Identifying Variables Leading to Membership in The Illinois Principals Association

A Dissertation Submitted to the University of St Francis College of Education in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Education

by

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January 2015

Abstract

Previous research has established that attracting and retaining members is a significant challenge associated with the formation and maintenance of interest groups. Research has also established that interest groups play a significant role in the formation of educational policy. This study will attempt to provide insight as to those factors that influenced members to join one such association—the Illinois Principals Association (IPA). The IPA offers potential members a range of incentives to become involved in the organization. The focus of this study is twofold: (1) to identify the relative significance of material, associative, policy and district incentives in the decision of members to join the IPA and (2) to determine if disaggregated groups of the sample report different significance associated with any of the four incentives. A review of data demonstrated that material incentives were the biggest inducement for members with policy and associative incentives also contributing in statistically significant but descending levels of importance. Analysis of disaggregated groups of the sample demonstrated that associative incentives were statistically more significant for principals who served in leadership roles within the IPA and those coming from districts with fewer schools. Associative and material incentives were also found to be valued in descending importance by rural, suburban and urban principals.

Keywords: interest groups, principals, membership, selective incentives.

Certification: In accordance with college and university policies, this dissertation is accepted in partial fulfillment of degree requirements.

Dissertation Advisor

1/15/2015

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1/20/15

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In memory of my father, Frank Sullivan, and son, Connor Sullivan

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would like to thank my family, friends and colleagues who have influenced and supported me in a myriad of ways along the many years that this study went from an idea to a completed work. When I asked my wife Chris whom I should acknowledge, she said immediately that she was the obvious choice. She was correct—as usual. I am fortunate to be married to the best teacher I know. I would also like to thank my kids Matt, Brenna, Ben and Grace whose hard work as students and dedication to doing their best in everything they do inspires me to be a better person and educator. I would also like to thank my first teachers: my parents. Finally, I would like to thank the many teachers I have had who made a difference in my life. I was fortunate during my time at Mt. Carmel High School, Loyola University of Chicago, the University of Illinois at Chicago and the University of St. Francis to work and be influenced by some truly exceptional people. Whether you are five or fifty, the chance to work with teachers who take a personal interest in your success is empowering. I would like to particularly thank Dr. Robert Barwa, Dr. Steve Midlock and Mr. Keith Pain from St. Francis who were each instrumental in the development of this study. I would also like to thank Dr. Mark Smylie of UIC with whose guidance the foundation of this study was developed. His dedication to scholarship and personal sense of integrity leave him a unique influence in so much that I do. Finally, I would like to thank my parents who were my first and most important teachers.

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Chapter 1: Introduction

Background

From the onset of American political theory, discussion of the nation's form of government has focused attention on the role that organized associations play in the policy process. The Framers of the Constitution viewed the division of interests into organized groups as something inherent to both the nature of humans and the nature of non-tyrannical government. As Madison (1787) offered in *Federalist Paper Number 10*:

> A landed interest, a manufacturing interest, a mercantile interest, a moneyed interest, with many lesser interests, grow up of necessity in civilized nations, and divide them into different classes, actuated by different sentiments and views. The regulation of these various and interfering interests forms the principal task of modern legislation, and involves the spirit of party and faction in the necessary and ordinary operations of the government.

This study is informed by two distinct literatures which together support the need for research focused on the decision-making of members of an interest group active in the education policy arena. First, a rich and divided body of literature within the field of political science has developed related to those factors which explain the decision of individuals to pursue membership in voluntary political associations. This literature offers a diverse range of theories associated with various inducements which promote the decision to become involved in a given political organization on the part of a potential member. To date, this work has not been applied to organizations which are active in the educational policy. Significantly, a second body of research has evolved which underscores the significant role which interest groups of various kinds play in the formation of public policy related to education. Mawhinney and Lugg (2001)

argued that American educational policy in the last quarter of a century has been shaped by what the authors describe as a whirlpool of interests working feverishly to promote their agenda. A range of important studies have emerged during this same period which highlights the diverse nature and political significance of these organizations. These bodies together underscore the importance of a study which seeks to better understand why people pursue membership in one such organization.

Purpose of Study

Until an understanding is developed as to those factors which account for the decision to join and become active in groups which play a role in the educational policy arena, such groups will not be fully understood—despite their essential role in the policy process. An understanding of such groups and their role in the policy environment cannot emerge until research identifies those factors which lead to the decisions of individuals to affiliate themselves with such groups. This study will attempt to identify those variables associated with membership on the part of individual members and potential members for one such organization—the Illinois Principals Association. In doing so, it is hoped to begin to address this gap within the literature which has been presented above.

The above literature suggests that attracting and retaining members is a foundational issue for interest groups. Early pluralist theorists such as Truman (1951) argued that there exists within humans a natural proclivity toward association such that individuals with like interests join together to express a shared perspective without regard to potential costs linked to such association. Later studies founded upon empirical research demonstrate that real and significant challenges are associated with the assembly of people into mutual endeavor. Olson (1965) posits: "(T)he empirical research shows that the average person does *not* in fact typically belong

to large voluntary associations and…the allegation that the typical American is a 'joiner' is largely a myth" (p. 20). The above literature offers a diverse range of explanations for why people join.

As stated above, this literature has established that there is a direct connection between organizational maintenance and the activities in which interest groups may engage in the policy process (Opfer, 2001). McFaland's (1984) analysis of Common Cause demonstrates clearly that a strong linkage may exist between the policy activities in which a group will choose to engage and the needs of its membership. As a result, an understanding as to those factors which account the decision on the part of an individual to seek membership in an interest group is essential to understanding the potential roles groups will assume in the policy arena.

Subject of the Study

This study will focus on an analysis of those factors which lead principals within the state of Illinois to become members in the Illinois Principals Association. Focus will lie primarily on their decision-making processes and those independent variables which account for decisions. The Illinois Principals Association is an organization composed of members from throughout the state of Illinois constituted largely of practitioners in the field of elementary and secondary educational administration. Other members include individuals who aspire to such positions and retired administrators. Data provided by the IPA indicated that 2,374 of 4,038 (58.8%) Illinois principals maintained membership in the organization as of the 2012.

The Illinois Principals Association offers its members a range of services and benefits as inducements to potential members. These benefits include: professional support, lobbying at the state level, serving as a liaison to the Illinois State Board of Education, networking, professional growth opportunities and publications. Efforts at promoting the agenda of the association within

the Illinois General Assembly are guided by an active organizational lobbying presence and participation in the Illinois Statewide School Management Alliance. The Alliance provides a forum for the joint dissemination of information and collective lobbying efforts on the part of the state's four educational management associations. Those associations are: the IPA, the Illinois Association of School Administrators (IASA), the Illinois Association of School Business Officials (IASBO), and the Illinois Association of School Boards (IASB). The Illinois Principals Association is divided into 21 separate regions. Such regional divisions are reflective of the divides utilized by the Illinois Association of School Boards and Illinois Association of School Administrators. A range of social and professional activities are hosted by individual regional groups which supplement those activities which are directed from the IPA's central offices in the state's capital, Springfield.

Research Questions

This study provides an analysis as to those factors which led Illinois principals to the decision to seek membership in the Illinois Principals Association using alternative causal explanations each supported by a clearly defined body of literature. The study also sought to understand the degree to which disaggregated groups of principals placed differing value on individual incentives. Those research questions which the study will address are: To what extend do material, associative, policy and district incentives impact the decision of members of the Illinois Principals Association to join the organization? Do disaggregated groups of principals report different levels of significance associated with material, associative, policy and district incentives impacting the decision to join the Illinois Principal Association?

Summary

The Illinois Principals Association is a viable political organization composed of individuals choosing to pursue such membership. By engaging in a study focused on factors which are linked to membership decisions around such an organization for principals, propositional knowledge may be gained as to the ability of various well-defined theories of political science to explain membership in organizations active in educational policy formation. It is hoped that this study will serve as a foundation for studies of other actors in this policy arena and a more complete understanding of the dynamics which result in the formation of interest groups active in the educational arena.

Chapter 2: Review of Literature

Introduction

Previous research on interest groups has focused on the significance of such interest groups in a variety of policy areas. This body of literature includes a growing number of studies which highlight the importance of such groups in the development of educational policy (Mawhinney and Lugg, 2001). A large and disparate body of research also exists which offers competing explanations as to the way in which interest groups are formed and sustained. Despite the protests of some early scholars in this area, there is no doubt that significant obstacles stand in the way of interests being organized and maintained. Nonetheless, interest groups remain a diverse and powerful presence in the formation of public policy in America at all levels of government. A plethora of interests has been and will continue to be organized despite the presence of such obstacles.

Although there has emerged a credible body of research highlighting the significance of organized interests in the formation of educational policy, there has been little serious exploration as to those factors which guide individuals in the decision to pursue membership in such organizations. Significantly, literature suggests that there is a correlation between those activities associated with organizational maintenance and the activities in which interest groups engage in the policy process (Opfer, 2001). In other words, the role that any such group may play in the policy environment is influenced directly by the needs of its members. Groups will consistently function in a way that allows them to continue to exist—and meet the needs of those who support it. Given this phenomenon, the absence of scholarly exploration on the factors which account for group membership must be addressed in order for scholars to more clearly understand how educational policy is formed.

The ability of interest groups representing an occupational sector to impact policy is contingent upon the degree to which the group is able to attract members. Classic research from political science on interest groups offers various empirically tested theories as to the factors which provide for the organization and maintenance of interest groups. While this literature cumulatively offers a range of potential variables which influence the decision of an individual to affiliate oneself with a group, there have been few studies focused on membership decision-making for organizations seeking to influence educational policy.

Previous research suggests that attracting and retaining members is a foundational issue for interest groups. Early pluralist theorists such as Truman (1951) argued that there exists within humans a natural proclivity toward association such that individuals with like interests join together to express a shared perspective without regard to potential costs linked to such association. Later studies founded upon empirical research demonstrate that real and significant challenges are associated with the assembly of people into mutual endeavor. Olson (1965) posits: "(T)he empirical research shows that the average person does *not* in fact typically belong to large voluntary associations and…the allegation that the typical American is a 'joiner' is largely a myth" (p. 20). Because of such challenges, a range of studies have been conducted which attempt to describe why individuals choose to join and become involved in such groups.

As stated above, the literature has established that there is a direct connection between organizational maintenance and the activities in which interest groups engage in the policy arena (Opfer, 2001). McFaland's (1984) analysis of Common Cause demonstrates clearly that a strong linkage exists between the policy activities in which a group will choose to engage and the needs and desires of its membership. As a result, an understanding as to those factors which account the decision on the part of an individual to seek membership in an interest group is

essential to understanding the potential roles that individual groups will assume in the policy arena.

Until an understanding is developed as to those factors which account for the decision to join and become active in an educational interest group on the part of the individuals who constitute its potential membership, such groups will not be fully understood—despite their essential role in the policy process. An understanding of such groups and their role in the policy environment cannot emerge until research identifies those factors which lead to the decisions of individual members and potential members to affiliate themselves with groups. This study will attempt to identify those variables associated with membership on the part of individual members and potential members for one such organization—the Illinois Principals Association.

This chapter will commence with a definition of terms which will be used throughout the remainder of the study. It will then provide a brief overview as to the literature which establishes the significance of interest groups in the formation of educational policy. Finally, it will highlight the literature which serves as the theoretical foundation for each of the research questions addressed by this study.

Definition of Terms

The classic definition of interest groups which will be used in guiding this study comes from David Truman. Truman (1951) sees interest groups as having two distinct characteristics which differentiate them from other organizations. First, such groups are bound by some shared attitudes or values which cause them to formally organize. Second, this commonality drives the group to become active in the policy process in an effort to advocate their shared position.

A second concept which will be explored below is that of selective incentives. In his treatment of this concept, Olson (1965) views selective incentives as inducements which can be

offered to potential members of interest groups to promote membership on their behalf. Such incentives must therefore be of a nature whereby they can be withheld from individuals not seeking membership and *selectively* offered to members. For the purposes of this study, selective incentives will be treated in separate categories which reflect various types of inducements offered by organizations such as the Illinois Principals Association. Baumgartner and Leech (1998) define material benefits as those which are tangible in the form of a product such as a journal, solitary benefits as those associated with opportunity for group interaction and fellowship, and purposive incentives as those associated with positive feelings tied to contribution to a cause in which one believes such as the importance of the principalship. This typology emanates from distinctions first identified by Clark and Wilson (1961).

