
REGIONAL EDUCATIONAL LABORATORY

SOUTHEAST ~ SERVECenter

EVIDENCE BASED EDUCATION REQUEST DESK

OUR GOAL

To assist educators and policymakers in their efforts to apply the evidence base to decisions about policies, programs, and practices they encounter.



REQUEST:

School Effectiveness Accountability

The state's Race to the Top (RTT) application requires changes to the state's evaluation/accountability system. It requires a teacher effectiveness measure, district effectiveness measure, leader effectiveness measure. Regarding the teacher effectiveness measure, RTT requires linking the data of individual students to individual teachers as part of teacher evaluation (value added modeling). This SEA anticipates a future discussion about this issue and the policy alternative of substituting an accountability measure/pay for performance/merit pay evaluation plan at the school level instead of at the teacher level.

- Please provide information on which of the 50 states may currently have or have had in the past, a school level pay for performance/merit pay evaluation/accountability program. Please identify the states and provide information on what the program involved and/or its implementation, including any relevant URL links to further detail.
- Please provide any information that may be available via published data, reports, or research literature on the results of such plans--their effect on student achievement, and educators' or the public's or experts' opinions about it.



RESPONSE

A nationwide scan of states' policies regarding performance-based pay for teachers identified a total of two current state-level programs that provide financial rewards to teachers based on school-level measures of student achievement (Arizona, Arkansas), one current program that no longer provides financial rewards but is otherwise similar (North Carolina), and one program that was recently discontinued (Alaska terminated a pilot program that failed to win teacher support, in part because targets for receiving bonuses were perceived as being unobtainable by many schools and because of opposition to bonuses being based solely on test scores.) Also included here is South Dakota's INCENTIVESplus program, which features both school performance-based awards to all principals and instructional staff in eligible schools, and awards for principals and teachers based on their individual performance. Three other state-level programs that provided financial rewards to teachers based on school-level measures of student achievement that began and ended in the 1990s are also listed (Georgia, Kentucky, and Texas).

It appears that only one state program, North Carolina's ABCs of Public Education, has received rigorous study. Researchers have concluded that the program enjoys broad public support, including among teachers; that bonuses may have led to an improvement in test scores, but may also have led to increased staff turnover in low-performing schools due to teachers departing for higher performing schools; and that the program has not led to a narrowing of the curriculum at the expense of low-stakes and non-tested subjects.

The following table provides a summary of state-level performance-based pay systems. Reviews or results of the programs are provided where available. REL staff extracted most of the following information from the National Center on Performance Incentives website (http://www.performanceincentives.org), an IES-funded research center at Vanderbilt University. Staff also consulted the Center for Educator Compensation Reform's website (http://www.cecr.ed.gov), a project sponsored by the US Department of Education. Information from The Education Commission of the States website (http://www.ecs.org) and various state departments of education websites were included in the search as well. Staff also searched the EducationIndex database of scholarly education research journals through the UNCG library, using the search terms "performance pay" AND "research", "performance pay" AND "research" AND "group", and "performance pay" AND "study".



¹ Other state programs that financially reward schools for student achievement but do not specify that the reward be used, at least in part, on teacher bonuses, were not included. See, for example, the Alabama Torchbearer Schools Program (http://alex.state.al.us/leadership/torch1.html) and Connecticut's Vanguard Schools Initiative (http://www.ctserc.org/vanguard/about.shtml). In addition, programs like Texas's Governor's Educator Excellence Grant (GEEG) and Texas Educator Excellence Grant (TEEG), which make awards to schools based on school-level data, but then allow the schools to provide bonuses to only selected teachers, were not included (see http://www.performanceincentives.org/state-by-state-resources/texas-state-initiatives/index.aspx). Also, district-run programs that reward teachers for school-level performance were not included here.

