready for debate by the end of the month. It had become in the meantime a maximum tariff with numerous rates increased and with a tariff board provided for the continuous study of tariff schedules. The bill passed the Senate in July with ten insurgent Republicans voting against it, among whom Beveridge, Cummins, Dolliver, and La Follette were the most outspoken. In the judgment of the *Outlook*, the Senate had betrayed the party faith.

Payne-
Aldrich
Tariff, 1909

Until the Payne-Aldrich tariff was sent to conference in July President Taft refrained from interference with the processes of legislation. His view of the powers of the re-

spective branches of government led him to abstain from intervention. He began to take a hand only in the last stages of the bill, when a deadlock between the houses appeared possible, and a failure of the hope of downward revision. Speaking at the Yale Commencement, he asserted that the country would hold the party to a strict accountability should the tariff fail. President Taft signed the Payne-Aldrich Bill on August 5, 1909. When Roosevelt returned and became aware of what had been done, he thought the tariff "better than the last [the Dingley Bill] and considerably better than the one before the last [Wilson Bill]." In the closing debate Taft succeeded in enlarging the free lists of raw materials, and the *Outlook*, one of the severest critics of the bill in its early stages, thought it in its final form "by far the most enlightened protectionist measure ever enacted in the history of the country."

The measure passed in the bright glare of publicity, with insurgent members of both houses pointing out what they construed as its defects, and with journalists trained in the technic of muckraking, exploiting the iniquities of the measure. It included as novelties free trade for the Philippines, which was close to the heart of the President, and a tax on corporation incomes. This latter measure marked a stage in the rehabilitation of Populism. The Supreme Court decision of 1894, which declared unconstitutional the income tax provision of the Wilson Bill, enraged the Populists, who believed it to be a corrupt defense of privilege and wealth, and a constitutional amendment safeguarding the income tax became their immediate demand. In a special message of June 16 Taft advocated a tax on the income of corporations as likely to be regarded as constitutional, and in the ensuing debates the tax was incorporated, and a new amendment to the constitution was agreed upon. The new amendment, proposed on July 12, 1909, received the requisite consent of three fourths of the States, and was proclaimed in 1913. It authorized Congress "to lay and collect taxes on incomes from whatever source derived" and silenced

permanently objections founded upon limitation in the taxing power.

The insurgent Senators voted "no" upon the final passage of the tariff bill, and hurried home to tell their constituents that the party pledge had been violated and that the tariff was another victory for privilege. The discontent that they voiced and stimulated was so pronounced that Taft made a speaking trip to defend the measure as a compliance with the pledge. He traveled sixteen thousand miles in vain. Speaking at Winona, Minnesota, September 17, he made a thoroughgoing defense of the bill without convincing his Western critics. The insurgent movement was centered in the upper Mississippi Valley, and accepted the explanation of its local leaders rather than that of the President. Instead of satisfying his audiences that the tariff was wise and fair, he convinced them that he had allied himself with the "stand-pat" group, and that Cannon and Aldrich, Penrose and Murray Crane, were to dominate his policies instead of those Republicans who had avowed and shown their zeal for correcting the abuses in trade and politics. The insurgents began to ask what would happen to the Roosevelt policies with such a President.

The insurgent Republicans

The Western speeches of the President were not confined to tariff matters. Repeatedly as opportunity offered he renewed his statement of determination to carry out the policies of his predecessor, and discussed the question of conservation in its various aspects. The difference between the temper of Taft and that of Roosevelt greatly affected their treatment of all administrative problems, and particularly one like conservation that was founded thus far chiefly in executive judgment. At the Conservation Conference in December, 1908, Taft alluded to the problem as lying in the twilight zone of federal jurisdiction. In Roosevelt's view the twilight zone belonged to him, and he regarded himself as warranted in doing anything in the public interest that was not forbidden by some specific law. His withdrawal of

Western political revolt

lands from entry had been based upon his belief that they ought to be conserved rather than upon any stated authority to conserve them. Taft approached similar problems and believed himself excluded from the twilight zone except as Congress directed him to enter it. He searched the statute books for laws conferring authority while Roosevelt searched to see if there were prohibitions. The normal consequence of such difference in temper was difference in conduct that showed itself now that Taft was responsible for presidential policies, and it necessarily made him appear to be allied with those who obstructed Government control.

Before leaving his summer home at Beverly, Massachusetts, for his Western trip, it became necessary for President Taft to straighten out a controversy involving problems of conservation. The Secretary of the Interior, Richard A. Ballinger, had served as Commissioner of the General Land Office under Roosevelt. His policies as Secretary failed to meet the expectations of the conservationists. Gifford Pinchot, of the Forestry Service, openly attacked him in the early summer because of his policies respecting water-power sites and coal lands. The controversy involved both policies and opinions, and was the more difficult to settle because Pinchot was in the Department of Agriculture and not under the control of Ballinger. Only by the direct intervention of the President could action be obtained. The attack on Ballinger was founded upon specific charges made by one of his employees named Glavis. A memorandum prepared for the President and supporting the Secretary, although not passing judgment upon the merits of particular claims, was signed by Taft in September. Glavis was dismissed from the Government service, and persuaded his friends that he was made a victim because of his activity in the public interest. On November 13, 1909, he published in *Collier's Weekly* "The Whitewashing of Ballinger."

Before Congress met, the friends of conservation were engaged in a vigorous attack upon Ballinger as a servant of

the trusts and monopolies that were endeavoring to steal the public domain. A joint committee was appointed on January 26 to investigate the administration of the Department of the Interior. It ultimately filed a report upholding the administration of the department, but the controversy had grown from the limited field of conservation to the broader one of general politics. Gifford Pinchot had continued his open attacks upon Ballinger and his policies. He carried his fight until it involved a matter of administrative discipline. In the early winter he wrote a letter to Senator Dolliver in violation of a rule forbidding subordinates to carry on direct correspondence with Congress in such cases. He believed the Secretary of Agriculture had authorized him to write the letter, but when Secretary Wilson denied having given the authority there remained no other course than to treat it as a breach of discipline. Taft dismissed Pinchot on January 7, 1910, and precipitated thereby a party crisis in the face of approaching Congressional elections.

So far as conservation was concerned, there was room for more than one opinion. The legal authority for as vigorous a program as Roosevelt had carried out was dubious at best. President Taft appealed in defense of conservation, with every appearance of sincerity, but his acts failed to satisfy the conservationists, and the difference of opinion was seized upon by the insurgents who were already disposed to believe that he had abandoned the progressive cause to ally himself with the "stand-pat." By 1910 another point of view had developed. In many respects the policy was an Eastern one for Western problems. Local opinion in the West had always favored the speedy development of the public domain. Western States invited irrigation works, but looked askance at national forests forever removed from State management or taxation, and objected to withdrawal of lands from entry. The selfish interests that desired to appropriate national resources found it possible to stir up a genuine Western objection to a national policy that hindered local development. Ballinger had the

Far Western point of view, while Taft, his chief, had the legalistic mind. Of necessity their conduct in conservation failed to meet the expectation of the scientific conservationists. The dismissal of Pinchot brought conservation into the field of active politics. Before his dismissal he had already written of the controversy to Colonel Roosevelt at Khartoum, and in the early spring of 1910 he crossed the Atlantic to meet Roosevelt at Porto Maurizio as he traveled north from Africa. The friends of conservation, thinking themselves deceived by the Administration, turned to the ex-President, the founder of the movement, for leadership and comfort, while in Congress the insurgent Republicans as well as the Democrats made the most of the Payne-Aldrich tariff and the Ballinger-Pinchot controversy as proof that the conservatives had gained control of the Administration.

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE

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CHAPTER XIX

INSURGENCY

THE differences of principle and the personal grievances that had been suppressed or overridden by the dominating personality of Roosevelt broke out in open warfare before Taft met his first Congress. While the Committee on Ways and Means was drafting its tariff schedules in secrecy, a group of dissenters became openly insurgent against the policies of the party, and let it be known that there would be a test of strength in the organization of the Sixty-First Congress. From this time until the end of the Administration the insurgents held the center of the political stage. Most of their members came from the upper Mississippi Valley. In the Senate their leaders had little chance for effective action, since there were almost twice as many Republicans as Democrats in that body, and the votes of men like Cummins, Beveridge, and La Follette were not needed to make a majority. In the House, however, of the three hundred and ninety-one members the Republicans at best had a majority of under fifty, while the insurgents claimed to control between twenty and thirty votes, and it was always possible that by uniting with the Democratic minority they might break the Republican control. Attempts were made in March, 1909, to defeat Cannon for reëlection, and these constituted the first formal action of the insurgents.

The fundamental insurgent claim was that machine politics had usurped the control of the national parties, and had defrauded the people of the right of self-government. The most visible agent of this dominance was the Speaker of the House of Representatives, whose power had steadily grown more autocratic since Thomas B. Reed had led in the revision of the rules in 1890. The large membership of the House and the short average

Schism

Cannon and
"stand-pat"

tenure of its members inherently weakened it as a machine for doing public business. On the floor and in the committee rooms most of the members were usually new and inexperienced in the mechanism of government. The small proportion who had sat in more than two or three preceding Congresses acquired a power of leadership based upon knowing the ropes that was often far in excess of their right to leadership. The Speaker was in control of his party in the House. He appointed all committees and these committees drafted the rules and statutes that the House enacted. He controlled the floor for purposes of debate; and by withholding recognition from private speakers or by collusion as to whom he should recognize, he was able to silence individuals or factions. Few members of Congress had personal grievances against Joseph G. Cannon, but all the insurgent leaders believed that his power was so exercised as to prevent interference with the legislative policies of conservative Republicans. The revolt had been long impending. A dozen Republicans voted against Cannon's reëlection, and a larger number voted against the reëlection of the rules of the House that placed the entire control of committee policies in his hands. In the ensuing debate over the Payne-Aldrich tariff the insurgents' grievance over the mechanics of party control was heightened by their hostility to the tariff that was passed. In both houses ominous groups voted against the final passage of the bill. When the administrative quarrel between Ballinger and Pinchot arose, and Taft most needed the support and confidence of his party, the insurgent Republicans were indisposed to grant it.

The reform program looked toward a revival of essential democracy by making government more responsive to the people. In the management of party conventions there had been personal grievances and violations of principle over a long term of years. Candidates for office were nominated by party conventions, while the delegates to these conventions were selected in other conventions or caucuses in which few voters partici-

pated and over which the influence of the political boss could easily be exerted. It was natural for defeated aspirants to feel that they suffered because of improper obstructions of the public will, and to regard themselves as entitled to more support than they received. It was also true that the managers of parties and conventions strove to have their business cut and dried, their slates framed in the interest of party harmony, and their own conclusions ratified without protest. Roosevelt had in 1908 helped to draft the statement of party principles that was released for publication before the convention that was to adopt it had assembled.

The control of conventions was by no means the only grievance of the insurgents. They declared that legislative bodies, city councils, State legislatures, and even Congress itself, responded more quickly to the will of professional politicians and big business than to the voice of the people, which they claimed to represent. Their complaint resembled that of the Populist Party in whose early platforms there had been accumulated similar charges of misgovernment as well as proposals for fundamental reform. The initiative and the referendum were words that became known in American politics through the discussions of the Populist period. With the referendum the United States was entirely familiar, since it habitually submitted constitutions and their amendments to ratification by popular vote. These ideas had been taken up by young Republican leaders as the Populists lost their grip. A few Western States made provision for initiating laws by popular action, as well as for calling a referendum upon legislative acts. The system seemed to promise relief from boss control.

The tendency of conventions to override movements of protest revived another mechanical reform, advocated by Senator La Follette and his Middle-Western friends. The direct primary as a means of making nomination for office was only an elaboration of the principle of the initiative, but it went further in that its advocates proposed to do away with the convention itself. The La Follette project for a

national system of direct primaries for nominating to all offices including the presidency, was advanced in 1897. In New York Governor Hughes was fighting for a similar reform in 1909, and numerous States had extended their election laws to control party behavior in making party nominations. The demand for a direct primary arose from a situation that the *Nation* in 1896 described as "the product of thirty years of government by intrigue, concealment, and bribery."

Another of the Populist reforms, the direct election of Senators, received the approval of the insurgents and was advanced by the election of a Senator from Illinois in 1909. William Lorimer was then elected Senator after a long struggle at Springfield in the course of which it was charged that bribery had contributed to the result. Lorimer was a man of exemplary personal habits, and had made so many strong friendships while in the lower house that the scandal of his election was the more notorious. The system itself not only made it possible for corrupt influences to purchase an election, but also to bring deadlock to the government of a great State while its legislature neglected public affairs in order to wrangle over a Senator at Washington. After a long and bitter investigation, Lorimer was expelled; and insurgent Senators, Bristow and Borah, utilized the scandal to urge the Seventeenth Amendment to the Constitution. The amendment was proclaimed in 1913 and placed the election of Senators in the hands of the voters themselves.

The dismissal of Pinchot from the Government service and the resulting investigation of the Interior Department, which was forced through the House by a combination of Democratic and insurgent votes in 1910, gave the cue for renewed effort by the insurgents to control the party. Twenty-four of them signed a public statement that the "object of the so-called insurgent movement in the national House of Representatives is to bring about such a revision of the present arbitrary rules under which the business of the House is carried on as will restore

Seventeenth
Amend-
ment:
direct elec-
tion of
Senators

Aim of
insurgency

the principle of representative government without interfering with the expedition of the public business." Under the leadership of George W. Norris, of Nebraska, they prepared an amendment to the House rules, taking the appointment of the Committee on Rules away from the Speaker, making it elective by the House itself, and disqualifying the Speaker from membership upon it. On March 17, 1910, they sprung their plot against Cannon, who exhausted all the parliamentary devices to delay a roll-call; but after thirty hours of continuous debate the insurgent-Democratic combination broke the power of the Speaker.

Fight on
power of
Speaker
Cannon

It was the hope of the opposition that it broke the power of the Republicans as well. For the first time since free silver split the Democratic Party was there a real hope of Democratic success. Democrats made the most of the inability of Taft to dominate his party. They conspired with the insurgents and attacked the Administration. "For the first time in the history of the country a President of the United States has openly proclaimed himself the friend of thieves and the enemy of honest men," wrote Henry Waterson in the *Louisville Courier-Journal* for the inspiration of his Democratic associates.

With his own party debating the sincerity of his acceptance of progressive ideas, President Taft had difficulty in guiding a program of constructive legislation through Congress. The revision of the tariff was the only important work of his first session.

Taft and
progressive
policies

In the winter of 1909-10 he called the attention of Congress to the need for further railroad regulation, for additional amendments to the Sherman Anti-Trust Law, and for special statutes defining the power of the President in the twilight zone of conservation. In this last field Congress removed the uncertainty with reference to the power of the President to withdraw lands of the public domain from entry, pending final determination as to their use. Roosevelt had acted freely in this direction without specific authority. Taft now withdrew coal lands until at the end

of his Administration 58,863,785 acres of these had been safeguarded in this way. The forest areas were increased. The vacancy in the Forestry Service caused by the dismissal of Gifford Pinchot was filled by the appointment of Henry S. Graves, head of the Yale School of Forestry. The Bureau of Mines was created in the Department of the Interior and shortly came under the direction of Van H. Manning, and received new powers for the scientific study of mineral resources.

The progress made in the field of conservation was paralleled by progress toward the completion of statehood for all the United States. The admission of Oklahoma in 1907 marked the final disappearance from the map of the old Indian Country. At one stage in the proceedings with reference to Oklahoma, an omnibus bill had been brought forward for the division of the Territory into two States instead of one, and for the enabling at the same time of the last remaining Territories of the American Desert, Arizona and New Mexico. The stubborn opposition of Senator Beveridge to the admission of Indian Territory except as a single State held back the admission of any of the last group for several years. The people of Arizona and New Mexico, caught in the political entanglement with which they had no concern, protested in vain, but procured no relief until 1910. Their territorial status had lasted for fifty years, beginning when New Mexico was made a Territory as a part of the Compromise of 1850. The slow-going Mexican population of the valley of the Rio Grande showed little disposition to expand or grow. In 1863 discoveries of gold near the Colorado River and the rediscovery of silver mines in the valley of the Santa Cruz brought about the partition of New Mexico and the creation of Arizona. Whenever statehood was discussed thereafter, these two Territories were included as a part of the general problem. The Southern Pacific and the Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe built across them without greatly affecting their development, but toward the end of the century the progress of irrigation and the rise of large-

scale mining, in which numerous company towns were established, gave to Arizona a quickened appearance that pointed toward speedy admission. In 1910 when they were enabled, Arizona had a population of 204,354; New Mexico, 327,301.

Under their enabling acts the Territories made rapid progress, and both were admitted by proclamation of the President in 1912. Arizona was some weeks later than New Mexico because of interference by President Taft that was interpreted as throwing light upon his attitude toward the progressive movement. Like most constitutional conventions, that of Arizona was offered all of the modern reforms and accepted many of them. One device, the recall of judges, aroused in general more opposition than any of the other mechanical reforms, and was widely attacked as striking at the independence and honesty of the judiciary. President Taft never forgot his training as a judge, and declined to issue a proclamation certifying the admission of Arizona until the Territory had amended its projected constitution by excising the objectionable recall of judges. Congress supported him in this and the Territory bowed to the inevitable; but once admitted it flaunted its independence of the President and Congress by amending its constitution and restoring the offending article.

Alaska was given full territorial organization in 1913. Since its acquisition in 1867 it had been governed arbitrarily and had been in continuous danger of exploitation. Its coal lands aroused the interest of speculators, whose attempts to secure control of them precipitated the attack upon Ballinger. There was need for railroad development, whose control was tied up with that of the natural resources, and whose execution was undertaken by the United States itself in the next Administration.

Alaska

The program of railroad legislation for the United States included an extension of the powers of the Interstate Commerce Commission, an enlargement of its jurisdiction to include terminals, telegraph, telephone, and cable services,

and the creation of a new federal court for the special purpose of determining appeals arising from the orders of the Commission. On June 18, 1910, Taft signed the Mann-Elkins Act for these purposes after a prolonged debate between the insurgent advocates of rigorous control and the conservative opposition to any control. Senator Cummins, the head of the insurgents in this matter, with the support of insurgent and Democratic votes, forced the adoption of amendments until, in its final passage, the bill was an acceptable compromise. Its commerce court was a distinct novelty. Heretofore, cases arising out of public control of the railroads had been long drawn out because of the crowded condition of the judicial docket, or had involved technical matters in transportation economics that many federal judges were unfitted to determine. The new panel of circuit judges that made up the commerce court was expected both to expedite decisions and to specialize in railroad problems. The long and short haul clause of the original Interstate Commerce Act was restated and placed under the discretionary control of the Interstate Commerce Commission. The bill retained the progress of 1906 and made new advances toward national control.

A Postal Savings Act, long advocated by reformers and included in the old Populist program, was passed in 1910, and in due time turned every post-office into a savings bank. The appropriation of a special fund for economic studies in the tariff schedules made a new step toward the adoption of a scientific basis for tariff legislation.

While Secretary of War in Roosevelt's cabinet, Taft had been drawn into close connection with the problems arising from the determination to build the canal at Panama. The progress of excavation and construction here brought the Isthmus of Panama and the canal into ever greater importance as the geographic center of American diplomacy. The work was well advanced when Roosevelt left office in 1909, after he had eliminated

foreign obstructions, headed off the possibility of German rivalry in the Caribbean, and reviewed the home-coming of the American fleet from its world tour. His demonstration of naval power and diplomatic intention smoothed the way for his successor. Taft found only those obstructions that were inherent in the engineering problem and the temper of the Latin-American neighbors around the Caribbean. The Roosevelt policy of swinging the "big stick" had warned off interlopers, but had increased suspicion of the motives of the United States in South and Central America. Both Root and Knox had to contend with this as they sought to stabilize the conditions of government in the vicinity of the canal.

Under the benevolent despotism of Goethals the work on the canal advanced without cessation. The annual report showed increasing millions of yards excavated in the Culebra cut. The fills and spillways for the dam at Gatun, and the monumental locks to control the water level became real. Roosevelt determined the site, Taft the lock method of construction. The estimates of the engineers indicated that the task would be completed early in the Administration of Taft's successor, and the formal date was finally fixed at August 15, 1914, with a great world's fair at San Francisco to celebrate the occasion in the following winter. The task was done on time, and Goethals was advanced to the rank of major-general as a reward for his services, while his medical subordinate, Gorgas, became brigadier-general.

Before the question of rewards was taken up Congress found it necessary in 1912 to settle the terms upon which the Panama Canal should be used by the commerce of the world. The only restriction upon the free power of Congress was the clause of the Hay-Pauncefote Treaty providing that it should be open on equal terms to the vessels of all nations. The bill for the government of the canal was shaped by those who desired a preference for American vessels, and was passed with a clause exempting American bottoms from the tolls. It was known at the time that

Great Britain would object to this as a violation of equality terms, but the provision was allowed to stand.

The neighbors of the canal continued to be centers of intrigue and of upheaval. Of all Latin-American countries they were the most tropical in character and possessed the smallest number of working white men. Traffic of foreigners in railroad concessions, mining rights, and natural resources was a constant provocative of bribery and repudiation. Their resulting insolvency always invited foreign interventions like the Venezuela blockade of 1902. In 1905 a step was taken by the United States for the better stability of one of them, Santo Domingo, by the erection of an American financial receivership, and this idea was extended toward Nicaragua and Honduras, and was pressed by Knox as an Administration policy. The principle applied to Cuba by the Platt Amendment was to be extended over Central America by the voluntary consent of the countries concerned. American bankers were to underwrite their debts and the American Government was to see that Treasury receipts were honestly collected and expended. The power of the United States was to be used to safeguard them against invasion, and a Central American court of arbitral justice, agreed to under the leadership of Root, was to resolve their local differences. American warships and detachments of marines were often used to maintain order in Nicaragua, Honduras, Santo Domingo, and in Cuba where the Cuban constitution specifically conveyed that power. In the winter of 1912 Knox visited the Caribbean for a series of friendly conferences with the republics bordering thereon. The Colombian Government took occasion to announce that he would not be welcome at Bogota, but elsewhere he was received with a cordiality that seems to have had no effect in reducing the amount of local disturbance.

Congress and the Senate were reluctant to become involved in the "dollar diplomacy" of Secretary Knox. The problems of maintaining peace in the vicinity of the canal were left to the next Administration, with Colombia still

aggrieved at what she believed to be the unfriendly intervention of the United States at the time of the Panama Revolution.

While Knox was engaged in pressing his dollar diplomacy, as a means of stabilizing affairs in Central America, he was carrying on other negotiations similarly founded upon a willingness to conciliate and a respect ^{Canadian fisheries} for the rights and interests of other nations. The last of the important disputes with England was brought to a friendly settlement by an arbitration at The Hague in 1910. This involved the interpretation of the fishing rights originally left with the United States at the time of independence in 1783. Ever after that date there was difference of opinion between New England, that did most of the fishing, and Newfoundland and Quebec, off whose shores the fishing was done. The shore rights in connection with the fishing were always in debate. At various times during the century, New England became aroused by a belief that its treatment was unfair. The Halifax award of 1877 failed to clear the matter up and left details unsettled until 1910. In the last weeks of Roosevelt's Administration, it was agreed to submit the details to an arbitration which Knox managed, and whose award was handed down in September, 1910. A general claims convention with Great Britain was also signed in order to dispose of the accumulated list of private claims.

Arbitration with Great Britain was no longer a novelty, and after 1908 had special sanction from the language of the treaty concluded by Root. Cleveland's earlier effort for a general treaty of arbitration was without success, but Root negotiated with ^{The arbitration treaties} James Bryce a general treaty that the Senate finally accepted. In accordance with this, all controversies were to be submitted to arbitration with the usual exception of matters involving national honor, or independence, or vital interests. From the standpoint of strict law an agreement so limited had little binding force, for in moments of international dispute it is easy to elevate any controversy

until it seems to become a part of one of these exceptions, but as an evidence of friendly feeling and kindly interest the agreement had considerable value, and described the practice that has generally prevailed between Great Britain and the United States for more than a century.

James Bryce, who conducted the British end of the negotiation, placed the relations between the two nations upon a new plane because of the regard in which he was held by Americans of all classes. Appointed Ambassador in 1907, he had for many years known more of America than most Americans. His repeated visits had given him a sympathetic understanding of the extent, difficulty, and success of the American experiment. Only the *Federalist* of Alexander Hamilton, and De Tocqueville's *Democracy in America* rank with the *American Commonwealth* of James Bryce, and each of these is more limited than the last. For twenty years before Bryce came to Washington as Ambassador, his book was the standard text upon American government. He was already intimate with many Americans of importance, and his administration of the embassy paved the way for a celebration of the hundred years of peace that would be rounded out in 1914. It did so much to solidify the cordiality between the two nations that Americans with Irish and German names, fearful of too much British influence in American affairs, broke up meetings in celebration of the peace with Britain, and organized in 1912 what they called the "American Truth Society," "to propagate true Americanism" by preventing an Anglo-American understanding.

The arbitration agreement with England had meanwhile been carried one step further, as a result of public statements separately made by President Taft and Viscount Grey, the British Foreign Secretary, in which each declared his willingness for a binding treaty for the arbitration of all disputes without any reservation. In August, 1911, Knox signed such treaties with both England and France, and uncovered in the Senate an unexpected hostility to un-

limited arbitration. Roosevelt spoke vigorously against the principle, and his old associate, Lodge, brought into the Senate the majority report against a binding pledge. The minority report of Root agreed with the position of Taft and Knox that arbitration could have no national sanction unless great nations were willing to accept it whether they wanted it or not, and whether the decisions were likely to go for them or against. All the anti-British elements in the United States were violent in their denunciations of the treaty as subservient to England. The treaties were so amended by their enemies in the Senate that they were allowed to die by the President, and the Roosevelt treaty remained in force.

International peace was progressing in spite of the reluctance of the Senate. The objections to competitive armament, and the reasonableness of arbitral methods, at least where other nations were concerned, were receiving ever wider attention. One of the Carnegie funds was devoted to the furtherance of peace and peace while its donor drew up his plans for a temple to be erected at The Hague, to house the court that had been agreed upon in principle in 1907. The opening of this building in 1913 was accepted as an indication that the world was through with its great wars.

The interest of Taft in the arbitration of international disputes was a part of his larger interest in the administration of justice. His refusal to admit Arizona into the Union with a constitutional provision for the recall of judges was another side of the same interest. His appointments to the federal bench were made with unusual care, and it fell to his lot to rebuild the personnel of the Supreme Court. Melville W. Fuller, a member of that court since 1888, died in 1910, which made it necessary to appoint a new Chief Justice. Edward Douglass White, a member of the court since 1894, when Cleveland appointed him from Louisiana, was promoted to that position. A group of unexpected vacancies changed the complexion of the court. Justices Lurton, Van Devanter, Lamar, and

Pitney were added within two years, as well as Governor Charles E. Hughes, of New York, who took his seat in October, 1910.

The debates over the Taft measures of 1910 were confused by rancorous controversy between the conservative and insurgent Republicans. Their final passage was obscured by the fact that on June 18 Theodore Roosevelt landed at New York to receive an ovation that indicated the strong hold that he retained upon the American people. The Roosevelt tour of 1909-10 began with a hunting trip in eastern Africa. The expedition was chiefly scientific in its nature and was partly financed by friends of the National Museum in Washington, to which institution the trophies were presented when the naturalists returned. When the hunt was over Roosevelt proceeded down the Nile to Khartoum, and then to Cairo and Alexandria. He crossed to Italy and paid a round of visits at the courts of Europe, received everywhere as the most distinguished American citizen, with honors usually accorded only to royalty. At Christiania he delivered his Nobel address, and in Paris, Berlin, Oxford, and London spoke upon politics and letters. While in London he was appointed special ambassador to represent the United States at the funeral of King Edward VII. He returned to Oyster Bay to receive the visits of politicians of all shades of opinion and to hear their tales of the events during his absence.

In August Colonel Roosevelt started West upon a speaking trip with his main objective at Osawatomie, Kansas, where he had agreed to speak on the memory of John Brown. Here as elsewhere he avoided aligning himself against the Administration or expressing an opinion as to whether it had upheld his policies, but he gave a name to the movement in which the insurgents were engaged when he spoke of the "New Nationalism" that must be brought into the United States Government in order to enable it to cope with the problems of industrial life. He preferred to find his legal authority for the work in the existing Constitution, but demanded the amend-

ment of the Constitution where necessary. The antipathies that conservative Republicans had developed toward him in 1909 were revived with increased intensity as he advocated fundamental changes. He showed his power in September by crowding Vice-President Sherman out of the chairmanship of the New York Republican Convention; and entered vigorously into the New York canvass for Henry L. Stimson as governor. The defeat of Stimson in November was interpreted as the work of conservatives to give Roosevelt a lesson, but was more intimately a part of the Democratic gain due to the Republican split.

The Sixty-Second Congress, elected on November 8, 1910, was under Democratic control after eight Congresses of Republican ascendancy. It was the consequence of Republican collapse rather than of Democratic leadership. Antagonism to the Payne-Aldrich tariff weakened the Republican vote, while the insurgent controversy gave opportunity for individual Democrats to gain office. Each faction blamed the other for the party losses, but the Democrats interpreted their victory as a precursor of a greater victory in 1912. A renewed interest in the personality of Democratic leaders was born and drew attention to the successful governors in 1910, Harmon, of Ohio, Dix, of New York, and Wilson, of New Jersey.

A Demo-
cratic
Congress

In January, 1911, Taft urged without avail upon the last session of the Republican Congress the enactment of an agreement for better trade relations with Canada. The project was in line with the relaxation of the high protective rates, demanded by insurgent Congressmen in 1909, but it received the bitter opposition of many of them because its result would be to bring Canadian agricultural products into more direct competition with those originating in the Northwestern United States. The session adjourned without action, and the President immediately summoned the Sixty-Second Congress in special session to debate the project.

Champ Clark, of Missouri, who had been a Democratic

Congressman for eight terms, was elected Speaker when the House convened, April 4, 1911. He presided over a group of lawmakers whose personnel had been greatly changed by insurgent contests and Democratic victory. The Democratic majority of more than sixty votes was able to control the proceedings of the House if its members could maintain discipline within their ranks. But the majority party had more than its quota of inexperienced and undisciplined new members, of which there were one hundred and eighteen. A new minority of one vote appeared in this Congress for the first time in the person of Victor L. Berger, a Socialist from a Milwaukee district. In the Senate the old Republican majority was reduced to so small a number that when Vice-President Sherman died in October, 1912, it was doubtful whether a Republican presiding officer could be elected to replace him. It was only a theoretical majority at best, for thirteen of the Republican Senators were insurgents who expected to be treated as Republicans in the assignment to committees, but who reserved their independent privilege of staying out of caucus and voting with the Democrats at pleasure. Speaker Clark, with Oscar W. Underwood, of Alabama, as chairman of the Committee on Ways and Means, blocked out a party program of tariff revision, one schedule at a time, and included the passage of the reciprocity agreement with Canada, as in accord with the larger policy.

In the summer of 1911 Congress accepted the reciprocal agreement, which became the basis of a general election in Canada in September. The Laurier Government went to the polls in the Dominion, seeking support for its trade policy, and met an opposition of Dominion nationalists who aspired to make Canada an independent nation, and who feared close contacts with the United States. A letter written by Taft to Roosevelt in January, 1911, embittered the debate. "The amount of Canadian products we would take," he wrote, "would procure a current of business between Western Canada and the United States that would make Canada only an adjunct

Champ
Clark,
Speaker

Canadian
reciprocity

of the United States. It would transfer all their important business to Chicago and New York, with their bank credits and everything else, and it would increase greatly the demand of Canada for our manufactures. I see this is an argument against reciprocity, made in Canada, and I think it is a good one." The unhappy phrase, "an adjunct of the United States," inflamed Canadian opinion against the Laurier Government, overturned it, and defeated reciprocity. To the embarrassment of being forced to appeal to Democrats to adopt the agreement was added the chagrin at having it rejected by the people of Canada. The political successes of the Administration of Taft were never more than partially complete. The failures were notorious and disastrous.

The National Progressive Republican League was organized on January 23, 1911, with Jonathan Bourne, of Oregon, as president. Its program included a group of mechanical reforms made necessary, its leaders declared, because "popular government in America has been thwarted, and progressive legislation strangled," by corrupt interests which "dictate nominations and platforms, elect administrations, legislatures, representatives in Congress, and United States Senators, and control cabinet officers." The reforms advocated by the league began with the demand for the direct election of United States Senators, direct election of delegates to national conventions, and direct primaries for the nomination of elective officers. The initiative, referendum, and recall were included in the list as suitable for State enactment, as well as a corrupt practices act. The movement thus crystallized in a formal organization was the outcome of the experiences of the insurgents in their controversy in 1909 and 1910. Its immediate aim was to capture the control of the Republican Party machinery, to defeat the renomination of Taft in 1912, and to nominate and elect a Progressive Republican.

The Progressive Republicans

The Republican split presaged by the formation of the Progressive League followed an old line of cleavage. Roose-

velt contended with the tendency throughout his presidency, and until 1904 conducted himself as though he expected to become the leader of reform. The schism was founded upon a belief, widespread and genuine, that the people were losing control of their government, and it was accentuated by personal ambition. The selection of Taft by Roosevelt as his heir-apparent was resented by other leaders who were thus debarred from their chance to enter contests for the nomination, and who believed that their devotion to good government was as sound as his. The leaders of this group looked on without regret when Taft showed himself unable to dominate the political situation as Roosevelt had done. Their experience with patronage showed them his weakness as a party disciplinarian. He withheld appointments from the insurgent Congressmen and then restored them; and wavered in his statements as to whether he regarded them as within the party or outside.

After the defeat of 1910 the Democrats made haste to consolidate their victory and Taft failed to narrow the Republican split. He suffered acute rebuffs upon Canadian reciprocity and British arbitration, while the single schedule tariff bills of the Underwood-La Follette combination caused him constant embarrassment. The Sixty-Second Congress, called in 1911 to pass the reciprocity agreement, remained in session to legislate upon the tariff. The purpose was not to make a new tariff, but to make trouble for Taft. A revision of the notorious Schedule K of the Payne-Aldrich Act was passed by a combination of Democrats and insurgents, and was vetoed by Taft on August 17. "Much has been made of La Follette's offhand statement that it was put together with 'blacksmith's tools,'" commented the *Nation* upon it. "But they are better than the burglar's tools with something very like which the woolen schedule was got into the Payne-Aldrich act." A farmer's free-list bill was vetoed on the following day and a cotton bill a little later. By these maneuvers Taft was forced into the position of advocating a "stand-

The fight
on Taft

pat" tariff policy against the progressive efforts of both Progressives and Democrats.

In the autumn of 1911 the Progressive Republican League held a conference at Chicago where it endorsed the candidacy of La Follette for the nomination as President in 1912, and in the closing months of the year the Progressive revolt gained such weight that it ceased to be a forlorn insurrection and gave promise of becoming revolution and victory. Through the winter of 1912 Republicans who had remained indifferent to Progressivism reached the conclusion that Taft could not be reëlected. They reached the conclusion also that Senator La Follette's Progressive leadership was so local in character that he could not win if nominated. They wished to win and for this they wished a different leader. "Good judges of political situations were announcing it as their deliberate conviction that La Follette had a fair chance of getting the republican nomination," wrote Herbert Quick. On February 2, 1912, La Follette spoke at a public meeting in Philadelphia. His physical condition was such as to suggest to his hearers that a nervous collapse impended, and his enemies gave it wide publicity. Many of the Progressives seized the occasion to follow Gifford Pinchot and other La Follette supporters who now abandoned La Follette in the hope of influencing Theodore Roosevelt to reënter politics and contest the nomination.

During February, 1912, the pressure upon Colonel Roosevelt increased. The Chicago *Tribune* led in organizing the demand that he become a candidate for a third term. Political friends who saw no way of winning except with him as candidate, urged him to resume the party leadership. It was arranged that seven Republican governors should write him a letter urging him to become a candidate. On February 24 he yielded to the pressure and in reply to the appeal announced his intention to enter the contest and remain there until the end. He had become convinced that Taft had fallen into the hands of the conservative Republicans, and that his policies could be saved

only by himself. A few days before formally entering the contest he discussed the fundamental reforms in government before the Ohio Constitutional Convention.

A flood of denunciation greeted the return of Roosevelt. His old Republican enemies, who had fought him as President, and were enraged at his advocacy of the "new nationalism," denounced him as a revolutionist, as carried away by ambition, and as desiring to get into the White House for life. "Occasionally," he commented upon this attack, "my more gloomy foes have said that I wanted to be a king. I wanted to answer them that they did not know kings as I did. Now, I like those kings, but I don't want to be one because the function of a modern constitutional king . . . would be the function of a life vice-president with the leadership of the four hundred thrown in. And I think that there are other jobs that a full-sized man would prefer." The third term tradition was brought into the discussion to discredit the candidate. His own declaration of 1904, as well as the unwritten law that had prevailed since the days of Washington, were cited against him. He brushed these objections away by alluding to a breakfast-table episode. "When I say that I do not wish a third cup of coffee, it does not mean that I shall never want another cup."

The bitterness of conservative Republicans was more than matched by that of Senator La Follette, sore at the desertion he had suffered, believing that Roosevelt was treacherously seizing his position, and convinced that Roosevelt's Progressivism was only one of words. In the contest for delegates that ensued, the great debate lay between the supporters of the renomination of Taft and the advocates of Roosevelt, while a small but irreconcilable La Follette group pursued them both.

The Republican National Committee had called the convention before the Roosevelt candidacy was launched. The Southern delegates as usual were being chosen under Administration auspices, while in States where conservative Republicans con-

The convention and the direct primary

trolled, the delegations were instructed to vote for Taft. In a period of less than four months Roosevelt strove to overturn the political habits of a generation, and used as his principal lever the demand for a direct primary, that the people might rule. He denounced the convention system as a mechanism of the bosses, and the Southern delegations as corrupt. Like Andrew Jackson, in 1824, he demanded a reform in order to let his supporters attain their will. As Jackson had then broken up the caucus system, so Roosevelt and his supporters tried to destroy the convention system. His claim that the voters were with him if the leaders were not, was borne out in those States where preference primaries existed or were adopted by special legislative sessions at his demand. In Illinois in April he swept the State, as he did Pennsylvania a little later. His ringing appeals for honest popular government drowned the utterances of the other candidates. In the Southern States, where the Administration controlled all of the party machinery, his friends organized irregular contesting delegations for what Frank A. Munsey called the "moral effect."

The Republican National Committee met in Chicago on June 6, twelve days ahead of the meeting of the convention, in order to prepare the preliminary roll, and hear the contests upon more than two hundred and fifty delegates. Of the 1078 delegates on the list, Roosevelt possessed 411 instructed for him and uncontested. Of the rest about 250 were for other candidates, Taft, La Follette, or Cummins without contest, and a similar number claimed for Taft were contested by Roosevelt delegations. With fewer than a majority of all the delegates pledged to him the only hope of securing the nomination lay in inducing the convention to rule out the votes of all contested delegates upon preliminary organization. In spite of the fact that many of the contests were frivolous in character, all of them were pressed with vigor. As the National Committee filed its preliminary opinion on them, and listed Taft delegates on the temporary roll, Roosevelt hastened to Chicago in person to conduct his fight. He arrived there on the Saturday

before the convention met and immediately spoke from the balcony of the Congress Hotel to an enthusiastic crowd that blocked Michigan Avenue, denouncing the quashing of his contests as "naked theft" on the part of the National Committee.

The leading members of the National Committee controlled the machinery of the convention and were too old at politics to be intimidated. They had determined to nominate Taft whether the party wished him or not, and this they did, driving the "steam roller" of the organization over all obstructions amid the derisive hoots of the contesting faction. Following its ancient practice, the convention permitted delegations seated by the National Committee to vote, whether contested or not. Elihu Root was elected chairman of the convention, Taft and Sherman were renominated, and the party platform was written by conservative Republicans. The Roosevelt delegates sat silent on the final roll-calls, and when the convention adjourned conferred with their leader in a mass meeting at which they decided to return to their homes, consult their constituents, and come back to Chicago in another national convention in August, there to organize a new Progressive Party.

The Democratic Party Convention met in Baltimore on June 25, 1912, exhilarated by the vision of success opened to them by the Republican split in Chicago. Their leaders in the House of Representatives had spent two years in preparing their majority to receive such an opportunity. One of them, Champ Clark, the Speaker, was supported by half the delegates, but the old Democratic rule of two thirds for a nomination made his selection anything but certain. The party was no longer the group of disorganized factions that had contested the last three presidential elections. Clark and Underwood had shown themselves skillful party leaders, and the reaction in 1910 had strengthened the group of Democratic governors. Four of these were seriously considered as candidates. Folk, of Missouri, had earned his position as a prosecutor of

fraud and corruption. Harmon, of Ohio, shared with Taft the distinction of early opposition to trusts. Marshall, of Indiana, had reestablished Democratic control in a doubtful State, and was devoting himself to the modernizing of an outgrown constitution. Wilson, in New Jersey, two years removed from the presidency of Princeton, was the strongest of them.

Woodrow Wilson, Virginian by birth, was one of the most distinguished graduates of Princeton when he assumed its presidency in 1902. In his student years he ^{Woodrow} belonged to the group of brilliant young men ^{Wilson} drawn to Johns Hopkins to study history and politics. His doctor's thesis on *Congressional Government* was nearly contemporary with Bryce's *American Commonwealth*, and ranked with it in penetration and insight. Through the nineties he was one of the notable lecturers at Princeton, and one of the most widely quoted historical essayists of the United States. A university, in his view, was a "place where ideals are kept in heart, in an air they can breathe; but no fools' paradise. A place where to learn the truth about the past and hold debate about the affairs of the present, with knowledge and without passion." As president of Princeton his struggle to democratize college life destroyed the effectiveness of his leadership. The unwillingness of the institution and its alumni to be reshaped defeated him, but the world outside became conscious of a new expression of the ideals of democracy. George Harvey, editor of *Harper's Weekly*, thought he found in Wilson the hope of the Democratic Party, one who could inspire with new ideals and be free from the heresies of Bryan.

In 1910, beaten at Princeton, and ready to resign on academic grounds, Wilson accepted the Democratic nomination for governor of New Jersey and was elected. He plunged immediately into a partisan contest in the politics of his State, and proved a devotion to the principle of majority rule by holding his party to the preference it had expressed in a senatorial primary for James Martine for Sen-

ator. If the party had anticipated the complete victory it secured, Martine could not have gained the preference vote; and practical leaders wished to throw him over after the unexpected success. The stubborn insistence of Governor Wilson that the party leaders must play the game fairly resulted in the election of Martine and the wider advertisement of the fact that a new personality was emerging in Democratic politics. A series of anti-trust laws put through the New Jersey Legislature at his instance indicated his acceptance of the general progressive doctrine.

William Jennings Bryan was the most prominent figure in the Baltimore Convention, but was not a candidate. The real leader of his party, he espoused no candidate, but obstructed the nomination of any one whose two-thirds majority would have to include the votes of the New York delegation. He insisted that the party nominate some one entirely free from the taint of Tammany support. Through forty-five ballots the convention struggled in its endeavor to make a nomination. The majority of Clark could not be made two thirds without Tammany. The favorite sons weakened one by one until on the forty-sixth ballot Woodrow Wilson was nominated for the presidency. Governor Thomas R. Marshall, of Indiana, became his companion on the ticket.

In the early days of August the bull moose, as the emblem of the Progressive Party, was added to the elephant of the G.O.P. and the Democratic donkey. At an enthusiastic convention in Chicago, that recalled the nervous excitement of the canvass of 1840 and the devotional intensity of the Populists in Cincinnati in 1891, the Progressives nominated Theodore Roosevelt and Governor Hiram Johnson, of California, to the tune of "Onward, Christian Soldiers." Their platform included the reforms that the insurgents had made popular as well as a long list of other reforms whose advocates had seen no chance for success. The program was one of social betterment to be attained by an improved political ma-

The Pro-
gressive
Party

chine responsive to the people. Social workers like Jane Addams, who had struggled against the forces of vicious politics in behalf of the less fortunate members of society, saw in the new party an avenue to the promised land. Militant fighters of corporations like Hiram Johnson brought their party methods to its support. Woman suffrage was advocated and the attempt was made to gain the votes of women wherever these were counted. The new party included, in addition to its professional political leaders and its share of the time-servers in politics, "a brave band of reformers who do not think in terms of practical political organization, but who regarded the progressive party as humanity's cause, and were for it without end, whether it were big enough to be political or small enough to be negligible." And around its margin hovered the impractical group whom Roosevelt jovially described as the "lunatic fringe."

The remnants of the Populist Party held a meeting in St. Louis a week after the Progressive Convention. The local reporter observed that they had changed from the Populists of twenty years before. They made no nominees, for their work was done. Most of their original planks were either incorporated in the platform of the new party or already accepted by the older organizations.

The canvass of 1912 was less bitter than the pre-convention struggle had been. The three personalities before the public were of such quality as to permit few personal attacks. The noisy and confident appeal of the Progressives met with wide sympathy in both parties, for the trend of a decade had been to convince the bulk of the voters that the United States needed a less reactionary program than the Republican machine could offer. Taft was in general held in high personal esteem, but it was believed that his political associates were undesirable. Progressive-minded voters cast their ballots in November for much the same reasons that had prevailed in 1908. They were forced to guess whether the progressive principles would stand a better chance with Roosevelt or with Wilson. In 1908 it had been Taft or Bryan. The charge of the Pro-

gressive Party that the Republican National Committee had stolen the nomination for Taft affected only those voters who had already determined how to vote. The charge of Roosevelt that Taft had bitten the hand that fed him had no more effect. In October the contest nearly ended in tragedy when an attempt was made to assassinate Roosevelt in Milwaukee. His rivals stopped their contest until he was convalescent and able to reënter the struggle.

When the votes were counted it was made clear that Roosevelt had conducted the most successful of all third-party struggles. With a new party organization hurriedly thrown together in the heat of the engagement he polled over four million votes, and ran well ahead of the regular Republican candidate. The division of the Republican strength, however, had its natural consequence. For the third time since the Civil War Republican dissension elected a Democratic President. The combined Republican and Progressive vote was 7,500,000 against 6,291,000 for Wilson. With fewer votes than Bryan received each time he was defeated, Woodrow Wilson was elected as a minority President. Taft and Nicholas Murray Butler — for Sherman had died during the canvass and a new vice-presidential nomination had been made by the National Committee — received the electoral vote of only two States, Utah and Vermont.

Eugene V. Debs, who ran for the presidency on the Socialist ticket, as he had done since 1900, received 897,000 votes. These were variously interpreted as evidence of a rising tide of socialism or as the result of the inability of voters to decide which of the more important leaders to support. In the Mugwump campaign in 1884 voters disgusted with both Cleveland and Blaine voted the Prohibition ticket. Now many similar votes were counted for Debs.

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CHAPTER XX

WOODROW WILSON

WOODROW WILSON, elected to the presidency in 1912 by default, was neither the deliberate choice of the people nor the political leader of his party. He was a minority President, successful only because the majority party was nullifying its own effort. He had not been long enough in politics to acquire the devoted following of Roosevelt, Bryan, or McKinley. His selection by his own party was based on the negative merit of availability rather than on that of preference. Among the intellectuals he was widely known and appreciated, and as governor of New Jersey he had shown vigor for reform and promise of leadership. But William Jennings Bryan, whom he had a few years earlier desired to see "knocked into a cocked hat," was the controlling ruler of the Democratic Party. Wilson's immediate predecessor, Taft, had suffered because the real leader, Roosevelt, was alive and active. President Harrison had been embarrassed because James G. Blaine was a greater man than he. The chances were all against Wilson's ability to dominate his own party, and to make that party lead the country.

The new Cabinet was not announced until after the inauguration, but the rumor correctly stated the fact that Bryan and the Cabinet Bryan was to be Secretary of State. No other Cabinet officer was widely known as a political administrator, and none was identified with the wealthy and fashionable society that had been visible in Washington under Taft and Roosevelt. William G. McAdoo, Secretary of the Treasury, was known chiefly because of the river tunnels which he had provided for New York City, and his vigorous work in the recent campaign. Josephus Daniels, Secretary of the Navy, had relatives in the naval service, but was himself editor of the Raleigh, North Caro-

lina, *Observer*, and without special technical qualifications for his post. Franklin K. Lane brought to the Interior Department long experience gained in the Interstate Commerce Commission. David F. Houston came directly from the presidency of a Western university to the Department of Agriculture. William B. Wilson, a veteran labor leader, took charge of the newly created Department of Labor. The remaining members had their reputations still before them, and no member of the Cabinet had been long identified with the management of government.

The Democratic Party, now in power for the first time since Grover Cleveland, had no specific policy in 1913. Demoralized by nearly twenty years of opposition, it had few constructive leaders, and was as badly divided upon the current issues as the Republican Party. It no longer adhered to the Cleveland policy of a tariff for revenue only, but was content with a tariff revision that should eliminate the most glaring abuses without destroying the principle of protection. Its last great passion, free silver, had become unimportant with the lapse of years.

It was necessary for President Wilson to outline policies for his party as well as to improvise its leaders. With no illusions as to the nature of his election, he saw that personal and party success would depend upon his ability to carry with him the progressive groups in both great parties. He might successfully disregard the Bourbon faction of his own party, which was quite as reactionary as the most "stand-pat" Republicans, and which might be forced into caucus and held in line by party pressure; but there could be only failure for the President who could not see that the public that desired the Roosevelt policies in 1908 still demanded them, and with greater definiteness. Between his election and inauguration Wilson spoke at Staunton, Chicago, and Trenton upon the constructive work proposed for his Administration, and promised that an effort should be made to settle adequately the three problems outstanding for a generation, of tariff, finance, and trusts. There was no intention in his mind to

wait for Congress to act upon its own initiative, as Taft had done. The theory of the presidency that Hayes and Cleveland had glimpsed, and Roosevelt had followed, was that of Wilson. "The President is at liberty, both in law and conscience, to be as big a man as he can. His capacity will set the limit," he had written while yet a professor. "He has no means of compelling Congress except through public opinion."

Congress was summoned to meet in special session on April 7, 1913, to take up its action in fulfilling party pledges, as Woodrow Wilson interpreted them. In both houses there was a Democratic majority for the first time since 1893-95. In the House of Representatives there was physical reorganization as well. Steadily since the Civil War each census had shown an enlarged population for the country, and Congress had apportioned Representatives among the States in accordance with it. The number of seats to be provided had steadily grown until in the Sixty-Third Congress now assembling there were 435 members. In the old Hall of Representatives each member had had his separate desk and chair, and many of them had spent their time during sessions reading the newspapers and signing their correspondence. The Senate, with its smaller membership, retained the semblance of a parliamentary body, but the House was noisy, inattentive, and more badly congested as to space, as each new apportionment bill increased the number of desks and chairs to be accommodated. For many years parliamentary reformers urged a physical reconstruction of the chamber, that it might become an auditorium large enough to accommodate its members, small enough for them to hear debate, and free from the distractions of members' private business. The completion of the new office buildings for the members of the Senate and House removed the last argument in favor of the individual desks. The new Congress met in a reconstructed hall with the desks gone, and with concentric benches before the Speaker; with a great table facing him for Oscar W. Underwood, chairman

Re-arrange-
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Congress

of the Committee on Ways and Means and leader of the majority, and another for James R. Mann, leader of the minority.

The physical novelty in the reconstructed House was outclassed by the political novelty, when the President reverted from the usage of a century to the practice of Washington and Adams, and appeared in person to deliver his message. While the House was growing larger in the last half-century, messages had been growing longer, and their thousands of words droned by official readers to an inattentive Congress had lacked in inspiration and result. By reading the message himself President Wilson invited attention to its content, and by condensing it to a few hundred words, he made it impossible for any one to ignore his meaning. "It is clear to the whole country that the tariff duties must be altered," he said. "They must be changed to meet the radical alteration in the conditions of our economic life which the country has witnessed within the last generation. . . . Consciously or unconsciously, we have built up a set of privileges and exemptions from competition behind which it was easy by any, even the crudest, forms of combination to organize a monopoly; until at last nothing is normal, nothing is obliged to stand the tests of efficiency and economy in our world of big business, but everything thrives by concerted arrangement. . . . We are to deal with the facts of our own day, with the facts of no other, and to make laws that square with those facts." He demanded that Congress begin with a revision of the tariff and served notice that at a later time he might call their attention "to reforms that should press close upon the heels of the tariff changes, if not accompany them, of which the chief is the reform of our banking and currency laws."

The Underwood Bill, ready for introduction when Congress convened, was the product of special studies in the last session, and of the single schedule bills of the preceding Congress. It passed the House unamended in May as a triumph of party manipulation. Only five Democrats voted against it on final

Underwood-
Simmons
Tariff

passage, although a considerably larger number disliked serious revision. During the debate rumors were heard that the lobby that had usually accompanied tariff debates was again on hand, trying to secure special favors in the schedules. The President immediately made public charge that such a lobby was interfering with the freedom of debate, and in the Senate a committee to investigate the lobby began its sessions early in June. By these tactics the lobby was placed at great disadvantage and it was made easier for Congressmen to be faithful to the party purpose. The Underwood-Simmons tariff passed the Senate early in September with two Progressive Republicans, La Follette and Poindexter, supporting it, and was everywhere regarded as a personal victory for the President in holding his party together. The difficulties in maintaining Democratic unity were greatest in the case of the sugar schedule, where free sugar was bitterly opposed by Democratic members from beet-sugar or cane-sugar areas. The iron rule of the party caucus was exerted over these. The average rates of tariff were reduced from a level of about thirty-seven per cent to that of twenty-seven per cent, and the free list was enlarged to include wool, cotton, hemp, and flax, and other agricultural products. The Sixteenth Amendment authorizing the levying of an income tax, which was submitted to the States during the Payne-Aldrich debate, was now in force. An income tax was accordingly included in the Underwood-Simmons Bill, based upon a one per cent rate on incomes over four thousand dollars and rising on incomes above twenty thousand. The best experience for determining its probable yield came from Wisconsin, where such a tax had been effective since 1911. The principle of an expert tariff commission, for which Taft and Roosevelt had contended, was abandoned. It was recalled three years later, when the World War had changed the course of trade. A Tariff Commission was created in September, 1916, and placed under the direction of F. W. Taussig as chairman.

The prestige of the President was high when he signed the Underwood-Simmons Bill on October 3, 1913. His

leadership kept the principle of revision downward always well to the front. The protectionist Democrats, who had worked against their party in the Mills Bill (1888) and Wilson Bill (1894) debates, were coerced into party loyalty. The lobby was discredited, and investigation of it and of party campaign funds of recent years emboldened timid Congressmen to disregard local pressure. The day after the passage of the tariff bill, Underwood announced his candidacy for a vacant seat in the Senate from Alabama, and in the following spring, in an election under the new Seventeenth Amendment, carried his State over Richmond Pearson Hobson, the hero of the Merrimac, and an advocate of prohibition. Congress meanwhile entered upon the second chapter of its task, the revision of the financial laws.

The Aldrich Monetary Commission, created by Congress after the panic of 1907, prepared an elaborate series of studies in the fields of banking, currency, and panics, and was forced to terminate its labors Finance in 1912. Before its final report was ready for publication so much odium was attached to the name of its chairman as to destroy the immediate utility of any recommendation he should make. Aldrich had been the great tariff specialist in the Senate since his entry into that body in time to participate in making the tariff of 1883. He was a consistent advocate of high protection, and enjoyed the steady support of the great manufacturing interests that came under attack between 1900 and 1908. His participation in the framing of the tariff bill that bore his name made him a target for Progressive attacks, which were made worse by his identification with the "stand-pat" group that insisted upon nominating Taft in 1912. His studies of the banking situation, more painstaking than those of any other Congressman, led him to the advocacy of a central bank; but the idea of a central bank had been unpopular since Andrew Jackson destroyed the Second Bank of the United States, and Aldrich's own connection with big business was such as to make a large portion of the public suspicious of any scheme that he might recommend.

The financial situation was bad and was steadily growing worse. The control of credit was subject to misuse or abuse, the currency itself failed to inspire confidence in its solidity, and there was a strong suspicion that the trust movement had extended its clutches into the field of finance as well as into that of industry and transportation. So far as the currency was concerned, the slight margin by which free silver was avoided in 1896 frightened sober thinkers into making serious studies of the money problem. The ordinary money of exchange — gold, silver, subsidiary coinage, gold certificates, silver certificates, Civil War greenbacks, Sherman Act legal tenders, and national bank notes — circulated at par only because of the public promise to redeem it in gold coin. The legal reserve of \$150,000,000 was inadequate to meet any real crisis. In the panic of 1907 fear that the Treasury might not maintain the gold basis was everywhere felt and led to hoarding of all varieties of currency. In violation of the law, the clearing-houses were compelled to issue notes of their own, based upon collateral, in order to avoid the worse evil of financial collapse. The national bank notes, instead of providing a flexible element in the currency were so circumscribed by law as to have an opposite tendency. There was no elasticity in the system to take care of seasonal expansion to move the crops in the fall, or emergency issues to forestall panics. The Aldrich-Vreeland Bill of 1908 made moderate provision for this need, but left the question of credit control untouched.

Having no public control, the banks and trust companies had neither guidance nor restriction in the use of credit. They operated on a strictly competitive basis, and when in periods of great speculation it became profitable to deposit their funds in New York banks where stock gamblers could use them, thither the money went regardless of the more prosaic daily requirements of business for commercial credit. The merchant, who needed to discount his notes as regularly as he bought his coal or paid his rent, found that the speculator received preferential treatment at the banks. The Aldrich Commission, with the assistance of banking ex-

perts and economists, worked upon methods whereby the speculative use of credit might be curtailed in order to make more certain provision for commerce. There was lack of flexibility in the control of credit as of currency. Huge balances were apt to accumulate and lie idle, while Western farmers were clamoring for credit. There was need for greater fluidity in order to permit the funds to flow freely where they were most needed.

The existence of a money trust was made much of by Progressive leaders, who charged that the control of credit was monopolized as completely as industry and railroads. They declared that a few great banks, ^{The money trust} controlling billions of deposits and controlled by small groups of directors, made it impossible for outsiders to procure the credit to build new railroads or construct new industries, while they lent it recklessly to insiders for the further advancement of existing monopolies. The Progressives charged as well, and Democrats echoed the charge, that the directors of the great banks lent the money to themselves in defiance of sound morality if not of law. It was freely asserted, and great diagrams were drawn up to prove it, that a system of interlocking directorates was bringing the whole American economic life into one gigantic consolidation at the heart of which lay the money trust.

The exchange of directors was a common feature in the financing of the trusts. The steel interests were represented on the railroad boards, the railroads in turn were represented on the banking directorates, the banks placed members on the governing bodies of the industries that did business with them. It was possible to show by diagram how a handful of banks in Wall Street were interlocked with all the great railroads and industries of the country. The House Committee on Banking and Currency, under the chairmanship of A. P. Pujo, of Louisiana, made a detailed investigation of the money trust in 1912, and by its report added to the resentment felt toward big business and to the odium that was attached to the idea of a central bank. The great financiers themselves either denied the existence

of a money trust or smilingly admitted it and inquired, "Can you unscramble eggs?" The problem of business and financial legislation was to find a means of unscrambling the eggs without addling them.

