Impacts of state aid for non-traditional students

AUTHORS

ABSTRACT

Oded Gurantz University of Missouri

University of Missouri

Do tuition vouchers and cash subsidies promote educational or labor force outcomes for "non-traditional" students? I use a regression discontinuity design to estimate the impacts of a state aid program with an unobserved eligibility cutoff. Eligibility has no impact on degree completion for students with a preference for community colleges or four-year colleges but increases bachelor's degrees for students interested in for-profit colleges by four percentage points. I find no impact on employment or earnings for all applicants. This research highlights challenges in promoting human capital investment for adults.

Acknowledgements: I thank the Smith Richardson Foundation and the Karr Family Graduate Fellowship for financial support, and acknowledge support by grant #R305B090016 from the U.S. Department of Education, Institute of Education Sciences. Special thanks to the California Student Aid Commission for making these data accessible and supporting me in pursuing this research. This paper benefitted from feedback by Eric Bettinger, Jeffrey Denning, Hans Fricke, Bruce Sacerdote, and seminar participants from the University of Buffalo, University of Maryland, University of Missouri, University of North Carolina, University of Reno, Stanford University and the Association of Education, Finance, and Policy.

VERSION

September 2018

Suggested citation: Gurantz, O. (2018). Impacts of state aid for non-traditional students (CEPA Working Paper No.18-19). Retrieved from Stanford Center for Education Policy Analysis: http://cepa.stanford.edu/wp18-19

Impacts of state aid for non-traditional students

Oded Gurantz

gurantzo@missouri.edu Truman School of Public Affairs University of Missouri October 2018

<u>Abstract</u>: Do tuition vouchers and cash subsidies promote educational or labor force outcomes for "non-traditional" students? I use a regression discontinuity design to estimate the impacts of a state aid program with an unobserved eligibility cutoff. Eligibility has no impact on degree completion for students with a preference for community colleges or four-year colleges but increases bachelor's degrees for students interested in for-profit colleges by four percentage points. I find no impact on employment or earnings for all applicants. This research highlights challenges in promoting human capital investment for adults.

I thank the Smith Richardson Foundation and the Karr Family Graduate Fellowship for financial support, and acknowledge support by grant #R305B090016 from the U.S. Department of Education, Institute of Education Sciences. Special thanks to the California Student Aid Commission for making these data accessible and supporting me in pursuing this research. This paper benefitted from feedback by Eric Bettinger, Jeffrey Denning, Hans Fricke, Bruce Sacerdote, and seminar participants from the University of Buffalo, University of Maryland, University of Missouri, University of North Carolina, University of Reno, Stanford University and the Association of Education, Finance, and Policy.

Introduction

Rapid technological advancements have renewed the emphasis on lifelong learning to ensure employability in an ever-shifting workplace (National Academies of Sciences & Medicine, 2017). Improving educational outcomes for individuals with weaker academic credentials is a key component of workforce development, as fewer than half of all adults have earned a postsecondary degree (Ryan & Bauman, 2016). Increasing human capital development among working adults could help to address many issues confronting the economy as a whole: increasing income inequality between educated and non-educated workers; technological shifts that are pushing older, unprepared workers into low-skilled jobs; and rising levels of postsecondary debt, driven particularly by college dropouts with poor job prospects (Autor, Katz, & Kearney, 2008; Autor, Levy, & Murnane, 2003; Goldin & Katz, 2007; Looney & Yannelis, 2015).

This paper examines whether financial aid impacts educational investment or labor market outcomes for "non-traditional" students, a broad definition that typically includes those who may be older, independent, enrolled part-time, or working significant hours (U.S. Department of Education, 2002, 2016). I test whether tuition vouchers and cash payments alters non-traditional students' outcomes using application data from the California Student Aid Commission's (CSAC) Competitive Cal Grant program. A state-based grant program initiated in 2001, the award explicitly targets adults who have not yet earned a bachelor's degree. Eligibility is determined by student GPA and a number of common measures of disadvantage, such as family income, with extra points assigned to students who are older and have fewer years of postsecondary schooling. As a result of these requirements, the average award winner is almost 30 years old and has Free Application for Federal Student Aid (FAFSA) reported family income of about \$15,000, with only

one-third still registering as a dependent.¹ Thus the type of "non-traditional" student in this paper is typically a young adult in their late 20s or early 30s, though as described below some traditionally-aged, undergraduate students do ultimately earn awards.

Understanding whether financial aid has meaningful impacts on educational or labor force outcomes requires us to produce evidence that is both causal and generalizable to other settings. There are two aspects of the program that make it an ideal site for producing such evidence. First, this paper uses data from an entire state, with over 900,000 unique applicants over a ten year period. Applicants in my study can be enrolled or not enrolled in college, and are weighing enrollment decisions across all postsecondary sectors. This is in contrast to recent studies of nontraditional students that mostly focus on students already enrolled in public colleges (Barrow, Richburg-Hayes, Rouse, & Brock, 2014; Denning, 2017). Although some studies have used national-level data to study financial aid for non-traditional students, these papers have focused on Pell grant recipients in the 1970s or military veterans (Barr, 2015, forthcoming; Seftor & Turner, 2002), and results may not be as generally applicable to the current population of non-traditional students. Second, I can credibly estimate causal effects using a regression discontinuity design that compares identical students on the margins of award eligibility. As the program rank orders applicants through a formula driven largely by measures of student disadvantage, the eligibility threshold compares the lowest income applicants and produces a treatment effect among students likely to be most sensitive to the financial subsidies. With hundreds of thousands of applicants and strong causal identification, I produce precise estimates of program impacts, and can estimate heterogeneous impacts for various sub-populations.

¹ Some FASFA submissions indicate zero income due to auto-zero EFC calculations but Unemployment Insurance estimates used below suggest my impact estimates are for students in families with about \$29,000 annual income (conditional on having reported income).

I find that Competitive award eligibility increases degree completion by one percentage point, with no impact on employment or earnings, as measured by California's unemployment insurance (UI) data. Using students' preferences for specific postsecondary sectors, measured exogenously by the colleges they list on the FAFSA during the application process, I divide applicants into three groups whether they are interested in community colleges, four-year colleges (both public and non-profit), or for-profit institutions. For students interested in community colleges, who constitute the majority of applicants, long-term estimates on degree completion and total quarterly earnings are close to zero, at -0.1 percentage points and \$27 per quarter, respectively. Estimates for students interested in traditional four-year colleges, both public and private non-profits, are also indistinguishable from zero, though noisier due to the smaller sample size. The only evidence of positive impacts is found among students interested in Title IV eligible for-profit colleges; the most frequently attended for-profit colleges are large chains such the University of Phoenix, Heald, and ITT, as non-Title IV institutions are ineligible for the aid program. For these students, bachelor's degree completion increases by four percentage points, a 17% increase over baseline, and instrumental variable estimates based on award utilization are roughly twice as large. I find earnings of for-profit students increase \$132 per quarter (1.5% over baseline) beginning roughly three years after application, the moment at which most of their increases in degree completion have finished, but results are statistically indistinguishable from zero. I also find no impacts on employment rates or earnings in the short-term for all students, implying that non-traditional students either do not or cannot meaningfully shift labor force participation while in school as a result of financial aid.

This paper makes a number of contributions to our understanding of how governments can support human capital investment for working adults. Although financial aid is generally found to have

positive impacts on postsecondary attendance and completion, there are few studies of financial aid based on non-traditional students. I find essentially no impact on student outcomes, adding to the literature which suggests that non-traditional students may be less responsive to aid than high school graduates.² Work on the early version of the Pell Grant found relatively small impacts on college attendance (Seftor & Turner, 2002), and a study of direct application assistance on the FAFSA found large attendance impacts for dependent students, but small to no impacts for independents (Bettinger, Long, Oreopoulos, & Sanbonmatsu, 2012).³ Randomized control trials of short-term performance-based scholarships for community-college attending non-traditional students documented small impacts on measures such as full-time enrollment but no statistically significant changes to long-term degree completion or earnings four years out (Barrow et al., 2014; Mayer, Patel, & Gutierrez, 2016; Patel & Valenzuela, 2013; Richburg-Hayes et al., 2009; Richburg-Hayes, Sommo, & Welbeck, 2011). Denning (2017) and Barr (forthcoming) show that financial aid to independent students and military veterans, respectively, improve degree outcomes. Although neither of the groups in those papers mirror the types of students examined here, they do support the idea that some groups of non-traditional students can indeed benefit from appropriately targeted financial support.

I also contribute to the broad literature on government intervention in educational and workforce development (Barnow & Smith, 2015; McCall, Smith, & Wunsch, 2016). Given the relatively small effects of workforce training on employment outcomes (e.g., Schochet, Burghardt, and McConnell (2008)), more attention is needed in assessing the relative merits of various program

² For brevity I do not discuss the full literature on financial aid, which often focuses on state-based merit- or needbased programs (Bettinger, Gurantz, Kawano, Sacerdote, & Stevens, 2019; Dynarski, 2000, 2004, 2008; Fitzpatrick & Jones, 2016; Scott-Clayton, 2011; Scott-Clayton & Zafar, 2016) or other types of services (Angrist, Autor, Hudson, & Pallais, 2014; Avery & Hoxby, 2004; Castleman & Long, 2016; Dynarski, 2003).

³ Most studies of Pell Grant impacts are conducted on traditional-aged students (Carruthers & Welch, 2016; Denning, Marx, & Turner, forthcoming).

formats. The voucher in this paper operates in a fashion relatively similar to the Pell Grant, the dominant form of U.S. federal financial aid. Essentially, financial aid can serve as a workforce training tool, allowing students to select the timing at which they improve their skills in order to improve their labor market outcomes. Educational vouchers may be a more effective approach than traditional government-created programs if individuals are better able than government to make decisions regarding their labor market opportunities and the strength of available educational options. Previous studies find that offering tuition vouchers or allowing consumers more discretion in program selection can increase training, but has little impact on employment outcomes (Perez-Johnson, Moore, & Santillano, 2011; Schwerdt, Messer, Woessmann, & Wolter, 2012). I find most program applicants exhibit no employment-related benefits in the first six years after application, suggesting that many older students continue to need additional support in order to improve their labor force prospects.

Background

Given the complexities of the award allocation process, I divide the Background section into two parts. The first describes how applicants are scored and what monetary benefit they receive. The second details the Competitive award application process.

Competitive Award Background

The California Student Aid Commission (CSAC) created the Competitive Cal Grant program in 2001. Although all students can apply, California residents must be two or more years removed from earning their high school degree, and need to submit the FAFSA and a GPA verification

form, which is submitted to CSAC directly by the administration of the corresponding high school or college.⁴

The Competitive Cal Grant program uses a point system that favors non-traditional students. CSAC determines award eligibility by assigning students a score between 60 and 200 through five distinct components. Students can earn up to 70 points through a higher GPA, with the remaining 130 points derived from multi-faceted measures of need: lower income, lower parental education, larger family size, being older, having less postsecondary experience, earning a GED, or graduating from a high school identified as disadvantaged. Appendix 2 provides a detailed map of the scoring process.

Award winners are provided four years of a cash "subsistence" award to be used for "living expenses and expenses related to transportation, supplies, and books," equal to \$1,551 per year. Students attending any in-state public four-year institution also receive three years of full tuition and fees, or subsidies up to \$9,708 per year towards any accredited private institution.⁵ Students who use an award are automatically renewed each year they resubmit their FAFSA and meet Satisfactory Academic Progress. Although the Competitive award does not offer community college tuition, a separate state program essentially provides free community college tuition for low-income applicants, for which all Competitive award applicants near the eligibility threshold would likely qualify.⁶ Cal Grant tuition payments are "first-dollar" scholarships, meaning that aid

⁴ Appendix 1 shows the GPA verification form. CSAC only uses a college GPA after a student has attempted at least 24 semester units. College GPAs are given priority over high school GPA, but if a student has both a community college and four-year college GPA, preference is given to the higher value.

⁵ Tuition for California's four-year public colleges is listed in Appendix Table 1. In practice over 95% of eligible Competitive award students elect to use the payment plan known as Cal Grant B, described in the text. A description of the alternate Cal Grant A payment is described in Appendix 2.

⁶ California offers free tuition to low-income students through the Board of Governor (BOGS) fee waiver program. In the rare case that students are unaware of the well-advertised program, California offers the lowest community college tuition in the nation. At \$1,104 for a year of full-time enrollment in 2011-12, the subsistence award is then more than equal to the equivalent of free college enrollment.

is paid to institutions before other forms of financial aid are considered.⁷ Although the only aid I can observe are payments made directly by CSAC, previous work on the Cal Grant found that receiving the grant had no impact on other federal programs such as the Pell Grant or federal tax credits (Bettinger et al., 2019).⁸

Competitive Award Application Process

The state budget authorizes 22,500 Competitive awards per year, which are allocated in a two-part process. Students enter into the first "cycle" if they submit a completed application by March 2nd, California's deadline for FAFSA submission. Eligible students are rank ordered by their point totals, from highest to lowest, with awards offered to the top 11,250 students. The second cycle includes students who apply by September 2nd, when another 11,250 awards were offered. The key takeaway is that changing applicant pools produced a year-varying eligibility cutoff score that is ex ante unknown to CSAC or any applicants. Cutoff values between 2002 and 2011 range from 153 to 166, and are shown in Appendix Table 1.

Whereas March applicants can take their award to any in-state institution, September cycle winners can only use the award at a community college. September winners must be enrolled at a community college in the Fall quarter or semester to receive their payment, but can later transfer and receive tuition at a four-year or private institution. Students who unsuccessfully applied in the

⁷ It is unlikely that colleges shift institutional aid awards as these are generally offered significantly before the Cal Grant results are provided to students.

⁸ The Competitive award is primarily used as a means to support students re-entering the postsecondary sector or persisting within their current institution, rather than as a means to encourage two-year to four-year transfer. An alternate CSAC award, known as the Transfer Entitlement award, assists students actively transferring from two-year to four-year institutions. The requirements for the Transfer Entitlement grant are substantially easier to meet than the Competitive award, though is reserved for students prior to turning 28 years old. The Transfer Entitlement program granted less than 5,000 awards per year during the time period studied, which is significantly fewer than the Competitive program.

March cycle can be rescored and entered into the applicant pool for the September awards, provided they were interested in an attending a community college or listed one on their FAFSA.

Although many students actively choose to submit the GPA verification form, CSAC has attempted to ease the process by entering into data-sharing agreements with various sectors of the California higher education system, primarily public two- and four-year institutions. As a result, CSAC receives automated GPA transfers for most continuing students in public colleges who submit a FAFSA. These students are automatically entered into the applicant pool, even if they are not aware of the award itself. The purpose of the GPA transfer process is to eliminate traditional barriers to financial aid application, as has been observed with the FAFSA (Bettinger et al., 2012; Dynarski & Scott-Clayton, 2006).⁹

Data

CSAC Administrative Data

I use administrative records for ten years of Competitive grant applicants applying for aid for the 2002-03 through 2011-12 academic school years (I refer to these as the 2002 through 2011 cohorts).¹⁰ In all cases I only utilize the first application for each individual, as roughly 40% of first-time applicants who did not earn an award re-apply in a later year. The data elements consist of many variables collected on the FAFSA (e.g., income, age, educational level, list of colleges to

⁹ Some students who apply by the March deadline and do not earn an award can re-apply for a smaller financial award known as Cal Grant C, which slightly decrease the treatment-control contrast and is described in Appendix 2.

¹⁰ I do not use the first year of the program (2001) as CSAC used an alternate scoring system of 100 points before converting to the current 200 point system. I eliminate all students who applied for a Cal Grant from 1998 through 2001 to ensure that the analysis uses only the first application for each student. I also eliminate students from 2002 to 2005 who applied in the March cycle but listed a community college on their FAFSA, for whom I could not recover their data. March applicants below the threshold are rescored into the September cycle but for these years I was unable to recover their initial March score, as their GPA and income were updated and overwrote the initial value, producing endogenous point values that would lead to biased estimates of program impacts.

which financial aid information should be sent), along with student GPA. I also track aid utilization through payments made by CSAC to participating institutions on behalf of individual students.