State	Performance Pay Program	Results
AK	Alaska School Performance Incentive Program (recently terminated program) "House Bill 13 established the Alaska School Performance Incentive	The Alaska School Performance Incentive Program was not renewed at the end of the three-year pilot period. From 2006 to 2009 the program awarded over \$3.2 million to approximately 80 schools. http://www.eed.state.ak.us/spip/
	Program as a pilot program for school years 2006-09. The bill authorizes payouts for up to 850 certificated employees each year as well as for the support staff in their schools. Funded for up to \$5.8 million annually, the program financially rewards all of the staff in a school whose students significantly improve in reading, writing and math compared with the same students' performance the previous year. Teachers, administrators and district central office staff members can receive up to \$5,500, and support staff can receive up to \$2,500." http://www.performanceincentives.org/state-by-state-resources/alaska-state-initiatives/index.aspx http://www.eed.state.ak.us/spip/PerformanceIncentiveProgramFactSheet.pdf http://mb2.ecs.org/reports/Report.aspx?id=1266	The press release announcing the final year's results concluded that, while the incentive program "sought to avoid mistakes made elsewhere the program fell short in a number of ways. The department did not win significant support for the program, particularly from teachers. The targets for achieving bonuses were high; they were too challenging for many schools, even those showing growth, to achieve. Some educators did not believe the bonuses should be based exclusively on students' assessment scores." The press release also concluded that "[t]he department did learn valuable information about schools by piloting the incentive program. The program's methodology for comparing students' performance from one year to the next provides clear information about the academic growth of students on an individual and schoolwide basis. School districts and the department can readily see how many students improved, remained static, or lost ground in each school. This information will continue to help the department evaluate whether schools are chronically underperforming and need assistance in improving student achievement." http://www.eed.state.ak.us/news/releases/2009/PIP_2009.pdf
		2006-2007 Results http://www.eed.state.ak.us/news/releases/2007/Perf_Incentive_07.pdf http://www.eed.state.ak.us/spip/2007/07AKSPIPStatewideSummaryPowerPt.pdf 2007-2008 Results http://www.eed.state.ak.us/AYP/2008/news_release_performance_incentive2008.pdf http://www.eed.state.ak.us/AYP/2008/08_AKSPIPAllSlides.pdf 2008-2009 Results http://www.eed.state.ak.us/news/releases/2009/PIP_2009.pdf http://www.eed.state.ak.us/spip/2009/09_AKSPIPAllSlides.pdf



Classroom Site Fund "Because CSF is implemented in many ways, there is no statewide evaluation of program; rather, the state of Arizona finance division and the Auditor General each district to report on its CSF expenditures and provide a summary of the reducation bill that included funding for districts to implement performance-based pay for teachers statewide. The state provided districts substantial flexibility in deciding how to define performance-based compensation for teachers. A 2002 survey found that most districts rewarded teachers for district-, school-, or grade-level performance. Although few districts based awards solely on individual performance, several districts gave rewards for both individual and group performance. Each school district governing board must vote on and adopt its plan at a public meeting." (http://www.cecr.ed.gov/initiatives/maps/pdfs/CECR_AZ.pdf) "Because CSF is implemented in many ways, there is no statewide evaluation of program; rather, the state of Arizona finance division and the Auditor General each district to report on its CSF expenditures and provide a summary of the CSF, with teacher salary increases ranging from \$924 to \$8,203." (http://www.cecr.ed.gov/initiatives/maps/pdfs/CECR_AZ.pdf) "This appendix provides alphabetically organized one-page information sheets individual school districts. Each page contains a summary of the district's report results using Proposition 301 monies, and its classroom and nonclassroom sper [starts on page a-5] (http://www.auditorgen.state.az.us/Reports/School_Districts/Statewide/2008_FCLSR_AZ.pdf) Classroom_Dollars_FY07_w_Districts.pdf)
"The compensation system must incorporate seven specific performance measurement elements such as measures of academic progress, dropout or graduation rates, and attendance rates. The plans must also include the input of teachers and administrators, an appeals process for teachers who have been denied performance-based compensation, regular evaluation for effectiveness, teacher development programs, and approval of the system based on an affirmative vote of at least 70 percent of the teachers eligible to participate in the system. However, districts may revise these elements as long as the compensation system is adopted at a public meeting." (http://www.auditorgen.state.az.us/Reports/School Districts/Statewide/20 08 February/Classroom Dollars FY07 w Districts.pdf) Related Links http://www.performanceincentives.org/state-by-state-resources/arizona-state-initiatives/index.aspx http://www.ade.az.gov/schoolfinance/FAQs/CSF/CSF.asp http://mb2.ecs.org/reports/Report.aspx?id=1267
http://mb2.ecs.org/reports/Report.aspx?id=1267



State	Performance Pay Program	Results
AR	Arkansas Comprehensive Testing and Accountability Program for Schools	(No evaluation or research found.)
	"The Arkansas Comprehensive Testing and Accountability Program evaluates school performance by measuring annual achievement levels and growth of students' performance on state assessments. High achieving and improving schools are eligible to receive awards including recognition and performance-based funding. The intent of cash awards to schools is to advance student learning through the purchase of additional materials and supplies, better technology, and bonuses for school staff." (http://www.performanceincentives.org/state-by-state-resources/arkansasstate-initiatives/index.aspx)	
	Related Links	
	http://arkansased.org/testing/actaap.html http://mb2.ecs.org/reports/Report.aspx?id=1269	
GA	Georgia Pay for Performance program (1993-2004) Georgia's voluntary school-based pay for performance program gave rewards to schools based on their creating and achieving improvement plan goals. Criteria were student achievement, educational programming, parent engagement, and resource development. Schools achieving improvement goals received awards of \$2,000 per certified staff member. Certified personnel determined whether award money was spent for salary bonuses or school improvement. (http://ritter.tea.state.tx.us/research/pdfs/incentives.pdf & http://www.cecr.ed.gov/guides/summaries/GeorgiaCaseSummary.pdf)	(The Center for Educator Compensation Reform published a case study of the program in 2008; see http://www.cecr.ed.gov/guides/summaries/GeorgiaCaseSummary.pdf)
	Related Links	
	http://www.cecr.ed.gov/guides/summaries/GeorgiaCaseSummary.pdf	