The House Committee on Banking and Currency, under the chairmanship of Carter Glass, of Virginia, began work upon financial legislation early in 1913, and introduced a banking bill in the later stages of the tariff legislation. The proposal was to avoid the politically dangerous central bank and yet secure for the country all the advantages of such an institution. It was accordingly proposed to establish a federal reserve system in which the country should be divided into districts (twelve being later created), in each of which the local banks should become members of an association for the erection of a federal reserve bank. The federal reserve banks were to receive on deposit the reserves of member banks, and it was to be made less easy for these reserves to accumulate in Wall Street. Provision was also made for the issuance of notes by the federal reserve banks based upon commercial securities and other assets deposited with them by member banks. The federal reserve banks themselves were to be under the general oversight of a Federal Reserve Board composed partly of public officers and partly of financial appointees serving for a term of twelve years, the board being closely attached to the Treasury of the United States. The new financial law was endorsed by the President in an address to Congress on June 23, 1913, and that body plunged into the middle of the federal reserve debate after the passage of the Underwood-Simmons tariff. Fatigued by their months of labor on the tariff, they had hoped for a recess in the autumn, but President Wilson insisted that Congress stay on the job till it was done. In December they looked for a recess at Christmas with the passage of the act postponed until 1914. Again executive pressure was exerted to procure legislation at once, with the result that the Federal Reserve Bill became a law December 23, 1913. "It assumed the character of a political

Federal
Reserve
System

miracle," wrote one of the leading economists who had despaired of constructive legislation on finance. Not more than three financial events in the history of the United States ranked with it in significance. The assumption of the public debt by Hamilton, the destruction of the Second Bank by Jackson, and the inauguration of the national banking system by Chase, alone are to be compared with it. The banks that protested bitterly throughout the debate against any governmental interference found that they liked it on its final passage. In the following year, under the direction of Secretary McAdoo, the new law was brought into operation, the country was divided into reserve districts, the Federal Board and the reserve banks began to operate. From the standpoint of currency and credit the resources of the country were better distributed than before, and it was no mean advantage of the system that the Treasury of the United States no longer was forced to go to Wall Street for assistance, but Wall Street came to it. The act would have been impossible without the prolonged financial investigations of the Roosevelt and Taft Administrations, but its passage by a Democratic Congress in the first session of a new Administration served to increase the prestige that was attaching itself to the political leadership of Woodrow Wilson.

The Sixty-Third Congress, beginning its session on April 7, 1913, sat until October 24, 1914, making a new record for Congressional diligence. The Democratic party ^{Continuous session} leaders, conscious of their uncertain tenure upon political power, determined to keep busy so long as the going was good, while their party followers submerged their personal preferences as they acted upon the maxim of Benjamin Franklin that they must hang together or hang separately. Instead of resting content with the passage of two basic laws, they were called to renewed efforts when the President addressed them on the subject of the trusts on January 20, 1914.

The new Administration, acting through Attorney-General James C. McReynolds, was no longer spending its

strength upon suits for the dissolution of corporations.
 Anti-trust policies It was instead working for an amicable dissolution of mergers by inducing big business to readjust its affairs voluntarily in order to come into better harmony with the Sherman Law. In his address to Congress Wilson took a course close to that outlined by Senator La Follette and Louis Brandeis who had gained distinction in the legal controversy with the trusts. A series of Administration bills made clear his intent, and included a better definition of unlawful monopoly and restraint of trade than the Sherman Act had given; defined a new list of unfair trade practices and forbade them; provided for the regulation of corporation directorates and prohibited their interlocking; and finally created a commission to stand toward interstate trade in the relationship already held by the Interstate Commerce Commission toward transportation.

The general drift of trust legislation as proposed gives evidence to the determination of the President to hold his party together by strict party discipline and to secure the enactment, not of party measures, but of the non-partisan program of the progressive citizens whom he believed to constitute the bulk of both great parties. The debate over the trusts was thirty years old. It had produced only one basic restraining law, whose intent was to abolish the combinations rather than control them. The renewal of the debate behind the leadership of Roosevelt had developed doubts as to whether abolition was either wise or possible, and had brought out a distinction between good trusts and bad. In their platforms of 1912 the Democratic and Progressive parties had taken different views of the problem; the former, adhering to the doctrine of the Sherman Act, demanded that the law be made more stringent to restore free competition and break up the trusts. The Progressives, however, recommended a discrimination between the useful and injurious forms of combination, a definition of unfair practices, and the creation of federal machinery to watch the trusts. It was this Progressive pro-

gram that Wilson supported more nearly than that of his own party.

The financial legislation of 1913 touched a large portion of the trust problem. In the Federal Reserve Act the banks and the people were reconciled, leaving the rest of the problem much easier of solution. In 1914, while Congress was debating its next steps, the banks were cheerfully preparing to enter into the new relationship of the federal reserve system. Decentralized reserves, flexibility of currency, and public control were established over the American financial world.

After eight months of debate the trust legislation was enacted without encountering partisan opposition. On September 26, 1914, the Federal Trade Commission was created to represent the Govern-^{Federal Trade Commission}ment in its oversight of the trusts. It was to consist of a non-partisan board of five members, the subject-matter of whose control was defined in the Clayton Anti-Trust Law of October 15, 1914. The chief purpose of this act was to forbid interlocking directorates in business as they had already been forbidden in banking; to prohibit corporations having trustees in common from doing business with each other; to prohibit unfair trading, and to grant special privileges to organized labor and to farmers. A great obstacle in the course of anti-trust legislation was the attitude of organized labor which desired to see commercial combinations restricted, but which asserted the right of labor to combine freely for any purpose. Farmers generally looked upon their own associations, organized for marketing purposes, as benevolent combinations rather than injurious. The insistence of these two groups imperiled the passage of the Clayton Act, until the act was amended to provide that the restrictions placed upon the trusts should not be interpreted as applying to labor or to agriculture.

Labor was closer to the Democratic Administration than it had been to any other. Ever since the failure of Gompers to induce the Republican Convention of 1908 to adopt

the anti-injunction plank that he desired, he had tended Department of Labor to work in harmony with the Democratic leaders. The unnatural union contained in the Department of Commerce and Labor was the subject of criticism which resulted in its division in 1913. Taft signed the bill creating a Department of Labor with reluctance because of his dislike to enlarge the Cabinet. William B. Wilson, the first Secretary of Labor, built up the organization of the new department, having jurisdiction over not only the old Bureau of Labor, but the related fields of immigration, naturalization, and the Children's Bureau.

The Children's Bureau, with Julia C. Lathrop as chief, was created in 1912 to promote the "welfare of children and child life." It was fifty years after the time when Congress legislated for the gathering of "all information concerning agriculture" before that body could be induced to take the first steps for the conservation of the raw material of citizenship. The experience of the social workers in the congested districts of great cities was every year making it more apparent that poverty and disease were depriving each generation of a part of its chance for life. Jane Addams at Hull House in Chicago and Lillian D. Wald, of the Henry Street Settlement in New York, were leaders in the demand that a government that safeguarded live-stock and crops ought to value the welfare of its children. Colonel Roosevelt in 1912 drew much support from leaders like these, who saw in the Progressive movement a chance of meeting social needs. Transferred to the Department of Labor as one of its constituent bureaus, the Children's Bureau rapidly expanded the scope of its investigations and administrative duties for the benefits of its wards. In September, 1916, Congress passed an act "to prevent interstate commerce in the products of child labor." Such a law had been demanded by progressives for ten years on humanitarian grounds, and received special new support now from manufacturing interests in the North and West. Most of the Northern States had already passed

laws prohibiting the labor of children under fourteen years of age, but in Southern States where such laws were less common, cotton mills using child labor were offering a competition embarrassing to Northern factories using adult labor. The Keating-Owen Child Labor Bill, as this was called, remained in force for less than a year because the Supreme Court in 1918 declared it to be unconstitutional. In 1919 a second attempt to outlaw child labor was based on the taxing clause of the Constitution, a special and prohibitory surtax being levied upon incomes derived from child labor. This was declared unconstitutional in 1922; whereupon, in 1924, Congress submitted to the States a proposed amendment to the Constitution authorizing the prohibition of child labor. The limits of the flexibility of the Constitution had been reached, in this direction, and further advance was tied up with the complicated process of amendment.

Another of the bureaus of the Department of Labor had administrative charge of workmen's compensation so far as the United States was concerned. With the ^{Workmen's} progress of industrial organization, the problem ^{compensation} of the industrially maimed increased in importance. Employers' liability for injuries received by workmen was limited by the legal doctrines of contributory negligence and fellow-servant, while the amount received by injured workmen had to bear the expensive cost of litigation to secure the awards. The result was that society in general carried the charge of the industrial cripples and their dependent families instead of the industries concerned. In 1908 Congress passed an employers' liability law affecting common carriers engaged in interstate commerce, replacing an earlier law that the Supreme Court had declared unconstitutional. A series of similar laws passed by the States accepted the principle of workmen's compensation according to a definite scale without litigation or cost to the injured persons. Industry proceeded to insure its employees against the risk of accident and to inaugurate a campaign for "safety first" that progressively reduced both the risk

and the accidents. So far as federal employees were concerned, Congress passed a workmen's compensation act in 1908 to be administered by the old Department of Labor, which became the Bureau of Labor Statistics in the new department of 1913. In these fields Congress was engaged in stretching the limits of its power to regulate interstate commerce.

It was no new thing for Congress to be interested in the education of citizens. Since 1862 the land-grant colleges, established under the Morrill Act, had been concerned with agricultural and industrial education. In some of the Western universities successful attempts were made after 1900 to extend the benefits of education to the adult population, and extension divisions were established to carry education to the people. In 1914 the Smith-Lever Act provided for coöperation in agricultural extension between the Department of Agriculture and the land-grant colleges, and the United States assumed a part of the responsibility for this type of local instruction by providing funds not exceeding, dollar for dollar, the contributions of the States themselves. In February, 1917, the Federal Board of Vocational Education, similarly financed, was created to coöperate with the States in vocational teaching and teacher training, and to make studies of the best methods of instruction in the fields of agriculture, industry, domestic science, and commerce. The vocational rehabilitation of persons maimed in industry was added to its duties in 1920.

Still another division of the Department of Labor began immediately to put together a United States employment service. The powers for this were derived by implication, partly from the organic act of the Department, which specified services to the wage-earner, and partly from the immigration law of 1907, which gave the Bureau of Immigration power to assist in placing immigrants where they could be used. An emergency call for harvest hands from Oklahoma in 1914 gave the impetus from which an employment service was developed in the next two years.

Coöperation
with the
States

Another highly controversial measure concerning the status of labor was pending in Congress when the anti-trust legislation of 1914 was passed. This was Andrew Furuseth's Seamen's Bill for the improvement of the conditions of sailors in the merchant service. The bill represented the aspirations of the seamen's unions and was designed to revolutionize the relations of the sailor to his employer. The prevailing practice made a seaman for the term of his contract bound to his master. The powers of a captain of a ship at sea, always large, were buttressed by the fact that his hands could not desert their jobs when his ship touched port. Supported persistently by Senator La Follette, the Furuseth Bill was in Congress for two years. It established physical conditions for the housing of the crew and their maintenance, effective for all merchant ships entering American ports. It provided that a seaman at any American port might legally demand half the wages due him, and destroyed the power to bring him back if he should desert. The power asserted in the law, which passed in 1915, ran counter to provisions in the commercial treaties with most of the maritime powers, by which their seamen in America were kept under their own jurisdiction as administered by their consuls. The statute required the State Department to abrogate these treaties to this extent, and the Supreme Court in 1920 upheld the constitutionality of the wage requirement. Favored by labor, the bill was bitterly opposed by the maritime interests, which maintained that it was the last blow against an American merchant marine, already moribund.

The broadening program of federal activity gave point to the title of the *New Republic* that appeared in November, 1914, as an organ of progressives. The intellectual leadership of the daily newspapers was weakening as the great editors one by one passed off the stage. Only Henry Watterson survived of that great group that had made their journals real organs for shaping public opinion in the two decades after the Civil War. The opinions of newspapers seemed to be counting for

less and less as the years went round, and the appearance of new weeklies representing different shades of opinion and uninfluenced by advertising policies, was a consequence. Bryan's *Commoner* (1900) was early in the field, and was followed in January, 1909, by *La Follette's Magazine*. Colonel Roosevelt became a contributing editor to the *Outlook*, and later, the *Metropolitan Magazine* and the *Kansas City Star*, after his retirement from office. Max Eastman brought out the *Masses* as a carrier for Socialist opinions in 1911, and reincarnated it in 1918 as the *Liberator*. The weekly of radical labor, *Solidarity*, began its course in January, 1910. The old dominance of the *New York Nation* in the formulation of critical opinion weakened after the withdrawal of E. L. Godkin, who retired in 1899. The *New Republic* in 1914 now added a deliberate breadth of vision and was serving seventeen thousand subscribers in its second year. Both it and the *Nation* developed so rapidly in their liberalism as to leave more conservative critics behind, who brought out in 1919 the *Review* as a protest against "unthinking radicalism"; while in 1920 the weekly *Freeman* appeared to struggle for the leadership of radical thought.

The promise of the Democratic platform of 1912 to restore freedom to the Filipinos at as early a date as possible started a discussion in which 1921 was accepted as the ultimate date. Ever since Bryan had exerted his influence to accomplish the ratification of the Spanish Treaty in 1898, this policy had been a Democratic doctrine. In the intervening years steady progress in the directions of education, self-government, and peace had been the consequence of American administration. The Filipino Assembly in 1907 took over the lawmaking power that the Philippine Commission appointed by the President had hitherto exercised. A new organic act for the islands became a law in August, 1916, after a vigorous debate, in the early stages of which Secretary of War Garrison declared his unwillingness to remain in the Cabinet if the principle of immediate independence should be adopted. The

new act provided for replacing the Philippine Commission with an elective Senate as the superior body in the Philippine Congress. Nearly three years before its passage the control of the Commission had been given over to Filipino citizens. Francis Burton Harrison, sent out as Governor-General in 1913, had announced the Administration policy of administering the Philippine Islands as a trustee for the Filipinos with a view to their ultimate independence, and had promised to take the steps, one at a time as conditions warranted them, and to begin by placing power in the hands of Filipino appointees.

A few weeks after the arrival of Governor Harrison at his post occurred an episode that illustrated the interest of the President in his success, as well as the fact that there was a new régime in Washington. The military Order of the Carabao was founded at Manila by the officers engaged in suppressing the insurrection of Aguinaldo, and established "corrals" at the various army centers, where from time to time periodical "wallows" gave an opportunity for members of the Philippine expeditionary force to renew their friendships and exchange reminiscences. The society drew its name from the draft animal of the Filipinos, which was "said to be slower than a camel and more obstinate than a mule," and whose chief ambition to lie down in a puddle provided the name for the local meetings of the society. In like fashion the military Order of the Dragon was formed by the officers who served in China, as the Aztec Club had long since been organized by the conquerors of Mexico. No importance had ever been given to the songs and burlesques that accompanied their annual "wallows" in Washington which resembled in character the meetings of the Gridiron Club or the Clover Club.

In December, 1913, the dinner of the Washington corral of the Carabao was followed by a burlesque directed against the naval policies of Secretary Daniels and the interest of Secretary Bryan in peace and pro-^{Discipline}hibition, and terminated with the famous "insurrecto song" whose refrain ran,

“Underneath the starry flag
Civilize them with a krag.”

By order of the President the officers concerned with the performance were immediately and publicly rebuked. A naval commander already detailed to the Asiatic fleet was transferred, and notification was abruptly served on the military officers of the United States that it was a gross impropriety for them to discredit or interfere with the policies of their Government.

The burlesques of Bryan and Daniels were founded upon disapproval. Secretary Bryan was already engaged in negotiation of an elaborate series of peace treaties whose ideals had been accepted by the Administration. He was also one of the leading advocates of prohibition, and had announced his devotion to the fight to make the United States dry by constitutional amendment. There was wide criticism and some serious disapproval of his determination not to serve wine at his residence, and the supposed hardship entailed upon the diplomatic corps when they found that he had substituted grape-juice became the subject of humorous squibs without number. The humorous weekly, *Life*, took up the joke as though it were serious, and devoted itself to a campaign of farce against both Bryan and Daniels.

Secretary Daniels came into the Navy Department as a landsman, as most of his predecessors had done. Shortly after his inauguration he approved a recommendation of the general board over which Admiral Dewey presided, changing the nautical vocabulary from “port” and “starboard” to “left” and “right.” There was resentment already developing because of his avowed determination to improve the condition of the enlisted man and to introduce reforms for his education and betterment. The port and starboard order was too good an opportunity to be overlooked. Broad comedy was based upon it, and revived the interest of cartoonists and joke-makers in Gilbert and Sullivan’s *Pinafore*, whose admiral owed his rise to a determination to “Stick close to your desk and never go to sea.” The attack on

Daniels was intensified in 1914 when an order was issued requiring naval officers to give up their wine mess, and to conform to the temperance regulations imposed upon their men. His recommendation that the Government undertake the manufacture of armor plate and heavy guns in order to prevent being gouged by ordnance makers, brought him unpopularity from another quarter. This culminated at the Carabao dinner, the aftermath of which revealed the President fully in support of the members of his official family.

The Adamson Law was enacted on September 3, 1916, under Administration pressure backed by the threat of a railroad strike. The four railway brotherhoods ^{The Labor threat} involved in the struggle were among the best organized and most responsible trade unions in the United States. For many years it had been their boast that they procured their results by collective bargaining. They defended their threat to tie up the transportation of the country by the assertion that the railroads were now so unified in their policies through interlocking directorates and gentlemen's agreements that they could maintain a common plan in the face of demands from their employees.

Wage increases were required by the brotherhoods to meet the rising cost of living. For nearly twenty years the index curve of average retail prices had been ^{Cost of living} gradually rising, and since the outbreak of the war in Europe the increase in many directions had been spectacular. All labor in America was unsettled because of the demand for workmen and the cost of living. The double effect of the World War was to stop the annual supply of cheap labor from Europe that had averaged over a million a year for ten years before the war, and to increase the demand for American goods for Allied consumption. The enlargement of munitions plants was only one aspect of the growing demand for labor. The effects produced by European causes were intensified by domestic developments that produced new objects for expenditure and called for help to supply new needs.

With new opportunities competing for labor and with the

supply no longer increasing, it became possible for organized labor to gain victories of a sort unusual in preceding years. The Adamson Law was denounced by Judge Hughes at Nashville the day after its passage. He pointed out that the measure was enacted under pressure rather than upon its merits and charged that it was a party move to win the vote of organized labor. The act as it passed Congress was less than the program for which the President had asked. He insisted upon the recognition of the eight-hour day, but also asked for powers that would make the repetition of this threat of a general railroad tie-up improbable, by requiring and giving time for a public investigation of the controversy at issue before permitting such a strike to be precipitated. The demand of the employees for an eight-hour day was declared to be a demand for wage increase in disguise, the real intent being not to limit the working day, but to secure time and a half for overtime over eight hours. The unions declared that in the absence of such a law their members were frequently forced to work sixteen hours or more at a stretch, to their injury and to the danger of the traveling public.

The law provided that the new working day should become effective January 1, 1917. Before that date the railroads attacked the law in the courts and procured a district court decision that it was unconstitutional. They let it be known that pending a final decision by the Supreme Court they would not pay the overtime provided by the Adamson Law, but would hold it in a separate fund for the benefit of the employees. A new strike to force the railroads to obey the law at once was declared in March, 1917, but was postponed at the request of the President while a special commission consisting of Secretaries Lane and Wilson, and Daniel Willard, chairman of the Advisory Commission of the Council of National Defense, brought pressure upon the railroad companies. The companies yielded on March 19, and later in the day the Supreme Court by a vote of five to four upheld the constitutionality of the act, and asserted in a dictum that it would have been possible for Congress to

compel the unions to arbitrate their grievance. Among the five justices making the majority in this decision were two new members recently appointed, Louis D. Brandeis, a liberal lawyer prominent for his advocacy of labor causes and his leadership against the trusts, and John H. Clarke, an Ohio associate of Secretary Baker.

Samuel Gompers, president of the American Federation of Labor, denounced that part of the Supreme Court decision that alleged a power to compel the unions to arbitrate. He maintained the right to strike as inherent in citizenship, and his organization supported the demands of the railway brotherhoods through the controversy just terminated. These brotherhoods were the only important organizations of labor not included in the American Federation, but there was coöperation between their several leaders, and the heads of the brotherhoods addressed the annual convention of the Federation in 1916, in an attempt to bring all organized labor into a fight against anti-strike injunctions and compulsory arbitration. Gompers, now sixty-seven years of age, and head of the Federation, with the exception of a single year, since 1881, represented in 1916 an aggregate of 2,072,802 organized workmen. In the *American Federationist*, through which Gompers reached his followers, he consistently upheld the labor movement and repelled both the idea of Government control and the undermining attempts of labor radicals imbued with the revolutionary ideas of syndicalism. He kept labor out of politics in the sense that he espoused no political party and opposed the formation of a labor party, but he believed in throwing the vote of wage-earners where it would injure public officials who opposed the demands of organized labor, and would reward its friends.

The aim of the Socialist Party, directly opposed to that of Gompers and the American Federation of Labor, was obtainable only with the support of the group that Gompers led. There was a rising Socialist vote after 1900, with here and there a Socialist locally elected to office or to Congress. In the presidential

elections Debs received 87,814 votes in 1900, 402,283 in 1904, 420,793 in 1908, 901,873 in 1912, and Allan Benson, editor of the *American Socialist*, 590,570 in 1916. The platforms of the Socialist Party reflected the doctrines of Karl Marx, and the ideal of a social revolution. Many of the most active party leaders were naturalized citizens who had grown to maturity of conviction in their native homes in Russia, Austria, and Germany. Many of their followers were foreign-born.

More radical than the organized Socialists and more dangerous to the settled program of the American Federation of Labor were the aims of a small group of labor leaders who opposed the idea of collective bargaining and worked for a social revolution by direct action. The word "syndicalism," as descriptive of the ideals of this group, came into the American vocabulary in 1912, in the course of a great strike of unskilled workmen at Lawrence, Massachusetts. The problem of unskilled labor was in substance the problem of the unassimilated immigrant. In the past century the basis of boss rule and corrupt city government was laid on the political control of the votes of this class, and among these the extreme social leaders were now preaching their doctrine. Syndicalism was founded on the assumption that the workmen are entitled to the whole product that they create, and that the quickest way for them to gain possession of the tools of the trade and the control of industrial life is by direct action to make the position of capital untenable: It regarded collective bargaining as injurious because this made it possible for capital to exist, and taught that agreements ought to be violated whenever convenient. The word *sabotage* came into the vocabulary with syndicalism, describing the process of breaking the machinery, spoiling the output, and otherwise injuring the employer. In the strike it was necessary for the workmen to leave their job and forfeit their pay. By *sabotage* they could do just as much harm to their employer and continue to draw their wages.

The Lawrence strike was accompanied by local violence

and wide publicity. The local violence produced another occasion for the use of the militia and for demonstration of its inadequacy. Since the railroad strikes of 1877 the National Guard of various States had been habitually called into service to attempt to produce order when the local machinery of the police broke down, and an antipathy of organized labor toward the National Guard was a consequence of this. Labor came to believe that the militia was only an agency of capitalism. During the Colorado mining strike of 1903 this belief was intensified. There was no money in the Colorado treasury to pay the expenses of the militia in the field, yet the local authorities were powerless to maintain order, and sympathizers of the Western Federation of Miners inaugurated a reign of terror. In this crisis the mine-owners with large property interests at stake guaranteed the expenses of the campaign if the governor would call out the militia. This was done, and it became possible for radical labor leaders to charge with a semblance of truth that the militia was hired out to break the strike.

The ineffectiveness of the militia was due to its voluntary character and lack of discipline. In 1905 Pennsylvania tried the experiment of creating a State constabulary to reënforce the hands of local police au-^{State}_{Police}thorities and to render it unnecessary to use the militia to curb disorder arising from labor controversies. The Pennsylvania constabulary was organized along the lines made famous by the Royal Mounted Police of the Canadian Northwest. Its success was complete and immediate, and the example was followed by New York and other States, but the unpopularity of the constabulary with organized labor exceeded that of the militia.

About the time that the Pennsylvania constabulary was established the extreme revolutionary labor leaders organized the Industrial Workers of the World in protest against the policies of the American Federation and in favor of social revolution by direct action. The leaders of the I.W.W. and many of the members came from the Western Federa-

tion of Miners whose career had received wide notoriety in the Rocky Mountain States, and whose strikes had been accompanied by violence at Cœur d'Alène in Idaho and at Cripple Creek in Colorado. Moyer and Haywood, the leaders, were Socialists as well as labor agitators, and aimed to divert the American labor movement into a revolutionary socialistic organization. They found their most promising material in the ranks of unskilled labor, which constituted the most notable defect of the scheme of the American Federation. The organized trades, working as industrial groups, made up the Federation, which thus included the aristocracy of labor. There was no considerable success in the organization of the unskilled whose illiteracy and miscellaneous nativity made them hard to approach and whose migratory habits made them unreliable for organization purposes. The I.W.W. appealed to this group with its idea of one big union that could by direct action plot against activities of any industry or by general strike tie up society itself.

Public opinion was impressed with the incidental violence that appeared wherever the I.W.W. was active in the seven years of its life before it organized the foreign laborers at Lawrence and brought on the strike of 1912. Moyer and Haywood gained the appellation of "undesirable citizens" from Colonel Roosevelt at the time they were under indictment for the murder of ex-Governor Stuenenberg, which occurred in 1905. This murder, apparently gratuitous and growing out of Western Federation controversies, occasioned a famous trial at Boisé, Idaho, in 1907, in which William E. Borah first gained national attention as counsel for the prosecution. The jury failed to convict, but the testimony revealed the long career of violence associated with the Western Federation of Miners, and when Haywood became an active leader of the I.W.W. his reputation helped to establish that of the new organization.

The cause of organized labor was further injured by the activities of structural steel workers in California which culminated in an attempt to wreck by a bomb the plant

of the Los Angeles *Times*, and the arrest of the two brothers McNamara as responsible for it. The McNamara trial at Los Angeles in 1911 was made the occasion for a great protest by organized labor that these men were being railroaded to jail by a conspiracy of capital. Unions subscribed to the defense funds and the American Federation of Labor took up the cause of the accused. When these confessed on December 1, 1911, that they had committed the crime, and changed their plea to guilty, they left their supporters feeling betrayed, and weakened the appeal of labor the next time it should voice a protest. A year later a group of thirty-eight labor chiefs were convicted as accomplices in the McNamara conspiracy.

In July, 1916, there occurred another act of violence to render more difficult the task of reconciling the aims of capital and labor and of establishing the proper relation of Government to each of them. A parade at San Francisco, organized as a demonstration in favor of national preparedness, was interrupted by the explosion of a bomb that killed several persons. California had been the scene of the bitterest part of the struggle against the radicals. The breach between labor and capital was here as wide as anywhere in the country. In San Francisco a few weeks later the Republican candidate for the presidency became so involved in the controversy as probably to account for his defeat in November.

The form of demonstration for preparedness so brutally interrupted at San Francisco was prevalent throughout the United States in 1916. The public tour of ^{Pacifism} President Wilson in the early weeks of the year brought the matter clearly to public attention, and on June 14, while the Democratic Convention that was to renominate him was assembling in St. Louis, he marched the length of Pennsylvania Avenue at the head of a preparedness procession, and delivered a vigorous speech against the hyphen in American politics. The Socialist labor leaders decried these preparations, and organized labor in some cases declined to march in similar processions. Preparedness ad-

vocates raised a clamor against the singing of a popular song, "I didn't raise my boy to be a soldier." They were denounced in turn as profiteers. "These patriots for profit — the richest and most powerful group of men in the United States," declared a Chicago Congressman, "have their minds set on vastly increased armaments, and they want no interference." To this Senator La Follette added, "If a man dares to intimate that he is unwilling to swallow the whole program for preparedness — *a big army, a big navy, big contracts for munitions of war* — that man is a fool or a coward or a traitor."

The bomb that exploded in San Francisco on June 22 was an incident in the preparedness debate, and ultimately Thomas Mooney, a labor leader whose reputation was that of a violent radical, was convicted of murder and sentenced to be hanged. As in the McNamara case, organized labor showed a tendency to demand the acquittal of Mooney and to assert that he was the victim of a conspiracy by the enemies of labor. Most Americans heard his name for the first time when mobs in Petrograd during the revolution of March, 1917, gathered around the American Embassy to demand his release. The international prominence given to the Mooney case by Russian revolutionary exiles who hurried home in 1917 forced the National Government to take an interest in his fate. His execution was stayed and the sentence was subsequently commuted to life imprisonment by the governor of California, after repeated attempts to procure his retrial or pardon had failed.

The growing militancy in the conduct of the labor movement, and the depressed and neglected condition of un-
 American- skilled labor which made it a safe field for the
 ization propagation of revolutionary doctrines, were much before the public in 1916. Congress declined to meet the former situation by enacting a scheme of compulsory arbitration, but programs of Americanization were inaugurated to lessen the danger of un-American propaganda. The nativist movement that had frequently appeared in the United States earlier than 1916 now for the first time took

the form of hastening the process of assimilation of naturalized citizens. Its earlier phases had confined themselves largely to legal and political attacks against the foreign-born as in the Alien and Sedition Acts of 1798 and the native American movement of the fifties. In the autumn of 1915 a national Americanization committee was organized to bring the language and ideals of the United States into the lives of newcomers of whom more than ten millions had arrived in the past decade. The Americanization movement took the form of political education and instruction in the English language. The United States Bureau of Education took an active part in advancing it, and it speedily entered the field of industry as employers realized the greater efficiency of English-speaking laborers, and as the latter became aware of their greater earning power.

Militancy as a means of advancing reform movements grew more frequent after its adoption by the advocates of woman suffrage in England in 1906. In this ^{Woman} movement it proved to be a successful means of ^{suffrage} advertising and attracting attention where earlier and more restrained appeals were unavailing. In the United States the suffrage movement did not become militant until 1917, when a faction of the woman's party adopted the English methods in part. During the Democratic Convention at St. Louis in 1916 advocates of woman suffrage in costume and in silence lined the streets leading to the auditorium. Leaders of both parties accepted the principle of woman suffrage before election day. In 1911 women had the right to vote in six of the Western States, Wyoming, Colorado, Utah, Idaho, Washington, and California, and had partial suffrage in about half the other States. The American movement took the double form of working for State suffrage and advocating a constitutional amendment for the whole United States. Additional States were gained one by one between 1911 and 1917, while the Susan B. Anthony amendment was brought forward at every session of Congress. In January, 1917, the Congressional Union for Woman Suffrage began a picketing of the White House to

influence the President to support the amendment in Congress. Two years later Congress yielded, overriding the opposition of the Southern States, and submitted the amendment for ratification.

Militancy, radicalism, and reform were all involved in a political movement that appeared in the Northwest. The agrarian region west of the Great Lakes and north of Texas, in which the Granger and Populist movements arose and flourished, produced in 1915 the National Non-Partisan League, which showed its non-partisanship by seizing the primaries of the Republican Party and electing a predetermined farmers' ticket in North Dakota. The grievances behind the appearance of the Non-Partisan League were economic, due to crop failures and the belief that the railroads and elevator companies were running the State for their own advantage. The new league was held together through the organization of a paid-up membership, reached by the *Non-Partisan Leader*, first published at Fargo, North Dakota, in September, 1915. The League employed Socialist writers to start the *Leader*, with the result that the agitation took on a socialistic aspect that it soon abandoned. The organization was working for the extension of State agencies of which State owned elevators, State hail insurance, and State banks were most discussed. "The members of the non-partisan league are not angry at anybody . . ." asserted the *Leader*. "The League seeks to gather together all the forces that stand for progress, justice, and a square deal for the people of this state." The Non-Partisan League elected its candidate for governor, and in the summer of 1917 elected John M. Baer, cartoonist of the *Non-Partisan Leader*, to Congress.

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CHAPTER XXI

“HE KEPT US OUT OF WAR”

THE success of President Wilson's policy of settling immediately the tariff, financial, and banking problems brought an affirmative answer by the autumn of 1914 to the question as to whether or not he could be the leader of his party. William Jennings Bryan, whose dominance was unquestioned at the date of the Baltimore Convention, was believed to have it in his power to wreck the Administration of any other man. His appointment as Secretary of State made it possible for the Administration to use his influence over Western and Southern Democrats, while he in the new office showed a willingness to subordinate himself and coöperate with his chief that contributed to the successful leadership of the latter. The influence of Bryan was always potent at the Capitol, maintaining party discipline, soothing the discontented, and facilitating the passage of the statutes of 1913 and 1914. By the latter date the President was in actual enjoyment of the party leadership that Bryan had possessed, and there was no sign of any break between them.

In the administration of the State Department Bryan contributed no special training and no unusual understanding of the problems. Technical matters were carried on by the permanent staff. Minor officials in the diplomatic service were promoted and transferred as consistently as the law allowed. The chief ambassadors and ministers were as usual allowed to retire, and their successors were appointed directly from civil life. In the more important posts men of letters or active partisans replaced Republican predecessors. The editor of *World's Work*, Walter Hines Page, was sent to the Court of St. James, Thomas Nelson Page to Rome, Brand Whitlock to Brussels, Henry van Dyke to The Hague, and James W. Gerard, a wealthy

New York judge, to Berlin. It was commonly believed that the President gave the leading title in his Cabinet to Bryan, but retained control of the diplomatic policies of the State Department himself.

A few days before the change in administrations Mexico underwent another of her periodic revolutions, and a military dictator, Victoriano Huerta, assumed the executive power, displacing Francisco I. Madero, ^{Mexican} _{affairs} whose own title had been based on successful revolution. For thirty-five years before 1911, Mexico enjoyed tolerable tranquillity under the heavy hand of General Porfirio Diaz, dictator and President. In the Diaz régime Mexico came nearer to the United States as railroads crossed the Rio Grande and penetrated the highlands of the Latin Republic. Foreigners were encouraged to take concessions for the development of Mexican resources. Mining and railroad construction were promoted, and in later years, when oil was discovered in the State of Tamaulipas, petroleum concessions were granted in the Tampico district. Foreign industry found it possible to do business under Diaz and the disorder that had formerly existed along the Rio Grande was rigorously repressed. By a semblance of popular government Diaz reëlected himself term after term, but in 1911 he fled the country in the face of an agrarian insurrection that brought Madero to the front. The protests of the Maderists asserted that natural resources had been misappropriated, that the common Mexican was being driven from his land, and that foreign capital was dominating the Government. The Madero Government was never peacefully established over the whole republic. On February 18, 1913, Madero was overturned by a military conspiracy, and three days later he was murdered amid circumstances that suggested that the new dictator, Huerta, was guiltily responsible. Taft took no step respecting Mexico that might embarrass his successor in handling the new problem. After the Maderist revolt he increased the number of regular troops stationed along the Rio Grande in order to lessen the border disturbance that

invariably accompanied Mexican revolutions. Texan, New Mexican, and Arizona towns, with considerable Mexican population, found their peace and safety disturbed as plots were hatched in them for execution in Mexico, and as Mexican fugitives and pursuers carried their fighting across the boundary into the United States.

The murder of Madero gave the Huerta Administration a bad start, and in one State at least it was repudiated from the beginning. In Coahuila, General Venustiano Carranza refused to recognize the change, and became the nucleus of an anti-Huerta movement. In March, 1912, under the stimulus of the Mexican revolt, Congress authorized the President to endeavor to moderate domestic violence in the Latin republics by forbidding the export of arms and ammunition. Operating under this law Taft placed an embargo on arms destined for Mexico, with the result that the Mexican revolutionists were driven to procure their supplies in Europe, where German dealers were entirely willing to provide them.

One of the first tasks of Secretary Bryan was that of determining what to do with Huerta. The American Ambassador in Mexico, Harry Lane Wilson, openly supported the new Government, and returned to Washington in the summer to report that the alternative for Mexico was Huerta or chaos. The Administration repudiated his conduct in the early days of the revolution. He resigned his post in August, and John Lind, of Minnesota, was sent to Mexico as a confidential agent to investigate the state of affairs. On August 27 the President addressed Congress upon the crisis, indicating his determination not to intervene, but to exert a "steady pressure of moral force" for the reestablishment of peace. Mexico was to be allowed to work out her own problem, with the United States in a position of "watchful waiting" for the outcome. In October the violent dissolution of the Mexican Congress by Huerta evoked the announcement that the United States would not recognize the Huerta Government or accept the approaching Mexican election as constitutional. An American

chargé d'affaires, Nelson O'Shaughnessy, was allowed to remain informally in Mexico, where all of the other great powers had already recognized Huerta. The former Ambassador issued a public attack upon the Mexican policy of the Administration, and on October 17, 1913, President Wilson discussed the Latin-American relationships of the United States in a speech at Mobile.

The "Mobile Doctrine" constituted a new interpretation of the Doctrine of Monroe. The diplomatic interventions of the United States in the affairs of Venezuela by Cleveland in 1895 and by Roosevelt in 1902 were welcomed in Latin America as evidence that the Monroe Doctrine constituted a safeguard against attack, but the brusque treatment of Colombia in 1903 and the prevention of her recovery of Panama aroused deep suspicions of the sincerity of the United States when its own expansion was involved. The special missions of Root and Knox to the Latin Americas were designed to allay these suspicions, which were revived when American business interests, aroused by the Mexican revolution, began to demand an intervention "to clean up Mexico." Speaking at Mobile President Wilson promised that the United States would never add a foot to its territory by conquest, and expressed the hope that law and order might prevail in the neighboring republics. A large part of the regular army remained in camp along the Rio Grande, where Texas and New Mexico were continually demanding protection.

Huerta, deprived of recognition by the United States, was unable to procure substantial aid from other countries since these were unwilling to interfere in American problems. As evidence of the sincerity of the Mobile policy, Bryan signed a treaty with Colombia on April 7, 1914, regretting that relations of the countries had been marred in 1903, and providing compensation to Colombia for the loss of the Canal Zone. The treaty remained only an evidence of administrative intent, as the Senate did not ratify it (although it later approved it with

The
"Mobile
Doctrine"

Canal
diplomacy

modifications, in 1921), and two days after its signature an episode at Tampico tested the self-restraint of "watchful waiting." An American naval officer with a few marines was arrested by the Huerta forces, and adequate apology was not forthcoming. A military and naval demonstration was at once prepared against Vera Cruz. "There can in what we do be no thought of aggression or of selfish aggrandizement," said the President as he announced the intervention to Congress on April 20, 1914. "We seek to maintain the dignity and authority of the United States only because we wish always to keep our great influence unimpaired for the uses of liberty, both in the United States and wherever else it may be employed for the benefit of mankind." In both parties impatience with watchful waiting was pronounced. Henry Watterson declared for war "because, helpless to help herself, Mexico has become a menace to us."

With Frank F. Fletcher in command of the fleet and Frederick Funston in command of the expeditionary force Vera Cruz was occupied and held for a short period. The "A.B.C." powers — Argentina, Brazil, and Chile — offered their services as mediators between the United States and Mexico, which were accepted at once. Formal satisfaction for the insult at Tampico was never given; but steady pressure upon Huerta made his position untenable, and he resigned on July 15, 1914. A few days later he set sail for Spain, an exile from his country. But peace failed to be established. General Carranza acceded to the presidency, while disorder continued throughout the republic; and along the Rio Grande life and property remained uncertain because of revolutionary turbulence. In the spring of 1916 a second military intervention took place in an attempt to capture a notorious bandit, one Francisco Villa. This time the whole available force of the regular army was used, and the National Guard was called out and mobilized along the border. Villa escaped, the invading column was drawn back across the Chihuahua desert to El Paso, and there remained nothing

Interven-
tion at Vera
Cruz

definite in the Mexican situation except the fixed determination of President Wilson not to take advantage of the dissensions in the neighboring republic or to restore order there by force.

The patience with which the American Government waited for Mexico to right itself and resume the normal activities of government was unpopular at home and abroad. Not only was the revolution pushing across the border endangering life and property in the United States, but within Mexico property was destroyed and lives of foreigners needlessly sacrificed. The European countries, whose subjects were suffering, looked to the United States for diplomatic guidance. They did not desire to arouse American hostility by intervention, yet were not satisfied to watch the losses and destruction without protest.

The cordial relationships that had existed in 1909 between the United States and the rest of the world were being undermined. With Japan there was the grievance against the United States due to the discriminations which California desired to exert against Japanese subjects with reference to land tenure. The open protest of the National Administration was unable to prevent the passage of discriminatory laws, which Japan believed to be in violation of her treaties. With Russia there was no treaty in existence to govern commercial relationships. That Government had refused to admit American citizens who happened to be Jews, and in retaliation the United States in 1911 denounced the Treaty of 1832. The Imperial Government showed no disposition to modify its determination not to surrender its control over aliens admitted into the empire, and the United States was unwilling to recognize an explicit discrimination against any class of American citizens.

The refusal of the Senate to approve the Taft arbitration treaty with England was regretted in that country, but was much less injurious to friendly relationships than the tolls exemption clause of the Canal Act of August, 1912. The United States was drifting into a position of isolation when on March 5, 1914,

Repeal of
toll exemp-
tion .

President Wilson appeared before Congress with a formal request for the repeal of the tolls exemption clause urging "the justice, the wisdom, and the large policy of such a repeal with the utmost earnestness." He asserted his belief that the exemption policy was not only unsound in an economic way, but was "in plain contravention" of the Hay-Pauncefote Treaty. "We are too big, too powerful, too self-respecting a nation," he urged, "to interpret with a too strained or refined reading the words of our own promises just because we have power enough to give us leave to read them as we please. . . . I ask this of you in support of the foreign policy of the Administration. I shall not know how to deal with other matters of even greater delicacy and nearer consequence if you do not grant it to me in ungrudging measure."

The inner reasons for this demand on Congress were not explained, and the public was left to wonder what international catastrophe was impending. The debate on the merits of repeal divided Congress without reference to parties, and continued bitterly for three months. The canal itself, meanwhile, was finished. On April 1, 1914, General Goethals became civil governor of the Canal Zone and a few days later a barge service was inaugurated through the canal. The date for the formal opening was set for August 15.

The tolls repeal act passed the House before the end of March and in the Senate was officially defended by Hoke Smith, of Georgia, formerly Secretary of the Interior under Cleveland. Its ablest support came from Elihu Root, while the non-partisan nature of the debate was revealed by the fact that O'Gorman, of New York, Democratic chairman of the Senate Committee on Oceanic Canals led in opposing it. Some Senators who were reluctant to repeal the clause and to concede its inequity urged that the matter be referred to arbitration under the existing treaty with England. On June 15 the repeal act became a law.

The diplomatic policy indicated by the Mobile speech

and the repeal of the tolls exemption clause was one of self-restraint and fair play. It received wider interpretation as Secretary Bryan undertook the negotiation of a series of arbitration treaties with the world at large. Bryan, like most Americans, was the sort of a friend of peace whom it was easy for the unthinking critic to confuse with the theoretical pacifist. In no sense a non-resistant, he believed war to be always an evil, and that it ought to be avoided in every possible case. He was sharply at variance with those who advocated large armies and navies as a means of defense, maintaining that these were in reality a provocation of war. He urged as a substitute for this type of preparation international good faith based upon arbitral agreements. More than thirty nations accepted his proposals in substance. "The high contracting parties agree," the opening article of each treaty ran, "that all disputes between them, of every nature whatsoever, shall, when diplomatic methods of adjustment have failed, be referred for investigation and report to a permanent international commission . . . and agree not to declare war or begin hostilities during such investigation and before the report is submitted."

Bryan
peace
treaties

The Senate ratified most of these treaties without delay, and their negotiator regarded them as a potent means of maintaining peace. The special arbitration treaty with Great Britain, due to expire on June 4, 1913, was renewed for a period of five years.

Diplomatic attempts were made to improve the contacts of the United States with the neighbors in the Caribbean region and resulted in more definite relationships with Nicaragua and Haiti. The Colombian treaty of April 7 was pending in the Senate, when in August, 1914, a treaty was signed with Nicaragua inspired in part by the assertion of the Minister from Nicaragua that the German Government was bidding for the control of the potential canal route across his country. In accordance with this agreement the United States, for the sum of three million dollars in gold, acquired the ownership of the

Caribbean
relations

Nicaragua right of way between the two oceans. In addition it acquired the control of islands for naval bases in the Caribbean and of shore rights on the Gulf of Fonseca. The purchase money was to be administered jointly "for the advancement of the welfare of Nicaragua," and in the control of its expenditure the United States acquired rights inferior to those of the protectorate plan of 1910, but quite sufficient to influence the course of that republic.

The purchase of the Nicaragua right of way, which the Senate ratified in 1916, failed to moderate the Central American suspicion of the United States. Both Costa Rica and Salvador had interests in either the right of way itself or the Gulf of Fonseca at its western end. They brought suit for redress in the Central American Supreme Court that the United States had urged them to found, but got no redress because that body was without jurisdiction over the United States. It was their claim that Nicaragua had no power to dispose of a canal right without their consent. The Government of Haiti was reëstablished as an American protectorate by a treaty of September 16, 1915. Its finances were brought under American control, and American naval forces were called upon to assist in maintaining order here as in Santo Domingo, Nicaragua, and Honduras. In the Caribbean, as in Mexico, the dilemma remained unsolved. It was impracticable to secure the cordial friendship of the Latin-American countries without treating them as equals and keeping hands off their affairs. It was impossible for them, with their own resources, to maintain the standard of public order and security to life and property prevalent in the United States or Europe. A growing consciousness in the United States that European powers might not indefinitely tolerate Latin-American disorder made the dilemma a practical one admitting of no evasion.

While the tolls repeal bill was in its last stages in Congress and General Goethals was preparing for the inauguration of commerce through the canal, another great canal was being brought into service. At Kiel the German Emperor, Wil-

liam II, opened the enlarged canal between the Baltic and the North Sea. At the original opening of this canal in 1895, a few ships in the American White Squadron took part in the celebration. In the years ensuing the canal became a part of Germany's naval establishment, and German battleships that could, through it, now take safe refuge in the Baltic were floated in increasing numbers in conscious rivalry to those of England. The first battleship of the dreadnaught class placed in commission by England in 1906 made the Kiel Canal obsolete as an adjunct to warfare because no ship of dreadnaught dimensions could be passed through its locks. Its rebuilding on a larger scale was immediately undertaken, while the keels of German dreadnaughts were laid down in the years after 1906; but until the enlarged canal was ready for use the power of the German navy was maimed. The formal reopening in the week ending on July 1, 1914, was believed by Germany to be the forerunner of great events. The latter days of the festivities, however, were marred by the news that Archduke Francis Ferdinand, Crown Prince of Austria, had been murdered at Sarajevo on June 28. The train of events that this precipitated brought new problems in the next few weeks to test the sincerity of the American Government in its professions of fair play and peace.

The murder of the Austrian Archduke was properly interpreted as an episode in the Pan-Slav struggle in the Balkans to obstruct the Pan-German pressure toward Constantinople and the East, with its ^{The World War} accompanying idea of a Central Europe under German influence. By annexing Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1908 the Dual Monarchy had added fuel to the Slavic grievances in general and those of Serbia in particular. The suspicion that the murder was due to a Serbian plot gave pretext for an Austrian attack to secure freedom from hostile intrigue, and to remove forever the obstacles to Teutonic advance in the region of the Bosphorus. Great Britain was on the edge of civil war, with Ulster armed and angry. Russia appeared to be in the throes of revolutionary movements,

the outgrowth of the partial revolution of 1905. France gave superficial evidence of decay within her government and army. The United States, far removed from European concerns, was on the verge of war with Mexico and perhaps Japan. An overbearing ultimatum addressed by Austria to Serbia on July 23, 1914, was expected to produce not satisfaction, but a cause for war. Five days later the bombardment of Belgrade began and within the next few days the World War became a fact.

One by one the European powers were drawn in. Russia mobilized in defense of Serbia and France followed to be prepared for contingencies in the event of a Russian war. The German Empire, which had approved the ultimatum in advance and had underwritten its consequences, mobilized against Russia and France, but exerted all its diplomatic powers to persuade England to stand aloof. The British fleet, assembled for a great review off Spithead on July 20, was held together after the review in control of the English Channel. The great powers went to war beginning August 1. On the following day the German forces crossed the Belgian frontier *en route* to France.

The invasion of Belgium, a neutralized state, whose status Germany like the other European powers was under contract to respect, aroused the world as no other fact since the Crusades had done. It changed the issue at once from the immediate merits of the controversy between Teutons and Slavs to the larger issue of world peace, and shifted the original combatants in the struggle, Austria and Serbia, to an inferior rank as the German Empire assumed the position of aggressor against a peaceful world for the carrying out of military ambitions. The Belgian forts, Liège and the rest, retarded Germany's advance enough to spoil the scheme for a surprise blow upon France and the seizure of Paris before Russia could complete her mobilization. Five weeks later Joffre checked the German armies at the Marne and Europe settled down to a war of exhaustion that involved the world.

The course for the United States to take in this war had

long been established by precedent and theory. The modern doctrine of neutrality was an American idea that Washington had conceived and Jefferson phrased in 1793. The American Neutrality Act of 1794 was the foundation of all such acts wherever they existed, and the progress of international law thereafter was due largely to the insistence of neutral states, generally under American leadership and demanding that belligerents respect their rights and property, and leave them alone. Neutrality

American insistence upon the rights of neutrals included also an acceptance of the duties of neutrals to belligerents. Proclamations of neutrality were issued by the United States as succeeding powers entered the war, and on August 18 the President addressed the nation upon its attitude to the struggle. It was too early to form any clear view of the general drift of the war, and authentic stories of its conduct were hardly yet available. It still appeared to be a war of Europe which Americans might interpret as the normal outcome of the competitive military preparations of the combatants. From the information at hand the President could say that "it is entirely within our own choice what its effects upon us will be"; and he went on to urge American citizens, drawn most of them from the nations at war, to keep down their passions, restrain their partisanship, and think first of the United States, "a nation that neither sits in judgment upon others, nor is disturbed in her own councils, and which keeps herself fit and free to do what is honest and disinterested, and truly serviceable for the peace of the world."

The first acts of neutrality comprised friendly services to the belligerents. The American Ambassadors at London, Berlin, Paris, St. Petersburg, and Rome were accepted as custodians of the deserted embassies of the various belligerents, and were at once engaged in relief work for the benefit of distressed non-combatants who found themselves in enemy country when the war broke out. As the German troops overran Belgium and the National Government retreated from Brussels, Brand Whitlock and the Spanish

Ambassador remained at their posts as Washburne had done at Paris in 1870, not only to represent their nations, but to serve mankind. The American embassies, undermanned at best, organized emergency groups of assistants, picking up Americans who chanced to be in Europe and using them in the relief work. Thousands of Americans found themselves stranded in a world at war. To relieve these an American warship was immediately dispatched with a store of American gold that Congress appropriated at once. The relief of belligerent subjects was hardly started before there began to pour across the Belgian frontiers and across the Channel into England a stream of Belgian refugees. Dispossessed by a lawless invader, with their homes destroyed and lives needlessly lost, the condition of the Belgians helped to crystallize neutral opinion as to the merits of the war. The American relief committee in London was organized under the leadership of an American mining engineer, Herbert C. Hoover, and out of it there developed in October the C.R.B. — the Commission for the Relief of Belgium — into whose hands the life of the Belgian civil population was entrusted.

American public opinion was stunned by the fact of war, and accepted with approval the statements of neutrality, which were harmonious at once with American policy and with the conditions of general ignorance respecting European affairs that prevailed over most of the United States. It was some months before Colonel Roosevelt and his friends voiced the contrary doctrine; that “neutrality is at best a drab-colored, selfish, and insignificant virtue, even when it *is* a virtue; and it is often a particularly obnoxious vice.” It became difficult to get authentic facts upon which to form a judgment. Newspaper correspondents were not welcome in the war zone, official censors colored the stories that were given out, and the British Government controlled the European cable terminals and mails. Propaganda took the place of news so far as the belligerents were concerned, and American opinion became skeptical as to the reliability of facts as

Propaganda
and public
opinion

printed. On August 10 a group of Americans of German ancestry brought out the first issue of the weekly, *The Fatherland*, in the interest of the Central Powers. In a poem directed to "William II, Prince of Peace," the editor himself cried out:

"But thy great task will not be done
Until thou vanquish utterly
The Norman brother of the Hun,
England, the Serpent of the Sea."

The German propaganda in America devoted itself to a blackening of the fame of England, and to a unification of the Germans in the United States. There were of these, in 1910, 8,712,149 either born in Germany or with one parent born there. Since the visit of Prince Henry of Prussia and the formation of the National German-American Alliance in 1902 the organization of this group had been tightened and extended. *The Fatherland* attempted to attach to it on the basis of anti-British feeling the Americans of Irish extraction, who, since the Fenian movement, had consistently opposed acts of agreement with Great Britain and who were already partially organized in the American Truth Society to fight the *rapprochement* due to the termination of a hundred years of peace.

On the other side of the debate centers of influence were soon visible, a few inspired by sympathy with England, but most of them judging the war from the basis of the invasion of Belgium, the expulsion of non-combatants, the reign of frightfulness at Louvain and elsewhere, and the deliberate bombardment of the cathedral at Rheims. For these the cause of the Central Powers was a wicked cause. When on September 5, 1914, Russia, Great Britain, and France signed an agreement that none of the three would "conclude peace separately during the present war" and became by this fact the Allies, the Americans who detested the acts of Germany became known as the "pro-Allies." The great body of Americans in 1914, however, stood aloof from the active controversy of propaganda, content with their traditional neutrality.

The World War, coming on top of the canal tolls dispute and the Mexican crisis, disturbed the tranquillity with which Congress applied itself to the legislative tasks before it. In spite of the distractions thus promoted, the anti-trust legislation was advanced to a conclusion, and on October 24 Congress adjourned after the longest continuous session on record. The Clayton Anti-Trust Law was completed, and the Federal Trade Commission was immediately launched, while the federal reserve system authorized the year before was ready to open its reserve banks in November.

The Underwood-Simmons Tariff Act of 1913 was in operation, but called for unforeseen amendment because of the war in Europe. Imports from the Central Powers were immediately restricted by the Allied blockades while Allied shipping found itself speedily diverted from American traffic to troop transport and other national service. American imports fell away and the tariff revenue derived from them was lessened nearly ninety million dollars during the fiscal year 1914-15. In anticipation of this emergency a war revenue bill was put through Congress, designed to produce one hundred million dollars extra revenue chiefly by internal taxation, and became a law October 22. It was preceded in enactment by a ship registry law inspired by the war-time crisis, and permitting merchant ships of foreign ownership to be transferred to American registry. The war brought to public notice the fact that the United States was at the mercy of the world for the carriage of its ocean freights. The cotton crop of 1914 piled up at Southern terminals because of lack of ships to carry it abroad. Another shipping bill was introduced providing for the erection of a United States Shipping Board with power to purchase, equip, maintain, and operate a merchant fleet. This project remained under debate for more than two years, before its final passage in 1916; but a war-risk bill was signed September 2, 1914, authorizing the Treasury Department to control the extortionate rates of the commercial insurance companies by establishing a Bureau of War Risk Insurance to underwrite these risks at a reasonable price.

Congress adjourned only ten days before the November election at which the Sixty-Fourth Congress was to be selected. For two years the majority party, held together by the strictest of discipline, had enacted the program demanded by progressive citizens regardless of party. Early in the spring of 1914 the Democratic National Committee, with "unwonted democratic forehandedness," began the issue of campaign literature setting forth "a record of achievement." The Progressive Party had begun to evaporate. Many of its members found themselves able to support the Democratic program and others relapsed into the Republican organization where they were welcomed back. The Progressive vote in 1914 was so unimportant as to make the contest one between the two old parties, and to raise a clear issue as to whether Democratic control could be founded upon majority votes. In Pennsylvania, where Roosevelt had carried the primaries before him in 1912, there were three candidates in a senatorial contest. Boies Penrose, one of the inner group of "stand-pat" Republicans, gained the election directly from the people, over the Democrat, A. Mitchell Palmer, and Gifford Pinchot, the Progressive candidate. The Democratic leaders in the Congressional election made what use they could of the World War and the American disposition toward neutrality. They printed on their campaign literature the text, "War in the East. Peace in the West. Thank God for Wilson!" The Democrats became for the time being a majority party as a result of the election, with a lead of nearly thirty votes in the House over the combined Republicans and Progressives, and of fourteen in the Senate. When the new session opened in December, 1914, further statements were received from the President as to the effect of the war upon the United States.

As the leading neutral in the war, and particularly because of American dependence upon foreign merchant marine, the United States developed a list of grievances against the belligerents and notably against those whose power lay on the high seas. The naval

forces of the Allies surrounded the water entrances to Germany with a blockade whose effectiveness was soon complete, but whose powers were exercised chiefly in connection with the belligerent rights of contraband and search. The Declaration of London, formulated in 1909 for the purpose of codifying the rules of maritime law, had not been ratified, and the practice of the powers reverted to the unwritten principles of international law. Under the law of blockade it would have been permissible for the Allied warships to cut off all trade with German ports and to confiscate as lawful prize all vessels attempting to evade the blockade. The Allies refrained from exercising this privilege because it was inadequate, and because the desired result could be reached by a simpler method. With German ports blockaded there was certain to develop at once an increase in the imports of Italy, Holland, and Scandinavia, whose ports were not subject to blockade and from whose territory, by land routes, neutral supplies could find their way to German and Austrian consumers. Since no right to blockade neutral ports was recognized, a blockade of German ports could at best divert the traffic, but could not stop it.

The law of contraband thereupon was elaborated to suit the needs of the existing war; and precedents created by the United States during the Civil War were produced by the Allies to sustain the correctness of the practice. During this contest American naval vessels had seized munitions *en route* from Europe to British ports in the Bahamas, to Havana, or to Matamoros in northern Mexico. The United States Supreme Court upheld these seizures as lawful because the destination of the contraband was clearly to aid the enemy. The Anglo-British Claims Convention after the Civil War did not overturn them. They were now cited to justify the seizure of contraband destined for Germany, though billed to Copenhagen or Rotterdam or some other neutral port. When the German Empire perfected its organization so that the whole nation was mobilized for war, and the distinction between combatant and non-combatant disappeared, the Allies enlarged the list of

contraband, contending that any supplies destined for the civil population of Germany were in reality supplies of war. The growing use of cotton for explosives brought that commodity within the contraband list.

In addition to the vexatious enlargement of the contraband list, the Allies exercised the right of search in a new form, taking neutral vessels into port in order to examine them, and seizing and searching the mails they carried for the light they might throw upon enemy operations. American protests began early against these practices, and were continuing with increasing acerbity when Germany advanced a view of maritime law whose novelty and horror forced the Allied excesses to appear moderate by contrast.

The submarine boat was an American invention that all countries had adopted as a part of their naval establishments. On February 4, 1915, the German Government, having already protested because the ^{Submarine} ^{warfare} United States failed to compel the Allies to respect the American view of neutral rights, so useful to the Central Powers, announced a war zone about the British Isles, within which, beginning on February 18, it proposed to use submarines to sink and destroy "every enemy merchant ship . . . even if it is impossible to avert dangers which threaten the crew and passengers." No right of indiscriminate destruction of merchant shipping has ever existed or been claimed and this proposed policy was conceded to be in excess of law and was justified only as a retaliation directed against England. Before it became operative the German Government was warned by the United States as to the possible consequences in case American merchant vessels or American citizens should be lost. "It is, of course, not necessary to remind the German Government that the sole right of a belligerent in dealing with neutral vessels on the high seas is limited to visit and search unless a blockade is proclaimed and effectively maintained, which this Government does not understand to be proposed in this case. To declare or exercise a right to attack and destroy any vessel entering a prescribed area of the high

seas without first determining its belligerent nationality and the contraband character of its cargo would be an act so unprecedented in naval warfare that this Government is reluctant to believe that the Imperial Government of Germany in this case contemplates it as possible." The German Government was warned that it would be held to "a strict accountability" for any acts that might result, and that the United States would do what might be necessary "to safeguard American lives and property and to secure to American citizens the full enjoyment of their acknowledged rights on the high seas."