Impact of Interest Groups in Formation of Educational Policy

This study is only of significance if interest groups play an important role in the development of educational policy. Numerous studies have advanced the proposition that interest groups play a foundational role in a range of policy arenas related to education. McDaniel, Sims, and Miskel (2001) examine the national reading policy network which emerged in the 1990's as a result of education—and reading in particular—taking a more prominent role in the agenda of various groups in the midst of what was reported to be the declining performance of American students. McDaniel et al. (2001) conclude that the policy arena influencing national reading initiatives in the 1990's was diverse in its composition and well established to the extent that there existed in the various actors a shared body of knowledge and common understanding as to those individuals and groups who were most influential in policy formation.

Other studies evidence the divergent settings in which interest groups have impacted policy related to education. Pipho (1981) offers a case study which highlights the essential role of interest groups representing the Christian right in promoting the introduction of creationism into public schools. Firestone, Goertz and Natriello (1997) highlight through their analysis of failed efforts to bring a level of equity to educational expenditures in New Jersey the essential role that entrenched and powerful political associations can have in protecting the status quo when it is threatened by efforts which seek to redistribute educational resources.

Renzulli and Roseigno (2005) cite teacher unions functioning as interests groups as having a powerful impact on the differences between the type and level of charter school legislation enacted in various states beginning in the late 1990's. The authors cite differences in the relative scope of membership in teachers associations as influencing the degree to which individual states would create such alternatively governed schools.

The further exploration of interest groups active in the development of educational policy is merited not only by the impact such organizations have of policy but also the diversity of interests represented. In *Conflict of Interest*, Spring (1993) identifies "the big three" (p. 11) of groups active in educational policy: foundations, teacher unions, and the corporate sector—including those elements with business interests directly tied to education such as textbook publishers. Spring also highlights the presence of a plethora of single-interest groups that advance causes ranging from school prayer to curricular initiatives within educational institutions. Spring (1993) asserts that this divergent mix of interests affects the very nature of the politics of education:

> Many groups compete to shape the educational system in a direction that serves their interests. At times groups work together, and at other times they are in

> conflict. Politicians, both elected and educational. Are under continuous pressure from a variety of interest groups. Sometimes they seek the aid and support of these groups. Whatever the situation, interest groups play a major role in determining the organization and content of the American educational system. (p. 17)

Additional studies have contributed insight to those types of organizations identified as particularly significant for Spring. Foundations (Havinghurst, 1981), unions (Beerube, 1988; Kerchner, Koppich, & Weeres, 1997; Murphy 1990) and corporate groups (Sipple, Miskel, Matheney & Kearney, 1997) have all been the subject of studies highlighting their role in the policy process.

Review of Literatures Associated with Research Questions

Research Question 1

To what extend do material, associative, policy and district incentives impact the decision of members of the Illinois Principals Association to join the organization?

Political scientists have developed a classic literature which addresses the phenomenon of interest group membership. As early as the publication of *Democracy in America* (1835), scholars identified group membership as a behavior which uniquely manifested itself within the American system of governance and the character of Americans themselves. De Tocqueville (1835) argued that American society is essentially a matrix of associations that reflect the broad range of interests of its populace. De Tocqueville maintained that the propensity of Americans to come together for political aims has created a culture wherein association for a broad range of purposes is the norm. Absent such ability to form political associations, the culture of the nation

would be foundationally altered to reflect more individualism and less collective effort along the full range of human endeavors.

Published over a century after the work of De Tocqueville, Truman's (1951) *The Governmental Process* painted a profoundly optimistic portrait of groups as avenues for political expression given what was seen as the inherently social nature of humanity. For Truman (1951), "Man is a social animal" (p. 14). As a result, association with others is a nearly universal phenomena through which people come to understand the society in which they live and the social norms which implicitly and explicitly govern their behavior. This tendency manifests itself most importantly for Truman in organization around political causes. Because Truman saw few if any costs or barriers associated with organization, associations of individuals were seen as easily forming as a result of the presence of some force or disturbance within the environment that threatens the welfare of particular classes of individuals who are united by a shared interest. Truman argued that the advent of such associations served as a vehicle to return the larger environment to some form of stability. For Truman, the nature of society has promoted within individuals this tendency to form associations. Increased specialization in the labor force combined with increasing technology to support communication were said to lead to greater and greater levels of association. Truman argues that formally organized interests were complemented by the presence of a range of *potential groups* of individuals with shared interests which could be easily organized into actual groups in response to environmental threats to said shared interest. He states that such potential groups have a significant impact upon the policy environment.

> The publication of *The Logic of Collective Action* by Mancur Olson (1965) is a pivotal point in the analysis of interest group membership decision-making.

> Olson offers a clear refutation of previously unquestioned assumptions regarding the costs and benefits associated with organizational development and maintenance; the notion that the presence of a system of organized interests would allow for all voices to be heard was first called to question in this work. Groups that would be representative of interests in society. (Baumgartner & Leach, 1998, p. 67)

Olson (1965) viewed man as a "rational and self-interested" (p.60) being. As such, membership in an organization must be based upon the ability of that organization to further the interest of the individual. This concept of man presents a fundamental problem for those engaged in the organization and maintenance of interest groups. The products of most interest group activity include public or collective goods such as the adoption of favorable regulations or the promotion of public policies which further the interests of the individual and the group concurrently. However, the adoption of such favorable policies are collective in the sense that no single individual or organization can be excluded from the benefits of said efforts once the group goal has been achieved in most instances. As a result, there exist few incentives for membership in interest groups unless leaders can manufacture scenarios wherein the interests of the individual are furthered independent of the attainment of some collective good which would be available to anyone—regardless of membership.

Olson (1965) identified specific exceptional circumstances in which self-interest would promote association. One such circumstance is the case of a small group. Because the total benefits that are accrue to individual members of small groups represent such a proportionately large share of the collective good which is being sought, members of such groups have a much greater incentive to participate in collective activities than potential participants in large

organizations. In some instances, the benefits accrued to individual members will exceed the total cost associated with the organization and maintenance of the group—thus providing all members with an incentive to participate.

Nonetheless, most groups which are organized and maintained do not share this dynamic. Olson argued that organizers of other interest groups employ incentives other than the furtherance of shared political interests as inducements to join. In doing so, they are able to appeal to the self-interest of potential members. Three distinctive types of incentives that can be selectively provided to members while being denied to non-members were of particular importance to Olson. First, Olson notes that many organizations provide what could be termed economic or material incentives for members. As additional form of selective incentives which Olson notes is coercion. Olson ties the history of organized labor in the United States to such negative incentives. He notes that the roots of many labor organizations lie in violence and that laws which require union membership in order to work continue to coerce membership on the part of many whose self-interest alone would not promote such a decision. Finally, Olson also argues that some groups—usually smaller in stature—may employ the use of social or associative incentives to attract members.

As stated above, the work of Mancur Olson is crucial to this literature both because of its importance and the impact it had upon subsequent research. Those works which have been developed after Olson essentially serve to build upon or refute his work in *The Logic of Collective Action*. An important voice in this discussion is Robert Salisbury. Salisbury (1969) developed an exchange theory of interest group membership which distinguishes the entrepreneur or organizer of such organizations from the customer or member who engage in a transaction with differing factors motivating their decisions. For organizers, benefits accrue in

the form of profits which manifest most frequently in the form of a job with the established organization. In short, initial investment by the entrepreneur translates into opportunities to garner a profit. For the member, benefits are most frequently found in the form of selective incentives which are most frequently material in nature. Salisbury does allow for cases in which benefits accrue of a more social or purposive nature. Because the benefits of membership are frequently separate from the political activities of the group, lobbying and other forms of political activity may occur—not because of the demands of members—but as a result of a decision on the part of the entrepreneur on how to invest his or her profits.

Andrew McFarland (1984) argues an alternative form of interest activity, countervailing influence, emerged in the 1960's and 1970's. McFarland acknowledges that plural elitists such as Lowi (1979) and Olson (1965) have formed a theory which explains much of what constitutes politics in contemporary America. However, McFarland argues that this theory errs in omitting powerful countervailing groups which have come to play an important role in the formation of policy in many important areas. He states that then-contemporary policy environments were frequently characterized by power triads in which a producer group, countervailing group and government agency existed and influenced policy concurrently. While all such groups did not share the same level of influence, all three types of organizations were seen as important and enduring influences on various policy arenas (McFarland, 1984). McFarland points to groups like Common Cause as "a durable force on the American political scene" (p.203). He argues that such organizations will be particularly influential during periods of *high politics* wherein coalitions are reformulated and the opportunity exists for the legislative or executive branch to more directly impact the activity of agencies. The cyclical nature of politics means that such

countervailing groups can be expected to "have considerable power perhaps one year out of three" (McFarland, 1984, p. 204).

McFarland's (1984) study of Common Cause provides tremendous insight into the requirements for mobilization and maintenance of countervailing groups. At the core of the success of Common Cause was an entrepreneur whose background, skills and vision helped to forge a politically successful *people's lobby* that maintained a consistent membership of approximately 250,000 without the effective use of selective incentives. The study identified Common Cause's John Gardner as the embodiment for this vision of the entrepreneur. He not only was able to offer a vision which attracted membership, but also was able to forge an organization which was highly successful in maintaining members. At the heart of this ability was a commitment to focus on issues which an overwhelming majority of its members supported. As a result, the political role for the organization in such groups is tied to the policy preferences of members.

Research Question 2

Do disaggregated groups of principals report different levels of significance associated with material, associative, policy and district incentives impacting the decision to join the Illinois Principal Association?

Research supports the notion that disaggregated groups of principals may place different values on individual incentives. A number of studies have provided examples wherein disaggregated groups may view individual inducements differently. Some research has supported the notion that there is a different level of commitment to the policy goals of the group found within those who assume leadership responsibilities within the organization. Sabatier (1992) asserts that membership decision-making frequently emerges from some combination of

self-interested behavior and concerns for the advancement of a political agenda. While a range of incentives—including material ones—may play a role in the desire for membership, only those members with a relatively heightened commitment level toward those collective benefits promoted by the organization are likely to invest sufficient time and resources in their membership to evolve from a member to a leader within the group. As a result, advocates of commitment theory, such as Sabatier, hypothesize that a continuum of political commitment exists for any interest group wherein leaders most ardently espouse the political values of the organization and members with more peripheral roles within the organization have a descending commitment as their level of involvement becomes more and more marginal. This theory in essence reverses the calculus of membership offered by McFarland above. Sabatier and McLaughlin (1990) assert:

> (C)ommitment theory would expect the leaders of opposing organizations to be further apart in their views than their respective memberships.
>
> The basic tenet of this approach is that increased political participation is correlated with more coherent and extreme ideologies—at least for certain types of elites, including political party activists and interest-group leaders…In the case of interest groups, one can distinguish a continuum from the potential constituency of a group through its members to its leaders. (p. 917)

In analyzing the relative commitment of homeowners to antidevelopment policies in the Lake Tahoe area in the mid-1980's, Sabatier (1992) found evidence supporting commitment theory when—as would be predicted therein—pro-environmental views increased in statistically significant ways in comparing survey data from members to organizational leaders of a local homeowners association.

Other research has demonstrated the importance that affiliations such as employers can have on the decision of potential members to become active in professional associations. The presence of a culture which encourages membership or directly supports member dues impacts decision-making in a way that membership may be more of a product of the expectations of an employer than any specific inducements an organization may offer. In this way, employers are thought to be patrons for the political organization. While it is apparent that a variety of interest groups historically and contemporarily function in American politics, Walker (1991) asserts that the growth in number and diversity of interests represented is a product of patrons who play the fundamental role of providing money and resources which make groups viable. Significantly, wide ranges of actors have served in this essential role of patron—helping to create and maintain a wide range of groups.

> Corporations, foundations, government agencies, hospitals, universities, private charities, local governments, the presidency, national religious organizations, trade unions, and wealthy families often provide financial and organizational support that is the key to the maintenance and effectiveness of interest groups. (Walker, 1991, p.48)

This is not to say that such patrons are readily available to any group or that the contemporary system reflects the totality of needs and desires in the nation. Political entrepreneurs can attempt to form a group to reflect any interest. Yet, Walker points out many potential interests such as the unemployed are not currently represented. Without the ability to secure a patron, an organization has little chance of emerging or maintaining itself. Patrons generally will not provide resources to groups which breed conflict and represent ideologies which ultimately could threaten their own political existence. As a result, the patron system provides opportunities for

many—but clearly not all—to mobilize. Thus, the ability of groups to identify sources of funding becomes an organizational necessity for Walker (1991).