Table 1 provides descriptive statistics of the total applicant sample in the first column, with over 900,000 unique applicants. About 40% of students have at least one college-educated parent, 58% are female, average income is \$20,900, and the average submitted GPA used in the eligibility calculations is 2.8. The average age is 27, though this differs greatly for dependent and independent students, who average 21 and 31, respectively. Additional descriptive statistics for students close to the eligibility threshold or separately by year are provided in Appendix Tables 2 and 3.

A key finding from the full sample (Table 1, column 1) is that 85% of all students list only one college on their FAFSA, and the few students who list more than one college almost always list two or more distinct community colleges. These results are in sharp contrast to high school students who often list up to the maximum of ten eligible schools across a variety of postsecondary sectors. Thus non-traditional students are rarely weighing enrollment choices across postsecondary sectors, but simply engaging in a binary decision to enroll or not, or persist versus drop out.

Given that students are focused on specific postsecondary sectors, using preferences determined exogenously prior to award eligibility, I divide the sample into five groups: <u>four-year students</u>, which includes students who list California State University, University of California, or in-state, non-profit four-year institutions; <u>for-profit students</u>, which includes students who list both in-state and out-of-state for-profit colleges; <u>community college students</u>, who list public two-year schools; and <u>mixed students</u>, which includes the relatively few students who list schools across postsecondary sectors.¹¹ Community college students are divided into two groups – March and

¹¹ I include private, non-profit colleges with public four-year colleges as the most commonly attended institutions generally offer liberal arts curriculum that most commonly align with these schools, rather the most occupationally

September – based on the cycle when they first applied for the program. Table 1, columns two through six, provides descriptive statistics for these applicant groups. One noteworthy contrast across groups is that almost all students who intend to enroll in four-year colleges are entering their third or fourth year of college, whereas the most common response for for-profit and community college students is their second year. Looking across these four categories, eligible students who immediately use the award received on average anywhere from \$4,480 (community colleges students) to \$13,050 (for-profit students) in combined tuition and subsistence payments over their lifetime.

Outcome Data

Applicant data are linked at the individual-level to National Student Clearinghouse (NSC) data, which are used to construct the primary academic outcomes measures, including college enrollment and completion rates. NSC data allow me to follow all cohorts for at least five years post application.¹² Due to the financial cost of NSC linking, I match all March cycle applicants within a 15 point bandwidth of the eligibility cutoff and September applicants within a 10 point bandwidth. Even with this limitation the sample is over 200,000 unique students across years.

One challenge with using NSC data in this context is that many for-profit colleges, as well as a handful of public or non-profit, private institutions, can choose not to report their enrollment records. Appendix Table 4 provides the full list of Cal Grant payments to for-profit colleges, which is not hampered by NSC reporting issues. For each college I can identify whether it had good NSC

driven for-profit colleges. The most popular non-profits include: Humprey's College, University of Southern California, Chapman University, University of LaVerne, Art Center College of Design, Fresno Pacific University, California Baptist University, Azusa Pacific, and Loyola Marymount.

¹² NSC identify postsecondary enrollment for the majority of students enrolled in the United States, though privacy laws and complications with student matching may result in a lower rate (Dynarski, Hemelt, & Hyman, 2015). Data were matched in late August 2016, and should contain practically complete degree completion records for 2015-16.

coverage by calculating how often a student who receives a Cal Grant payment also appears in the NSC data.¹³ This exercise shows that my NSC data on for-profit colleges essentially identifies attendance or completion results for five large colleges: University of Phoenix, Heald, ITT, DeVry, and Academy of Art University. In practice, the first three colleges listed are also the most popular colleges in the Cal Grant applicant pool. In the context of the Competitive award, where most students are only considering one postsecondary institution, non-response in for-profit colleges will bias any impacts on attendance or degree completion toward zero.¹⁴ In later robustness checks I use a student's list of FAFSA schools to selectively remove students who prefer colleges where they are unlikely to be observed in the data.

Employment and earning outcomes come from a match to California's Employment Development Department (EDD) Unemployment Insurance (UI) data.¹⁵ Any employee whose employer pays into the state UI program is included within these records. Individuals that are unobserved or may have incomplete records primarily include those who work or live out of state, independent contractors, or the self-employed. Internal calculations by EDD estimate that approximately 92% of all employed Californians are included in the files in any given quarter. I create variables that identify whether an individual had any employment (extensive margin) and the sum of total earnings within each quarter, conditional on employment (intensive margin). At the time of match EDD data extended through the third quarter of 2017; this allows me to follow all applicants for six and one-quarter years (i.e., 25 total quarters) after they would have learned their award status. Earnings are top coded at \$25,000 per quarter. The primary concern as noted by the EDD is that

¹³ NSC provides a Student Tracker report that shows institutional-level block rates based on the data submitted for matching. When I compare Tracker block rates to my own institutional-level block rate calculations they align closely. ¹⁴ If financial aid induces students to switch colleges, then college-specific non-response bias can be problematic.

¹⁵ Matching is done at the individual-level through social security numbers. EDD does not return individual-level data, but provides descriptive statistics provided the match meets minimum cell size requirements, or allows the researcher to provide SAS code that can be run by the EDD, who then return statistical output.

some SSNs are either erroneously or illegally used by multiple individuals within the same quarter, thus leading to large outliers. Top coded results are essentially similar to unadjusted results.¹⁶ In contrast to the NSC outcomes, the UI data cover all applicants.

Methodology

The existence of a sharp cutoff for Competitive award eligibility allows me to estimate treatment effects using a regression discontinuity design. Under the assumption that students whose initial scores just above and below the threshold are essentially identical, I look for sharp changes in student outcomes that occur in a narrow bandwidth around these cutoffs. This estimation strategy is appropriate in the Competitive grant context because students are unable to sort endogenously in relation to the eligibility cutoff. The changing applicant pool and rank-order sorting resulted in a time-varying eligibility threshold that was unknown prior to application. Conversations with CSAC officials indicated that though the scoring information was publicly available, few students were aware of how scoring occurred or where to find this information. Additionally, GPA datasharing agreements with a large number of California's postsecondary institutions resulted in many students who submitted or renewed the FAFSA being entered into the applicant pool without their knowledge. Finally, students are unlikely to report false information as the FAFSA is routinely subject to verification by the federal government, and GPA data come directly from the institution rather than the student. Although providing false information would not necessarily invalidate the identification strategy given the unknown cutoff, it does suggest that I can interpret these values as accurate representations of the type of student affected by the award.

¹⁶ Only 0.36% of wage values were topcoded down to \$25,000 and there is no discontinuous jump in likelihood of topcoding at the eligibility threshold.

Throughout the paper I provide heterogeneous impacts for students based on their FAFSA preferences. I focus on this categorization for three reasons. First, the Competitive award implicitly highlights this distinction by offering differing financial aid packages depending on whether a student attends community college (cash only), four-year public college (cash plus full tuition), or a private college (cash plus subsidized tuition). Given that the responsiveness to aid is likely a function of the award size, this is a natural area of concern. Second, variation in the types of postsecondary offerings between sectors is likely to attract students who differ on unobservable characteristics, even in the absence of observable differences. As there are few applicants who select private, non-profit colleges – only 4% of the sample, compared to 10% and 16% who choose for-profit or four-year publics, respectively – I merge private, non-profit and four-year publics together given the closer relationship in curriculum between these sectors (see footnote 12). Finally, as noted above, almost all students in the data appear to choose one sector, allowing for an easy distinction between these groups of students.

On the full sample I estimate treatment effects using the following equation:

$$Y_{igt} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 * f(score_{ig}) + \beta_2 * CG_{igt} + \beta_3 * CG_{igt} * f(score_{ig}) + \theta_{gt} + X_{igt} + \varepsilon_{igt}$$
(1)

In equation (1), Y_{igt} is the outcome of interest (e.g. degree completion) for student *i* in group *g* in year *t*. I include five distinct groups (*g*), based on the FAFSA preferences described in the Data section above: four-year, for-profit, March community college, September community college, and mixed students. CG_{igt} is a dummy variable that equals one if student *i* is above the Cal Grant eligibility threshold, which is centered at zero and allowed to vary by group *g* and year *t* (given the year- and cycle-specific cutoffs). I estimate the jump at the eligibility threshold CG_{igt} by allowing $f(score_{ig})$ to be a flexible function that indicates an individual's distance from the centered year- and group-specific threshold, and is allowed to vary on either side of the cutoff. In practice I use local linear regressions over the IK optimal bandwidth, which was calculated as eight points (Imbens & Kalyanaram, 2012), though the results are generally invariant to bandwidth or functional form. For labor market outcomes I use the full bandwidth of 15 points for March applicants and 10 points for September applicants in order to maximize power, though estimates are similar in magnitude. θ_{gt} are year- and group-specific fixed effects, which are necessary to account for the year- and cycle-specific eligibility thresholds. X_{igt} is a vector of baseline observable characteristics, such as student's background and demographic characteristics, though I only include them as a robustness check for my main results. I present robust standard errors as they were more conservative than the common practice of clustering on discrete running variables (Lee and Card, 2008).

The main focus is the intent-to-treat parameter, β_2 , which identifies the causal impact of the Competitive award eligibility on later outcomes. It is common practice in these settings to supplement the reduced form analysis with an instrumental variable (IV) estimate that assumes changes in outcomes only occur through actual award utilization. In these cases my instrument is whether an individual ever received a Cal Grant payment by 2016. As discussed above, students below the threshold can also earn an award through rescoring in a given year (between the March and September cycles), re-applying in the same year for Cal Grant C, or re-applying in a later year. Students above the threshold might not use the award if they choose not to attend an eligible postsecondary institution or if FAFSA verification later identifies them as ineligible.

Validity of Research Design

To provide evidence that this design produces unbiased estimates, I test a number of assumptions that indicate no sorting of students in the area surrounding the eligibility threshold. Observable evidence of bunching would indicate that students have the ability to manipulate their scores above the cutoff, and would invalidate a key assumption required to interpret my results as causal estimates. Panel A in Appendix Figure 1 shows the distribution of students' initial scores for 2002 to 2011, using the same sample shown in the first column of Table 1. The scores are normally distributed, with two lines indicating the lowest threshold (153 points in 2007) and highest threshold (165 points in 2011) over time. Panel B shows the distribution of student scores near the cutoff for all applicants, with panels C, D, E, and F showing results separately for four-year, for-profit, March community college, and September community college students respectively.

I next provide evidence that covariates are smooth in the vicinity surrounding the eligibility threshold. I first present graphical depictions of covariates in the vicinity of the threshold in Appendix Figure 2, with no evidence of discontinuous jumps.¹⁷ I formally test this assumption using a variant of equation (1) above, where covariates are substituted as outcomes in the regression model. Appendix Table 5 shows results for student GPA, income, parental education, family size, sex, age, dependency status, student education level at the time of application, and the number of colleges listed on their FAFSA. There is no evidence of discontinuities on either the full sample (column 1) or each of the FASFA subsamples (columns 2 to 5), or when estimating linear or quadratic functions forms over various alternate bandwidths. Together with the figures and histograms above, these results provide strong evidence that the design produces unbiased estimates of the treatment impact.

¹⁷ These graphs use the full sample of eligible students, rather than just the NSC sample that restricts to 10 point bandwidths for the September cohort.

Results

First-stage Impacts of Competitive Award Eligibility

To understand my estimated treatment, I first show graphically how Competitive award eligibility impacts aid utilization in Figure 1, with corresponding regression estimates presented in Table 2. (Table 2 and later tables include baseline estimates, based on control group means for students one and two points below the threshold, just below the RD treatment estimates). Although the threshold defines a sharp cutoff in initial award eligibility, the cutoff produces a 64 percentage point difference in award utilization in the first year, with a \$1,710 difference in award receipt, as measured by grant aid delivered by CSAC. The difference in overall award utilization shrinks to 46 percentage points as control group students re-apply in subsequent years, though the dollar contrast increases to \$3,060 over students' lifetimes.¹⁸ The impact of the award on total grant aid received varies significantly across FAFSA groups, ranging from a low of \$1,470 for March community college students (Table 2, column 4) to a high of \$7,280 for March for-profit students (Table 2, column 3).

Although eligible Competitive award students could potentially receive tens of thousands of dollars in tuition payments, along with over \$6,000 in subsistence payments, there are a few reasons we observe much smaller dollar award contrasts at the threshold. Some eligible students choose not to use the award and some ineligible students earn the award in later years; if they applied in the March cycle, students can be rescored and earn the award within the same year. In addition, eligible students do not utilize the full award amount if they drop out or do not require four years to graduate. As many students are continuing their studies or have previous college

¹⁸ Lifetime aid is measured for at least five years in each cohort but include all payments from 2002 through 2016.

experience, it is expected that many will require fewer than four years. Finally, as most students intend to attend a community college, the maximum benefit is much smaller than the potential benefits offered towards four-year and for-profit institutions.

Educational Outcomes

I focus on a wide set of college attendance outcomes, including initial enrollment or ever enrolling at an in-state community college, in-state four-year college (including public and private, non-profit institutions), any for-profit, or any other institution. I also examine whether a student earned a college degree, which I divide into three categories: (1) associate degree or certificate; (2) bachelor degree; or (3) any degree. Generally, I show only a limited set of outcomes for brevity, though provide more complete results in appendices.¹⁹

Table 3 presents results of Competitive award eligibility on college attendance and completion. Column 1 represents reduced form results for the entire sample and shows virtually no impact on college attendance. Enrollment results are precisely estimated, and allow me to reject the likelihood that Competitive award eligibility increases attendance by even one percentage point. The lack of attendance impacts may be due in part to the high enrollment rate of these students; the baseline enrollment rate for students who are initially ineligible is 72%. There is suggestive evidence that the award increases transfer to a four-year public or non-profit college, with a positive impact of 0.9 percentage points. Graphical depictions of these attendance results are shown in the top panel of Figure 2, and support the regression findings. The first column of

¹⁹ Less than one percent of students attended an out-of-state institution the year after applying for the award. Few students earned a certificate, so I combine both certificates and associate degrees into one category for simplicity.

Appendix Table 6 provides a more complete set of enrollment estimates, with only a few marginally significant results.

Competitive award eligibility also increases the probability of earning a bachelor's degree by 0.9 percentage points (5 percent) or the probability of earning any degree by 1.0 percentage points (3 percent), with a smaller and statistically insignificant increase of 0.2 percentage points on associate degree completion. Graphical results for degree completion are shown in the bottom left panel of Figure 2. IV results are presented in column 2, and are generally a little over twice as large as the reduced form impacts. Baseline rates are also provided using only students just below the threshold who never utilized a Cal Grant payment. Thus the IV results indicate that bachelor's degree completion among students who used the award increased roughly two percentage points, which translates to an eleven percent increase in bachelor's degrees.

Heterogeneity in the types of students who apply for the award raise the possibility of stronger impacts for specific subgroups within the sample. Table 4 splits the sample into four separate groups, based on their listed FAFSA preferences.²⁰ Students who list for-profits as their preferred institution on the FAFSA are the most responsive to the program. Bachelor degree completion rates for this group increase 3.9 percentage points in the reduced form estimates, which represents a 17% increase over a baseline completion rate of 23%. IV estimates show an increase of 8.6 percentage points, or a corresponding 36% increase. For all other FAFSA groups – four-year college or community college students – award eligibility appears to have no meaningful impacts.

²⁰ As noted above, there are few students who list multiple schools across postsecondary sectors, and I do not focus on them throughout the paper. Using students within the optimal bandwidth, removing the "mixed" students eliminates only 2.8% of the analytic sample.