State	Performance Pay Program	Results
KY	Kentucky Instructional Results Information System (KIRIS) (1992-1998) "Kentucky. As part of a court-ordered reform of the education system in 1990, the Kentucky accountability program provided rewards to schools for improving student performance and sanctions for schools with declining performance. Assessment indicators were based on a school's annual scores in seven academic subjects in Grades 4-5, 7-8, and 11-12, as well as attendance, retention, and dropout figures. Academic achievement was assessed through a combination of standardized and nonstandardized instruments such as portfolios. The state target was for each school to increase its scores by 10% over its baseline score in 1991-1992 in a 2-year cycle. Reward schools—those exceeding this goal—received a pool of funds based on the degree to which the school exceeded its goals. The vast majority of schools (98%) used the awards for teacher bonuses. The maximum bonus per teacher in reward schools was about \$3,690 in the first cycle, reduced to \$2,600 in the second cycle, and \$1,100 in 1998. Although government funding for the program actually increased slightly over this period to a maximum of \$27,235,000, the number of qualifying reward schools doubled, thus decreasing the size of the bonuses (Kentucky Department of Education, 1999)" [From: Raham, H. (2000). Cooperative Performance Incentive Plans. Peabody Journal of Education, 75(4), pp. 144-145.*] Related Links http://www.rand.org/pubs/monograph_reports/2007/MR792.pdf	From Teacher Motivation: "Significantly positive coefficients were obtained for the effect of the bonus on goal commitment suggesting the positive role bonuses can play in increased teacher understanding of and commitment to the goals [Teachers'] perceptions of the bonuses: * Teachers felt it was appropriate to receive bonuses and that receiving a bonus was deserved. * The teachers varied in how meaningful the size of the bonus they could receive actually was, especially after deductions for taxes. * The teachers varied in how much the possibility of earning a bonus motivated them to improve student achievement, or whether an even larger bonus would motivate them more. * Teachers were skeptical that earned bonuses would actually be paid, due to past experiences with actual reneging on bonus payments or beliefs that the funding for the bonuses would not be continued. * Teachers varied as to whether they wanted the bonus part of the School Based Performance Awards (SBPA) program to continue. * The meaning of the bonus varied, with teachers variously viewing it as an appropriate "thank you," a formal recognition, reimbursement for personal expenditures on school-related items, a reward that allowed for the purchase of desired goods, or that it was simply irrelevant. * Teachersfound that having to decide among themselves how to divide up the bonus money among teachers and staff was a divisive process that created tension within and between schools. * Awards paid as salary bonuses appeared to have more visibility than awards paid as school improvement funds. (Kelley et al., 1999, pp. 18-19) In Kentuckyresearchers concluded it provided teachers with a focus for their work, increased the energy devoted to instruction, and helped channel teachers' work to the most important goals of the system (Fuhrman, 1999)." (From: Raham, H. (2000). Cooperative Performance Incentive Plans. Peabody Journal of Education, 75(4), p.150).



State	Performance Pay Program	Results
	(KY continued)	Student Achievement: "Almost a decade into its ambitious reforms, Kentucky is showing achievement gains. The percentage of elementary students scoring at the proficient level rose from 8% in 1993 to 38% in 1997 (Palmaffy, 1998, p. 30). Reading results on the 1998 national assessments (NAEP) show Kentucky's students are raising their achievement faster than most other states. Placing 2 points below the national average in 1992, Kentucky is now 4 points above, despite having higher than average poverty levels and lower adult education levels (Hoff, 1999). Still, further research must be done to establish a clear relation between and student achievement and [cooperative performance incentive] plans." [From: Raham, H. (2000). Cooperative Performance Incentive Plans. <i>Peabody Journal of Education</i> , 75(4), p.153.*]

^{*}Also see: Kelley, C., Conley, S., & Kimball, S. (2000). Payment for Results: Effects of the Kentucky and Maryland Group-Based Performance Award Programs. *Peabody Journal of Education*, 75(4), 159-199.