Finally, many theories of membership assume a perfect level of understanding of an organization on the part of potential members. They ignore the possibility that the low costs associated with membership provide incentive for some to join a group as a way to learn more about the organization. Rothenberg (1988) asserts that theories of membership decision-making such as those found above are fundamentally flawed in that they presume perfect knowledge on the part of potential members and ignore the issue of group retention. While enticing potential members to become involved in an organization remains a foundational element of group success, promoting retention in membership is an element of group maintenance which has been virtually ignored by other scholars in this field. As a result, Rothenberg (1988) argues that theories of membership decision-making fail to capture the true essence of the decision-making process of individuals. Rothenberg offers, instead, a theory of experiential search in which potential members of an organization join groups as a way to learn more about them; once informed about the organization as a result of their experience as a member, individuals then make informed decisions associated with membership retentions.

> When the costs of evaluating specific qualities are relatively low, prospective contributors will tend, ceteris parivus, to join, accumulate knowledge and then decide either to quit or to stay and learn more. Since a reasonable inference is that one accumulates knowledge more and more slowly over time, the expected rate of dropping out should diminish temporally. Specific characteristics should also be more important for newcomers than for veterans. (Rothenberg, 1988, p. 1133)

Empirical testing of this theory using survey data of members of Common Cause demonstrated support for the experiential search theory (Rothenberg, 1988). Specifically, members of the organization joined with little information as to the nature of the organization itself. Because members learn about groups by joining them, the rate of membership retention increased with succeeding intervals in a virtually linear manner. For purposes of the current study, this could mean that there are differing inducements which are of significance for those members who have different lengths of time associated with the organization.

Conclusions

The above literature suggests that attracting and retaining members is a foundational issue for interest groups. Early pluralist theorists such as Truman (1951) argued that there exists within humans a natural proclivity toward association such that individuals with like interests join together to express a shared perspective without regard to potential costs linked to such association. Later studies founded upon empirical research demonstrate that real and significant challenges are associated with the assembly of people into mutual endeavor. Olson (1965) posits: "(T)he empirical research shows that the average person does *not* in fact typically belong to large voluntary associations and…the allegation that the typical American is a 'joiner' is largely a myth" (p. 20). The above literature offers a diverse range of explanations for why people join.

As stated above, this literature has established that there is a direct connection between organizational maintenance and the activities in which interest groups may engage in the policy process (Opfer, 2001). McFaland's (1984) analysis of Common Cause demonstrates clearly that a strong linkage may exist between the policy activities in which a group will choose to engage and the needs of its membership. As a result, an understanding as to those factors which account

the decision on the part of an individual to seek membership in an interest group is essential to understanding the potential roles groups will assume in the policy arena.

Until an understanding is developed as to those factors which account for the decision to join and become active in groups which play a role in the educational policy arena, such groups will not be fully understood—despite their essential role in the policy process. An understanding of such groups and their role in the policy environment cannot emerge until research identifies those factors which lead to the decisions of individuals to affiliate themselves with such groups. This study will attempt to identify those variables associated with membership on the part of individual members and potential members for one such organization—the Illinois Principals Association. In doing so, it is hoped to begin to address this gap within the literature which has been presented above.

Chapter 3: Methodology

Introduction

The chapter will provide an overview of the methodology used to conduct this study. It will highlight the design of the study and the components of the instrument found in Appendix A.

Purpose of the Study

This study attempted to identify those variables associated with membership on the part of individual members of the Illinois Principals Association (IPA). As described above, a robust literature from the area of political science offers differing explanations of those factors which induce individuals to seek and maintain membership in an organization attempting to influence public policy.

Research Design

The study utilized a survey of Illinois principals to determine what factors accounted for their decision to seek membership in the Illinois Principals Association. A quantitative analysis utilized data from the surveys. Analysis took place as to the manner in which identified independent variables influence the decision-making of principals to join the IPA within the survey sample and for sub-groups of the sample. The use of a simple descriptive survey was appropriate for this study as it seeks to have individuals self-report their feelings and experiences based on their thoughts and perspectives at one given point in time. Mertens (1998) asserts that this methodology has become pervasive in educational and psychological research because of the ability of such instruments to garner data from a broad range of subjects who are reporting results.

In designing the survey, four independent variables have been identified for which participants were be questioned. Five questions are associated with each of the independent variables. Those variables include:

Material Selective Incentives: Material inducements which can be selectively offered to potential members of a group. In the case of the IPA, such selective incentives include publications, workshops and legal representation.

Associative Incentives: Opportunities for fellowship, networking and social gatherings which are linked with membership in the organization.

***District Support and Expectations*:** Incentives which come from the employers of principals including direct financial support for membership and cultural expectations for participations in professional organizations.

***Policy Advocacy*:** The desire of individual principals to support the legislative agenda of the group.

Variables

The study determined how identified independent variables impacted the decision to join the Illinois Principals Association. As a result, dependent variables were limited to the decision to join or not join the IPA as well as the decision to seek greater levels of involvement through committee participation and leadership positions at the state or regional level on the part of some members. Those independent variables which have been identified as a result of a review of literature include inducements offered by the Illinois Principals Association including policy incentives such as lobbying, material incentives such as publications, associative incentives linked with opportunities for fellowship and networking and the desire of individuals to support the policy initiatives of the organization. Information on demographic factors related to the

individual principals and their employment context was also gathered and used for subgroup analysis. Those factors are summarized in Table 1 below.

Table 1

Identified Variables by Type

ORGANIZATIONAL	INDIVIDUAL	EMPLOYMENT
Material Selective Incentives	Degree Status	Grade Level of School
Associative Incentives	Membership in Other Organizations	Location
Policy Incentives	Age	District Expectations and Financial Support for Membership
	Income	Size of District
	Service Time as Principal	

Participants

The subjects of the study were the principals of public elementary, middle and secondary schools which are located within the state of Illinois. The Illinois Principals Association is an organization composed of members from throughout the state of Illinois constituted largely of practitioners in the field of elementary and secondary educational administration. Data provided by the IPA indicated that 2,375 of 4,038 (58.8%) Illinois principals maintained membership in the organization as of the 2012.

The Illinois Principals Association offers its members a range of services and benefits as inducements to potential members. These benefits include: professional support, lobbying at the state level, serving as a liaison to the Illinois State Board of Education, networking, professional growth opportunities and publications. Efforts at promoting the agenda of the association within

the Illinois General Assembly are guided by an active organizational lobbying presence and participation in the Illinois Statewide School Management Alliance. The Alliance provides a forum for the joint dissemination of information and collective lobbying efforts on the part of the state's four educational management associations. Those associations are: the IPA, the Illinois Association of School Administrators (IASA), the Illinois Association of School Business Officials (IASBO), and the Illinois Association of School Boards (IASB). The Illinois Principals Association is divided into 21 separate regions. Such regional divisions are reflective of the regions utilized by the Illinois Association of School Boards and Illinois Association of School Administrators. A range of social and professional activities are hosted by individual regional groups which supplement those activities which are directed from the IPA's central offices in the state's capital, Springfield.

Principals within the state of Illinois must hold valid licensure which requires completion of at least one graduate degree in administration and successful completion of state assessments. The diversity of the state is reflected in the diverse range of communities in which principals in Illinois serve. A survey conducted by the IPA revealed a wide range within the state as to norms around principal compensation and benefits.

Survey Design

The survey included in Appendix A was designed to be the foundation of this qualitative study. The study protocol called for an electronic version of this survey to be sent to all public school principals within Illinois. By surveying principals from regions which are geographically and demographically distinct, analysis can take place as to the manner in which contextual variables impact member decision-making. The use of a simple descriptive survey is

appropriate for this study as it seeks to have individuals self-report their perceptions based upon one given point in time.

Five survey items were developed associated with each of the four independent variables identified above: material selective incentives, associative incentives, district support and expectations and policy advocacy. In addition, analysis took place as to the manner in which various demographic factors may account for a decision-making calculus which is different in a way which is statistically significant.

Those factors which were analyzed included:

- Length of time as principal
- Grade level and characteristics of school and district
- Age and level of education of the principal

Table 1 above provides overview as to all of those variables which will be analyzed through this study.

Research Procedures and Data Analysis

The survey was sent via email to all principals within the state on April 22, 2014. Survey Monkey will be used for this process. A database developed by the Illinois State Board of Education was used to determine the email for all of the state's principals. A copy of this request is included as Appendix B. On April 26, 2014, the request for participation was resent. A final request was sent on May 5, 2014, which informed potential participants that the survey would close on May 12. 2014. A copy of this request is included as Appendix C.

Survey Monkey was used to collect data. Results were exported into statistical program SPSS for purposes of analysis. By surveying all principals, potential issues around sample size and biases around geographic differences were precluded. The total population for

this study was in excess of 4000. Analysis of the data focused on the mean and medium associated with each variable. Standard deviations for each variable will also be calculated. Analysis will take place as to the degree to which differences between means are statistically significant.

Reliability and Validity

A number of steps were taken to promote the reliability and validity of the below instrument. To promote the validity of the study, four clearly defined variables have been identified which are the focus of the survey. For each variable, five different questions have were developed to ensure the ability of the instrument to accurately assess the significance of each factor in the decision-making of principals. Each of these variables reflects a well-defined research base which identifies each variable as significant factors linked to membership in other organizations outside the educational policy arena. The use of a well-established body of literature to develop the theoretical foundation for the survey combined with the design of the instrument promote the content validity of the instrument. Moreover, feedback from a pilot which is described below will be used to establish the presence of face validity.

Several actions were taken to ensure reliability. The instrument was designed using research-supported practices to ensure that participants clearly understand items and that there is a clear and consistent pattern to the presentation of said items. In addition, the survey was piloted by ten administrators who were not a part of the sample to provide feedback as to the design of the survey and the degree to which the prompts were clear and free of any jargon or imprecise language which might detract from the ability of the instrument to reflect the perceptions of the participants. Finally, to ensure that the incentives which were being analyzed were accurately captured in the survey instrument, a factor analysis took place to allow for the

removal of any items would not have the impact of increasing the Cronbach's coefficient for each variable.

Limitations

Among the limitations of the study was the fact that analysis took place only as to a single organization. However, it is hoped that the results of this study can provide a foundation of an analysis of other interest groups active within the educational policy arena. As stated simply and eloquently by Stake (1995), "Case study seems a poor basis for generalization" (p. 7). Thus, the study will yield propositional knowledge, but will not be able to explain member and non-member decision-making for other cases. However, this element of the study will provide important insight as to how the district and culture in which one works may impact the decision-making calculus of individual principals.

Chapter 4: Results and Analysis

Introduction

Research suggests that interest groups play a significant role in the development of public policy in the area of education. An understanding of such groups and their role in the policy environment cannot emerge until research identifies those factors which lead to the decisions of individual members and potential members to affiliate themselves with such groups. This study will identify the relative significance of variables associated with membership on the part of members of one such group—the Illinois Principals Association (IPA). The study will also identify whether disaggregated data reflecting demographic and workplace variables among the sampled principals is linked with different values associated with the identified incentives.

Data from the instrumentation for this study were analyzed for the aggregate group as well as disaggregated groups based upon self-reported data from the participants in the survey. Those groups into which members of the IPA were disaggregated include: involvement in leadership within the organization; membership in professional associations other than the IPA; length of service as a principal; highest grade level of the school at which the subject serves as principal; the amount of graduate study in which the principal has engaged; the age of the subject; the type of community in which the principal serves; the number of administrators in their district; and, the number of schools within their district.

The data was analyzed using the Statistical Package for Social Sciences (SPSS) Version 22 published by IBM. The data for the aggregate population was analyzed using a factor analysis in which cases were suppressed which had an absolute value of $p \leq 0.5$. This analysis also explained the total variance associated with each of the dependent variables. As stated above, this analysis occurred after a prior factor analysis took place for each of the identified

independent variables and items were removed that had the net effect of decreasing the associated Cronbach's alpha.

Data for the disaggregated groups were analyzed using cross tabs to identify frequencies and the chi-square metric. Analysis took place as to whether variance within the subgroups yielded a Person chi-square value which was statistically significant at the level of $p \leq 0.5$. This analysis took place for each of the four identified independent variables for the disaggregated population.

Sample

The sample for this survey consists of responses from 437 principals from the state of Illinois who completed the survey and indicated that they are currently members of the Illinois Principals Association. This sample came from a pool of 692 responses. One-hundred-and-thirteen responses were not included because one or more items in the survey were not completed. Significantly, there was no observable pattern within the responses in terms of the items which were not included. Two additional responses were omitted from the analysis because they responded *No* to the prompt: "Do you consent to participate in this survey given the conditions described in the email?" An additional 140 responses were not included as a result of an indication that they were not a current member of the IPA. Data provided by the Illinois Principals Associated indicated that, during May of 2014, 2370 principals were members of the IPA.