All results are robust to common validity checks for regression discontinuity designs, including a scatterplot of for-profit degree completion outcomes (bottom right panel of Figure 2).²¹

Pathways to Degree Completion

To understand the process by which aid increases degree completion, Figure 3 shows changes in overall attendance, full-time attendance, or persistence for the for-profit sample five years post application.²² As before I find no impacts on attendance in the first year, yet in the second year after application eligible students are roughly three percentage points more likely to be enrolled, and bachelor degree completion rates have risen by a marginally significant 1.5 percentage points. These results indicate that the award promotes degree completion through substantial persistence effects on enrolled students. By three years after application both the persistence and degree completion effects become stable, with few students remaining enrolled; following students over a longer time-frame is then unlikely to reveal additional impacts on degree completion. Similar figures for community college and four-year applicants are shown in Appendix Figure 5 and show essentially no impacts on degree completion at any point in the first five years. These results indicate that the aid does not produce a shorter time-to-degree effect that then fades out.

²¹ Robustness checks include: (i) varying the bandwidth and functional form (Appendix Figure 3); (ii) using triangular kernels (Appendix Figure 4), or; (iii) using covariates or combinations of covariates and triangular kernels (results omitted for brevity). An additional robustness check deals with a potential source of bias by eliminating students whose FAFSA preferences identify schools that do not report data to the NSC or those with high FERPA blockage rates that render students invisible to the researcher. See Dynarski et al. (2015) for a lengthier discussion of the student blockage issue. I can identify schools with high NSC blockage rates through both the Student Tracker report and by cross-referencing NSC attendance rates with CSAC financial aid payments for eligible students. Removing these students suggests bachelor's degree completion results are closer to five percentage points for for-profit students, but unchanged for everyone else (Appendix Table 7). Appendix 3 describes an alternate difference-in-difference strategy that leverages cross year changes to the eligibility thresholds, with results presented in Appendix Table 8 similar to the RD estimates.

²² Full-time attendance is taken from NSC data, although some schools do not report these data to the NSC and I am not aware of any reports that verify the accuracy of these data.

As the Competitive award explicitly targets non-traditional students, I test whether impacts are particularly beneficial for older applicants. I create three equally sized age groups, which translates to 22 and younger, 23 to 31, and 32 and older. Figure 4 shows treatment impacts on bachelor degree completion based on the interaction of age categories and the intended sector of college attendance. I find that the award increases the likelihood that for-profit students earn a bachelor degree in both the middle and upper age terciles but has no impacts for all other groups (Regression results are provided in Appendix Table 9). Additional results suggest little substantial heterogeneity in treatment effects based on other background characteristics.²³

Labor Force Outcomes

In the aggregate, estimates from UI data point to no meaningful impact from Competitive award eligibility on either employment or total earnings. Figures 5 and 6 show results for employment and earnings using the full sample, for the time period including one year prior to application (e.g., for those who submitted in March 2011 this includes 2010 Q3 through 2011 Q2) through six and one-quarter years post-application (e.g., 2011 Q3 through 2017 Q3 for March 2011 applicants). Figure 5 shows no evidence that employment between treatment and control students differs from zero in any quarter post-application, with standard errors rejecting differences larger than roughly one percentage point. I also find no statistically significant differences in quarterly earnings (Figure 6), with 95% confidence intervals rejecting estimates larger than \$100 (over the first three

²³ I further examine other potential forms of student heterogeneity on college outcomes based on for-profit students (Appendix Table 10) and all other students (Appendix Table 11). I fit separate models based on student sex, dependency status, whether a student was already enrolled in college at the time of application, GPA, and educational level. In the for-profit sample the observed results are stronger for females, those with higher GPA, and those with some college experience, where in the alternate groups there are almost no impacts on any attendance or completion measures, regardless of subgroup studied. First-stage impacts are relatively similar across groups, indicating that differences in estimates arise from variation in the impact of the award on student behaviors, rather than the inability to get different groups to participate in the program.

years post-application) to \$200 (over the last three years). All results for the full sample are shown in Appendix Table 12.

When broken down into the four distinct FAFSA groups, I again find no changes to employment or earnings for any individual group. Figures 7 and 8 provide quarter by quarter estimates on employment and earnings, respectively, for each of the four primary FAFSA groups, with corresponding regression results provided in Appendix Table 13. Among the September community college applicants, the largest and most precise subsample, increases in average earnings were essentially zero, with point estimates exceeding \$50 only three times in the subsequent 24 quarters. Results for the March community college, four-year, and for-profit applicants are similar in content though statistically noisier.

Null results on labor force outcomes are not surprising for the community college and four-year applicants, given there are no changes to their human capital, but the most likely explanation for the null for-profit results is that I lack the statistical power to determine whether these degrees have value in the labor market. To increase power, Table 5 shows results for a stacked regression that includes all quarters between 12 and 24 quarters post-application (i.e., beginning four years after applying, the point where Figure 3 shows that for-profit degree has essentially finished), clustering standard errors by individual to account for within-student correlations in earnings. No results are statistically significant; in the full sample we find that quarterly earnings increase \$49 per quarter (0.7%), driven by for-profit students, for whom quarterly earnings increases \$132 (1.5%). Taken literally, treatment impacts on earnings suggest a 37% return from earning a for-profit degree (a baseline rate of \$8,842 per quarter, a point estimate of \$132, and a 4 percentage point impact on degree completion). Given that this return is in line or slightly higher than estimates of returns to degree for potentially similar degrees and certificates (Carruthers &

Sanford, 2018; Jepsen, Mueser, & Jeon, 2016; Stevens, Kurlaender, & Grosz, forthcoming), I conclude that I simply cannot estimate true returns to these degrees with the current data. Appendix Figure 6 present scatterplots of earnings around the threshold, and provide suggestive evidence of a meaningful shift in total earnings for the for-profit sample that begins just at the eligibility threshold, with no observed differences for either community college or four-year applicants.²⁴

Discussion

This paper investigates the effect of tuition and cash vouchers on stimulating human capital investment among adults with less formal education. My results come from California's Competitive Cal Grant award, and constitute the first estimates based on a state-level, formuladriven approach to allocating aid toward non-traditional students. Overall, offering financial aid is shown to have virtually no effect on college attendance, degree completion, employment, or earnings. These results suggest that non-traditional students may be less sensitive to aid as a policy intervention than their traditional counterparts. Increased commitments to work and family might limit their ability to invest necessary effort in their education (Kazis et al., 2007). Non-traditional students may also face less uncertainty about the costs and benefits of schooling – due to previous poor experiences within the postsecondary sector or personal observations of workplace stratification in earnings based on educational attainment – making aid a less salient feature of the college-going decision at that point in time.

²⁴ Appendix Figure 7 provides a scatterplot showing null results on the extensive margin of employment. Appendix Figure 8 examines labor force outcomes beyond the six year mark for a subset of the applicant pool, though I must drop the most recent cohorts for whom the outcome data do not exist. None of the results change our interpretation of null effects.

The largest observed impacts are for adults interested in attending for-profit colleges, with increases in bachelor's degree completion and estimates of earnings increases that are in line with previous studies but statistically indistinguishable from zero. Even barring precision issues, there are strong reasons for being skeptical of the utility of these for-profit increases. First, I am unable to observe other outcomes, such as student loans, which might complicate the results. For example, in the aggregate we might observe increases in in debt that could dwarf any small gains in earnings. Second, it should be noted that state expenditures in the Competitive award program are roughly four times larger per for-profit student than those in community colleges, which may help explain differences in degree outcomes. Even taking the for-profit earnings' point estimates at face value, the results suggest the program is a poor investment when comparing discounted earnings against the sizeable government expenditures per for-profit student.²⁵

Why might the Competitive award program do little to change educational outcomes? One answer might be the California context, where low-income students already have free community college through an alternate state program. Aid boosts postsecondary attendance not just through lowering price, but also minimizes uncertainty by providing students an early signal of expected costs. Thus the Competitive award exists in a state that already provides a clear message of affordability, and directs extra funds toward needy students but through an opaque formula with no early indication of who will benefit.

²⁵ The cost-benefit impacts on degree completion observed in this study are significantly lower than observed in other studies of financial aid. In the full sample, scaling aid offered by degree completion shows that the state purchased each additional degree for roughly \$300,000, or \$185,000 if we focus on for-profit degrees. Estimates across other studies estimate associate or bachelor degree completion from \$50,000 to \$200,000, with some showing sizeable wage increases or other ancillary benefits (Barr, forthcoming; Bettinger et al., 2019; Denning et al., forthcoming; Fack & Grenet, 2015; Goldrick-Rab, Kelchen, Harris, & Benson, 2016; Mayer et al., 2016).

Improving award effectiveness then requires shifting the structure of the program by increasing expenditures to better support students, or improving information so that dollars are targeted towards those whose marginal benefit is higher. As it stands, for-profit students receive roughly four times the aid as community college students; though some of this difference is due to forprofit tuition payments for which community college students are theoretically exempt, the firstdollar nature of the scholarship could mean that for-profit students have additional Pell dollars to use for non-tuition purposes. One possibility is to offset this difference by increasing the size of the cash payments to community college students. For example, IV estimates using an instrument of dollars received, rather than an indicator for receiving an award, dramatically shrinks the differences in estimated impacts (results not shown). An alternate issue is that individuals most in need of the financial support may be unaware of the program, and complementary programs that offer students guidance could induce them to apply or select schools of higher quality (Barr & Turner, 2018; Corcoran, Jennings, Cohodes, & Sattin-Bajaj, 2018). Evidence is mixed on whether this type of assistance matters, though again much of our information derives from studies of traditional-aged students (Carrell & Sacerdote, 2017; Hurwitz & Smith, 2016). The FAFSA data in my study indicate that most non-traditional students are only focused on one specific school, even among those who are not currently enrolled in college. This suggests that applicants are so constrained in their choice set that they are considering few alternative options, and that aid without guidance is unlikely to shift students into higher quality institutions or across postsecondary sectors. Supplementing educational vouchers with some type of student-focused supports has the potential to help students make better decisions.

References

- Angrist, J. D., Autor, D. H., Hudson, S., & Pallais, A. (2014). *Leveling Up: Early Results from a Randomized Evaluation of Post-Secondary Aid*. NBER Working Paper No. 20800.
- Autor, D. H., Katz, L. F., & Kearney, M. S. (2008). Trends in U.S. Wage Inequality: Revising the Revisionists. *The Review of Economics and Statistics, 90*(2), 300-323.
- Autor, D. H., Levy, F., & Murnane, R. J. (2003). The Skill Content of Recent Technological Change: An Empirical Exploration. *The Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 118(4), 1279-1333. doi:10.1162/003355303322552801
- Avery, C. N., & Hoxby, C. M. (2004). Do and Should Financial Aid Packages Affect Students' College Choices? In C. M. Hoxby (Ed.), *College Choices: The Economics of Where to Go, When to Go, and How to Pay For It* (pp. 239-301). Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
- Barnow, B. S., & Smith, J. (2015). *Employment and Training Programs*. NBER Working Paper No. 21659.
- Barr, A. (2015). From the Battlefield to the Schoolyard: The Short- Term Impact of the Post- 9/11 GI Bill. 50(3), 580-613. doi:10.3368/jhr.50.3.580
- Barr, A. (forthcoming). Fighting for Education: The Effect of the Post-9/11 GI Bill on Degree Attainment. *Journal of Labor Economics*.
- Barr, A., & Turner, S. (2018). A Letter and Encouragement: Does Information Increase Postsecondary Enrollment of UI Recipients? *American Economic Journal: Economic Policy*, 10(3), 42-68. doi:doi: 10.1257/pol.20160570
- Barrow, L., Richburg-Hayes, L., Rouse, C. E., & Brock, T. (2014). Paying for Performance: The Education Impacts of a Community College Scholarship Program for Low-Income Adults. *Journal of Labor Economics*, 32(3), 563-599.
- Bettinger, E. P., Gurantz, O., Kawano, L., Sacerdote, B. I., & Stevens, M. (2019). The Long Run Impacts of Financial Aid: Evidence from California's Cal Grant. *American Economic Journal: Economic Policy*, 11(1).
- Bettinger, E. P., Long, B. T., Oreopoulos, P., & Sanbonmatsu, L. (2012). The Role of Simplification and Information in College Decisions: Results from the H&R Block FAFSA Experiment. *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, *127*(3), 1205-1242.
- Carrell, S. E., & Sacerdote, B. I. (2017). Why Do College-Going Interventions Work? *American Economic Journal: Applied Economics*, 9(3), 124-151. doi:doi: 10.1257/app.20150530
- Carruthers, C. K., & Sanford, T. (2018). Way station or launching pad? Unpacking the returns to adult technical education. *Journal of Public Economics*, *165*, 146-159. doi:https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jpubeco.2018.07.001
- Carruthers, C. K., & Welch, J. (2016). Not Whether, but Where? Pell Grants and College Choices.
- Castleman, B. L., & Long, B. T. (2016). Looking beyond Enrollment: The Causal Effect of Need-Based Grants on College Access, Persistence, and Graduation. *Journal of Labor Economics*, 34(4), 1023-1073.
- Corcoran, S. P., Jennings, J. L., Cohodes, S. R., & Sattin-Bajaj, C. (2018). *Leveling the Playing Field for High School Choice: Results from a Field Experiment of Informational Interventions.* NBER Working Paper No. 24471.
- Denning, J. T. (2017). Born Under a Lucky Star: Financial Aid, College Completion, Labor Supply, and Credit Constraints. IZA Discussion Paper No. 10913.
- Denning, J. T., Marx, B. M., & Turner, L. J. (forthcoming). ProPelled: The Effects of Grants on Graduation, Earnings, and Welfare. *American Economic Journal: Applied Economics*.
- Dynarski, S. M. (2000). Hope for Whom? Financial Aid for the Middle Class and Its Impact on College Attendance. *National Tax Journal*, *53*(3), 629-662.

- Dynarski, S. M. (2003). Does Aid Matter? Measuring the Effect of Student Aid on College Attendance and Completion. *American Economic Review*, *93*(1), 279-288. doi:doi: 10.1257/000282803321455287
- Dynarski, S. M. (2004). The New Merit Aid. In C. Hoxby (Ed.), *College Choice: The Economics of Where to Go, When to Go, and How to Pay for It* (pp. 63-97). Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
- Dynarski, S. M. (2008). Building the stock of college-educated labor. *Journal of Human Resources, 43*(3), 576–610.
- Dynarski, S. M., Hemelt, S. W., & Hyman, J. M. (2015). The missing manual: Using National Student Clearinghouse data to track postsecondary outcomes. *Educational Evaluation and Policy Analysis, 37*, 53S-79S.
- Dynarski, S. M., & Scott-Clayton, J. E. (2006). The Cost of Complexity in Federal Student Aid: Lessons from Optimal Tax Theory and Behavioral Economics. *National Tax Journal*, *59*(2), 319-356.
- Fack, G., & Grenet, J. (2015). Improving College Access and Success for Low-Income Students: Evidence from a Large Need-Based Grant Program. *American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, 7*(2), 1-34. doi:doi: 10.1257/app.20130423
- Fitzpatrick, M. D., & Jones, D. (2016). Post-baccalaureate migration and merit-based scholarships. *Economics of Education Review*, *54*, 155-172.
- Goldin, C., & Katz, L. F. (2007). Long-Run Changes in the Wage Structure: Narrowing, Widening,
 Polarizing. In *Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Economic Studies Program* (Vol. 38, pp. 135-168): The Brookings Institution.
- Goldrick-Rab, S., Kelchen, R., Harris, D. N., & Benson, J. (2016). Reducing Income Inequality in Educational Attainment: Experimental Evidence on the Impact of Financial Aid on College Completion. *American Journal of Sociology*, *121*(6), 1762-1817. doi:10.1086/685442
- Hurwitz, M., & Smith, J. (2016). Student Responsiveness to Earnings Data in the College Scorecard.
- Imbens, G. W., & Kalyanaram, K. (2012). Optimal bandwidth choice for the regression discontinuity estimator. *Review of Economic Studies, 142*(2), 615-635.
- Jepsen, C., Mueser, P., & Jeon, K.-S. (2016). *The Benefits of Alternatives to Conventional College: Labor-Market Returns to Proprietary Schooling*. IZA Discussion Paper No. 10007.
- Kazis, R., Callahan, A., Davidson, C., McLeod, A., Bosworth, B., Choitz, V., & Hoops, J. (2007). Adult Learners in Higher Education Barriers to Success and Strategies to Improve Results. U.S.
 Department of Labor, Employment and Training Administration, Occasional Paper 2007-03.
- Looney, A., & Yannelis, C. (2015). A crisis in student loans? How changes in the characteristics of borrowers and in the institutions they attended contributed to rising loan defaults. *Brookings Papers on Economic Activity*.
- Mayer, A. K., Patel, R., & Gutierrez, M. (2016). Four-Year Degree and Employment Findings From a Randomized Controlled Trial of a One-Year Performance-Based Scholarship Program in Ohio. *Journal of Research on Educational Effectiveness, 9*(3), 283-306. doi:10.1080/19345747.2015.1086914
- McCall, B., Smith, J., & Wunsch, C. (2016). Chapter 9 Government-Sponsored Vocational Education for Adults. In S. M. Eric A. Hanushek & W. Ludger (Eds.), *Handbook of the Economics of Education* (Vol. Volume 5, pp. 479-652): Elsevier.
- National Academies of Sciences, E., & Medicine. (2017). *Information Technology and the U.S. Workforce: Where Are We and Where Do We Go from Here?* Washington, DC: The National Academies Press.
- Patel, R., & Valenzuela, I. (2013). *Moving Forward: Early Findings from the Performance-Based Scholarship Demonstration in Arizona*. MDRC. New York, NY.