Three months after the beginning of submarine warfare the catastrophe that had been foreseen occurred. On May 7, 1915, the British liner, *Lusitania*, *en route* to Liverpool, was sunk off the coast of Ireland without warning by a German submarine. Among the 1200 lost were 114 Americans, including women and children, whose destruction was denounced that night by Colonel Roosevelt as "an act of piracy." The act convinced the nation of the imminence of war.

In three notes directed to Germany after the sinking of the *Lusitania* President Wilson sought to bring that nation to an abandonment of its submarine policy and to lead his country to a clear understanding of the crisis. The second note, dated June 9, produced the resignation of Bryan from the Cabinet because of his unwillingness to be responsible for war, should it occur. "Nothing but actual forcible resistance or continued efforts to escape by flight when ordered to stop," ran the argument of the second note, . . . "has ever been held to forfeit the lives of . . . passengers or crew. . . . The sinking of passenger ships involves principles of humanity which throw into the background any special circumstances of detail. . . . The Government of the United States is contending . . . for nothing less high and sacred than the rights of humanity . . . [and] cannot admit that the proclamation of a war zone . . . may be made to operate as in any degree an abbreviation of the rights . . . of American shipmasters or of American citi-

zens. . . ." In his third note of July 21, for the replies had been evasive and unsatisfactory, President Wilson warned Germany that a repetition of the outrage would be construed as "deliberately unfriendly." This was his last word upon the *Lusitania*, and on the same day he directed the Secretaries of War and Navy to take up the preparation of plans for national defense. "Wilson has lost ninety per cent of the German-American vote," complained *The Fatherland*; but the German Government heeded the warning for a time and saw to it that no outrage of similar magnitude occurred until the following spring.

The *Lusitania* affair turned the National Administration to an advocacy of measures of preparedness, which an earnest minority had discussed since the autumn of 1914. The attack on Belgium, coming without provocation, was a warning as to what might happen to the United States, and new voices were heard in Congress demanding a reconsideration of national defense. "For a dozen years," declared Gardner, of Massachusetts, who led in the preparedness movement, "I have sat here like a coward in silence and listened while men have told us how the United States can safely depend on the state militia and the naval reserve. All the time I knew that it was not true."

Wilson and
prepared-
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The fight for preparedness was waged on the floor of Congress, in the press, and by means of propagandist societies. The National Security League, organized in December, 1914, took up a work that the Navy League had been pressing with little response for a dozen years. In August, 1915, the more intense members of this society broke away from it to organize the American Defense Society because the National Security League was unwilling to denounce members of the Democratic Administration for failures in preparedness. The American Rights Committee, formed in December, 1915, was still more extreme and demanded instant warfare.

The American Government was unwilling in the session of 1914-15 to destroy the effect of its stand for neutrality

by making the menace of warlike preparations. The advocates of preparedness were denounced variously by pro-Germans, by pacifists, and by Americans who saw in preparedness only another aspect of the conspiracy of big business. Denunciations of the manufacturers of munitions were used by this last group to meet arguments for national defense. The Administration stood aloof from the actual controversy until the discussion of the *Lusitania* was over. Thereafter it led the movement. In January, 1916, President Wilson took to the stump to urge his policies of preparedness.

The debate over preparedness, beginning in the autumn of 1914, extended through the following year as its implications came to be understood, until at last it constituted one of the greatest struggles for the control of American public opinion. The preparedness societies that took the lead in presenting the case were followed by propagandist organizations of diverse opinions, working sometimes in secret and sometimes in the open. The need for preparedness came as a shock to the bulk of American opinion, whose pacific tendencies prejudiced it against the use of force. An American League to Limit Armaments was organized in December, 1914, under the leadership of anti-militarists and non-resistants. A year later the American Union Against Militarism appeared under much the same leadership, but more completely under the control of Socialists and pacifists. The Women's Peace Party, formed in Washington in January, 1915, with Jane Addams as its head, conducted an active campaign for theoretical peace, and dispatched its leader to Europe at the head of a women's delegation to try to stop the war. Individual leaders of these movements gained access to the well-known motor manufacturer, Henry Ford, with the result that on December 4, 1915, the *Oscar II*, chartered by this philanthropist, sailed for Copenhagen with a great delegation of peace advocates aboard, "to try to get the boys out of the trenches and back to their homes by Christmas day."

By the end of 1915 these pacifist societies were left in the control of Socialists and non-resistants, while the more constructive members who had started in with them switched their support to a different program, which was launched in Independence Hall in Philadelphia on June 17, 1915. In preceding months groups of statesmen in England and America worked over rough drafts for a league of nations which should produce peace by preventing war, and by providing a substitute for war as a means of settling international disputes. It was peace backed by force that the League to Enforce Peace proposed. Among its leaders were ex-President Taft, A. Lawrence Lowell, President of Harvard University, and Hamilton Holt, editor of the *Independent*. The Independence Hall conference issued "a declaration of interdependence" that was widely accepted during the ensuing months. A year later, when the league held its annual meeting in Washington, its general program received the support of President Wilson. Before the end of 1916 the leaders of all the responsible belligerents had accepted the principle of a league of nations.

The bitter debate between peace and preparedness was made more difficult to follow by the open propaganda of German sympathizers and secret intrigue emanating from the German Embassy at Washington. German
intrigue The former group, adhering to the cause of Germany from the opening of the war, denounced "perfidious Albion" and devoted themselves particularly to the attack upon the conditions produced by the British naval power. Save for a handful of submarines and an occasional raider, German vessels were swept from the oceans of the world. The imports of food and munitions were cut off by a rigorous scrutiny that could neither be broken nor evaded. Unable to avail itself of the right conferred by international law to buy munitions in neutral countries subject to the right of the other belligerent to intercept them, Germany advanced the novel claim that it was unneutral for neutral countries to sell such munitions to the other belligerent. To German-Americans this statement appeared conclusive. It was ac-

cepted by a considerable number of pacifists and by many of the old Progressives who had schooled themselves to a consistent attack upon the agencies of big business, and who saw in the munitions trade only the great profits derived from manufactures by the fact of war.

Congress was under continuous pressure not only to compel England to accept the American view of international law, but to establish an embargo upon shipments to Great Britain to accomplish this, or to place that country upon an equality of opportunity with Germany. On January 20, 1915, Secretary Bryan in a long letter to W. J. Stone, chairman of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, defended the neutrality of the American Government and pointed out that to refuse to permit the Allies to buy munitions in America would involve participation by the United States on the side of Germany, and would be quite as unneutral as the course complained of. He demonstrated, moreover, the sound basis for the lawfulness of trade in munitions, not only in international law, but also in the fact that otherwise the smaller nations, unable to manufacture their own supplies, would be completely at the mercy of the military powers. At the end of January a group of embargo advocates, summoned by Bartholdt, of Missouri, a former Congressman and an active worker for peace, held a conference in Washington and organized there the American Independence Union. An active part was taken in the movement by editors of German and Irish papers, and the enterprise was described by *The Fatherland* as a great movement "to organize the German-American element and all German and Austro-Hungarian sympathizers." In Congress the friends of the embargo movement urged their resolutions, while citizens outside flooded members with form letters and telegrams demanding that they support such action. In June, 1915, the Friends of Peace induced Bryan, who had now left the Cabinet, to denounce preparedness, and at the same time Labor's National Peace Council was floated upon funds that were later shown to have originated in the German Government.

The secret intrigues by which Germany and Austria sought to prevent the development of an adverse American opinion were increased after the sinking of the *Lusitania* had shown how precarious the situation was. The *New York Evening Mail* was secretly bought and converted into an anti-British organ. Societies like the American Humanity League and the American Embargo Conference were created or subsidized for the same purpose. Agents attached to the German and Austrian embassies were used for the definite purpose of fomenting strikes in manufacturing plants engaged in producing munitions for the Allies and in injuring their output by means of *sabotage*. Enough evidence as to the intrigue was known to the White House to give an ominous character to the *Lusitania* correspondence, and to induce von Bernstorff, the German Ambassador, to redouble his efforts to prevent a breach. In August an American journalist was arrested by the British at Falmouth while on his way to the Continent and was found to have in his dispatch cases correspondence of Dr. Constantin Dumba, the Austrian Ambassador in Washington, recommending a deliberate program of industrial intrigue. The facts of these violations of neutral duties by American citizens were transmitted by the English Government to Robert Lansing, who had succeeded Bryan as Secretary of State, with the result that the recall of Dumba was demanded in September. Two months later the military and naval attachés to the German Embassy, von Papen and Boy-Ed, were dismissed because of their proved complicity in unneutral plots engineered by Buenz, American agent of the Hamburg-American Line. At the end of the year it became possible to substantiate the plots with greater definiteness, for the British found in von Papen's papers at Falmouth check-books whose incriminating stubs revealed part of the details of the pro-German plot.

The office of von Papen in New York was occupied after his departure by Wolf von Igel, who continued the intrigue. On April 18, 1916, the rooms were raided by officers of the Department of Justice, and the records in von Igel's safe

were seized. The German Ambassador protested that this was a violation of diplomatic immunity, but Secretary Lansing showed that neither the premises nor their occupant were on the diplomatic list, and offered to turn over to the German Ambassador any documents which he would authenticate as his own. Von Bernstorff made no claim to any of them, for the secret papers here seized provided the data for federal prosecutions which subsequently exposed in fuller detail the secret activities of the German Embassy.

The crisis produced by the Lusitania was not followed by any occurrence of similar magnitude until the Channel The Sussex Case steamer Sussex was sunk by a submarine on March 24, 1916, with a loss of two American lives. There was one course possible for the United States after the warning conveyed in the third Lusitania note. On April 18 the President transmitted an ultimatum to Germany which he explained to Congress the following day. "Unless the Imperial German Government should now immediately effect and declare an abandonment of its present methods of warfare against passenger and freight-carrying vessels, this Government can have no choice but to sever diplomatic relations with the Government of the German Empire altogether." A specific pledge given by Germany to amend its practice postponed the diplomatic breach, but in Congress and the departments the program of national defense was pushed ahead against the organized obstruction of pacifists and German sympathizers.

The National Defense Act of June, 1916, was the first great step in the accomplishment of the preparedness program. In the earlier stages of its discussion the line was sharply drawn between those who desired an army organized on the basis of compulsory service and those who desired to maintain it upon the National Guard and the principle of volunteering. The recommendation of the General Staff was for compulsory service, which was supported by Senator Chamberlain and many of the preparedness advocates. The Secretary of War, Garrison, supported the principle of a continental

army that should be subject to federal control and not hampered by the ineffectiveness inherent in the National Guard system. Unable to induce Wilson to take an unalterable stand for his principle of army organization, Garrison resigned in February, 1916, and was shortly succeeded by Newton D. Baker, of Cleveland. The bill was finally passed, providing an authorized strength for the regular army of 223,000; the total to be reached in five years. It provided also for a National Guard of about 450,000 officers and men. The Guard itself was now on service on the Mexican border supplementing the efforts of the regular army to put a stop to the marauding work of Villa. The law also provided for the development of an officer's reserve corps to be recruited from civil life and trained in summer camps such as had been begun by General Leonard Wood while chief of staff and continued with great success at Plattsburg and elsewhere in 1915. A revision of the articles of war, finished later in the summer, was attached to the Army Appropriation Bill in August.

The Nevada, the Oklahoma, and the Pennsylvania, new dreadnaughts carrying fourteen-inch guns, were brought into service in the spring of 1916, while Congress ^{Naval} debated the lessons of the European War and ^{program} the form that naval defense should take. Among the naval theorists there was controversy as to the effects of submarine warfare upon battleship programs, and upon the relative merits of dreadnaughts and the swifter fighting units known as battle cruisers. Since the Spanish War the naval building policy had included the construction of one or two capital ships every year, but there had been no acceptance of a general program or an approved naval strength to be reached at a given date. A proposal for a five-year program, prepared in the autumn of 1915, was condensed into three years in the course of the debate upon preparedness. The Naval Appropriation Act of 1916 carried a larger sum than had ever before been voted at one time for national defense, and authorized the building over a term of three years of ten dreadnaughts and six battle cruisers.

Another type of defense was provided for in August, 1916, when Congress authorized the creation of a Council of National Defense to consist of six members of the Cabinet with the assistance of an Advisory Commission of seven civilian experts. Such a body as this had been urged by preparedness advocates for many years as a means of drafting plans of defense that might make easier a complete national mobilization in time of war. The obvious effect of the World War in tying into a compact unit the whole civil and military population of every belligerent country showed what would be necessary should the United States become involved in any great struggle. Secretary Daniels had already taken a step in this direction by organizing a Naval Consulting Board in October, 1915, to give scientific advice upon the manufacture of naval munitions. This body appointed a committee on industrial preparedness that in the following winter made a survey of the facilities of existing plants for carrying on munitions work. The National Academy of Sciences at the request of the President had also been turned toward the problems of defense, creating for this purpose a National Research Council. In September, at the close of the preparedness session, Congress created the United States Shipping Board, urged by the President two years previously, and a Tariff Commission made necessary by the intricate effects of the World War on foreign trade. Congress adjourned on September 8 with the presidential canvass of 1916 already well advanced.

In the four years since 1912 Progressives and conservative Republicans had remained as far apart as ever, but successful efforts had been made to bring them back into a common party that might have a chance to elect a President. The national organization of the Progressive Party continued to go through the motions as though it were a reality, but called its national convention to meet in Chicago on the same day as the Republican Convention, June 7, 1916. The leadership of Colonel Roosevelt over his Progressive followers had not weakened in the four years. The Progressives who

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objected to him and distrusted him continued to object, but his friends remained firm in their allegiance and hoped to win the Republican nomination for him. In an interview given out from the Island of Trinidad in March, Theodore Roosevelt declared that "June is a long way off," and was held to have announced his candidacy by denying his interest in "the political fortunes either of myself or any other man," and by asserting his interest "in awakening my fellow-countrymen to the need of facing unpleasant facts."

In the contest for delegates there was no revival of the bitterness of 1912, and numerous favorite sons were brought out representing all shades of Republican opinion. The emergence of public interest in the Nomination of Hughes character of Justice Charles Evans Hughes destroyed the chances of all local candidates and left the contest for the nomination between him and Roosevelt. The judicial attitude of mind that made him a great lawyer and judge made Hughes a candidate acceptable to conservative Republicans, while the vigor with which he had pressed his reform measures as governor of New York gave him a wide following among the Progressives. During the canvass for delegates he remained at his work in the Supreme Court without uttering a public word to indicate his interest in the contest. At the convention he received the support of still other elements in the party who were as anxious to defeat President Wilson as any Republicans, and who objected to Colonel Roosevelt because of the vigor with which he had criticized the action of Germany in the war.

A few days before the Republican Convention a group of German-American newspaper editors held a conference at Chicago and gave out a public statement demanding a candidate for President, whom they described as without passionate attachment to any foreign country. "The nomination of Justice Hughes means the redemption of the Republican Party," declared *The Fatherland*. The antipathy of German-Americans to Roosevelt coincided with that of the conservative Republican group. The Pro-

gressive Convention met and nominated Roosevelt in the hope that the Republicans would concur and avoid a split. The Republicans, however, nominated Hughes and Fairbanks, and Justice Hughes immediately resigned his seat on the Supreme Court to enter vigorously upon the canvass.

The unpopularity of Colonel Roosevelt with the German vote was surpassed only by that of President Wilson, who was renominated by the Democratic Convention without contest. The German intrigue to tie the hands of the United States in the World War ran parallel to the feelings of Americans of German descent who were unable to believe the truth of the charges made against Germany by her enemies. The bitterness with which they believed that Wilson's policies had favored England and injured Germany was aggravated by their resentment at the charges of "hyphenism" made against themselves. Some weeks before the outbreak of the war, while dedicating a monument to a great Irishman, Barry, who laid the foundations of the American navy in the Revolution, Wilson had defined the hyphen. "Some Americans," he said, "need hyphens in their names because only part of them came over, but when the whole man has come over, heart and thought and all, the hyphen drops of its own weight out of his name." In his succeeding speeches upon the issues of the war he denounced without restraint the hyphenated Americans who acted in American affairs not as Americans, but as naturalized Europeans.

The hope of the Progressive Party that its nomination of Roosevelt would force the Republicans to accept him failed doubly. The old party nominated Hughes; and Roosevelt declined to run independently, after it was too late to choose a substitute. His desire to defeat the Democratic ticket made him unwilling to assist it by dividing the Republican vote. In the ensuing canvass he gave his support to Hughes, without quite believing that the latter deserved to win.

The task of the Republican candidate was to play both ends against the middle. In his speeches Hughes felt

bound to satisfy the Progressives without alienating the conservatives, and to hold the interest of extreme pro-Allies without forfeiting that of Germans who desired to punish Wilson. It weakened his chances when it was learned that he had given audience to Jeremiah A. O'Leary, a leader in the movement to punish Wilson; and it helped Wilson when the President's reply to the overtures of the same leader was made public: "I should feel deeply mortified to have you or anybody like you vote for me. Since you have access to many disloyal Americans and I have not, I will ask you to convey this message to them." It injured Hughes also when in California on the stump he accepted a banquet served by "scab" waiters and left the State without even meeting its progressive and popular governor, Hiram Johnson.

The difficult task of President Wilson was to hold together the vote of 1914, and to defeat the united Republican Party, which no Democrat had done since the Civil War. He stood on the record of Democratic achievement and of fundamental loyalty to America. His followers in the West and South, sensing the drift of the pro-German or pro-Ally endeavors, translated this latter issue into the phrase, "He kept us out of war"; and the women, newly enfranchised in the Western States, appear to have voted on this phrase. In August a national calamity in the form of a strike of the four railway brotherhoods appeared on the horizon, and such a strike was called for Labor Day. After a conference with the railroad managers and leaders of the unions, Wilson exerted his influence over Congress and induced it to avert the strike by making the principle of the basic eight-hour day mandatory upon interstate railroads. The strike was avoided, but the Adamson Law by which Congress fixed the wages of the trainmen became a new issue in the canvass.

The first figures from the election in November, 1916, indicated that Hughes was the choice, but later returns conveyed the unusual fact that although he carried every New England State except New Hampshire, all of the

Northwest but Ohio, and every Middle State but Maryland, he was defeated by the accumulated votes of the farther West and South. Hughes was defeated by political mismanagement in one or two doubtful States, but the reëlection of Wilson by whatever means, in opposition to the densely populated States of the North and East, marked a revolution in political influence paralleled only by the victories of Jefferson, Jackson, and Lincoln.

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CHAPTER XXII

THE WAR OF 1917

THE pledge given by the German Government after the sinking of the *Sussex* was kept during the autumn of 1916 while the presidential election was in progress. The war in The United States continued its work in laying ¹⁹¹⁶ the foundations for national defense, but in the diplomatic field no new developments of importance occurred until after the election. Germany, meanwhile, believed that she had won the war. The Allied blockade remained unbroken, but the ambition to build up a new central Europe under German leadership was accomplished. Along the western front, from the Swiss border north toward Verdun and thence westerly to the English Channel the opposing lines of trenches had not been widely shifted since Joffre compelled the German retreat at the Marne in 1914. A desperate attempt of the German armies under the Crown Prince to take Verdun in 1916 was repulsed by France, and an Allied attempt to break through the trenches along the Somme failed in the latter half of the year.

On the eastern front German gains were decisive. During 1915 Poland and Galicia were overrun, and Serbia was completely crushed, making it possible for the Central Powers to maintain unimpeded communications with Constantinople. Roumania entered the war in 1916 and was occupied by the Central Powers before the year was up. The hopes of the Pan-German Party, realized in Europe by the end of 1916, reached out across Asia Minor toward Egypt and India, and the old catch-phrase "Berlin to Bagdad" was changed to read "Antwerp to Bombay." The French historian, André Chéradame, pointed out the completeness of the German victory in the East in his *Pan-German Plot Exposed*, and warned the Allies of the imminence of German peace overtures inspired by a German hope to consolidate the gains of war.

On December 12, 1916, Germany, acting through the United States Government, offered peace to the Allies.

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overture

The terms of the peace were not announced in specific form. At home to the army it was described as a peace of victory, but to the outside world it was characterized as a peace "to free the world." In every Allied country there were factions tired of war and fearful of national destruction if the exhaustion should continue. The American Government had come to the conclusion that the position of the neutral was no longer tenable. With war as it now existed, involving the whole strength of each belligerent, and leading each to insist upon a belligerent right to monopolize the common property of the world, the neutral, whose existence depended upon the free enjoyment of its rights upon the high seas on legitimate business, found itself drawn ever nearer to the state of war.

Six days after the German peace overtures were made, Secretary Lansing sent notes to all of the nations at war, asking that "an early occasion be sought to call out from all nations now at war such an avowal of their respective views as to terms upon which the war might be concluded . . . as would make it possible frankly to compare them." The note went on to point out that the official spokesmen of all the belligerents were claiming to have the same general objects in mind; "each side desires to make the rights and privileges of weak peoples and small states . . . secure against aggression. . . . Each wishes itself to be made secure in the future. . . . Never yet have the authoritative statesmen of either side avowed the precise objects which would if attained satisfy them and their people that the war had been fought out."

The "war of peace notes," as the London *Nation* described it, was continued into the next year. The German Government ostensibly welcomed the American overtures, but instead of reciting precise terms it demanded a general conference to work them out. Simultaneously, on January 19, 1917, it instructed its Minister in Mexico that in the

event of a war with the United States he was to arrange for the occupation by Mexico of the territory lost in 1848 in the region of New Mexico, Texas, and Arizona, and to induce Mexico to invite the adherence of Japan to this end.

The Allied Powers rejected the German overtures at once, and replied to the American request with a specific recital of the unprovoked attack by Germany upon the peace of Europe, the violations of the laws of war, and the inhumane war practices of the aggressor, and stated terms of peace based upon a determination to prevent a repetition of the outrage. On January 22 President Wilson addressed Congress upon the terms of peace, and interpreted the answers to his overtures. He spoke for the neutral powers and from the standpoint of the peace of the world, and described the peace that was needed as "peace without victory," one not dictated by a victor for his own desires, but constructed for the purpose of establishing world peace. He asked for a new and enlarged Monroe Doctrine for all the world, in which the peaceful nations should join to prevent the disturbance of the world by any nation acting for its own aggrandizement. Six months earlier he had given his personal support to a project for a league to enforce peace, and in the autumn had announced that "America must hereafter be ready as a member of the family of nations to extend her whole force, moral and physical, to the assertion of those rights [of humanity] throughout the round globe." He demanded that the European powers conclude such a peace as the United States could agree to guarantee.

Ten days after President Wilson spoke in favor of a peace without victory, the German Government withdrew the pledges it had given after the sinking of the German submarine warfare Sussex, and inaugurated a new submarine policy, in accordance with which it proposed to sink on sight all Allied vessels found within the danger zone. The note announcing the new intention described the waters surrounding the British Isles, which were thus closed to neutral commerce; and described as well a narrow lane leading from the high seas into Falmouth along which it

was proposed to permit one American vessel to pass each week each way if painted in gaudy stripes according to specifications laid down. There was to be no search to determine the belligerent character of a vessel attacked in the war zone, no attempt to convoy it and its cargo to a home port for trial before a prize court, and no attempt to safeguard the lives of non-combatant passengers and crew, whether subjects of enemies of Germany or of the neutral powers.

This announcement of the proposed resumption of unrestricted submarine warfare brought into effect the declaration issued at the time of the sinking of the *Sussex*, that a repetition of the offenses against neutral rights would be followed by a severance of diplomatic relations. On February 3, 1917, von Bernstorff was formally dismissed, and later that afternoon the President announced the fact to Congress. "I think that you will agree with me that . . . this government has no alternative consistent with the dignity and honor of the United States but to take the course which, in its note of the eighteenth of April, 1916, it announced. . . . We do not desire any hostile conflict with the Imperial German government. We are the sincere friends of the German people and earnestly desire to remain at peace with the government which speaks for them . . . We . . . seek merely to vindicate our right to liberty and justice and an unmolested life."

The breach with Germany brought to a focus all the elements in America opposing war in general or this war in particular, as the persons and organizations concerned brought pressure upon Congress to prevent the opening of hostilities. William J. Bryan led in the opposition with the advice: "Wire immediately to the President, your Senators and your Congressman. A few cents now may save many dollars in taxation and possibly a son." The pacifist organizations that had grown up under the names of the American Union against Militarism, the Women's Peace Party, the American Neutrality League, and the Anti-Conscription League,

opened headquarters in New York on the Monday following the breach, under the name of the Emergency Peace Federation. Delegations of pacifists were appointed to wait upon the President and advertisements were run in newspapers that had no sympathy with the obstructive movement. "Shall we allow the United States to be dragged into the European quarrel?" queried one of these, which bore the signatures of R. S. Bourne, Max Eastman, Paul U. Kellogg, Winthrop D. Lane, and Amos R. Pinchot.

Within a few days the peace movement took the form of a demand for a national war referendum. Pilgrimages to Washington were organized to bring pressure to bear upon individual Congressmen. "The men and women now so bustling and multi-vocal in pacifism, the interlocking directors of peace-at-any-price societies of many names, are familiar figures, continually reappearing the same old 'bunch of uplifters,'" said the *New York Times*.

The expressed hope of the President that the conduct of Germany would be less offensive than its declaration, and that no overt acts would be directed against the United States to drive the country from non-^{Armed merchant ships} intercourse to war, produced a period of delay following the breach. On February 26 the President appeared before Congress to ask for specific power to defend merchant ships in case they should be attacked by submarines in the course of the unrestricted warfare. The status of the submarine was no more nearly accepted than it had been when the warfare against merchant ships began in 1915. The clear rule of international law, requiring the belligerent to search the enemy ship before destroying it, and requiring condemnation before the prize court as a part of the process, was flagrantly violated by the submarine blockade. The Allied Powers maintained that the submarine blockade, which was never effective, and at no time stopped the commerce that it pretended to cut off, was in itself an act of piracy. International law guarantees safety for the passenger and crew of the merchant vessel that does not attempt flight from an enemy warship, and permits the

merchant vessel at its own risk to flee or to try to defend itself. The execution by Germany of Captain Fryatt in 1916 for having attempted to ram a German submarine that sought to torpedo his ship was in violation of accepted law. Allied merchantmen were armed by their Governments for the purpose of defending themselves against such piratical attacks, and President Wilson now asked specific authority to defend American vessels by similar methods. No serious overt act had yet occurred, but the threat of indiscriminate sinkings was having the result desired by Germany in that it intimidated many of the masters of neutral vessels and kept their ships in port. The aim of the submarine blockade was to starve the Allied Powers by cutting off their foreign commerce. Prevention was as useful as destruction.

The bill affirming the power of the President to place guns and guards on American merchant ships occupied Congress during the concluding seven days of its expiring life. The nearness of the end of the session made it possible for the opponents of a breach to delay action so that Congress adjourned on March 4 with the bill unpassed. The Senate was already engaged in a general filibuster. The Republican minority desired to force the President to summon the new Congress in special session immediately after March 4, 1917, in order that Congress might be on hand to watch whatever international events might transpire, and to keep the Administration from playing the whole part. The anti-war filibuster was directed against the Armed Ship Bill on February 28. Senator Stone, the chairman of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, was unwilling to support the measure, turning over its management to Senator Hitchcock, of Nebraska. On the legislative day of February 28 the Senate sat for more than twenty-six hours. It sat for twenty-three hours on March 1, thirteen hours on March 2, and for twenty-six hours on March 3, the final day of its session. Temper ran high in the Senate and outside during the bitter struggle. In its last hours the supporters of the bill, realiz-

ing that they could not pass it, gained the floor and held it to the exclusion of its opponents until the Congress expired at noon on the 4th of March. "When the history of these days comes to be chronicled," asserted *Viereck's* (as *The Fatherland* had renamed itself since the breach with Germany), "the names of Stone, La Follette, Hearst, and Bryan will shine forth like beacon lights — if our annals are written by an American pen." That afternoon President Wilson gave out a public statement declaring that a "little group of willful men, representing no opinion but their own, have rendered the great Government of the United States helpless and contemptible."

The filibuster against the Armed Ship Bill was successful in defeating that measure, but called attention to the well-known fact that the rules of the United States Senate permitted any Senator to speak as long ^{Senate} as he could and as often as he desired on any pending measure. ^{closure} Strong-willed Senators in the past had repeatedly held up the will of the majority in the closing days of a session by speaking for many hours at a stretch, and groups of such Senators, speaking in relays and yielding the floor to each other in turn, were able to prolong a filibuster from hours into days. The practice was commonly regarded as an abuse, but its correction was impossible until public opinion, now focused on the "little group of willful men," forced the Senate to take action. Twelve men, seven Republicans and five Democrats, had used their power to destroy majority rule. A majority of the Senators, excluded from their power to vote, signed a statement demanding a closure rule, and the Senate remained in special session after March 4 to formulate it. On March 8, by a vote of seventy-six to three, a new rule was adopted providing a procedure by which the majority might force the termination of a debate.

The failure of the Armed Ship Bill did not affect the defense of American shipping, for the Attorney-General ruled that the power to defend it already existed, and guns with gunners' crews were installed as opportunity offered.

American public opinion accepted the fact of the imminence of war in the weeks following the breach with Germany. Opponents of the defense measures demanded by the Administration found themselves temporarily outlawed and the objects of bitter unpopularity. The country as a whole reached the conviction that the status of neutrality had become untenable, and that of the grievances offered by the two sets of belligerents, the German affront demanded immediate action. There were commercial grievances against the Allies in connection with which an exasperated correspondence had been begun, but in all of these it was certain that in the long run they would either be agreed upon or submitted to the peaceful process of an arbitration. It was impossible to arbitrate the status of American women and children drowning in the English Channel. The submarine attack involved not only a limitation of the conceded legal right of neutrals, but the immediate murder of unoffending non-combatants. The hope that the new rule of February 1 might somehow or other fail to be enforced yielded to the national belief that the United States must associate itself in defense of its rights with the other enemies of Germany.

The original Allies of 1914, enlarged a little later by the accession of Japan and Italy, stated their case to the world in the terms of democracy against military autocracy. The invasion of Belgium spread what might have been a local war in the Balkans, over Europe and Asia. Many Americans, however, found difficulty in accepting Russia in the guise of a foe to autocratic government. These found it easier to see the duty to associate the United States with the Allies when revolution broke out in Russia in March, 1917. The Czar Nicholas II was deposed, and a liberal constitutional government was organized with Prince Lvoff as Premier, and Paul Milyukov as Foreign Secretary. "The greatest tyranny in the world has fallen," said the *London Nation*, and liberal opinion in all of the Allied countries felt more certain as to the ends of the war. The United States welcomed the new Russian

Republic. Elihu Root was sent to Petrograd at the head of a special mission to congratulate the Provisional Government, and to offer aid and counsel. He was accompanied by specialists in the fields of industry and war, including the Chief of Staff of the United States Army, Major-General Hugh L. Scott. Before he reached Petrograd, other missions arrived there from the United States to render Root's success impossible.

The refuge offered by the United States to political immigrants from all the world had brought Russians to America in large numbers after the revolutionary movements of 1905. The Russian immigrants accumulated in increasing numbers, their children grasped eagerly the opportunities for education in the American schools, and the sense of grievance that had driven them from Russia was directed against the Government of the land of refuge. The new Russian Government called the exiles home, and one of them, Leon Trotzky, speaking in New York before his departure, warned the United States against assuming "that the revolution was necessarily pro-Ally," and avowed that it was "for an early peace and a better form of government." Trotzky and his associates carried back into Russia the conventional Socialist belief that the United States was a corrupt capitalistic nation, and that Root, who had been among the most prominent of conservative Republicans in 1912 was the incarnation of capitalism. When the Root mission reached Petrograd it found that anti-American influences had already been started by the returned exiles.

The progress of the Russian revolution from constitutionalism to Bolshevism was protracted over eight months. In December, 1917, the provisional Government, in which Lenine and Trotzky had managed to assume dominant places, opened negotiations for a separate peace with Germany; but in the early stages of the revolution the friends of Russian freedom believed that the alliance was strengthened by the elimination of the Czar. In the United States the revolution was the last fact needed to

convince the country that the cause of the Allies was a cause of liberty and self-government.

The Sixty-Fifth Congress, elected with Wilson in November, 1916, was convened on April 2, 1917. The Democratic Party was able to organize both houses, in neither of which, nor in the Administration itself, did the transition into Wilson's second term make any considerable break. In the House of Representatives the most notable novelty was Jeannette Rankin, of Montana, the first woman to be seated in Congress. In the Senate Philander C. Knox returned after an absence as Senator from Pennsylvania; and Governor Hiram Johnson took his seat as Senator from California, after having run 300,000 votes ahead of Hughes in the November elections. The message of the President, delivered to Congress on the evening of April 2, recited the grievances of the United States against the German Government, and called for a declaration of a state of war with "this natural foe to liberty. . . . We are glad, now that we see the facts with no veil of false pretense about them, to fight thus for the ultimate peace of the world and for the liberation of its peoples, the German people included; for the rights of nations, great and small, and the privilege of men everywhere to choose their way of life and of obedience. The world must be made safe for democracy."

The war resolution, declaring that a state of war existed against the Imperial German Government, was passed on April 6, 1917, and was proclaimed by the President. Congress immediately took up the varied tasks of granting emergency powers to the Government and determining the national policies upon which the war should be maintained.

"The departments at Washington were never conceived or organized to meet the modern needs incident to mobilizing a nation," said the Philadelphia *Public Ledger* in comment upon the rush of citizens to Washington to volunteer their services. The dismissal of von Bernstorff started a period of national mobil-

The war
session of
Congress

The Govern-
ment in
war time

ization for the war that seemed unavoidable. The Council of National Defense, created in the preceding summer to assist and direct such mobilization, completed its organization and that of its Advisory Commission early in February, and sat behind closed doors at the War Department listening to the reports of Kuhn, late military attaché at Berlin, Hoover, whose experiences in Belgium revealed the completeness with which the civil populations were organized, and Stettinius, the New York banker who had been the American purchasing agent for the Allies for many months.

The Council of National Defense, an *ex-officio* body whose members were all busy with their regular Cabinet departments, did business through its Advisory Commission, of which Daniel Willard, president of the Baltimore & Ohio Railroad was made chairman. The seven civilian experts on the Advisory Commission organized as many national committees to deal with raw materials, supplies, munitions, transportation, labor, medicine, and education. To assist in running these committees business men were taken from their offices at "a dollar a year" or less, and there grew up in Washington, beside the agencies of peace-time government, a civilian war machine. The function of the Council of National Defense was to create and advise rather than administer. Its numerous committees were brought into existence to meet needs that were supposed to exist, and if they functioned usefully were liable to be taken away from the Council that created them and to be set up independently or attached to an appropriate branch of the Government. Before the declaration of war, all of the great committees were in operation. In many instances the experiences of the European belligerents were drawn upon; the military lesson of the war as thus far seen was that victory would go to the nation functioning most nearly as a unit.

Samuel Gompers, one of the seven members of the Advisory Commission, organized a labor committee in the latter part of February, and brought to its support the full strength of the American Federa-

Council of
National
Defense

Labor and
socialism

tion of Labor and the conservative labor groups. With armies calling for the military man power of every nation, and with the military program demanding relentless labor from the man power left at home, national military strength was closely connected with the spirit and devotion of wage-earners in every country. On March 12 the labor committee held a conference at which the representatives of three million organized workmen were present, and adopted a manifesto "to stand unreservedly by the standards of liberty and the safety and preservation of the institutions and ideals of our republic." The Government accepted the general principle that the livelihood of the wage-earners should not be allowed to deteriorate because of the war, and labor agreed to accept the principles of peaceful settlement in meeting the adjustments made necessary by the shifting of labor to war occupations, the congestion of workers in war plants, and the rising costs of living.

The declaration of war on April 6 was accepted with a high degree of national unity in which the expressed convictions of organized labor had a large share. The degree of this unity was measured in part by the roar of condemnation that greeted the action of an emergency convention of the Socialist Party held at Chicago on April 7. Here the majority of the convention, presided over by a Russian immigrant and supported by other foreign-born leaders, passed resolutions attacking the war as a conspiracy of capitalism. A minority of the party left it on this issue under the leadership of American Socialists. "The proclamation reads like a speech by Chancellor von Bethmann Hollweg," said John Spargo, one of the resigning leaders. "It requires language so strong that it sounds like the use of epithets to describe the scuttling of the socialist party by German nationalistic jingoes and anarchistic impossibilities at St. Louis," said another. The pro-war Socialists became one of the most active groups in interpreting the issues of the war to the aliens among whom Socialist and radical labor propaganda found their readiest adherents.

Every private agency for or against the war shouted its

advice at the country during the weeks in which the emergency was at its height. On April 14 President Wilson added an official voice for the Government itself by creating a Committee on Public Information, consisting of the Secretaries of State, War, and Navy, with George Creel, a journalist, as chairman. The C.P.I. opened offices across Pennsylvania Avenue from the White House, and became at once a distributing point for news of war activities of the Government. Its chairman devoted his time to lifting the lid of secrecy that all branches of the Government tended to clamp down because of the war, and his organization acted upon the assumption that the more the country knew about the facts of the war and its causes, the more completely would a united national opinion stand behind its prosecution. In the *Official Bulletin*, a daily newspaper which the C.P.I. published first on May 10, 1917, the facts that were released at Washington were reprinted for circulation throughout the country. As the war went on, pamphlets were issued by the million, films were produced, patriotic societies were encouraged, and press agencies were established in neutral and Allied countries, all for the purpose of laying before the world the facts relating to the war.

The nature of American participation in the war was uncertain at the date of its declaration, but was generally believed to be of economic rather than military character. There were no ships available to carry troops to Europe, even if there had been troops to be transported. "Ships will win the war" was the first phrase that caught the ear of the public, and was re-enforced by the urging of Lloyd George, the English Prime Minister, before an American audience in London. Up to the beginning of 1917 the Allies had lost more than 7,000,000 deadweight tons of shipping; 9,500,000 tons more were to be lost during 1917. The hopes of Germany were founded upon her ability to hold her Eastern conquests while her submarines in unrestricted warfare sunk the shipping of the Allies, broke their morale, and starved them

Committee
on Public
Information

"Ships will
win the
war"

into submission. The frantic efforts of the Allied Powers to replace their lost tonnage were unable to keep up with the destruction. During 1915 and 1916, their needs had brought unwonted activity to American shipyards, all of whose shipways came into use while new ways were laid down to meet the foreign demand.

The United States Shipping Board was organized during the winter of 1917, and during March and April accepted in a general way the idea of building a "bridge of wooden ships" across the Atlantic. The yards equipped to build steel ships were already working at their fullest capacity, and the time necessary to establish new yards seemed prohibitive. The supplies of wood, however, were abundant; labor was more plentiful in the regions of the Southern and Northwestern forests than in the Eastern industrial centers; the program of quantity production of wooden steam freight ships of about thirty-five hundred tons capacity was accepted; Major-General George W. Goethals was drawn into the service of the Shipping Board to direct the construction; and the Emergency Fleet Corporation took out its charter on April 16, 1917.

The Government-owned corporation, of which the Emergency Fleet Corporation was the first, was a new and distinctive contribution of the war to the American science of government, although the Panama Railroad Co., as agent of the Isthmian Canal Commission had paved the way for it. All of the stock was purchased with funds provided by Congress and became the capital of the corporation, which was thereafter able to operate with the freedom of any commercial corporation, unhampered by the restrictions over expenditure with which Government agencies are habitually tied up. The members of the Shipping Board elected themselves directors and officers of the corporation, which they thus interlocked with the governmental agency, while retaining by the corporation device a freedom and directness of action otherwise unattainable.

The Emergency Fleet Corporation took up the program of wooden ships and let contracts for the building of vessels,

the enlargement of existing yards, and the laying-out of new ones. It developed also the idea of a standardized steel ship, whose plates and parts were to be made in quantity in hundreds of factories throughout the country. The parts were to be entirely standardized and shipped to assembling plants of which the greatest was built below Philadelphia on the Delaware, at Hog Island. Here fifty shipways were provided, with the idea of turning out an endless series of fabricated steel ships to beat the submarine.

Before May was over General Goethals and Chairman William Denman of the Shipping Board were in open disagreement as to the extent to which the shipping program should depend upon the construction of wooden ships. Goethals shortly resigned his position, and Denman was relieved by the President, but the work of ship construction continued to expand until the war was over.

The view that the United States could best assist by supplying the Allies with the means of war rather than contributing armies led to a second general formula: "Food will win the war." Germany, most narrowly encircled by the state of war, had been driven to create a food dictator in May, 1916, who proceeded to apply a ration system in order to equalize distribution of food resources. The shortage of which this policy was the result grew out of the close investment of Germany by the Allied blockade, and gave rise to the demands from German sources for a neutral embargo against England and for a broadening of the submarine campaign. In November, 1916, England was forced to establish a food controller in the person of the owner of a great chain of retail groceries, Lord Devonport, and the British Board of Agriculture undertook a campaign to increase the agricultural acreage, to bring women into farm work, and to lessen the dependence of Britain upon food from overseas.

The Council of National Defence early appreciated the fact that the United States would need organi- zations to stimulate food production and to equalize distribution such as the European countries had

Herbert C.
Hoover

established. The need was the more imperative because the traditional American practice, as expressed in the anti-trust laws, demanded free competition and proscribed the type of combination needed for successful national control. The necessities to which England and Germany had been driven had been exceeded at an earlier period of the war by those of Belgium, overrun and prostrate in the invader's hands. Only the Commission for the Relief of Belgium had saved that country from collapse. Its American director, Herbert C. Hoover, had learned the problems of rationing from the standpoints of all the belligerents, and had kept Belgium alive with the assistance of large economic and dietetic staffs. The work had been diplomatic in the highest degree, for the employees of the C.R.B. had been called upon to disregard military frontiers, and to pass repeatedly through the lines from Belgium to Germany, France, or England. The fame of this performance made Hoover the natural food adviser of the United States. He was in Washington in conference with the Government in February, 1917, then he returned to Europe to wind up the affairs of the C.R.B., whose American assistants were now forced to leave Belgium, and in April he came back to the United States to become chairman of a food committee created by the Council of National Defense. As Goethals launched the Emergency Fleet Corporation the President asked Congress for powers with which Hoover might organize the food supply. "The foremost duty of America toward her Allies in this war is to see that they are supplied with food," said Hoover as he returned to America to take up this task. When Congress delayed its compliance with the request for powers in order to debate their nature, the President on May 19 appointed Hoover as voluntary food controller with power to organize a Food Administration at his own expense and without legal sanction. It was entirely too late to affect most of the crop of 1917 by any agitation, for the spring planting was already under way, but by advertisement and coöperation with the Department of Agriculture and the agricultural colleges, the spring wheat

acreage in the Northwest was enlarged, garden areas were multiplied throughout the United States, and the saving of food was popularized as a patriotic virtue.

The Council of National Defense continued to act as a civilian general staff for the planning of agencies to hasten the preparations for war. Its committee on ^{Production} supplies under Julius Rosenwald, of Chicago, ^{of munitions} entered into coöperation with the army in preparing its contracts and awarding them. Bernard M. Baruch, in charge of raw materials, brought the copper and steel producers into closer relationships with the Government. A General Munitions Board was created on April 9 to assist in the procurement of war supplies, and like the British Munitions Ministry to decide questions of priority when the needs of the army and the navy interfered with those of general industry.

A single munition of war assumed a prominence resulting in the creation of the Aircraft Production Board on May 16, with Howard E. Coffin, a leading automobile manufacturer, as chairman. Airplanes had brought great changes in military tactics. Used first for reconnaissance and observation, they placed a high premium on concealment of movements behind the lines as an element of strategy, and brought into existence the art of camouflage. Carrying machine guns they had begun to be used for combat to attack, first, troops on the ground, and then, each other in the air. Carrying bombs, they had been used as agents of destruction of railways, factories, and magazines, and had been employed by German forces for the terrorizing of the civilian towns of England and France. The Aircraft Production Board proposed to develop the quantity manufacture of aircraft, while aviators were trained by the thousands to manipulate them. From an organization with 65 commissioned officers and 1120 enlisted men when the war broke out, the Aviation Section of the Signal Corps was expanded, said the Secretary of War, until at the end of 1917 there were 3900 officers and 82,120 enlisted men. The Liberty engine was designed, adopted, and put

under production, and Congress, on special appeal to assist in the development of the new arm of the service, voted \$640,000,000 in a single bill in July, 1917.

The myriad activities in preparation for war that were launched in March and April produced a demand for immediate funds that resulted in the Loan Act of April 24. A debate upon methods of war finance began earlier than the war itself, and turned upon the relative desirability of loans or taxes. Many of the "stop-the-war" group, as they saw themselves defeated upon their major issue, turned their efforts to the advocacy of a "pay-as-you-go" method of war finance, whose purpose was to make the well-to-do carry the burden of the war. One of their leaders explained that a policy of supporting the war by means of taxation and by seizing all incomes above \$100,000 a year would have a tendency to prevent war. Socialists and others who believed that the war was brought on by capitalists for their own profit eagerly supported the pay-as-you-go movement. Before Congress met many of its members were ready to support with their votes movements for heavy income and war-profit taxation.

Although it was expected that the American effort would be largely economic, there were no estimates as to the probable cost of the first year of war, and Professor Seligman's conjecture that it would run to the neighborhood of \$10,000,000,000 was "greeted with a smile of incredulity." The grand total of national appropriations for the twenty years before the war was less than \$17,500,000,000. In no one year had the total appropriations run much above \$1,000,000,000. It was clear, however, that whatever theory should finally be accepted for raising the necessary funds, the United States must resort to borrowing until the revenue acts should be passed and the funds should become available. The President recommended that the credits to be granted be sustained, "so far as they can equitably be sustained by the present generation, by well-conceived taxation."

Finance:
"Pay as
you go."

The first Loan Bill of the war became a law April 24, 1917. It authorized a bond issue of \$5,000,000,000 at three and a half per cent interest, and in addition to this an issue of short-term notes of \$2,000,000,000. It was proposed by the Treasury Department to sell the short-term notes as money was needed by the Treasury and then to receive them back in return for bonds. It was hoped in this manner to provide for a continuous flow of funds. About twice in each year it was proposed to have a vigorous campaign for the sale of bonds to the people at large, and in anticipation of the first of these drives three weeks were set aside about the first of June for the first Liberty Loan campaign in which bonds to the amount of \$2,000,000,000 were offered to the people. A Liberty Loan organization was built up to aid in bringing the campaign for funds to the attention of the citizens. Bonds for as low as fifty dollars were issued so that no one need be unable to subscribe, and the national morale that supported the entry into war at once stimulated the sale of Liberty bonds and was sustained by it. In November the second loan of \$3,800,000,000 was placed.

The Loan Bill, passed in the understanding that the United States was to aid the other enemies of Germany, provided that \$3,000,000,000 might be loaned Loans to Allies by the Treasury Department to the Allies and their associates. Until this time the Allies had made heavy purchases of raw materials in America, paying for them in turn by their credits in the American banks, by gold shipped to America to meet the balances, by American securities sent home to be sold in the open market, and by national loans offered for subscription in the United States. The gold in the Treasury, amounting to \$1,279,000,000 on July 1, 1914, rose to \$2,445,000,000 in April, 1917. Hereafter the Allied purchases were paid for by the proceeds of national loans extended by the United States Government. Before the end of the war Congress had authorized the lending of \$10,000,000,000, of which \$9,300,000,000 were actually advanced. The first American participation in the war was as banker for the Allies.

The belief that the American contribution was to be economic postponed the date at which it was expected to have military forces available for use, but did not prevent their preparation. The National Defense Act of 1916 was in effect, training camps had prepared a considerable number of reserve officers, and a new series of training camps was opened May 15, 1917, to prepare more reserve officers to be used first as instructors in the organization of new divisions. The National Guard was recruited to 382,000 men, the regular army was enlarged by enlistment to 527,000, the navy and the Marine Corps by enlistment to 75,101, and the General Staff sent into Congress with the approval of the President a project for raising the rest of the national army by a draft.

The principle of selective service, as the draft of 1917 was called, was supported on two theories. There had been nothing quite like it in American experience. The Civil War draft had been a method for stimulating enlistments, not for forcing men to the colors. The Confederate draft had been a means of coercing a population. Selective service was to be a means of raising an army at a time when young men were eager to bear the responsibility, but to raise it in accordance with the national need rather than individual enthusiasm or patriotism. Great armies were to be raised, but they were also to be provided with military implements, and their dependents at home were to be regarded as entitled to maintenance by the nation. In England, where the armies had been filled by volunteers, national industry had been crippled by the patriotic spirit that took skilled men from their shops to the front, and the burden of society had been increased by the dependent families left behind.

The principle of selective service was debated until the middle of May, and became a law on the 18th. The office of the Provost Marshal-General was revived to administer it, and draft boards were organized throughout the nation to coöperate in the registration of men of draft age, from twenty-one to thirty, and in their classification. "If farms,

factories, railroads, and industries were not to be left crippled, if not ruined, by the indiscriminate volunteering of key and pivotal men," said the Provost Marshal-General in his report upon the new national departure, "then, in the face of such an enemy as Germany, the total military effectiveness of the nation would have been lessened rather than strengthened by the assembling of 1,000,000 volunteers."

The Selective Service Act became a law on May 18. Upon signing it the President announced that John J. Pershing, junior major-general on the active list, would be sent to France at the earliest possible date in command of a small contingent of American troops, and that a great army would be raised as soon thereafter as possible. A few days later the orders issued to the commander of the American Expeditionary Forces reminded him that "the underlying idea must be kept in view that the forces of the United States are a distinct and separate component of the combined forces." At the date of his appointment Pershing was in command of the American troops on the Mexican Border, where he had succeeded the late Major-General Frederick A. Funston. His earlier military career had been most intimately associated with the Philippine Islands, where his successes as a junior officer inspired President Roosevelt in 1905 to promote him over 902 seniors on the army list to be a brigadier-general.

Pershing
and the
A.E.F.

The decision to send an expeditionary force to France was a departure from the views that had prevailed in Washington a few weeks before. When the original ^{Foreign} plan for raising the army was drawn up in April, ^{missions} "there was no intention whatever of sending any troops abroad until March, 1918." The Quartermaster-General, with the assistance of the Council of National Defense, placed his first orders with this in view. The change in intention came within a few hours after a French warship passed in at the Capes of the Chesapeake on April 24 bearing Marshal Joffre, Viviani, and a French military mission for a conference with the United States. "Let the American soldier come now" was the message they brought from

France who had borne the heaviest impact of the war for thirty-three months, and whose morale needed the stimulus of a visible aid from America if it was to hold until the American weight could be brought upon the line. A. J. Balfour with a British mission arriving about the same time told the same story. As a result of their arguments "it was determined to begin at once the dispatch of an expeditionary force of the American army to France."

The naval participation of the United States had become a fact two weeks before the appointment of Pershing was announced. In anticipation of the state of war Rear Admiral William S. Sims, president of the Naval War College at Newport, was ordered to England at the end of March to coöperate with the British naval forces in the blockade of Germany. A flotilla of destroyers followed him in April, and arrived at Queenstown May 4.

In addition to maintaining an increasing fleet of destroyers on the blockade and on convoy duty, the navy added a squadron of battleships and undertook to close the North Sea, by a barrage of mines, in order to prevent the egress of submarines. A new type of contact mine was subsequently invented, manufactured, and transported; and 56,611 such mines were planted by American mine-layers between the Orkney Islands and the coast of Norway, constituting four fifths of the whole barrage which extended across two hundred and thirty miles of sea. Small destroyers were built by scores to watch for submarines.

After a few days spent in Washington, Pershing with a little staff went quietly to England, and then to France, where on June 26, 1917, he was joined by units of the first division, regular army troops, who had arrived at Saint-Nazaire, at the mouth of the Loire. On July 4 he marched the troops that Joffre had called for through the streets of Paris.

The headquarters of the A.E.F. were maintained at Paris for a few weeks while Pershing studied the military situation on the western front and made his plans for the organization, training, and operation of his forces. At the end of

August he moved his headquarters halfway across France to the ancient town of Chaumont where he was within easy striking distance of his sector on the western front, and the training areas provided for the American divisions.

The western front of 1917 was battered but unbroken after three years of war. Each side had repeatedly shown that it was possible to bend the line, but neither had possessed the continued power to break through. The unwillingness of the United States to permit its troops to be used for re-
The American army on the western front
placements in the British and French armies, as the Allies would have preferred, made it necessary to assign a sector to the forces under Pershing. England was already in possession of the northern end of the line with her supplies in the rear connected by her network of military railroads with the French and Belgian Channel ports. It could not be suggested that she entrust the defense of the Channel to another force or abandon the short lines of communication between her armies and London. For France the vital strategic factor was the defense of Paris, and from that city the net of railroads to her front was such that no foreign military force could be thrust in and be of service. The American forces had not even been assembled when Pershing took up the question of their disposition with the English and the French. He received as his assignment the quiet sector between the great fortresses of Belfort and Verdun. Here the American armies could do the least damage if ineffective, and here they could be supplied without bringing disorder to the British and French lines of communication north of Paris.

The same reasons that assigned Pershing to the region of Chaumont required him to utilize as seaport base the French shore south of Brest. There was equal determination that the American forces should remain a unit and that they should not constitute a burden upon France. The collier *Jupiter*, laden with ten thousand tons of wheat, preceded the arrival of the first contingents in France, and engineer regiments, railroad regiments, and forestry regi-

ments followed to take possession of the seaport towns. They dredged the harbors, and opened channels up the tidal rivers. They built docks and constructed railway sidings where their gantry cranes could lift their cargoes from the steamship hold to the waiting freight-car. They constructed assembling plants where the freight-cars and the locomotives as they came from the United States were put together. They rebuilt the light French railroads to carry heavy American rolling stock from Brest to Le Mans, from Saint-Nazaire, La Pallice, and Bordeaux to Tours, and thence across France south of Paris to the Chaumont region, where the main lines were sprayed out in branches toward the battle front.

At Tours Pershing erected a secondary headquarters for the Services of Supply. All along the lines of communication from the seaboard bases through the intermediate regions to the zone of advance, cantonments were erected and schools prepared to house and train the troops as they should come, while the departments in Washington were instructed to forward the materials of war upon tables of automatic supply. Each increment of twenty-five thousand troops was to bring with it an initial equipment and every month thereafter for each similar number of troops overseas supplies were to be forwarded in accordance with the tables. The correspondent of the London *Times* who inspected the American plant in France in February, 1918, declared that there was "no question that the General Staff of the army is delivering supplies and material upon the longest lines of communication in the annals of war."

The preparations for an independent army, powerful enough to turn the balance on the western front, retarded the development of an imposing force of combat troops. Before 1917 was ended there were only five divisions on the soil of France, the 1st and 2d, composed of units selected from the regular army; the 26th, made out of the National Guard of New England; the 42d, or Rainbow Division, composed of picked units from the National Guard of all the



States, and the 41st, which never had a combat record, but remained a depot and replacement division through whose units 227,000 replacement troops passed on their journey to the front. The 32d Division of Wisconsin and Michigan National Guardsmen was added in February; and in March, 1918, there were 250,000 American troops in France, more than half of whom were technical troops devoted to the construction of the American plant.

It was the belief in April, 1917, that American troops would not be needed in large numbers, and that if needed they could not be transported. In anticipation of their coming the German submarine campaign was pushed to its highest effectiveness. In August, 1917, an American embarkation service was organized to take charge of the troops and freight as they were presented at Atlantic ports for transportation. From a modest beginning of 131,000 dead weight tons in August, 1917, the transport fleet grew to 2,700,000 dead weight tons in the final month of the war, and when in the spring of 1918 the need came for immediate American assistance the embarkation service, with the aid of British ships, carried safely to France or England nearly ten thousand troops a day for five consecutive months.

While Pershing was laying the foundations for the A.E.F., the units of the regular army and the National Guard were being raised to their full quotas by the induction of volunteers. It was possible to use these existing military units as training schools for the new recruits until such time as it might be practicable to proceed in the formation of new units. The division of about twenty-seven thousand officers and men became the unit for training. It was decided to rearrange the whole existing force and to assimilate the drafted men in a single army organization of which the divisions numbering one to twenty-five should be founded upon regular army units, the numbers twenty-six to seventy-five were reserved for divisions made out of the National Guard, while those numbered seventy-six and higher were to be entirely new and

The
National
Army

made up of National Army men. In the summer of 1918 the distinctions existing between the different varieties of divisions were abolished, and all were merged in the single Army of the United States and wore the same insignia. Few of the divisions long retained much of the local character with which some of them started out. In each of them gaps were filled by replacements without reference to their origin. Units and individuals were constantly transferred from one division to another. The small number of regular soldiers in the service in April, 1917, were scattered so widely throughout the whole force that the so-called regular divisions were regular only in name. The National Guard divisions retained their identity a little longer, but only seven of the seventeen divisions organized from this source contained less than twenty-five per cent of draft members when they sailed for France, and all of them tended as the war went on to approximate more closely the other divisions of the National Army.

The determination to raise an army of indefinite size by means of a draft made it necessary to provide housing accommodations to be ready as soon as the recruits assembled. On registration day, June 5, 1917, 9,586,508 men enrolled themselves as liable to service. In the ensuing three months they were arranged in sequence in their several districts, with their order of liability fixed by a lottery that took place on July 20, in anticipation of the calling of the first quotas to duty in September. While this work was going on with the assistance of 4557 local draft boards, the selection of cantonment sites was being followed by the adoption of standardized plans for barracks and other buildings, by the letting of contracts, and the hurried mobilization of armies of workmen in the building trades to get ready for the arrival of the first half million men. The regular divisions were put together at posts throughout the South, and sixteen temporary cantonments were provided in the South for as many divisions of the National Guard. In addition to these the 42d or Rainbow Division was assembled at Camp Mills on Long Island

and started overseas in October, 1917. For the sixteen divisions of the National Army first organized, sixteen permanent camps were built, most of them in the Eastern States, and scattered from Camp Devens in Massachusetts to Camp Travis in Texas. These camps were built of wood and later possessed an average capacity of 48,000 men. In addition to the thirty-three new divisional camps numerous smaller camps were brought into existence for the specialized services, artillery, aviation, engineer corps, and others, and for embarkation near New York and Newport News. The construction division that prepared this physical plant was conducted by officers, mostly commissioned directly from civil life, from the ranks of engineers and contractors.

The officers' training camps opened in May, 1917, and graduated in August their first class of first and second lieutenants. They were followed by a second series on August 27, and a third in January, 1918. In no earlier war had the United States safeguarded the health and comfort of its soldiers by requiring that line command should be exercised only by men with some specialized training for the task. The boys accepted as candidates for commissions included the pick of the college classes of 1917 and 1918. In the fourth series of camps organized in May, 1918, the emergency need for officers had been met, and most of the candidates were drawn directly from the ranks of men already in the service. The graduates of the officers' training camps were assigned to the new divisions as these were formed, but this was only the beginning of their training. When they arrived in France every one was sent to school, the enlisted men to the infantry and artillery training areas, while their officers were detailed to the specialized schools for the innumerable new services that had become a part of the operation of an army.