Results

Research Question 1

To what extend do material, associative, policy and district incentives impact the decision of members of the Illinois Principals Association to join the organization?

The data reported in this subsection is a product of an analysis of results of the survey for all participants who indicated that they are currently members of the Illinois Principals Association. To ensure that the incentives which were being analyzed were accurately captured in the survey instrument, a factor analysis first took place to ensure that the removal of any items would not have the impact of increasing the Cronbach coefficient for each variable. As is stated above, five questions were designed for each factor to promote the reliability and validity of the study results. Following this factor analysis, one item was removed for each of three variables: material, associate and district. The policy factor remained unchanged as described below.

Table 2

Inter-Item Correlation Index for Material Incentives

	Scale Mean if Item Deleted	Scale Variance if Item Deleted	Corrected Item-Total Correlation	Squared Multiple Correlation	Cronbach's Alpha if Item Deleted
Material1_12	15.1287	5.407	.134	.055	.528
Material2_17	15.1517	4.558	.349	.296	.386
Material3_18	14.9287	4.223	.498	.345	.283
Material4_24	14.9103	5.179	.151	.077	.525
Material5_25	14.7494	5.271	.269	.101	.445

An initial analysis of data for the material incentives yielded a Cronbach's alpha of .497. As is indicated in Table 2 above, that statistic was increased to .528 with the elimination of item 12. That item stated: "The presence of high quality professional journals impacts my decision to

join a professional association." As a result, this item was eliminated from further analysis of this factor.

Table 3

Inter-Item Correlation Index for Policy Incentives

	Scale Mean if Item Deleted	Scale Variance if Item Deleted	Corrected Item-Total Correlation	Squared Multiple Correlation	Cronbach's Alpha if Item Deleted
Policy1_19	15.4000	5.429	.558	.317	.616
Policy2_22	16.1839	5.892	.375	.162	.701
Policy3_27	15.3862	5.745	.481	.271	.650
Policy4_29	14.9287	6.214	.508	.303	.644
Policy5_31	15.3609	6.462	.421	.179	.675

An initial analysis of data for the policy incentives yielded a Cronbach's alpha of .706. As is indicated in Table 3 above, the elimination of any items in this factor would serve only to lessen that metric. As a result, this factor remained unchanged.

Table 4

Inter-Item Correlation Index for District Incentives

	Scale Mean if Item Deleted	Scale Variance if Item Deleted	Corrected Item-Total Correlation	Squared Multiple Correlation	Cronbach's Alpha if Item Deleted
District1_14	14.2483	7.187	.305	.122	.547
District2_15	13.7747	6.074	.507	.471	.426
District3_21	14.0644	7.116	.358	.134	.519
District4_26	14.2184	8.632	.046	.035	.674
District5_30	13.9471	6.105	.536	.478	.412

An initial analysis of data for the district incentives yielded a Cronbach's alpha of .583. As is indicated in Table 4, that statistic was increased to .674 with the elimination of item 26.

That item stated: "I feel it is an expectation in my district to become active within a professional association." As a result, this item was eliminated from further analysis of this factor.

Table 5

Inter-Item Correlation Index for Associative Incentives

	Scale Mean if Item Deleted	Scale Variance if Item Deleted	Corrected Item-Total Correlation	Squared Multiple Correlation	Cronbach's Alpha if Item Deleted
Associative1_13	13.7264	5.549	.473	.426	.424
Associative2_16	13.8276	5.433	.472	.418	.420
Associative3_20	14.2736	6.517	.167	.047	.599
Associative4_23	13.8874	6.215	.254	.075	.548
Associative5_28	13.5632	6.071	.291	.109	.527

Finally, an initial analysis of data for the associative incentives yielded a Cronbach's alpha of .564. As is indicated in Table 5 above, that statistic was increased to .599 with the elimination of item 20. That item stated: "Whether or not a friend or colleague encourages me to participate impacts my decision to join a professional association." As a result, this item was eliminated from further analysis of this factor.

Following the analysis of individual factors, analysis took place as to the degree to which each of the factors contributed to the decision-making of the aggregate population in joining the Illinois Principals Association. It is important to note that the number 2 after Material, District and Associative references the above-described removal of one item each from the factor.

Table 6

Descriptive Data for Factors

	N	Minimum	Maximum	Mean	Std. Deviation
ComputePolicy	435	1.20	5.00	3.8630	.58851
ComputeMaterial2	435	1.25	5.00	3.7822	.58134
ComputeDistrict2	435	1.00	5.00	3.5546	.73450
ComputeAssociative2	435	1.50	5.00	3.5684	.63822
Valid N (listwise)	435				

Table 6 provides descriptive statistics for each of the variables which is being examined. As is seen above, the means for the items ranged from 3.5546 for District to 3.8630 for Policy while standard deviations ranged from .58134 for Material to .73450 for District.

Table 7

Analysis of Sampling Adequacy

Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy.		.692
Bartlett's Test of Sphericity	Approx. Chi-Square	287.833
	df	6
	Sig.	.000

Table 7 demonstrates that the sample population for the study was adequate in reviewing the Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy. This is important in establishing that reliable and valid conclusions can be drawn from the sample as presented. Table 6 also demonstrates a statistically significant level of sphericity within the sampled data in applying Barlett's test.

Table 8

Component Matrix

	Component
	1
ComputePolicy	.772
ComputeMaterial2	.817
ComputeDistrict2	
ComputeAssociative2	.766

Table 9

Revised Analysis of Sampling Adequacy

	Initial Eigenvalues			Extraction Sums of Squared Loadings		
Component	Total	% of Variance	Cumulative %	Total	% of Variance	Cumulative %
1	2.024	50.596	50.596	2.024	50.596	50.596
2	.916	22.911	73.508			
3	.592	14.806	88.313			
4	.467	11.687	100.000			

Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.

Tables 8 and 9 identify the two foundational findings of this study. First, Table 8 demonstrates the relative importance of each factor in accounting for the decision of members to join the IPA. This data demonstrates that material incentives were the biggest contributor to decision-making with policy and associative incentives following in significance. Importantly, the analysis demonstrates that district incentives do not contribute to the member decision-making in a way that is statistically significant and must be rejected as a contributing incentive. Table 9 demonstrates the relative importance of material incentives to account for over 50% of the decision-making of members. It is important also to note that policy incentives contribute almost 23%. As will be discussed in the analysis of findings below, this is an important finding

in that many past theories have offered material inducements and policy considerations as competing rather than complementary explanations for the decision of potential members to become active in and interest group.

Summary

The above-described data demonstrates that material incentives were the biggest inducement for members to seek affiliation with the Illinois Principals Association. It also demonstrates that policy incentives and associative incentives contributed in descending, but statistically significant ways. Finally, data demonstrates that district incentives did not contribute in a statistically significant manner for the aggregate sample.

Research Question 2

Do disaggregated groups of principals report different levels of significance associated with material, associative, policy and district incentives impacting the decision to join the Illinois Principal Association?

A second series of statistical analysis took place which focused on determining if there were significantly different values associated with individual factors between disaggregated groups of the sampled principals. These groups emerged from a review of literature which identified potential ways in which membership may play different roles for different groups of principals. To engage in this analysis, descriptive data were generated to reflect the responses of each group of principals for each of the four variables. In addition, a Person chi-square test for independence was employed for each identified inducement with each of the disaggregating factors serving as independent variables within the crosstab analysis. Included below is an overview of descriptive and comparative findings for each variable.

Leadership

This study asked principals to identify the degree to which they had engaged in active leadership positions within the organization with the following prompt: "Have you ever served on any regional or statewide committees with the Illinois Principals Association or been active in planning or presenting at any regional or statewide events for the organization?" Fifty-nine subjects responded affirmatively while 376 responded *no*.

Table 10

Leadership Case Summaries

Leadership		ComputePolicy	ComputeMaterial2	ComputeDistrict2	ComputeAssociative2
Leadership	Mean	4.1390	3.9873	3.5763	3.9407
	Median	4.2000	4.0000	3.7500	4.0000
	Minimum	2.60	2.50	1.50	2.50
	Maximum	5.00	5.00	4.75	5.00
	Std. Deviation	.52293	.52198	.72998	.56922
No Leadership	Mean	3.8197	3.7500	3.5512	3.5100
	Median	3.8000	3.7500	3.7500	3.5000
	Minimum	1.20	1.25	1.00	1.50
	Maximum	5.00	5.00	5.00	5.00
	Std. Deviation	.58709	.58424	.73612	.62934
Total	Mean	3.8630	3.7822	3.5546	3.5684
	Median	4.0000	3.7500	3.7500	3.7500
	Minimum	1.20	1.25	1.00	1.50
	Maximum	5.00	5.00	5.00	5.00
	Std. Deviation	.58851	.58134	.73450	.63822

Table 10 provides the mean, median, standard deviation and range for the computed values of each variable disaggregated by the responses to this prompt.

Table 11

Chi-Square Tests for Policy Incentives for Leadership

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	21.878[a]	17	.189
Likelihood Ratio	22.875	17	.153
Linear-by-Linear Association	15.012	1	.000
N of Valid Cases	435		

a. 17 cells (47.2%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .14.

Table 12

Chi-Square Tests for Material Incentives for Leadership

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	15.231[a]	14	.363
Likelihood Ratio	16.428	14	.288
Linear-by-Linear Association	8.496	1	.004
N of Valid Cases	435		

a. 16 cells (53.3%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .14.

Table 13

Chi-Square Tests for District Incentives for Leadership

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	22.305[a]	16	.134
Likelihood Ratio	23.004	16	.114
Linear-by-Linear Association	.059	1	.807
N of Valid Cases	435		

a. 17 cells (50.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .14.

Table 14

Chi-Square Tests for Associative Incentives for Leadership

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	50.435[a]	14	.000
Likelihood Ratio	39.848	14	.000
Linear-by-Linear Association	23.226	1	.000
N of Valid Cases	435		

a. 14 cells (46.7%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .14.

As is demonstrated in Tables 11, 12 and 13 above, the chi-square analysis for policy, material and district incentives did not show statistical significance at the level of $p \leq 0.5$. In contrast, the chi-square analysis for associative incentives demonstrated significance at the level of $p \leq 0.5$. The mean associative value for those within the leadership group was 3.9407 with a standard deviation of .56922 while the same data for those who indicated no past leadership roles was 3.5100 with a standard deviation of .62934. These data demonstrate that the associate incentives played a greater role in accounting for member decision-making for those members who had assumed leadership positions than for those who had not.

Membership in Other Professional Associations

This portion of the study asked principals to identify whether they held membership in other professional organizations with the prompt: "Are you currently a member of any professional associations other than the Illinois Principals Association such as ASCD?" Three hundred and thirty-five subjects responded affirmatively while 100 responded *no*.

Table 15

Memberships Case Summaries

Memberships		ComputePolicy	ComputeMaterial2	ComputeDistrict2	ComputeAssociative2
Yes	Mean	3.8699	3.7649	3.5373	3.5627
	Median	4.0000	3.7500	3.7500	3.5000
	Minimum	1.20	1.25	1.25	1.50
	Maximum	5.00	5.00	5.00	5.00
	Std. Deviation	.60360	.58339	.72881	.63028
No	Mean	3.8400	3.8400	3.6125	3.5875
	Median	3.8000	4.0000	3.7500	3.7500
	Minimum	2.00	2.00	1.00	2.00
	Maximum	5.00	4.75	5.00	5.00
	Std. Deviation	.53711	.57353	.75409	.66702
Total	Mean	3.8630	3.7822	3.5546	3.5684
	Median	4.0000	3.7500	3.7500	3.7500
	Minimum	1.20	1.25	1.00	1.50
	Maximum	5.00	5.00	5.00	5.00
	Std. Deviation	.58851	.58134	.73450	.63822

Table 15 provides the mean, median, standard deviation and range for the computed values of each variable disaggregated by the responses to this prompt.

Table 16

Chi-Square Tests for Policy Incentives for Memberships

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	21.642[a]	17	.199
Likelihood Ratio	24.768	17	.100
Linear-by-Linear Association	.198	1	.656
N of Valid Cases	435		

a. 15 cells (41.7%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .23.