- Perez-Johnson, I., Moore, Q., & Santillano, R. (2011). *Improving the Effectiveness of Individual Training Accounts: Long-Term Findings from an Experimental Evaluation of Three Service Delivery Models*. Mathematica Policy Research. Princeton, NJ.
- Richburg-Hayes, L., Brock, T., LeBlanc, A., Paxson, C., Rouse, C. E., & Barrow, L. (2009). *Rewarding Persistence: Effects of a Performance-Based Scholarship Program for Low-Income Parents*. MDRC. New York, NY.
- Richburg-Hayes, L., Sommo, C., & Welbeck, R. (2011). Promoting Full-Time Attendance Among Adults in Community College: Early Impacts from the Performance-Based Scholarship Demonstration in New York. MDRC.
- Ryan, C. L., & Bauman, K. (2016). *Educational Attainment in the United States: 2015*. United States Census Bureau. Washington DC.
- Schochet, P. Z., Burghardt, J., & McConnell, S. (2008). Does Job Corps Work? Impact Findings from the National Job Corps Study. *American Economic Review*, 98(5), 1864-1886. doi:doi: 10.1257/aer.98.5.1864
- Schwerdt, G., Messer, D., Woessmann, L., & Wolter, S. C. (2012). The impact of an adult education voucher program: Evidence from a randomized field experiment. *Journal of Public Economics*, 96(7–8), 569-583. doi:<u>http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jpubeco.2012.03.001</u>
- Scott-Clayton, J. (2011). On Money and Motivation: A Quasi-Experimental Analysis of Financial Incentives for College Achievement. *Journal of Human Resources*, *46*(3), 614-646.
- Scott-Clayton, J., & Zafar, B. (2016). *Financial Aid, Debt Management, and Socioeconomic Outcomes: Post-College Effects of Merit-Based Aid*. NBER Working Paper No. 22574.
- Seftor, N. S., & Turner, S. E. (2002). Back to School: Federal Student Aid Policy and Adult College Enrollment. *Journal of Human Resources*, *37*(2), 336-352.
- Stevens, A. H., Kurlaender, M., & Grosz, M. (forthcoming). Career Technical Education and Labor Market Outcomes: Evidence From California Community Colleges. *Journal of Human Resources*.
- U.S. Department of Education. (2002). *Nontraditional Undergraduates*. National Center for Education Statistics, NCS 2002-12. Washington DC.
- U.S. Department of Education. (2016). *Digest of Education Statistics 2014*. National Center for Education Statistics. Washington DC.

	•	1)	(2	2)	(3	5)	(4	+)	(!	5)	()	0)
Application cycle	All		March		March		March		September		March	
FAFSA type	A	.11	Four	-year	For-p	profit	Communi	ty college	Communi	ity college	Miz	ked
Years	2002-	-2011	2002	-2011	2002-	2011	2006	-2011	2002	-2011	2002	-2011
Ν	911	492	143	329	87:	132	106	991	545	576	284	464
	Estimate	St.Dev.	Estimate	St.Dev.	Estimate	St.Dev.	Estimate	St.Dev.	Estimate	St.Dev.	Estimate	St.Dev.
Family Size	2.9	1.7	2.7	1.7	2.7	1.6	2.9	1.7	3.0	1.7	2.7	1.7
College Educated Parent	40%	49%	55%	50%	38%	49%	36%	48%	37%	48%	46%	50%
Female	58%	49%	54%	50%	56%	50%	60%	49%	59%	49%	58%	49%
Dependent Student	39%	49%	44%	50%	18%	39%	33%	47%	43%	49%	36%	48%
Age	27.3	8.8	25.9	6.6	29.9	8.6	29.1	10.0	26.9	9.0	27.5	8.2
Age: dependent	21.0	1.5	21.7	1.2	21.8	1.3	21.4	1.3	20.7	1.5	21.6	1.3
Age: independent	31.4	9.2	29.2	7.2	31.8	8.5	32.9	10.2	31.5	9.5	30.7	8.6
Application GPA	2.8	0.8	3.1	0.5	3.0	0.7	2.9	0.7	2.7	0.8	3.0	0.6
Income	\$20,923	\$18,372	\$24,765	\$21,980	\$19,330	\$16,855	\$18,110	\$17,475	\$20,696	\$17,506	\$21,375	\$19,203
FAFSA educational background												
No college experience	9%	28%	1%	9%	9%	28%	4%	20%	12%	33%	4%	20%
Freshman	22%	42%	3%	16%	30%	46%	26%	44%	26%	44%	13%	34%
Sophomore	38%	48%	10%	30%	36%	48%	50%	50%	44%	50%	28%	45%
Junior	21%	41%	50%	50%	18%	38%	17%	37%	14%	35%	43%	49%
Senior	9%	28%	35%	48%	7%	25%	3%	18%	3%	17%	11%	32%
FAFSA school listings												
Number of Schools	1.3	0.8	1.2	0.9	1.0	0.2	1.1	0.5	1.2	0.6	3.2	1.9
Only one school listed	85%	36%	90%	30%	96%	20%	90%	29%	85%	36%	3%	17%
Community college	74%	44%	0%	0%	0%	0%	100%	0%	100%	2%	78%	41%
For-profit	10%	30%	0%	0%	100%	0%	0%	0%	0%	1%	21%	40%
UC	11%	31%	60%	49%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	1%	56%	50%
CSU	5%	21%	27%	44%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	20%	40%
Private, non-profit	4%	19%	19%	39%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	1%	24%	43%
Cal Grant award outcomes												
Offered A or B	18%	39%	8%	26%	37%	48%	27%	44%	16%	37%	17%	37%
Offered C	1%	12%	0%	5%	8%	27%	5%	22%	0%	1%	2%	13%
Received payment in first year	13%	34%	6%	24%	28%	45%	20%	40%	12%	32%	10%	30%
Reapplied in later year	47%	50%	37%	48%	22%	42%	49%	50%	54%	50%	43%	50%
Ever received payment	26%	44%	13%	34%	32%	47%	36%	48%	26%	44%	24%	43%
Total payments, conditional on immediate award usage	\$6,850	\$7,638	\$11,362	\$8,289	\$13,054	\$9,140	\$5,344	\$6,595	\$4,880	\$5,947	\$11,746	\$9,515

Table 1. Descriptive Statistics, First-time Competitive award applicants, 2002-2011

Notes. 'Mixed' FAFSA applicants in column 6 restricts to students who listed more than one type of postsecondary sector (i.e., public or non-profit four-year, for-profit, community college) on their application. 'Total payments, conditional on immediate award usage' sums all Cal Grant payments for students who above the eligiblity cutoff on their first application and received a Cal Grant award in the subsequent year.

Table 2 First-Stage impacts of Comp	etitive award eligibility on program take-up
Tuble 2. This Stage impacts of comp	curve a ward engineery on program take up

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Application cycle	All	March	March	March	September
FAFSA type	All	Four-year	For-profit	CC	CC
Years	2002-2011	2002-2011	2002-2011	2006-2011	2002-2011
N	185915	17639	23772	25182	114136
Offered Cal Grant A or B	0.933**	0.931**	0.843**	0.750**	0.995**
	(0.002)	(0.005)	(0.007)	(0.008)	(0.001)
	4.2%	1.3%	14.1%	15.5%	0.1%
Offered Cal Grant C	-0.025**	-0.009**	-0.114**	-0.062**	0.000
	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.007)	(0.005)	(.)
	2.7%	0.8%	12.4%	6.9%	0.0%
Rescored	-0.093**	-0.071**	-0.025**	-0.562**	-0.000
	(0.002)	(0.007)	(0.003)	(0.010)	(0.000)
	12.1%	8.4%	2.7%	75.6%	0.0%
Received Cal Grant payment in	0.637**	0.759**	0.506**	0.453**	0.695**
first year	(0.003)	(0.009)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.004)
	3.7%	1.1%	13.7%	13.2%	0.0%
Total grant aid: first year	1713.822**	4483.763**	4715.767**	641.442**	879.794**
	(15.938)	(78.260)	(91.122)	(15.690)	(6.592)
	\$64	\$31	\$336	\$120	\$1
Ever received Cal Grant payment	0.462**	0.631**	0.450**	0.319**	0.474**
	(0.004)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.012)	(0.005)
	27.0%	16.7%	22.5%	36.1%	27.6%
Total grant aid: all years	3059.741**	7276.920**	7222.708**	1473.027**	1835.426**
-	(54.745)	(187.039)	(176.900)	(153.425)	(64.160)
	\$1,793	\$1,230	\$1,211	\$2,323	\$1,866

Notes. + p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01. Coefficients are treatment effects at the eligibility threshold pooled across years, as estimated by equation (1). All results use local linear regressions that include all observations within the optimal bandwidth of eight points of the eligibility threshold. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Baseline rates are presented under the regression estimates and include mean values for all observations one or two points below the eligibility threshold.

Table 3. Impacts of Competitive awa		
	(1)	(2)
Application cycle	All All	All
FAFSA type		All
Ν	185915	185915
Regression estimates	Reduced Form	IV
<u>Attendance</u>		
Immediately attend	0.001	0.001
	(0.004)	(0.009)
(Baseline rate below estimates)	71.8%	71.3%
Ever attend	0.004	0.009
	(0.003)	(0.007)
	82.3%	80.9%
Ever attend four-year	0.009*	0.020*
	(0.004)	(0.009)
	30.1%	25.4%
Five-Year Degree Completion		
Associate degree	0.002	0.005
	(0.004)	(0.008)
	19.6%	15.6%
Bachelor degree	0.009**	0.020**
	(0.003)	(0.008)
	19.9%	18.6%
Any degree	0.010*	0.022*
	(0.004)	(0.009)
	35.6%	31.3%

Notes. + p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01. Coefficients are treatment effects at the eligibility threshold pooled across years, as estimated by equation (1) in column (1) and by equation (2) in column (2). All results use local linear regressions that include all observations within the optimal bandwidth of eight points of the eligibility threshold. The instrument used in column (2) is whether an individual ever received any Cal Grant payment through 2016. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Baseline rates are presented under the regression estimates and include mean values for all observations one or two points below the eligibility threshold. Baseline rates are presented under the regression estimates and include mean values for all observations one or two points below the eligibility threshold; IV rates only include observations who never received a Cal Grant payment.

Table 4. Impacts of Competitive awa	rd on attendance a	and degree compl	etion, by FAFSA	A preferences
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Application cycle	March	March	March	September
FAFSA type	Four-year	For-profit	CC	CC
Ν	17639	23772	25182	114136
Reduced Form				
Ever attend four-year	0.011	0.009+	0.008	0.011*
	(0.012)	(0.006)	(0.011)	(0.005)
	78.6%	4.0%	27.1%	28.1%
Associate degree in five years	-0.001	-0.003	0.012	0.001
	(0.005)	(0.009)	(0.011)	(0.005)
	2.7%	14.1%	24.0%	22.7%
Bachelor degree in five years	0.018	0.039**	0.006	0.005
с ,	(0.015)	(0.011)	(0.009)	(0.004)
	63.4%	22.6%	13.4%	13.4%
Instrumental Variable				
Ever attend four-year	0.017	0.021+	0.026	0.023*
	(0.019)	(0.012)	(0.035)	(0.011)
	77.5%	3.5%	20.4%	21.3%
Associate degree in five years	-0.002	-0.008	0.039	0.003
	(0.008)	(0.020)	(0.034)	(0.011)
	2.7%	10.5%	19.1%	18.5%
Bachelor degree in five years	0.028	0.086**	0.018	0.010
<u> </u>	(0.023)	(0.025)	(0.027)	(0.009)
	62.8%	24.2%	10.7%	10.3%

Table 4. Impacts of Competitive award on attendance and degree completion, by FAFSA preferences

Notes. + p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01. Coefficients are treatment effects at the eligibility threshold pooled across years, as estimated by equation (1) in column (1) and by equation (2) in column (2). All results use local linear regressions that include all observations within the optimal bandwidth of eight points of the eligibility threshold. The instrument used in column (2) is whether an individual ever received any Cal Grant payment through 2016. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Baseline rates are presented under the regression estimates and include mean values for all observations one or two points below the eligibility threshold; IV rates only include observations who never received a Cal Grant payment.

Group	Employment	Earnings
All	0.0	49
	(0.4)	(49)
(Baseline rate below estimates)	60.3%	\$7,482
Four-year	-0.1	-11
	(1.1)	(175)
	64.8%	\$9,518
For-profit	-0.4	132
	(1.0)	(138)
	65.7%	\$8,842
Community College: March	-0.3	77
	(1.0)	(139)
	57.0%	\$7,251
Community College: Sept.	-0.1	27
	(0.5)	(61)
	59.2%	\$6,888

Table 5. Reduced form impacts on labor force outcomes stacking data between
12 to 24 guarters after initial application, by FAFSA preferences

Notes. + p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01. Coefficients are treatment effects at the eligibility threshold pooled across years, as estimated by equation (1). All results use local linear regressions that include all observations within 8 points of the eligibility threshold. The full sample uses 1,631,987 student-by-wage quarter observations, with the subsequent four rows using 169,189, 222,572, 208,336, and 987,478 observations, respectively. Quarter equals zero for the first full quarter after a students' initial aid application. Standard errors clustered by individual.




Figure 1. First-stage impacts at Competitive award eligibility threshold, All applicants

All applicants, 2002-2011

Notes: The x-axis indicates the distance from the year- and group-specific Competitive award eligibility threshold, centered at zero. The left panel indicates whether students ever received a Cal Grant offer or payment. The right panel shows differences in financial aid received in dollar amounts (unadjusted for inflation).





Figure 2. Treatment impacts at Competitive award eligibility threshold


Notes: The x-axis indicates the distance from the year- and group-specific Competitive award eligibility threshold, centered at zero.

Figure 3. Competitive award impacts on attendance, full-time attendance, and degree completion by year, For-profit students only





Notes: The x-axis indicates the years since initial application, with year-specific estimates for impacts on degree completion, any attendance, or full-time attendance. Statistical significant is indicated by either a hollow circle (p<0.10) or a solid circle (p<0.05).

Figure 4. Treatment impacts at Competitive award eligibility threshold, by age and college sector




Notes: Each line indicates a treatment estimate and 95% confidence interval from a separate regression, based on the age category and FAFSA preferences.





Notes: The solid and dashed lines provide treatment estimates and 95% confidence intervals at each time interval from 4 quarters prior to application to 24 quarters after application, where quarter 0 is the third quarter of the calendar year in which the individual applied. Employment is a dummy that indicates an individual received positive wages within that quarter, as based on California Unemployment Insurance records.