The principles of selective service and special training for line command were emphasized by the refusal of President Wilson to permit the private recruiting that had been a part of every earlier American war. Colonel Roosevelt's desire to be allowed to raise

The Roose-
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sion

a division and to command one of its infantry brigades was widely discussed while the Draft Law was in Congress. In the Spanish War his regiment of "Rough Riders," which Leonard Wood and he commanded in turn, had shown private recruiting at its best. At the end of the Santiago campaign he was a colonel commanding an infantry brigade, and he now wished to reënter the service at this rank. It was believed by many that the inspiration derived from Roosevelt at the front would have sustained the morale of the Allied cause, for no other American was so universally admired or so widely known. His friends in Congress sought to make it mandatory upon the President to permit him to recruit a division. The law passed authorizing, but not commanding, such a course. As he signed the bill President Wilson stated that he would not avail himself of the authorization. "This is not the time or the occasion," he declared, "for a compliment or for any action not calculated to contribute to the immediate success of the war. The business now in hand is undramatic, practical, and of scientific definiteness and precision. I shall act with regard to it at every step and in every particular under expert and professional advice, from both sides of the water. . . . The first troops sent to France will be taken from the present forces of the regular army and will be under the command of trained soldiers only."

In the Espionage Act of June 15, 1917, the United States Government was given powers to combat any attempt that might be made to obstruct the administration ^{Espionage} of the draft or to weaken the morale of troops while training. There was wide difference of opinion as to the extent of sedition and the proper measures for its suppression. The European countries had become used to censorship in all of its forms, and bills were introduced in Congress conferring on the Government powers for the censorship of the press. These powers were never granted and no censorship of the press existed except one of voluntary character in which the newspapers of the country, under the leadership of the Committee on Public Information, co-

operated in the preservation of military secrets. The Espionage Act forbade aid to the enemy and the spreading of information intended to cause insubordination, disloyalty, or mutiny in the military forces. The Postmaster-General was given power to rescind the mailing privileges of newspapers and individuals offending against the act. The prosecutions in enforcement of the Espionage Law were few in comparison with the number of Americans of alien origin who might have been supposed likely to need watching. The greatest difficulties were with Socialist and other radical leaders whose normal political language became menacing in war-times. The Department of Justice organized a volunteer association, the American Protective League, that grew to have two hundred and fifty thousand associates pledged to report evidence as to disloyalty. Internment camps received a few thousand Germans believed to be dangerous, the federal jails a few more charged with resisting the draft and other crimes, but in general the Selective Service Act enforced itself because it had public opinion behind it.

As the draft was administered, exemption from military service was accorded to men of military age because of physical and mental defects, dependent families, and the importance of their civil occupations. In the first quotas called for September, 1917, speed was imperative, for the new machinery was as yet imperfect and the men were needed in the camps. In December, 1917, all registrants still in civil life were rearranged by a system of questionnaires in a new classification based upon industrial importance, and subsequent calls were thereafter taken from men in Class I, who were generally liable to service and without dependents.

For the benefit of dependent families of men who volunteered and to fulfill the national obligation to the men themselves due to the risks of war, Congress extended the principle of employers' liability over the armed forces in October, 1917. The history of pension legislation since the Civil War told the

Liability,
allowance,
allotments,
insurance

story of national obligation and of the difficulties of meeting it by subsequent legislation. The new law attempted to anticipate or to avoid the problems. By rigorous physical examination men of unsound physique, liable to collapse under military strain, were excluded from the forces. If men with families dependent upon them entered the service, they were required to make allotments from their pay for the benefit of the family, while the United States added to this a family allowance based upon nearness of kin and number of dependents. The Bureau of War Risk Insurance of the Treasury Department was enlarged to insure the whole military force, with provisions for payments in the event of death or complete disability and of proportional amounts for partial disability. The maimed soldier was promised, in addition to this, reëducation at the national expense in case he returned from war shell-shocked or crippled and unable to resume his former place. The Federal Board for Vocational Education was given charge of the administration of this guarantee. In addition to the liability that the United States assumed toward every soldier, the latter was permitted if he desired to take out life insurance at cost to the maximum of ten thousand dollars, and in all of the cantonments insurance officers were appointed to persuade the men to take out the maximum with premiums charged against their pay. By the time the war risk legislation was enacted Congress had completed a summer of prolonged discussion, and had laid down the fundamental policies upon which the United States was to fight the war.

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CHAPTER XXIII

THE AMERICAN WAR GOVERNMENT: WORK OR FIGHT

THE American legislation of 1917 divides itself roughly into two classes, one having to do chiefly with emergencies that must be met without delay, and the other comprising policies whose full effect could come only with the lapse of time.

The authorization of the first Liberty Loan and the determination to finance the Allies belong to the emergency measures that were enacted without prolonged debate. In this class falls also the Selective Service Act, whose acceptance was by almost unanimous agreement. While Congress was enacting the emergency laws, its committees were discussing permanent policies for bringing the full strength of the United States into the war.

The World War brought into existence new weapons that changed the character of strategy and altered the position of both the non-combatant and the neutral. Aircraft, the submarine, poison gases, and the tanks were all added into the arsenal of physical weapons. Propaganda and the censorship were brought to play upon men's minds — to weaken the resistance of the enemy, or to encourage the spirit of the nation using it. Before the United States was drawn into the war the position of the neutral had been made almost unbearable by “a new war weapon against Germany — a noiseless and unseen weapon.” This was the embargo.

The anciently admitted right of the belligerent to blockade or invest his enemy and starve him into submission carried with it a right never denied by neutrals to search merchant vessels on the high seas, to seize contraband goods where they could be found, and to seize both the cargo and the vessel carrying it in an attempt to violate a blockade. The inconvenience caused by these conceded rights would

Embargo
and neutral
trade

have been great enough to disorganize the life of neutral nations if no additional means of restricting trade with the enemy had been discovered. The Allies before 1917 relied chiefly upon the law of contraband and the doctrine of ultimate enemy destination in their attempts to bring economic pressure upon the Central Powers. Friction and inconvenience resulted, but since the Allies were ready to purchase most of the cargoes they intercepted, and since their assertions of enemy destination were generally well founded, no neutral nation offered to defend its immunity in trade with a belligerent by going to war about it. As the war progressed the Allies discovered attempts to evade the consequences of enemy destination. The people of Holland and Denmark shipped their butter fats to Germany and themselves consumed oleo that they purchased in Allied countries. In many ways it was found possible to sell the Central Powers a commodity originating in Continental neutral countries and to replace it with an Allied or other neutral commodity. The effect of this was identical with that of the method of direct importation by way of the Allied countries, and it left the enemies of Germany in the situation of provisioning her through the connivance of neutrals. The Allied blockade broke up the direct maritime trade with Germany, and then the indirect trade upon the principle of enemy destination, and finally the Allied Government undertook to prohibit trade with the neutrals unless assured that the commodities so imported would not release others for the benefit of Germany.

The United States suffered from loss of the profitable trade with Germany and European neutrals that might have been enjoyed had the Allies permitted it, or had Great Britain been willing to furnish her own ships to carry it. Since the United States had little merchant marine and American exports had been habitually carried in the ships of countries now at war, there had been much inconvenience and considerable hard feeling due to the pressure of the Allied embargo. As a tool of war, however, the weapon was both permissible and effective, and the Espionage Act, now

passed by Congress, of June 15, 1917, carried a provision for the control of exports.

Vance McCormick, who had been chairman of the Democratic National Committee in 1916, was made chairman of the Exports Administrative Board, appointed under this act. The exports of the United States were to be controlled by a system of licenses for the double purpose of preventing their reaching the enemy, and of conserving them for the use of the United States and its associates in the war. Neutrals were not to be hampered in their reasonable needs so far as these could be met without injury to the Allied cause or without aiding the enemy. As the summer advanced the number of commodities affected was increased through extensions of the prohibited list and the exports conservation list, and to these there was added the control of bunker coal. By refusing to sell coal to neutral vessels in American ports until these contracted to refrain from carrying cargoes useful to the enemy and agreed to a trade acceptable to the United States, it was possible to extend the influence over the war trade.

Power to control imports into the United States was voted in August, and on October 6 Congress brought together other provisions relating to the embargo in the Trading with the Enemy Act. The War Trade Board, of which McCormick remained the chairman, took over and enlarged upon the work of the Exports Administrative Board to stop all trade with the enemy, to conserve American exports, and to restrict the imports. Tonnage was so short that it could not be spared for unnecessary cargoes. All imports were under license by February, 1918, and the technical bureaus of the War Trade Board issued the licenses as it was shown that the imports could not be done without or be replaced by similar commodities of American origin.

In breaking up trade with the enemy, the War Trade Board undertook to stop the trade with enemy subjects wherever they might reside, and created an intelligence division to gather information, which was embodied in

lists of enemy firms with whom trade was prohibited. The office of Alien Property Custodian, created by the same act, was administered by A. Mitchell Palmer, who took possession, as public trustee, of the American property of enemies or others residing in enemy countries. The property of enemy aliens residing in the United States and not violating the law was not interfered with.

Before the full organization of war trade had taken place, Congress had passed other measures for the conservation of food and fuel in the Lever Act of August 10, 1917. The additional powers to stimulate the production of food and to control its disposition within the United States were asked for in April, but were not granted until August. The debates over the Food and Fuel Act revealed the permanence of the distrust of combinations that pervaded the Progressive movement. Fear that the power to control the necessities of life might be misused for the advantage of a few citizens, inspired protracted opposition to the bill. While the debate was pending the Department of Agriculture used its existing organization to encourage the planting of larger crops than usual, and asked for an appropriation to make a food inventory of the United States. The voluntary Food Administration under Hoover was created in May, when it seemed likely that the debate would indefinitely postpone the grant of the desired power to bring the food industry under license. The danger of sugar, flour, and potato famines, accompanied by hoarding and extortionate prices, were among the visible reasons for granting the powers. There was no danger that the United States would starve, but there was need to conserve to the uttermost in order to increase the surplus for export to the Allies, and to prevent improper hoarding and speculation.

Upon the passage of the Lever Act, Hoover was appointed Food Administrator, and on August 23 President Harry A. Garfield, of Williams College, was made Fuel Administrator. The price of wheat was guaranteed at \$2.20 a bushel. The Grain Corporation took out a charter from

the State of Delaware with officers provided by the Food Administration, and with a capital stock of fifty million dollars owned by the Government. Its duty was to buy and distribute the crop of 1917, and administer the established price. A year later the Sugar Equalization Board was similarly incorporated to stabilize the price of sugar and equalize its distribution. The per capita consumption of wheat in the United States was reduced from 5.3 bushels per year to 4.12 bushels in the first year of war. The reduction was brought about by the campaign for conservation and the use of substitutes, with wheatless days and meatless days popularized through the coöperation of the State Food Administrations, and with a resulting surplus of food released for shipment to the Allies.

The Fuel Administration took over work that had been begun by one of the committees of the Council of National Defense and used its powers to increase the activities of the mines and to meet the demands of mining labor. Its effectiveness was involved with that of the railroads of the country, because in many of the mines there were no facilities for storage, and the output was dependent upon the ability of the railroads to provide empty coal cars at the mine mouth. There were no available figures on the capacity of either the railroads to provide the cars or the mines to fill them, and the work of the Fuel Administration was forced to include a new economic study of the industry in which the experts of the Bureau of Mines played an active part.

The oil division of the Fuel Administration was added in January, 1918, because of the growing importance of fuel oil and gasoline. This was a motorized war, with armies moving by motor truck and with aircraft propelled by gasoline engines. The varying requirements of different kinds of motors made the question of specifications international in character, while the need arose to conserve the particular grades of gasoline most valuable for the use of aircraft, and ultimately to limit the use of any kind of gasoline for pleasure purposes.

The debate in Congress upon war policies, whether of

emergency or permanent character, began before the de-
 War revenue clarification of war and was continuous until Con-
 gress adjourned on October 6. It ranged from the merits of the war itself to the treatment of sedition, the freedom of the press, the management of armies, and the national control of trade. On October 3 a War Revenue Act was passed, after the most persistent of the discussions which involved theories of finance. The Revenue Act of 1917 was not constructed with reference solely to the finances of the war. There was a wide agreement that taxes must be increased not only to the extent at which they would cover the normal running expenses of the Government together with interest and sinking-fund charges upon the debt, but beyond that until they should carry a considerable portion of the current expenses of war. The great debate over the proportion of military expenses to be borne directly by taxation was colored by the demands of leaders who, having opposed the war, wished to make it unpopular; of others who, believing the war to be due to a conspiracy of wealth, wanted to punish the holders of wealth; and of still others who saw an opportunity to correct inequalities in the distribution of wealth or to destroy certain types of wealth entirely. The demand for taxes ranged from a minimum that would carry only the fixed permanent charges to a maximum that would confiscate enough of the accumulations of the frugal and the fortunate to pay the whole of the war expense out of current revenue. Socialist leaders, agrarian politicians, and progressive farmers who had long been warring upon accumulated wealth, led the attack against bond issues and in favor of taxation. They were supported by what remained of the organized pro-German sentiment.

Of the available methods of taxation, the tariff, formerly the chief reliance of the nation, had lost much of its importance. Its revenues were uncertain because of the war-time interruption of foreign trade and the deliberate efforts of such agencies as the War Trade Board to reduce it to its lowest terms. There remained the excise and the income tax, over whose details the debate proceeded. The great

controversy came over the amount of the normal income tax and its exemption limit, and the rate to be applied to the particular forms of income due directly to the war. It was obvious that huge fortunes were accruing to some citizens because of their war contracts, and to others who were able to profiteer because of the increased demands for the necessities of life. The degree to which these persons should be allowed to enjoy profits because of the war was always present in the discussion, with each side attacking the motive of the others. The act as passed was based upon a graduated excess profits tax, ranging from twenty to sixty per cent of the war excess over the profits of the pre-war years, 1911-13. It included an income tax beginning with a rate of four per cent upon individual incomes over a thousand dollars, and heavy increases in the excise taxes upon tobacco and alcoholic drinks, transportation, luxuries and amusements, and letter postage. The final measure was opposed by representatives of business who said that it took too much, and by pay-as-you-go advocates, who said that it took too little. The revenues received under the law in 1918 were \$3,696,000,000.

The debate on the Revenue Act of 1917 was only the beginning of the financial debate. In the spring of 1918 Secretary McAdoo invited Congress to begin upon a revision of the act that might be expected to raise in 1919 a third of the total current cost of the war. His law, designed to raise approximately six billion dollars by taxation, was before Congress for eight more months of the same type of debate that prevailed in 1917. The extremists who thought the law of 1917 inadequate were much comforted by the demand of the Administration for even heavier rates than they had urged, and proceeded to advocate more advanced proposals for the conscription of private property. This Revenue Act was not passed until February, 1919.

The money raised by taxation during the war period, April, 1917, to October, 1919, aggregating \$11,-^{War} 280,000,000, fell far short of the expenditures ^{expenses} of the same period, which ran to \$26,007,000,000, not in-

cluding \$9,406,000,000 lent to the Allies. The grand total raised and expended or lent during these three years, \$35,413,000,000, made necessary the development of McAdoo's system of continuous revenue and the floating of five great national loans. The continuous revenue device made it possible for the Treasury to meet the financial needs as they arose without withdrawing greater amounts of capital from industry than were immediately needed. At intervals of about two weeks the banks of the country, reached through the federal reserve system, were invited to buy short-term certificates of indebtedness, in a fixed percentage of their total assets. As the Liberty Loan drives produced subscriptions for the long-term bonds, these payments were deposited in the banks, and the latter paid the Treasury for the bonds as issued with their accumulations of certificates. Four Liberty Loan drives were conducted in June and November, 1917, and May and September, 1918. They were followed by a fifth "Victory" drive in April, 1919. They brought into the Treasury the savings of more than sixty-five million subscribers, and funds as follows:

I —	\$2,000,000,000
II —	3,808,766,150
III —	4,176,516,850
IV —	6,964,524,650
V —	4,498,312,650

The total of the five loans amounted to \$21,448,120,300.

The repeated campaigns for the sale of Liberty bonds served not only as a means of raising needed funds, but played an unmeasured part in sustaining the public opinion of the United States, in popularizing the aims of the war, and in suppressing opposition to it. The Liberty Loan organization, directed by the Treasury Department, was based upon committees in the federal reserve districts, and these in turn on similar bodies in the several States and in their cities and counties. Members of these committees, drawn into Government

service during the drives, educated themselves as well as their fellow-citizens to whom they sold their bonds. Masses of explanatory literature were prepared for their use, flying squadrons of speakers were sent throughout the country to explain the loans. The committee on Public Information published pamphlets by the million in a dozen languages: *How the War Came to America*, *The War Message and the Facts Behind it*, *The President's Flag Day Speech*, *German War Practices*, *The War Cyclopedia*, *Conquest and Kultur*. The Four-Minute Men were organized by the Committee on Public Information to speak in motion-picture theaters, and included, by the autumn of 1918, 43,000 volunteer orators, whose message it was impossible for the most indifferent to evade.

The work of these coöperative organizations in unifying public opinion was further extended by the State Councils of Defense. These were formed everywhere upon recommendation of the Council of National Defense, and built up local systems of county councils, which sometimes reached down into ward and precinct committees. The Food Administration added a similar network of committees of its own; the American Red Cross, reorganized for war in May, 1917, added still another organization and called for voluntary contributions by the hundred million. By the autumn of 1917 service flags appeared spontaneously throughout the country, boasting by their stars the members of each household who were with the colors. The window emblem of the Liberty Loans advertised the subscribers to the patriotic funds, and the banner of the Red Cross took its place by the side of these, while the pledge cards of the Food Administration were added to the group. The citizen working at war tasks wore the numerous buttons of his organizations, and every day national understanding of the causes of the war became clearer, and it was more difficult for disloyalty, stupidity, or dissent to hold its own.

Congress closed its war session in October, and at the same time occurred the last of the open manifestations of disapproval of the war. The anti-war group, never very

large, became more stubborn and persistent as it lost its audience. It received a new inspiration from the progress of the Russian Revolution, which in the spring of 1917 demanded a speedy peace based upon a doctrine of "no annexation, no indemnities." An international conference of Socialists was summoned to meet at Stockholm during the summer, to bring about a peace in spite of the Governments, and was supported by the Governments in Russia and the Central Powers. In the United States the People's Council for Democracy and Terms of Peace was organized by a Socialist-pacifist combination at Madison Square Garden on May 30. It began a propaganda for immediate peace that was continued for the next three months. The American Alliance for Labor and Democracy was organized by the leaders of the American Federation of Labor and the pro-war Socialists, and in September the debate came to a crisis and end in Minnesota.

The center of disaffection with the war lay in the upper Mississippi Valley, drawing many of its supporters from the German populations in Illinois and Wisconsin, and the radical farmers of Iowa, Minnesota, and North Dakota. The People's Council proposed to hold a national convention at Minneapolis, whither it was invited by the Socialist mayor of that city. The special train that started from New York with the delegates to the council — the "rabbit special" as its critics called it — received a different sort of publicity from that which it desired. The American Alliance for Labor and Democracy trailed it with a special train carrying supporters of the war. The governor of Minnesota refused to let the pacifist meeting take place within his State, and the baffled opponents of the war, instead of setting the prairies aflame for peace, drifted back to their homes, excluded from auditoriums and hotels. Hereafter the movements in opposition were less conspicuous. The Postmaster-General barred from the mails Socialist papers like the *Milwaukee Leader* and the *Masses*, and friends of free speech complained of a national intolerance that refused to listen to dissent or allow it a public

hearing. But the same intolerance revealed substantial national unanimity and a fixed determination to see the war through to a victorious conclusion. The opposition in Congress confined itself to a criticism of war policies in debate. On the final passage of the war measures few cared to vote in the negative.

In the winter of 1917-18 the war passed into its darkest period, in which the victory of Germany seemed to be almost complete and there was reason to fear that the United States had joined too late. On the western front in the spring the German army had somewhat shortened its length of trenches by retiring to the Hindenburg Line between Arras and Soissons. Three times during the year the British forces tried in vain to break the position. On the Italian front an Austrian drive under German leadership poured down the slopes of the Alps from the Isonzo across the Tagliamento to the Piave. The Russian Revolution ended the active fighting on the eastern front, and released German divisions for a new effort in 1918 to destroy the power of the Allies before American troops could be available. The crisis of the war

In the United States, as this darkest period of the war approached, there prevailed everywhere noisy congestion and confusion, with new programs in every line of war activity in operation, with none of them complete, and with many of them encroaching on each other. Conservation was the dominant note of the approaching winter, with priority as its most important element.

The word "priority" acquired significance in the United States when it became apparent that war needs would require more railroad cars, more tons of coal and steel, and more labor than the land possessed and when it became impossible to permit each agency of Government and every private business to serve its own needs in the open market to the exclusion of the national program. There was not yet, in 1917, a real national program, but lessons were being learned that entered into the making of one. In August Congress prepared to meet the crisis by

authorizing the President to give preference to such railway traffic as appeared to be essential for national defense. Under this act Judge Robert S. Lovett was appointed director of priority and began his work by giving coal shipments to Lake Erie ports preference over all other freight in order to meet the Northwest need for winter coal. In subsequent priority circulars he classified the freight that presented itself for shipment and gave the right of way to that belonging to the army, the navy, or the Emergency Fleet Corporation. His work marks the beginning of actual Government control over industry, as distinguished from the earlier mobilization of industry to meet the needs of war.

The War Industries Board was created in July, 1917, to hasten the mobilization of industry and its control, and was the outgrowth of a series of experiments that had been begun in the Council of National Defense early in the year. The various committees created by the Advisory Commission were in continuous coöperation with the Government in the early weeks of the war, and one of them, on Munitions Standards, sought to work out an approach to uniformity in the requirements of the various fighting units. This committee on April 9 was reorganized as the General Munitions Board with Frank A. Scott as chairman, and set out to formulate "a system for clearing the needs of the army and navy, and for having the needs brought before the people." For the next three months the General Munitions Board worked with the coöperative committees of industry of the Council of National Defense on the one hand, and the buying agents of the army, navy, and Emergency Fleet Corporation on the other. There was necessary confusion in the work because of the great number of independent agencies authorized by law to buy for the Government, and because of the lack of legal power in the General Munitions Board to compel coördination. In the navy there existed already a consolidated buying system, but in the army each of the separate services had been allowed to purchase for itself, with

the result that the Chief of Ordnance, the Chief of Engineers, the Chief Signal Officer, the Quartermaster-General, and the Surgeon-General entered the crowded markets to bid against each other for supplies of the same type. The ensuing competition raised the price to the Government and to the Allies, who were buying in American markets with American funds, and it favored the trade of the contract broker, who took Government contracts, expecting not to fulfill them, but to sublet them. The Council of National Defense sought to keep track of the contracts as they were let, and to prepare some kind of a picture of the military contracts of the United States. Its statistical division formed for this purpose was subsequently taken into the army as the statistical branch of the General Staff.

Before the Government had proceeded far with the letting of contracts, Washington filled up with agents seeking them, and with disappointed bidders complaining at their misfortune. The system of sub-committees came under fire because it often happened that committeemen chosen by Baruch or Rosenwald because of their expert knowledge of raw materials or supplies were forced to pass upon bids tendered by the very companies that had released them for Government service. The services of the dollar-a-year man were in many instances given to the Government by his former employer who continued to pay his salary. The disappointed bidder, failing to secure his Government contract, was enabled to charge that it had been awarded to a rival firm through favoritism. Other complaints were due to the newness of the committee system and the inexperience of many of the committeemen with Washington habits of business and the law. In their discussions of the Food and Fuel Act pending in Congress opponents of food control denounced the work of the sub-committees, and incorporated in the act passed on August 10 a clause forbidding agents of Government to act in the award of contracts in which they had any financial interest.

Before this act was passed the General Munitions Board was rearranged on July 28 and became the War Industries

Board with Scott still chairman. The new board was designed to concentrate and standardize buying methods. It included, in addition to the chairman, representatives of the army and navy, Baruch in charge of raw materials, Brookings for finished products, Hugh Frayne, a representative of labor, and Judge Lovett, commissioner of priorities. The sub-committee system inaugurated by the Council of National Defense was gradually reorganized between the creation of the War Industries Board in July and the dissolution of the committees on supplies in November. Scott, who retired as chairman of the War Industries Board because of ill-health, was succeeded in November by Daniel Willard, whose position was somewhat similar to that of chief of a Munitions Ministry.

A new arrangement for bringing the resources of industry to the service of the nation was inaugurated in December, 1917, at the instance of the United States Chamber of Commerce. Since it had proved impracticable to permit contracts to be awarded by men who were on temporary leave from their industries, the Chamber of Commerce recommended at its annual meeting in September that the several industries organize themselves and create war service committees, voluntarily empowered to bind each its whole industry in dealing with the Government. Upon the initiative of the Chamber of Commerce more than five hundred such committees were formed, based upon the coöperation of the rival members in every industry. The committees came to Washington to aid the Government. Some of them, like the Iron and Steel Institute, the Tanners' Council, the Textile Alliance, and the Chemical Alliance (for their titles were by no means uniform) opened elaborate central offices in Washington to keep the trade and the Government in continuous contact. The committees helped to award contracts; and with equal readiness they abolished unnecessary styles, standardized their output, consented to curtailments of output, and in some cases discontinued their industries as non-essential.

To coöperate with the war service committees the War

Industries Board organized a long list of commodities sections directed by managers who were compelled to separate themselves from business. In the commodities sections the production, needs, and statistics of the various trades were assembled and studied, and when any of the other agencies of Government needed to be brought into contact with a given industry, the meetings took place at the War Industries Board in the presence of the commodity chief and the war service committee of the industry.

The new organization of the War Industries Board and war service committees was developed between December, 1917, and February, 1918, when the air was full of ominous threats that the organization was too late, and that military preparation had already broken down. The most visible sign of the breakdown was congestion on the railroads with loaded freight-cars crowding the tracks around the ports of embarkation and munition or shipyard plants, and with shippers throughout the United States clamoring for cars they could not get. In every field of war preparation contracts had been let by guesswork in the previous spring, since no branch of the Government had ever been empowered to determine a schedule of requirements. In the early summer the factories readjusted themselves to make war supplies, ships, guns, railroad materials, explosives, automobiles, aeroplanes, uniforms, and the other thousands of items needed in the war. New factories were established and added to the confusion by demanding building materials and labor to construct their plants. In the autumn of 1917 finished supplies began to leave the factories for delivery at the shipping points or at the assembling plants of the Fleet Corporation. Their sudden pressure upon the railroads came in the worst months of the severest winter known in a generation.

The American railroad plant was underbuilt and in bad repair when the war broke out. For several years railroad companies had been ground between the upper millstone of inflexible rates fixed by public authority and the lower millstone of rising costs. The fifteen-year fight for Gov-

ernment control had placed the common carriers under minute public regulation. The margin of profit in operation, out of which the railroads were accustomed to maintain their plants and make their betterments, was cut down. With income thus reduced, it became more difficult to borrow at a moderate figure, for lenders insisted upon a reasonable return, which the best-managed railroads could not guarantee. In passing the Adamson Law in 1916, Congress added to the financial burdens of the carriers without providing extra revenues to meet them.

The Army Act of 1916, contemplating that in the event of war it might be necessary for the Government to operate the railroads, granted such power to the President; but he refrained from taking them over in the early months of the war. The American Railway Association was called into conference with the Council of National Defense in February and acted as a Transportation Committee for the Council. On April 11 it organized a Railroads' War Board with Fairfax Harrison, president of the Southern Railway, as chairman. This body took charge of the tracks and rolling stock of all the lines and directed their operation without reference to their ownership. A few weeks later, on May 29, Congress directed the Interstate Commerce Commission to organize a Bureau of Car Service with power to regulate the use of rolling stock which included about 2,300,000 freight-cars, without reference to their ownership; while the legislation of August legalized the control of priorities and shipments.

Through the summer of 1917 the Railroads' War Board fought against the difficulties of car and equipment shortage, finance and labor. The unevenness of military manufacture brought factories into full production before facilities for storage at the ports were ready, and increasing thousands of loaded cars waiting to be unloaded made the confusion worse. Toward the end of the year the trainmen presented demands for forty per cent wage increase to meet the rising costs of living, and the public began to feel that private management had broken down.

On December 26 President Wilson took over the control of the railways and appointed Secretary of the Treasury McAdoo as Director-General of the United States Railroad Administration, in control of 2905 companies, with 397,014 miles of track. Railroad
administra-
tion

At the beginning of 1918 Congress set to work upon the passage of an act to regulate the compensation to the railroads during the period of Government control. This became a law March 21, with compensation based upon the three-year average, 1914-17. The Director-General of Railroads operated them as a single system, but decentralized their management in the hands of regional directors. The operative officers of the roads were relieved of their duties, but were in many instances taken into Government service with different assignments. Competition among the roads for traffic was abolished, consolidated ticket offices were opened in the various large cities, needless trains and parlor cars were dropped from the schedules, and the public was urged to stay at home.

Before the Railroad Administration had time to show its capacity, the month of January, with extreme cold weather and heavy snowfalls, blocked the tracks around the Eastern ports and froze the contents of the open cars into solid masses of ice and freight. The coal supply of the cities and the ordnance plants ran low. On January 17, while the Railroad Administration was maintaining an embargo on freight in order to clear its lines, the Fuel Administrator tightened the regulations on the use of bunker coal by neutral vessels and ordered all factories except those engaged in indispensable war operations to shut down for the next five days, and thereafter for ten successive Mondays. "The Garfield fuel order was a call of all hands to the lifeboats," said the *Outlook*; while injured industry complained to the President. Wilson upheld the Fuel Administrator with the grim comment, "We are on a war footing." On Tuesday, January 22, Colonel Roosevelt arrived in Washington with the slogan on his lips, "Tell the truth and speed up the war."

Congestion and despondency in the United States coin-

cided with the rumors that Germany was preparing for a final drive upon the western front to force a peace. In both parties there were critics of the war measures that had been passed and the way they had been administered, who recited in Congress facts and rumors gathered from the factories and the cantonments that seemed to show delay and failure. On January 19 Senator G. E. Chamberlain, Democratic chairman of the Committee on Military Affairs, attended a luncheon of the National Security League in New York, and there "undertook to show that since the battle of Bunker Hill we had never had a proper military organization or policy." In conclusion, he said that "the military establishment of America has fallen down. There is no use to be optimistic about a thing that does not exist. It has almost stopped functioning . . . because of inefficiency in every bureau and in every department of the government of the United States."

The charge of Senator Chamberlain evoked an indignant and point-blank denial from the President, who asserted that it was "an astonishing and absolutely unjustifiable distortion of the truth. As a matter of fact, the War Department has performed a task of unparalleled magnitude and difficulty with extraordinary promptness and efficiency." A few days later Secretary Baker appeared before the Committee on Military Affairs with an impressive statement of the work done and doing. Senator Chamberlain introduced a bill for the creation of a Munitions Ministry, which received support in principle from Colonel Roosevelt, many of the preparedness organizations, and many members in both parties. An attempt was made by Senator Stone to show that the demand for a Munitions Ministry was in effect a censure of the President inspired by partisan politics. The President announced that he would veto any measure that attempted to take from him or lessen his responsibility for the conduct of the war.

When the advocates of a Munitions Ministry insisted that the existing laws on military coördination were inade-

quate, he suggested that, if they desired to speed up the war, they should give him power to rearrange the agencies of government as need should indicate. On February 6 a bill was introduced in the Senate by Overman, of North Carolina, authorizing the President for the period of the war to create new agencies of government, and to alter existing ones and to transfer their powers and unexpended appropriations according to his judgment and the need. It was difficult for advocates of a Munitions Ministry to oppose the Overman Bill, that went so much further in the direction of the consolidation of sweeping powers in the hands of the President. Chamberlain's bill was dropped, and on May 20, 1918, the Overman Bill became a law, "to coördinate or consolidate executive bureaus, agencies, and offices."

For the remainder of the war President Wilson had dictatorial powers, limited only by the size of available appropriations and specific prohibitions fixed by law. He exercised his new powers immediately. An Air Service was created, taking duties away from the Signal Corps and granting them to a new Bureau of Aircraft Production, over which John D. Ryan became civilian chief. A Chemical Warfare Service was added to the army, and the War Industries Board, which had existed thus far as a sub-committee of the Council of National Defense, and which had wavered in the balance as Congress debated the Munitions Ministry that might supersede it, was made an independent agency of the Government. Other powers of less consequence were transferred from one department to another.

During the debate on the Overman Bill, the American equivalent of a Munitions Ministry came into existence. There had now been created six tremendous new war agencies that were familiarly described as the "war boards," the Shipping Board under Hurley, the Food Administration under Hoover, the Fuel Administration under Garfield, the War Trade Board under McCormick, the Railroad Administration under McAdoo, and finally the War Industries Board under Baruch, who took

charge on March 4, 1918. Upon the afternoon of March 20 the President called into conference the Secretary of the Navy and Benedict Crowell from the War Department, for Secretary Baker was in France, and the six heads of the war boards. Popularly known as the "war cabinet," this body held weekly meetings until the end of the war, serving as a clearing-house for the conservation of American resources and the fulfillment of war demands.

The German *Friedensturm* was designed by Ludendorff to be a final stroke to break the power of the Allies before the promised American aid should come. The magnitude of American preparations indicated that it might soon be too late to break the Allies; and the submarines, on which reliance had been placed in 1917, had failed to starve England or to crush her spirit. On March 21 the German divisions advanced in the first phase of the greatest battle in history, whose active front extended from Verdun to the North Sea, and which lasted in its succeeding phases until November 11. The immediate front on which the activities commenced was some fifty miles wide across its line of advance from the vicinity of Cambrai toward Amiens and the estuary of the Somme. The apparent purpose was to split the English and French armies, crumple the former on its narrow footing along the Channel, and then sweep to the left for an attack on Paris. The blow struck the British front at its right end, and on the days following March 21 the German machine pushed back all resistance at a rate of from five to seven miles a day until at the end of the first week there was a gap at the point of junction, and the British Fifth Army on the extreme right was stretched to the breaking point if not beyond. "Where the wave struck it was bound to wash something away," wrote Sir Arthur Conan Doyle. That the wave was checked on its seventh day, and that Amiens did not fall, were due to that law of diminishing returns that affects all drives after their earliest stages and to the gallantry of a scratch division composed in part of American engineer troops and other miscellaneous units not directly prepared for fight-

ing, that was organized in the very face of the advance and that not only resisted it, but helped to drive it back. The installation of Foch on March 26 introduced a unifying element into the resistance; but the word came out of France to America to hurry up the preparations before it was too late.

In the United States the reorganization of the war machine was approaching completion. The noisy debate over a Munitions Ministry had two more months to run, but within the Government noiseless changes were being made as defects were realized. The last great elements to be brought within the scheme of conservation, labor and finance, occasioned the creation of new machinery in April and May.

No earlier war had brought into such sharp prominence the essential importance of labor. The huge armies both reduced the man power of the nation and in- Labor backs
the war creased the demand for industrial production.

The industries, depleted of their workmen, even after all the practicable principles of selection had been followed in the draft, were called upon for a larger output than before the war. New war industries more than made up for the abandonment of non-essential ones. In the United States the labor market was additionally depleted by the disappearance of immigrant labor, with a deficit of nearly a million workmen a year since 1914. In every country it had required a large part of the time of the Government to see to it that the morale of labor was upheld, and to make the continuous adjustments of wage and working conditions that were unavoidable because of the rising cost of living. Early in 1917 the American Government accepted the principle that labor standards should not be allowed to suffer from the war, and representatives of labor agreed to settle disputes where possible without interruption of work. Women were introduced into factories in large numbers, and the scarcity of skilled labor was in part made up by diluting it with unskilled assistants working at routine tasks.

The importance placed upon the effectiveness of labor was

revealed when President Wilson in November, 1917, left Washington to address the annual meeting of the American Federation at Buffalo, where he laid before the representatives of labor the same body of doctrine that he later elaborated into the "fourteen points." The black weeks that ensued from the Italian collapse to the opening of the Somme drive (November, 1917–March, 1918) inspired new efforts toward the conservation of labor as of everything else. Congress appropriated \$250,000 for the Employment Service in the Department of Labor, and to this the President added \$825,000 from his special fund. The Employment Service was reorganized in January, 1918, and extended its network of offices throughout the United States until, on August 1, by executive order all private employment agencies were closed, and the recruiting and placing of unskilled labor were taken over by the National Government. Nearly as many men were placed by the United States Employment Service as were recruited for the armies.

The other services of the Department of Labor like the Children's Bureau and the Woman in Industry Service were Government activities enlarged in 1918, and in May the housing of labor became one of the functions of the department. The shortage of living accommodations was brought to the attention of the Council of National Defense and investigated by one of its committees in the autumn of 1917. The new munitions factories and shipyard plants were calling for laborers by tens of thousands in regions where there were no houses, and contractors were unable to fulfill their guarantees because their workmen had no place to live. The Emergency Fleet Corporation joined the Council of National Defense in demanding provisions for housing. In places like Hog Island and Sparrow Point its program could not move until its men were provided for. The ordnance plants, like those near Charlestown in West Virginia, or Hopewell, or Perryville, were in the same position. In March Congress made an appropriation for shipyard housing, and followed it with another in May to be expended by the Department of Labor. Under the latter the United

States Housing Corporation was organized in July on the principle of the Government-owned corporation, and proceeded to manipulate its forces of architects and draftsmen and to undertake great building projects where the need was worst. On the Plaza in front of the Union Station in Washington there arose a group of Government hotels to house the young women drawn to Washington for war work in the enlarged departments and war boards, for whom the overflowing homes of Washington offered no accommodation.

A conference board was created at the end of February, 1918, to consider a permanent war basis for capital and labor, the organized unions contributing part of Labor its members and the employers the rest. The policies joint chairmen of this board were ex-President Taft and Frank P. Walsh, who led their colleagues in a unanimous report as the result of which the President appointed them all to constitute a National War Labor Board on April 8. This board was to be a supreme court for labor disputes, handling none until all local resources had been exhausted, but then to be called in to make a final judgment while the work proceeded. On May 13 a War Labor Policies Board, with Felix Frankfurter as chairman, was appointed, to represent all Government departments employing labor, to eliminate confusion and to standardize the conditions of labor. When Bridgeport machinists in August refused to accept the judgment of the National War Labor Board, the President focused public attention upon their refusal to abide by their agreement and brought them back to work. When the Smith and Wesson ordnance plant refused to recognize another award, he commandeered their plant.

The organization of labor was nearly completed by the 1st of August, with the doctrine of conservation close to its logical extreme as expressed in the principle "Work or fight" of "work or fight." On May 17 the Provost Marshal-General issued a new ruling under the Selective Service Act to minimize the disturbance in industry caused by the draft. He listed occupations in the order of their social importance and ruled that loafers and idlers, or men

engaged in useless employments or non-productive personal service, should not be entitled to deferred classification on grounds of dependency. These men must get a useful job and work or fight. In September the War Industries Board, now thoroughly reorganized, emphasized this principle by another classification of industries which cut off the supplies of fuel, steel, transportation, and labor from industries not essential to the winning of the war.

Bernard M. Baruch became chairman of the War Industries Board, succeeding Daniel Willard, on March 4, 1918, after it had become clear that Congress would not pass any measure similar to that urged by Senator Chamberlain. "Barney Baruch had more power during the war than any other man in the world," wrote the chairman of the committee that later investigated his work. His powers as chairman were based upon a sweeping letter from the President, asking him to "act as the general eye of all supply departments in the field of industry." His reorganized board became, in the words of the Chief of Staff, "the great coördinating factor of the government." When the Overman Bill became a law, the War Industries Board was made independent of the Council of National Defense and was already well along on its task of industrial correlation.

The organization of the War Industries Board was never rigorously defined. It was kept flexible until the end of the war, with the chairman more interested in results than in organization charts. It was so flexible that at times it was difficult for citizens to find out with which departments to do business. Its most fundamental processes were brought together in the Requirements Division that was formally organized toward the end of March. The duty of the Requirements Division was to determine the priorities in which materials were to be delivered for Government use. Every branch of the War Government was called upon to organize its own requirements section in which its material needs should be placed on a schedule week by week as far in advance as they could be conceived. From each of these sec-

Baruch and
War Indus-
tries Board

tions an agent was sent to represent that interest in the Requirements Division, over which Alexander Legge presided as the agent of Baruch. The army and navy were there, the Fleet Corporation and the Railroad Administration, with other representatives, whose information and judgment were needed in order to determine, from the assembled list of all the requirements, which should be allowed and the order in which they should be satisfied.

For the assistance of the Requirements Division Judge Edwin B. Parker was appointed Priorities Commissioner, working through a Priorities Board, for the special study of the factors determining the order in which contracts should be delivered. The relative supply of material, facilities, fuel, transportation, labor and capital was taken into consideration, and preference list number 1, dated April 6, 1918, began a series of classifications culminating in the more elaborate lists of September.

In the determination of the various problems before the Requirements Division, price was often an important factor. With the exception of food prices, which were already in the charge of the Food Administration, the duty of fixing prices was assigned directly by the President to Robert S. Brookings and his Price-Fixing Committee. This body was independent of, but interlocked with, the War Industries Board, and represented all the other war boards as well as the Trade and Tariff Commissions. The statistical staff of the Federal Trade Commission was used for the determination of production costs, while prices based upon these costs were adjusted for short periods, with the idea of stabilizing industry and securing a maximum production.

After the various needs of the United States and the Allies had been presented in the Requirements Division, and had run the gauntlet of the Price-Fixing and Priorities Committees, the contracts were authorized and recorded in the Clearance Committee of the War Industries Board. In many cases the award of contracts was so huge as to disarrange the normal market. A Conservation Division that grew out of the earlier commercial economy board of

the Council of National Defense worked with the commodities sections and the trades concerned to get a fair distribution of the materials left after meeting the war demands. A Resources and Conversion Section was created in May, to reorganize the industries not directly engaged in a war production and make them useful. It divided the United States into twenty districts where regional advisers and local war resources committees applied the principles of the War Industries Board to local affairs. A Facilities Division created in August brought representatives of all departments of Government together to coördinate their work in the new construction needed for war purposes, while a Non-War Construction Section formed at the same time brought all building in the United States to a stop, unless definitely approved by the War Industries Board.

The resources of the United States were strained in every direction by the needs of war. The demand for capital to be lent directly to the Government in the form of Liberty bonds was matched by a demand from war industry for its commercial credits. The supply of available capital was limited, and in January, 1918, voluntary capital issues committees were formed in each of the federal reserve districts to do in the field of finance what the conservation and priorities divisions were doing for industry. The capital issues committees discouraged the use of credit for purposes not connected with the war. They were directly legalized by an act of Congress in April, which at the same time authorized the Treasury Department to create a War Finance Corporation with a capital stock of \$500,000,000, Government-owned, with power to sell bonds in order to raise more capital, and with authority to lend these funds to banks to cover loans made by the latter for the benefit of war industries.

The Government grip, tightening on industry and finance, was tightened on trade as well. Final steps were taken in February to bring all foreign trade under license from the War Trade Board. The Shipping Board, in conjunction with the other boards, undertook with new seriousness the

study of allocation and conservation of tonnage, and of essential needs for imports and exports. Shipping in American harbors was brought under the autocratic control of their Shipping Control Committee; divisions of planning and statistics were formed to look into the future in an attempt to have supplies ready when the demand for them should come. The ancient silver question took on a new aspect when the Oriental demand for silver bullion raised the price until it neared \$1.2929 at which price it would resume the old ratio of sixteen to one to gold. The Pittman Act of April 23, 1918, authorized the replacement of the silver dollars and certificates by federal reserve bank notes, and the sale of the silver bullion to be used in the Far East to stiffen the exchange rate. When the price of silver a little later arose above the ratio of sixteen to one, there was not much silver left in circulation to be hoarded because of its superior value.

The development of the war machine brought great new powers into the hands of men of affairs. Baruch was supreme in the field of war industries. On April 16 the President commandeered the services of Charles M. Schwab as Director-General of the Emergency Fleet Corporation. A few days later John D. Ryan was brought into the War Department to reorganize and inspire aircraft production. George W. Goethals at the same time became the chief reliance of the War Department in the fields of purchase storage, and traffic.

A reorganization of the War Department and of the General Staff had been continuous throughout the war. The selection of a staff for Pershing in 1917 left the Washington offices, already undermanned, with Army re-organization few officers available for staff service. The absence of Major-General Hugh L. Scott on the Russian mission deprived the Department of the advice of a Chief of Staff. When General Scott was retired in September, his understudy, Major-General Tasker H. Bliss, succeeded him, but was soon sent to the Paris Conference with Colonel House. The preparations for training and outfitting the armies and

the performance at wholesale of tasks that no officer in the regular army had ever been allowed to anticipate led to continuous error and improvement. While the advocates of a Munitions Ministry were demanding a change in the conduct of the war, the War Department itself was reorganizing its services and concentrating in single offices all of the similar services heretofore exercised independently in each division of the army. General Goethals became Chief of a Storage and Traffic Service in December; Edward R. Stettinius was made Surveyor-General of Purchases in January. In April the Division of Purchase, Storage, and Traffic combined these two establishments under Goethals, and brought War Department methods into harmony with those of the War Industries Board, while Stettinius became an assistant Secretary of War, specializing in matters of purchase and supply, and was sent to Paris in the summer to represent the United States on the Inter-Allied Munitions Council.

The internal structure of the General Staff was reorganized in February and again in August with increasingly sharper definition of function. On March 4 Peyton C. General Staff March, after European experience as Chief of Artillery with General Pershing, assumed the duties of Chief of Staff; a few weeks later he was elevated to the rank of general. In the next six months the war machine, that had creaked and rumbled through its year of construction, gained ever-increasing momentum, while the elevation of Foch produced the unity of command desired by the United States and the various inter-Allied councils improved the coördination of war aims and practices.

The message brought back by Colonel House from the Paris Conference called for an increase in the scale of American preparations, and the outbreak of the German drive in March made it imperative that Eighteen to forty-five draft troops be sent at once. "It will be humanly impossible to get 250,000 men on the French territory within a year" was the regretful opinion of the *Washington Post* in July, 1917. But by the first of the following July more than four times that number had sailed for France, and in

the two months, May and June, more than half a million men were transported across the Atlantic. As the American divisions one by one left their cantonments, "for an Atlantic port," their places were taken by new men called in under the draft, while new plans were prepared for the organization of the whole man power of the country. Congress authorized the calling-out of troops as needed without limit and the General Staff prepared plans to have eighty divisions in the field for the campaign of 1919. On August 31 a Man Power Act was passed extending the draft ages to include the years eighteen to forty-five, and increasing the total number of military registrants to 24,234,021. The nation was completing its organization upon the basis of "work or fight" as the battle of 1918 entered into its second phase and tested the mettle of the Americans in France.

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CHAPTER XXIV

PEACE AND THE LEAGUE

THE conduct of the war thus far was investigated by the Senate Committee on Military Affairs in December and January; and just as the interest in the war organization was approaching its height, President Wilson appeared unexpectedly before Congress, on January 8, 1918, and delivered an address upon the aims of the war. A year earlier, on January 22, 1917, he had discussed these aims in the last weeks of American neutrality, and had described the "peace without victory" that he believed the United States was willing to endorse. In the ensuing twelve months the United States went to war convinced there could be no peace without the destruction of the German military power. At frequent intervals leaders of all countries reverted in general terms to their war aims, but until the Russian Revolutionary Government called for a formal statement of these in the interests of an early peace, no compulsion was felt to define the terms before the danger of defeat was averted. The overtures of Pope Benedict XV for peace and disarmament in August, 1917, kept the discussion alive, while President Wilson's reply to this on August 27 showed a faith in the German people as distinguished from their Government, and pointed out that a peace based upon reciprocal condonation, which the Pope requested, would contain no guarantee against another unprovoked attack by a nation with unfulfilled military ambitions. The overtures of the Pope were without avail, as were the demands of the Russian revolutionists, but the informal discussion of war aims did not subside.

The only possible program that President Wilson could see he described as (1) "open covenants of peace openly arrived at"; (2) freedom of the seas; (3) equality of trade conditions; (4) reduction of armaments;

Basis of
peace

The Four-
teen Points

(5) adjustment of colonial claims, giving equal weight to the interests of the populations concerned, and the equitable claims of their Governments; (6) evacuation of all Russian territory; (7) evacuation and restoration of free Belgium; (8) evacuation and restoration of invaded France and restoration of Alsace-Lorraine to right the wrong of 1871; (9) readjustment of Italian frontiers along lines of nationality; (10) autonomous development for Austro-Hungarian peoples; (11) Balkan reconstruction and restoration with a free and secure access to the sea for Serbia; (12) freedom of the Dardanelles and of foreign nationalities under Turkish rule; (13) independence for the indisputable Polish population, with access to the sea; and (14) an association of nations to afford "mutual guarantee of political independence and territorial integrity to great and small states alike." Commenting upon these "fourteen points," the London *Spectator* remarked, "it may truly be said now that the minimum terms of the Allies have been stated."

The defection of Russia from the Allies because of her internal collapse and her Socialist revolution weakened the opposition to Germany. It removed one great set of armies from the field and aroused aspirations in the labor classes of all Allied countries. Unless these could be shown that the World War was essentially a struggle for democracy in the interests of the common people, there was danger that the ability to wage it would be sapped by the weariness of the masses of the Allied peoples. The demand of the Russian leaders in May, 1917, for peace without annexation or indemnities was accepted in words by a resolution in the German Reichstag on June 19, and thereafter the utterances of the extreme Socialists of Germany were given wide publicity by the Imperial Government, and German funds were made available for the use of the revolutionary Socialists in Russia who spoke the same political language. The Russian Constitutionalists who had precipitated the revolution in March were forced out in July, when Kerensky came into power. He in turn was attacked by the Bolsheviki Party that admitted no national allegiance, accepted finan-

cial aid from Germany, and urged a program of complete social revolution and of proletarian dictatorship, and that satisfied the demands of the peasants of Russia by promising a division of the crown lands and commons and the great estates.

The international conference of Socialists called to meet at Stockholm aroused the interests of anti-war Socialists in all countries, and received the enthusiastic endorsement of the German Socialists. The Allied Governments denounced it as German propaganda, and refused to permit their subjects to attend it, but in all the Allied countries demands arose for some definite statement of war aims, and for guarantees that the war was not a menace to the future prosperity of the working classes.

The British Labor movement led in the formulation of terms of peace and reconstruction. As in other countries there was in England an anti-war Socialist minority, but the Labor Party was already strongly represented in Parliament, and its representatives sat in the war cabinet. "The Labor party," said the London *Nation*, "has from the beginning kept the country to the best of its war aims." Its leader, Arthur Henderson, broke with the Government on the treatment of the proposed Stockholm Conference, but the Labor Party continued to believe in the war, and in December adopted a memorandum on war aims that commanded attention from political leaders everywhere.

The policies embodied in the "fourteen points" were received with remarkable unanimity in the United States, and were approved by liberal leaders in all the Allied countries. The London *Saturday Review*, speaking the voice of reaction, complained: "Instead of twaddling about democracy, if Messrs. Wilson and George would talk the only universal language, viz. £, s., d., the Germans would respond immediately." The United States became the diplomatic spokesman for the Allies, and the danger of disunity through the detachment of Labor from its support to the Allies was avoided. The success of the Bolsheviki in the November revolution brought Lenine and

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Trotsky to the top in Russia with power to carry out their purpose of a separate peace. In the negotiations at Brest-Litovsk, which began in December, the German Socialists, who had been allowed to talk about peace aspirations, were conspicuously absent, while the military leaders who dictated the peace substituted for the doctrine of no annexations a new view of voluntary separation under which Finland, Lithuania, Poland, and Ukrainia were separated from helpless Russia. The insincerity of the German overtures was clear before the program of the "fourteen points" was announced. "The year 1917, with its great battles," as an Amsterdam dispatch quoted the Kaiser, "has proved the German people has in the Lord of Creation above an unconditional and avowed ally on whom it can absolutely rely."

In the ensuing weeks the war aims of the United States received the approval of the Allies. Von Hertling, the German Chancellor, discussed them. Count Czernin accepted them in general so far as Austria was concerned, but the Central Powers continued to give a more reliable interpretation of their intentions as they imposed their will upon Russia at Brest-Litovsk. The United States had declared war upon Austria-Hungary on December 7, 1917. In commenting upon the Austrian and German reactions to the "fourteen points," President Wilson still further stressed the hostility of the Allies to the German Military Government, rather than to the German or Austro-Hungarian peoples, and held out hopes to both of these peoples that a revolt against the German dictatorship would end the war without their own destruction. The Allied campaign of propaganda inside the Central Powers against the German Government was carried on by spies sent in, by advertising in the papers of neutral countries circulating in Germany, and by the distribution on the western front from balloons and aeroplanes of tracts and pamphlets that described the war aims of the Allies and the autocratic practices of the masters of Germany.

The war failed to slacken in spite of the discussion of the

aims of peace. The German response in the field was a renewal of large-scale hostilities. On April 6, as he opened the third Liberty Loan drive at Baltimore, the President closed the discussion for the present. "Germany has once more said that force, and force alone, shall decide whether justice and peace shall reign in the affairs of men . . . there is therefore but one response possible from us: Force, force to the utmost, force without stint or limit, the righteous and triumphant force which shall make right the law of the world, and cast every selfish dominion down in the dust."

The expression of war aims in which the United States took the lead was possible in 1918 because, for the first time since the war broke out in Europe, the Allies had brought into existence machinery for continuous discussion of their policies. The leadership of the United States was pronounced in the creation of this machinery.

The determination of Congress in April, 1917, to lend money to the Allies to cover their supplies bought in America placed new responsibility upon the Treasury Department, in which the loans were made. A few hours after the law was passed, Great Britain borrowed two hundred million dollars. The business continued until nearly all of the ten billion dollars authorized had been thus disposed of. An immediate consequence of these loans was greater freedom in American purchases for all the borrowers who had come nearly to the limit of their available funds. American markets "sky-rocketed" in the early summer of 1917, as the numerous buying agencies of the United States Government bid against each other in the open market for war supplies, and as each of the Allied missions added to the competition on its own account. The War Industries Board, organized July 28 to simplify American buying, had no power to control the acts of the Allied buyers who were in the market; but since the Allied buyers were spending American funds, it was possible to exert pressure from other sources, with the result that an agreement was signed in August, bringing into existence an American Purchasing Commission for the

Coöpera-
tion among
Allies

Allies. The United States promised that prices should be the same, whether for Government or Allied account or for private consumption, and three officials of the War Industries Board, Baruch, Brookings, and Lovett, constituted the new commission. To this commission the Allied Governments brought their requirements, which were placed, like the American requirements, through the agencies of the War Industries Board.

A second embarrassment arising from the policy of loans was the discrimination necessary to be made in placing them. The loans were by law available for all countries associated in the war against Germany, and all these in turn brought their demands to the Treasury Department. It was an invidious task to decide upon the relative merits of the demands of two associates, and in the absence of an avowed war policy there was occasional room for suspicion that the aims were contradictory and that the United States was being asked to finance both sides of a controversy. This was particularly true of the requests from the eastern Mediterranean and the Balkans. Early in the summer the suggestion was made that an Inter-Ally Council on War Purchases and Finance ought to be created to pass upon their importance and priority, leaving to the United States the more formal duty of meeting the requisitions. Not only were the smaller Allies somewhat divergent in their aims, but the larger Allies, borrowing by billions, were conducting on their own account in Europe independent lending campaigns to the lesser nations. The loans of the United States were making these lesser sub-loans possible, and gave to the American Government a legitimate interest in Allied war finance that was recognized in the early autumn of 1917, when it was agreed to hold an Inter-Allied Conference at London in November and there formally to organize the needed financial commission under an American chairman. The leadership of the United States in avowing war aims was warranted by the relative detachment of the United States from selfish interest in the details of the outcome, and by the financial

Inter-Ally
Finance
Council

advances that were making the continuance of the war possible.

In September it was announced that Colonel E. M. House, of Texas, had been asked by the President to begin Preparations for peace the assembling of data to be used by the American commissioners when the time should come to talk about a peace. Colonel House had been an influential adviser of President Wilson since the beginning of his Administration, and had performed functions that might reasonably have been expected of the State Department. He had been in Europe during the spring of 1914 visiting with royalty as a distinguished traveler, and had returned to America about the time of the murder of the Archduke Ferdinand. In the spring of 1915 he was sent abroad as confidential agent of the President, and visited the various belligerent capitals, but the chief thing that Americans learned from his visit was the fact that he would not talk. He arrived home this time just after the sinking of the *Lusitania*, fresh from conferences with the American ambassadors and European statesmen. At the end of the year he went abroad again, and spent the early weeks of 1916 in contact with the European Governments, the results of which he brought back to the White House in the interval between the resignation of Secretary Garrison and the appointment of Secretary Baker. By this time he possessed advantages unique among diplomats in that he had had intimate intercourse with the belligerent statesmen on both sides of the World War. His frequent appearance at the White House as the President's guest on the eve of announcement of important diplomatic policies gave foundation to the growing belief that the President relied on his advice. His appointment to gather materials to be used at the Peace Conference involved an overlapping with the functions of the State Department, but was natural in the light of his wide European acquaintance. The work of the "House inquiry" was organized in the autumn of 1917 with the coöperation of historians and economists, who had been in the service of the Committee on Public Information and

the State Department since early in the war. Before they had outlined their tasks it was announced that Colonel House would shortly proceed to Europe at the head of the American delegation to the Inter-Allied Conference.

The Inter-Allied Conference opened in Paris November 29, 1917, with the United States represented by a delegation that included the Chief of Staff of the army, Bliss; the Chief of the Naval Operations, Benson; an assistant Secretary of the Treasury, Crosby; a member of the Shipping Board, Colby; the chairman of the War Trade Board, McCormick; a delegate of the Food Administration, Taylor; a representative of the Priorities Commission, Perkins; with their several staffs. Before opening the formal sessions in Paris, Colonel House and his associates spent several days in London in conference with the British Government. Here on November 18 Colonel House made public his instructions from the President to support the doctrine of unity of control at the forthcoming Paris Conference.

The American experience in financing the Allied cause and starting a train of events that moved toward unity of policy was reënforced by the Austro-German ^{Supreme} drive that plunged down the Alps into the plains ^{War Council} of Lombardy on October 24, 1917. Sweeping away in a few hours all of the gains that Italy had laboriously put together in two years of war, the Central Powers threatened not only to capture Venice, but to overrun Italy as they had overrun Serbia and Roumania. The Italian Government called for aid from her allies, and Lloyd George and Painlevé hastened from London and Paris for an immediate conference with Orlando. The three premiers met on November 6 at Rapallo, near Genoa, where they agreed that a Supreme War Council should be erected to sit continuously and advise the Allied Powers on their military policy. The German drive was checked in course of time, but the movement that it started joined forces with the movement originating in the United States. In a speech at Paris, as he returned from Rapallo, Lloyd George talked with brutal frankness upon the failure of the Allies to coördinate their

military policy and explained the Supreme War Council which was to consist of the Prime Minister and one of his associates from each of the Great Powers, and was to meet monthly at Versailles in conjunction with the permanent military staff that was to be maintained there.

The Bolshevik victory in Russia in November made the need for Allied coöperation more complete by the time the Allied Powers met for their Paris conference. Upon motion of the American delegation, the conference divided into separate committees upon finance, munitions, ocean tonnage, and food, and spent its time not upon oratory, but upon a comparison of the several national programs. The American experts gathered the information needed to guide the United States in its military contribution of 1918. On December 1 the Premiers assembled at Versailles for the formal opening of the Supreme War Council, and a few days later the American delegation started home.