Table 17

Chi-Square Tests for Material Incentives for Memberships

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	17.416[a]	14	.235
Likelihood Ratio	18.237	14	.196
Linear-by-Linear Association	1.284	1	.257
N of Valid Cases	435		

a. 13 cells (43.3%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .23.

Table 18

Chi-Square Tests for District Incentives for Memberships

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	18.906[a]	16	.274
Likelihood Ratio	19.263	16	.255
Linear-by-Linear Association	.807	1	.369
N of Valid Cases	435		

a. 14 cells (41.2%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .23.

Table 19

Chi-Square Tests for Associative Incentives for Memberships

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	12.604[a]	14	.558
Likelihood Ratio	13.736	14	.470
Linear-by-Linear Association	.116	1	.733
N of Valid Cases	435		

a. 12 cells (40.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .23.

As is demonstrated in Tables 16, 17, 18, and 19 above, the chi-square analysis for policy, material, district and associative incentives did not show statistical significance at the level of $p \leq 0.5$. These data demonstrate no statistically significant differences in the relative importance of incentives in accounting for member decision-making for those members who reported membership in other organizations than for those who did not.

Length of Service as Principal

This portion of the study asked principals to identify their length of service as principals with the prompt: "How long have you been a principal?"

Table 20

Length of Service as Principals

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Two or less	72	16.6	16.6	16.6
	Three to six	120	27.6	27.6	44.1
	Seven or more	243	55.9	55.9	100.0
	Total	435	100.0	100.0	

Table 20 provides an overview of responses as to length of service as principals.

Table 21

Length of Service Case Summaries

Years		ComputePolicy	ComputeMaterial2	ComputeDistrict2	ComputeAssociative2
Two or less	Mean	3.7806	3.7118	3.6181	3.4722
	Median	3.8000	3.7500	3.7500	3.5000
	Minimum	2.20	2.25	1.00	1.50
	Maximum	5.00	4.75	4.50	5.00
	Std. Deviation	.53829	.51673	.68430	.68376
Three to six	Mean	3.7600	3.7667	3.6146	3.6146
	Median	3.8000	3.7500	3.7500	3.7500
	Minimum	1.20	1.25	1.00	1.75
	Maximum	5.00	5.00	5.00	5.00
	Std. Deviation	.66842	.62151	.74041	.65296
Seven or more	Mean	3.9383	3.8107	3.5062	3.5741
	Median	4.0000	4.0000	3.7500	3.7500
	Minimum	1.60	2.00	1.25	1.75
	Maximum	5.00	5.00	5.00	5.00
	Std. Deviation	.55086	.57914	.74514	.61630
Total	Mean	3.8630	3.7822	3.5546	3.5684
	Median	4.0000	3.7500	3.7500	3.7500
	Minimum	1.20	1.25	1.00	1.50
	Maximum	5.00	5.00	5.00	5.00
	Std. Deviation	.58851	.58134	.73450	.63822

Table 21 provides the mean, median, standard deviation and range for the computed values of each variable disaggregated by the responses to this prompt.

Table 22

Chi-Square Tests for Policy Incentives for Length of Service

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	35.747[a]	34	.386
Likelihood Ratio	35.809	34	.384
Linear-by-Linear Association	6.841	1	.009
N of Valid Cases	435		

a. 27 cells (50.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .17.

Table 23

Chi-Square Tests for Material Incentives for Length of Service

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	28.685[a]	28	.429
Likelihood Ratio	30.483	28	.340
Linear-by-Linear Association	1.719	1	.190
N of Valid Cases	435		

a. 23 cells (51.1%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .17.

Table 24

Chi-Square Tests for District Incentives for Length of Service

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	35.297[a]	32	.315
Likelihood Ratio	42.133	32	.108
Linear-by-Linear Association	1.996	1	.158
N of Valid Cases	435		

a. 24 cells (47.1%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .17.

Table 25

Chi-Square Tests for Associative Incentives for Length of Service

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	23.653[a]	28	.700
Likelihood Ratio	22.240	28	.770
Linear-by-Linear Association	.683	1	.408
N of Valid Cases	435		

a. 21 cells (46.7%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .17.

As is demonstrated in Tables 22, 23, 24, and 25 above, the chi-square analysis for policy, material, district and associative incentives did not show statistical significance at the level of $p \leq 0.5$. These data demonstrate no statistically significant differences in the relative importance of incentives in accounting for member decision-making based upon the reported length of service as a principal.

Grade Level of School

This study asked principals to identify the grade level of the school in which they served with the prompt: "In what grade levels do you serve as principal?" Subjects were then disaggregated by the highest-grade level of the students they served.

Table 26

Grade Level

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Elementary	209	48.0	48.0	48.0
	Middle	126	29.0	29.0	77.0
	High	100	23.0	23.0	100.0
	Total	435	100.0	100.0	

Responses provided by the sample are provided in Table 26 above.

Table 27

Grade Level Case Summaries

Highest_Grade		ComputePolicy	ComputeMaterial2	ComputeDistrict2	ComputeAssociative2
Elementary	Mean	3.8641	3.7572	3.6089	3.5203
	Median	4.0000	3.7500	3.7500	3.5000
	Minimum	1.60	1.75	1.50	1.50
	Maximum	5.00	5.00	5.00	5.00
	Std. Deviation	.59121	.62448	.70910	.66044
Middle	Mean	3.8603	3.8036	3.4881	3.5734
	Median	4.0000	4.0000	3.7500	3.7500
	Minimum	1.20	1.25	1.25	1.75
	Maximum	5.00	5.00	4.75	5.00
	Std. Deviation	.60254	.56001	.72032	.63802
High	Mean	3.8640	3.8075	3.5250	3.6625
	Median	4.0000	4.0000	3.7500	3.7500
	Minimum	2.20	2.25	1.00	2.00
	Maximum	5.00	5.00	4.75	5.00
	Std. Deviation	.57058	.51352	.80049	.58428
Total	Mean	3.8630	3.7822	3.5546	3.5684
	Median	4.0000	3.7500	3.7500	3.7500
	Minimum	1.20	1.25	1.00	1.50
	Maximum	5.00	5.00	5.00	5.00
	Std. Deviation	.58851	.58134	.73450	.63822

Table 27 provides the mean, median, standard deviation and range for the computed values of each variable disaggregated by the responses to this prompt.

Table 28

Chi-Square Tests for Policy Incentives for Highest Grade Level

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	19.050[a]	34	.982
Likelihood Ratio	19.975	34	.973
Linear-by-Linear Association	.000	1	.989
N of Valid Cases	435		

a. 27 cells (50.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .23.

Table 29

Chi-Square Tests for Material Incentives for Highest Grade Level

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	28.763[a]	28	.425
Likelihood Ratio	32.777	28	.244
Linear-by-Linear Association	.632	1	.427
N of Valid Cases	435		

a. 22 cells (48.9%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .23.

Table 30

Chi-Square Tests for District Incentives for Highest Grade Level

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	21.507[a]	32	.920
Likelihood Ratio	22.875	32	.882
Linear-by-Linear Association	1.345	1	.246
N of Valid Cases	435		

a. 23 cells (45.1%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .23.

Table 31

Chi-Square Tests for Associative Incentives for Highest Grade Level

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	32.835[a]	28	.242
Likelihood Ratio	35.577	28	.154
Linear-by-Linear Association	3.299	1	.069
N of Valid Cases	435		

a. 20 cells (44.4%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .23.

As is demonstrated in Tables 28, 29, 30, and 31 above, the chi-square analysis for policy, material, district and associative incentives did not show statistical significance at the level of $p \leq 0.5$. These data demonstrate no statistically significant differences in the relative importance of incentives in accounting for member decision-making based upon the reported highest-grade level of the school in which the principals served.

Level of Education

This portion of the study asked principals to identify the level of education they had completed with the prompt: "Please indicate the highest degree status you have attained." Two hundred and fifty-two indicated *masters* while 177 answered *pursuing doctoral work* and an additional 106 of respondents indicated *doctorate (PhD or EdD) completed*.

Table 32

Level of Education Case Summaries

Degree		ComputePolicy	ComputeMaterial2	ComputeDistrict2	ComputeAssociative2
Masters	Mean	3.8698	3.7917	3.6151	3.5923
	Median	4.0000	3.7500	3.7500	3.7500
	Minimum	1.60	2.00	1.00	1.75
	Maximum	5.00	5.00	5.00	5.00
	Std. Deviation	.57175	.53952	.69978	.60761
Some doctoral work	Mean	3.8349	3.7877	3.5119	3.5694
	Median	4.0000	4.0000	3.7500	3.7500
	Minimum	1.20	1.25	1.50	1.50
	Maximum	4.80	5.00	5.00	5.00
	Std. Deviation	.62537	.65960	.73271	.68457
Doctorate completed	Mean	3.8947	3.7281	3.3816	3.4605
	Median	4.0000	3.7500	3.5000	3.5000
	Minimum	2.40	1.75	1.00	2.00
	Maximum	5.00	4.75	4.75	5.00
	Std. Deviation	.58567	.58302	.85840	.66445
Total	Mean	3.8630	3.7822	3.5546	3.5684
	Median	4.0000	3.7500	3.7500	3.7500
	Minimum	1.20	1.25	1.00	1.50
	Maximum	5.00	5.00	5.00	5.00
	Std. Deviation	.58851	.58134	.73450	.63822

Table 32 provides the mean, median, standard deviation and range for the computed values of each disaggregated variable.

Table 33

Chi-Square Tests for Policy Incentives for Level of Education

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	23.324[a]	34	.916
Likelihood Ratio	25.429	34	.855
Linear-by-Linear Association	.000	1	.992
N of Valid Cases	435		

a. 27 cells (50.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .13.

Table 34

Chi-Square Tests for Material Incentives for Level of Education

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	32.398[a]	28	.259
Likelihood Ratio	31.736	28	.285
Linear-by-Linear Association	.400	1	.527
N of Valid Cases	435		

a. 24 cells (53.3%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .13.

Table 35

Chi-Square Tests for District Incentives for Level of Education

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	33.057[a]	32	.415
Likelihood Ratio	30.950	32	.520
Linear-by-Linear Association	5.272	1	.022
N of Valid Cases	435		

a. 25 cells (49.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .13.

Table 36

Chi-Square Tests for Associative Incentives for Level of Education

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	25.710[a]	28	.589
Likelihood Ratio	25.696	28	.590
Linear-by-Linear Association	1.639	1	.200
N of Valid Cases	435		

a. 22 cells (48.9%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .13.

As is demonstrated in Tables 33, 34, 35, and 36 above, the chi-square analysis for policy, material, district and associative incentives did not show statistical significance at the level of $p \leq 0.5$. These data demonstrate no statistically significant differences in the relative importance of incentives in accounting for member decision-making based upon their reported level of graduate study.

Age

This portion of the study asked principals to identify their age with the prompt: "Please indicate your current age." One hundred and seventy-six indicated *43 or under* while 152 answered *44 - 52* and an additional 107 of respondents indicated *53 or above*.

Table 37

Age Case Summaries

Age		ComputePolicy	ComputeMaterial2	ComputeDistrict2	ComputeAssociative2
43 or under	Mean	3.8307	3.7884	3.6335	3.5852
	Median	3.8000	3.7500	3.7500	3.7500
	Minimum	2.00	2.00	1.00	1.50
	Maximum	5.00	5.00	4.75	5.00
	Std. Deviation	.55154	.53681	.69070	.67600
44-52	Mean	3.8474	3.7681	3.5526	3.5148
	Median	4.0000	4.0000	3.7500	3.6250
	Minimum	1.20	1.25	1.00	1.75
	Maximum	5.00	5.00	5.00	5.00
	Std. Deviation	.66621	.65616	.77451	.63248
53 or above	Mean	3.9383	3.7921	3.4276	3.6168
	Median	4.0000	3.7500	3.5000	3.7500
	Minimum	2.60	2.50	1.25	1.75
	Maximum	5.00	5.00	4.75	4.75
	Std. Deviation	.52515	.54241	.73492	.58005
Total	Mean	3.8630	3.7822	3.5546	3.5684
	Median	4.0000	3.7500	3.7500	3.7500
	Minimum	1.20	1.25	1.00	1.50
	Maximum	5.00	5.00	5.00	5.00
	Std. Deviation	.58851	.58134	.73450	.63822

Table 37 provides the mean, median, standard deviation and range for the computed values of each variable disaggregated by the responses to this prompt.

Table 38

Chi-Square Tests for Policy Incentives for Age

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	35.467[a]	34	.399
Likelihood Ratio	38.270	34	.282
Linear-by-Linear Association	2.005	1	.157
N of Valid Cases	435		

a. 26 cells (48.1%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .25.