Figure 6. Treatment impacts on total wages conditional on employment by wage quarter



Notes: The solid and dashed lines provide treatment estimates and 95% confidence intervals at each time interval from 4 quarters prior to application to 24 quarters after application, where quarter 0 is the third quarter of the calendar year in which the individual applied. Wages derive from California's Unemployment Insurance records and are topcoded at \$25,000 per quarter.






Figure 7. Treatment impacts on any employment by wage quarter, by FAFSA preferences

Notes: The solid and dashed lines provide treatment estimates and 95% confidence intervals at each time interval from 4 quarters prior to application to 24 quarters after application, where quarter 0 is the third quarter of the calendar year in which the individual applied. Employment is a dummy that indicates an individual received positive wages within that quarter, as based on California Unemployment Insurance records.





Notes: The solid and dashed lines provide treatment estimates and 95% confidence intervals at each time interval from 4 quarters prior to application to 24 quarters after application, where quarter 0 is the third quarter of the calendar year in which the individual applied. Wages derive from California's Unemployment Insurance records and are topcoded at \$25,000 per quarter.

	Cycle	eligibility		Income	e Limits			
	thre	eshold			Independent		In-State Resident U	ndergraduate Tuition
Application				With	Single, No	Married, No	California State	University of
Year	March	September	Dependent	Dependents	Dependent	Dependent	University (CSU)	California (UC)
2002	156	158	\$76,500	\$76,500	\$27,800	\$24,700	\$1,428	\$3,429
2003	156	159	\$77,100	\$77,100	\$28,180	\$24,680	\$2,046	\$4,984
2004	157	159	\$78,100	\$78,100	\$28,300	\$24,800	\$2,334	\$5,684
2005	155	158	\$80,400	\$80,400	\$29,200	\$26,070	\$2,520	\$6,141
2006	154	157	\$83,600	\$83,600	\$30,385	\$26,605	\$2,520	\$6,141
2007	153	158	\$85,100	\$85,400	\$31,150	\$26,830	\$2,772	\$6,636
2008	155	159	\$89,500	\$88,970	\$32,205	\$28,215	\$3,048	\$7,126
2009	161	164	\$92,100	\$92,125	\$33,665	\$29,675	\$4,026	\$7,788
2010	163	165	\$93,350	\$93,500	\$33,990	\$29,430	\$4,230	\$10,302
2011	165	166	\$91,575	\$91,185	\$33,245	\$29,085	\$5,472	\$12,192

Notes. Income limits for dependents and independents with dependents refers to families with six or more students. Income limits generally decline by about \$5,000 per family member, and income limits for families of two individuals are generally \$20,000 lower. Undergraduate tuition does not include system and campus fees, which are also covered by the Cal Grant.

Appendix Table 2. Descriptive Statistic		1)		2)	(3)	-	•	1)	(5	5)	(5)
Application cycle	A	di .	Ma	rch	Ma	rch	Ma	rch	Septe	mber	Ma	irch
FAFSA type	A	di .	Four	-year	For-p	profit	Communi	ty college	Communi	ty college	Mi	xed
Years	2002	-2011	2002	-2011	2002	-2011	2006	-2011	2002-2011		2002-2011	
Ν	185	915	170	627	23	772	25:	182	114	148	51	.86
	Estimate	St.Dev.	Estimate	St.Dev.	Estimate	St.Dev.	Estimate	St.Dev.	Estimate	St.Dev.	Estimate	St.Dev.
Family Size	3.0	1.6	2.9	1.5	2.9	1.5	3.0	1.6	3.1	1.6	2.8	1.5
College Educated Parent	26%	44%	33%	47%	29%	45%	25%	43%	24%	43%	32%	46%
Female	65%	48%	62%	49%	62%	48%	66%	47%	65%	48%	63%	48%
Dependent Student	34%	47%	45%	50%	18%	39%	26%	44%	37%	48%	34%	48%
Age	29.1	9.8	27.5	8.5	30.4	8.8	30.9	10.6	28.6	10.0	28.7	9.1
Age: dependent	21.0	1.6	21.8	1.3	21.9	1.3	21.4	1.3	20.7	1.6	21.6	1.4
Age: independent	33.1	9.8	32.2	9.0	32.3	8.6	34.2	10.5	33.2	10.0	32.4	9.2
Application GPA	3.0	0.8	3.3	0.5	3.1	0.6	3.1	0.5	2.9	0.9	3.2	0.6
Income	\$15,686	\$13 <i>,</i> 075	\$16 <i>,</i> 386	\$13,815	\$17,209	\$14,251	\$13,608	\$13,016	\$15,713	\$12,611	\$15 <i>,</i> 822	\$13,844
FAFSA educational background												
No college experience	11%	31%	2%	14%	10%	30%	5%	21%	14%	35%	6%	23%
Freshman	29%	46%	6%	23%	32%	47%	31%	46%	32%	47%	19%	39%
Sophomore	40%	49%	15%	35%	37%	48%	51%	50%	43%	49%	33%	47%
Junior	14%	35%	49%	50%	15%	36%	11%	31%	8%	27%	34%	47%
Senior	4%	21%	27%	44%	5%	22%	2%	13%	1%	11%	7%	26%
FAFSA school listings												
Number of Schools	1.2	0.7	1.3	1.0	1.0	0.2	1.1	0.5	1.2	0.6	3.2	2.0
Only one school listed	86%	35%	87%	33%	97%	16%	91%	28%	85%	35%	4%	20%
Community college	77%	42%	0%	0%	0%	0%	100%	0%	100%	2%	76%	43%
For-profit	14%	34%	0%	0%	100%	0%	0%	0%	0%	2%	25%	43%
UC	6%	25%	54%	50%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	1%	47%	50%
CSU	3%	17%	27%	44%	0%	0%	0%	0%	8.76E-06	0%	21%	40%
Private, non-profit	3%	18%	26%	44%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	1%	27%	44%
Cal Grant award outcomes												
Offered A or B	43%	49%	36%	48%	53%	50%	48%	50%	40%	49%	44%	50%
Offered C	1%	12%	0%	7%	6%	24%	4%	19%	0%	0%	2%	14%
Received payment in first year	30%	46%	30%	46%	37%	48%	34%	47%	29%	45%	24%	43%
Reapplied in later year	42%	49%	34%	47%	20%	40%	43%	50%	49%	50%	38%	48%
Ever received payment	45%	50%	39%	49%	43%	50%	49%	50%	45%	50%	39%	49%
Total payments, conditional on	\$6,712	\$7,538	\$11,013	\$7,955	\$12,726	\$9,105	\$5,366	\$6,739	\$4,824	\$5,963	\$11,918	\$9,572
immediate award usage	Ψ Ο, 7 ±Ζ	<i>Υ</i> ,330	Ŷ11,013	ووور بې	<i>712,72</i> 0	<i>43,</i> 103	<i>43,300</i>	,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,	₽ 7,024	<i>,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,</i>	<i>711,310</i>	4 <i>3,372</i>

Appendix Table 2. Descriptive Statistics, First-time Competitive award applicants, 2002-2011; Only within 8 points of eligibility threshold

Notes. 'Mixed' FAFSA applicants in column 6 restricts to students who listed more than one type of postsecondary sector (i.e., public or non-profit four-year, for-profit, community college) on their application. 'Total payments, conditional on immediate award usage' sums all Cal Grant payments for students who above the eligiblity cutoff on their first application and received a Cal Grant award in the subsequent year.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
Application year	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011
Ν	11764	12449	13892	14194	18840	18861	20555	24227	24799	26334
Family Size	3.0	3.0	3.0	3.0	3.0	3.0	2.9	3.0	3.1	3.0
College Educated Parent	26%	25%	26%	28%	30%	28%	28%	25%	22%	22%
Female	66%	66%	66%	65%	66%	64%	65%	65%	64%	64%
Dependent Student	30%	30%	33%	34%	35%	38%	37%	34%	31%	32%
Age	29.3	29.6	29.3	29.0	28.8	28.2	28.1	28.7	29.8	29.8
Age: dependent	21.0	21.0	20.9	21.1	21.0	21.0	21.0	21.0	21.1	21.2
Age: independent	32.8	33.2	33.4	33.0	33.0	32.6	32.4	32.6	33.7	33.8
Application GPA	2.7	2.7	2.6	2.6	3.1	3.1	3.1	3.1	3.2	3.2
Income	\$15,922	\$15,955	\$16,295	\$16,540	\$17,498	\$16,715	\$16,717	\$14,589	\$14,427	\$14,027
FAFSA educational background										
No college experience	11%	10%	12%	11%	11%	12%	12%	12%	10%	10%
Freshman	26%	27%	28%	28%	27%	26%	27%	31%	33%	34%
Sophomore	37%	39%	38%	41%	41%	40%	41%	40%	42%	41%
Junior	17%	15%	14%	14%	16%	17%	15%	13%	11%	12%
Senior	4%	5%	4%	5%	5%	6%	5%	4%	4%	3%
FAFSA school listings										
Number of Schools	1.2	1.2	1.2	1.2	1.2	1.2	1.2	1.2	1.2	1.3
Only one school listed	87%	86%	88%	87%	86%	85%	86%	86%	85%	83%
Community college	76%	74%	74%	75%	78%	77%	78%	80%	78%	77%
For-profit	10%	13%	13%	14%	12%	12%	12%	12%	16%	18%
UC	8%	7%	6%	6%	7%	8%	8%	6%	5%	4%
CSU	3%	4%	3%	3%	4%	4%	4%	3%	2%	2%
Private, non-profit	4%	4%	4%	4%	4%	4%	3%	2%	2%	2%
Cal Grant award outcomes										
Offered A or B	44%	43%	43%	44%	45%	45%	44%	41%	41%	39%
Offered C	1%	1%	1%	1%	2%	2%	1%	2%	1%	1%
Received payment in first year	34%	34%	33%	28%	32%	33%	30%	29%	29%	27%
Reapplied in later year	44%	43%	43%	43%	43%	44%	45%	44%	41%	37%
Ever received payment	47%	48%	48%	44%	46%	47%	43%	44%	44%	42%
Total payments, conditional on immediate award usage	\$6,340	\$6,617	\$6,409	\$4,460	\$6,617	\$6,947	\$7,013	\$7,207	\$7,372	\$6,949

Appendix Table 3. Descriptive Statistics, First-time Competitive award applicants, 2002-2011; by year and within 8 points of eligibility threshold

Notes. 'Mixed' FAFSA applicants in column 6 restricts to students who listed more than one type of postsecondary sector (i.e., public or non-profit four-year, for-profit, community college) on their application. 'Total payments, conditional on immediate award usage' sums all Cal Grant payments for students who above the eligiblity cutoff on their first application and received a Cal Grant award in the subsequent year.

	Total	% of students attending
For-profit college name	Payments	for-profit in NSC data
University of Phoenix	4837	97%
Heald	3455	94%
ТТ	1496	94%
Westwood	963	3%
Argosy	948	8%
San Joaquin	866	3%
Kaplan	760	2%
Devry	678	64%
Carrington	516	1%
Everest	293	15%
MTI College	280	1%
American Career	249	1%
Southern California Institute of Technolo	229	0%
Universal Tech	208	0%
Fashion Institute of Design Merchandise	206	0%
Concorde	191	0%
Bryan College	172	0%
Academy of Art University	171	96%
Platt	169	2%
All other for-profits	1914	3%

Appendix Table 4. For-profit payments and NSC coverage

Notes. Sample size includes all Cal Grant payments made to for-profit colleges in the year after first application, among students who indicated a for-profit on their FAFSA.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)
Application cycle	All	March	March	All	September			All			
FAFSA type	All	Four-year	For-profit	CC	CC			All			
Years	2002-2011	2002-2011	2002-2011	2006-2011	2002-2011			2002-2	011		
N	185915	17639	23772	25182	114136	116708	116708	231002	231002	272728	272728
Bandwidth	8	8	8	8	8	5	5	10	10	15	15
Functional Form	Linear	Linear	Linear	Linear	Linear	Linear	Quadratic	Linear	Quadratic	Linear	Quadratio
Family Size	0.018	0.034	0.036	0.004	0.013	0.011	-0.031	0.024+	0.013	0.013	0.023
	(0.014)	(0.045)	(0.040)	(0.040)	(0.018)	(0.019)	(0.033)	(0.013)	(0.020)	(0.012)	(0.018)
College educated parent	-0.001	0.026+	0.018	-0.009	-0.007	-0.003	-0.006	-0.001	-0.002	-0.003	-0.002
	(0.004)	(0.014)	(0.012)	(0.011)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.009)	(0.004)	(0.006)	(0.003)	(0.005)
Female	0.006	0.006	0.014	0.004	0.004	0.002	0.006	0.006	0.003	0.007+	0.001
	(0.004)	(0.015)	(0.013)	(0.012)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.010)	(0.004)	(0.006)	(0.004)	(0.006)
Age	-0.107	-0.432+	0.441+	-0.026	-0.167	-0.178	-0.406+	-0.119	-0.154	-0.094	-0.183
	(0.091)	(0.260)	(0.227)	(0.268)	(0.119)	(0.117)	(0.209)	(0.081)	(0.126)	(0.074)	(0.113)
Dependent	0.002	0.024	-0.006	0.013	-0.001	0.004	0.006	0.004	-0.000	0.004	0.002
	(0.004)	(0.015)	(0.010)	(0.011)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.010)	(0.004)	(0.006)	(0.004)	(0.005)
Student GPA	-0.002	-0.015	-0.012	-0.010	0.004	0.003	0.016	0.001	-0.001	-0.002	-0.001
	(0.007)	(0.016)	(0.015)	(0.013)	(0.010)	(0.009)	(0.016)	(0.006)	(0.010)	(0.006)	(0.009)
Total Income	189.123	-259.731	248.045	296.199	223.256	106.511	-32.382	287.309**	42.296	258.604*	134.596
	(120.069)	(410.315)	(367.200)	(324.268)	(148.423)	(153.846)	(273.990)	(107.470)	(166.873)	(99.627)	(152.584
-AFSA values											
Oth year undergraduate	-0.002	0.002	0.006	-0.006	-0.003	-0.000	0.003	-0.001	-0.002	-0.000	-0.003
	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.008)	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.007)	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.002)	(0.003)
1st year undergraduate	-0.003	0.001	-0.019	0.017	-0.003	-0.004	-0.001	-0.001	-0.006	0.001	-0.002
	(0.004)	(0.007)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.006)	(0.005)	(0.010)	(0.004)	(0.006)	(0.003)	(0.005)
2nd year undergraduate	0.007	0.003	0.010	-0.002	0.007	0.010+	0.007	0.005	0.011+	0.001	0.009
	(0.004)	(0.011)	(0.012)	(0.013)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.010)	(0.004)	(0.006)	(0.004)	(0.006)
3rd year undergraduate	-0.001	0.001	0.007	-0.009	-0.001	-0.004	-0.007	-0.002	-0.002	-0.001	-0.003
	(0.003)	(0.015)	(0.009)	(0.008)	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.007)	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.004)
4th year undergraduate	0.000	-0.007	-0.002	0.001	0.001	-0.000	-0.001	0.001	-0.001	0.000	-0.001
-	(0.002)	(0.013)	(0.006)	(0.003)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.004)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Total FAFSA schools listed	0.007	-0.004	-0.002	0.006	0.012+	0.000	-0.004	0.009+	0.000	0.008	0.006
	(0.006)	(0.031)	(0.005)	(0.012)	(0.007)	(0.008)	(0.014)	(0.005)	(0.008)	(0.005)	(0.008)

Notes. + p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01. Coefficients are treatment effects at the eligibility threshold pooled across the years listed in the column heading, as estimated by equation (1).