The Inter-Ally Council on War Purchases and Finance began its work at London in the middle of December under the unified program the presidency of Oscar T. Crosby. Its experiences in coördinating the often conflicting demands stimulated an inter-Allied coöperation in other fields similar to the unification of resources that the war was forcing upon every country. The Allied Naval Council, agreed upon at Paris, went into continuous session to direct the blockade of the Central Powers. In March, 1918, the Allied Maritime Transport Council began business in London with sub-sections representing the merchant marine of England, Italy, France, and the United States, and worked for a better utilization of ocean tonnage. In July the Munitions Council was convened in Paris with Edward A. Stettinius present as the American representative, and the various food controllers came together in London to complete the pooling of food resources for the use of the Allies.

The unity of conduct which the Allies had not evolved before the end of 1917 was the object of continuous pressure from the United States, and became a reality as the great councils built up their organization in 1918. The Supreme

War Council, meanwhile, was developing in the same direction under the influence of the logic of events. At the end of January the Premiers were again at Versailles for a renewal of their discussions. France and Italy were now asking that the Council be expanded into a new Inter-Allied General Staff with one general in command of all the armies. In England there was violent attack upon Lloyd George because of his Paris speech and the reluctance of the British army officials to subordinate their independence of command to any foreign commander. The fear of such interference brought about the resignation of the British Chief of Staff, Sir William Robertson, but did not prevent the steady evolution of the Supreme War Council toward a real command. The Council at this meeting discussed whether the American troops should be used as a unit or merged with French and British organizations. However they were to be used, General Haig believed they could not be available as a force in 1918.

The Supreme War Council met again in March when the determination of Germany for a peace by conquest had been fully revealed. While the discussion of the "fourteen points" had sounded as though peace might be near, preparations were being completed for a new drive along the Somme in the hope of breaking through the line near the junction point of the British and the French. The new drive, put in motion on March 21, 1918, completed the process begun in November at Rapallo. On the 26th, at the village of Doullens, a little north of Amiens on the endangered front, the military and political leaders signed a momentous document "to coordinate the action of the Allied armies on the western front," and placed the French general Ferdinand Foch in a position of supreme command. A few hours later General Pershing, with four divisions ready for the field, offered them all to the new commander to be used as needed. "If we must have one commander," said the *London Nation*, "and we still doubt the necessity or suitability from a political point of view, we could have no one better than Foch."

German
drive,
March, 1918


The training program of the A.E.F. distributed the American divisions as they arrived in France among the cantonments behind the line, where officers and men were put through courses of specialized study before the components of each division were brought together again for maneuver as a unit. After this course of schooling the divisions were transferred to quiet sectors on the western front, generally between Verdun and the Swiss border, and there relieved French divisions and received their final training for active operations.

Four American divisions were ready for the active front when the German drive began, March 21, 1918, and were turned over to Foch to be used where needed. The 1st and 2d Divisions were built up, each around a nucleus of regular army troops; the 26th (Yankee) Division included the National Guard of New England; the 42d (Rainbow) Division represented the National Guard of most of the States. All of these were attached to the British or French armies, and brought into action in the early spring, while the strident call went out to America to hurry up more troops. The transport service, increased by British vessels taken away from their task of carrying food to England, for defeat was wavering in the balance and was a greater menace than starvation, rushed new divisions to France. In addition to the four divisions ready for the front when the drive began, there were four more in the training areas; and additional divisions arrived, one in April, nine in May, seven in June, four in July, six in August, four in September, and three in October, until in the end there were forty-two divisions on the soil of France. In addition to these were special troops, not attached to any division, that swelled the American total which reached 1,000,000 in July and 2,000,000 in November. Two thirds of them were to see active service in the front line before the armistice, while twenty-nine of the divisions engaged in combat.

The quality of the American troops, despised by Germany in their turn as "Kitchener's contemptibles" had been, was a matter of uneasiness in the Supreme War Council. The



The Battle of 1918



American army was composed of physically fit young men, with little military training before the war. The men themselves were drawn directly from their civil occupations, whether they entered the service through the regular army, the national guard, or the draft. Of 200,000 commissioned officers, who trained them, less than 10,000 were in the service when war was declared; of this five per cent, upon whose training and initiative the fate of the army depended, only 5791 were professional officers in the regular army, and many of these were young men fresh from their studies at West Point, with little more than the age and maturity of a college senior. There were not over 3000 officers of reasonable maturity to assemble, train, and operate the army, and until the earliest division had met the enemy there was a question as to the success of the American experiment in war. The Yankee Division, stationed in line on the south side of the Saint-Mihiel salient near the village of Seicheprey, took part in the first engagement that could be called a battle. Its trenches were raided by the Germans on April 20, 1918, and were retaken by American troops on the following day.

The German armies retained the choice of time and place for the first four months of the battle of 1918. Re-
 Battle of 1918 enforced by divisions from the Russian front, Ludendorff and Hindenburg used all their resources to force a victory. The first phase of the offensive, in the valley of the Somme, continued for two weeks after March 21 until the German line was stabilized near Amiens and Montdidier. On April 9 the thrust was shifted in a new direction, this time in the valley of the Lys, from the direction of Lille and Armentières toward the shoulder in the British line at Ypres and the great supply stations around Hazebrouck. Here again the line swayed, but held. On May 27 the Germans felt for a third time for a soft spot on the Allied front, and this time struck at the Chemin des Dames, north of the Aisne River, between the towns of Soissons and Rheims, and again bent the Allied line and stretched it to the breaking point.

The American divisions, brigaded with the English and French armies, and growing more numerous every month, saw a routine service all along the battered front from March till May. To the 1st Division, stationed south of Amiens near Montdidier, came the earliest opportunity for an engagement arranged and executed by its own officers. The success of the training of divisional staffs was as much a question as that of the field effectiveness of the troops. From G.H.Q. at Chaumont relentless supervision was maintained over officers entrusted with command. Inspectors with the black braid of the General Staff descended anywhere at any moment. The giant limousine with four stars on its windshield was liable to appear with General Pershing himself without warning, and the lack of officers of proved experience was somewhat made up by the summary removal of officers of whatever rank who appeared to waver in a crisis. The returning troop transports soon began to bring to the United States officers from division commanders down, for whom Pershing had no use, while the officers who remained on duty never escaped the spur of staff pressure.

On May 28 the 1st Division, commanded by Robert L. Bullard, took the village of Cantigny, near Montdidier. With neatness and dispatch the plan of operations worked out to a complete success, and the growing suspicion that the raw material of the American troops was good enough to atone for under-preparation was confirmed. From every corner of the front there came demands to Foch for more of the American soldiers, whose vigor and enthusiasm wherever they appeared brought stimulation to the tired divisions on the French and British sectors. War was an old story to troops that had been in it through four campaigns, and needed the crusading spirit of the American divisions; while the repute the 1st Division gained at Cantigny came just in time. The third phase of the German offensive, beginning the day before, swept away resistance along the Chemin des Dames, pushed across the Aisne, and then the Vesle, and drove everything

before it along a front of thirty miles or more, as it advanced southward between Soissons and Rheims toward the Marne at Château-Thierry and the road to Paris.

From the first hours of the new advance the critical nature of the emergency was clear. There was an element of surprise in the spot selected for the attack, and the first divisions dislodged by the Germans on the Chemin des Dames were British troops who had been sent there for rest. The fortifications around Rheims could not be reduced by the invader, but those at Soissons yielded a little, and between the two shoulders thus created, the apex of the salient forced itself to the south. Every available American division was brought up by motor train to support the French. On the afternoon of the fifth day of the advance, May 31, a battalion of motorized machine-gunners belonging to the 3d American Division came up from the south, crossed the Marne on the bridge at Château-Thierry, and pushed through that city to its northern rim against the stream of refugees and retreating troops. Here it took its station and helped to hold back the advance of German troops until the French forces had been brought across the Marne. The next day it withdrew itself to the southern bank and stuck there until the rest of the 3d Division came up behind it, and the 2d Division took station on its left. "The American gunners," wrote a French correspondent who saw them there, "are handsome chaps, with long, muscular legs and supple movements, in whom a certain seeming nonchalance follows concise action which goes directly to the point."

The German tide slacked at Château-Thierry with a raw American division standing between it and Paris. The 2d Division, under Bundy, instead of going into training camp, was sent to position along the Paris-Vaux road, where its first units came to rest on June 1. There was no line left to be taken over. Between their outposts and the advancing Germans there was nothing but a procession of French troops in full retreat. By Sunday morning, June 2, parts of the 2d Division, including a

brigade of marines, had chosen their own line and were dug in. Late that afternoon the German columns in full pursuit were broken by American fire at Hill 165. Four days later the 2d Division took the offensive to clean the German machine-gunners out of the hill pockets and brush concealments of Belleau Wood. In the next four weeks the margins of the Marne salient were consolidated as Foch awaited a renewal of the German drive.

At daybreak on July 15 the German offensive opened up once more upon a long front from Château-Thierry to Rheims and beyond Rheims to the edge of the forest of the Argonne. The strategic situation of Rheims and the importance of the railway lines behind it made it important to remove this obstruction at once. There were now new American divisions awaiting behind the line, but the 3d Division at the extreme left of the assailed area held its own at Château-Thierry, under General Dickman, when the Germans advanced again. Eight divisions in all played their part in this engagement: — the 1st, 2d, 3d, and 4th, 26th, 28th (Iron Division, of Pennsylvania troops), 93d (colored), and the 42d.

The German General Staff knew in its heart that this was its last offensive. Following the defensive scheme of Pétain, Foch yielded a little to take up the shock of the impact, and on July 18 countered with his left between Soissons and the Marne. The German success had thrust a sharp salient with three sides exposed south of the Aisne. Foch, who had devoted the first weeks of his supreme command to taking an inventory of his strength and to meeting immediate emergencies as they appeared, was watching for his opportunity to endanger the salient by striking near its base, and to take the aggressive into his own hands. His twenty-five-mile front extended from Belleau Wood to the Aisne below Soissons. The 1st and 2d Divisions operated near his left, the 4th and 26th were stationed near his right. As the counter-attack was developed into an Allied offensive, the 3d Division was brought in, then the 42d and the 32d (Wisconsin and

Foch's
counter-
attack

Michigan National Guard). The counter-attack was successful beyond expectation. For a few days it looked as though the whole German army might be caught in the pocket it had itself created. This hope was not realized, but on August 4 Fismes, on the Vesle, was occupied and the Marne pocket was entirely gone. From the Vesle to the Aisne the line pushed on through August. On October 4 a German shell hit the dismantled cathedral at Rheims for the last time, and Foch had brought additional pressure to bear at five other points.

On August 8, following the elimination of the Marne salient, Haig was allowed to advance in the third battle of the Somme. With Amiens in his rear and with the front between Albert and Montdidier immediately before him, he gained seven miles at once on a twenty-five-mile front and pushed on in a war of movement after long and tedious months of defensive actions. The 27th and 33d Divisions of Americans operated with him. By the 18th of August this salient had gone like that at Château-Thierry. On August 18 and 19 two more thrusts were made against the German line, one at the junction of the Aisne and Oise against what was now a German salient after the elimination of the Marne and Picardy pockets. With Mangin in charge, Noyon and La Fère became the objectives, and on the seventh day of this thrust the German forces began a strategic retreat upon the Oise, while on August 30 the 32d Division at Juvigny, after fighting, as Pétain cited it, "for three days without stopping, without rest, and almost without food," gained control of the western approaches to the Chemin des Dames. Simultaneously on August 19 the British in Flanders renewed their operations on the extreme German right.

The Allied crisis from March until July delayed the final steps in the organization of the A.E.F. as a separate force, but gave to the early divisions brigaded with the English and the French intimate experience, first with defensive fighting, then with offensive. The Allied divisions had of necessity become past-masters

The First
American
Army

of defense. The American troops were indoctrinated with the idea of an offensive campaign, and in their training camps continuous bayonet drill kept them alive to their special mission. Early in August, as the divisions could be released from their services elsewhere, they were transferred to the immediate command of General Pershing, and were organized in the First American Field Army, which remained for the time being under the immediate direction of the commander-in-chief. There were eighteen divisions in the three army corps of the First Army. The selective process and field experience of the colonels and brigadier-generals of the old regular army were the basis for the selection of the division commanders, and from these in turn were picked the commanders for each army corps. The 1st Corps under Hunter Liggett was partially organized before the 1st of June, and fought under his command at Château-Thierry, and in due time Liggett was elevated to the command of the First Field Army. The announcement of the creation of this army was followed by so suspicious a silence upon the doings of the American divisions as to arouse surmises that larger operations were in view. Each day brought to Foch greater freedom for the selection of his field of operations. With armies operating continuously along the Aisne, the Oise, the Somme, and the Lys, the German salients created in the first phase of the battle of 1918 yielded to Foch in the second phase that began July 18, and had disappeared early in September.

The long curve of the western front from Ostend on the Channel to the Swiss border was in September broken only by the sharp hook lying southeast of Verdun and known as the Saint-Mihiel salient. As the German armies advanced upon Belgium and France in 1914, Verdun had held, although the line beyond it swung far west to the Marne. Verdun continued to hold when the Crown Prince drove against it in 1916. Flanked by the Saint-Mihiel salient it continued to be the defense of France; and the salient itself had been fortified by Germany for permanent occupation. Here were found later great me-

morial cemeteries to the German dead, with granite tombs and concrete decorations, which gave every evidence of having been constructed to remain German forever as a *Denkmal* for future generations.

The Saint-Mihiel salient lay directly in front of the sector chosen for American operations, and was selected to test the capacity of the First Field Army. On September 12, in coöperation with the French, but with plans of his own making, Pershing reduced the salient. In two days' fighting, directed simultaneously on both flanks of the salient, the obstruction of four years' standing was removed, the whole Allied front was smooth, and directly before the American forces lay the city of Metz and the coal-fields of the Briey district. Twelve thousand German prisoners were reported on the first day, while a German retreat, slow but stubborn, was soon in motion along the whole front.

The American success at Saint-Mihiel revealed both the capacity of the American troops and the strategic strength of Foch. Before the week was over an Allied drive was begun in the valley of the Vardar above Saloniki on the Bulgarian front. In three days more, Allenby in Palestine broke up the Turkish armies between the Jordan and the sea, and took the town of Nazareth, eliminating Turkey from the war. A little later, on October 24, on the anniversary of the Austro-German drive, Italy was let loose upon her Austrian front, and Austria made haste to ask for terms of peace.

While Foch was clearing the Germans from the pocket on the Marne, the United States prepared its eighty-division Preparations program for 1919 and increased the limits of the for 1919 draft. New divisions were organized, and the War Industries Board made ready to take even more complete control of the machinery of economic life. The successes of Foch brought a new possibility to the attention of the Supreme War Council. The second million of American troops was on its road to France, the advance divisions had shown their mettle, and there now appeared a chance,

with the German armies all in retreat, to end the war in 1918. The British kept up their pressure in front of Ypres, and with the French pushed toward Cambrai and Saint-Quentin. The American forces after Saint-Mihiel were shifted west of the Meuse between Verdun and the Argonne Forest, and there in conjunction with French forces between the Argonne and Rheims were headed down the Meuse toward the city of Sedan.

On September 26 the battle of the Meuse-Argonne began, the third phase of the battle of 1918, with nine American divisions participating in the first advance. The Meuse-Argonne territory in front of them was not surpassed by any on the active front in its adaptability for defense. Crowded with ravines and hills and river valleys, obscured by forests and dense undergrowth, and almost without roads, there was no terrain more difficult to take by force. Only two of the nine divisions concerned had seen heavy fighting before they were plunged into this new battle. The veteran divisions had all been used at Saint-Mihiel and were not reorganized for operations until the Argonne was in its second phase, but before the forty-seven days of continuous fighting were over twenty-one divisions had been used.

Bulgaria quit the war on September 30, the fifth day of the Argonne drive, and surrendered unconditionally. On October 5 the German Government officially asked for terms of peace, and with Austria avowed a devotion to the "fourteen points" that had been spurned in January. The overtures were made through the United States, and were met by the sharp inquiry: For whom do you pretend to speak, the German peoples or their rulers? The correspondence thus begun continued through October, with German armies yielding as slowly as they could, and with German diplomats struggling to hurry an armistice before complete collapse. The drive of Foch, from being a series of related attacks, became a great strategic movement threatening on its left the German forces in Belgium and northern France, and on its right the great railway system upon which the whole German front depended.

With their backs against the forest of the Ardennes, and the Belgian highlands, the German forces foresaw complete destruction when Sedan should fall. The various Allied columns pressed upon the Germans in the hope of forcing a collapse, and toward the end of October the United States transmitted the appeal for peace to the Supreme War Council.

On October 31, when the Supreme War Council formally assembled to consider the terms of the armistice to be granted to Germany, Turkey was in the act of signing an unconditional surrender in the field and Austria was in negotiation for one that was signed November 3. In the correspondence preceding the meeting it was brought out that there could be no cessation of hostilities until the Supreme War Council was satisfied in a military way that Germany had been deprived of power to resume the war. The Supreme War Council debated the terms of German disarmament, and on November 5 the United States transmitted their reply to Germany. They were ready to make peace upon the basis of the "fourteen points," except as to the freedom of the seas, upon which they reserved to themselves complete freedom, and the evacuation and restoration of invaded territory, as to which "they understand that compensation will be made by Germany for all damage done to the civilian population of the Allies and their property by the aggression of Germany by land, by sea, and from the air." The German Government was informed that Marshal Foch would receive their representatives and communicate the military terms of the armistice.

The war was over; Germany was in open revolution; William II abdicated on November 9; and on November 11 the German envoys signed an armistice that was in substance an almost unconditional surrender. They began at once the withdrawal of their troops from the invaded area, while a few days later the army of occupation followed them to the Rhine and took station at Cologne, Coblenz, and Mainz. The American forces, which the armistice had

found along the Meuse above Sedan, marched down the Moselle to headquarters at Coblenz.

The closing weeks of the battle of 1918 brought peace to Europe and relieved the tension of the world. Between September 15, when Austria made her open appeal for a cessation of hostilities, and November 11, when the armistice terms were signed, the alliance of the Central Powers fell apart. Bulgaria and Turkey capitulated, the Dual Monarchy disintegrated and collapsed, and the military rulers of Germany were deposed. The fear of possible defeat disappeared from the mind of the Allies, and in its place arose inconsistent hopes of recouping the losses of the war, of strengthening national defenses against the next war, of punishing Germany, and of realizing those ideals whose clear enunciation by President Wilson held the associates together during the final year of war. Whether conservative or radical, the citizens of the victor nations ceased to fear and turned to the future. The fact that they were free to do so was the most important feature of the Congressional campaign then in progress in the United States.

Congres-
sional elec-
tion, 1918

Only in the United States had the Government in power at the outbreak of the war survived the upheavals of opinion and the shifting fates and remained in office until the armistice. In England, France, and Italy there had appeared war coalition Governments. Lloyd George, Clemenceau, and Orlando, their premiers, were in office with a backing of sagacious and practical politicians, whose acceptance of the "fourteen points" and the political liberalism that these embodied was less a matter of conviction than of expediency. In America the author of this formula remained in power because of the constitutional provision for a four-year term, and no war issue could have driven him out because America has no responsible government in the European sense. Critics of his Administration and partisan opponents of his party were forced during the war to restrain their active political opposition, for this could have no effect but to hinder the prosecution of war measures and

perhaps wound the obstructionists on the rebound. "Politics is adjourned," the President himself declared. Public opinion treated alike Republicans and Democrats believed to be obstructive of the war. With national defense holding the whole of the mind of the nation, the parties had prepared to elect a Congress in 1918. The Republican minority found itself bound hand and foot by the necessities of patriotic unity.

The reorganization of the Republican Party after the defeats of 1910, 1912, 1914, and 1916 was accomplished in February, 1918, when Will H. Hays, of Indiana, was made chairman of the National Committee. Hays was already favorably known as a healer of factional differences, and replaced a chairman whose war record was poor, in order to bring into solid front all the factions whose controversy since 1912 disrupted the party. The only basis of attack open to Republicans was to charge the Administration with inefficiency and lukewarm prosecution of the war. The Munitions Ministry debate received most of its support from Republican leaders. Defects in war preparation were charged against the Government, and Democratic opponents of the war were pictured as the real Democrats. But the assignment of Judge Hughes to investigate the aircraft scandal and the appointment of ex-President Taft as chairman of the National War Labor Board broke the force of these attacks. To offset Roosevelt and Wood, who were set aside, the friends of the Administration could point to the important duties of Pershing, Sims, March, and Hoover, all of whom were Republicans. The canvass of 1918 was unimportant until in October the beginning of the discussion of the armistice made it clear that the danger had passed. Immediately the demand for "unconditional surrender" was raised by Republicans, the Administration was charged with an intention to accept a peace of negotiation, and the international tendency of the "fourteen points" was denounced. Lodge and Poindexter led in the attack, and Roosevelt, who had consistently opposed the program of the League to Enforce

Peace, raised his voice against a League of Nations. Unconditional surrender for Germany and independence for America became the war-cry of the canvass. When on October 25 the President issued an open letter asking for the election of a Democratic Congress so that he might be assured of assistance in negotiating the sort of peace he had promised the nation, his action was criticized as unnecessarily partisan. Henry Ford, who was running for the Senate in Michigan, and Secretary of War Baker were described as pacifists.

The day of election was the day that President Wilson transmitted to Germany the decision of the Supreme War Council to receive the German envoys begging peace. The war was over, and the votes that were cast that day insured the return of the Republican Party to power in Congress, with easy control of the House and a probable majority in the Senate. "In no other free country in the world to-day would Mr. Wilson be in office" was the comment of Roosevelt upon the election.

The disbanding of the army of the United States began within a few hours of the signing of the armistice. The Third Field Army, which had been organized by Demobilization Pershing during the battle of the Argonne, was designated to march into Germany as a part of the army of occupation; but preparations were made to send all the other troops home as rapidly as transportation could be provided, and the camps in the United States were emptied within the next few weeks. The restrictions upon industry that had been administered by the War Industries Board were relaxed at once, and when Congress met on December 2 the President spoke with confidence of the speedy resumption of the ordinary course of life. Two days later he set sail on the army transport, George Washington, for Brest and the Peace Conference.

The American Commission to Negotiate Peace had at its head the President of the United States, just as the commission of each other Allied country was The Peace Commission presided over by its most important political official. As-

sisting him were four other members: Robert Lansing, the Secretary of State; Edward M. House, who had acted since 1914 as confidential agent; General Tasker H. Bliss, who had represented the United States on the Supreme War Council from its formation; and Henry White, whose diplomatic service had included many years at Vienna, London, Rome, and Paris. There was no Senator on the commission, and, in spite of the result of the November election, no active member of the party that was to dominate the Congress to which the peace treaty would have to be submitted. There were, however, some hundreds of other assistants representing the State Department, the "House inquiry," and the various war boards whose members had acquired useful information upon the status of world affairs.

Only a few of the better informed among European leaders knew enough of American institutions to appreciate the fact that a President serves out his term whatever the result of a Congressional election. The additional fact that the adverse Congress would not meet earlier than December, 1919, unless specially summoned, served to obscure the vote of dissatisfaction that Wilson had received. To most of Europe he was in office, and hence in full power. His had been the decisive leadership whose democratic idealism held the Allies together and disintegrated the morale of the enemy. Europe, when he "touched its shores," wrote an old and keen observer of world politics, E. J. Dillon, "was as clay ready for the creative potter. Never before were the nations so eager to follow a Moses who would take them to the long-promised land where wars are prohibited and blockades unknown. . . . In France men bowed down before him in awe and affection. . . . To the working classes of Italy his name was a heavenly clarion at the sound of which the earth would be renewed. . . . The Germans regarded him and his humane doctrine as their sheet-anchor of safety. . . . In German Austria his fame was that of a savior." But in the United States he had lost his power; and the party leaders of the Old World knew that if they could withstand the pressure of their own liberal classes

until national suspicion should supersede the wave of idealism, they could prevent the writing of the Wilson doctrine into the Peace of Versailles.

It was perhaps because of this official willingness to let the wave subside that the Peace Conference was unready to begin its sessions when the American delegation arrived. The Supreme War Council was Wilson in
Europe yet at work upon the details of the execution of the armistice, and the courts of Europe clamored for visits from the President of the United States. Arriving at Brest on December 13, he proceeded to Paris, where he was welcomed with a succession of ceremonious greetings. Christmas was spent at Chaumont with the army. London was visited the next week, and Rome just after the new year. Before Wilson returned to Paris Herbert C. Hoover was made Director of the Supreme Council of Supply and Relief, for the relief of the devastated region; and the Government of Lloyd George had been confirmed in its powers by huge majorities after a parliamentary campaign in which England had been promised that Germany should pay for the war. Clemenceau, at the same time, asked and received from his parliament an approval of his avowed determination to work for a new and useful system of alliances in the approaching meeting. On January 12, 1919, the formal preparations for the Peace Conference were begun, and six days later the first plenary session was held at the French Foreign Office, with Clemenceau as president.

The hopes and aspirations of the little nations for a new world order in which their weight would equal that of the larger powers began to wane with the opening of the conference. Seats were provided for nearly seventy delegates from the twenty-eight nations associated against Germany, but their assignment was made, not by the conference, but by an inner and dominant circle, the Supreme War Council, as modified by the arrival of Wilson. The President, with the three premiers of England, France, and Italy, and their foreign secretaries, and two delegates from Japan, constituted a Council of Ten from whose decisions it was useless

to appeal. As the weeks ran on and debate protracted the discussions, the Council of Ten was reduced first by the elimination of the foreign secretaries, and then by the elimination of the Japanese, until at the end a Council of Four, or the "Big Four," sat together in informal conference day after day, hearing appeals and reaching decisions which the Peace Conference was allowed to approve and enact at its various plenary sessions.

It will long remain a matter of dispute how far Wilson, Lloyd George, Clemenceau, and Orlando individually affected the decisions of the "Big Four." But the earliest action taken was the course proposed by the American President. The peace that he was pledged to work for was one that might tend to end war by removing its causes. The "peace without victory" that he advocated in 1917 had become a "peace of justice" in his later utterances, and had in substance received acceptance as expressed in his "fourteen points." In his mind the recurrence of war could be prevented in two ways: by maintaining the Allied military power on such a scale that resistance would be impossible, or by making a generous peace which all nations, enemy or Allied, would be interested in upholding. The latter alternative involved the creation of a League of Nations through which common decisions could be reached and the common power be exerted for the benefit of all. His critics at home demanded peace first, and then, if at all, negotiation for a league. To him it appeared necessary to have first a league whose promise would make it possible to have a stable peace. At the second plenary session of the Peace Conference, January 25, Wilson spoke on behalf of a League of Nations; the conference agreed to proceed to its formulation and created a Commission on the League of Nations to that end; and three weeks later the covenant of the League was reported back to the conference for adoption.

The machinery of the Peace Conference was complicated because of the multitude of problems pressing for solution. Every nation and every faction with a grievance appeared

with a delegation to demand hearing under the principle of "self-determination," and when the interests of rival groups inevitably clashed there was only unpopularity to be gained, whatever the decision. At the same time the administration of relief was taxing the resources of the Allies, while the military authorities were watching with minute suspicion the conduct of Germany under the armistice. Russia was still at war, with a Bolshevist Government at the head of a new system of soviets, and was threatening the world with proletarian revolution. If Germany was left prostrate there was danger of her infection with Bolshevism that she might pass on to western Europe. If she were allowed to survive in comfort there was danger of the revival of militarism. In addition to the Commission on the League of Nations, created on January 25, the Peace Conference appointed a Commission on Responsibility for the War, and other Commissions on Reparations, Labor, and Transportation. A Supreme Economic Council was organized February 8, to administer such matters as finance, food, shipping, blockade, and raw materials.

The draft of the covenant for the League of Nations was presented by President Wilson to the whole conference at the third plenary session, February 14, 1919. It went beyond the type of international court that had been discussed at the two Hague Conferences, and created instead a large assembly for the discussion of international problems, and a small council for the formulation of decisions. The guarantees were so sweeping as to make unnecessary the military staff which France urged for her own defense. Like the old Congress under the Articles of Confederation, the Council could take important action only when unanimous. The powers of the League went far enough to raise fair questions as to their jurisdiction over problems that nations might regard as domestic and within their own control. The Peace Conference accepted the draft at once, and the next day Wilson sailed from Brest for a brief visit to Washington where his last Democratic Congress was winding up its work.

Covenant of
League of
Nations

Reaction in the United States followed close upon the exaltation of spirit that accompanied the exertions to place the nation upon a "work-or-fight" basis. For most Americans it was a new accomplishment to think seriously or consecutively on European or world affairs. While the war was on, and American divisions appeared to be adding the definitive weight for victory, it was easy to think of permanent participation in world politics. But the political habits of a century and a quarter were so tough that they could not be destroyed by a single experience, and, with the fighting over, it was easy to revert to the habit of regarding America as apart from the rest of the world. The counsels of Washington and Monroe recurred to the American mind, and were the more welcome since the new course promised trouble and expense, and perhaps some loss of national freedom of action. The deep resentment at being disturbed by foreign matters that was displayed between 1914 and 1917 reappeared, and Americans made haste to resume the business that had been interrupted by the excursion into war.

Demobilization of the armed forces progressed rapidly. On the day of the armistice there were 3,703,273 men and women in the army of the United States. More than half of these were with the expeditionary forces, and were parts of a machine that needed now to be reversed in order to bring them home. In nearly every other country the stages of demobilization had been under serious study since early in the war, in order that industry should not be upset and huge numbers of released soldiers turned loose upon the street. No such preparation was made in America, though the Council of National Defense and the General Staff both talked about it. The military units were broken up and disbanded one by one, and by the summer of 1919 discharges had been issued to 2,736,654. As the divisions came back they were greeted with civic and national welcome; the officers and men received the sixty-dollar bonus that Congress voted them, sewed the red chevron of discharge upon their sleeves, and passed back into civil life. Discharge,

however, could not guarantee readjustment; and this, for many of them, was to be a long and painful process.

During May, 1919, the men themselves prepared to perpetuate the memory of their service, and held in St. Louis a representative convention out of which the ^{American} American Legion emerged as the most important ^{Legion} military society of the war. A few officers and men started the movement in Paris earlier in the year, mindful of the dignity of the Grand Army of the Republic and anxious to become a force at an earlier date than the G.A.R. had been. In November, on the first anniversary of the armistice, the first formal convention of the order was held in Minneapolis. The Grand Army had found it impossible to avoid the elevation of the pension problem as its noisiest task. Soldiers' bonus bills were already in evidence before the meeting of the American Legion, and attempts were in the making to turn it into a machine for gaining bonus votes.

The shapeless demobilization of the army and of war industry, which took place in the same months in which the War Department canceled its outstanding contracts, caused unemployment in the cities. The United States Employment Service exerted itself to maintain a census of employment conditions, and to improve them, until Congress abolished its appropriation after July, 1919. The *Official Bulletin*, which had been the only reliable means of following Government actions through the war, had been discontinued in the preceding March. The War Trade Board was reduced to the status of a section of the State Department, and the Food and Fuel Administrations found that the backing for their work was gone. Government guidance was abolished and industry was left to shift for itself.

Congress devoted the short session of 1918-19 to the completion of the revision of the Revenue Law that had been before it since the passage of the War Act of September, 1917. The statute, which proposed to raise \$6,000,000,000 in the next fiscal year, was awaiting the signature of the President when he arrived in Boston on February 24. The Victory Liberty Loan of \$4,500,000,000 was floated in May

to provide funds for the period until the new act should be productive. McAdoo had ceased to be Secretary of the Treasury, his place being taken by Carter Glass, of Virginia, who had played a leading part in the enactment of the Federal Reserve Act in 1913.

In the absence of legislation to give form and program to the period of demobilization, Secretary of Commerce Redfield created in February, 1919, an Industrial Board which proposed to do informally what the war boards had accomplished during active warfare. The experiment was a failure. The patriotic incentive to coöperation was gone. Business now demanded to be let alone. Willing to scold the Government for inconveniences it had suffered, it was not ready to make a voluntary sacrifice for the general good. The members of the Industrial Board resigned in a body in May, after their attempt to fix, and lower, the price of steel had been ruled upon by Attorney-General Palmer as probably illegal. The anti-agreement provisions of the trust laws became once more effective with the cessation of hostilities, and the combinations which the government had compelled for military purposes became illegal again.

Congress developed no new leadership to face the problems of peace. The end of Democratic ascendancy was approaching with the expiration of the Sixty-Fifth Congress on March 4, 1919, and there was no spirit for the advocacy of measures that could not pass. The absence of the President in Paris during most of the session further demoralized the departing majority. For six years Wilson's leadership had been coercive or persuasive at every point, and with each success in his program there had been a tendency to make the next measure more completely his. In his absence his party associates could not feel his impressive leadership; his Cabinet found itself without a head and working at cross-purposes, while the Republican minority promised great and practical things for the future and watched with complacency every event that revealed the inconvenience of doing business without the President or

that could plausibly be ascribed to his or his party's shortcomings.

The return of Wilson to Washington in February was necessary in order to wind up the affairs of the session, but produced no change in the course of administration. He was greeted with open defiance by Republican members of the Senate, who were to sit in the next session as part of the majority. These had opened a debate on the League of Nations while he was on the ocean, and at the close of the session thirty-seven of them, more than enough to defeat any treaty, signed a manifesto declaring their unwillingness to vote for the covenant that he brought from Paris. Unshaken by their opposition, and heartened by the open support of Taft and many other Republicans, Wilson performed his necessary tasks in Washington and on March 5 set sail again for Paris to complete his work at the Peace Conference.

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CHAPTER XXV

THE NEW ENVIRONMENT

THE phrase "before the war" has had two meanings in the American vocabulary. To the generation whose period of maturity fell between 1865 and 1914, it meant "Reconstruction" the era preceding the Civil War, and there was a strong tendency to look back upon it as a vanished and a better age; and to attribute to the Civil War itself the responsibility for all the varied changes in the content of life that came as the Industrial Revolution impressed itself upon America. But the World War brought an end to the state of mind that could look back to the struggle of the Confederacy as the greatest of American experiences. "The war" now came to mean the new war, and the latest; the war that had rocked the civilization of the world, and that had inspired the people of the United States to efforts which in degree and kind went beyond anything in recollection. And like the Civil War, the World War came to be regarded loosely as the great prime cause of whatever was different or disappointing in life, after the years of its duration, 1914-18.

Certainly there was much justice in fixing upon the World War the responsibility for many of the new features of life and thought that are apparent after 1918. It was impossible to divert men by the million, perhaps five or six millions in the United States, from their normal routine, to give them a glimpse of new angles of civilization and new principles of organization, and have them come back to their jobs unchanged. It was unreasonable to suppose that women, made indispensable by the conditions of war industry and enfranchised by the Nineteenth Amendment to the Constitution, could resume the intellectual or economic status that had been theirs in the nineteenth century. Labor earned wages at a new level, and caught a glimpse of

a possible new standard of life; and could not be put back to a ready acceptance of the old standard. Education was revealed more clearly than ever before as marking the difference between the leaders and the led, the rulers and the ruled; and the aspiration of the pre-war parents to get for their children educational opportunity in the post-war years made new demands upon schools and colleges, increased their patronage and broadened their scope.


The World War did much to alter the environment of life and to deflect the currents of thought; but most of the changes that are visible in post-war society in the United States can be connected with a course of material evolution whose beginnings may be traced back through the years of the World War to the first decade of the twentieth century.

The progressive conquest of air, earth, and water, not to mention the natural resources underneath the earth, provides the framework of life and thought in the quarter-century dominated by the World War. The rapidity of this conquest was given a clear illustration in the autumn of 1909, while Taft was President. On September 25, 1909, the State of New York celebrated with pomp and ceremony the three hundredth anniversary of the arrival off Sandy Hook of Henry Hudson with his Dutch crew, and also the one hundredth anniversary of the work of Robert Fulton. There was a tiny replica of Hudson's ship, *Half Moon*, and a reproduction of Fulton's steamboat, *Clermont*; which together called attention to the changes in navigation in three centuries. The successful return of the American fleet from its world cruise was still in mind. The naval review in the Hudson River, in which great European powers participated with the United States, revealed the revolutionary influence of steam and steel upon naval war as well as trade. But most striking of all, as the attention of observers was shifted from the earth and its waters to the air, was the airplane in which Wilbur Wright flew above the Hudson River and circled around the Statue of Liberty.

120°

110°

100°



UNITED STATES 1920

SCALE OF MILES

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State Capitals shown in this type

Denver

Cities of 100,000 and over shown by dot

EXPLANATION OF SHADING

Over 10,000 feet 6,000 to 10,000 feet


2,000 to 6,000 feet

Railroads

110°

100°

Longit



90°

80°

70°

A

D

A

R.

MINNESOTA
Duluth

WISCONSIN
St. Paul
Madison

IOWA
Des Moines

ILLINOIS
Springfield

MISSOURI
Kansas City
Jefferson City

ARKANSAS
Little Rock

LOUISIANA
Baton Rouge

MISSISSIPPI
Jackson

ALABAMA
Birmingham
Montgomery

GEORGIA
Atlanta

FLORIDA
Tallahassee

MICHIGAN
Grand Rapids
Lansing

INDIANA
Indianapolis

KENTUCKY
Frankfort

TENNESSEE
Nashville

MISSISSIPPI
Jackson

ALABAMA
Birmingham
Montgomery

GEORGIA
Atlanta

FLORIDA
Tallahassee

OHIO
Columbus

WEST VIRGINIA
Martinsburg

VIRGINIA
Richmond

NORTH CAROLINA
Raleigh

SOUTH CAROLINA
Columbia

ALABAMA
Birmingham
Montgomery

GEORGIA
Atlanta

FLORIDA
Tallahassee

NEW YORK
Albany

PENNSYLVANIA
Harrisburg

DELAWARE
Dover

MARYLAND
Annapolis

VIRGINIA
Richmond

NORTH CAROLINA
Raleigh

SOUTH CAROLINA
Columbia

ALABAMA
Birmingham
Montgomery

GEORGIA
Atlanta

FLORIDA
Tallahassee

MAINE
Augusta

VERMONT
Montpelier

NEW HAMPSHIRE
Concord

MASSACHUSETTS
Boston

CONNECTICUT
Hartford

NEW JERSEY
Trenton

DELAWARE
Dover

MARYLAND
Annapolis

VIRGINIA
Richmond

NORTH CAROLINA
Raleigh

SOUTH CAROLINA
Columbia

ALABAMA
Birmingham
Montgomery

GEORGIA
Atlanta

FLORIDA
Tallahassee

45°

35°

25°


Tropic of Cancer

CUBA

Vest from Greenwich

90°

80°



Aviation was still a novelty that turned men's heads to gape in admiration at a passing plane. For generations its experimenters had struggled with ridicule and ignorance in its advancement, and many had laid down their lives in its service. In 1903, two American brothers, Orville and Wilbur Wright, working together, made their earliest flights in power-driven planes. The gasoline engine made possible the attainment of success for them, since until its development there was no known source for propulsion sufficiently light and powerful. In the six years after 1903 their mastery of the air, and that of their hundreds of imitators throughout the world, was increased many-fold. In July, 1909, Orville Wright performed tests for endurance and distance exacted by the War Department before the acceptance of its first signal corps airplane. For one hour, nine minutes, and thirty-one seconds he circled above Washington carrying a passenger with him in his plane. Two days earlier a Frenchman, Louis Blériot, flew his monoplane across the English Channel to the cliffs at Dover, while in Germany Count Zeppelin's third dirigible airship in August made its course from Friedrichshafen to Berlin.

The conquest of the air was begun by 1909. When the World War broke out, new influences operated to hasten the process. Conceived of as available for scouting and reconnaissance at the beginning of the war, aviation speedily became an essential component of a military establishment. From scouting it developed into combat, with new types of planes and guns devised to meet the new needs; and with a multitude of appliances to simplify the navigation of aircraft and to bring increasing safety for their occupants. From combat to the carriage of explosives, bombs, and gas was the next step. And when the war was over, commercial aviation with regular planes operating upon advertised routes, for the transportation of passengers and freight, dawned upon the world. When the airmen turned from war to peace in 1919, new records for flights were speedily established. The naval aviator of the United States crossed

the Atlantic by way of the Azores in May, 1919; on June 14, an airplane jumped off from the shore of Newfoundland and sixteen hours later landed on the coast of Ireland; and the Atlantic Ocean was flown over by a British dirigible, the R-34, which made a friendly visit to New York in July, 1919. The North American continent was crossed in less than twenty-two hours from New York to California, in 1924. The limits of aviation were by no means clear when the United States made its attempt to return to normalcy after the World War; but it was obvious that in any estimate of the future, whether for military or commercial purposes, a new era had been opened by the conquest of the air.

In a different way, the air had been conquered by the electricians. Early in 1909 had occurred a signal demonstration of a new achievement. At daybreak on Wireless January 23, the White Star steamship Republic, outbound from New York, was rammed by a tramp freighter when off the Nantucket lightship. The wrecked ship foundered; but for the first time in history it could call for help. From his wireless cabin, Jack Binns, the wireless operator, sent out his CQD signal of distress (a signal which international usage speedily changed to SOS) and kept repeating it until it was answered from varying distances by the Baltic, the Lucania, and La Lorraine, which responded in time to save the passengers and crew of the Republic. Three years later, in April, 1912, another impressive demonstration of the usefulness of the wireless at sea started a train of laws that made it compulsory for ocean-going vessels to carry the new tool. The Titanic, fresh from her builders' hands and the largest vessel in the world, rammed an iceberg on her maiden voyage, and sank carrying with her nearly fifteen hundred passengers and crew. The survivors, drifting in their lifeboats and on their rafts, were rescued by the Carpathia, which had picked up the signal of distress fifty-six miles away, and which pushed at top speed through night and floating ice to the scene of the disaster.

The radio, like the airplanes, became at once a tool of

war in 1914, and received an intensive development and application for which it might have waited long in time of peace. It took its place by the side of the field telephones and telegraphs as part of the regular equipment of the Signal Service; and before the war ended the radio telephone had been brought to a point at which it was possible for ground observers to talk directly to pilots of aircraft at considerable distances. After the war, the spread of public broadcasting and private reception created a new industry whose growth rivaled that of the automobile. Major-General James G. Harbord, who had commanded the Services of Supply at Tours, for the A.E.F., retired from the army to become an officer of one of the radio manufacturing companies; and the radio receiving outfit became a part of the equipment of the normal American home. On January 7, 1927, a public wireless telephone service between New York and London was inaugurated; and this was supplemented by a wireless transmission of photographs, by which even checks and signatures could be certified with ease. President Coolidge addressed the Congress upon the character of George Washington on February 22, and was heard not only in every corner of the United States, but in the capitals of Europe as well. The next day he signed a bill for the federal regulation of radio broadcasting, whose intent was to place the control of the wave lengths of the air in the governing hands of the Department of Commerce.

The earth, as well as the air above it, was coming within knowledge and control. Among the spectators of the Hudson-Fulton celebration of 1909, none attracted more attention than Commodore Robert E. Peary on the bridge of his exploring yacht Roosevelt, and fresh from his discovery of the North Pole on April 6, 1909. He had terminated a long and gallant struggle for a sporting chance. The discovery of the hidden places of the world was nearly over; on December 16, 1911, Captain Roald Amundsen, a Norwegian, reached the South Pole, in the heart of the Antarctic Highlands. In May, 1926, Lieutenant-Commander Richard E. Byrd, an American

naval airman, flew an airplane around the North Pole from Spitzbergen; and within a few days an Italian officer piloted a dirigible across the North Pole area from Spitzbergen to Nome.

The steamboat, airplane, and wireless had conquered the water and the air. The motor car was changing the character of transportation, life, and business on the land. At the close of President Taft's Administration nearly a million and a quarter automobiles were registered in the United States. Substantially all of these had been designed and built since the beginning of the century, at which time only a few hundreds were in operation in the country. All of these were in 1900 as yet experimental; and even had the cars been perfected to a point of easy operation, the roads of the United States were not ready to carry them. The first national automobile show was held in Madison Square Garden in 1900, and what cars there were were expected to become the playthings of the rich.

During the first ten years of the new century the cars ceased to be either novelties or experiments and became a commonplace utility. A large part of the equipment and supply of the World War was motorized, and much was learned in the process that improved the cars for the service of peace. By 1924 some 16,000,000 cars were in use in the United States; and at the end of 1926, some 24,500,000. Eighty per cent of the world supply was in use in the United States, making an average of one car for nearly every American family. Most of them were cheap cars, driven by the owners, stored in the family garage, and giving profitable occupation not only to the manufacturers, but to service men, to gasoline producers and distributors, and to the builders of new roads.

The natural needs of the motor car, as well as the demand of the citizens who used the cars, brought about a reconstruction of the American highway system. In the nineteenth century roads were conceived generally as serving the local population and horse-drawn

vehicles driven at low speed. The roads were generally primitive, graded and surfaced with dirt or gravel, little cared for, with a low proportion of hard roads of any kind. The development of highway engineering began before the World War, and sprang into full activity when peace returned. There was much experiment in stone and gravel highways, tar-bound and surfaced, and in concrete pavements. The horse retreated from the roads and the cities. The change became one of finance as well as of engineering, for the cost of road-building made new drains upon taxation and the borrowing power of communities. In 1916 the United States Government started upon a program of aided trunk-line highways, built with the coöperation of the States through which they passed. Nearly every State undertook on its own account a program of State and county trunk lines, and road supervision. After ten years of federal aid, in 1925, a unified system of identifying and marking the roads of the United States was undertaken. It was needed, for in the summer months tourists by millions took to the open road, to wander through the country, carrying their camp equipment and living at roadside inns or in the public camping-sites that nearly every community found it necessary to establish.

The effect of the automobile upon civilization was much discussed. It broke down distance; took the city dweller into the country; and brought the farmer into town. It multiplied the innocent pleasures of ^{The shifting} life the common man; but it made crime easier because it increased the speed of flight. It helped to concentrate country business in the larger towns, and the village storekeeper felt its influence; but it allowed the city worker to dwell on the outskirts of town, and helped develop the suburbanization of the United States that was visible at the beginning of the century. It made it almost impossible for the old to supervise the young, and played a large though unmeasurable part in the change of manners that came after the World War. It injured, and in many cases killed, the business of street-car companies in the smaller towns and on the

inter-urban lines; but the new routes established to be operated by motor buses brought organized transportation into remote contacts that had never enjoyed convenient transportation before.

In the background of the changes of life and thought of the post-war period, the wireless and the automobile must take an important place. Changes of equal importance, however, were coming about by the reorganization of public amusement through the moving pictures. It was characteristic of the years after 1919 that whatever the general condition of business in the United States, every one seemed to have plenty of money. Personal spending consumed much of the high wages which were prevalent when the war ended. The ownership of motor cars on so general a scale could not have taken place except where there was easy money and a breakdown of the old habit of accumulation rather than of immediate indulgence. Even in the Western farming regions, where deflation brought wide losses, the use of motor cars was as general as elsewhere in the country. By the side of the miles of new concrete roads that marked a new era after 1919 stood the thousands of new picture theaters, built solely for the movies and executed in a spirit of luxury, and sometimes beauty, that most of the legitimate theaters had never known.

The development of the moving-picture machine from an interesting toy to the basis of a major industry coincided with the active years of the life of Thomas Alva Edison. Between his thirtieth and his eightieth birthdays he more nearly personified the mechanization of life than any other American. At the beginning, in the period of the Philadelphia Centennial, he experimented with telephone and arc light and incandescent electric lamps. At the termination of the half-century these had become commonplaces and he was established in his position of inventive sage. He experimented also with moving pictures, and various of his machines and devices gave an early promise of success. Not, however, until the middle of the nineties did the moving-picture camera and projector become cer-

Movies

tain enough for industry to take any risks with it. One of the earliest of the new films to attract public attention showed the inaugural carriage carrying Cleveland and McKinley on March 4, 1897. Another preserved the famous knock-out blow with which the pugilist Fitzsimmons terminated the heavy-weight championship of James J. Corbett. Rapidly thereafter, the movies came to the public, growing more simple and more perfect, until by 1926 small hand moving-picture cameras were available for private use, as the original kodaks had been in the eighties.

The films appeared first in vaudeville houses, and only later in theaters of their own. They exploited the news of the day, and developed a great organization of producers of films, who operated sometimes near to the settings of their stories, but oftener near to natural stage-settings in a land of sunshine, Southern California. Great chains of picture houses were eventually opened and as the movies developed the legitimate drama declined. The taste of the public was often very bad, for there were always plenty of producers and actors ready to satisfy the craving for the worst. But the public taste was not entirely indiscriminate. The prompt and successful boycott of certain actors of notorious life was as real as the success of the better group of actors, among whom Douglas Fairbanks ranked high with his photographic renderings of popular classics.

The movies, after their period of crude and flickering experiment, entered upon an era of dramatic attainment with the first showing of the *Birth of a Nation* in 1915. In the next decade the industry became important enough to offer dignified publicity to a former Cabinet member, William G. McAdoo, who accepted its retainers after leaving the Treasury Department. From President Harding's Cabinet, the Postmaster-General, Will H. Hays, resigned to direct the consolidated activities of the movie world. Fairbanks was meanwhile rising from the ranks, presenting in quick succession *The Three Musketeers*, *Robin Hood*, and in 1924 a version of the Arabian Nights entitled *The Thief of Bagdad*. He established himself with these as among the most useful

and intelligent of the actors. In every foreign country the American actors were nearly as well known as they were at home. The European public gave as cordial welcome to the American movies as did that of the United States, until their success gave rise to a series of protective discriminations, for the encouragement of their own national producers. Partly with this in view the French Government in 1924, permitted the Opéra in Paris to be used for a formal showing of a national patriotic film, *The Miracle of the Wolf*.

The theaters that were devoted to the regular drama were lessened in number by the popularity of the movies, but
 Theaters had triumphs of their own. Of the lighter performances, none surpassed in intriguing and daring entertainment the perpetual variety show, of which the eighteenth annual revision was playing in New York in 1924, as *The Follies*. This was a twentieth-century evolution from a type that had been introduced to New York, and its country visitors, as *The Black Crook* in 1866. It, and its innumerable imitators, whose varying expositions of nudity on the stage stirred up a demand for a public censorship in 1927, promised nothing for the usefulness of the theater. There was, however, some evidence that the taste for serious acting was not entirely extinct. John Barrymore, in New York in 1922–23, carried on the tradition of a famous acting family, by giving one hundred and one performances of *Hamlet*, breaking thereby the old record of Edwin Booth; and there were three other *Hamlets* in New York before 1923 was over. Jane Cowl, in the same season, played one hundred performances of *Romeo and Juliet*.

The ability of the United States to amuse itself and pay the bills is a prominent element of the background of the
 Standard of living post-war period. Just how well off the American people were was suspected, but not clearly demonstrated in figures, until in 1921 a coöperative statistical society, the National Bureau of Economic Research, made an exhaustive study of national income. It reached the conclusion that the production of the United States repre-

sented a per capita income of \$335 in 1914; as against \$243 for the United Kingdom, \$146 for Germany, and \$185 for France, in the same year. Japan had only \$29 per capita. The dollar figures of American income rose to \$586 in 1918 (representing \$372 in purchasing power at the price level of 1913). The American common people were moving upon a new plane of comfort and opportunity, but this did not in any way diminish the cry of classes that they were receiving less than their proper share of the good things of life; nor did it check the vigor of the demand for change — change in the organization of government — change in the fundamental basis of life and thought.

The literature of the five years after 1921 is full of despondent conjectures as to the effect of the war and the new living standards upon morality and man-
Literature of pessimism
 ners. In the manners of the younger generation, and, indeed, in those of many of their elders, it was hard to tell how far there was merely a rationalizing of custom or whether there was a moral decay. "Everywhere in this mad, glad democracy young wings are beating water in the effort to soar," said the *New York Times*. The dancing craze and the devotion to moving pictures helped greatly to modify the habits of youth. Their elders lost contact with them at many points. The change in fashion and the greater freedom for girls alarmed the older generation, somewhat as the latter had alarmed their grandparents in the eighties, in the period of the rise of sport. Many who recalled the restrictive modesty of the Victorian period found it hard to reconcile their minds to the bare knees, short skirts, shorter hair, and sketchy manners of school-girls and the younger women. They called them "flappers," in the spirit that inspired the use of the word "dude" a generation earlier. The freedom of the motor car, the rise of roadhouse entertainment, and the spread of club life in one form or another, bred a companionship among the sexes in which the chaperon rapidly disappeared. A strong tendency to violate the spirit of the Eighteenth Amendment inspired a demoralizing quest for "booze." It was possible

for a hopeful critic to believe that, with all the abuses, society was looking at the realities of life with clearer eyes and less cant than ever before; but it was equally possible to make these things an occasion for expressing the chronic disapproval of age for youth and change.

The status of temperance and prohibition in the new period was one upon which it was difficult to frame a conclusion because the basic facts regarding it were Prohibition objects of bitter controversy between "wets" and "drys." There had been several movements for temperance in the United States. The earliest of them, active prior to the Civil War, brought a series of State restrictive statutes, directed in most instances against the use of alcohol in the form of ardent spirits. Whiskey was a pioneer product in America, and a national drink, giving to the American problem a slant different from that of the European countries in most of which wines or beer constituted the form of alcoholic drink. The waning of the first period of American prohibition, in the decade of the Civil War, coincides with the arrival in the United States of the great German migration, and the substitution of beer for whiskey with a large part of the population.

A second movement against alcohol appeared in the eighteen-seventies, with the creation of the National Prohibition Party and the Woman's Christian Temperance Union. By varying routes these organizations worked toward State amendments, high-license laws and local option, and prohibition upon a national scale through amendment to the Constitution of the United States. With considerable rapidity, in the decades before and after 1900, the dry section of the map of the United States increased its area, comprising the States from which traffic in alcohol was legally excluded, and parts of States in which by local vote the sale of alcoholic drinks was forbidden. There was genuine difference of opinion among temperance advocates whether the advance ought to be along the lines of local prohibition or that of a National Amendment.

The movement received a powerful support from new

allies after 1900. Hitherto it had been largely that of a social reform, advocated as a moral issue. Now there came to its aid much political weight from the Southern States, where the white population lived in constant nervousness because of the negro population; and where white opinion was now ready to accept prohibition for the sake of keeping alcohol from the negroes. The other powerful ally was found among the employers of labor in industrial centers. With the growth of employers' liability, or workmen's compensation legislation about 1910, the employer found his business saddled with the cost of industrial accidents. Hitherto this incidental cost of industry had fallen upon the mutilated workmen and the innocent members of their families. It had been the cause of a large share of the poverty and suffering of the working people; and it was none the less real because much of it originated in excessive use of alcohol. The efforts of the managers of industry, now charged with these costs of accidents, were directed toward the reduction of the costs. "Safety First" was widely advertised as a business motto; great care was to be taken to reduce the danger attendant upon the use of machinery; and a fight was begun upon alcohol as one of the prime causes of loss.

With the aid afforded by Southern and by industrial opinion, the movement toward temperance gained headway. The Anti-Saloon League, a private organization, started a general drive for a National Amendment. Congress reflected the growing opinion, and withdrew from the traffic in liquor the protection of the interstate commerce clause of the Constitution. Hitherto, the attempt of a State to enforce prohibition had been blocked in part by the fact that Congress alone possesses power to regulate interstate commerce, and that the Supreme Court had ruled that a commodity concerned in interstate commerce did not pass out of the protection of the National Government until it had been sold or distributed in its State of destination. This meant in practice that in a prohibition State it was still possible to purchase liquor by mail from a dealer in another State, and have it shipped to its consumer in the prohibition

area. This materially modified the degree of "dryness" that any State could command by its own action. In 1912, by the Webb-Kenyon Act, Congress adopted as part of its regulation of interstate commerce whatever provision any State might establish for the government of liquor within its own limits. The Supreme Court held this as constitutional, and as a consequence the wet penetration of dry States under cover of the interstate commerce clause came to an end.

The World War hastened the movement toward prohibition, and changed it from a gradual advance based upon conviction and local majorities to a rapid and inflexible completion of its task. As a part of the food conservation system erected in the Lever Bill, August 10, 1917, the use of grain for the distillation of beverages was forbidden, and the President was given wide discretionary powers in the control of both wines and beer. An Amendment to the Constitution making the prohibition complete and permanent passed Congress December 18, 1917, and Eighteenth Amendment was transmitted to the States for ratification. In the following year, under the guise of war prohibition, the manufacture and sale of intoxicants was ordered to cease after July 1, 1919. The bill for this was passed after the signing of the armistice, and with the war over; but the war-time swing was so powerful that the ancient friends of the movement convinced themselves that it had come to stay. They were encouraged in this idea by the success which the new Eighteenth Amendment was having in the States. Between December, 1917, and January 19, 1919, it was ratified by the legislatures of the thirty-six States whose affirmative votes were necessary to make the Amendment part of the Federal Constitution. It was ratified with long discussion and wide publicity; and the readiness of the States to concur was so complete that ratification did not cease with thirty-six States, but continued until forty-five of the forty-eight States in the Union gave their concurrence. Under the terms of the Amendment it became effective one year after its adoption as part of the

Constitution; whereby on January 19, 1920, the constitutional task was done.

With the Amendment pending, Congress took up in 1919 the problem of enforcement. The war-time prohibition which had become legally operative July 1, 1919, needed enforcement if it was to be effective, and the Eighteenth Amendment would require legislation. President Wilson urged Congress to repeal war-time prohibition, on the ground that it was no longer warranted since the war was over. But the dry forces declined to retreat, and passed, over his veto of October 27, 1919, an act generally known, from the name of the Minnesota Congressman who introduced it, as the Volstead Act. This law made provision for the enforcement of the new condition.

A great industry was thus legislated out of existence by majorities that were furnished largely by regions already dry before the war; and the extinction of the industry was to be worked out largely in communities whose population contained a considerable preponderance of persons who thought and voted wet. The difficulties which the United States Government had faced at earlier times, in the carrying out of Eastern views concerning the public lands in the West where the lands were, and in enforcing the Southern view respecting the return of escaped slaves in the North whither the slaves fled, were now repeated. The American habit of law observance has always been weak, and local practice of "boot-legging" unpopular law has been widespread. Moreover, a strict enforcement of prohibition entailed a large, elaborate, and rigidly honest governmental machine; and until the period of the World War and the advent of federal income-tax legislation the United States had had little experience in the construction and operation of such machinery.

Resistance to the enforcement of prohibition became embarrassing. Localized somewhat in the large cities, along the seacoast, on the international frontiers, and among the population of new importation whose habits respecting wine and beer were violently interfered with, it nevertheless pre-

vented a complete enforcement and in itself, as an open disrespect for law, became a center of infection to the injury of public standards and morale. Whether the Amendment was capable of enforcement was a matter of doubt for many years. An organized agitation against the Amendment was started and supported by the liquor interests that had been outlawed. This had the approval of many disinterested citizens, to whom the aspect of prohibition that was offensive was its interference with personal liberty. It was claimed that crime, law violation, drinking among the young, and political corruption were becoming worse rather than better. The facts were so largely obscured by passion and misrepresentation as to be difficult to establish. One eminent economist, Professor Irving Fisher, of Yale University, examined them with great care and reached the conclusion that *Prohibition at its Worst* (the title he gave to his book in 1926) was nevertheless better than the old order had been. When one turns from the public arguments designed to influence men's minds and from the attempts to drag prohibition into the position of a political issue, and examines the course of the Congress whose duty it was to enforce the law, it becomes clear that most of the Congressmen continued to believe that their constituents were in earnest in desiring the Eighteenth Amendment to succeed. Although individual members of both Senate and House gained prominence as admitted "wets," the majorities for enforcement of the Amendment remained large. At the close of the Sixty-Ninth Congress, in March 1927, in the face of a threat of "wets" to filibuster against a reorganization of the prohibition service, the "dry" forces were powerful enough to procure in the Senate one of the rare agreements bringing debate to an end under the cloture, and to pass their bill. Whichever side was gaining, there was no doubt that the conditions attendant upon prohibition were difficult and menacing.