Table 39

Chi-Square Tests for Material Incentives for Age

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	24.911[a]	28	.633
Likelihood Ratio	31.567	28	.292
Linear-by-Linear Association	.000	1	.998
N of Valid Cases	435		

a. 22 cells (48.9%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .25.

Table 40

Chi-Square Tests for District Incentives for Age

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	42.201[a]	32	.107
Likelihood Ratio	45.032	32	.063
Linear-by-Linear Association	5.146	1	.023
N of Valid Cases	435		

a. 22 cells (43.1%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .25.

Table 41

Chi-Square Tests for Associative Incentives for Age

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	23.705[a]	28	.697
Likelihood Ratio	27.811	28	.475
Linear-by-Linear Association	.044	1	.833
N of Valid Cases	435		

a. 19 cells (42.2%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .25.

As is demonstrated in Tables 38, 39, 40, and 41 above, the chi-square analysis for policy, material, district and associative incentives did not show statistical significance at the level of $p \leq 0.5$. These data demonstrate no statistically significant differences in the relative importance of incentives in accounting for member decision-making based upon the reported age of the principals.

Community Type

This portion of the study asked principals to identify the socio-economic nature of the community in which they work with the prompt: "Please pick the term which best describes the community in which your school is located." One hundred and sixty indicated *rural* while 237 answered *suburban* and an additional 38 of respondents indicated *urban*.

Table 42

Community Case Summaries

Community_Type		ComputePolicy	ComputeMaterial2	ComputeDistrict2	ComputeAssociative2
Rural	Mean	3.9050	3.9594	3.6031	3.7453
	Median	4.0000	4.0000	3.7500	3.7500
	Minimum	2.20	2.25	1.00	2.00
	Maximum	5.00	5.00	5.00	5.00
	Std. Deviation	.52074	.47325	.73298	.57767
Suburban	Mean	3.8734	3.7046	3.5591	3.4968
	Median	4.0000	3.7500	3.7500	3.5000
	Minimum	1.20	1.25	1.25	1.50
	Maximum	5.00	5.00	4.75	5.00
	Std. Deviation	.58615	.60611	.70312	.65073
Urban	Mean	3.6211	3.5197	3.3224	3.2697
	Median	3.8000	3.5000	3.6250	3.5000
	Minimum	1.60	2.00	1.00	2.00
	Maximum	5.00	5.00	4.75	4.25
	Std. Deviation	.79836	.64300	.89463	.61891
Total	Mean	3.8630	3.7822	3.5546	3.5684
	Median	4.0000	3.7500	3.7500	3.7500
	Minimum	1.20	1.25	1.00	1.50
	Maximum	5.00	5.00	5.00	5.00
	Std. Deviation	.58851	.58134	.73450	.63822

Table 42 provides the mean, median, standard deviation and range for the computed values of each variable.

Table 43

Chi-Square Tests for Policy Incentives for Community Type

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	44.510[a]	34	.107
Likelihood Ratio	34.430	34	.447
Linear-by-Linear Association	4.465	1	.035
N of Valid Cases	435		

a. 32 cells (59.3%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .09.

Table 44

Chi-Square Tests for Material Incentives for Community Type

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	51.698[a]	28	.004
Likelihood Ratio	59.631	28	.000
Linear-by-Linear Association	26.534	1	.000
N of Valid Cases	435		

a. 24 cells (53.3%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .09.

Table 45

Chi-Square Tests for District Incentives for Type

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	33.545[a]	32	.392
Likelihood Ratio	36.145	32	.281
Linear-by-Linear Association	3.114	1	.078
N of Valid Cases	435		

a. 26 cells (51.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .09.

Table 46

Chi-Square Tests for Associative Incentives for Type

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	46.072[a]	28	.017
Likelihood Ratio	52.032	28	.004
Linear-by-Linear Association	23.573	1	.000
N of Valid Cases	435		

a. 23 cells (51.1%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .09.

As is demonstrated in Tables 43 and 45 above, the chi-square analysis for policy and district incentives did not show statistical significance at the level of $p \leq 0.5$. In contrast, the chi-square analysis for material and associative incentives demonstrated significance at the level of $p \leq 0.5$. A review of the case summaries found in Table 42 indicates that material and associative incentives played a greater role for rural principals than for their peers. In contrast, these inducements played a lesser role for urban principals than for their rural or suburban counterparts.

Number of Administrators in District

This portion of the study asked principals to identify the number of administrators in their districts with the prompt: "How many administrators are there within your district."

Table 47

Number of Administrators in District

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	1-10	223	51.3	51.3	51.3
	11-20	94	21.6	21.6	72.9
	21-40	53	12.2	12.2	85.1
	More than 40	65	14.9	14.9	100.0
	Total	435	100.0	100.0	

The distribution of responses is included below in Table 47 and evidences a majority of principals working in districts in which there are ten or fewer administrators.

Table 48

Number of Administrators in District Case Summaries

Administrators_In_District		ComputePolicy	ComputeMaterial2	ComputeDistrict2	ComputeAssociative2
1-10	Mean	3.8646	3.8587	3.5471	3.6603
	Median	4.0000	4.0000	3.7500	3.7500
	Minimum	1.20	1.25	1.00	1.75
	Maximum	5.00	5.00	5.00	5.00
	Std. Deviation	.56581	.56969	.69589	.58155
11-20	Mean	3.9362	3.7527	3.6170	3.5000
	Median	4.0000	3.7500	3.7500	3.5000
	Minimum	2.00	2.00	1.25	1.75
	Maximum	5.00	5.00	5.00	5.00
	Std. Deviation	.58528	.60519	.72836	.63922
21-40	Mean	3.8189	3.7217	3.5189	3.5330
	Median	4.0000	3.7500	3.7500	3.5000
	Minimum	1.60	2.25	1.75	2.00
	Maximum	4.60	4.75	4.75	4.75
	Std. Deviation	.63762	.57316	.71193	.64681
More than 40	Mean	3.7877	3.6115	3.5192	3.3808
	Median	3.8000	3.7500	3.7500	3.5000
	Minimum	2.40	2.00	1.00	1.50
	Maximum	5.00	5.00	4.75	5.00
	Std. Deviation	.62837	.55907	.88753	.76305
Total	Mean	3.8630	3.7822	3.5546	3.5684
	Median	4.0000	3.7500	3.7500	3.7500
	Minimum	1.20	1.25	1.00	1.50
	Maximum	5.00	5.00	5.00	5.00
	Std. Deviation	.58851	.58134	.73450	.63822

Table 48 provides the mean, median, standard deviation and range for the computed values of each variable disaggregated by the responses to this prompt.

Table 49

Chi-Square Tests for Policy Incentives for Number of Administrators

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	54.350[a]	51	.348
Likelihood Ratio	53.490	51	.379
Linear-by-Linear Association	.845	1	.358
N of Valid Cases	435		

a. 45 cells (62.5%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .12.

Table 50

Chi-Square Tests for Material Incentives for Number of Administrators

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	42.637[a]	42	.444
Likelihood Ratio	44.269	42	.376
Linear-by-Linear Association	10.022	1	.002
N of Valid Cases	435		

a. 35 cells (58.3%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .12.

Table 51

Chi-Square Tests for District Incentives for Number of Administrators

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	42.469[a]	48	.698
Likelihood Ratio	42.874	48	.682
Linear-by-Linear Association	.081	1	.776
N of Valid Cases	435		

a. 40 cells (58.8%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .12.

Table 52

Chi-Square Tests for Associative Incentives for Number of Administrators

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	55.815[a]	42	.075
Likelihood Ratio	51.180	42	.157
Linear-by-Linear Association	10.086	1	.001
N of Valid Cases	435		

a. 33 cells (55.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .12.

As is demonstrated in Tables 49, 50, 51, and 52 above, the chi-square analysis for policy, material, district and associative incentives did not show statistical significance at the level of $p \leq 0.5$. These data demonstrate no statistically significant differences in the relative importance of incentives in accounting for member decision-making based upon the number of administrators in the district.

Number of Schools in District

This portion of the study asked principals to identify the number of administrators in their districts with the prompt: “How many schools are there within your district?”

Table 53

Number of Schools in District

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	1	38	8.7	8.7	8.7
	2-10	294	67.6	67.6	76.3
	11-24	56	12.9	12.9	89.2
	25 or more	47	10.8	10.8	100.0
	Total	435	100.0	100.0	

The distribution of responses is included above in Table 53 with a clear majority reporting being in districts of between two and ten schools.

Table 54

Number of Schools Case Summaries

Schools_In_District		ComputePolicy	ComputeMaterial2	ComputeDistrict2	ComputeAssociative2
1	Mean	3.7789	3.8224	3.3487	3.7368
	Median	3.8000	3.7500	3.5000	4.0000
	Minimum	2.60	2.75	1.00	2.50
	Maximum	5.00	4.50	4.50	4.50
	Std. Deviation	.56910	.47898	.78744	.51644
2-10	Mean	3.9041	3.8401	3.5901	3.5944
	Median	4.0000	4.0000	3.7500	3.7500
	Minimum	1.20	1.25	1.25	1.75
	Maximum	5.00	5.00	5.00	5.00
	Std. Deviation	.55538	.56486	.70677	.60697
11-24	Mean	3.8179	3.5848	3.5714	3.4107
	Median	4.0000	3.7500	3.6250	3.2500
	Minimum	1.60	2.25	2.00	2.00
	Maximum	4.80	5.00	4.75	5.00
	Std. Deviation	.70353	.67129	.62106	.72837
25 or more	Mean	3.7277	3.6223	3.4787	3.4574
	Median	3.6000	3.7500	3.7500	3.5000
	Minimum	2.40	2.00	1.00	1.50
	Maximum	5.00	5.00	4.75	5.00
	Std. Deviation	.64258	.58018	.94815	.75958
Total	Mean	3.8630	3.7822	3.5546	3.5684
	Median	4.0000	3.7500	3.7500	3.7500
	Minimum	1.20	1.25	1.00	1.50
	Maximum	5.00	5.00	5.00	5.00
	Std. Deviation	.58851	.58134	.73450	.63822

Table 54 provides the mean, median, standard deviation and range for the computed values of each variable disaggregated by the responses to this prompt.

Table 55

Chi-Square Tests for Policy Incentives for Schools in District

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	64.121[a]	51	.103
Likelihood Ratio	56.950	51	.263
Linear-by-Linear Association	1.657	1	.198
N of Valid Cases	435		

a. 49 cells (68.1%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .09.

Table 56

Chi-Square Tests for Material Incentives for Number of Schools

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	57.569[a]	42	.055
Likelihood Ratio	54.601	42	.092
Linear-by-Linear Association	8.906	1	.003
N of Valid Cases	435		

a. 39 cells (65.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .09.

Table 57

Chi-Square Tests for District Incentives for Number of Schools

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	38.590[a]	48	.832
Likelihood Ratio	38.819	48	.825
Linear-by-Linear Association	.020	1	.889
N of Valid Cases	435		

a. 45 cells (66.2%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .09.

Table 58

Chi-Square Tests for Associative Incentives for Number of Schools

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	70.081[a]	42	.004
Likelihood Ratio	68.271	42	.006
Linear-by-Linear Association	6.385	1	.012
N of Valid Cases	435		

a. 37 cells (61.7%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .09.

As is demonstrated in Tables 55, 56, and 57 above, the chi-square analysis for policy, material and district incentives did not show statistical significance at the level of $p \leq 0.5$. In contrast, the chi-square analysis for associative incentives demonstrated significance at the level of $p \leq 0.5$ as seen in Table 58. As is seen in Table 54 above, the mean associative value for those reporting being from one-school districts was 3.7368 with a standard deviation of .51644 while the same data for all other groups was smaller in terms of both mean value with a larger standard deviation. This data demonstrates that the associative incentives accounting for member decision-making played a different role depending on the number of school within the district of the surveyed principals.

Summary

Analysis of the degree to which different incentives impacted the decision-making of disaggregated groups of the respondents yielded statistically significant results in four areas. First, there was a statistically significant difference in the role that associative incentives played between those principals who had and had not indicated service in leadership positions within the organization. Data demonstrates that associative incentives were more important to those

involved within the leadership of the organization. Second, analysis of data which disaggregated the reported type of community in which the principals served demonstrated statistically significant differences for both associative and material incentives. Data evidences decreasing levels of importance to principals representing, in order, rural, suburban and urban schools for associative and material incentives. Finally, data evidenced statistically different importance of associative incentives for principals depending upon the number of schools in their districts. Those principals coming from one-school districts placed a higher level of value on associative incentives than their peers in districts of two-10 schools, 11 – 24 schools or 25 or more schools.