Appendix Table 6. Impacts of	. (1)	(2)	(3)	. (4)	(5)
Application cycle	All	March	March	March	September
FASFA type	All	Four-year	For-profit	СС	сс
Ν	185915	17639	23772	25182	114136
Immediate attendance					
Attend	0.001	0.008	0.010	0.009	-0.004
	(0.004)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.012)	(0.005)
Community College	-0.001	0.000	-0.004	0.013	-0.003
	(0.004)	(0.010)	(0.006)	(0.012)	(0.005)
Four-year	0.000	0.011	0.002	-0.003	0.000
	(0.002)	(0.013)	(0.002)	(0.004)	(0.002)
For-profit	0.003	0.000	0.009	0.000	0.001
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.013)	(0.002)	(0.001)
All other schools	0.001	0.003	0.002	-0.001	0.001
	(0.001)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.001)
Ever attend					
Attend	0.004	0.001	0.001	0.022*	0.002
	(0.003)	(0.010)	(0.013)	(0.010)	(0.004)
Community College	-0.001	0.004	-0.022*	0.017	0.001
	(0.004)	(0.014)	(0.010)	(0.011)	(0.005)
Four-year	0.009*	0.011	0.009+	0.008	0.011*
	(0.004)	(0.012)	(0.006)	(0.011)	(0.005)
For-profit	0.002	-0.004	0.016	-0.001	-0.000
	(0.003)	(0.006)	(0.013)	(0.005)	(0.003)
All other schools	-0.000	0.005	-0.002	-0.005	0.001
	(0.002)	(0.008)	(0.005)	(0.006)	(0.003)

۸. div Tabl .+:+: ard on attendanc and dogra moloti **~** 1

Notes. + p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01. Coefficients are treatment effects at the eligibility threshold pooled across years, as estimated by equation (1). All results use local linear regressions that include all observations within the optimal bandwidth of eight points of the eligiblity threshold. Robust standard errors in parentheses.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
Restriction	FAFSA c	only lists scho	ols with stron	g NSC repor	ting rates	FAFSA	contains scho	ols with weal	NSC report	ting rates
Application cycle	Both	March	March	March	September	Both	March	March	March	September
FAFSA type	All	Four-year	For-profit	CC	CC	All	Four-year	For-profit	CC	CC
Ν	151111	15806	15417	20628	95033	34804	1833	8355	4554	19103
<u>Attendance</u>										
Immediately	0.001	0.005	0.011	0.014	-0.003	-0.004	-0.011	0.002	-0.018	-0.003
	(0.004)	(0.012)	(0.014)	(0.012)	(0.005)	(0.010)	(0.045)	(0.011)	(0.030)	(0.014)
Ever	0.004	-0.004	0.001	0.024*	0.002	0.006	0.015	-0.001	0.013	0.007
	(0.003)	(0.009)	(0.013)	(0.010)	(0.004)	(0.010)	(0.047)	(0.020)	(0.028)	(0.013)
Ever attend four-year	0.007	0.006	0.012	0.003	0.008	0.015+	-0.001	0.004	0.031	0.023+
	(0.004)	(0.012)	(0.008)	(0.012)	(0.006)	(0.009)	(0.045)	(0.007)	(0.027)	(0.013)
Degree Completion										
Associate	0.001	-0.003	-0.001	0.017	-0.001	0.007	0.012	-0.010	-0.009	0.016*
	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.006)	(0.005)	(0.010)	(0.007)	(0.018)	(0.008)
Bachelor	0.010**	0.018	0.050**	0.007	0.004	0.004	-0.028	0.012+	-0.002	0.009
	(0.004)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.010)	(0.004)	(0.007)	(0.041)	(0.007)	(0.021)	(0.010)
Any degree	0.009+	0.018	0.044**	0.009	0.003	0.012	-0.021	-0.000	-0.004	0.025*
,	(0.005)	(0.015)	(0.016)	(0.013)	(0.006)	(0.008)	(0.041)	(0.010)	(0.025)	(0.012)

Appendix Table 7. Reduced form mpacts of Competitive award eligibility on attendance and degree completion, NSC reporting robustness checks

Notes. + p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01. Coefficients are treatment effects at the eligibility threshold pooled across years, as estimated by equation (1). All results use local linear regressions that include all observations within the optimal bandwidth of eight points of the eligibility threshold. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Strong NSC reporting schools are those where less than half of students identified as receiving financial aid also appear in the NSC data; weak NSC reporting schools are those where more than half of aid receipients do not appear in the NSC, including all schools that do not report to the NSC.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Application cycle	All	March	March	March	September
FAFSA type	All	Four-year	For-profit	CC	CC
Competitive point range	149-170	149-170	149-171	149-172	156-166
Ν	176673	21968	31416	34751	78565
Ever received payment	0.473**	0.658**	0.464**	0.347**	0.478**
	(0.004)	(0.010)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.006)
Total payment	3423.919**	7640.088**	7211.962**	1668.554**	1904.125**
	(53.373)	(149.681)	(145.959)	(122.748)	(73.013)
Associate degree: Reduced form	0.002	-0.005	-0.007	0.011	-0.005
	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.007)	(0.009)	(0.006)
Associate degree: IV	0.005	-0.007	-0.014	0.031	-0.010
	(0.007)	(0.006)	(0.016)	(0.025)	(0.012)
Bachelor degree: Reduced form	0.013**	0.008	0.023*	0.006	0.006
5	(0.003)	(0.012)	(0.009)	(0.007)	(0.004)
Bachelor degree: IV	0.028**	0.013	0.049**	0.017	0.013
0	(0.007)	(0.018)	(0.019)	(0.020)	(0.009)

Appendix Table 8. Difference-in-difference impacts of Competitive award on attendance and degree completion

Notes. + p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01. Coefficients are treatment effects at the eligibility threshold pooled across years, as estimated by equation (2) in Appendix 3. All results use local linear regressions that include all observations within the optimal bandwidth of eight points of the eligibility threshold. Robust standard errors in parentheses.

Appendix Table 9. Impacts of Competitive award on degree completion, by age terciles									
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)				
Application cycle	All	March	March	March	September				
FAFSA type	All	Four-year	For-profit	CC	CC				
<u>Associate degree</u>									
Age: 18-23	0.004	0.003	-0.006	0.017	0.003				
	(0.006)	(0.007)	(0.019)	(0.020)	(0.008)				
Age: 24-31	0.007	-0.003	-0.000	0.042*	0.002				
	(0.007)	(0.009)	(0.015)	(0.020)	(0.010)				
Age: 32+	-0.003	-0.004	-0.004	-0.012	-0.001				
	(0.006)	(0.011)	(0.014)	(0.017)	(0.009)				
Bachelor degree									
Age: 18-23	0.005	0.009	0.003	0.004	0.008				
	(0.006)	(0.021)	(0.018)	(0.019)	(0.007)				
Age: 24-31	0.012+	0.003	0.044*	0.018	0.003				
	(0.007)	(0.027)	(0.018)	(0.016)	(0.008)				
Age: 32+	0.010+	0.038	0.047*	-0.003	0.002				
	(0.005)	(0.030)	(0.019)	(0.010)	(0.006)				

Notes. + p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01. Coefficients are treatment effects at the eligibility threshold pooled across years, as estimated by equation (1). All results use local linear regressions that include all observations within the optimal bandwidth of eight points of the eligiblity threshold. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Samples sizes across regressions for March applicants range from 4,042 to 9,234, September applicants range from 30,535 to 49,391, and for the full sample 54,443 to 74,016.

Appendix Table 10. Heter	-													
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)	(14)
	Female	Male	Dependent	Independent	Independent w/no	Currently enrolled in	Not enrolled in	GPA >= 3.0	GPA < 3.0	Educational Level: First-	Educational Level: Second	Educational Level: Third	Years:	Years:
				w/ dependents	dependents	college	college			year	year	year or more	2002 to 2007	2008 to 2012
Ever received payment	0.443**	0.459**	0.397**	0.464**	0.454**	0.514**	0.369**	0.516**	0.352**	0.323**	0.476**	0.689**	0.458**	0.443**
	(0.015)	(0.018)	(0.027)	(0.014)	(0.026)	(0.015)	(0.017)	(0.014)	(0.019)	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.021)	(0.017)	(0.015)
Immediate attendance	0.018	-0.002	0.003	-0.003	0.044	0.010	-0.001	0.028+	-0.010	0.011	-0.000	0.007	0.015	0.007
	(0.016)	(0.021)	(0.029)	(0.016)	(0.029)	(0.013)	(0.010)	(0.017)	(0.020)	(0.019)	(0.021)	(0.027)	(0.019)	(0.017)
Ever attended	0.006	-0.007	-0.007	-0.014	0.045	0.012	-0.021	0.019	-0.021	-0.011	0.008	-0.001	-0.002	0.004
	(0.016)	(0.021)	(0.030)	(0.015)	(0.030)	(0.011)	(0.017)	(0.016)	(0.020)	(0.020)	(0.021)	(0.025)	(0.019)	(0.017)
Associate degree	-0.016	0.014	-0.012	-0.005	0.006	-0.006	-0.003	-0.001	-0.010	0.005	-0.020	0.010	-0.001	-0.005
	(0.012)	(0.013)	(0.021)	(0.012)	(0.020)	(0.015)	(0.008)	(0.011)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.016)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.013)
Bachelor degree	0.054**	0.016	0.013	0.038*	0.055*	0.050**	0.018*	0.059**	0.020	0.013	0.047**	0.057*	0.021	0.053**
	(0.014)	(0.018)	(0.021)	(0.015)	(0.024)	(0.017)	(0.008)	(0.016)	(0.014)	(0.012)	(0.018)	(0.029)	(0.017)	(0.015)
N	14784	8988	4329	14784	4672	13002	10770	14331	9441	9928	8815	4829	10571	13201

Notes. + p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01. Coefficients are treatment effects at the eligibility threshold pooled across years, as estimated by equation (1). All results use local linear regressions that include all observations within the optimal bandwidth of eight points of the eligibility threshold. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Baseline rates are presented under the regression estimates and include mean values for all observations one or two points below the eligibility threshold.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)	(14)
	Female	Male	Dependent	Independent w/ dependents	Independent w/ no dependents	Currently enrolled in college	Not enrolled in college	GPA >= 3.0	GPA < 3.0	Educational Level: First- year	Educational Level: Second year	Educational Level: Third year or more	Years: 2002 to 2007	Years: 2008 to 2012
Ever received payment	0.453**	0.483**	0.484**	0.422**	0.536**	0.468**	0.455**	0.481**	0.438**	0.452**	0.451**	0.509**	0.473**	0.453**
	(0.005)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.006)	(0.010)	(0.005)	(0.008)	(0.006)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.010)	(0.006)	(0.006)
mmediate attendance	0.003	-0.008	-0.011	0.011+	-0.011	0.003	-0.008	-0.010+	0.011	-0.009	0.008	-0.002	-0.002	0.001
	(0.005)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.006)	(0.010)	(0.002)	(0.008)	(0.005)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.010)	(0.006)	(0.006)
Ever attended	0.007	0.001	-0.004	0.014*	-0.000	0.003	0.009	-0.003	0.016**	-0.005	0.015**	0.003	0.001	0.008+
	(0.004)	(0.006)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.009)	(0.002)	(0.008)	(0.004)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.005)	(0.008)	(0.005)	(0.005)
Associate degree	0.005	0.000	0.011+	0.000	-0.005	0.002	0.005	0.008	-0.004	-0.001	0.004	0.003	0.003	0.004
	(0.005)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.006)	(0.010)	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.007)	(0.008)	(0.006)	(0.006)
Bachelor degree	0.008+	-0.000	0.006	0.006	-0.002	0.003	0.010+	-0.001	0.014**	0.002	0.010	0.003	0.006	0.005
	(0.004)	(0.006)	(0.007)	(0.005)	(0.009)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.006)	(0.011)	(0.005)	(0.005)
N	105613	56530	58046	75229	28954	108520	53623	95835	66308	65091	65842	29651	79429	82714

Notes. + p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01. Coefficients are treatment effects at the eligibility threshold pooled across years, as estimated by equation (1). All results use local linear regressions that include all observations within the optimal bandwidth of eight

points of the eligiblity threshold. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Baseline rates are presented under the regression estimates and include mean values for all observations one or two points below the eligiblity threshold.

Appendix Table 12. Reduced form impacts on labor force outcomes, by wage quarter


orce outcomes, by	wage quarter	
Quarter	Employment	Earnings
-4	.4	23
	(.5)	(42)
-3	.5	10
	(.5)	(43)
-2	.5	28
	(.5)	(42)
-1	.3	24
	(.5)	(42)
0	2	48
	(.5)	(42)
1	.2	-23
	(.5)	(44)
2	0.0	-19
-	(.5)	(44)
3	2	-47
5	(.5)	(44)
4	2	-36
	(.5)	(45)
5	6	38
5	0	(48)
6	6	(48)
0	(.5)	(48)
7	3	
7		26 (49)
0	(.5)	
8	5	8
0	(.5)	(51)
9	5	-1
10	(.5)	(54)
10	6	3
	(.5)	(54)
11	5	20
10	(.5)	(55)
12	5	53
	(.5)	(56)
13	.4	5
	(.5)	(59)
14	.2	38
	(.5)	(59)
15	.2	30
	(.5)	(60)
16	.3	17
	(.5)	(61)
17	0.0	45
	(.5)	(64)
18	.2	41
	(.5)	(64)
19	0.0	69
	(.5)	(64)
20	.1	50
	(.5)	(66)
21	.1	50
	(.5)	(69)
22	.2	6
	(.5)	(69)
23	.3	67
	(.5)	(69)
24	.4	29
	(.5)	(71)
otes $\pm p<0.1 + p<0.1$	05 ** p<0.01 Coeffi	cients are treatment

Notes. + p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01. Coefficients are treatment effects at the eligibility threshold pooled across years, as estimated by equation (1). All results use local linear regressions that include all observations within 8 points of the eligibility threshold. Employment regressions utilize 185,915 observations per quarter and wage regressions vary from 89,930 to 114,087 observations per quarter. Quarter equals zero for the first full quarter after a students' initial aid application. Robust standard errors in parentheses.