The disturbance caused by prohibition was not confined to a single party. It was a part of an unstable state of mind that was general in the United States after the World

War, and that revealed itself in another way in the impressive though sectional revival of the Ku Klux Klan. The Ku Klux Klan became a national issue. This secret, ritualistic organization, reminiscent of the older Klan of reconstruction days, was launched in Georgia during the World War, avowing an adherence to American principles and a determination to keep the country for Americans. It generally appeared to have antipathies toward Jews, Catholics, and the foreign-born. It possessed many of the attributes of the Know-Nothing Party that followed the immigrations of the eighteen-forties, and bore close resemblance to its more recent predecessor of the nineties, the American Protective Association (or A.P.A.).

The Klan spread through the South, and north into the Middle West. In 1922 its advocates boasted of their influence in determining the political complexion of several States, notably Texas and Oregon. One of its outspoken enemies, Governor J. C. Walton, of Oklahoma, received the most impressive illustration of its power. Its official organ, the Indianapolis *Fiery Cross*, waged continuous warfare upon him, which he met with more vigor than discretion. His enemies in Oklahoma, many of them Klansmen, moved for his impeachment, through which they removed him from office in 1923. The issue was clouded by gross abuses of authority on his part and violent claims of Klansmen on the other. The cloak of secrecy in which the Klan moved to accomplish its ends made it hard to fix responsibility; but the Imperial Wizard of the order, speaking in Dallas, Texas, in October, 1923, claimed the breaking of Walton as an achievement of the Klan. The special correspondent of the New York *Times* declared in November that "The three great Southwestern States of Texas, Arkansas, and Oklahoma are dominated to-day by the Ku Klux Klan. There is no doubt of this." Some observers identified the spirit of the Klan with Fascism in Italy and the successes of Mussolini; others denounced it as antagonistic to the spirit of Americanism. It was, at least, a factor in the turmoil of the American mind.

The type of mind that saw in these events clear evidence of decay was prone to hope for a restoration of conservatism. Religion rose in many quarters to protest against society; and denominationalism in religion, which had undergone some decline in the last quarter of the nineteenth century, came actively to life again. With this denominationalism came a revival of old-fashioned orthodoxy. The Legislature of Kentucky acquired notoriety by enacting a law forbidding the teaching of the scientific doctrine of evolution. William J. Bryan, whose religious preaching and lectures had gained for him a large non-political following among the audiences of the Chautauqua circuits, assumed a leading position in this crusade against Darwinism. He had been an undismayed prophet of prohibition, and now with the Eighteenth Amendment in operation he turned to the task of reviving the piety of the preceding century. In a similar way, an outpouring of conservative political opinion was incited by the excesses of the revolutionary doctrinaires, and made difficult the position of the open and progressive mind.

Fundamentalism in history took the form of a patriotic interpretation of the past and an insistence that no historical investigation must be allowed to lessen the traditional greatness of the leaders of the American Revolution. "Treason to American Tradition" was denounced as the result of a pro-British conspiracy. The hereditary patriotic societies were predisposed to favor such an attitude and to look with disapproval upon restatements of accepted popular facts in the light of historical evidence. But the leadership in the movement came from the Democratic administration of the City of New York and the editorial policy of the chain of newspapers controlled by William Randolph Hearst. There were premonitions of the movement in the organized efforts of 1912-14 to break up the approaching celebration of a century of peace with England. But the attack broke out now in 1921, exploiting the fact that the trend of historical scholarship since 1890 had been to soften the edge of denunciation of English tyranny during the American

colonial period. It was charged that there was a conspiracy to revise history to make it friendly to Great Britain, and that this conspiracy was promoted by the educational foundations established by Andrew Carnegie and Cecil Rhodes. The alleged goal was a resubordination of America to England. Similarly, in Washington's second Administration the friends of Jefferson had fancied they saw an intention to make George Washington a king. The attack was timed in 1921 with the opening of Sulgrave Manor, an English home of the Washingtons, as a place of American pilgrimage. It received the ready support of the Irish societies and the Germans. It appeared to provide a valve for releasing the feelings of those classes of Americans, anti-English by inheritance, who were forced by the loyalties of the World War to accept England as an ally; and who were rasped by the overenthusiasm of some of the war leaders for everything Allied. In more than one State the legislatures of 1923 passed laws for the "purification" of historical textbooks, and the elimination of the work of the alleged pro-British revisionists.

CHAPTER XXVI

THE RETURN TO NORMALCY

THE word "reconstruction" was a misnomer in 1919 as it had been in 1865. In the period following the Civil War its use makes it easy to obscure the fact that the South underwent an economic and social revolution while in the North the rural basis of society gave way to industrial. The plans then made and the statutes passed with reconstruction in view failed to effect it, and society proceeded to readjust itself to changed conditions in spite of the advice of its political guardians. In 1919 the world was full of talk of reconstruction, and in many countries programs were evolved fitting each individual and every group into a prearranged niche in a more or less logical structure. The diplomats at Paris manipulated the boundaries and balance of international powers; parliaments tried to house their people and to put the citizen to work where he belonged; party leaders promulgated doctrines with as much assurance as though their followers accepted them. But the tired world was no longer plastic. Russia was in evolutionary revolt and not able or willing to respect the usages of nations. The "backward nations" were everywhere restive at the control they had to endure. Germany was beaten to the ground, but only the blind could think of keeping her there forever. The working classes among the Allies, conscious that their effort made victory possible, were enjoying the economic improvement that had come to them through the accident of war, and were determined to increase rather than diminish their future share in the output of the world. Unsettlement, national and international, contained its unrevealed promise of evolution, while hold-over leaders of the pre-war age professed to reconstruct society.

President Wilson arrived back in Paris on March 14,

1919, with the ominous threat of the Senate leaders to wreck the treaty ringing in his ears; with his opponents spurred on by his defiance, that "when that treaty comes back gentlemen on this side will find the covenant not only in it, but so many threads of the treaty tied to the covenant, that you cannot dissect the covenant from the treaty without destroying the whole vital structure"; and with the knowledge that his ranking adviser, Secretary of State Lansing, was in thorough disapproval of both the protracted negotiations, and the nature of the projected league. During his absence, he found, the other American delegates had consented to shelve the League in the interest of immediate peace. He learned as well that France was unwilling to accept the League as sufficient guarantee along the Rhine frontier, and that Italy was unwilling to sign the German peace until assured that her own claims to territory along the Adriatic would be protected. Secret treaties signed in the darkest period of the war were now openly brought forth pledging the Allies to support Italy against Austria and Jugo-Slavia, and Japan as conqueror of and successor to German rights in China. America was no party to these, but their European signers brought into danger the doctrines of self-determination and open covenants. Germany was threatened with annihilation through the medium of reparations that were in effect punitive indemnities, and unbearable at that. The freedom of the seas was not even discussed. Equality of nations had been forgotten. And the peace that was to end wars because of its essential moderation and justice was fading away. There was even fair question whether the associates could be brought to agree to any peace at all.

The burden and complexity of the negotiations hastened the concentration of power in the Peace Conference in the hands of Wilson, Clemenceau, and Lloyd George, with Orlando generally a fourth. Every attack was focused upon Wilson, since he alone, by conviction, stood against a peace of barter and balance of power, and struggled to rescue some of the liberalism that had made the last year of war

look like the dawning of a new age of international fair play. Early in April the ravage of influenza, that had washed over the world in the winter of 1918-19, laid him prostrate; and the conferences of the "Big Four" in his Paris residence were held with him in the adjacent sick-room. He had planned a one-man task, and what he could not himself accomplish no one could do for him. He met the critics of the covenant by obtaining a recognition of the Monroe Doctrine, and prevented the inclusion of the racial equality demanded by Japan. The latter victory was paid for by his reluctant acceptance of Japan as the inheritor of Germany in Shantung; with the result that China felt herself betrayed and every weaker nation lost confidence in the fairness of the peace.

What Wilson saved of his liberal program he saved by compromise or threat. On April 6 he ordered the George Washington to Brest, and by this intimation of The Treaty of Versailles his willingness to abandon the Peace Conference held his associates to their work. He refused to assent to the binding force of the secret Italian treaty of 1915; but was induced to agree to a compromise whereby France was enabled to secure the mineral output of the Saar Valley whose population was almost entirely German. The treaty as it was submitted to the fourth plenary session of the Peace Conference on April 28 was the best treaty that the five Great Powers could be induced to sign unanimously, but departed far from the altruism of the "fourteen points." It contained as its most promising feature, so far as the peace of the world was concerned, a revised covenant for the League of Nations. In this organization, working through the council of nine — the five Great Powers and Belgium, Brazil, Greece, and Spain — it would be possible to negotiate the undoing of the worst features of the treaty itself, as passions should subside with the passing of the years.

The treaty was handed to the German delegates on May 7, by Clemenceau, who recalled the last occasion when German and French envoys had met in the palace at Ver-

sailles. For him the treaty was the victory of his philosophy of force; for them it was the last stage of the bitterness of complete defeat. They signed it, with slight modifications, on June 28, 1919; and on the same day Lloyd George and Wilson signed treaties with the French providing for the defense of the left bank of the Rhine in case Germany should endanger it. The President left Paris that night, sailed for New York immediately, and on July 10 presented the treaty and the covenant to the Senate in open executive session.

The stubbornness of the Senate that showed itself when John Hay negotiated his first treaty with Lord Pauncefote, in 1900, as well as when Cleveland, Roosevelt, and Taft concluded their successive treaties for international arbitration, endangers the success of any American treaty that is not one-sided in favoring the United States. The Spanish Treaty of 1898 was ratified only because the leader of the opposition, who himself decried the annexation of island colonies, brought his influence to prevent the defeat of peace. Under the Constitution the President has power, "by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, to make treaties, provided two thirds of the senators present concur," but the minority of the body that is thus enabled to defeat any treaty is under constant temptation to be influenced more by party jealousies and individual antipathies than by the non-partisan view of national interest that ought to prevail in international affairs. Before the President presented the treaty in person, a copy of the document had been brought to Washington by a journalist who managed to obtain it privately in Paris. Its text was read into the *Congressional Record* by Borah, of Idaho, on June 9, and the general debate that had begun in February became more specific. The thirty-seven signers of the Lodge manifesto were still determined, and one of them, Harding, of Ohio, declared that "at the present time the preservation of American nationality rests with the Senate of the United States. And . . . the Senate is not going to fail you."

The Senate
and the
treaty

President Wilson demanded the ratification of the treaty without amendment, on the grounds that (1) peace could not be restored until the document was ratified and proclaimed, (2) any American amendment would force the reopening of the whole conference, since no change in the text would be binding until approved by every signatory, and (3) any modifications upon which agreement could be reached at all could be obtained best through the League of Nations which the ratification of the treaty would bring into existence. His opponents included those who thought the document too lenient in its treatment of Germany and those who believed it too harsh. Germans in the United States generally opposed it on the latter ground, while the Irish disliked it because England had gained control of a considerable number of former German colonies through the system of mandatories created in the treaty. Liberals and radicals, who had been close to the President in support of his program of the "fourteen points," turned against him because compromise and balance of power, instead of internationalism, had prevailed at Paris. Conservatives took the opposite position and declared that American independence had been sacrificed to the League of Nations, and that under Article X of the covenant the United States could be forced to go to war over European controversies and counter to the constitutional provision requiring declarations of war to be made by Congress. Between those who thought the treaty too reactionary, and those who saw it as a document of national surrender, a temporary alliance was made to defeat it. The *Nation* and the *New Republic*, the Socialists, the Irish, and the Germans found strong support among great bodies of Americans who had had enough of war in Europe and desired to draw back to the isolated and complete independence of the Monroe Doctrine. The irreconcilable opposition was led in the Senate by men as far apart on other matters as Hiram Johnson, Robert M. La Follette, William E. Borah, and Miles Poindexter, on the one hand, and Philander C. Knox, Frank B. Brandegee, George H. Moses, and Lawrence Y. Sherman, on the other.

The Sixty-Sixth Congress, elected in November, 1918, met May 19, 1919, upon proclamation cabled by Wilson from Paris. The work before it included several of the ordinary supply bills, whose passage at the last regular session had been blocked by a Republican filibuster, and the new treaty. In the House the Republican majority had no difficulty in setting aside James R. Mann, of Illinois, its former leader, and selecting as Speaker Frederick H. Gillett, of Massachusetts. Mann was deposed because of party revolt against his war record and his attitude prior to American entry, during which he had described the Lusitania victims as "joy-riders." The control of the Senate was in doubt until the last minute. Of the ninety-six Senators only a bare majority (forty-nine) could be claimed for the Republicans, and this only by including La Follette, who had flaunted the regular organization and voted independently for years, and Newberry, newly elected from Michigan. The latter defeated Henry Ford in the preceding November, after a bitter contest in which huge funds were expended by the victor and his friends, and in which Ford was denounced as pacifist and anti-American. Newberry was later convicted and sentenced under the Federal Corrupt Practices Act; but the Supreme Court, on appeal, subsequently declared this to be unconstitutional. He was, however, allowed to keep his seat in the Senate while under indictment, making part of the shaky majority that organized the body May 19, 1919, and thus was made possible the appointment of Henry Cabot Lodge as chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations, with a group of colleagues known to be opposed to the ratification of the treaty as signed.

The Treaty of Versailles was ratified by enough European signers to enable its proclamation January 10, 1920. The first meeting of the Council of the League of Nations occurred six days later; while in the United States the approval of the treaty, with or without amendments or reservations, was still pending in the Senate. The President insisted that the good faith as well as the interests of the

United States were involved in its acceptance. Early in September he left Washington for a speaking tour of the Western States, in an attempt to arouse enthusiasm for it. In his own party there were outspoken opponents of the treaty, while its Republican advocates were becoming more willing to qualify their acceptance. The country as a whole had lost faith in the possibility of rejuvenating the world, and was becoming increasingly absorbed in the affairs of its own existence. Wilson opened his tour September 4, a week before the Committee on Foreign Relations reported the treaty to the Senate with reservations. He crossed the country near the northern border, invaded the States of Reed, Borah, Poindexter, and Johnson, all irreconcilables, and was on his way home through the Middle West with the result of his campaign uncertain, when on September 26 his physicians ended the tour abruptly and sent him back to the White House a sick and broken man.

The precise nature of the disease and the degree of the incapacity were not revealed to the country, and once more, as in the summer of 1881, when Garfield lay on his deathbed, the failure of the Constitution to provide for such contingency was noticed and deplored. On October 14 Secretary Lansing began to hold informal meetings of the Cabinet with the supposed approval of the invalid, but he was dismissed by Wilson on this ground four months later. Not until February, 1920, did the President resume active work of any sort, and then under conditions that suggested the end of his political control of his party. Bryan at a meeting of the Democratic National Committee opposed Wilson's desire to make the next election a "solemn referendum" on the treaty; members of his Cabinet dropped out or were dismissed until by April there were five new heads.

The treaty had a varied career. It was tabled in the Senate November 19, 1919, because of the impossibility of ratifying it with or without reservations. In February, 1920, it was taken up again in the hope of finding a compromise, but failed of the necessary two thirds on March 19.

In May an effort was made to terminate the state of war by joint resolution repealing the declaration of April 6, 1917; but this was prevented by presidential veto, as an "ineffaceable stain upon the gallantry and honor of the United States." With the rest of the world struggling to get back to peace, the United States remained technically at war with Germany and dissociated from the League of Nations eighteen months after hostilities had ceased.

Internal peace, as well as international, was disturbed during the Senate fight over the treaty. From a state of war, with elaborate Government control over every relationship of life, there had been the ^{Unsettle-}_{ment} sharp transition into non-war, if not real peace, with individual competition resumed and with world shortage disturbing the equilibrium of every industry. Extravagance and scarcity, high prices and labor unsettlement, unfulfilled hopes of a millennium and opportunities for successful greed, profiteering in material things and effort to gain advantage for panaceas of reform, crowded before a public that was wearied with efforts and lacked admitted leaders. Roosevelt, whose generation was over, had laid down his powers early in 1919, and though the simple grave at Oyster Bay attracted pilgrims by thousands the voice was silent. Wilson was sick, and among a multitude of noisy advisers of the public there was none that gained its ear as he had done. Labor in particular, always first to feel a change in the conditions of life, was restive. Flattered by the attentions received during the war and somewhat dazzled by proletarian successes in Russia, its status was now challenged by its ancient enemies, and its leaders seized the occasion to reassert its claim.

In the basic fields of transportation, coal, and steel, strikes were impending during the summer of 1919. The railroad workers had received less increase than ^{Strikes of}₁₉₁₉ most other union men. In 1916 the Adamson Act fixed for them the basic eight-hour day, which the Supreme Court upheld in the following March. This improved their condition, but failed to keep pace with rising

prices. When the war began no other industry suffered more than theirs. The railroad regiments, and enlistments for other line duty, depleted their numbers. Troop movements and the great mass of war freights called for military precision in their work. The public took the sound attitude that a railroad strike would amount to treason, and the Railroad Administration did what it could during 1918 to equalize pay. But there was no practical way to give them relief against the rising prices after the armistice. A threatened strike in the summer of 1919 was deferred upon appeal from Wilson to wait for six months in order to allow his plans for lowering prices to become effective. In the following winter he was too sick to initiate measures of relief, although A. Mitchell Palmer, the Attorney-General, administered what remained of the powers under the Food and Fuel Act of 1917, and organized fair-price committees and sought evidence against profiteers. But prices continued to rise, and in the spring of 1920 the public demand for goods persisted in spite of rising prices. The six-months period expired, and the railroad men were next asked to await the decision of Congress as to the future control of the railroads, and to bring their request to their future employers. Their protracted uneasiness made it hard for the roads to procure labor, lowered the efficiency of all railroad service, and encouraged other groups to more stubborn struggles.

A great steel strike was started on September 22, 1919, aiming to force the United States Steel Corporation to recognize the unions. The leaders that directed it belonged to the radical group, and were characterized by their opponents as socialist, anarchist, bolshevist, and I.W.W. There had been no great strike in this industry since the two failures at Homestead in 1892 and 1901. Gary, Indiana, the company town of the Steel Corporation, was the center of the strike, which lasted officially until January 8, 1920. Long before it was called off it was a failure. Steel orders had passed their peak, and high prices were discouraging to new construction. The steel mills were able to get non-

union labor for what work they had to do. Public opinion turned against the strike because a demand by the workers to share in the direction of their industries looked like the beginnings of sovietism, and this aversion obscured public notice of the repudiation of collective bargaining and the refusal to let union men hire halls or deliver public lectures.

The coal strike began in the Indiana fields on November 1, 1919, in spite of notice from the President that such a strike would be regarded as illegal under the Food and Fuel Act that forbade conspiracies to hinder production while the state of war lasted. The Government immediately procured a mandatory order upon the officers of the United Mine Workers directing them to recall the strike. This they complied with, under protest, and in the American Federation of Labor the voice of Gompers was raised against the doctrine that any strike could be forbidden as contrary to public interest. A federal commission was named in December to adjust the wage matter; and a year later, when the anthracite miners became discontented, they profited by the experience of 1919, and declared no strike. The men concerned merely took a concerted "vacation" against which no legal action was possible. A strike of the police force in Boston gave special emphasis to the claim of labor to the unlimited right to strike. Governor Calvin Coolidge denied that public guardians possessed this right. He was reëlected in November, 1919, largely upon this issue, and though a Republican received a warm letter of congratulation from President Wilson.

The American delay in ratifying the peace treaty was emphasized when on October 29, 1919, the international labor conference arranged for at Paris convened in Washington to draw up a general platform for Radicalism labor betterment. One attempt to do this for the United States had already failed. An industrial conference, meeting on October 6, had broken up in less than three weeks because of the inability of the delegates of capital, labor, and the general public to find common ground for discussion. A second industrial conference, likewise called by the

President, met on December 1, with Herbert C. Hoover as its dominant personality. A manifesto on industrial relations, published by this body some months later, was swallowed up in the presidential campaign.

A menace of revolutionary radicalism was believed by many to be connected with the labor troubles. About September 1, 1919, the Socialist Party split, and a "left wing," which the regulars later expelled, formed itself into the Communist Party, and proclaimed allegiance to the Socialist International that had recently sat at Moscow. Leaders of this party were later tried and convicted under the Espionage Act, which remained enforceable even after hostilities ceased. A general cry against socialism and the "reds" was heard throughout the country, and the Department of Justice proceeded, under the Alien Deportation Act, to round up foreign agitators who were believed to be dangerous. At Christmas the transport Buford sailed for Finland with a cargo of such aliens, who were thus carried back to the Russia of their revolutionary hopes. Victor L. Berger was made a national figure during the reaction against socialism. He had attained some fame in 1910 as the first Socialist to sit in Congress. In 1919 he was convicted of a conspiracy to obstruct the draft, and although reëlected to Congress in 1918 was not allowed to take his seat. At a special election after his unseating his Milwaukee constituency elected him again; and again in January, 1920, the House held that he was not entitled to take his oath. His district this time remained without a representative.

In New York five Socialists who had been chosen to the Assembly were expelled on the avowed ground that members of their party could not be both consistent and loyal; and when these were reëlected to succeed themselves, three of them were again unseated in September, 1920. Charles Evans Hughes protested against the expulsion, with the support of both the *Tribune* and the *World*, and Lieutenant-Colonel Theodore Roosevelt, Jr., made a similar protest in his maiden speech in the New York Assembly. Uneasy rad-

icalism struggled against reaction throughout the country, while the deadlocked Senate kept the nation out of peace.

The year 1920 may well be remembered because the Constitution of the League of Nations then became effective with the promulgation of the peace treaty, and the Constitution of the United States, whose provisions were invoked by opponents of ratification in America, was modified by the Eighteenth and Nineteenth Amendments. The Sixteenth and Seventeenth Amendments, one authorizing the levy of an income tax and the other providing for the direct election of United States Senators, were proclaimed seven years earlier, in the opening weeks of the Wilson Administration. The new amendments established prohibition and granted full suffrage to women. Together they worked a greater change in the purport of the Federal Constitution than had been brought about by all the preceding amendments since its original adoption.

The movement for woman suffrage attained success late in 1920. Like prohibition, it had been adopted in the Western States and was sweeping toward the East. The demand for sex equality that Lucretia Mott and Susan B. Anthony voiced in the middle of the century gained its first victories in the frontier States where the qualifications for the franchise had been systematically lowered since the first migrations. Anna Howard Shaw, who inherited the leadership of Miss Anthony, died within a few days of the proposal of the amendment by Congress, in 1919, but lived long enough to see her measure approved by the responsible leaders of all parties and started toward a sure success. For months, during the crisis of the war, a group of militant women picketed the White House and cast what discredit they could upon the President for his failure to procure the immediate suffrage they demanded. The ratification of the Nineteenth Amendment took only a year, and in the spring of 1920 there was a scramble among the leaders of both great parties to make it possible for women to vote in the presidential election. The amendment was pro-

The Nine-
teenth
Amendment:
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claimed in August, 1920, each party claiming credit for the act.

The artificial state of war, prolonged in the United States by the failure of the peace treaty, did not prevent steps toward the restoration of normal conditions. The series of loans, by which the United States supplemented her military effort in the war, was stopped with nearly all the authorized ten billion dollars advanced to the Allies. "The United States could not, if it would, assume the burdens of all the earth," said Secretary Houston when he announced that loans would cease. The balance of trade had not only created great debts owed to the United States, but it had caused alarming decline in foreign exchange that acted as an automatic embargo on the American export trade. On February 4, 1920, the pound sterling could be bought in New York for \$3.19 instead of its ordinary \$4.84; and French and Belgian francs fell to between seven and eight cents, while the German mark, under the influence of defeat as well as balance of trade, invited speculation at over forty to the dollar, instead of four. American prices remained at the peak caused by the various forces of actual scarcity, high cost of labor, impeded transportation, inflation of the currency, and the spendable savings of citizens whose Liberty bonds were thrown on the market now the emergency was over. Retail food prices averaged 207 in the first six months of 1920 as against 146 in 1917, and 100 in 1913.

The long-continued high prices exasperated citizens, who felt that they were in some way the fault of the Administration, and gave basis for the renewed demands of workers in every field for higher pay. In the schools and colleges, where salaries were low at best, a fear of the decay of scholarship and instruction inspired a general effort to correct the pay schedules. The railroad workers, whose demands had been put off from month to month, renewed their pressure, and fought the plans of Congress for terminating the Railroad Administration.

The Plumb plan for railroad control was advanced by

the unions during the summer of 1919, and contemplated a representation of the workmen upon the directorates of the lines. Many of the unionists hoped that Government control might be permanent, and might develop into actual Government ownership, but the obvious impossibility at this time of passing any law for extending Government activities turned the movement into one that guaranteed the workers a share in the management. Under the Railroad Act of 1918, which fixed the terms of Government control, it was provided that the roads must be returned to their owners twenty-one months after the end of the war. Director-General McAdoo asked to have this period lengthened in order to have an opportunity to test the system in times of peace. This was refused by Congress, which seemed indisposed either to allow Government control or to turn the roads back. Under the stimulus of presidential threat to deliver the roads to their owners at the earliest date unless Congress should act, the Esch-Cummins Bill was passed in February, for the return of the roads on March 1, 1920. The Interstate Commerce Commission was given large new powers over railroad finance, and a Railroad Labor Board was created to adjust wage disputes. This body granted large increases in pay during the next summer, and adopted a policy of refusing to confer with the leaders of outlaw strikes. The Interstate Commerce Commission allowed the carriers to increase their rates in order to earn the increased pay. Organized labor in general opposed the Esch-Cummins Act, and assisted in defeating Esch himself for reelection in November.

Before the return of the railroads was accomplished, the new presidential campaign was so far advanced that all public acts were directly affected by it. It was the wish of President Wilson that public attention should be kept fixed upon the treaty and the League of Nations, making the election a "solemn referendum" on that issue. "The United States enjoyed the spiritual leadership of the world," he wrote, "until the Senate of the United States failed to ratify the treaty by

Esch-
Cummins
Railroad
Act, 1920

The Treaty
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politics

which the belligerent nations sought to effect the settlements for which they had fought throughout the war." His own health was too uncertain to permit him to take any active part in the struggle, and in the absence of his aggressive leadership his party ranged in opinion from those who supported his views to those who accepted Bryan's policy of ratification with any amendments that might be needed to secure action, and even to those who believed with Reed, of Missouri, that there should be no league at all. Among the Republicans opinion was equally divided, with a tendency for the treaty opponents to receive support from League advocates who thought the failure of the treaty due to the stubbornness of Wilson.

In this uncertainty the candidacy of Herbert Hoover had an immediate appeal when his friends announced it in January. As a mining engineer, living much outside the United States, Hoover had no known political affiliations. The Democratic *New York World* supported him none the less, as did the liberal *New Republic*, the Republican *Philadelphia Public Ledger*, and the non-partisan but ubiquitous *Saturday Evening Post*. His supporters came largely from those who were unorganized in politics, the women and college professors, and business men, large and small. He appeared to represent a wave of thought that was tired of politicians and wanted the National Government administered upon the same high and impartial ideals that had made the Commission for the Relief of Belgium an international triumph. Moreover, he wanted a League of Nations, and was a proper continuator of American war policies.

The Hoover boom came to nought. Its supporters lacked cohesion and experience, and the powerful cement that comes from wanting something for themselves. So long as Hoover remained outside both parties he could expect no aid from active politicians. So soon as he was forced to admit that it was the Republican nomination he desired, he lost at once the support of such Democrats as had been willing to adopt him. The Republican leaders did not want

him, as they had not wanted Roosevelt in 1900. They preferred instead some one in harmony with the senatorial associates who had fought the treaty under the leadership of Lodge. Instead of Hoover, the opponents of Wilson gathered around the names of Leonard Wood, who was supposed to embody something of the spirit of Roosevelt; Hiram Johnson, who had made himself the personification of irreconcilable opposition to any league; or Governor Frank O. Lowden, of Illinois, whose appeal was that of a business man turned into an admirable executive. The Republican Party, still divided as in 1916, needed a candidate who could be supported by opponents of the League as well as its friends, by German-Americans who hated the treaty and Irish-Americans who hated England, by the remnants of the Roosevelt Progressives and the survivors of the "Old Guard" who wanted to get back to the conditions of 1896.

"Any good Republican can be nominated for president and can defeat any Democrat," said Senator Boies Penrose, who knew as much as any one about the organi-^{Harding and} zation of the party. By the time the convention^{Coolidge} met in Chicago in June, Hoover was out of the running, Wood and Lowden were weakened by revelations as to the large funds expended by their admirers to procure their nomination, and Johnson was too outspoken to meet the party need. Lodge, the temporary chairman, in his keynote speech, urged the ousting of the Wilson dynasty and the defeat of the Wilson league. The platform, adopted before the candidate was chosen, was a compromise designed to hold the Johnson faction in the party. The candidate, Senator Warren G. Harding, of Ohio, was a reservationist upon the treaty, a new member of the Senate, steady, well-liked, and conciliatory. His companion on the ticket was Governor Calvin Coolidge, of Massachusetts, whose behavior in the Boston policemen's strike had identified him with the maintenance of law and order.

Congress brought its regular session to a close a few days before the Republican Convention met. It had failed to end the state of war. On March 19 the treaty had been

defeated for the second time, and on May 27 Wilson had vetoed a joint resolution repealing the war declaration. The session had done less in reconstruction than the Republican advocates had promised in the campaign of 1918, and had spent months of time in patient though fruitless search for official misconduct in the war. Since March it had engaged in a naval investigation growing out of criticisms advanced by Sims. The investigation of the War Department, begun a year earlier, brought forth much testimony to the unreadiness of the country when war came, and to the blundering and waste that accompanied the hurried mobilization of industry and society. But no scandals were uncovered equal to those that followed the war with Spain. Appropriations were pared down to bring expenditures to a peace basis, and at the very end of the session laws were approved relating to the army and the merchant marine.

The Army Act of June 4, 1920, revised the National Defense Act of 1916 in the light of the experience of the years of war. It authorized a strength of about three hundred thousand for the regular army, and left the organization of the forces largely in the hands of the War Department. The General Staff was directed to confine itself more strictly to coördination than had been its habit during the war, but was left large enough to operate, and able to conduct the various schemes of professional education that had been found indispensable in the A.E.F. The post-graduate courses developed in the Roosevelt-Root administration of the army had justified themselves, and were now made the basis of advancement for all officers. For the enlisted men new schemes of education and specialized training were provided. Compulsory service or training in peace-time failed to find a majority. The National Guard was continued, but in closer and more organic relations with the regular army than ever before.

The Jones Merchant Marine Act, passed June 5, 1920, rearranged the duties of the United States Shipping Board and withdrew many of the emergency powers granted for the time of war. It left the

emergency fleet at the control of the Shipping Board, and made provision for the encouragement of the carriage of American freights in American vessels. In certain of its provisions, which Wilson declined to enforce on the ground that they went beyond the capacity of Congress, it ran counter to the treaty agreements existing with most of the nations having shipping in American ports. In the same spirit the Republican Convention adopted a plank re-opening the Panama Canal tolls controversy, and favoring the repeal of the law secured by President Wilson in 1914 whereby the merchant ships of all nations were put upon an even footing.

The Democratic Administration was under continuous attack by the Republican majorities in both houses of Congress, and only occasionally did President Wilson intervene openly from his seclusion in the White House. He announced no choice for his successor, but it was believed that William G. McAdoo would be a welcome selection. The criticism of McAdoo as "son-in-law" and "crown prince" weakened his availability as a candidate, and although many delegates to the convention were in favor of him he did not at any time become more than a receptive candidate. A. Mitchell Palmer was an aggressive aspirant for the nomination. As Alien Property Custodian during the war, and as Attorney-General after it, he had gained much prominence. Under his direction the federal anti-red campaign was waged, and an attack was made upon the profiteers. He was opposed by most of the radical Democrats on the ground that he had gone beyond reasonable limits in the restriction of freedom of speech and opinion. Outside the Administration group were Governor Edwards, of New Jersey, with aspirations founded upon his defense of "personal liberty" in his opposition to the Eighteenth Amendment, and Governor James D. Cox, of Ohio, who had the distinction of three elections to that office in a doubtful State.

William J. Bryan was again a leading figure at the Democratic Convention, held in San Francisco at the end of June;

not as a candidate, but as the champion of peace and prohibition. He failed to secure action for the latter cause, for this convention, like the Republican, treated the "dry" amendment as a closed issue and said nothing to stir up either side of the long fight. Ireland was present at San Francisco, as it had been at Chicago, demanding planks in support of the pretensions to independence of the Sinn Fein Republic. Since the Easter revolt of 1916 the Irish independents had organized what they claimed to be a government and had kept the island in a state of chronic disorder. American Irishmen, headed by Frank Walsh and Governor Dunne, had presented the claims of their former country to the "Big Four" at Paris, without avail; and Eamonn De Valera, as president of the revolutionary government, maintained American headquarters and supervised the sale of Irish bonds. On March 18, 1920, the Senate passed a resolution of sympathy with Ireland; and the organized Irish devoted themselves to the defeat of the peace treaty because of its failure to recognize their self-determination. The threat to swing the usual Irish Democratic vote to Harding resembled the hyphenated threat to swing the German vote to Hughes in 1916. The Democratic platform included a resolution of sympathy with the Irish cause.

The deadlock of the Democratic Convention over the leading candidates lasted longer than it had done at Chicago. In each case no one of the leaders could command the support of the tested professional politicians of the party; and as the Republican Senators swung to Harding at the end, so the Democratic city politicians swung the convention to Cox on the forty-fourth ballot, and gave him the two thirds needful for a nomination. Franklin D. Roosevelt, Assistant Secretary of the Navy, was named for Vice-President.

The passions aroused in the canvass of 1920 were inspired less by the candidates than by the idea of punishing either the President for his arrogance or the Senate for its defeat of the treaty. The hopes of third-party reformers were aroused by the apathy of the campaign. An attempt was

made in July, by a committee of forty-eight progressives, to unite the labor parties, the Non-Partisan League, and all the other discontented elements in a new party of reform. The Socialists had already nominated Eugene V. Debs for the fifth time, although he was now behind the bars in the Atlanta penitentiary. The other dissenting groups proved non-fusible; the farmers captured the convention of the "Forty-Eighters" and made so radical a platform that most of the callers of the convention repudiated the result. La Follette declined to accept a nomination from the group, and P. P. Christenson, of Utah, headed their ticket.

Labor continued uneasy during the summer of 1920, with many outlaw strikes, which labor leaders could not or would not restrain. Farmers were in protest against the fall of prices that became visible after July. To them the conduct of the Federal Reserve Board in raising the discount rate, and in refusing credit to borrowers who wanted it for the purpose of hoarding necessities for a higher price, was a sort of treason. But the Federal Reserve Board justified its creation by preventing panic as prices started back to normal. Sugar, which had been extensively hoarded, dropped from thirty-five to under ten cents per pound. In the early summer the textile mills noted a decline in orders and laid off hands. When Henry Ford cut his prices to a pre-war basis in the autumn there was no resulting crisis, although the act was generally accepted as proof of the post-war price decline.

The debate of 1920 centered upon the League of Nations, but with a majority of voters determined to vote without reference to its logic. Cox supported the League with enthusiasm, visiting nearly every State. Harding, speaking generally from his front porch in manner reminiscent of the campaign of 1896, varied his emphasis from day to day in the determination not to offend beyond recall either Root and Taft who wanted the League, or Borah and Johnson to whom it was anathema. But whatever he said, the underlying current was that of the majority party determined to return to power after two ad-

ministrations of self-incurred defeat. In his favor were the habitual Republican votes, the anti-Wilson votes, and the support of the multitude of Americans who had chafed under the unusual restrictions and penetrating taxation of the World War.

Harding and Coolidge were elected in November, with a popular plurality of 6,998,964 over Cox and Roosevelt, with every Northern State supporting them, and with Arizona, New Mexico, Oklahoma, Tennessee, and all the border States, except Kentucky and Virginia, in the Republican column. Debs ran third, but a better third than ever because of the radical reaction against war restraint and the protest against suppression of opinion. His votes measure in part the lack of interest in the two great parties. In both houses of Congress the Republican majorities were greatly increased. Like the Civil War, but for different reasons, the World War had driven the Democratic Party out of power, and left the future, whose outlines were but faintly visible, in the hands of the party of the North and West.

The political situation of 1920 bears a marked resemblance to that of 1912. In the earlier year, after a prolonged period of discussion of progressive measures, and with a heavy majority of Americans apparently desiring their enactment, a Democratic President was elected because of a split in the Republican ranks. And that President, seeing that the sole chance for success for his party lay in gratifying the desire of the non-partisan majority, directed the passage of the laws on tariff, banks, and trusts that had been formulating through the administrations of Roosevelt and Taft. In 1920, in similar fashion, there was an apparent conviction, broader than either great party, that the international relations of the United States must be put upon a new basis, and that the national expenditure must be brought within the amount of the national income. But the animosities of the World War, the natural disturbances after a period of deep emotional stress, and the normal trend toward a Republican majority, made it impossible for a member of Wilson's party to be elected

President. Much as the Rooseveltian ideals upon domestic policy were handed over to a Democratic President for realization, the international ideals of 1920 were now handed to Harding, although they had been reached behind the leadership of Woodrow Wilson. For a multitude of variant reasons, the Harding majority was made overwhelming; but the conclusion is evident that he was expected to find a means of doing what the League of Nations had attempted, without arousing the fears that the Covenant had engendered. "If the league to elect Harding can hold together," said *Life*, which had supported the League throughout the debate, "no one need despair of the possibility of a League of Nations."

Among the voters for the Republican candidates of 1920 there was a longing for a "return to normalcy," as Harding himself phrased it. But no one knew better than he that the future must be different from the past, and that the United States could never again remain outside and indifferent to the aspirations of the association of nations. The sharp cleavage in his party between the Treaty friends and the irreconcilables drove him to cautious statements during the campaign, but in making his Cabinet he gave no place to any prominent anti-Leaguer. He put Hughes in the State Department; and to Hoover, who as much as any American stood for effective participation in world affairs, he entrusted the reorganization of business conditions by placing him in charge of the Department of Commerce. There was much newspaper talk of this strength at the head and tail of the Cabinet, while the intervening posts proved to be even weaker than was suspected. The Secretary of the Navy resigned three years later under fire, the Attorney-General was subsequently dismissed, and both the Attorney-General and the Secretary of the Interior were finally brought to trial upon criminal charges of malfeasance in office. When opportunity offered, Harding called William Howard Taft to the post of Chief Justice of the United States, completing an administration whose conservatism was obvious, but whose attitude toward world affairs was not

crippled by any prejudice. In the Senate, Lodge became party leader, with a position that grew more secure when Penrose was, at the end of 1921, removed by death.

In the immediate foreground of public opinion, economy and a balancing of the national budget took the lead. Legislation for a budget system had been before Congress for many years, and Wilson had vetoed an unsatisfactory statute at the end of his administration. There was glaring evil in the practice of the Departments and bureaus in demanding funds from Congress without scrutiny as to either need or duplication. Each house of Congress made the matter worse by permitting as many committees as there were bills to call for appropriations of public funds. The reform required a national budget to be made under the eye of the President as responsible Chief Executive, and a change in procedure in each house, so that a single Committee on Appropriations might pass upon expenditures as a whole, and thus create an effective control of the purse.

The new Congress was called by President Harding to meet in April, 1921, to consider the budget, the tariff, the system of taxation, and other measures that might hasten the return to normal conditions. The first of these was ready for speedy passage because of its recent consideration by the last Congress. In June the Budget Bill became a law, and Harding emphasized his determination to give it full enforcement by appointing as Director of the Bureau of the Budget, Brigadier-General Charles G. Dawes, a successful banker, fresh from his tasks as buyer for the A.E.F. in Europe, and coördinator of Allied purchases. General Dawes had, moreover, caught the public attention and approval by his emphatic impatience at petty criticism of the conduct of the war. As a Republican whose war work had been a signal success, and as one who lacked the politician's nervous fear of Congress, Dawes was able to fight, with a chance of success, the bureaucratic inertia of the Departments and the administrative ineptitude of Congress.

The reform of taxation was laid before Congress as a

necessary part of readjustment. The whole tariff basis needed reconsideration in the light of post-war conditions, and there was much dissatisfaction with the working of the other revenue laws. Before either of these matters could reach a conclusion, the conditions in agriculture produced a temporary crisis. The farmers had passed from war conditions and inflated prices for their crops, with corresponding increase in apparent land values, to an abnormal depression in both land and crop in 1920 and 1921. So keen was their distress that an "agricultural bloc" appeared in Congress, composed of Representatives and Senators from the Southern and Western States, and strong enough to prevent legislation on other matters until its demand was met. An emergency tariff on farm products, and special legislation permitting the War Finance Corporation to advance funds on the security of farm loans, partly satisfied the bloc, but did not bring about its dissolution. Throughout the Congress the bloc remained a special guardian of the farmers' interests, prodded continually from the Washington headquarters of the various farmers' national societies.

The influence of the agricultural bloc was balanced, in part, by a veterans' demand, formulated through the American Legion, for "adjusted compensation" for veterans of the World War. The leaders of this claimed that while the soldiers were abroad, under the draft and serving for scanty pay, their associates who stayed at home in civil life were enabled to profit by the rise of war wages. They demanded that the soldiers be compensated for some of the difference between what they received as army pay and what labor was allowed to earn under the various national wage agreements. This demand was entirely apart from the insistence upon proper care for the cripples of the war and the dependents produced by it. The Bonus Bill, which embodied the various proposals for this adjusted compensation, persisted in Congress. It embarrassed the financial officers of the Administration, for it called for a new expenditure that might run to several bil-

lions at a time when the whole effort was being directed toward economy and the curtailment of expenditure. Adjusted compensation was asked for as a right, but to many it appeared to be a gratuitous gift that would be a dangerous precedent and injurious to the ideals of civic duty. The new Pennsylvania Senator, George Wharton Pepper, who succeeded Penrose, took an early lead in opposing the appeal of the Legion. The agricultural bloc, steady for retrenchment, opposed any bonus movement that involved financial outlay, and upon the shoulders of the President and his Secretary of the Treasury, Andrew W. Mellon, fell the duty of balancing the pressures. Mellon decried any assumption of a new financial obligation, while Harding forced the postponement of bonus legislation in July, 1921, and in 1922 still insisted that there should be none unless Congress were willing to pay the bill by a new tax on sales that would fall alike on all classes of citizens. He declared himself friendly to the idea of a bonus, but vetoed the bonus bill that was presented to him.

A tax revision bill, unsatisfactory to all, was passed at the special session, and repealed many of the lesser "nuisance" taxes. No agreement was possible on tariff revision, and the further Congress progressed in the field of finance, the worse became its dilemma. If a policy of a heavy protective tariff should be adopted, American manufacturers might thrive, but they could not hope easily to extend their foreign trade. Under such a policy imports from Europe would be reduced. But since the war ended with the Allies and Associates owing the United States, as their banker, some ten billion dollars, there was need for easy import of European commodities to reduce the debt. Most of the world's gold supply was already in American hands, foreign-owned American securities had already been bought back, and except with manufactured goods Europe could neither buy American wheat, cotton, and manufactures, nor pay the debt. Any policy that would aid in the collection of the debt would interfere with protection, while protection might make

The
foreign
debts

collection impossible. In February, 1922, a commission was created to negotiate the funding and payment of the foreign debt. British opinion at this time conceded that the debt must be paid, and the British Treasury made preparations for an interest payment in the following summer. In France, however, many voices declared that France could not pay unless the German reparations could be collected; and that the United States by rejecting the Treaty of Versailles had endangered this collection and compelled France to maintain a huge and costly army on the Rhine.

American business began to show signs of improvement in the spring of 1922, although Congress had made little progress upon a permanent scheme of finance. The "tumult and the shouting" of war times was giving way to a revival of habits of industry. Prices had declined far below their war levels, and their fall had been associated with a general deflation of currency conditions. The pound sterling, which had gone down to \$3.19 [normal value \$4.84] at the bottom of the depression in 1920, recovered to \$4.45 in July, 1922. The process of readjustment was accompanied by labor controversy and class complaint as each group tried to make deflation painless for itself. The crisis in agriculture was matched by one in labor. In January, 1922, Harding directed the holding of a great conference in the hope of easing the readjustments so far as agriculture was concerned. No cure-all was found at this conference, and the demand of extremists that Congress should try to fix prices by law was voted down. A law was, however, passed relieving farmers' coöperative marketing associations from the prohibitions of the anti-trust laws.

The road to normalcy was rough. Every angle of opinion was outspoken and irritable, and the clash of rival interests tended to obscure the full realization of the ^{Public} relatively high plane of economic thought upon ^{opinion} which the debate was conducted. No crude panacea like the greenbacks or free silver received the endorsement of any dominant group. The great body of Americans were willing to worry through, confident of ultimate success.

But the extreme utterance of radical marginal opinion was matched by equal extremity of reactionary advice. Insurgency and militancy and the war upheaval had done their work. The pessimism of the seventies of the preceding century, when serious men doubted whether democracy could be made to work, had a parallel in many minds of this later period. On every side there seemed to be waves of crime, flaunting immorality, disrespect for law, and discontent with the existing social order. The fears of a social revolution after the strikes of 1877 were matched by the forebodings of those who thought that the I.W.W. in their extremist form, the communist revolutionists, and the proletarian agitators represented an oncoming collapse of all that America had hitherto valued.

With Congress hesitating among the measures that would restore prosperity, and with the people distracted by the conflict of social and economic advice, the National Administration was confronted by the hard fact that the rest of the world was worse off than the United States, and that there could not be a sound prosperity and reconstruction until a reasonable basis of relationship should be found. The United States was still technically at war with Germany and Austria when Hughes took charge of the State Department. The other Allies had ratified the Peace of Versailles, and under this the League of Nations and numerous commissions for the readjustment of European conditions were operating as well as they could without the coöperation of America. During the campaign of 1920 it had been politic to hold together the various conflicting Republican groups. It was now necessary to define the position of the United States in order to conserve its interests. George Harvey, editor of the *North American Review*, was sent to England as ambassador, and was allowed to say with brutal frankness, so that there might be no misunderstanding, that the League of Nations was dead so far as the United States was concerned.

While Harvey was preparing for his British mission, Harding cleared the decks still further by settling the old

and annoying difficulty with Colombia respecting Panama. A treaty to close this dispute, in which Colombia claimed damages because of the loss of the Isthmus strip, had been negotiated in 1914 by Secretary Bryan. Year after year the Senate declined to ratify this agreement, inspired partly by dislike of the clauses in which regret for the occurrence was expressed by the United States. With these apologetic clauses omitted, but with the inclusion of a cash compensation sufficient to assuage Colombia (\$25,000,000), Harding asked the Senate to ratify the treaty at the special session in April, 1921. Senator Lodge, though an old and faithful friend of Colonel Roosevelt, reported the treaty and supported it in the debate, against those who attacked it as a reflection upon the memory of Roosevelt as President.

Colombia
Treaty
settlement

The prompt ratification of the Colombia Treaty was followed by an ending of the state of war with Germany and Austria.

As one of the victors in the World War the United States was entitled to a share in the control of the colonies taken from Germany. The allotment of these had been entrusted by the Peace of Versailles to the League of Nations, and this body had in 1920 taken up the task of assigning mandates for the control of the colonies. The United States was in vain requested to take the mandate for Armenia. Toward the close of his term of office President Wilson notified the Allies that the United States had not surrendered any of its rights, even though it had failed to ratify the treaty, and that the allotment of mandates without consulting the United States could not be accepted. In particular he protested against the assignment to Japan of the control of the former German islands lying in the Pacific Ocean, north of the Equator, and including the Island of Yap, which was of importance as a cable base. Hughes continued this protest, but found the Allies unwilling to take action undoing that of the League of Nations. The dispute over Yap was difficult of settlement, because the United States could not accept the

Yap and
the man-
dates

basis upon which it had been assigned, whereas the Allies and Japan were unwilling to unsettle their relationships by discarding the various private agreements of alliance by which they had unified the nations against Germany before peace negotiations were begun. President Harding determined to negotiate a separate peace with Germany and Austria, and to safeguard in this treaty the American rights as victor.

By act of July 2, 1921, Congress declared the state of war with Germany and Austria at an end, and terminated the operations of those special laws whose duration had been for the period of the war. Agents were thereupon put to work in Berlin and Vienna to negotiate the desired treaties of peace, which were signed and ratified a few weeks later. The World War was thus ended without bringing about the betterment of world affairs, or realizing those ideals of peace and concord that had in 1918 bound the Allies and the United States, and their peoples, in an alliance of interest and conviction sturdy enough to withstand the shock of the German drives, and resilient enough to rebound under the leadership of Foch, and to win the war. The failure of the Treaty of Versailles in America defeated that method of settlement, but did not extinguish American interest in the fundamental principles that President Wilson carried to Paris.

A few days after the passage of the peace resolution President Harding announced that he proposed to invite the principal Allies to meet in Washington on Armistice Day, November 11, 1921, to consider a plan for the limitation of naval armaments and for the establishment of a basis of peace for the Pacific. The announcement fell in with the hopes of even the bitterest of the opponents of the League of Nations, while pacifist opinion welcomed it as a first step to the millennium. Even after it was realized that the United States had no intention of suggesting a complete disarmament, the proposal was approved; and the European Powers, all of them fighting off bankruptcy and fearful of the mounting costs of competitive

armament, accepted the invitation with evident enthusiasm.

The ceremonies on Armistice Day comprised a pageant in Washington, and the burial at Arlington of the body of an unknown American soldier of the war. All over the United States, at the armistice hour of eleven, the work of the Nation paused while local meetings of commemoration directed attention both to the task that had been completed and the end still to be attained. On the following day President Harding met the delegates of the Great Powers at the opening session of the Washington Conference on the Limitation of Armaments, and Secretary Hughes proposed that the delegates agree to (1) a general treaty limiting the naval strength of Great Britain, the United States, and Japan to a fixed ratio of five-five-three; (2) a scrapping of naval tonnage in excess of the amounts that should be fixed; and (3) a general cessation of new construction of capital ships (dreadnaughts and battle cruisers) for a period of ten years. No one had anticipated so sweeping and convincing a pledge of sincerity in reduction of fighting strength, but each of the nations at Washington welcomed the basis of the American proposal.

The work of the Conference of Washington was grouped around the naval limitation treaty, a four-power treaty in which Great Britain, France, Japan, and the United States gave pledges for the maintenance of peace in the Pacific, a general agreement upon the affairs of China, and an amendment of the laws of war. Minor agreements were concluded supplementary to these, including one between the United States and Japan which closed the issue over Yap. The first treaty to be finished and signed was the Four-Power Pact. This called a halt to the fortification of the islands in the Pacific, and pledged the signatories not to attack each other. By its fourth article the Anglo-Japanese alliance of 1911 was terminated, thus lifting from the United States the fear that this alliance might some day have been brought to bear against itself.

The Conference of Washington completed its work on February 6, 1922, and the Senate, which had already be-

gun to discuss the new proposals, received the treaties a few days later. Those who were most irreconcilable in the debate of 1919 were still irreconcilable, and thought that they saw in the new agreements a set of alliances as obnoxious as those of the treaty of Versailles. A few Democrats maintained an opposition because the new treaties did not create a League of Nations. But public opinion, as the debate progressed, showed a declining interest in the apprehensions of the "bitter-enders"; and the fact that Great Britain managed to reach an agreement with insurgent Ireland and to inaugurate an Irish Free State, tended to lessen the antagonism of that anti-British group that had been so vocal during the debate over the League of Nations. The Four-Power Pact was ratified without amendment or serious reservation on March 24, 1922. It had received the bulk of the heavy debate, and the other agreements were approved in quick succession. The United States thus found a basis of reasonable agreement with its world neighbors. Business showed improvement in the spring of 1922, and gave ground for a hope that the approach to peace, normalcy, and a balanced budget was in sight.

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE

The dependence of the student upon the special articles in the reviews mentioned under Chapter XVIII, p. 404, becomes greater in the years of the immediate past. The weekly magazines remain useful, though with less significance than before 1900; in the *Nation* and the *New Republic* there is a continuous fire upon governmental policies, flanked upon the radical left by the short-lived *Freeman* and upon the conservative right by the *Weekly Review*.

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CHAPTER XXVII

THE CONTROL OF THE GOVERNMENT

THE desire to prevent the election of a Democratic President was the chief bond that held together the "league to elect Harding." The huge majority by which Harding and Coolidge carried the United States in 1920 was not the result of agreement upon the program of any party, or of opposition to any such program. It did not mean a permanent and effective membership in a party organization. But it did measure the accumulation of discontents based upon the inconveniences of war, and the willingness of the country to resume the old arrangement, generally typical since the Civil War, of Republican rule for national purposes. With the defeat of Cox accomplished, the Harding majority speedily dissolved itself into its component parts; and within the ranks of the Republicans the old and chronic debate of the factions was revived. Even before the Conference of Washington had done its work, the power of Harding and his friends was checked, a new insurgency was destroying any appearance of party discipline, and the hopes and aspirations of the searchers after normalcy were challenged by economic and social issues that would not down.

The control of the Government of the United States, to be operated in the interests of the controlling elements, became a dominant ambition after the World War. This represented a new philosophy of government that seeped slowly into the thinking and the unconscious reactions of capital and labor, of agriculture and industry, of the rural area and the urban districts. Men in middle life, who had already passed through two periods in which the emphasis was different from this, found themselves somewhat bewildered by the difficulty of the new equilibrium that had now to be estab-

The
Harding
majority

Philosophies
of govern-
ment

lished. Recently they had gone through a period of rampant progressivism; in their youth they had been exposed to new ideals of civic virtue.

Theodore Roosevelt, as an exponent of the advanced philosophies of the last quarter of the nineteenth century, embodied in his writings and his acts the notion of reform. The abuses in government and administration that produced the scandals from Tweed to Croker were largely diagnosed as due to bad men in office. The philosophy of civil service reform was that of getting the bad men out, getting in the good, and in protecting the latter in the tenure of their jobs. The reform movements made great progress, and the personal habits of public men improved from year to year; but the millennium failed to arrive and thinking men continued to find fault with the work of government. More than mere civic virtue was needed in the management of the modern state.

The movement of progressivism threw the emphasis in a different direction. Without casting aside the notion of reform, as such, the Progressives preached the doctrine of the expert. There is implicit in most of their teachings the idea that government can be made more or less a matter of science; that detached laboratory examinations of social and economic problems will yield laws that may be applied outside of politics; that these general principles should be made the subject of basic laws; and that the management of the latter should be entrusted to scientific experts. The shoals of administrative commissions that were spawned among the States, and around the National Government, between 1901 and 1916, indicate the general acceptance of these notions; and the success of the first presidential administration of Woodrow Wilson was founded upon his recognition of the wide currency of the ideas of progressivism in both the parties. But still the millennium did not come.

The experiences of the American Government during the World War threw doubts upon the completeness of either the older theory of reform through good men,

or the newer one of non-political advance through experts. Classes emerged with an unreasoning and disconcerting definiteness. There was no way of reducing to an eternal law the rate of interest that capital might enjoy, or the hours of labor that a woman might work, or the percentage of output that ought to go to ^{Class} wages, or the proportion of private income that ^{struggle} Government might take for its own purposes. These matters could be adjusted only by tests of strength. It was a consequence of the World War that labor was better organized and more conscious of its desires than it had ever been; that the agricultural interests knew more of their problem and their strategic situation; that finance knew its own mind and desired to retain its own profits. The control of the Government of the United States comes upon the scene as the aim of every vital class; with the fact of control a matter of greater concern than the course to be followed once the control is reached. There resulted a superficial confusion among the political events of the Harding Administration and its successor. Beneath the confusion lay a relentless struggle of rival groups and classes to operate the machinery of life in their several interests.

The degree and location of the dissensions that were to confuse the currents of politics became visible during the regular session of Harding's first Congress, in ^{Western} 1922. It was in the Middle West that the ^{uneasiness} regional character of the struggle for a new equilibrium was most clearly visible; which was not surprising, since the Middle West had long been a breeding ground for heresies. Here the Progressives had been strongest. Here the promises of Populism had been widely accepted. A little earlier still, the Granger movement had taken its firmest hold upon the farmers of the Northwest prairies. And here was yet alive the recollection of the outburst of 1854 that gave birth to the Republican Party. An abiding interest in whatever affected the prosperity of farms, and an equally abiding distrust of the political influence of

money and the corporations, had ever prevented the Western farmer from giving unswerving support to the Republican ticket. The weakness of the Administration was revealed in Iowa, in the spring of 1922, by the successful candidacy of Colonel Smith W. Brookhart for the United States Senate. Colonel Brookhart, a World War veteran and a small-arms expert, but not a professional politician, was nominated and elected by large majorities to fill out the term of Senator William S. Kenyon, whom Harding had elevated to the Federal bench. Brookhart's irregular popularity was such, and his fighting strength was so impressive, as to create a suspicion that when he should come up for reelection for a full term in the presidential year, 1924, he might make it impossible for the Republican Party to carry Iowa. Once in the Senate he immediately aligned himself with Senator La Follette and the other critics of the Administration.

The election of Brookhart was only one of the omens of 1922. In Indiana, former Senator Albert J. Beveridge, now distinguished as the notable biographer of John Marshall, entered the primaries to oppose the sitting Senator Harry S. New, a strong personal friend of Harding. He gained the nomination, but the election went to a Democrat. Gifford Pinchot, in Pennsylvania, revived the memories of Roosevelt Progressivism in his contest for Governor, and won the election. Farmer-Labor candidates, with the help of La Follette on the stump, took both Minnesota seats in the Senate in 1922 and 1923. Porter J. McCumber, of North Dakota, chairman of the Senate Committee on Finance, failed to secure a nomination to succeed himself, and was replaced by a Non-Partisan Leaguer, ex-Governor Lynn J. Frazier. In Wisconsin, Senator La Follette was reelected for his fourth term by more sweeping majorities than ever. And in New York, Alfred E. Smith, Democrat, carried the State for Governor.

Harding, meanwhile, in the face of this wide revolt, made but moderate success with his legislative policy. The Fordney-McCumber Tariff received his signature, Sep-

tember 21, 1922, without arousing enthusiasm in any quarter. Against his wish, the Congress passed a Bonus Bill, offering adjusted compensation to the veterans of the World War, on the theory that their low pay in the army entitled them to compensation on account of the high wages earned by the workmen of deferred classification who did not fight. Harding vetoed this (September 9, 1922) because it called for a great expenditure of money without making provision for raising the amount; and he emphasized through General Dawes and the Budget Office, the importance of his efforts to restore the expenditures of Government to a normal basis of economy. After election he called Congress in a special November session to consider a subsidy for an American merchant marine, which he worked through the House, but which died under a Democratic-Insurgent filibuster in the Senate. He advocated, without avail, American adherence to the Permanent Court of International Justice that had been launched by the League of Nations in December, 1920.

The reappearance of militant farmer politics was linked with a new political stirring in the ranks of organized labor. The influence of Samuel Gompers and his friends had thus far prevented the launching of a formidable labor party; but it now appeared as though such a party was imminent. The Agricultural Bloc, that had formed during the summer of 1921, to demand relief legislation regardless of party lines, continued to function and to work toward a *rapprochement* with the representatives of labor. The majority party was so weakened by the elections of November, 1922, that the Insurgents aspired to control a balance of power in both houses. They organized a Federated Press League to spread their publicity, and held in December a Conference for Progressive Political Action that was widely supported by labor leaders and that looked toward exerting an influence on the next presidential election.