Chapter 5: Conclusions, Observations, and Recommendations

Introduction

This chapter offers a review of major findings associated with this research project and draws conclusions as to what these findings mean when placed within the broader literature that served as the theoretical framework for the study. Finally, the chapter offers insight as to further research which emerges following a review of these conclusions.

Summary of the Study

Research suggests that interest groups play a significant role in the development of public policy in the area of education. An understanding of such groups and their role in the policy environment cannot emerge until research identifies those factors which lead to the decisions of individual members and potential members to affiliate themselves with such groups. This study was undertaken to identify the relative significance of variables associated with membership on the part of members of one such group—the Illinois Principals Association (IPA). The study also sought to identify whether disaggregated data reflecting demographic and workplace variables among the sampled principals is linked with different values associated with the identified incentives. The study was designed to answer two research questions: (1) *To what extend do material, associative, policy and district incentives impact the decision of members of the Illinois Principals Association to join the organization?* and (2) *Do disaggregated groups of principals report different levels of significance associated with material, associative, policy and district incentives impacting the decision to join the Illinois Principals Association?*

The study employed a survey to determine what factors account for the decision of those who sought membership in the Illinois Principals Association. In designing the survey, four independent variables were identified including material selective incentives, associative

incentives, district support and expectations and policy advocacy. In addition, members of the sample were surveyed as to demographic factors to facilitate analysis as to whether such factors accounted for a decision-making calculus which was different in a way which was statistically significant. Those factors that were analyzed include: length of time as principal; grade level and characteristics of school and district; and, age and level of education of the principal. The sample for the survey consists of responses from 437 principals from the state of Illinois who completed the survey and indicated that they are currently members of the Illinois Principals Association.

Conclusions and Discussion

This section is organized by an analysis of each of the two research questions embedded in the study. A conclusion for each research question is offered based upon data presented in Chapter 4. A discussion regarding the conclusions associated with each research question is also offered.

Research Question 1

To what extend do material, associative, policy and district incentives impact the decision of members of the Illinois Principals Association to join the organization?

The analysis of data presented in Chapter 4 demonstrates that material incentives were the biggest contributor to decision-making with policy and associative incentives following in significance. Importantly, the analysis demonstrates that district incentives do not contribute to member decision-making in a way that is statistically significant and must be rejected as a contributing incentive. In evaluating the relative significance of each of the statistically significant factors in accounting for the decision of members of the sample to join the Illinois

Principals Association, material incentives account for over 50% while policy incentives contribute almost 23%.

The above findings clearly support the work of Olson (1965) in evidencing the primacy of material incentives in motivating potential members to join the Illinois Principals Association. It is apparent that material inducements offered by the IPA such as publications and access to legal advice contribute significantly to the decision of members to join. While it is beyond the scope of this study to offer insight as to the relative significance of any particular benefit, it is apparent the organization benefits from offering such tangible incentives to members. Given the importance of such inducements, it becomes essential for the organization to continue to offer material selective incentives which meet the needs of members. It would be errant to assume that the specific nature of those products which members seek are fixed. Parallel to McFarland's (1984) findings of the need for leaders in Common Cause to monitor the policy preferences of their members, it becomes imperative for leaders in IPA and other organizations in which selective incentives are important to monitor what incentives will best meet member needs and promote their initial and continued membership.

Among the most interesting findings of this study is the significant role that policy incentives played in the decision-making calculus of IPA members. As was highlighted in Chapter 2, the past sixty-five years of scholarship in the area of interest group membership has been essentially a series of refutations of the simple notion that individuals are motivated to join groups active in a policy environment by the policy goals of the organization. McFarland's (1984) work on Common Cause is unique in that it offers a highly specific example of an organization wherein the policy goals of members are foundational in the maintenance of the organization. The findings of this study evidence not only that such policy considerations are

important to members of this group, but also that material and policy incentives can serve as complementary rather than competing inducements for potential members. This finding has tremendous implications for the organization. It appears the investment the group makes in areas such as lobbing and policy advocacy are essential to the maintenance of the organization. Moreover, this finding underscores the importance of maintaining an accurate understanding as to the policy priorities of its membership. IPA works to accomplish this task through a committee structure. The maintenance of such forums for feedback from members and exploration of other potential means to assess the policy priorities of members becomes incumbent upon the organization given this finding.

This study is limited by the fact that the survey which is its foundation is a snapshot of principal feedback at one given time. Given the variability of the policy environment, there is no assurance that such policy incentives might not play relatively different roles in the decision-making of potential members at another time. Given the presence of ongoing pension reform litigation and the implementation of a dramatically new assessment system at the time of the study, it would be imperative to engage in additional research at other times to place these findings into a larger perspective. Given that literature from political science has established the cyclical nature of policy environments, it is difficult to generalize these findings beyond the time of the study

This study also supports the notion that associative incentives play a role in the decision-making of principals. As will be seen below, this finding is most interesting when placed within the context of disaggregated findings which support the notion that such opportunities for fellowship and networking are of different importance to principals who work in different

environments. As a result, the aggregate data may not evidence the true importance of such incentives for individual principals and groups thereof.

Finally, the study found that the district in which the principal worked did not play any statistically significant role in determining the decision of members to join IPA. This is an important finding in highlighting the individual nature of these decisions. Cultural expectations of the employing district of a principal were not shown to significantly impact the decision to join. Perhaps the most interesting implication of this finding is the notion that the subjects of the study were acting as individuals when joining the organization. Rather than following organizational expectations, there was a conscious decision on the part of the subjects to become active in IPA. This has important implications on the need for the organization to appeal to potential members as individuals—rather than as members of districts .

Research Question 2

Do disaggregated groups of principals report different levels of significance associated with material, associative, policy and district incentives impacting the decision to join the Illinois Principal Association?

As was stated above, analyses of the degree to which different incentives impacted the decision-making of disaggregated groups of the respondents yielded statistically significant results in four areas for this study. First, there was a statistically significant difference in the role that associative incentives played between those principals who had and had not indicated service in leadership positions within the organization. Data demonstrates that associative incentives were more important to those involved within the leadership of the organization. Second, analysis of data which disaggregated the reported type of community in which the principals served demonstrated statistically significant differences for both associative and

material incentives. Data evidenced decreasing levels of importance to principals representing, in order, rural, suburban and urban schools for associative and material incentives. Finally, data evidenced a statistically different value for associative incentives depending upon the number of schools in their districts. Those principals coming from one-school districts placed a higher level of value on associative incentives than their peers in districts of two-10 schools, 11 – 24 schools or 25 or more schools.

While each of these findings is interesting and merits additional consideration, it is important to first note the relatively small number of areas for which there were statistically different values associated with individual incentives between disaggregated groups of the surveyed principals. A total of thirty-six analyses took place to assess the degree to which the four identified independent variables played significant roles in the decision-making of nine disaggregated groupings of the participant principals. The fact that there were no statistically significant differences in thirty-two of those instances evidences a high level of consistency in the decision-making calculus of the aggregate principal population. Of particular note is the lack of differences which personal characteristics had on their assessment of the relative significance of individual incentives. Groups disaggregated by highest degree earned, length of time in service as a principal, membership in other organizations and age yielded no statistically significant differences. This suggests a level of homogeneity in those who serve as principals which extends across demographic groupings. Much of this same continuity was found when disaggregating principals by variables which reflected the context of the district in which they were employed including: highest grade level of their school and number of administrators in the district. Finally, it must be noted that there were no groups that yielded significant differences with regard to policy. This speaks again to the significance of this incentive across

disaggregated groups and throughout the sample of principals. It highlights the foundational importance of political activities in attracting and retaining members for the Illinois Principals Association.

In reviewing instances in which there were statistically significant differences within subgroups, a number of important conclusions can be drawn. First, there were statistically significant differences for material incentives based upon the type of community wherein the principal served. Material incentives played a greater role for rural principals than for their peers. In contrast, these inducements played a lesser role for urban principals than for their rural or suburban counterparts. In discussing this finding, it is important to note two potential sources of these differences which would merit exploration in later studies. One conclusion which could be drawn is that there is a difference in the value place on material incentives whereby they are valued by rural principals more than their suburban peers but less than urban principals. An alternative explanation would be that the specific inducements offered might have been less appealing to urban principals than their peers. For example, publications might not speak to the needs of urban principals in the same way as their suburban and rural counterparts. If such was the case, then the less significance that urban principals placed on such inducements might be more of a reflection on the specific tangible benefits made available by the IPA rather than the importance of material incentives themselves. The same questions emerges in reviewing the greater importance of such incentives for rural principals. These questions are beyond the scope of this study but merit additional consideration.

Among the foundational findings of this study is the greater variability in the role that associative incentives play between groups of principals than any of the other inducements. The above analysis demonstrates that variable importance of associative incentives within the

following disaggregated groups of principals: principals who had assumed leadership roles in the organization valued such incentives more than those who did not; principals valued such incentives more when in single-school districts and less when in districts with 11 or more schools; and, principals valued associative incentives when disaggregated by the community type of their school in ascending order of urban, suburban and rural principals. Each of these findings merits individual comment.

As was referenced in Chapter 2, Sabatier (1992) found that leaders within organizations pursuing public policy objectives tend to have a greater investment in the political activity of the organization. In looking at the results of this research, that is not the case for the Illinois Principals Association. The fact that leaders tend to value associative opportunities more than their peers infers that such opportunities are among the primary motivations for principals to seek greater levels of involvement within the organization. As such, leadership positions provide forums for additional networking and relationship building. This has important implications for the executive leadership of the organization in terms of meeting the needs of those most active within the organization. It also provides a potential cautionary note that the perceptions of those most active in the organization may not reflect the true value for associative incentives of the larger membership.

The finding that principals valued associative incentives inversely with the number of schools in their district is not surprising. Larger organizations have opportunities for principals to interact with their colleagues on an ongoing basis. In many instances, shared-problem solving, fellowship and networking are built into the administrative structure and culture of such districts. Opportunities for such interaction are much more limited in smaller districts—most prominently those constituting a single school. As such, principals utilize their professional

associations as a resource in filling the void which is a product of the smaller size of their district. It would be errant to conclude that principals in larger schools value such opportunities less as it may just be a case of those needs being supported within the context of their employing organization.

Many of those same conclusions as to the role that associative incentives play for principals when coming from districts with differing numbers of schools can be drawn in reviewing data around the differing significance of associative incentives for principals from rural, suburban and urban district. It is not hard to recognize that principals have different opportunities to interact with peers in the more densely populated communities in which urban principals serve. Conversely, the larger nature of attendance boundaries in many rural districts likely precludes leaders in these communities from interacting with peers absent opportunities for networking and fellowship like those created by the IPA and their regional organizations. Among the subjects meriting additional review is analysis of the degree to which regional activities in different types of communities differ to meet the needs of principals working in different environments.

Recommendations

The above findings support further scholarly research in four areas. First, this is a case study of one organization and, as a result, the findings are not generalizable beyond the Illinois Principals Association. If the foundation goal of understanding those organizations active in the educational policy cycle is to be met, similar analyses will have to take place for other actors within this environment. Second, this study took place during a period of significant policy discussion and activity in the area of education within the state of Illinois. The design of this study precludes analysis from taking place as to the manner in which the policy environment

impacted the responses of the sample. This literature would benefit from an additional survey being administered at a later date to compare results or some form of a longitudinal analysis of the IPA being conducted to identify changes in the relative important of incentives over time for members.

Third, it was beyond the scope of this study to differentiate between the value members place on certain incentives as opposed to their valuation of the quality of incentives being offered by the IPA in this area. By engaging in case studies at the level of the individual principal, future researchers would better be able to analyze this issue. For example, respondents who identified material incentives as a less important factor in their decision to join might have been responding more to their perceptions on the quality of those publications of the organization than the value they place on such incentives. Additional research would be required to answer this question.

Finally, this study has important implications for the ability of organizations like the Illinois Principals Association to attract and retain members. Such organizations routinely attempt to identify the needs of members through internally develop surveys or the use of outside companies which specialize in such work. However, such work typically employs descriptive statistics. The opportunity for organizations to develop surveys based upon a clear theoretical framework and utilize inferential statistics in analyzing data has the potential to reshape the ability of such groups to understand the needs and preferences of their members and subgroups therein.