Application cycle								September
FAFSA type	March Four-year	March For-profit	CC	September CC	March Four-year	March For-profit	CC	CC
Quarter		Employ	ment			Earni	ings	
-4	-1.1	1.8	6	.6	83	107	35	-13
	(1.5)	(1.3)	(1.3)	(.6)	(129)	(128)	(114)	(52)
-3	-1.0	2.6*	-1.7	.6	-34	123	20	-20
	(1.5)	(1.3)	(1.3)	(.6)	(144)	(132)	(119)	(53)
-2	-1.5	1.7	-1.3	.8	-166	276*	-55	6
	(1.5)	(1.3)	(1.3)	(.6)	(142)	(133)	(115)	(51)
-1	-2.1	.9	-1.1	.7	-82	210	42	-8
	(1.5)	(1.3)	(1.3)	(.6)	(140)	(133)	(115)	(51)
0	-1.9	.7	5	2	-137	199	52	36
	(1.5)	(1.3)	(1.3)	(.6)	(139)	(135)	(116)	(50)
1	-2.2	2.0	.7	3	-53	-63	-2	-30
	(1.5)	(1.3)	(1.3)	(.6)	(157)	(137)	(122)	(52)
2	2	2.3+	2	7	-267+	88	15	-30
2	(1.5)	(1.3)	(1.3)	(.6)	(158)	(132)	(124)	(52)
3	0.0	1.7	6	8	-211	-55	-85	-33
4	(1.5) -1.1	(1.2) 3.6**	(1.3) -1.1	(.6) 9	(157) -92	(132) -93	(127) 1	(53) -37
4	(1.5)	(1.2)	(1.3)	(.6)	(154)	(138)	(131)	(55)
5	4	1.5	-1.5	-1.2*	-70	26	130	46
5	(1.5)	(1.2)	(1.3)	(.6)	(178)	(143)	(136)	(58)
6	3	1.9	-1.8	-1.2*	-70	-43	8	33
-	(1.5)	(1.2)	(1.3)	(.6)	(180)	(141)	(135)	(58)
7	.6	1.4	-2.2+	6	-197	-28	73	66
	(1.5)	(1.2)	(1.3)	(.6)	(182)	(143)	(140)	(60)
8	-2.0	.6	-1.6	4	-70	-8	62	2
	(1.5)	(1.2)	(1.3)	(.6)	(182)	(147)	(147)	(62)
9	-1.4	.1	9	7	-25	-134	98	29
	(1.5)	(1.2)	(1.3)	(.6)	(197)	(154)	(154)	(66)
10	8	8	-1.3	6	-93	110	39	-1
	(1.5)	(1.2)	(1.3)	(.6)	(196)	(153)	(153)	(66)
11	-1.2	8	-1.4	4	-31	81	97	10
	(1.5)	(1.2)	(1.3)	(.6)	(198)	(156)	(157)	(67)
12	7	.1	-1.5	4	-32	109	234	9
	(1.4)	(1.2)	(1.3)	(.6)	(198)	(158)	(159)	(68)
13	.2	3	-1.8	.8	-66	113	130	-36
	(1.5)	(1.2)	(1.3)	(.6)	(214)	(164)	(165)	(72)
14	.5 (1.5)	5 (1.2)	.4 (1.3)	0.0	-11	235	-56	21
15	(1.5) 1.3	4	.1	(.6) 0.0	(217) -146	(163) 214	(164) -2	(72) 15
15	(1.5)	4 (1.2)	.1 (1.3)	(.6)	(214)	(166)	-2 (166)	(73)
16	1.0	.1	0.0	.2	-171	186	82	-5
10	(1.4)	(1.2)	(1.3)	(.6)	(221)	(169)	(169)	(75)
17	2.0	2	-1.4	1	-220	155	130	50
	(1.5)	(1.2)	(1.3)	(.6)	(229)	(175)	(179)	(79)
18	1.1	2	2	.1	-67	140	52	24
	(1.5)	(1.2)	(1.3)	(.6)	(230)	(176)	(180)	(79)
19	.1	7	0.0	0.0	-76	137	7	80
	(1.4)	(1.2)	(1.3)	(.6)	(227)	(178)	(180)	(80)
20	4	7	0.0	.2	-36	304+	69	-4
	(1.4)	(1.2)	(1.3)	(.6)	(235)	(183)	(186)	(82)
21	4	-1.1	.3	.1	-110	369*	27	15
	(1.5)	(1.2)	(1.3)	(.6)	(243)	(187)	(193)	(86)
22	-1.0	4	1.0	.2	-181	183	-139	25
	(1.5)	(1.2)	(1.3)	(.6)	(247)	(188)	(194)	(85)
23	-1.7	.6	.2	.5	17	-45	49	100
	(1.5)	(1.2)	(1.2)	(.6)	(244)	(189)	(195)	(86)
24	7	6	.5	.5	-210	119	10	44
	(1.4)	(1.2)	(1.2)	(.6)	(249)	(193)	(202)	(89)

Appendix Table 13. Reduced form impacts on labor force outcomes, by wage quarter and FAFSA preferences

Notes. + p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01. Coefficients are treatment effects at the eligibility threshold pooled across years, as estimated by equation (1). All results use local linear regressions that include all observations within 8 points of the eligibility threshold. Employment regressions utilize 17,639, 23,772, 25,182, and 114,136 observations per quarter for the first four columns, respectively. Wage regressions vary by quarter and generally increase in size over time; the final quarter contains 11,533, 15,043, 14,915, and 69,517 observations for the last four columns, respectively. Quarter equals zero for the first full quarter after a students' initial aid application. Robust standard errors in parentheses.




Appendix Figure 1. Distribution of Competitive Cal Grant scores



Appendix Figure 2. Covariate Balance at Eligibility Threshold, All applicants

Notes: The x-axis in all figures is the year- and group-specific Competitive award eligibility threshold, centered at zero.


Appendix Figure 3. Treatment impacts at Competitive award eligibility threshold, by bandwidth and functional form



(A)


Notes: Each dot indicates an estimate of treatment impacts along with dotted 95% confidence intervals, based on the bandwidth as specified on the x-axis (5 to 15 points). Results in the left and right panels use linear and quadratic functional forms, respectively, in the estimating equation.


Appendix Figure 4. Treatment impacts at Competitive award eligibility threshold, by bandwidth and functional form, Triangular kernels



Impact on bachelor degree completion, For-profit students, Tri kernel


Notes: Each dot indicates an estimate of treatment impacts along with dotted 95% confidence intervals, based on the bandwidth as specified on the x-axis (5 to 15 points). Results in the left and right panels use linear and quadratic functional forms, respectively, in the estimating equation.





Notes: The x-axis indicates the years since initial application, with year-specific estimates for impacts on degree completion, any attendance, or full-time attendance. Statistical significant is indicated by either a hollow circle (p<0.10) or a solid circle (p<0.05).


Appendix Figure 6. Average quarterly wages from quarters 12 through 24 postapplication, by FAFSA preferences



Wages

Notes: The x-axis indicates the distance from the year- and group-specific Competitive award eligibility threshold, centered at zero. Results average wage values from the time period from 12 and 24 quarters after initial application. Wages derive from California's Unemployment Insurance records and are topcoded at \$25,000 per quarter.


Appendix Figure 7. Average employment levels from quarters 12 through 24 postapplication, by FAFSA preferences



Employment

Notes: The x-axis indicates the distance from the year- and group-specific Competitive award eligibility threshold, centered at zero. Employment is a dummy that indicates an individual received positive wages within that quarter, as based on California Unemployment Insurance records. Results average employment values from the time period from 12 and 24 quarters after initial application.

Appendix Figure 8. Treatment impacts on total wages conditional on employment by wage quarter, by FAFSA preferences and over longer time periods with fewer available cohorts



Notes: The solid and dashed lines provide treatment estimates and 95% confidence intervals at each time interval from 4 quarters prior to application to 36 quarters after application, where quarter 0 is the third quarter of the calendar year in which the individual applied. Wages derive from California's Unemployment Insurance records and are topcoded at \$25,000 per quarter. Estimates in the grey shaded areas indicate regions where the most recent cohorts do not have the requisite data available and are dropped; the figure includes three additional outcomes years that sequentially drop the 2011, 2010, and 2009 applicant pools.

Appendix 1. GPA Verification Form

Cal Grant GPA Verification Form

DEADLINE: MARCH 2, 2016 (POSTMARKED)

For 2016-17 Academic Year

TO BE FILLED OUT BY STUDENT

DO NOT SEND ACADEMIC TRANSCRIPTS

(SEE BACK OF FORM FOR INSTRUCTIONS) Please print clearly using blue or black ink only.



1.	Your Social Security number or Dream Act ID number: 2. Month/year of high school graduation 1 Re-enter your Social Security or Dream Act ID number: (If currrently a HS senior, anticipated date)
3.	Your name — last, first, middle initial, as it is listed on your Social Security card and FAFSA:
4.	Your date of birth:
6.	Your permanent mailing address:
7.	Your e-mail address, if available:
8.	Fill in bubble if you are submitting a SAT, ACT, GED, TASC or HiSET test score instead of a GPA. Attach your applicable test score to this form, transcripts will not be accepted. You do not have to have your school fill out the FOR SCHOOL USE ONLY section
9.	STUDENT CERTIFICATION: I have read the instructions and information accompanying this form. I understand that this Cal Grant GPA

Verification Form is used to determine Cal Grant eligibility and the GPA must be calculated as described on the attached GPA Calculation Instruction sheet. The information I have completed is true to the best of my knowledge, and I understand that it is illegal to report false or misleading information. I understand that without a valid Social Security number and signature, this form will not be considered.

I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the foregoing is true and correct.

Student Signatu	ıre	Date	
	E ONLY (High schools MUST be fully accredited by mal accreditation agency to certify a Cal Grant hig		Schools and Colleges [WASC] or an
STATEWIDE STUD	DENT ID (SSID) :		GPA VERIFIER'S SCHOOL CODE:
GPA IS BASED ON	HIGH SCHOOL COURSEWORK?		
CALIFORNIA COM	IMUNITY COLLEGE REESTABLISHED GPA?		BE ABOVE 4.00
Calculation Instru regional accrediti	the high school or college official certifies, under pena iction sheet. The signature of a high school official also ing agency, or has a UC-approved course list as requi of California that the foregoing is true and correct.	certifies that his or her high s	chool is fully accredited by the WASC or other
Signature of Sch	nool Official	Name of Schoo	1
Title of School C	Official	Street Address	of School
Date	E-mail Address	City	State Zip Code

Mail completed form to: California Student Aid Commission, Cal Grant Operations, P.O. Box 419077, Rancho Cordova, CA 95741-9077

Instructions for filling out the Cal Grant GPA Verification Form

STUDENT INFORMATION SECTION. Please print clearly using blue or black ink only. Filing deadline for 2016-17 awards is March 2, 2016

- Your Social Security number or DREAM Act ID Number: Enter your Social Security number (SSN) as it appears on your Social Security card and your FAFSA. (Valid SSNs do not begin with 9 or 000. If you believe your SSN begins with an 9 or 000, then contact your local Social Security Office to verify your number.) Individual Tax Identification Numbers (ITIN) are not accepted. If you are a Dream Act Applicant and do not have a valid SSN, please enter your DREAM Act ID number which was given to you when you completed your Dream Act Application.
- 2. *Month/year of high school graduation:* Enter the month and year you graduated, or plan to graduate from high school. Enter the month in a two-digit format (for example: January should be appear as "01"; November should appear as "11"). Enter the year in a four-digit format (for example: 2016 should appear as "2016").
- 3. Your name: Print your full name as it appears on your Social Security card. Enter last name, first name, middle initial.
- 4. Your date of birth: Enter your birth date. For example, June 25, 1998 would be entered as 06-25-1998.
- 5. Telephone number: Enter your area code and daytime telephone number.
- 6. Your permanent mailing address: Enter your permanent mailing address, city, state and five-digit zip code.
- 7. Your E-mail address: Enter a "safe" e-mail address where you can be contacted for questions. This is optional.
- 8. Submitting a test score instead of a GPA: Complete questions 1 through 9, sign the form and attach a photo copy of the testing organization's score report and mail by the deadline to Commission. **DIPLOMAS WILL NOT BE PROCESSED.**

The results from the GED, SAT, ACT, TASC or HiSET scores must be submitted in lieu of a GPA if:

- You participated in a home schooling program or attended an unaccredited high school.
- You attended a high school or college outside of the United States and are unable to have those grades converted to a 4.00 scale or your school did not grade in a manner that can be readily converted to a 4.00 scale.
- Students who have been out of school for five years can choose to submit either test scores or their GPA.
 - Scores from the California High School Proficiency Examination (CHSPE) cannot be accepted in lieu of a high school GPA, but passing the CHSPE does meet the high school graduation requirement of the Entitlement Cal Grant program. Also, grade reports, transcripts, and other proficiency certificates WILL NOT BE ACCEPTED.
 - Only scores from the SAT reasoning test WILL BE ACCEPTED. Subject test scores will NOT BE PROCESSED.
- 9. *Student signature:* By signing this form, you certify that you have read these instructions and that the information you provided is correct. It is illegal to report false or misleading information on this form and doing so may result in any Cal Grant award being revoked.

Once you have filled out the student information, take the form to your school and request that they verify your GPA. Be aware that if your school will be electronically submitting your GPA to the California Student Aid Commission, you do not need to submit this form. It is your responsibility to verify that the school will be submitting your GPA for you.

FOR SCHOOL USE ONLY SECTION

STATE STUDENT IDENTIFICATION NUMBER:	(Optional) Please enter the 10-Digit Statewide Student Identification Number (SSID) of the student who's GPA is listed on this form. If the student does NOT have a SSID, please leave blank.
GPA IS BASED ON HIGH SCHOOL COURSEWORK:	Fill in this bubble ONLY if the GPA is based on high school coursework.
CA COMMUNITY COLLEGE RE-ESTABLISHED GPA:	Fill in this bubble ONLY if the GPA being certified is based on at least 16 but less than 24 units completed at a California Community College. If the GPA is based on college units, and is not a reestablished GPA as described above, do not fill in any bubble.
GPA VERIFIER'S SCHOOL CODE:	High schools use their College Board school code; colleges use their USED OPE ID code.
VERIFIED STUDENT GPA:	Fill in ALL three GPA spaces. Cal Grant GPAs are calculated on a 4.00 scale. High Schools certifying GPAs MUST be accredited or have a UC approved course list in order to verify GPAs. Students not attending accredited high schools should provide either a GED, SAT, ACT, TASC or HiSET score.

After the school completes the GPA information, we recommend making a copy for your records, and purchasing a \$1.30 Certificate of Mailing from the post office and mail to:

California Student Aid Commission Cal Grant Operations P.O. Box 419077 Rancho Cordova, CA 95741-9077

Appendix 2. Competitive Award Scoring System

CSAC determines award eligibility by assigning students a score between 60 and 200 through a systematic scoring process that involves no human discretion. Scoring consists of five distinct components, and the majority of the information relies on student self-reports on the FAFSA. The five components are briefly summarized below:

- GPA (70 points): Applicants must have a minimum 2.0 GPA. An unweighted GPA of 2.0 earns the minimum score of 30 points, with this score increasing linearly up to a maximum of 70 for a 4.0 GPA.
- Income and family size (76 points): Lower income and larger family size increase the point total, with four different scales for dependents and independents who are single, married, or have their own dependents.
- Parent Education Level (18 points): Five and nine points are assigned for each parent whose highest education level is high school or below high school, respectively.
- Student or Parent Household Status (18 points): A dependent student with parents who are unmarried, divorced, or widowed earns 18 points. An independent student who is single with dependents earns 18 points. There are additional exceptions for orphans or wards of the court, though this affects few applicants.
- Access Equalizer (18 points): Students can earn points one of two ways:
 - Students with college experience the vast majority of applicants earn between 0 and 18 points, with more points assigned to students with less postsecondary experience and a longer period of time since they graduated high school.
 - Students with no college experience are assigned 18 points if they graduated from a high school identified as disadvantaged or if they earned a GED. Students are considered to have no college experience if they submit a high school GPA, rather than college. GED scores are converted to a GPA-point equivalent by CSAC.

Students who ultimately earn the Competitive award are entitled to receive one of two payment options, referred to as Cal Grant A and Cal Grant B. In practice, over 95% of eligible Competitive award students elect to use the Cal Grant B payment. To qualify for Cal Grant B, students must be classified as "low-income", which are defined by CSAC-generated cutoffs that are typically about half the maximum income limit for dependents (or independents with dependents) shown in Appendix Table 1. Any single or married independent student without dependents is considered low-income. The Cal Grant A option differs from Cal Grant B in four ways. First, students can only select this option if they have a GPA of 3.0 or higher. Second, it offers four years of full tuition payments, rather than the three offered by Cal Grant B. Tuition payments under Cal Grant A can be used immediately, whereas students receiving Cal Grant B must have achieved Sophomore status or higher, as self-identified through the FAFSA. The final but most important difference is that the Cal Grant A option does not include the cash subsistence award, which explains why most applicants select the Cal Grant B option.

Students who apply by the March deadline and do not earn an award, but indicate on the FAFSA that their degree objective is in earning a degree in an occupational or technical program, can reapply for a smaller financial award known as Cal Grant C. Roughly six percent of the applicant sample who fall just below the March eligibility threshold is offered one of these Cal Grant C awards, which slightly decreases the financial contrast between treatment and control groups. The eligibility process is significantly more complicated for this award, as students must actively re-apply for Cal Grant C. At the time, they were scored based on their academic history, length of work history, and letter of recommendation, as well as receiving extra points for intending to enroll in a program deemed high-need by the state. The exact amounts offered are \$2,462 in tuition and fees and \$547 for books, tools, and equipment, for up to two years.

The following pages provide detailed descriptions of the Competitive award point system based on the 2010-11 academic year.