The term of Congress that convened for 1922-23 was

Tariff,
bonus, and
budget

Farmer-
Labor

designated as the "Lame Duck" session, and was greeted with reproach by both Democrats and Insurgents. It contained the unwieldy majority that had been elected with Harding in 1920; but so many of its key members had been defeated at either primary or polls as to spread a general gloom over the short session. Unless the President took care of them with Federal appointments, they would be obliged shortly to retire into private life. The opposition called attention to the anomaly in the American system that leaves Representatives and Senators in office for a session after their successors have been elected. It revived the demand for an adjustment of the presidential term, and a shift of the meeting-time of Congress, in order to bring successful candidates into immediate charge of national affairs. There was wrangling throughout the session. Only with difficulty was a law passed approving the funding of the British war debt of \$4,704,654,465.43. The other debtors were not yet willing even to discuss the funding of their own. After a protracted fight, the various measures for farmer relief were brought together in an Agricultural Credits Bill (March 3, 1923), that established a new series of Federal Intermediate Banks to facilitate the granting of credit to cover the ordinary operations of the farmer's seasonal work. This completed an elaborate system whereby the farmer could procure short-time credit through his local bank and the Federal Reserve Board; longer crop financing through this new series of banks; and mortgage loans through the Federal Farm Loan Board. That any measure of this kind was passed at all was due largely to the pressure of the non-partisan Agricultural Bloc, whose point of view in legislation was defended by Brookhart of Iowa during the debate: "Forty per cent of the American people are farmers. As things are now organized in the United States, they have little voice in either its economic affairs or its political affairs. . . . The farm bloc, the labor bloc, the common soldier bloc, and the mothers' bloc of this country mean to have equal rights, equal economic and equal political power

The "Lame Duck" session

with the other combinations which are now able to put overhead charges upon the people of this country with such power . . . that it amounts to taxation without representation."

Harding's first Congress expired March 4, 1923, with much of its work undone; but the President announced his determination to get along without a special "Normalcy" session, and to allow the country to enjoy a period of relief from the almost continuous congressional debate that had come in repeated sessions since 1913. The voices for immediate legislation on every subject were confusing. The party tie had broken down, leaving nowhere a power to discipline insurgents; there was no recognized spokesman for any majority of the people; and the insistence of special pleaders on special points was matched by the narrow radius of their influence. It was a natural consequence of that shift in purpose which had been operating for a quarter of a century, whereby the Government of the United States was expected to interfere with human relationships at every point and to become a sort of "earthly providence" for the people. New measures for the reorganization of business and life had not yet had time to show the degree of their utility. Normalcy, which was the ideal of the wearied and conservative mind, was perhaps unattainable, but there was general approval of President Harding's decision to invite a season of economy and repose.

The uneasiness in the United States was but a part of the general unsettlement that prevailed throughout the world after the termination of the war. The Soviets in Russia remained in power and in bankruptcy; they maintained their authority, although the outside nations could not agree whether the Soviet rule was based on World terror or on the substantial consent of their unrest people. The passive resistance of the Germans to the terms of the peace settlement caused France in retaliation to occupy the Ruhr district and to seize control of the most important German industrial centers. The act was un-

avoidable, in the French mind, for France had reorganized its financial affairs after the World War on the supposition that the German reparations were to meet the costs of restoration of the devastated districts. Not until 1924 did the Allied Governments accept the discouraging principle that Germany could not pay unless allowed to control and create its own prosperity. Italy was in the throes of near-revolution, as was also Spain. England, with markets curtailed because of the collapse of buying power on the Continent of Europe, and with an army of unemployed who could not be allowed to starve, and who could not be supported except on public and demoralizing doles, faced impoverishment. The greatest American difficulty was the lack of the usual foreign market for the surplus of raw materials; the rest of the world was too poor to buy, and the farmer felt the pinch. There was real agricultural depression in the United States, but this was partly hidden by the evidences of greater comfort and wider-spread well-being than the rest of the world enjoyed.

The unexpected death of President Harding brought Calvin Coolidge into the presidency, August 2, 1923, but Coolidge did not bring a greater definiteness of purpose to the minority in Congress or a greater accord between Congress and presidential leadership. This Congress, the Sixty-Eighth, lacked any party majority strong enough to carry out a policy, and possessed in each house a block of Insurgents able to prevent legislation, if they could not dictate it. President Coolidge accepted the Harding Cabinet without change, as Roosevelt had accepted McKinley's, and in his annual message showed a substantial adherence to the Harding purpose of unemotional economy and legislative rest. Within a few months his friends had organized a movement to secure for him the Republican nomination for the presidency in 1924. He showed great capacity for silence and for taking political abuse without retort.

He needed this capacity when, early in 1924, ominous scandals broke out over the Department of Justice, the Inte-

rior, the Navy, and the Veterans' Bureau. In the last of these, a former chief of the bureau, an appointee of Harding, was accused of callous indifference to the needs of disabled veterans and gross waste of funds, and was brought under indictment for "fraud, conspiracy, and bribery." He was convicted and imprisoned at Fort Leavenworth. The descriptive testimony taken by the committee investigating the Veterans' Bureau spread a general belief that Harding had been betrayed by his appointee and friend. In the Navy Department the Secretary was attacked for his policy respecting the oil lands that had been set aside to provide fuel oil for the vessels. These oil reserves, at Elk Hills, in California, and Teapot Dome, in Wyoming, with Secretary Denby's approval, had been transferred in 1921 by President Harding to the custody and management of the Interior Department. The Secretary of the Interior, Albert B. Fall, with the explanation that the oil was being drained away and lost by the sinking of wells on adjacent property, had contracted with private oil companies to exploit the naval oil fields and to pay a royalty in the form of crude oil and tankage for storage purposes to the Navy Department. The dispute over this policy became a scandal when one of the oil men testified that he had made a "loan" of \$100,000 to the Secretary of the Interior; and when it was shown that Fall had accepted valuable gifts from another of the oil men. The mineralogical justification of the policy of developing the fields at this time was a matter of some doubt, but the suspicion of crude bribery for the benefit of oil producers transferred the whole question at once from the field of science to that of common honesty. Secretary of the Navy Denby resigned to relieve the Administration. Secretary Fall was already out of office, having retired before Harding's death; but he was proceeded against for bribery and conspiracy, while suit was brought by the Government to cancel the oil contracts. The suits, however, could not be prosecuted by the Attorney-General, Harry M. Daugherty, for he had lost the confidence of Congress because of allegations that he had

failed to prosecute for graft in the Veterans' Bureau, and that bootleggers and other traffickers in violation of the Prohibition Amendment had diverted to him a part of their ill-gotten gains. The fact that he had been a friend and intimate of President Harding made the charges the more sinister. The Attorney-General denied all guilt, but refused to allow the files of his office to be searched by committees of Congress in their investigation of his conduct. He was later tried for conspiracy with the alien Property Custodian, but the jury disagreed. The President required his resignation in March, 1924; and the Government cancellation suits were brought by special attorneys named by the President.

The scandal over Teapot Dome resounded through the press in the spring of 1924. In 1926, Samuel Hopkins Adams, in his novel of Washington and White House life, *Revelry*, used or adapted many of the details, and set society guessing at identifications, as Paul Leicester Ford had done with his *Peter Stirling* in Cleveland's second administration. In Congress there was partial deadlock and general unwillingness to follow presidential leadership. The proposals of the Secretary of the Treasury for income-tax reduction were rejected, and in a revenue law passed in June the detailed schedules were those offered by the Democrats, with Insurgent support. Coolidge vetoed the bill for the soldiers' bonus, known as the Adjusted Compensation measure, as Harding had done before him. But this time Congress had the votes to pass it over the veto.

A new Immigration Law became effective in May, 1924, after a prolonged fight by advocates of restriction, who had gained their earliest significant victory in the literacy test for immigrants which they passed over President Wilson's veto on the eve of the war in 1917. The problem of immigration control was unimportant from 1914 until 1919 because of war conditions, but immediately upon the establishment of peace the stream of newcomers rose in volume, and the United States

Immigra-
tion restric-
tion

was threatened with a deluge. European unsettlement added millions to the number of those ambitious to enter the United States, and the proportions of the stream showed, as always since 1890, a heavy preponderance of southern and eastern Europeans.

An emergency immigration law, in 1921, restricted the entry in any one year, from any one country, to three per cent of the number of persons from that country who were residing in the United States at the time of the census of 1910. Thus began a quota system designed to impede the wholesale rush to the United States, to protect American working conditions from indiscriminate competitors, and to establish some sort of national control over the racial constituents of the American people. For the next three years a permanent Immigration Law was intermittently discussed. It now, in 1924, took shape in a law limiting the annual quota of any country to two per cent of the number of its natives in the United States in 1890. The census of 1910 was abandoned as the base for determining percentages; and that of 1890 was selected, because at the earlier date the European contributions to the American people were still mostly from northern Europe — Ireland, England, Germany, and the Scandinavian lands. Provision was made for the ultimate substitution of a “national origins” base for determining the quotas; but the operation of this was deferred in 1927, because of the impossibility of identifying the “national origins” of the whole American population. Place of birth was relatively easy to establish, but the ultimate ancestry of the American people and the proportions of their origins defied statistical proof. President Coolidge signed the Immigration Law, approving its general principles, but disliking one of its provisions which peremptorily forbade immigration from countries whose natives were ineligible to naturalization in the United States. This meant Japan, and had the effect of arousing and intensifying the sensitiveness of that nation upon matters of racial equality.

The political damage of which the administrative scan-

dals and the headless Congress were capable was great in the early spring of 1924, but the presidential primaries revealed the fact that Coolidge was not thought to be contaminated by them. He carried the North Dakota primary in March, at the height of the scandal, with a good lead over both La Follette and Hiram Johnson, his competitors for the nomination. And North Dakota, next to Wisconsin, was the most promising State for the Insurgent movement. Coolidge was renominated at Cleveland in June, on the first ballot. He received as companion on the Republican ticket Brigadier-General Charles G. Dawes, just back from service in Europe with the Dawes Commission, whose function was to find a workable scheme for the German reparations and to put it into practice.

The Democrats met in Madison Square Garden, New York, with the local stage set for the nomination of Governor Alfred E. Smith, then in his second term at Albany, and strong in effective personality and party record. But the out-of-New-York delegates were equally strong for William G. McAdoo, who had the support of the South and West, and the friendship of organized labor, dating from his service as Director-General of the Railroads during the war. He had also the support of many of the anti-Catholic elements of the party, for Governor Smith was a member of the Catholic Church. A Democratic journalist at Cleveland had never seen a "Republican convention in which the atmosphere was so gratifying to a Democrat"; but at New York the atmosphere was even more gratifying to Republicans. The convention turned into a religious fight between Catholics and Protestants, with Smith supporters in the galleries making much of his humble origin on the "East Side," and roaring the chorus of "The Sidewalks of New York," and with William Jennings Bryan leading the rural members to check Smith's nomination. The convention met June 24; and on July 9 it took its one hundred and second ballot without result. On the next ballot the break came, and John W. Davis, of West

Virginia and New York, received the nomination. Charles W. Bryan, of Nebraska, brother of William Jennings Bryan, was the choice for Vice-President. The long deadlock over a religious issue, which had much the same cleavage as the ancient division between the Democratic city machines and the Southern country Democracy, destroyed the ability of the party to present a united front and make full use of the scandals among the Republicans.

As the campaign of 1924 progressed, little was heard of Teapot Dome, but much of the hopes of a new third candidate of protest who had now arisen. The various Insurgent elements of both parties, reënforced by some of the Socialists, and the representatives of many labor groups, met at Cleveland on July 4, with much the same spirit as the Progressives of 1912 and the Populists of 1892. They nominated Robert M. La Follette, Senator from Wisconsin and long an Insurgent, as an independent candidate for the presidency; and allowed his executive committee to select as running mate Senator Burton K. Wheeler, of Montana, a Democrat who had risen to prominence in the various investigations of the year. The platform was the old La Follette Progressive platform. The candidate repudiated Socialism, as the convention had excluded Communists. The appeal was to discontented farmers, to labor as a class, and to the advocates of political and social reform. The executive committee of the American Federation of Labor, in spite of its rigid policy of keeping away from parties, endorsed La Follette as a protest against the candidates of the two old parties; but as the campaign advanced, it was revealed that most of labor, as most of the farmers, were still Republicans or Democrats rather than members of any economic party.

A demand of the platform for a curbing of the Supreme Court of the United States by a constitutional amendment permitting Congress, by reënactment, to give validity to a statute disallowed as unconstitutional by that body, received heavy attention in the debates of the autumn. General Dawes, who was Republican representative on the

stump while President Coolidge remained calmly in the White House, contended that such an amendment would destroy the constitutional basis of the Government. The suggestion, that in the Supreme Court lay the chief protection of religious or racial minorities against the temporary passion of a majority, had wide influence. Colonel George Harvey, back from England and again a journalist, produced in his *North American Review* the lucky slogan "Coolidge or Chaos," and showed a possible series of consequences should the third candidate receive enough electoral votes to throw the election of President into the House of Representatives. Quite as influential as any of the arguments were the rising price of corn and the improvement in the financial condition of the West. On November 4, 1924, another landslide, nearly as great as that of 1920, took place. Coolidge and Dawes were elected by Election results nearly 7,500,000 plurality. Davis and Bryan carried only the eleven States of the old Confederacy, and Oklahoma. La Follette, unsupported in his hope of an uprising of the people, received the electoral vote of only his own State. In the Congress that was chosen, a clear Republican majority was indicated in both houses. The Insurgents lost their power to block. The older leaders in the Senate, thinned by defeat and death, were reduced in influence. Senator Henry Cabot Lodge, who had led them, died a few days after the election, and the Governor of Massachusetts appointed to succeed him a wealthy manufacturer, William M. Butler, generally unknown to national politics until in this campaign he had become sponsor for Calvin Coolidge and chairman of the National Committee.

The political stage in the United States was clearing rapidly. The death of Senator Lodge removed one of the human links connecting the period of the World War with that of hopeful reform after the Civil War. The new personnel Senator Penrose, of Pennsylvania, as real a Harvard man as Lodge, but one who stood not for reform but as the incarnation of stalwart machine politics, had died and left

Pennsylvania politics headless in 1921, Roosevelt had died early in 1919, leaving no successor. Wilson, lingering in sickness until 1924, beheld the defeat of his highest hopes. La Follette, whose fighting spirit had long been fiercer than his body had been strong, broke in 1925; while Bryan passed away at the same time, in the midst of his impassioned crusade against science. Eugene V. Debs, released from Federal prison where his conscience against the World War had carried him, died in 1926, and took from Socialism its figurehead of a generation; while Samuel Gompers had recently vacated his dominant place in the labor world. Cummins of Iowa, long a progressive, lived to be rejected by his own people, and died in 1926. And toward the end of the year, Joseph Gurney Cannon, personification of "stand pat" in politics, but "dimmed to an ember by the weight of ninety years," died peacefully at his home in Danville, Illinois.

There remained as outstanding elder statesmen, William E. Borah and Hiram Johnson, both of whom represented the progressive tradition of the West. There was no great stalwart Republican left on the stage except Elihu Root, who was living in private life; and no imposing Democratic leader outlasted the Democratic interlude that Woodrow Wilson had dominated. In the new struggle for the control of the Government of the United States, party lines were frayed, leaders were local and accidental, issues were confused, and even the goal toward which thoughtful men hoped to advance was dimmed.

Calvin Coolidge passed into his second term, in 1925, without sensation, and without great change in his official family. Charles Evans Hughes retired from the State department to be replaced by Frank B. Kellogg, who was brought back from London for the purpose. In the War Department, John W. Weeks was soon driven by failing health to retire in favor of Dwight F. Davis. The Attorney-General Harlan Fiske Stone was elevated to the Supreme Court; and in filling the vacancy thus created President Coolidge received one of the rare

humiliations that occur when the Senate declines to confirm a Cabinet officer. Charles B. Warren, Coolidge's first choice, was twice nominated and twice rejected by the Senate; the grounds alleged by the Democratic-Progressive dissenters being a too close affiliation with large business. Eventually John G. Sargent of Vermont received the post.

Before Coolidge was reinaugurated, the Republican caucus in the House of Representatives had decided that
 The third term Nicholas Longworth of Ohio should be made
 Speaker when the new Sixty-Ninth Congress
 should convene. This arrangement was carried out in December, 1925; but it was easier to elect a Speaker than it was to chart a course for the legislation of the Congress. Already party lines were beginning to be shaped with the election of 1928 in view. Critics, who were on any grounds opposed to the election of Coolidge, began to dig out and rearrange the old arguments against a third term for any President; and to cite Washington and Jefferson who declined such terms, and Grant and Roosevelt who were refused them. Longworth was talked about as a possible leader for the conservative wing of the Republican Party. The Progressive wing looked for some available leader of the farmers' cause, and seemed to see the likeliest candidates in the Vice-President, Charles G. Dawes, and in the former Governor of Illinois, Frank O. Lowden. The legislation of 1926 and 1927 was snarled in this clash of Republican views and aspirations; with Democrats encouraging first one side and then the other, in the hope that again a Republican split might give them an opportunity.

Economy was still the catchword of the Administration, although critics did their best to prove that it was not real.

Finance The national budget continued to operate, watched relentlessly by its director, with the President behind him. Apart from agriculture, the country was prosperous, and there accumulated in the Treasury a large surplus above expenditures. It was the desire of the Administration to turn most of this into the channel of debt reduction; but a large part of it was instead returned to the

people by a tax reduction bill that passed in February, 1926. Among the few matters upon which there was wide agreement were the inexpediency of new ventures in expenditure and the wisdom of frugality. There was difference as to when the fruits of frugality should be enjoyed; whether immediately through tax reduction or in the future after debt reduction. The interest-bearing national debt was steadily reduced, from its peak of \$26,300,000,000, in the summer of 1919, to \$19,300,000,000 at the end of the fiscal year 1926.

Agriculture continued depressed and dissatisfied. In every session of Congress the spokesmen of the Western farmers dwelt upon the structural weakness of agriculture as against that of labor or manufacture or finance. More and more real study was given to the economics of the farmers' situation. Part of the agricultural depression was diagnosed as being the consequence of post-war deflation; part as fundamental and inviting basic legislation.

The bad temper of the agricultural argument came largely from the post-war deflation. It could be shown that agriculture had been hardest hit when prices came down after 1920. All the tables of average prices showed a deeper decline for farm products than for either wages or manufactured goods. The Federal Reserve System was attacked, on a charge of having deliberately encouraged this deflation under the improper influence of the banks and the manufacturers. And while there was some doubt as to the degree to which the deflation had possessed this special animus, it was certain that the farmer had borne its burden. His crops had declined in value, the appraised value of his farm had often fallen below the amount of the mortgage on it; yet the machinery and supplies that he was forced to buy had remained at or near their old high levels. Revolt against the protective tariff again spread over the Republican West; and the farm bloc revived much of the intemperate language of Populism in the debates of 1922-27.

One of the results of the Populist movement and the free silver craze had been a serious study of currency and

finance, with a gradual agreement upon the banking system under the Federal Reserve Board. Now, in somewhat similar way, serious study of the economics of land and agriculture, began to reveal the outlines of the farmers' problem. The economists in the universities, the banking and manufacturing interests that wanted peace, and the farmer politicians that wanted both issues and relief joined in innumerable organizations to dissect the problem. During 1926 and 1927 the names of an Iowa Congressman, Gilbert N. Haugen, and an Oregon Senator, Charles L. McNary, were identified with proposals to aid agriculture through control of the farmers' surplus.

The central feature of agricultural difficulty was revealed in the surplus. In other fields of production, some sort of control had been established upon the gross output to prevent the collapse of prices due to glutted markets. No means had yet been evolved whereby the farmer could control his surplus. In the great staples of agriculture, each farmer as an individual guessed each year at the acreage that he might devote to crops; and when prices were high he enlarged the total output so as to cause a glut that often broke the price below the cost of production. There was no way of limiting production to probable needs, and the result was a continuous fluctuation in prices, to the great advantage of middlemen and speculators, but to the injury of the farming regions. In addition to this, the normal hazards of agriculture due to rainfall, temperature, crop disease, and parasites, made it quite impossible for any farmer to know how much of a crop he would harvest, regardless of the acreage put in. Unless an effective control of the surplus and its marketing could be evolved, there was little prospect of bringing agriculture up to the level of stability that prevailed in industry.

From the Populist period down to the passage of the Agricultural Aid Bill of 1923, with its system of intermediate banks, the remedy for the farmers' plight had generally been sought in some sort of credit manipulation, whereby

the farmer could borrow easily and cheaply. But the source of the disease was now seen to lie deeper than this. Without collateral, no farmer could borrow, however much he might need money; and without a market, no farmer could sell to advantage and pay his debt.

The agricultural proposals of 1926 and 1927 were directed at the surplus. A McNary-Haugen Bill, for the control of the surplus and the stabilization of price, was under consideration in the latter year. It proposed to create a Federal board that should buy the surplus in the big years, and either hold it off the market until prices should rise or dispose of it abroad for what it would bring. The proponents of this legislation, who included both General Dawes and Governor Lowden, believed that some such control of agricultural surplus could be made effective. The opponents charged that the only result would be a taxation of the whole population in order that the farmer, as a favored producer, might enjoy a high price for his output; and they asserted that a high price level, maintained by such means, would only invite larger crops in ensuing years until the whole system would break down. To this the proponents rejoined that the manufacturers' price was already pegged at a high and artificial level by the protective tariff, and that there was no reason why the farmer should not similarly enjoy the aid and favor of the Government.

The McNary-Haugen Bill was vetoed by President Coolidge, in 1927; with the result that its advocates set to work to find a farmers' candidate for the Republican nomination of 1928, while President Coolidge undertook to find a remedy that would satisfy the genuine grievance of the farmer, without being inherently unsound in an economic way. He spent his vacation in the Black Hills of South Dakota, seeking both recreation and political guidance, and allowing himself to be photographed in the garments of the plainsmen and the wild Indians as he tried to make new contacts with the Republicans of the West. When he left Washington for the vacation it was generally supposed that he was to be

McNary-
Haugen
Bill

an active candidate for the presidential nomination in 1928; and his opponents, whether Democrat or Insurgent Republican, were hopefully playing upon the old tradition that runs against a third term for any President. The *Atlantic Monthly*, sensing the reëntrance of the idea, procured for its September 1927, issue, an article by the dean among the American historians, John Bach McMaster, on "The Tradition against the Third Term." But before the article was printed, its interest was only academic, since President Coolidge, on the fourth anniversary of the death of President Harding, August 2, 1927, announced curtly through the newspaper men to the public: "I do not choose to run for President in 1928."

With President Coolidge withdrawn from the running, the field was wide open for aspirants for the farmer vote. It was quite as much a class movement as the manufacturers' for a protective tariff had ever been. But no theory of farmer relief through the control of the surplus, or on any other principle, had attained the definiteness or the simplicity of the protective tariff as a means to an end. No program even succeeded in gaining the undivided attention of the general public, as the tariff, and slavery restriction, and inflation had more than once done. Old politicians had found their tenure weakened or broken, and an ominous number of them had been retired at the election of 1926; but there was as yet no evidence that their successors in office had a firmer grip on the fundamentals of economics or government than they had had. And the public refused to be interested. "The philosophy of democracy is one of random conjecture," was the comment of the leading newspaper of the Mississippi Valley upon the congressional election of 1926; "The *Chicago Tribune* sold 50,000 more copies the morning after Mr. Gene Tunney made scrambled eggs of Mr. Dempsey's re-created face than it sold the morning after the election of November 2, when the voters made scrambled eggs out of the elections."

In the field of external relations there was greater de-

finiteness than could be shown in the struggles over domestic problems. The foreign policy of President Coolidge was simple and realistic, following ^{Foreign policies} the lines laid down by President Harding and Secretary of State Hughes. It accepted without objection or further discussion the fact that the United States was not to be a member of the League of Nations. It remained willing to discuss matters of common interest with various committees and commissions of the League; it continued to work for the disentanglement of American affairs from those of the war associates, and pressed the discussion of terms of adjustment for the foreign debts; it desired to aid the pacific settlement of international disputes by bringing about American membership in the World Court of International Justice; it protected American interests in the Americas or overseas, even though such protection was denounced as open imperialism; and it lessened the effectiveness of any charge of imperialism by proposing further reduction of armaments along the lines established at the Conference of Washington in 1922.

The League of Nations was becoming a reality in world politics, without the United States. It passed one of its great milestones when, after a conference at ^{League of Nations} Locarno, in the Swiss Alps, in 1925, Germany and France agreed to treaties providing that neither should attack the other and that their differences should be submitted to arbitration. This was followed by the decision to admit Germany to full participation as a member of the league, which took place at the meeting of the Assembly in September, 1926. In the various enterprises of the League, the United States was habitually represented by unofficial observers, who took part in the general debates. In one of them, a committee named to prepare the *agenda* for a conference on reduction of armament on land, the United States took an active part, although it was found impossible to bring the European nations to any sort of agreement even upon the bases of discussion.

The continuance of the policy of disentanglement was

complicated, as respected France, by the rise in France in 1924 and 1925 of a positive opinion that rejected the binding character of the French debt to the United States. The leaders of this protest came in many instances from the regions of France that had been devastated by Germany during the World War. They had been promised complete reimbursement by the French Government; and like all of France had taken it for granted that Germany would be made to pay the damages. When the likelihood of Germany's payment faded and the obligation of restoration fell upon the French nation, there was created a burden for France that no other participant in the World War, save Belgium, suffered under. France tottered on the verge of bankruptcy; and many of her people, seeing no way of meeting current expenses of government, let alone the six billions of dollars, more or less, that restoration would cost, began to wonder why they should also have to pay to the United States a debt that now amounted to \$3,340,000,000. They recalled the fact that the United States had not suffered devastation, that it had lost few among the dead, that it had come late into the war, and that it was President Wilson who had stated so convincingly that notion that the World War was a common struggle of the Allied World against reaction and autocracy. It was not hard for the French, following this train of thought, to come to a conclusion that the debt ought to be an American contribution to this common cause, and not an added burden upon their own shoulders. But France desired to continue to borrow in the United States the funds needed for financial recovery, and there was slight chance of floating new loans if the United States should think the war loan had been repudiated. Hence the French Government, seeing the whole situation, made no attempt to disavow the debt, whereas the French people generally tended to disregard it. In the autumn of 1925 the French Minister of Finance, Joseph Caillaux, came to Washington to negotiate an agreement, but left without one. In April, 1926, the French Ambassador in Washington signed a contract of payment, which

the French Government could not bring itself to submit to Parliament for ratification. The Italian debt, however, was reduced to contract in 1925, as were most of the debts of the lesser borrowers. It remained the American policy to treat the loans as genuine obligations; not to press actively for payment, and to make sweeping compromises as to principal and interest whenever the debtors felt ready to take the matter up. But it was also the policy to discourage private investment in countries that were unable to recognize their obligation.

Membership of the United States in the World Court became an inactive issue after 1926. The protocol by which the World Court was to be established was offered to the nations in 1920, and was by President Harding transmitted to the United States Senate in 1923. Harding, and later Coolidge, urged the Senate to ratify the agreement, and used many arguments to prove that such action would only be a compliance with the old American policy of arbitration and not an involvement with the League of Nations. In the spring of 1925, the pro-Court Senators succeeded in making action upon the Court a special order for December, 1925. Senator Lenroot led the parliamentary fight for the World Court in the session of 1925-26, having to face a protracted filibuster made by the opponents of the bill. A final vote was forced only after invoking the cloture in January, 1926; but so many reservations had been accepted by the Administration that the measure as finally passed would have required the League of Nations to make over the World Court, as the price of American adherence. The nations declined to do this, and President Coolidge, in December, 1926, announced that he had given up the fight.

The United States continued to play a lone hand in foreign affairs, with the major portion of American opinion satisfied with such a policy. But there was an acute difference of view as to the way in which the lone hand should be played, and domestic controversy was reflected in the reaction of the various groups to foreign Imperialism

episodes. In general radical opinion chose to believe that foreign policy was dictated by property interests alone, and both the Secretary of State, Frank B. Kellogg, and the President came in for attack by critics who were already attacking the Administration on other matters. In Nicaragua, Panama, Mexico, and China were situations whose development made it possible to revive old discussions of imperialism.

In the discussions of imperialism in the United States there has been no agreement as to the precise meaning of the term. Those who have regarded themselves as anti-imperialists have generally believed that imperialism is a conscious and deliberate policy whereby the United States seeks to erect a control of force over other peoples, for its own advantage, or for the financial profit of those who exploit the Government. Those who conduct the other side of the argument never accept cheerfully the term as applied to themselves. They maintain that in each instance in which American influence is asserted or exercised, the Government is impelled by some other motive than immediate profit, and that some principle is at stake that cannot properly be sacrificed. A treaty made with Panama in July, 1926, was brought to public discussion in the following winter, and was denounced as imperialistic because it provided that in the event of war the United States, in the defense of the Canal Zone, should be permitted to make what use it regarded as necessary of the territory of Panama. The ratification of the treaty was obstructed in Panama by an opposition that saw in it a surrender of the dignity of that republic.

In Nicaragua there was revolution in 1926 and American intervention in 1927. Here, after prolonged election conflict, the United States declined to recognize a military dictator as President, and gave formal recognition, November 17, 1926, to General Adolfo Diaz whose title appeared legal to the State Department. An insurgent candidate, who had been overridden by both the military dictator and Diaz, protested the action of the

United States, receiving much countenance from Americans who thought that the recognition of Diaz was an instance of imperialistic tendency. The insurrection continued against Diaz, in spite of the intervention of American Marines, until, in the spring of 1927, Henry L. Stimson was sent in by Coolidge as special agent and succeeded in bringing the warring factions to a temporary truce. Underneath the episode ran the difficult question of American investments and property in the disturbed area and the degree to which the Government ought to interfere in the affairs of weak neighbors to protect property rights. Coolidge and Kellogg maintained that it was the duty of the United States to afford such protection when the weakness of local governments made it necessary.

In Mexico much larger problems arose out of the application of a new constitution of 1917 to the status of the Catholic Church and to the title of mineral re-
sources. In pursuance of mandates in this con-
stitution the Mexican Church was nationalized in the sum-
mer of 1926, and the hierarchy of the Church inaugurated a strike against interference by the State. Under other mandates of the constitution decrees were issued asserting national title to oil and ore lands in a way to threaten the rights of the nationals of foreign countries that were engaged in working the Mexican resources. Certain of the American oil companies refused to register their claims, as the decrees required, and complained that their property was being seized by the Mexican Government. The United States Senate, by almost unanimous vote in January, 1927, urged the Administration to arbitrate with Mexico this matter of land and resource titles; but to President Coolidge it seemed to be a question of fundamental right, and not a matter for arbitration, and he continued to press for full recognition by Mexico of the principle that American property could not be subject to compulsory nationalization. The fact that many American Catholics were already bitterly antagonistic to the Mexican Government helped to create a situation in which American opinion was spread

over a wide range, from the one extreme, that the United States ought to intervene at once by force, to the other, that Americans in foreign lands have no claim upon their Government for any kind of protection. And anti-imperialists again found material to be used in denouncing imperialistic tendencies of the American Government.

The willingness of Coolidge to use pressure or force in the interest of Americans abroad was again shown in the case of China Chinese upheaval. Early in 1927, China was in general confusion, the only realities of government emanating from the Nationalist center at Canton and from the remnant of the old order at Peking. Throughout China rival military leaders exercised what force they could, but no one ruler was able to speak for the Chinese. The common divisor of the revolutionary movements was a hostility toward foreigners that was shown everywhere, and that resulted in extensive destruction of life and property. For more than a quarter of a century, since the Boxer uprising, the Chinese had been irked by the presence of foreign influence, and they had responded to the World War phrase of "self-determination of nations." There was no promise in sight as to what the future might bring to China or to Western interests there. But the immediate problems were the salvage of what property there was and the protection of the lives of Europeans and Americans in China. The foreigners were largely concentrated in and around Shanghai. As the waves of revolt approached this region, European powers sent in their troops and warships; and again Coolidge had to make the practical decision. Without raising a question of the future, he acted in the present for the protection of Americans, sending to their aid a large detachment of Marines, commanded by Brigadier-General Smedley D. Butler.

In most of these diplomatic crises, the ultimate rights involved were highly uncertain, and it was impossible to protract debates on fundamental principles so long that both rights and human lives might be needlessly destroyed. The policy of the American Government was to recognize

the special position of the United States in the Americas and to give protection to American citizens where they might need it, but at the same time to avoid either indiscriminate intervention or abstinence merely because of a fear that action might be called imperialism. The thoughts of the Government respecting permanent policy followed the line of reasoning that had produced the Treaties of Washington in 1922.

The ten-year naval holiday that was embodied in the Treaty of Washington was half over when the United States again took up the difficult question of ^{Naval} limitation of naval armament. There had been ^{limitation} a futile attempt by a commission of the League of Nations to carry forward the general policy initiated by President Harding and Secretary Hughes; but the problem as a whole was too complicated for easy adjustment, and the failure of the United States to become a member of the League weakened the latter in any world adjustment. President Coolidge now took the lead toward another piecemeal limitation, in the matter of minor and auxiliary naval armament. France and Italy were unwilling even to discuss these limitations, which would affect policies in the building and armament of submarines and cruisers. But England and Japan accepted the American invitation, whereby the delegates of these three countries assembled at Geneva, June 20, 1927, to attempt to apply the existing battleship ratio of 5:5:3 to the other tools of naval warfare. This time the United States had no such voluntary renunciation to offer on its own part as when it proposed in 1922 to scrap its battleship project of 1916 in the interest of economy and limitation. The new discussions spread over six weeks at Geneva, and to no end, since the Conference adjourned without agreement. In their background was a new possibility of developments in aviation that might easily affect every agency of national defense.

The striking event that indicated a new range of utility for aircraft was the thrilling exploit of a young American, Charles A. Lindbergh, who flew a small plane, the *Spirit*

of *Saint Louis*, from California to New York, with but a single stop at Saint Louis; and who then alone in his Lindbergh plane rose from the runway at Roosevelt Field, Long Island, on May 20, 1927, to descend thirty-three hours later on the landing-field at Paris. Lindbergh became an international hero in a moment, was fêted at London, Brussels, and Paris, was brought home on a warship as a hero of the nation, and was welcomed by President Coolidge and the whole Government in a huge triumph. Before his exploit ceased to be news, two other Americans, Chamberlin and Levine, flew from the same Long Island field almost to Berlin. Two army aviators, on June 29, landed in Honolulu, on a non-stop flight of twenty-six hours from Oakland, California. And on the same day Commander Richard E. Byrd, with three associates, flew the Atlantic to the shore of France. The sudden conquest of the air and the Atlantic had portentous implications for peace and trade, and brought new uncertainties into every aspect of war, on sea or land.

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INDEX

- "A.B.C." powers, offer mediation between United States and Mexico, 466.
- Adams, Henry, 62.
- Adamson Law, 451.
- Addams, Jane, 174, 444.
- Adjusted Compensation Act, the, 646.
- Agricultural Aid Bill, 654.
- Agricultural bloc, the, 629, 641 f.
- Agricultural Credits Bill, the, 642.
- Agricultural relief, 653 f.
- Agriculture, depression in, 653.
- Agriculture, Department of, 157.
- Aguinaldo, leader of insurrection in the Philippines, 292; capture of, 327.
- Air Service, in the World War, 543.
- Aircraft Production Board, the, 509.
- Alabama claims, the, 41 f.
- Alaska, purchased from Russia, 43; full territorial organization of, 411.
- Aldrich, Nelson W., 399.
- Aldrich Monetary Commission, 437 f.
- Aldrich-Vreeland Act, the, 379.
- Algeciras, conference at, 334.
- Alger, Russell A., 263, 278.
- Alien Property Custodian, 528.
- Aliens, deportation of, 616.
- Allied Maritime Transport Council, 562.
- Allied Naval Council, 562.
- Allies, war debts of, 658 f.
- Altgeld, John P., 241.
- Amalgamated Association of Iron and Steel Workers, the, 236 f., 314.
- Amendments to the Constitution, Thirteenth, 11; Fourteenth, 13 f.; Fifteenth, 68; Sixteenth, 400; Seventeenth, 408; Eighteenth, 459, 599 f.; Nineteenth, 617 f.
- American Alliance for Labor and Democracy, 534 f.
- American Commission to Negotiate Peace, the, 577 f.
- American Expeditionary Force, the, 513 f., 564 f., 570 f.
- American Federation of Labor, 168, 314, 453 f., 503.
- American Historical Association, the, 63.
- American Legion, the, 583 f.
- American Party, the, 393.
- American Railway Union, the, 237.
- American Red Cross, the, 533.
- Americanization, 458 f.
- America's cup, the, 161.
- Amundsen, Captain Roald, 591.
- "Ananias Club," the, 373.
- Anthracite coal strike, 313, 347.
- Anti-Saloon League, the, 599.
- Anti-trust legislation (1903), 345.
- Anti-trust policies, Wilson's, 442 f.
- Anti-war agitation, 534 f.
- Arbitration treaties, President Taft's, 415 f.; Bryan's, 469.
- Architecture, effect of Richardson on, 61.
- Argentina, offers mediation between United States and Mexico, 466.
- Arizona, admission of, 410 f.
- Armaments, limitation of, 634 f.
- Armed merchant ships, 497.
- Armistice, in war with Spain, 290; at end of World War, 574.
- Army, the, after the Civil War, 5; status under Hayes administration, 70; use in strikes, 239; in war with Spain, 278; organization during World War, 486 f.; expansion in World War, 512, 518 f.; reorganization during World War, 551 f.; in France, 564 f., 570 f.
- Army Act of 1920, 622.
- Army War College, 328, 331.
- Arnold, Matthew, 61.
- Arthur, Chester A., nominated for Vice-President, 85; succeeds to Presidency, 89; administration of, 126 f.
- Astor, John Jacob, 116.
- Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe Railway, 102 f.
- Atkinson, Edward, 123.
- Atlantic Monthly*, the, 57.
- Authors, new, the rise of, 58.
- Automobiles, increased use of, 592.
- Aviation, in World War, 509; development of, 589 f.
- Baer, George F., 347.
- Baer, John M., 460.
- Baker, Newton D., Secretary of War, 487.
- Ballinger controversy, the, 402 f.
- Ballot reform, 184 f.
- Baltimore, strikes of 1877, 78.
- Bancroft, George, 58, 62.
- Barker, Wharton, 393.
- Barnard, F. A. P., 51.
- Barnum, P. T., 160.
- Baruch, Bernard M., 509, 548.
- Baseball, professional, 163 f.
- Battleships, modern, 329; building of, 487.
- Beef, becomes new article of commerce, 151 f.
- Belgium, invaded by Germany, 472; American relief in, 508 f.
- Bell, Alexander Graham, 112.
- Bellamy, Edward, 172.
- Benson, Admiral William S., 331.
- Berger, Victor L., 420, 616.
- Bicycles, popularity of, 165.
- "Big Four," the, at the Peace Conference, 580 f.
- Bimetallism, 209, 227 f. *See also* Gold standard and Silver.
- Blaine, James G., Speaker of the House of Representatives, 45; leader of a faction in the Republican Party, 81; aspirant for Presidential nomination, 84; Secretary of State, 86, 89, 185; career of, 131 f.; at Republican Convention in 1888, 179; relations with President Harrison, 216 f.
- Bland, Richard Parks, 95.
- Bland-Allison Act, the, 96.
- Bliss, General Tasker, H., 328.

- Blockade, in World War, 478, 525; unrestricted, 495 f.
- Bond issues, President Cleveland's, 243.
- Bonus bill, the, 629, 641.
- Book-Buyer*, the, 57.
- Bookman*, the, 57.
- Boone and Crockett Club, the, 158.
- "Boot-legging," 601 f.
- Borah, William E., 456 f.
- Bosses, political, 298 f.
- Boston, police strike in, 615.
- Bourne, Jonathan, 421.
- Boxing, 162 f.
- Boy-Ed, German military attaché, 485.
- Brady, Thomas J., 108 f.
- Brazil, offers mediation between United States and Mexico, 446.
- Brest-Litovsk, negotiations at, 557.
- Bridges, construction of, 114.
- British labor movement, the, 556.
- Brookhart, Smith W., 640.
- Brookings, Robert S., 549.
- Brooklyn bridge, opening of, 114.
- Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers, the, 74, 77.
- Bryan, Charles W., nominated for Vice-President, 649.
- Bryan, William Jennings, leader of silver faction, 230; nominated for Presidency, 256 f., 302, 393; leader of Democrats at Baltimore Convention, 428; Secretary of State, 432, 450, 462; peace treaties, 469; opposes breach with Germany, 496; opinion upon Fundamentalism, 604; leading figure in Democratic Party, 623.
- Bryce, James, 61, 415 f.
- Buckner, Simon B., 258.
- Budget reform, 628 f.
- Buffalo Bill, 159.
- Bullard, General Robert L., 567 f.
- Bureau of Corporations, 346.
- Bureau of Education, 54.
- Bureau of Mines, 385, 410.
- Business in politics, 338-355; railroads and prosperity, 338; Edward H. Harriman, 338; Union and Southern Pacific merger, 339; Northern Pacific panic, May 9, 1901, 340; mergers, 341; United States Steel Corporation, 341; integration, 342; Sherman Anti-Trust Act, 342; the Northern Securities Company, 344; Anti-Trust legislation, 1903, 345; Department of Commerce and Labor, 346; Cuban reciprocity, 346; anthracite strike, 347; elections of 1902, 349; reform, 349; tariff reduction, 350; Joseph G. Cannon, 351; Hanna and the presidency, 352; the Wisconsin Idea, 353; Roosevelt and Fairbanks, 353; Alton B. Parker, 353; campaign contributions, 354.
- Butler, Benjamin F., nominated for President, 129 f.
- Butler, Nicholas Murray, nominated for Vice-President, 430.
- Byrd, Commander Richard E., 591, 664.
- Cabinet, President Hayes's, 65 f.; President Garfield's, 86; President Arthur's, 89 f.; President Cleveland's, 140; during Cleveland's second Administration, 220; President Harrison's, 185; President McKinley's, 261; President Roosevelt's, 316, 332; President Taft's, 397; President Wilson's, 432; President Harding's, 627; President Coolidge's, 644, 651.
- Cable, George W., 60.
- Campaign contributions, 354.
- Canada, relations with, 70 f.; Taft urges agreement for better trade relations, 419; efforts toward reciprocity, 420; American rights in fisheries, 415.
- Cannon, Joseph G., Speaker of the House of Representatives, 351 f., 388, 406 f.; death of, 651.
- Cantigny, fighting at, 567.
- Caribbean region, interests in, 413 f., 469 f. *See also* Latin America.
- Carlisle, John G., Speaker of the House of Representatives, 129; Secretary of the Treasury, 222.
- Carnegie, Andrew, 117, 341; gifts to education, 364.
- Carnegie Corporation, the, 364.
- Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 364; interest in international peace, 417.
- Carpet-baggers, the, 15.
- Carranza, General Venustiano, 464.
- Cattle industry, the, 149 f.
- Cattle-men, organization of, 154 f.
- Centennial Exposition, the, 62.
- Central America, relations with, 414. *See also* Latin America.
- Century Magazine*, the, 57.
- Cervera, Admiral, 280 f.
- Chaffee, General Adna R., 280.
- Chamberlain, David H., 68.
- Chamberlain, G. E., 542 f.
- Chamberlin and Levine, flight to Germany, 664.
- Charity, new theory of, 174.
- Château-Thierry, fighting at, 568 f.
- Chemical Warfare Service, the, 543.
- Chemin des Dames, German assault upon, 566.
- Chicago, Burlington and Quincy Railroad, 104.
- Chicago, Columbian Exposition at, 233; packing industry in, 151 f.
- Child labor, 444.
- Children, literature for, 60.
- Children's Bureau, 444 f.
- Chile, difficulty with, 214; offers mediation between United States and Mexico, 466.
- China, European concessions in, 316 f.; revolution in, 662.
- Cincinnati convention, for formation of a third party in 1891, 212.
- Cities, growth of, 160, 172 f.
- Civil Rights Bill, the, 13.
- Civil Service Commission, the, 367 f.
- Civil Service reform, 127 f., 182.
- Civil War, the aftermath of, 1-48; the right to secede, 1; changing status of the State, 2; fruits of victory, 2; meaning of reconstruction, 3; end of the Civil War, 3; restoration, 4; home rule, 4; the army, 5; financial reconstruction, 5; the Civil War in politics, 6; population of the sections, 6; Lincoln's theory of the Union, 7; the rival theories, 8; Congress and Lincoln, 9; Andrew Johnson, 10; Republican radicals, 11;

- Congress in control, 12; the veto and the two thirds, 13; Reconstruction Acts, 14; Fourteenth Amendment, 14; tenure-of-office, 16; impeachment of Johnson, 16; Grant, 17; Civil War and the idea of nationality, 20; frontier and post-frontier, 21; Far West, 22; the mineral empire, 24; the Indian problem, 25; Sioux War of 1862, 26; Sand Creek, 1864, 27; Fort Phil Kearney, 1866, 28; railroad-building and the Indians, 29; Union Pacific, 29; middle Western development, 30; frontier finance, 31; deflation, 37; greenbacks, 33; greenback movement, 33; the "Ohio Idea," 34; election of 1868, 35; railroad control, 35; panic of 1873, 36; frontier economics, 37; Jay Cooke, 38; Granger movement, 38; diplomatic reconstruction, 39; Mexico, 40; Alabama Claims, 41; Santo Domingo and Alaska, 43; Greeley and the liberal Republicans, 43; *Crédit Mobilier*, 44; frauds, 45; anti-Republican drift, 45; Greenbackers, 45; Tilden, 46; Hayes, 47; electoral contest, 1876, 47; episode of the "rebel" flags, 182.
- Clark, Champ, Speaker of the House of Representatives, 419 f.
- Class struggle, 639.
- Clayton Anti-Trust Law, 443 f., 476.
- Clayton-Bulwer treaty, the, 318.
- Cleveland, Grover, career of, 136; Cleveland and the dead center, 176; attacks on tariff system, 176; the tariff a major issue, 177; the Mills Bill debate, 1888, 178; Cleveland renominated, 179; Benjamin Harrison, 179; status of reform, 182; the "rebel" flags, 182; the Murchison letter, 183; second nomination of Cleveland, 217; Democratic victory, 1892, 220; reelected President, 220; rum, Romanism, and rebellion, 137; panic of 1884, 138; the Cleveland government, 140; pensions, 141; fraud in the public lands, 143; homestead system, 144; illegal enclosures, 146; forfeiture of the railroad land grants, 147; the falling price of silver, 222; status of Treasury, 223; panic of 1893, 223; the Democrats and the panic, 226; bimetallism, 227; the gold reserve, 228; repeal of the Silver Purchase Act, 229; clash of classes, 231; party realignment, 232; Chicago's World Fair, 1893, 233; steel, 234; the Homestead strike, 236; Debs and the American Railway Union, 237; the courts and strikes, 238; the army and strikes, 239; the Democratic program, 1893, 240; Altgeld of Illinois, 241; growth of populism, 242; disappearance of the surplus, 243; the Cleveland bond issues, 243; the Wilson Tariff, 1894, 244; income tax, 245; Venezuela boundary dispute, 246; the new navy, 248; death of, 392.
- Coal mining, control of, 385.
- Coal strike of 1902, the, 347; in Indiana fields, 615.
- Cody, Colonel William F., 159.
- Coffin, Howard E., 509.
- Coinage, silver, 91 f.
- Colfax, Schuyler, 17.
- Collective bargaining, 451.
- Colleges, expansion of, 49 f.
- Colombia, attitude toward construction of the Panama Canal, 320 f.; Hay-Herran Treaty, 320 f.; attitude toward United States, 414; Bryan's treaty with, 465, 469; cash compensation for loss of Panama, 633.
- Columbian exposition, the, 233 f.
- Commerce and Labor, Department of, 346.
- Commission for the Relief of Belgium, the, 508.
- Commissioner of Labor, 346.
- Committee on Public Information, 505.
- Communism, menace after World War, 616.
- Congress, relations with President Lincoln, 9 f., relations with President Johnson, 10 f.; period in which political faith differed from that of the President, 45; relations with President Hayes, 67, 99; election of 1898, 294; Democrats gain control during Taft's Administration, 419; rearrangement of, 434 f.; continuous session of, 441; the war session, 502 f. *See also* Democratic Party and Republican Party.
- Conkling, Roscoe, 81; rivalry with Blaine, 87 f.
- Conservation of national resources, 379 f.; conference during President Roosevelt's Administration, 383; the Ballinger controversy, 402.
- Continental railroads, completion of, 102.
- Contraband, in World War, 478 f.
- Cooke, Jay, 37 f., 226.
- Cooley, Thomas M., 156.
- Coolidge, Calvin, as Governor of Massachusetts, 615; nominated for Vice-Presidency, 621; succeeds to Presidency upon death of Harding, 644; renominated for Presidency, 648; elected President, 650.
- Cooper, James Fenimore, 158.
- Cooper, Peter, nominated for President, 45.
- Cortelyou, George B., 346, 353 f.
- Corruption, in politics, 81 f.; during Grant's Administration, 44 f.
- Cost of living, increased, 451.
- Cotton States' Exposition, the, 115.
- Council of National Defense, the, 488, 533, 503 f.
- Country clubs, rise of, 164.
- Courts, place in American system of government, 238; attitude toward strikes, 393.
- Covenant of the League of Nations, the, 581 f.
- Cowboys, in the West, 151.
- Cox, James D., 623.
- Coxey's army, 241.
- Crawford, F. Marion, 59.
- Crédit Mobilier* of America, the, 44.
- Creel, George, 505.
- "Crime of 1873," the, 92.
- Crisp, Charles F., 214.
- Critic*, the, 57.
- Crocker, Richard, 299.
- Cuba, struggle for independence, 43; revolution in, 269; blockade of, 280 f.; government organized, 326 f.; reciprocity with, 346 f.; relations with, 414.
- Cullom, Shelby M., 155.
- Currency, after Civil War, 91 f.
- Currency Act of 1900, 300.
- Current Literature*, 57.
- Custer, General, 28; expedition of, 73.
- Cycles, of prosperity and panic, 224 f.

- Dakota Territory, 94; demands statehood, 197 f.
- Daniels, Josephus, 450 f.
- Dartmouth College case, the, 36.
- Davis, John W., nominated for Presidency, 648.
- Dawes, Charles G., 628; nominated for Vice-President, 648.
- Day, William R., Secretary of State, 290 f.
- De Lima *vs.* Bidwell, case of, 326.
- Debs, Eugene V., 237 f.; nominated for President, 301, 355, 393, 430, 625; death of, 651.
- Debt, National, at close of Civil War, 32.
- Declaration of London, the, 336.
- Deficit, Treasury, 263 f.
- Deflation, following Civil War, 32.
- Demobilization, at end of World War, 577 f.
- Democratic Party, in 1868, 17, 35; in 1876, 46; in 1880, 86; claim of fraud in election of President Hayes, 99; in 1882, 120 f.; return to partial control of government, 140; in 1888, 179; in 1892, 218 f.; relation to panic of 1893, 226; in 1893, 240; in 1895, 251 f.; in 1900, 302; in 1902, 353 f.; in 1910, 419; in 1912, 426 f.; in 1914, 477; in 1918, 623 f.; in 1924, 648 f.
- Demonetization of silver, a grievance of the Populists, 213.
- Denominational colleges, 52.
- Denver and Rio Grande Railroad, 104.
- Dewey, Admiral George, 275.
- Dial*, the, 57.
- Diaz, General Porfirio, demands recognition as President of Mexico, 71; ruler of Mexico, 463.
- Dingley, Nelson R., 263.
- Dingley Tariff Bill, 263 f.
- Diplomacy, improvement in American methods, 39.
- Direct election of Senators, provided for in Seventeenth Amendment, 408.
- Direct primary, advocated, 266; advocated by Senator La Follette, 407; advocated by Roosevelt, 425.
- Directors, of trusts, exchange of, 439.
- Discontent, in 1877, 98 f.
- "Dollar diplomacy," 414.
- Donnelly, Ignatius, 212.
- Dorsey, Stephen W., 108 f.
- Downes *vs.* Bidwell, case of, 326.
- Draft, in World War, 512, 552.
- Drago doctrine, the, 335.
- Drama, changing taste in, 361.
- Dreadnaught, British battleship, 329.
- Dumba, Dr. Constantin, Austrian ambassador, 485.
- Eastern front, German gains on, 493.
- Edison, Thomas A., 113, 594.
- Edmunds, George F., 135.
- Edmunds Law, the, 203.
- Education, 49-64; education in the American life, 49; Johns Hopkins and the educational renaissance, 49; college education, 51; the Morrill Act: educational endowment, 51; denominational colleges, 52; the women's colleges, 52; Southern education, 53; educational saturation, 54; the new school of letters, 56; the magazines, 56; Mark Twain, 58; Henry James, 59; children's literature, 60; the negro theme, 60; the European visitor, 61; era of the Centennials, 62; the frontier of history, 63.
- Education test, a virtual disfranchisement of the negro, 219.
- Educational foundations, the, 364.
- Eighteenth Amendment, the, 599 f.
- Eight-hour day, the, 452.
- El Caney, fighting at, 286.
- Election, of 1868, 35; of 1876, 47.
- Elections, of 1902, 349. *See also* Democratic Party and Republican Party.
- Electric light, invention of, 113.
- Electricity, increasing use of, 113.
- Eliot, Charles W., 54.
- Elkins Anti-Rebate Act, 346.
- Embargo, in World War, 525.
- Emergency Fleet Corporation, 506 f.
- Emergency war revenue bill, the, 476.
- Employers' liability, 445.
- Employment service, 446.
- Enclosure of public lands, illegal, 146 f.
- Enclosures, in cattle country, 154.
- Endowments, educational, 51.
- Esch-Cummins Railroad Act, 619 f.
- Esch-Townsend Act, the, 372.
- Espionage Act of 1917, 521 f.
- Exports Administrative Board, 527.
- Evans, Robley D., 330.
- Evarts, William M., Secretary of State, 66.
- Expedition Act, the, 345 f.
- Failures, commercial, in 1893, 228.
- Fairbanks, Charles W., nominated for Vice-President, 353.
- Fairbanks, Charles W., 388.
- Fall, Albert B., 645.
- Farmers, proposed political alliance with labor, 641.
- Farmers' Alliances, 205 f.
- Farmers' surplus, problem of, 654.
- Far West, the, changes in, 22 f.
- Federal Board of Vocational Education, 446.
- Federal Reserve System, the, 440 f.
- Federal Trade Commission, 443, 476.
- Fifteenth Amendment, 68.
- Fifty Million Act, the, at opening of war with Spain, 279.
- Filibuster, in Senate, against Armed Ship Bill, 498 f.
- Finance, effect of Civil War, 5 f., 31 f.; frontier, 31 f.; study of banking situation during President Wilson's Administration, 437 f.; World War appropriations, 510 f.; after World War, 618; problems in 1926, 652.
- First American Army, the, 570 f.
- Fisheries dispute, adjusted with Great Britain, 70.
- Fleet of 1907, the, 331. *See also* Navy.
- Foch, General Ferdinand, placed in supreme command of Allied armies, 563; counter-attack of, 569.
- Food, government inspection of, 375 f.; war-time conservation of, 507.
- Food control, in World War, 528 f.
- Food prices, average in 1920, 618.
- Foraker, Joseph B., 298.
- Foraker Act, the, 325, 388.
- Ford, Henry, peace ship of, 182; defeated for United States Senate, 611.

- Ford, Paul Leicester, 172.
 Fordney-McCumber Tariff, the, 640.
 Foreign born, education of, 459.
 Foreign debts, 630 f.; problems of payment, 658 f.
 Foreign exchange, decline in, 618; increase in, 631.
 Foreign relations, improvement in, 39; following Civil War, 40 f.; under Blaine as Secretary of State, 89; during President Harrison's Administration, 214 f.; during President Roosevelt's Administration, 316-337; during President Taft's Administration, 412 f.; during President Wilson's Administration, 462-586; during President Coolidge's Administration, 657 f. *See also* Latin America, and World War.
 Forest lands, conservation of, 383.
 Fort Leavenworth, army service schools enlarged, 328, 331.
 Fort Phil Kearney, 28.
 Foster, John W., 71.
 Foundations, educational, 364.
 Four-Power Pact, the, 635.
 Fourteen Points, President Wilson's, 554 f.
 Fourteenth amendment, to the Constitution, 13 f.
 France, interests in Morocco, 334; at outbreak of World War, 472 f.; at Conference of Washington, 635; war debt to United States, 658. *See also* League of Nations, and World War.
 Francis Ferdinand, Crown Prince of Austria, murder of, 471.
 Frankfurter, Felix, 547.
 Frauds, during President Grant's Administration, 44 f.; election, 99.
 Free coinage of silver, demand for, 95 f., 209 f.; attitude of Democrats, 254.
 Free trade, advocates of, 123. *See also* Tariff.
 Freeman, Edward A., 62.
 Frick, Henry Clay, 236.
 Frontier, changes in, 21; financial problems, 31 f., economic problems, 37 f.; historical treatises upon, 63; attitude toward silver coinage, 94; disappearance of, 105, 149-175; the cow country, 149; railroads and farm competition, 150; plains cattle, 150; the long drive, 151; packing industries, 151; Northern ranches, 153; enclosures, 154; organization of cattle-men, 154; railroad regulation, 155; *Munn vs. Illinois*, 1877, 155; Interstate Commerce Act, 1887, 156; Department of Agriculture, 157; substitutes for the frontier outlet, 157; the "Wild West," 159; the "Greatest Show on Earth," 160; urbanization, 160; rise of sport, 161; John L. Sullivan, 162; rise of baseball, 163; the country club, 164; bicycles, 165; tennis, 166; the changing social outlook, 166; standard of life, 167; Knights of Labor, 167; immigrant ideas, 169; Henry George and the single tax, 170; Labor parties, 170; Western railroad strikes, 171; social visions, 172; the crowded cities, 172; social relief, 173.
 Fuel control, in World War, 528.
 Fundamentalism, 604 f.
 Funston, Frederick, 327.
 Furuseth, Andrew, 447.
 Gage, Lyman P., 262.
 Garfield, James A., nominated for President, 85; Administration, 86; relations with Congress, 87; assassination of, 88.
 Garrison, Lindley M., Secretary of War, 486.
 Gary, Indiana, steel strike at, 614.
 Gasoline, conservation in World War, 529.
 General Education Board, 365.
 General Land Office, effect of railroad expansion, 106.
 General Munitions Board, the, 509, 536.
 General Staff, of army, established, 329; reorganization of, 551 f.
 Geneva, naval conference at, 663.
 George, Henry, 170.
 Gerard, James W., 462.
 Germany, becomes a united nation, 20; Socialists prosecuted by, 169; attitude during Spanish-American War, 277; blockade of Venezuela, 322 f.; interests in Morocco, 334; Kiel Canal opened, 470; at outbreak of World War, 471 f.; propaganda in United States, 475 f.; submarine warfare of, 478 f.; President Wilson's notes to, 480; early gains in World War, 493 f.; the breach with, 496 f.; efforts late in World War, 563 f.; collapse in World War, 573; treaty of Versailles, 608 f.; end of war with United States, 634; war reparations, 658; French occupation of the Ruhr, 643. *See also* World War.
 Gillett, Frederick H., chosen speaker of the House of Representatives, 611.
 Gilman, Daniel Coit, 55.
 Glass, Carter, 440, 584.
 Godkin, Edwin Lawrence, 56.
 Goethals, George W., 322, 413, 468, 506, 551.
 Gold Democrats, the, 258.
 Gold plank, in Republican platform of 1896, 254.
 Gold reserve in 1893, 228.
 Gold standard, Republican attitude, 305.
 Golf, introduction of, 164.
 Gompers, Samuel, relation to labor movement, 314, 453 f., 503; upon strikes of 1919, 615.
 "G.O.P." the Republican Party returned to power, 259; reform in, 265.
 Gorgas, Colonel William C., and sanitation of Panama Canal Zone, 322, 413; control of yellow fever in Cuba, 326.
 Gould, Jay, 117, 171.
 Government, increase in business of, 366; the control of, 637 f.
 Government control, 369-386; the extension of immigration, 369; Northern Securities case, 370; Interstate commerce, 371; the conservative Senate, 372; the Hepburn Railroad Law, 373; pure food, 375; Oklahoma admitted, 376; Roosevelt panic, 1907, 377; Aldrich-Vreeland Act, 379; conservation, 379; control of water rights, 381; forests, 383; conservation conference, 383; Bureau of Mines, 385.
 Grain Corporation, the, 528.
 Grand opera, growth in popularity, 362.
 Granger movement, the, 38.
 Grant, Ulysses Simpson, nominated for President, 17; Administration of, 17 f., 35 f.; third-term boom, 83; death of, 139.