Implications for Practice

In addition to the recommendations for further study, this research has important implications for practitioners. Foundational to the significance of this study is the importance of the policy process in shaping contemporary education. At the root of the position of

superintendent is the role of serving as chief executive officer of a governmental body. To do so most effectively, superintendents must have the knowledge and skills to impact their organization not only internally, but also to be active and effective participants in the larger policy process that ultimately shapes their district in a number of vital ways. This study can provide educators with a better understanding on how to promote the viability of organizations which seek to advocate for the interests of schools within the larger policy environment. It is also recommended that universities and graduate schools of education begin to consider engaging superintendent candidates in coursework and dissertations which will more fully involve them in the policy making process. It is only though such preparations that the future leaders of schools will have a role in shaping educational policy at the state and national levels.

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Appendix A

Survey

Identifying Variables Leading to Membership in Professional Associations

You are being asked to participate in a survey about why Illinois Principals choose to join professional organizations such as the Illinois Principals Association. You have been asked to participate because you are a principal in the state of Illinois. Your participation in this survey is voluntary. Your decision whether or not to participate will not affect your current or future relationship with the researcher.

1. **Do you consent to participate in this survey given the conditions described in the email?**
    a. Yes
    b. No

Kindly identify the appropriate response to each of the following prompts. Please remember that your responses are kept confidential. Thank you.

2. Are you currently a member of the Illinois Principals Association?

a. Yes
b. No

3. Have you ever served on any regional or statewide committees with the Illinois Principals Association or been active in planning or presenting at any regional or statewide events for the organization?

a. Yes
b. No

4. Are you currently a member of any professional ssociations other than the Illinois Principals Association such as ASCD?

a. Yes
b. No

5. How long have you been a principal?

a. Two years or less
b. Three years to six years
c. Seven or more years

6. In what grade level(s) of school do you currently serve as a principal? Please indicate all that apply.

a. Elementary (Early childhood to fifth grade)
b. Junior High (Grades six through eight)
c. Senior High School (Grades nine through twelve)

7. Please indicate the highest degree status that you have attained.

a. Masters Degree
b. Pursuing doctoral work
c. Doctorate (PhD or EdD) completed

8. Please indicate your current age

a. 43 or under
b. 44 – 52
c. 53 – 61
d. 62 or over

9. Please pick the term which best describes the community in which your school is located.

a. Rural
b. Suburban
c. Urban

10. How many administrators are there within your district?

a. 1 – 10
b. 11 – 20
c. 21 - 40
d. More than 40

11. How many schools are there within your district?

a. 1
b. 2 - 10
c. 11 - 24
d. 25 or more

In the following section, please indicate the relative importance of each factor in your decision to join a professional association such as the Illinois Principals Association.

12. The presence of high quality professional journals impacts my decision to join a professional association.

(1) Strongly Disagree
(2) Disagree
(3) Neither Disagree or Agree
(4) Agree
(5) Strongly Agree

13. The availability of regional opportunities for fellowship and networking impacts my decision to join a professional association.

(1) Strongly Disagree
(2) Disagree
(3) Neither Disagree or Agree
(4) Agree
(5) Strongly Agree

14. The cost associated with membership impacts my decision to join a professional association.

(1) Strongly Disagree
(2) Disagree
(3) Neither Disagree or Agree
(4) Agree
(5) Strongly Agree

15. The degree to which my employer financially subsidizes my membership impacts my decision to join a professional association.

(1) Strongly Disagree
(2) Disagree
(3) Neither Disagree or Agree
(4) Agree
(5) Strongly Agree

16. The availability for statewide opportunities for fellowship and networking impacts my decision to join a professional association.

(1) Strongly Disagree
(2) Disagree
(3) Neither Disagree or Agree
(4) Agree
(5) Strongly Agree

17. The opportunity to attend an annual conference which offers a range of presentations related to my responsibilities impacts my decision to join a professional association.

(1) Strongly Disagree
(2) Disagree
(3) Neither Disagree or Agree
(4) Agree
(5) Strongly Agree

18. The opportunity to attend subject specific workshops on individual topics such as building a master schedule or implementing the Common Core in Mathematics impacts my decision to join a professional association.

(1) Strongly Disagree
(2) Disagree
(3) Neither Disagree or Agree
(4) Agree
(5) Strongly Agree

19. The ability of a group to represent the professional interests of principals in Illinois impacts my decision to join a professional association.

(1) Strongly Disagree
(2) Disagree
(3) Neither Disagree or Agree
(4) Agree
(5) Strongly Agree

20. Whether or not a friend or colleague encourages me to participate impacts my decision to join a professional association.

(1) Strongly Disagree
(2) Disagree
(3) Neither Disagree or Agree
(4) Agree
(5) Strongly Agree

21. Whether or not my superintendent or another administrator at my district office encourages me to participate impacts my decision to join a professional association.

(1) Strongly Disagree
(2) Disagree
(3) Neither Disagree or Agree
(4) Agree
(5) Strongly Agree

22. The degree to which the political activity of the group represents my personal political beliefs impacts my decision to join a professional association.

(1) Strongly Disagree
(2) Disagree
(3) Neither Disagree or Agree
(4) Agree
(5) Strongly Agree

23. The potential that membership may promote my career advancement impacts my decision to join a professional association.

(1) Strongly Disagree
(2) Disagree
(3) Neither Disagree or Agree
(4) Agree
(5) Strongly Agree

24. The opportunity for legal representation as part of membership impacts my decision to join a professional association.

(1) Strongly Disagree
(2) Disagree
(3) Neither Disagree or Agree
(4) Agree
(5) Strongly Agree

25. It is important to me that a professional association develops publications which focus on issues in educational administration unique to Illinois.

(1) Strongly Disagree
(2) Disagree
(3) Neither Disagree or Agree
(4) Agree
(5) Strongly Agree

26. I feel that it is an expectation in my district to become involved with a professional association.

(1) Strongly Disagree
(2) Disagree
(3) Neither Disagree or Agree
(4) Agree
(5) Strongly Agree

27. The current pension crisis in Illinois makes it more important for me to become a part of organizations which are advocating for educators in the state of Illinois.

(1) Strongly Disagree
(2) Disagree
(3) Neither Disagree or Agree
(4) Agree
(5) Strongly Agree

28. I use principals with whom I interact as part of my professional associations as sounding boards and sources of knowledge for the many issues I address on a daily basis as a principal.

(1) Strongly Disagree
(2) Disagree
(3) Neither Disagree or Agree
(4) Agree
(5) Strongly Agree

29. It is important for me that there is a voice in Springfield advocating for the needs of principals and the schools they serve.

(1) Strongly Disagree
(2) Disagree
(3) Neither Disagree or Agree
(4) Agree
(5) Strongly Agree

30. The amount of money my district will pay toward membership impacts my decision

and ability to join a professional association.

(1) Strongly Disagree
(2) Disagree
(3) Neither Disagree or Agree
(4) Agree
(5) Strongly Agree

31. I am more likely to join professional groups which I think are highly effective in impacting public policy in education.

(1) Strongly Disagree
(2) Disagree
(3) Neither Disagree or Agree
(4) Agree
(5) Strongly Agree

Appendix B

Request for Participation dated April 22, 2014

From: Pete Sullivan
Sent: Saturday, April 26, 2014 9:55 AM
To: Pete Sullivan **Cc:** rbarwa@stfrancis.edu
Subject: Request for Participation in Doctoral Research Survey

Good morning,

You are being asked to be a participant in a survey about why principals choose to join the professional organizations such as the Illinois Principals Association conducted by Peter Sullivan who is a graduate student at the University of St. Francis. The survey consists of 31 items and will take approximately 10 minutes to complete. You have been asked to participate in the research because you are a principal in the state of Illinois. We ask that you read this form and ask any questions you may have before agreeing to be in the survey. Your participation in this survey is voluntary. Your decision whether or not to participate will not affect your current or future relations with the researcher.

Why is this research being done?
This survey is part of research which attempts to explain what motivates principals to join or not join organizations such as the Illinois Principals Association. It is hoped that this research will help explain what allows some organizations to form and influence public policy.

What is the purpose of this research?
There are a variety of alternative explanations for why people join groups such as professional associations. The purpose of this research is to explain which of these alternative theories best explains why people join this one organization.

What procedures are involved?
If you agree to participate in this survey, we would ask you to simply click the link to the survey which can be found near the bottom of this page. This survey is being sent to every public school elementary and high school principal in the state of Illinois.

What are the potential risks and discomforts?
There are no identified risks associated with participation with this survey.

Are there benefits to taking part in the research?
This study will provide a better understanding of what motivates people to join professional associations in education. Since research shows that these groups are important to the development of policy in education, this research can potentially help us to better understand the policy process. There is no financial benefit which accrues to potential participants in this survey.

What about privacy and confidentiality?
Survey participants do not disclose their identity. No information about you or provided by you during the research will be disclosed. When the results of the research are published or discussed in conferences, no information will be included that would reveal your identity.

Whom should I contact if I have questions?

The student conducting this study is Peter Sullivan. If you have questions, you may contact the researcher at: psullivan@lisle202.org. The faculty advisor for this research is Robert Barwa. Dr. Barwa may be contacted at RBarwa@stfrancis.edu.

Remember: Your participation in this research is voluntary. Your decision whether or not to participate will not affect your current or future relations with the University of St. Francis. If you decide to participate, you are free to withdraw at any time without affecting that relationship.

If interested in participating in this survey, please click on the following link: https://www.surveymonkey.com/s/FSJNF95.

Sincerely,

Peter M. Sullivan

Principal
Lisle Senior High School
1800 Short Street
Lisle, Illinois 60532
(630)493-8301

Appendix C

Request for Participation dated May 5, 2014

From: Pete Sullivan
Sent: Monday, May 05, 2014 11:24 AM
To: Pete Sullivan
Subject: Final Request for Participation in Doctoral Research Survey

Good morning,

You previously received a request to participate in a survey on what motivates principals in Illinois to become involved in professional associations. I would like to thank those of you who have taken time to participate. For those of you who have not yet done so, I would ask that you please consider taking a few moments to complete this survey. As a principal myself, I know firsthand how many demands are present for your time—particularly in May. At the same time, I hope you would be willing to take just a couple of moments to help with this important work. If you are willing to participate, you can simply click on the following link which will take you to the survey or cut and paste this address to your web browser: https://www.surveymonkey.com/s/FSJNF95. I will conclude collecting survey data on Monday, May 12th at noon.

I have included below the information I previously send related to this study. Again, I thank you very much for your time. I hope the end of the year is a good one for each of you and your students.

Pete Sullivan

You are being asked to be a participant in a survey about why principals choose to join the professional organizations such as the Illinois Principals Association conducted by Peter Sullivan who is a graduate student at the University of St. Francis. The survey consists of 31 items and will take approximately 10 minutes to complete. You have been asked to participate in the research because you are a principal in the state of Illinois. We ask that you read this form and ask any questions you may have before agreeing to be in the survey. Your participation in this survey is voluntary. Your decision whether or not to participate will not affect your current or future relations with the researcher.

Why is this research being done?
This survey is part of research which attempts to explain what motivates principals to join or not join organizations such as the Illinois Principals Association. It is hoped that this research will help explain what allows some organizations to form and influence public policy.

What is the purpose of this research?
There are a variety of alternative explanations for why people join groups such as professional associations. The purpose of this research is to explain which of these alternative theories best explains why people join this one organization.

What procedures are involved?
If you agree to participate in this survey, we would ask you to simply click the link to the survey which can be found near the bottom of this page. This survey is being sent to every public school elementary and high school principal in the state of Illinois.

What are the potential risks and discomforts?
There are no identified risks associated with participation with this survey.

Are there benefits to taking part in the research?
This study will provide a better understanding of what motivates people to join professional associations in education. Since research shows that these groups are important to the development of policy in education, this research can potentially help us to better understand the policy process. There is no financial benefit which accrues to potential participants in this survey.

What about privacy and confidentiality?
Survey participants do not disclose their identity. No information about you or provided by you during the research will be disclosed. When the results of the research are published or discussed in conferences, no information will be included that would reveal your identity.

Whom should I contact if I have questions?
The student conducting this study is Peter Sullivan. If you have questions, you may contact the researcher at: psullivan@lisle202.org. The faculty advisor for this research is Robert Barwa. Dr. Barwa may be contacted at RBarwa@stfrancis.edu.

Remember: Your participation in this research is voluntary. Your decision whether or not to participate will not affect your current or future relations with the University of St. Francis. If you decide to participate, you are free to withdraw at any time without affecting that relationship.

If interested in participating in this survey, please click on the following link: https://www.surveymonkey.com/s/FSJNF95.

Sincerely,

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