COMPETITIVE CAL GRANT A AND B PROGRAM SCORING SUMMARY FOR 2010-11

ELEMENTS	MAXIMUM POINTS
GRADE POINT AVERAGE (GPA)	70
PARENT EDUCATIONAL LEVEL (Mother and Father)	18
ACCESS EQUALIZER	18
STUDENT or PARENT HOUSEHOLD STATUS	18
FAMILY INCOME and HOUSEHOLD SIZE	76

GPA	SCORE
2.00 - 2.04	30
2.05 - 2.09	31
2.10 - 2.14	32
2.15 - 2.19	33
2.20 - 2.24	34
2.25 - 2.29	35
2.30 - 2.34	36
2.35 - 2.39	37
2.40 - 2.44	38
2.45 - 2.49	39
2.50 - 2.54	40
2.55 - 2.59	41
2.60 - 2.64	42
2.65 - 2.69	43
2.70 - 2.74	44
2.75 - 2.79	45
2.80 - 2.84	46
2.85 - 2.89	47
2.90 - 2.94	48
2.95 - 2.99	49
3.00 - 3.04	50
3.05 - 3.09	51
3.10 - 3.14	52
3.15 - 3.19	53
3.20 - 3.24	54
3.25 - 3.29	55
3.30 - 3.34	56
3.35 - 3.39	57
3.40 - 3.44	58
3.45 - 3.49	59
3.50 - 3.54	60
3.55 - 3.59	61
3.60 - 3.64	62
3.65 - 3.69	63
3.70 - 3.74	64
3.75 - 3.79	65
3.80 - 3.84	66
3.85 - 3.89	67
	80
3.70 - 3.74 3.75 - 3.79 3.80 - 3.84 3.85 - 3.89 3.90 - 3.94 3.95 - 3.99 4.00	

FAFSA	PARENTS'	SCORE per
VALUE	EDUCATION	PARENT
1	Middle School/Jr High	9
2	High School	5
3	College or Beyond	0
4	Other / Unknown	9

DEPENDENT STUDENT: PARENT HOUSEHOLD			
Married	0		
Unmarried	18		
Separated / Divorced	18		
Widowed	18		

PARENTS' EDUCATION SAMPLES		
FAFSA VALUE		
FATHER	MOTHER	SCORE
		0
	1	9
	2	5
	3	0
	4	9
1		9
1	1	18
1	2	14
1	3	9
1	4	18
2		5
2	1	14
2	2	10
2	3	5
2	4	14
3		0
3	1	9
3	2	5
3	3	0
3	4	9
4		9
4	1	18
4	2	14
4	3	9
4	4	18

INDEPENDENT STUDENT: STUDENT HOUSEHOLD				
Married	0			
Single, no dependents	0			
Single, with dependents	18			

OR

INDEPENDENT STUDENT:		
IF STUDENT IS AN ORPHAN		
OR WARD OF THE COURT		
Married	0	
Single, no dependents*	22	
Single, with dependents	18	

* Single, no dependents can receive a maximum of 72 points on income and family size. To ensure that these students can earn the maximum 200 points, they receive an additional four points for household status.

2010-11 COMPETITIVE CAL GRANT A AND B PROGRAM SCORING FOR ACCESS EQUALIZER

Student will receive Access Equalizer points if a disadvantaged high school experience is indicated either by:

- 1. The high school code on the GPA verification form is one of the following:
 - * A continuation high school; or
 - * A high school in the upper quartile of free or reduced lunch program; or
 - * A high school in the lowest quartile of university-going rate, excluding those high schools having no reported university-going rate and those having a free or reduced lunch rate of less than 25 percent.

<u>or</u>

2. The student submitted a GED test score.

GPA from	Disadvantaged High School Experience		
	No	Yes	
High School	0	18	
Non-High School	0	See below chart	

Number of Years	Educational Level						
Out of High School	No College	1	2	3	4		
2-3	9	6	3	0	0		
4-5	12	9	6	0	0		
6-7	15	12	9	3	0		
8 or more	18	15	12	6	3		

TABLE 1: DEPENDENT STUDENTS 2010-11 COMPETITIVE CAL GRANT A AND B PROGRAM SCORING FOR FAMILY INCOME AND HOUSEHOLD SIZE

	Size of Household								
Parents' Income	10	9	8	7	6	5	4	3	2
\$0 - \$19,850	76	76	76	76	76	76	76	76	76
\$19,851 - \$21,350	76	76	76	76	76	76	76	76	75
\$21,351 - \$22,850	76	76	76	76	76	76	76	76	74
\$22,851 - \$24,350	76	76	76	76	76	76	76	76	73
\$24,351 - \$25,850	76	76	76	76	76	76	76	75	71
\$25,851 - \$27,350	76	76	76	76	76	76	76	74	70
\$27,351 - \$28,850	76	76	76	76	76	76	76	73	69
\$28,851 - \$30,350	76	76	76	76	76	76	76	71	67
\$30,351 - \$31,850	76	76	76	76	76	76	75	70	66
\$31,851 - \$33,350	76	76	76	76	76	76	74	68	65
\$33,351 - \$34,850	76	76	76	76	76	76	72	67	64
\$34,851 - \$36,350	76	76	76	76	76	75	71	66	63
\$36,351 - \$37,850	76	76	76	76	76	74	70	65	62
\$37,851 - \$39,350	76	76	76	76	76	73	68	64	61
\$39,351 - \$40,850	76	76	76	76	76	72	67	63	60
\$40,851 - \$42,350	76	76	76	76	75	70	66	61	58
\$42,351 - \$43,850	76	76	76	76	74	69	65	60	57
\$43,851 - \$45,350	76	76	76	76	73	68	64	59	56
\$45,351 - \$46,850	76	76	76	76	72	67	63	58	55
\$46,851 - \$48,350	76	76	76	75	71	66	61	57	54
\$48,351 - \$49,850	76	76	76	74	69	65	60	56	52
\$49,851 - \$51,350	76	76	76	72	68	63	59	54	51
\$51,351 - \$52,850	76	76	75	71	67	62	58	53	49
\$52,851 - \$54,350	76	76	74	70	66	61	57	52	48
\$54,351 - \$55,850	76	76	73	68	65	60	56	50	46
\$55,851 - \$57,350	76	75	71	67	64	59	54	49	45
\$57,351 - \$58,850	76	74	70	66	63	58	53	47	43
\$58,851 - \$60,350	76	73	69	65	62	57	52	46	41
\$60,351 - \$61,850	75	71	68	64	60	56	50	44	40
\$61,851 - \$63,350	74	70	66	63	59	54	49	42	38
\$63,351 - \$64,850	73	69	65	62	58	53	48	41	37
\$64,851 - \$66,350	71	68	64	61	57	52	46	39	34
\$66,351 - \$67,850	70	67	63	60	56	50	40	37	32
\$67,851 - \$69,350	69	66	62	58	55	49	42	35	30
\$69,351 - \$70,850	68	64	61	57	53	43	41	32	29
\$70,851 - \$72,350	67	63	60	56	52	46	39	30	28
\$72,351 - \$73,850	66	62	59	55	51	40	37	29	
\$73,851 - \$75,350	65	61	58	54	49	42	35		
\$75,351 - \$76,850	64	60	56	52	48	40	33		
\$76,851 - \$78,350	62	59	55	51	46	38	30		
\$78,351 - \$79,850	61	58	54	49	44	36	29		
\$79,851 - \$81,350	60	57	53	48	43	34	28		
\$81,351 - \$82,850	59	55	51	46	43	32	20		
\$82,851 - \$84,350	58	53 54	50	40 45	39	30		Ineligible	
\$84,351 - \$85,850	57	53	48	43	37	29		Juliano	
\$85,851 - \$87,350	56	52	40	43	35	29			
\$87,351 - \$88,850	50 54	52 50	47	39	33	20			
\$88,851 - \$90,350	53	49	43	39 37	30				
\$90,351 - \$90,350 \$90,351 - \$91,850	53 52	49 47	43	37	29				
\$90,351 - \$91,850 \$91,851 - \$93,350	52 50	47 45	42 40	33	29				
\$91,001 - \$90,000	- 50	40	40	33	20				

NOTE: The maximum income ceilings for the Cal Grant program are within the family income ranges.

The cells above the bold line in the matrix show Cal Grant B eligible incomes.

All unshaded incomes are Cal Grant A eligible.

TABLE 2: INDEPENDENT STUDENTS 2010-11 COMPETITIVE CAL GRANT A AND B PROGRAMS SCORING FOR FAMILY INCOME AND HOUSEHOLD SIZE

With Dependents	Size of Household								
Student/Spouse Income	10	9	8	7	6	5	4	3	2
\$0 - \$24,500	76	76	76	76	76	76	76	76	76
\$24,501 - \$26,000	76	76	76	76	76	76	76	76	75
\$26,001 - \$27,500	76	76	76	76	76	76	76	76	74
\$27,501 - \$29,000	76	76	76	76	76	76	76	76	73
\$29,001 - \$30,500	76	76	76	76	76	76	76	75	71
\$30,501 - \$32,000	76	76	76	76	76	76	76	74	70
\$32,001 - \$33,500	76	76	76	76	76	76	76	73	69
\$33,501 - \$35,000	76	76	76	76	76	76	76	72	68
\$35,001 - \$36,500	76	76	76	76	76	76	76	71	67
\$36,501 - \$38,000	76	76	76	76	76	76	75	69	65
\$38,001 - \$39,500	76	76	76	76	76	76	74	68	64
\$39,501 - \$41,000	76	76	76	76	76	76	73	67	63
\$41,001 - \$42,500	76	76	76	76	76	76	72	66	62
\$42,501 - \$44,000	76	76	76	76	76	76	70	65	61
\$44,001 - \$45,500	76	76	76	76	76	75	69	64	60
\$45,501 - \$47,000	76	76	76	76	76	74	68	63	59
\$47,001 - \$48,500	76	76	76	76	76	73	67	61	58
\$48,501 - \$50,000	76	76	76	76	76	71	66	60	56
\$50,001 - \$51,500	76	76	76	76	76	70	65	59	55
\$51,501 - \$53,000	76	76	76	76	75	69	64	58	54
\$53,001 - \$54,500	76	76	76	76	74	68	62	57	53
\$54,501 - \$56,000	76	76	76	76	73	67	61	56	51
\$56,001 - \$57,500	76	76	76	76	72	66	60	54	50
\$57,501 - \$59,000	76	76	76	75	70	64	59	53	48
\$59,001 - \$60,500 \$60,501 - \$62,000	76 76	76 76	76 76	74	69 68	63 62	58 57	52 50	47 45
	76	76 76	76 76	73 72	67	62 61	57 56		45 44
\$62,001 - \$63,500 \$63,501 - \$65,000	76	76	76 75	72	67 66	60	56 54	49 47	44 42
\$65,001 - \$66,500	76	76	73	69	65	59	53	47	42
\$66,501 - \$68,000	76	76	74	68	64	58	52	40	39
\$68,001 - \$69,500	76	76	72	67	63	57	52	44	33 37
\$69,501 - \$71,000	76	75	70	66	61	55	49	41	36
\$71,001 - \$72,500	76	74	69	65	60	54	48	39	34
\$72,501 - \$74,000	76	73	68	64	59	53	46	37	V T
\$74,001 - \$75,500	76	72	67	63	58	52	40		
\$75,501 - \$77,000	75	70	66	61	57	50	42		
\$77,001 - \$78,500	74	69	65	60	56	49	41		
\$78,501 - \$80,000	73	68	64	59	54	47	39		
\$80,001 - \$81,500	72	67	63	58	53	45	37		
\$81,501 - \$83,000	70	66	61	57	52	44			
\$83,001 - \$84,500	69	65	60	56	50	42		Ineligible	
\$84,501 - \$86,000	68	64	59	54	49	40			
\$86,001 - \$87,500	67	63	58	53	48				
\$87,501 - \$89,000	66	61	57	52	46				
\$89,001 - \$90,500	65	60	56	50	44				
\$90,501 - \$92,000	64	59	54	49	42				
\$92,001 - \$93,500	63	58	53	48	41				

NOTE: The maximum income ceilings for the Cal Grant program are within the family income ranges. The cells above the bold line in the matrix show Cal Grant B eligible incomes.

All unshaded incomes are Cal Grant A eligible.

TABLE 3: SINGLE INDEPENDENT AND MARRIED STUDENTS2010-11 COMPETITIVE CAL GRANT A AND B PROGRAMSCORING FOR FAMILY INCOME AND HOUSEHOLD SIZE

Without Dependents Other Than Spouse							
Student/Spouse Income			Married Couple	Single			
\$0	-	\$8,910	72	72			
\$8,911	-	\$9,480	72	71			
\$9,481	-	\$10,050	72	70			
\$10,051	-	\$10,620	72	69			
\$10,621	-	\$11,190	72	68			
\$11,191	-	\$11,760	72	66			
\$11,761	-	\$12,330	72	65			
\$12,331	-	\$12,900	72	64			
\$12,901	-	\$13,470	72	63			
\$13,471	-	\$14,040	72	62			
\$14,041	-	\$14,610	72	61			
\$14,611	-	\$15,180	72	60			
\$15,181	-	\$15,750	72	59			
\$15,751	-	\$16,320	72	58			
\$16,321	-	\$16,890	72	57			
\$16,891	-	\$17,460	72	56			
\$17,461	-	\$18,030	72	55			
\$18,031	-	\$18,600	71	54			
\$18,601	-	\$19,170	70	53			
\$19,171	-	\$19,740	69	52			
\$19,741	-	\$20,310	68	51			
\$20,311	-	\$20,880	67	50			
\$20,881	-	\$21,450	66	49			
\$21,451	-	\$22,020	65	48			
\$22,021	-	\$22,590	64	47			
\$22,591	-	\$23,160	63	46			
\$23,161	-	\$23,730	62	45			
\$23,731	-	\$24,300	60	44			
\$24,301	-	\$24,870	59	43			
\$24,871	-	\$25,440	58	41			
\$25,441	-	\$26,010	57	40			
\$26,011	-	\$26,580	56	39			
\$26,581	-	\$27,150	55	38			
\$27,151	-	\$27,720	54	37			
\$27,721	-	\$28,290	53	36			
\$28,291	-	\$28,860	52	35			
\$28,861	-	\$29,430	51	34			
\$29,431	-	\$30,000	50				
\$30,001	-	\$30,570	49				
\$30,571	-	\$31,140	47				
\$31,141	-	\$31,710	46	Ineligible			
\$31,711	-	\$32,280	45				
\$32,281	-	\$32,850	44				
\$32,851	-	\$33,420	43				
\$33,421	-	\$33,990	42				

NOTE: The maximum income ceilings for the Cal Grant program are within the family income ranges.

Appendix 3. Difference-in-difference results

An alternative estimation strategy for the Competitive award is through a difference-indifference (DD) design. As shown in Appendix Table 1, the March eligibility cutoff varies from 153 to 165 across years, and September varies from 157 to 166. These time-varying cutoffs allow me to compare students with exactly equal Competitive scores in years in which they were initially eligible compared to years in which they were not.

I implement the DD equation as follows:

$$Y_{igpt} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 * CG_{igpt} + \theta_t + \mu_{pg} + \varepsilon_{igt}$$

In equation (3), Y_{igt} is the outcome of interest for student *i* in FAFSA group *g* with Competitive point score *p* in year *t*. CG_{ipgt} is a dummy variable that equals one if student *i* with points *p* is above the Cal Grant eligibility threshold for group *g* in year *t*. θ_t are year fixed effects and μ_{pg} are "FAFSA group-by-Competitive score" fixed effects. For similar reasons as before, I rely on robust standard errors. β_1 then identifies the causal impact of the Competitive award eligibility by estimating separate effects for each Competitive point group, based on whether the award eligibility was switched on or off in that particular year. To better implement this design I include only point totals that were available in all years, though explicitly matched some additional March applicants that were outside of the 15 point discontinuity sample to facilitate this approach. Appendix Table 8 presents results, with both reduced form and IV point estimates generally similar to the regression discontinuity results.