- Grant and Ward, failure of brokerage house, 138.
- Graves, Henry S., 410.
- Great Britain, the Alabama claims, 41 f.; American rights on the Isthmus of Panama, 89; in Venezuela boundary dispute, 246 f.; attitude toward Panama Canal, 318 f.; blockade of Venezuela, 322; interests in Morocco, 334; Panama Canal tolls, 413 f.; proposed arbitration treaties, 415; at outbreak of World War, 471 f.; at Conference of Washington, 635. *See also* League of Nations, and World War.
- Great Northern Railroad, 340.
- Greeley, Horace, nominated for President, 43.
- Greenback movement, the, 33 f.
- Greenback National Party, the, 45; candidates of, 85; in 1878, 98; in 1880, 85; opposition to resumption of specie payments, 98.
- Greenbacks, 33 f.
- Gresham, Walter Q., 180.
- Hadley, Arthur Twining, 301.
- Hague, Carnegie's peace palace, 417.
- Hague conferences, the, 335 f.
- Haiti, relations with, 469 f.
- "Half-breeds," the, 65-90.
- Hancock, Winfield Scott, nominated for President, 85; upon the tariff issue, 124.
- Hanna, Marcus A., 252; relations with President Roosevelt, 311; relation to the Presidency, 352.
- Harding, Warren G., as Senator, 609; nominated for Presidency, 621; elected President, 626; death of, 644.
- Harding and Coolidge, administrations of, 637-665; the Harding majority, 637; philosophies of government, 637; the "good men" theory, 638; government by experts, 638; class struggle, 639; Western uneasiness, 639; elections of 1922, 640; tariff, bonus, and budget, 641; Farmer-Labor, 647; the "lame duck" session, 642; "Normalcy," 643; world unrest, 643; Coolidge, 644; scandals, 645; immigration restriction, 646; Coolidge and Dawes, 1924, 648; Davis and Bryan, 648; La Follette, 649; election results, 650; the new personnel, 650; Cabinet rearrangements, 651; the third term, 652; finance, 652; agricultural relief, 653; problem of the farmers' surplus, 654; McNary-Haugen Bill, 655; foreign policies, 657; League of Nations, 657; the foreign debts, 658; World Court, 659; imperialism, 659; Panama, 660; Nicaragua, 660; Mexico, 661; China, 662; naval limitation, 663; Lindbergh, 664.
- Harmsworth, Alfred Charles, 269.
- Harper's Monthly*, 57.
- Harriman, Edward H., 338 f.
- Harris, Joel Chandler, 60.
- Harrison, Benjamin, nominated for President, 179 f.; elected President, 183; ballot reform, 184; the Harrison Administration, 185; Reed and the Fifty-First Congress, 185; the doctrine of protection, 187; the McKinley Bill, 189; Silver Purchase Bill, 1890, 190; pensions, 190; the attack on the trusts, 191; Sherman Anti-Trust Act, 1890, 193; Republican defeat, November, 1890, 193; Western demands on Congress, 195; development of the Territories, 197; Dakota, 197; politics and statehood, 198; the Omnibus Bill, 1889, 200; Oklahoma, 201; Utah, 203; railroad saturation and overproduction, 204; Farmers' Alliance, 205; hard times on the plains, 207; Populism, 208; free silver, 209; southern alliances, 210; Ocala Conference, 211; Cincinnati Convention, 212; the People's Party Convention, 1892, 212; the Harrison Administration, 214; Chilean affair, 214; Italian breach, 215; Blaine, 216; Harrison and Reid, 216; the nomination of Cleveland, 217; Democratic victory, 1892, 220.
- Harrison, Fairfax, 540.
- Harrison, Francis Burton, 449.
- Harte, Bret, 60.
- Harvey, George, 632.
- Haugen, Gilbert N., 654.
- Hawaiian Islands, strategic importance of, 277.
- Hay, John, Ambassador to Great Britain, 262; Secretary of State, 291 f., 316.
- Hay-Herran Treaty, the, 320.
- Hay-Pauncefote Treaty, the, 319.
- Hayes, Rutherford B., nominated for President, 47; Administration of, 65 f.
- Haymarket riots, in Chicago, 169.
- Hearst, William Randolph, 269, 354; nominated for President, 393; editorial policy of newspapers, 604.
- Hepburn Railroad Law, 373 f.
- Hepburn Report, the, 156.
- Hewitt, Abram S., elected mayor of New York City, 170.
- High prices, after Civil War, 31 f.
- Highways, extension of, 592.
- Hill, David B., elected Governor of New York, 183.
- Hill, James J., 340.
- Hindenburg Line, the, 535.
- History, begins to be taught seriously in colleges, 62.
- Homestead strike, the, 236 f.
- Homestead system, the, 144.
- Honduras, relations with, 414.
- Hoover, Herbert C., 474, 507 f.; boom as presidential candidate, 620; Secretary of Commerce, 627.
- Horse racing, 161.
- House, Edward L., 551 f.; information gathered by, 560 f.
- Housing problems, during World War, 546 f.
- Howard, General Oliver O., 73.
- Howells, William Dean, 59.
- Hubbell letter, the, 108.
- Hudson-Fulton celebration, the, 588.
- Huerta, Victoriano, 463 f.
- Hughes, Charles Evans, 390; appointed to Supreme Court, 418; denounces Adamson Law, 452; nominated for President, 489; protests expulsion of Socialists from New York Assembly, 616; Secretary of State, 627.
- Hull House, 174.
- Humorists, literary efforts of, 61.
- Huntington, Collis P., 339.
- Huxley, Thomas, 61.
- Hyphenism, in World War, 490 f.

- Illustrated magazines, the, 357.
Immigration, increase in, 168 f., 369 f.
Immigration law, new, 646 f.
Impeachment, of Andrew Johnson, 16 f.
Imperialism, Republican attitude, 305;
Roosevelt, Hay, and Root, 316; the open
door, 317; Panama Canal problems, 318;
Hay-Pauncefote Treaty, 1901, 319; Hay-
Herran Treaty, 320; the Panama secession,
321; Goethals and the Canal, 322; Vene-
zuela intervention, 322; the Monroe Doc-
trine, 324; Santo Domingo, 324; Root in
the War Department, 325; Porto Rico, 325;
Cuba, 326; the Philippines, 327; reorgani-
zation of War Department, 328; General
Staff, 329; the world cruise, 329; the fleet of
1907, 331; Taft in the War Department,
332; Treaty of Portsmouth, 333; Confer-
ence at Algeciras, 334; Second Hague Con-
ference, 335; Declaration of London, 336;
Caribbean relations, 659.
Incandescent electric light, invention of, 113.
Income, national, study of, 596.
Income tax, provision in Wilson Tariff Bill,
245; in Sixteenth Amendment to the Con-
stitution, 400; during World War, 531.
Independence Party, Hearst's, 393.
Indian problem, the, 25 f.
Indians, wars with, 73.
Indian Territory, the passing of, 201 f.
Industrial combinations, 341. *See also* Trusts.
Industrial Board, the, 584.
Industrial combinations, 341 f.
Industrial conferences, of 1919, 615 f.
Inflation, following Civil War, 31 f.
Ingersoll, Robert G., 101.
Initiative and referendum, purposes of, 266.
Inland Waterways Commission, the work of,
383.
Institutional church, the, 363.
Insurance, for volunteers in World War, 522.
Insurgent Republicans, during Taft's Ad-
ministration, 401.
Inter-Allied Conference, at Paris, 561 f.
Inter-Allied General Staff, the, 563.
Inter-Ally Council on War Purchases and
Finance, 562.
Inter-Ally Finance Council, the, 559 f.
Intercollegiate Athletic Association, the, 164.
Integration, of trusts, 342.
Interlocking boards of directors, of trusts,
439.
I.W.W., the, 455 f.
Interstate Commerce Act, the, 156 f.; revision
of, 371 f.
Intrigue, German, in World War, 483 f., 494 f.
Iowa idea, the, 350, 398.
Ireland, agitation for freedom of, 42; sym-
pathy of Democratic party for, 624.
Irish vote, importance of, 131.
Irrigation works, the construction of, 381.
Italy, becomes a united nation, 20; diplo-
matic breach with, 215 f.; blockade of
Venezuela, 322; war debt to United States,
659. *See also* League of Nations, and
World War.
Jackson, Helen Hunt, 60.
James, Henry, 59.
Japan, rise of, 20; war with Russia, 333 f.;
grievance due to discrimination against
subjects, 467; relations with United States,
472; at Conference of Washington, 635.
Johns Hopkins University, 49, 55.
Johnson, Andrew, policy toward the South,
10 f.; relations with Congress, 11 f.; im-
peachment of, 16.
Johnson, Hiram, 428, 621.
Johnson, Tom L., elected mayor of Cleve-
land, 349.
Jones Merchant Marine Act, 622.
Joseph, Chief of the Nez Percés Indians,
74.
Journalism, the vehicle for the muckrakers,
357; new types, 447.
Keating-Owen Child Labor Bill, 445.
Kellogg, Frank B., Secretary of State, 651.
Kenyon, William S., 640.
Keokuk dam, the, 382.
Kern, John W., nominated for Vice-President,
393.
Kiau-chau, seized by Germany, 277.
Kiel Canal, opening of, 470.
Klondike, discovery of gold fields, 260.
Knickerbocker Trust Company, suspension
of, 378.
Knights of Labor, the, 80, 167.
Knox, Philander C., attorney-general, 345;
Secretary of State, 397.
Ku Klux Klan, the, 603.
Labor, attitude toward war with Germany,
503; attitude toward government during
World War, 545 f.; government policies
during World War, 547 f.; unrest in 1919,
613; unrest in 1920, 625. *See also* Gompers,
S., and Strikes.
Labor, Department of, 444.
Labor movement, 74 f.; attitude of Samuel
Gompers, 453 f.
Labor parties, 170 f.
Labor problem, new importance of, 167.
La Follette, Robert M., 266, 399 f., 405 f.,
422 f.; elected governor of Wisconsin, 353;
Senator from Wisconsin, 372 f.; reform
program, 406; relations with Progressives,
423 f.; nominated for Presidency, 649.
"Lame Duck" session of Congress, 642.
Lands, public, 143.
Lansing, Robert, Secretary of State, 485, 494,
607, 612.
Lathrop, Julia C., 444.
Latin America, relations with, 89, 189, 412 f.,
463 f., 470 f., 660 f.
Lawrence, Mass., strike at, 454 f.
League of Nations, the, 554 f.; revised conve-
nant, 608; Constitution promulgated, 617;
element in canvass of 1920, 625 f.; enter-
prises of, 657.
Lee, General Fitzhugh, 272.
Lenine, Nicolai, Russian revolutionist, 501.
Lever Act, the, 528.
Liberal Republicans, in 1872, 43.
Liberty engine, the, 509.
Liberty Loans, the, 511 f., 532.
Limitation of armaments, 634 f.
Lincoln, Abraham, theory of the Union, 7;
relations with Congress upon Reconstruc-
tion, 9.
Lind, John, 464.
Lindbergh, Charles A., 663.

- Literature, new school of, 56 f.; changing taste in, 360; current, 597.
- Living, standard of, 167.
- Lloyd, Henry D., 238, 343.
- Loan Act of 1917, the, 510.
- Loans, to the Allies, in World War, 511.
- Local government, partisan control opposed, 349.
- Locarno, conference at, 657.
- Lodge, Henry Cabot, 134, 219, 295; death of, 650.
- Logan, John A., 135.
- London, Declaration of, 336, 478.
- Long, John D., 274.
- Longworth, Nicholas, Speaker of the House of Representatives, 652.
- Lorimer, William, 408.
- Los Angeles *Times*, plant wrecked by bomb, 457.
- Louisiana, two conflicting State governments in, 68 f.
- Lovett, Judge Robert S., 536 f.
- Low, Seth, elected mayor of New York, 349.
- Lowden, Frank O., 621.
- Lowell, James Russell, 56.
- Ludendorff, German General, plan of, 544 f.
- Lusitania, sinking of the, 480 f.
- McAdoo, William G., Secretary of the Treasury, 432; Director-general of U.S. Railroad Administration, 541; criticized as Democratic candidate for presidential nomination, 623.
- McClure, S. S., 358.
- McCormick, Vance, 527.
- McCulloch, Hugh, Secretary of the Treasury, 32.
- McKinley, William, minority leader in the House of Representatives, 178; author of tariff bill, 252; nominated for President, 253; Hanna and McKinley, 252; nomination of McKinley, 253; Democrats and free silver, 254; the gold plank, 254; William Jennings Bryan, 256; the Populist Convention, 257; the Gold Democrats, 258; the G.O.P., 259; prosperity returns, 260; John Sherman and John Hay, 261; Alger, 263; the Dingley Tariff, 1897, 263; reform in the G.O.P., 265; Sherman in the State Department, 269; yellow journalism, 269; Cuban insurrection, 1895, 270; Woodford and Madrid, 271; the Maine destroyed, 272; naval mobilization, 274; the war with Spain, 275; Manila, May 1, 1898, 276; Hawaii and the Panama Canal, 277; the army, 278; the Fifty Million Act, 279; Tampa, 280; Sampson and the blockade of Cuba, 280; Santiago invested, 282; Shafter and the army, 284; advance on Santiago, 286; battle, July 1-3, 1898, 286; naval battle of Santiago, 288; army morale, 289; armistice, 290; the Peace Commission at Paris, 291; the Philippines, 292; Congressional election of 1898, 294; rise of Theodore Roosevelt, 296; the new statesmen, 298; Quay, 298; Currency Law of 1900, 300; prosperity and the trusts, 301; Democrats in 1900, 302; McKinley and Roosevelt, 303; gold standard and imperialism, 305; murder of McKinley, 306; Theodore Roosevelt, 306; reform in politics, 307; letters and sport, 308; the new era, 309; contrasting theories of representation, 309; the office of President, 310; Hanna, 311; Booker T. Washington, 312; strikes, 313; labor and public opinion, 314.
- McKinley tariff, the, 187 f.
- McMaster, John Bach, 62.
- McNamara brothers, trial of, 457.
- McNary, Charles L., 654.
- McNary-Haugen Bill, the, 655 f.
- McParlan, James, 77.
- Madero, Francisco I., 463.
- Magazines, 56, 358, 448.
- Mahan, Alfred Thayer, 249, 274.
- Mail service, difficulty of, 106 f.
- Maine, battleship, destruction of, 272 f.
- "Manchus," in army circles, 331 f.
- Mandates, the problem of, 633 f.
- Manila, battle of, 276.
- Mann, Horace, 50.
- Mann-Elkins Act, the, 412.
- Man Power Act, the, 553.
- March, General Peyton C., 552.
- Marcy, William H., 126.
- "Mark Twain," 56, 58.
- Marne, second battle of, 568.
- Marshall, Thomas R., nominated for Vice-President, 428.
- Martinsburg, Md., strikes of 1877, 78.
- Marx, Karl, 169.
- Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 50.
- Mellon, Andrew W., Secretary of the Treasury, 630.
- Merchant marine, legislation upon, 622.
- Mergers, railroad, 339; business, 341 f.
- Merritt, General Wesley, 277.
- Meuse-Argonne, battle of, 573.
- Mexico, relations with, 40 f.; intervention in, 71 f.; revolutions in, 463; new Constitution in, 661 f.
- Michigan Agricultural College, 51.
- Middle West, development of, 30 f.
- Miles, General Nelson A., 279.
- Militia, use in strikes, 455.
- Millionaires, rise of, 115 f.
- Mills Bill debate, the, 178.
- Mines, Bureau of, 385.
- Mining, increased activity, 94.
- Mining claims, in the West, 24.
- Mitchell, John, 313, 347.
- Mobile Doctrine, the, 465.
- "Molly Maguires," the, 76.
- Monetary conference at Brussels, 227.
- Money kings, rise of, 115 f.
- Money trust, the, 439.
- Monopolies, first national attack on, 110.
- Monroe Doctrine, invoked in Venezuela boundary dispute, 246; in connection with Hay-Pauncefote Treaty, 319; bearing upon European intervention in Venezuela, 322; as applied to European creditors of South American republics, 324. *See also* Latin America.
- Mooney, Thomas, 458.
- Morgan, J. Pierpont, 244.
- Mormon Church, the, 203 f.
- Morocco, the status of, 334.
- Morrill Act, the, 51.
- Morrill tariff, the, 121 f.
- Morse, Samuel F. B., 111 f.

- Morton, Levi P., nominated for Vice-President, 180.
- Motor cars, increased use of, 592.
- Moving pictures, development of, 594 f.
- Moyer and Haywood, leaders of strike violence, 456 f.
- Muckraking and the new standards, 356-368; opportunity in America, 356; exposure of trusts, 356; new journalism, 357; S. S. McClure, 358; Ida M. Tarbell, 358; the muckrakers, 359; literary taste, 360; drama, 361; music, 362; religion and social spirit, 363; wealth and the foundations, 364; trend of the universities, 365; government by experts, 366; Federal civil service, 367.
- Mugwump threat, the, 134 f.
- Mulligan letters, the, 46, 133.
- Munitions Ministry, war-time demand for, 542.
- Munitions, sale during World War, 484; production of, 509.
- Munn vs. Illinois, the case of, 39, 155.
- Murchison letter, the, 183, 251.
- Music, increased appreciation of, 362.
- Napoleon III, in Mexico, 41.
- Nation*, the, 57, 448.
- National Amateur Athletic Association of America, 164.
- National Army, the, in World War, 518 f.
- National Bureau of Labor, 168.
- National Conservation Commission, 384 f.
- National debt, reduction of, 653.
- National Defense Act, the, 486.
- National Labor-Greenback Party, the, 99.
- National Labor Union, 75.
- National Non-Partisan League, 460.
- National Progressive Republican League, 421.
- National Prohibition Party, 75.
- National Research Council, 488.
- National War Labor Board, 547 f.
- Nationality, effect of Civil War on the idea of, 20.
- Naval Appropriation Act, the, 487.
- Naval limitation, 663.
- Navy, in the war with Spain, 274; development of, 248; use of steel in vessels, 235; world cruise of, 329 f.
- Negro theme, in literature, 60.
- Negro voters, intimidation of, 68, 115, 219.
- Neo-Republicanism, 177.
- Neutral rights, American insistence upon, 477 f.
- Neutral trade, in World War, 525 f.
- Neutrality, in World War, 473.
- Newberry, Truman H., Senator from Michigan, 611.
- New Republic*, the, 447.
- Newlands Bill, the, 381.
- New Mexico, admission of, 410 f.
- "New Nationalism," Roosevelt's addresses upon, 418.
- New York, Socialists expelled from New York State Assembly, 616.
- New York, Central Railroad, 116.
- New York Life Insurance Company, 355.
- Nicaragua, relations with, 414; relations with, 469 f.; revolution and intervention, 660.
- Nineteenth Amendment, 617.
- Nobel peace prize, awarded to Theodore Roosevelt, 333.
- Non-Partisan League, the, 460.
- Normalcy, the return to, 606; self-determination, 606; the Treaty of Versailles, 608; the Senate and the Treaty, 609; Wilson and the Republican Congress, 611; collapse of Wilson, 612; unsettlement, 613; strikes of 1919, 613; radicalism, 615; communism and socialism, 616; the Nineteenth Amendment: woman suffrage, 617; international finance, 618; Esch-Cummins Railroad Act, 1920, 619; the treaty issue in politics, 619; the Hoover boom, 620; Harding and Coolidge, 621; the Army Act, 1920, 622; merchant marine, 622; Cox and Roosevelt, 623; deflation, 625; canvass of 1920, 625; significance of election, 626; budget reform, 628; the agricultural bloc, 629; veterans' bonus, 629; the foreign debts, 630; public opinion, 631; Colombia treaty settlement, 633; Yap and the mandates, 633; end of World War, 634; limitation of armaments, 634; Treaties of Washington, 636.
- North Pole, the, discovery of, 591.
- Northern Pacific Railroad, 104 f.
- Northern Pacific panic, the, 340.
- Northern Securities Company, the, 344 f.
- Northern Securities Case, the, 370 f.
- Ocala conference, the, 211.
- Offensives, of 1918, German, 566; Allied, 570 f.
- Ohio idea, the, regarding the greenback movement, 33, 97.
- Oil industry, growth of, 110 f.
- Oil reserves, scandals over, 645.
- Oklahoma, the opening of, 201 f.; admission of, 376 f.
- Omnibus Bill, 1889, 200.
- Open-door policy, in China, 317 f.
- Organization, labor, 75 f.
- O'Shaughnessy, Nelson, 465.
- Overman Act, the, 543 f.
- Pacifism, 457 f.; in World War, 482, 496 f.
- Packard, Stephen B., 68 f.
- Packing industry, rise of, 151 f.
- Page, Thomas Nelson, 462.
- Page, Walter Hines, 462.
- Palmer, A. Mitchell, 477, 528, 623.
- Palmer, John M., 258.
- Panama, secession from Colombia, 321 f.; treaty of 1926, 660.
- Panama Canal, need for, 277; problems of, 318 f., 412, 465 f.; repeal of toll exemption, 467.
- Panic, of 1857, 226; of 1873, 36, 226; of 1884, 138.
- Panic of 1893, the, 222-249; the falling price of silver, 222; status of Treasury, 223; panic of 1893, 223; the Democrats and the panic, 226; bimetallism, 227; the gold reserve, 228; repeal of the Silver Purchase Act, 229; clash of classes, 231; party realignment, 232; Chicago's World Fair, 1893, 233; steel, 234; the Homestead strike, 236; Debs and the American Railway Union, 237; the courts and strikes, 238;

- the army and strikes, 239; the Democratic program, 1893, 240; Altgeld of Illinois, 241; growth of populism, 242; disappearance of the surplus, 243; the Cleveland bond issues, 243; the Wilson Tariff, 1894, 244; income tax, 245; Venezuela boundary dispute, 246; the new navy, 248; Northern Pacific (1901), 340; Roosevelt, 377.
- Paris, peace commission at close of Spanish War, 291.
- Parker, Alton B., nominated for the Presidency, 353.
- Parkman, Francis, 62.
- Parties, political, effect of Civil War, 6; changes in, 45 f.; changes in, 97 f.; in 1882, 120 f.; issues in 1895, 250; realignment in 1893, 232. *See also* Democratic Party, and Republican Party.
- Patrons of Husbandry, the, 38, 155.
- Payne-Aldrich Tariff, 399 f.
- Peabody, George, 53.
- Peace Commission, the, 577 f.
- Peace overture, German, 494.
- Peary, Robert E., 591.
- Pendleton, George H., 34.
- Pennsylvania State Constabulary, 455.
- Penrose, Boies, 477.
- Pensions, military, system of, 141 f., 190.
- People's Party, national convention in 1892, 212; gain in power, 265.
- Periodicals, weekly, 359, 363.
- Pershing, General John J., 513 f., 567 f.
- Petroleum industry, rise of, 110.
- Philippines, problem of the, 292; civil government in, 327; results of American occupation, 332; question of independence, 448.
- Pinchot, Gifford, 383, 403, 410, 477.
- Pittman Act, the, 551.
- Pittsburgh, becomes center of steel industry, 235.
- Platt, Thomas C., 88, 298.
- Platt Amendment, 414.
- Plattsburg, training camp at, 487.
- Plumb plan for railroad control, 618 f.
- Politics, effect of Civil War, 6.
- Pony Express, the, 29.
- Poor relief, in large cities, 173.
- Pope Benedict XV, overtures for peace, 554.
- Population, after the Civil War, 6. *See also* Cities, growth of.
- Populism, rise of, 208 f., 241 f.
- Populist convention of 1896, 257; meeting at St. Louis, 429.
- Porto Rico, expedition against, 290.
- Porto Rico, American Government of, 325 f.
- Portsmouth, Treaty of, 333.
- Postal Savings Act, 412.
- Post-Office Department, scandal of 1881, 106.
- Potter Law of Wisconsin, the, 155
- Powderly, Terence V., 168.
- Preëmption Law, the, 144 f.
- Preparedness, demonstrations for, 457; attitude of President Wilson, 481.
- President, the significance of the office, 310.
- Price-Fixing Committee, the, 549.
- Prices, high, after Civil War, 31 f.; fall in 1920, 625.
- Priorities Board, the, 549.
- "Priority," war-time significance of the word, 535.
- Prize-fighting, 162.
- Professional education, rise of, 54 f.
- Progressive Republicans, the, 421 f.; in 1912, 428 f.; vote in 1914, the, 477; in 1916, 488.
- Prohibition, the status of, 598.
- Propaganda, in World War, 474.
- Prospectors, in Far West, 23 f.
- Prosperity, during Arthur's Administration, 100; following resumption of specie payments, 120; returns in 1896, 260; revival of, 301.
- Protection, question of the tariff, 176 f.; Cleveland and the dead center, 176; attacks on tariff system, 176; the tariff a major issue, 177; the Mills Bill Debate, 1888, 178; Cleveland renominated, 179; Benjamin Harrison, 179; status of reform, 182; the "rebel" flags, 182; the Murchison letter, 183; ballot reform, 184; the Harrison Administration, 185; Reed and the Fifty-First Congress, 185; the doctrine of protection, 187; the McKinley Bill, 189; Silver Purchase Bill, 1890, 190; pensions, 190; the attack on the trusts, 191; Sherman Anti-Trust Act, 1890, 193; Republican defeat, November, 1890, 193; the party issues, 250; protection, 251; Hanna and McKinley, 252; nomination of McKinley, 253; Democrats and free silver, 254; the gold plank, 254; William Jennings Bryan, 256; the Populist Convention, 257; the gold Democrats, 258; canvass of 1896, 258; the G.O.P., 259; prosperity returns, 260; John Sherman and John Hay, 261; Alger, 263; the Dingley Tariff, 1897, 263; reform in the G.O.P., 265.
- Public lands, frauds in, 143.
- Pujo, A. P., 439.
- Pullman strike, the, 237.
- Pure Food Act, the, 375 f.
- Quay, Matthew S., 298.
- Radicalism, in periodicals, 448; following close of World War, 615 f.
- Radio, development of, 590 f.
- Railroad administration, during World War, 541 f.
- Railroad employees, organization of, 77 f.
- Railroad land grants, forfeiture of, 147.
- Railroad legislation during Taft's Administration, 412.
- Railroad strikes (1877), 74, 78 f.; effect on the frontier, 149 f.; in 1886, 171; threatened in 1919, 613.
- Railroads, attitude of Indians toward building of, 29; control of, 35; development of, 101 f.; effect on frontier, 149 f.; extension across great plains, 150 f.; regulation of, 155 f.; effect of extension of, 204 f.; reorganization of, 338; during World War, 539 f.
- Railroads' War Board, 540.
- Railway brotherhoods, increased wages required by, 451.
- Ranches, in the Northwest, 153 f.
- Randall, Samuel J., 129.
- Rankin, Jeannette, 502.
- Rapid transit, in cities, development of, 114.
- Reading Railroad, failure of, 228.
- Real estate, New York, growth in value, 116.

- Recall of judges, provision in proposed State Constitution for Arizona, 411.
- Reclamation Service, the work of, 382.
- Reconstruction, after the Civil War, 1-48; following World War, 587 f.
- Reconstruction Acts, of 1867, the, 14.
- Reed, Thomas B., 185 f.; a candidate for presidential nomination, 253.
- Reed, reelected Speaker, 263.
- Registration, for military service in World War, 519 f.
- Reid, Whitelaw, nominated for Vice-President, 217.
- Religion, broadened interest in, 363.
- Representation, contrasting theories of, 309.
- Republican administrations, 65-119; the Hayes Administration, 65; the Hayes policies, 67; the Senate in revolt, 67; home rule in the South, 67; status of the army, 70; Canada, 70; Mexico, 71; Custer and the Sioux, 73; railroad strikes, 1877, 74; labor movement, 75; the "Molly Maguires," 76; strikes of 1877, 78; new social theories, 80; factions of Republican Party, 81; Hayes and the New York stalwarts, 82; the Grant third-term boom, 83; Blaine, Sherman, or Grant, 1880, 84; Garfield and Arthur, 84; Greenback party, 85; General Hancock and the Democrats, 86; the Garfield Cabinet, 86; Conkling and the patronage, 88; murder of Garfield, 88; Chester A. Arthur, 89; economic realities, 91; silver coinage, 91; the "crime" of 1873, 92; silver and the frontier, 94; free coinage, 95; Bland-Allison Act, 1878, 96; resumption of specie payments, 96; the Greenback opposition, 98; organized discontent, 98; Democrats and the election frauds, 99; resumption, January 2, 1879, 100; the new prosperity, 100; the continental railroads, 102; Henry Villard, 104; disappearance of the frontier, 105; standard time, 105; railroad saturation, 106; star-route frauds, 107; Garfield and the Hubbell letter, 108; transportation and monopoly, 110; John D. Rockefeller, 110; oil, 111; telephone and telegraph, 112; other inventions, 113; the new South, 114; the money kings, 115; American society, 118.
- Republican Party, in 1865, 11; nominates General Grant for President, 17; in 1872, 43 f.; in 1876, 46; factions in 1876, 81 f.; in 1880, 84 f.; reaction against, 120-148; prosperity, 120; Republican losses, 120; the tariff situation, 121; tariff reform and free trade, 123; treasury surplus, 123; the tariff issue, 124; Tariff Act of 1883, 125; Arthur's Administration, 126; the spoils system, 126; civil service reform, 127; John G. Carlisle, 129; Butler and the reformers, 129; James Gillespie Blaine, 131; the Irish vote, 131; Blaine and the Mulligan letters, 133; the Mugwump threat, 134; Blaine and Logan, 135; Grover Cleveland, 136; rum, Romanism, and rebellion, 137; panic of 1884, 138; death of U. S. Grant, 139; the Cleveland government, 140; pensions, 141; fraud in the public lands, 143; homestead system, 144; illegal enclosures, 146; forfeiture of the railroad land grants, 147; in 1888, 179; theory of protection, 188 f.; in 1890, 193; in 1892, 216 f.; relation to panic of 1893, 227; in 1896, 252 f.; in 1897, 264 f.; in 1898, 294 f.; in 1902, 350 f.; in 1908, 394 f.; factions in, 387 f., 405 f.; in 1912, 424 f.; in 1918, 576; reorganization of, 576 f.; in 1918, 611 f.; in 1924, 648 f.
- Requirements Division, of War Industries Board, 548 f.
- Restricted immigration, 646 f.
- Resumption of specie payments, 96 f., 100 f.
- Revenue Act of 1917, the, 530 f.
- Rhodes, James Ford, 63.
- Riis, Jacob, 173.
- Riley, James Whitcomb, 61.
- Riots, in railroad strikes, 78 f.
- Roads, improvement in, 165, 592.
- Rockefeller, John D., 110, 117, 341; reopens University of Chicago, 52.
- Rockefeller Foundation, the, 365.
- Rockefeller Institute, the, 365.
- Roosevelt, Franklin D., nominated for Vice-Presidency, 624.
- Roosevelt, Theodore, 134, 153, 156; nominated for mayor of New York City, 170; on Civil Service Commission, 216; Police Commissioner of New York City, 239; Assistant Secretary of the Navy, 274 f.; commands the Rough Riders, 286 f.; summary of early career, 296; the new statesmen, 298; Quay, 298; Currency Act of 1900, 300; prosperity and the trusts, 301; Democrats in 1900, 302; McKinley and Roosevelt, 303; gold standard and imperialism, 305; murder of McKinley, 306; Theodore Roosevelt, 306; reform in politics, 307; letters and sport, 308; the new era, 309; contrasting theories of representation, 309; the office of President, 310; Hanna, 311; Booker T. Washington, 312; strikes, 313; Roosevelt, Hay, and Root, 316; the open door, 317; Panama Canal problems, 318; Hay-Pauncefote Treaty, 1901, 319; Hay-Herran Treaty, 320; the Panama secession, 321; Goethals and the Canal, 322; Venezuela intervention, 322; the Monroe Doctrine, 324; Santo Domingo, 324; Root in the War Department, 325; Porto Rico, 325; Cuba, 326; the Philippines, 327; reorganization of War Department, 328; General Staff, 329; the world cruise, 329; the fleet of 1907, 331; Taft in the War Department, 332; Treaty of Portsmouth, 333; conference at Algieras, 334; Second Hague Conference, 335; Declaration of London, 336; railroads and prosperity, 338; Edward H. Harriman, 338; Union and Southern Pacific merger, 339; Northern Pacific panic, May 9, 1901, 340; mergers, 341; United States Steel Corporation, 341; integration, 342; Sherman Anti-Trust Act, 342; the Northern Securities Company, 344; Anti-Trust legislation, 1903, 345; Department of Commerce and Labor, 346; Cuban reciprocity, 346; anthracite strike, 347; elections of 1902, 349; reform, 349; tariff reduction, 350; Joseph G. Cannon, 351; Hanna and the presidency, 352; the Wisconsin idea, 353; Roosevelt and Fairbanks, 353; Alton B. Parker, 353; campaign contributions, 354; opportunity in America, 356; exposure of trusts, 356; new journalism, 357; S. S. Mc-

- Clure, 358; Ida M. Tarbell, 358; the muck-rakers, 359; literary taste, 360; drama, 361; music, 362; religion and social spirit, 363; wealth and the Foundations, 364; trend of the universities, 365; government by experts, 366; Federal civil service, 367; immigration, 369; Northern Securities case, 370; Interstate commerce, 371; the conservative Senate, 372; the Hepburn Railroad Law, 373; pure food, 375; Oklahoma admitted, 376; Roosevelt panic, 1907, 377; Aldrich-Vreeland Act, 379; conservation, 379; control of water rights, 381; forests, 383; conservation conference, 383; Bureau of Mines, 385; hunting expedition to Africa, 418; addresses upon "New Nationalism," 418; Progressive candidate for President, 423 f.; nominated by Progressives, 428; contributing editor to magazines, 448; leadership of Progressives in 1916, 488 f.; death of, 613.
- Roosevelt, Theodore, Jr., 616.
 Roosevelt Division, in World War, 520.
 Root, Elihu, Secretary of War, 325 f.; career of, 389; mission to Russia, 501.
 Rosenwald, Julius, 509.
 "Rough Riders," the, 278, 286.
 Ruhr district, occupied by France, 643.
 "Rum, Romanism, and rebellion," 137.
 Russia, difficulty over American citizens in, 467; at outbreak of World War, 471 f.; revolution in, 500 f.; defected from the Allies, 555 f.; Soviet control of, 643.
 Russo-Japanese War, the, 333 f.
 Ryan, John D., 543, 551.
- Sabotage, 454.
 Sackville-West, Sir Lionel, British minister, 183.
 Saint-Mihiel, American success at, 571 f.
 Salvation Army, the, 173.
 Sampson, W. T., 274, 280 f.
 Sand Creek, 27.
 Santiago, Cuba, invested, 282 f.; naval battle, 288.
 Santo Domingo, attempt at annexation, 43; control of customs revenues, 324 f.; American financial receivership, 414.
 Scandals, during Grant's Administration, 44 f.; in Government Departments, 645 f.
 Schedule K, of Payne-Aldrich Act, revision of, 422.
 Schley, Winfield S., 280 f.
 Schurman commission, for study of Philippine affairs, 327.
 Schwab, Charles M., 551.
 Scott, Frank A., 536 f.
 Scott, Thomas A., 117.
Scribner's Monthly, 57.
 Seamen's Act, 447.
 Secessionists, conflicting theories upon treatment of, 8.
 Selective Service Act, the, 513.
 "Self determination," the principle, of, 581, 606 f.
 Senate, revolt against President Hayes, 67; conservatism of, 372; schism during Taft's Administration, 399, 405 f.; the "little group of willful men," 498 f.; attitude toward Treaty of Versailles, 609 f.
- Services of Supply, overseas, 516.
 Seventeenth Amendment, 408.
 Sewall, Arthur, 257.
 Sewing machine, improvements in, 113.
 Seymour, Horatio, nominated for President, 18, 35.
 Shafter, General William R., 280, 284.
 Sherman, James Schoolcraft, nominated for Vice-President, 392.
 Sherman, John, 81; Secretary of the Treasury, 66; suggested as presidential nominee, 84; Secretary of State, 261, 269.
 Sherman Anti-Trust Bill, the, 192 f., 342 f.
 Ship registry law, the, 476.
 Shipping, Allies' losses by submarine warfare, 505 f.
 Sholes, Charles Latham, 112.
 Silver, decline in value, 93 f., 222.
 Silver coinage, 91 f.
 Silver Purchase Bill, 1890, 190; repeal of, 229.
 Sims, Admiral William S., 514 f.
 Single tax, the, 170.
 Sioux War of 1862, the, 26.
 Sitting Bull, the Indian chief, 73.
 Sixteenth Amendment, 400.
 Slater, John F., 54.
 Smith, Alfred E., 648.
 Smith, Goldwin, 71.
 Smith-Lever Act, the, 446.
 Social changes, 80, 115, 231 f., 258 f., 639 f., 149-175; the cow country, 149; railroads and farm competition, 150; plains cattle, 150; the long drive, 151; packing industries, 151; Northern ranches, 153; enclosure, 154; organization of cattle-men, 154; railroad regulation, 155; *Munn vs. Illinois*, 1877, 155; Interstate Commerce Act, 1887, 156; Department of Agriculture, 157; substitutes for the frontier outlet, 157; the Wild West, 159; the "Greatest Show on Earth," 160; urbanization, 160; rise of sport, 161; John L. Sullivan, 162; rise of baseball, 163; the country club, 164; bicycles, 165; tennis, 166; the changing social outlook, 166; standard of life, 167; Knights of Labor, 167; immigrant ideas, 169; Henry George and the single tax, 170; Labor parties, 170; Western railroad strikes, 171; social visions, 172; the crowded cities, 172; social relief, 173.
 Social service, widened scope of, 363.
 Social settlements, 174.
 Socialism, appearance in America, 80; menace after World War, 616.
 Socialism, international, 556 f.
 Socialist Party, organized, 301, 393, 453; emergency convention of, 504.
 Socialists, attitude of government in Germany and Russia, 169.
 South, the, after the Civil War, 1-48; Home Rule in, 4, 67 f.; part played by education in the rebuilding, 53; industrial reorganization in, 114; favors free silver, 210.
 South America, relations with, 189. *See also* Latin America.
 South Carolina, two conflicting State governments in, 68 f.
 South Pole, the, discovery of, 591.
 Southern continental railroads, 103.
 Southern Education Board, the, 364.

- Southern Pacific Railway, 103; merged with Union Pacific, 339.
- Spain, the war with, 269-297; Sherman in the State Department, 269; yellow journalism, 269; Cuban insurrection, 1895, 270; Woodford and Madrid, 271; the Maine destroyed, 272; naval mobilization, 274; the war with Spain, 275; Manila, May 1, 1898, 276; Hawaii and the Panama Canal, 277; the army, 278; the Fifty Million Act, 279; Tampa, 280; Sampson and the blockade of Cuba, 280; Santiago invested, 282; Shafter and the army, 284; advance on Santiago, 286; Battle of July 1-3, 1898, 286; naval battle of Santiago, 288; army morale, 289; Armistice, 290; the Peace Commission at Paris, 291; the Philippines, 292; Congressional election of 1898, 294; rise of Theodore Roosevelt, 296.
- Spargo, John, 504.
- Speaker of the House of Representatives, fight on power of, 409.
- Specie payments, resumption of, 96.
- Spencer, Herbert, 61.
- Spoils system, the, 126 f.
- Sport, the rise of, 161 f.
- "Stalwarts," the, 65-90; relations with President Hayes, 82 f.
- Standard Oil Company, the, 110, 341.
- Standard time, 105.
- Standards of living, 167 f., 225, 596 f.
- Stanford, Leland, 339.
- Stanton, Edwin M., Secretary of War, 16.
- Star route frauds, the, 107 f.
- State colleges and universities, early, 51.
- State Councils of Defense, 533.
- State police, organization of, 455.
- Statehood, demanded by territories, 197 f.
- States, admission of, 195 f., 410; Federal cooperation with, 446.
- Stedman, Edmund Clarence, 58.
- Steel, increased use of, 103, 234.
- Steel strike, 614 f.
- Stettinius, Edward R., 552.
- Stevenson, Adlai E., nominated for Vice-President, 219.
- Stewart, A. T., 116.
- Stockyards, Chicago, rise of, 152.
- Strikes, railroad, 74, 171 f.; of 1877, 78 f.; of 1886, 171; of steel workers, 234; Pittsburgh, 234; at Pullman, Ill., 237; attitude of courts, 238; use of army against, 239; during winter of 1900-01, 313; coal (1902), 347; at Lawrence, Mass., 454 f.; in mining regions, 456; of 1919, 613.
- Students, ratio to population, 54.
- Submarine warfare, in World War, 479 f., 495.
- Sugar Equalization Board, the, 529.
- Sullivan, John L., 162.
- Sumner, William Graham, 123.
- Supreme Court, justices appointed by President Taft, 417 f.; demand for curbing of, 649.
- Supreme War Council, during World War, 561 f.
- Surplus, Treasury, disappearance of, 243.
- Sussex case, the, 486.
- Syndicalism, 454 f.
- administration as President, 387-431; Republican factions, 387; the third term, 387; Taft and his rivals, 388; Taft and Sherman, 1908, 390; death of Cleveland, 392; Bryan and Kern, 392; Hearst and Debs, 393; canvass of 1908, 394; William H. Taft, 396; the Cabinet, 397; tariff problem, 397; Payne-Aldrich Act, 1909, 399; the Sixteenth Amendment: income tax, 400; the Insurgent Republicans, 401; Western political revolt, 401; the Ballinger controversy, 402; schism, 405; Cannon and stand-pat, 405; political reform, 406; Seventeenth Amendment: direct election of Senators, 408; aim of insurgency, 408; fight on power of Speaker Cannon, 409; Taft and Progressive policies, 409; Arizona and New Mexico, 410; Alaska, 411; railroad legislation, 412; postal savings, 412; Isthmian affairs, 412; Panama Canal, 413; Latin America, 414; Canadian fisheries, 415; the arbitration treaties, 415; James Bryce, 416; Carnegie and peace, 417; Supreme Court, 417; return of Roosevelt, 418; new nationalism, 418; a Democratic Congress, 419; Champ Clark, Speaker, 420; Canadian reciprocity, 420; the Progressive Republicans, 421; the fight on Taft, 422; La Follette and the Progressives, 423; Roosevelt a candidate, 423; the convention and the direct primary, 424; renomination of Taft, 426; Democratic opportunity, 426; Woodrow Wilson, 427; the Progressive Party, 428; the canvass of 1912, 429; election of Wilson, 430; joint chairman of National War Labor Board, 547; supports the League of Nations, 585; appointed Chief Justice, 627.
- Tampa, army camp at opening of war with Spain, 280.
- Tampico, arrest of American naval officer by Huerta forces, 466.
- Tanner, Corporal James, 142, 185, 190.
- Tarbell, Ida M., 358 f.
- Tariff situation, in 1882, 121; Act of 1883, 125; system attacked, 176 f.; Wilson's bill, 244; the Dingley Tariff Bill, 263 f.; reduction (1902), 350; problem at opening of Taft's Administration, 397 f.; revision pledged by Republican Party in 1908, 398 f.; Payne-Aldrich Tariff, 399 f.; Underwood-Simmons, 435; Fordney-McCumber, 640. *See also* Protection.
- Tariff commission, 124, 436, 488.
- Taussig, F. W., 436.
- Tax revision bill, 630.
- Taxation, during World War, 530 f.
- Teapot Dome, scandal over, 645 f.
- Telegraph, invention of, 112.
- Telephone, invention of, 112.
- Teller, Henry M., 255.
- Temperance movement, the, 598.
- Tennis, popularity of, 166.
- Tenure of Office Act, the, 16 f., 127.
- Territories, admitted as States, 22 f.; development of, 197 f. *See also* States.
- Texas idea, the, 350.
- Texas Pacific Railway, 102.
- Theater, the, recent tendencies in, 596.
- Third term, boom for President Grant, 83; question of, 387, 652 f.

- Thirteenth Amendment to the Constitution, 11.
 Thurman, Allen G., nominated for Vice-Presidency, 179.
 Tilden, Samuel J., nominated for President, 46.
 Timber conservation, 383.
 Tolls, Panama Canal, 413 f.; repeal of exemption, 467.
 Tourgée, Albion W., 61.
 Toynbee, Arnold, 174.
 Trade, neutral, in World War, 525 f.
 Trade unions, national, organization of, 75.
 Training camps, in World War, 520.
 Trans-Missouri freight case, the, 344.
 Transportation, difficulties during World War, 539 f.
 Treasury, status in 1893, 223.
 Treasury surplus, in 1881 and 1882, 123.
 Trotzky, Leon, 501 f.
 Trusts, attack on, 191 f.; the rise of, 301; integration of, 341 f.; exposure of, 356 f.; prosecution of, 371; legislation upon, 442.
 Turner, Frederick Jackson, 63.
 Typewriter, invention of, 112.
- Underwood-Simmons Tariff, the, 435 f.
 Unemployment, following World War, 583.
 Unified program, of Allies during World War, 562.
 Union Labor Party, the, 170.
 Union Pacific Railroad, the, 29; merged with Southern Pacific, 339.
 Unionism, trade, rise of, 75 f.
 United Labor Party, the, 170.
 United Mine Workers of America, 313 f.
 United States Chamber of Commerce, the, 538 f.
 United States Housing Corporation, the, 547.
 United States Railroad Administration, 541.
 United States Shipping Board, 476, 488, 506.
 United States Steel Corporation, 314, 341 f.
 Universities, effects to solve specific problems, 365.
 University extension, 446.
 Unskilled labor, problem of, 454 f.
 Utah, admission of, 203 f.
- Vail, Theodore N., 112.
 Van Dyke, Henry, 462.
 Vanderbilt, Cornelius, 116.
 Vanderbilt, William K., 116.
 Vassar College, 50.
 Venezuela boundary dispute, the, 246 f.; claims of Great Britain, Germany and Italy against, 322; blockade by European powers, 414.
 Vera Cruz, intervention at, 466.
 Versailles, Treaty of, 608 f.; element in American politics, 619.
 Veterans' bonus, 629.
 Victory Liberty Loan, the, 583.
 Villa, Francisco, 466.
 Villard, Henry, 104.
 Violence, in strikes, acts of, 456 f.
 Vocational Education, Federal Board for, 523.
 Vocational teaching, 446.
 Volstead Act, the, 601.
 Von Bernstorff, German Ambassador, 485 f., 496.
- Von Igel, Wolf, German military attaché, 485.
 Von Papen, German military attaché, 485.
- Wald, Lillian D., 444.
 Walking races, 161.
 Wallace, Lew, 59.
 Walsh, Frank P., 547.
 War aims, expressions of, 558 f.
 War boards, under the Overman Act, the, 543 f.
 War debts, of Allies to United States, 658 f.
 War Department, reorganization of, 328, 331 f., 551.
 War Finance Corporation, 550 f.
 War Industries Board, the, 536 f., 548.
 War Labor Policies Board, 547.
 War message, against Germany, President Wilson's, 502.
 War Revenue Act, the, 530 f.
 War Risk Insurance, Bureau of, 476, 523.
 War service committees, 538 f.
 War Trade Board, 527 f.
 Washington, Booker T., 54; relations with President Roosevelt, 312.
 Washington, naval conference at, 635; treaties of, 636.
 Water rights, control of, 381.
 Watson, Thomas E., 214, 257; nominated for President, 393.
 Wayland, Francis, 50.
 Weaver, James B., nominated for President, 85, 212.
 Webb-Kenyon Act, the, 600.
 Weekly periodicals, 448.
 Wells, David A., 123.
 West, the, changes in, 21 f.; frontier in, 23; higher education in, 53; demands of, 195-221; Western demands on Congress, 195; development of the Territories, 197; Dakota, 197; politics and statehood, 198; the Omnibus Bill, 1889, 200; Oklahoma, 201; Utah, 203; railroad saturation and overproduction, 204; Farmers' Alliance, 205; hard times on the plains, 207; Populism, 208; free silver, 209; Southern alliances, 210; Ocala Conference, 211; Cincinnati Convention, 212; the People's Party Convention, 1892, 212; the Harrison Administration, 214; Chilean affair, 214; Italian breach, 215; Blaine, 216; Harrison and Reid, 216; the nomination of Cleveland, 217; Democratic victory, 1892, 220; political revolt against President Taft, 401 f.; uneasiness during President Harding's Administration, 639 f.
 West, Middle, development of, 30 f.
 West Point, United States Military Academy at, 50, 328.
 Western Federation of Miners, 455 f.
 Western front, the American army on, 515 f.
 Weyler, General Valeriano, 270.
 Wheeler, Burton K., nominated for Vice-President, 649.
 Whitlock, Brand, 462.
 "Wild West," Cody's, 159.
 Wilde, Oscar, 62.
 Wilson, Harry Lane, 464.
 Wilson, William B., 444.
 Wilson, William L., 240 f.
 Wilson, Woodrow, author of *Congressional*

Government, 63; early career of, 427 f.; nominated for Presidency, 428; elected President, 430; Administration of, 432-620; a minority President, 432; Bryan and the Cabinet, 432; Wilson policies, 433; rearrangement of Congress, 434; Underwood-Simmons Tariff, 435; finance, 437; the money trust, 439; Federal Reserve System, 440; continuous session, 441; anti-trust policies, 442; Federal Trade Commission, 443; Department of Labor, 444; Children's Bureau, 444; workmen's compensation, 445; coöperation with the States, 446; Seamen's Act, 447; critical journalism, 447; the Philippines, 448; discipline, 449; the threat of labor, 451; cost of living, 451; Gompers and the labor movement, 453; socialism, 453; syndicalism, 454; State police, 455; the I.W.W., 456; pacifism, 457; Americanization, 458; woman suffrage, 459; Non-Partisan League, 460; Bryan and the Wilson Administration, 462; Mexican affairs, 463; the Mobile Doctrine, 465; Canal diplomacy, 465; intervention at Vera Cruz, 466; repeal of tolls exemption, 467; Bryan peace treaties, 469; Caribbean relations, 469; the World War, 471; neutrality, 473; propaganda and public opinion, 474; emergency legislation, 476; Democratic victory, 1914, 477; neutral rights, 477; submarine warfare, 479; the Lusitania, 480; Wilson and preparedness, 481; pacifism, 482; German intrigue, 483; the Sussex case, 486; National Defense Act, 1916, 486; naval program, 487; the Progressives, 1916, 488; nomination of Hughes, 489; hyphenism, 490; reflection of Wilson and Marshall, 492; the war in 1916, 493; German peace overture, 494; Wilson and peace, 494; German submarine warfare, 495; the breach with Germany, 496; armed merchant ships, 497; the "little group of willful men," 498; Senate cloture, 499; Russian Revolution, 500; the War Session of Congress, 502; the Government in war time, 502; Council of National Defense, 503; labor and socialism, 503; Committee on Public Information, 505; ships will win the war, 505; food will win the war, 507; Herbert C. Hoover, 507; production of munitions, 509; finance: pay as you go, 510; loans to Allies, 511; officers and men, 512; selective service, 512; Pershing and the A.E.F., 513; foreign missions, 513; the American army on the western front, 515; services of supply, 516; the National Army, 518; registration, 519; training camps, 520; the Roosevelt Division, 520; espionage, 521; liability, allowance, allotment, insurance, 522; embargo and neutral trade, 525; War Trade Board, 527; Alien Property Custodian, 528; food and fuel control, 528; war revenue, 530; war expenses, 531; civic organization and co-operation, 532; anti-war, 534; the crisis of the war, 535; priority, 535; War Industries Board, 536; War Service Committees, 538; transportation, 539; railroad administration, 541; demand for a munitions ministry, 542; Overman Act, 543; the War

Boards, 543; the battle of 1918, 544; labor backs the war, 545; government activities, 546; labor policies, 547; work or fight, 547; Baruch and the War Industries Board, 548; requirements, 549; War Finance Corporation, 550; army reorganization, 551; General Staff, 552; eighteen to forty-five draft, 552; basis of peace, 554; the fourteen points, 554; international socialism, 556; Russia withdraws, 556; coöperation among Allies, 558; Inter-Ally Finance Council, 559; preparations for peace, 560; Supreme War Council, 561; the unified program, 562; German drive, March, 1918, 563; status of the A.E.F., 564; battle of 1918, 566; training the A.E.F., 567; Cantigny, 567; the second Marne, 568; Château-Thierry, 568; Foch's counter-attack, 569; the Allied offensives, 570; the First American Army, 570; Saint-Mihiel, 571; preparations for 1919, 572; the Meuse-Argonne, 573; collapse of Germany, 573; the Armistice, November 11, 1918, 574; Congressional election, 1918, 575; reorganization of Republican Party, 576; demobilization, 577; the Peace Commission, 577; Wilson in Europe, 579; the Big Four, 580; Covenant of the League of Nations, 581; reaction in the United States, 582; American Legion, 583; economic demobilization, 584; returns to Washington, 585; reconstruction, 587; post-war society, 588; air, earth, and water, 588; aviation, 589; wireless, 590; North and South Poles, 591; motor cars, 592; highways, 592; the shifting life, 593; movies, 594; theater, 596; standard of living, 596; literature of pessimism, 597; prohibition, 598; Eighteenth Amendment, 600; boot-legging, 601; Ku Klux Klan, 603; fundamentalism, 604; self-determination, 606; the Treaty of Versailles, 608; the Senate and the treaty, 609; Wilson and the Republican Congress, 611; collapse of Wilson, 612; unsettlement, 613; strikes of 1919, 613; radicalism, 615; communism and socialism, 616; the Nineteenth Amendment: woman suffrage, 617; international finance, 618; Esch-Cummins Railroad Act, 1920, 619; the Treaty issue in politics, 619; the Hoover boom, 620; Harding and Coolidge, 621; the Army Act, 1920, 622; merchant marine, 622; Cox and Roosevelt, 623; deflation, 625; canvass of 1920, 625; significance of election, 626; budget reform, 628; the agricultural bloc, 629; veterans' bonus, 629; the foreign debts, 630; public opinion, 631; Colombia treaty settlement, 633; Yap and the mandates, 633; end of World War, 634; limitation of armaments, 634; Treaties of Washington, 636.

Wilson Tariff Bill, 244.

Windom, William, Secretary of the Treasury, 87.

Windom Report, the, 156.

Wireless telegraphy, development of, 590.

Wisconsin idea, the, 353.

Woman suffrage, spread of, 459 f.; 617 f.

Woman's Christian Temperance Union, the, 598.

- Women's colleges, the, 52.
 Wood, Leonard, 278; service in Cuba, 326; considered as presidential candidate, 621.
 Woodford, General Stewart L., 271.
 Workmen's compensation, 445 f.
 World Court, question of membership in, 659 f.
 World War, the, 462-586; Bryan and the Wilson Administration, 462; Mexican affairs, 463; the Mobile Doctrine, 465; Canal diplomacy, 465; intervention at Vera Cruz, 466; repeal of tolls exemption, 467; Bryan peace treaties, 469; Caribbean relations, 469; the World War, 471; neutrality, 473; propaganda and public opinion, 474; emergency legislation, 476; Democratic victory, 1914, 477; neutral rights, 477; submarine warfare, 479; the Lusitania, 480; Wilson and preparedness, 481; pacifism, 482; German intrigue, 483; the Sussex case, 486; National Defense Act, 1916, 486; naval program, 487; the Progressives, 1916, 488; nomination of Hughes, 489; hyphenism, 490; reelection of Wilson and Marshall, 492; the war in 1916, 493; German peace overture, 494; Wilson and peace, 494; German submarine warfare, 495; the breach with Germany, 496; armed merchant ships, 497; the "little group of willful men," 498; Senate cloture, 499; Russian Revolution, 500; the War Session of Congress, 502; government in war-time, 502; Council of National Defense, 503; labor and socialism, 503; Committee on Public Information, 505; ships will win the war, 505; food will win the war, 507; Herbert C. Hoover, 507; production of munitions, 509; finance: pay as you go, 510; loans to Allies, 511; officers and men, 512; selective service, 512; Pershing and the A.E.F., 513; foreign missions, 513; the American army on the Western front, 515; services of supply, 516; the National Army, 518; registration, 519; training camps, 520; the Roosevelt Division, 520; espionage, 521; liability, allowance, allotment, insurance, 522; embargo and neutral trade, 525; War Trade Board, 527; Alien Property Custodian, 528; food and fuel control, 528; war revenue, 530; war expenses, 531; civic organization and cooperation, 532; anti-war, 534; the crisis of the war, 535; priority, 535; War Industries Board, 536; War Service Committees, 538; transportation, 539; railroad administration, 541; demand for a Munitions Ministry, 542; Overman Act, 543; The War Boards, 543; the Battle of 1918, 544; labor backs the war, 545; Government activities, 546; labor policies, 547; work or fight, 547; Baruch and the War Industries Board, 548; requirements, 549; War Finance Corporation, 550; army reorganization, 551; General Staff, 552; eighteen to forty-five draft, 552; basis of peace, 554; the fourteen points, 554; international socialism, 556; Russia withdraws, 556; coöperation among Allies, 558; Inter-Ally Finance Council, 559; preparations for peace, 560; Supreme War Council, 561; the unified program, 562; German drive, March, 1918, 563; status of the A.E.F., 564; battle of 1918, 566; training the A.E.F., 567; Cantigny, 567; the second Marne, 568; Château-Thierry, 568; Foch's counter-attack, 569; the Allied offensives, 570; the First American Army, 570; Saint-Mihiel, 571; preparations for 1919, 572; the Meuse-Argonne, 573; collapse of Germany, 573; the Armistice, November 11, 1918, 574; Congressional election, 1918, 575; reorganization of Republican Party, 576; demobilization, 577; the Peace Commission, 577; Wilson in Europe, 579; the Big Four, 580; Covenant of the League of Nations, 581; reaction in the United States, 582; American Legion, 583; economic demobilization, 584; separate treaty of peace between United States and Germany, 634.
 World's Fair, at Chicago, 233 f.
 Wright, Carroll D., 168.
 Wright, Orville and Wilbur, 589.
 Yacht racing, 161.
 Yap, the question of, 633 f.
 Yellow journalism, 269.
 Young, General S. B. M., 329.
 Y.M.C.A., the, 363.
 Ypres, German assault at, 566.
 Y.W.C.A., the, 363.