State	Performance Pay Program	Results
NC	"The ABCs of Public Education "The ABCs of Public Education, which took effect in 1996-97, is North Carolina's comprehensive plan to improve public schools in the state. It focuses on strong accountability (with an emphasis on high standards), teaching the basics, and local control. Its elements include performance growth standards, school incentive awards, recognition, and assistance for schools falling below standards or requesting help. The ABCs accountability program sets growth and performance standards for each elementary, middle, and high school in the state. End-of-Grade (EOG) and End-of-Course (EOC) test results and other selected components are used to measure a school's growth and performance. Certified staff members working in schools that exceed their expected growth standards can receive incentive awards of \$1,500 from the state. Certified staff in schools meeting their expected growth standards receive \$750. Other staff in these schools receive lower amounts." (http://www.performanceincentives.org/state-by-state-resources/north-carolina-state-initiatives/index.aspx) Note: The program is still in existence, and still provides public recognition to qualifying schools, but since 2008 no longer provides the monetary incentives. Related Links http://mb2.ecs.org/reports/Report.aspx?id=1130 http://abcs.ncpublicschools.org/abcs/	The North Carolina ABCs performance incentive program was recently evaluated by Douglas Lee Lauen, PhD, at The University of North Carolina-Chapel Hill. Results indicate some improvement in student achievement: "The study finds evidence consistent with the hypothesis that educators in North Carolina respond to incentives to increase test score gains in reading and math. Those students in schools that just missed the bonus threshold in 2007 have higher test score gains in 2008. This suggests that educators expend additional effort and may implement new practices in response to the failure to receive a bonus. [The author] find suggestive, but not conclusive, evidence that math gains are primarily driven by low and average achieving students. Contrary to expectations, reading gains are disproportionately driven by students with the highest within-school achievement. This suggests that either schools targeted high achieving students with reading interventions, which is unlikely, or that schools used whole-school interventions that had positive effects on high achievers and no effects on low achievers. This finding deserves future research into its generalizability across different time periods and investigation of the mechanisms through which this differential effect was produced. [The author] finds no evidence of a narrowing of the curriculum at the expense of science. This is in contradiction to theory and prior research on a 'narrowing of the curriculum' at the expense of low-stakes and non-tested subjects. The fact that the policy is focused on test score gains, rather than levels, however, raises questions about whether incentive effects on test score levels should be expected. That North Carolina's bonus policy had no effect on test score levels may be viewed as a shortcoming of the policy if absolute, rather than relative, levels of performance are also of interest." (http://www.sree.org/conferences/2011/program/downloads/abstracts/110.pdf) Note: At the Society for Research on Educational Effectiveness S



State	Performance Pay Program	Results
	(NC continued)	The National Center on Performance Incentives produced a report on the teacher salary bonus programs in NC. The following is an excerpt from the conclusions section:
		"North Carolina's accountability bonus program is the nation's largest, and perhaps the longest-running, initiative to reward teachers for producing gains in student test scores. Repeated tinkering with the incentive system also reflects a willingness to address concerns as they are raised. It is also clear, however, that certain aspects of the bonus program are statistically perplexing, threaten to place disadvantaged schools at a further disadvantage, or weaken the program's potential incentive effect.
		The bonus program has always based rewards on the performance of a school, rather than an individual teacher. There are clear tradeoffs between the strength of incentives faced by any individual teacher, and the relative importance of luck or political maneuvering relative to effort in determining rewards. Further research is necessary to quantify these tradeoffs, and indeed to determine whether the flaws are sufficient to warrant abandoning efforts to incentivize teachers
		There is at least some evidence that the bonus program has led to an improvement in test scores, though the evidence in this article should be considered less than definitive. Math proficiency rates have increased both on the high-stakes test used to determine bonus eligibility and on the lower-stakes NAEP exam. Reading proficiency rates have improved only on the state's own examination. The regression discontinuity analysis of failure to receive a bonus suggests that schools do implement changes that lead to improvements following a negative outcome.
		Hopes that the bonus program would help ameliorate racial or socioeconomic differences in achievement have not been realized, quite possibly because teachers have reacted to the uneven playing field by departing disadvantaged schools in increased numbers
		What lessons does the North Carolina experience offer to other states, districts, or individual schools seeking to incentivize teacher effort? Above all else, the results discussed here suggest that incentive programs, when adopted in an effort to raise the performance of disadvantaged students, can be a two-edged sword. If teachers perceive



State	Performance Pay Program	Results
	(NC continued)	bonus programs as yet another factor making jobs in advantaged schools more attractive, increased turnover rates in low-performing schools are a predictable consequence. This unintended side effect could be avoided so long as teachers perceive the bonus program as a fair reward for their effort, rather than a reward for student background or other inputs over which they have no direct control Finally, given the political controversy surrounding the use of performance bonuses in public schools, it should be noted that the accountability bonus program enjoys broad support in North Carolina. The state does not have a teachers' union with collective bargaining power, which undoubtedly eased the path toward implementing the bonus program, but there is a professional association of teachers, the North Carolina Association of Educators, which engages in policy advocacy on a number of fronts. In its published agenda for the 2007/08 legislative session, there is no opposition to the bonus program. In fact, the NCAE explicitly advocates maintaining the bonus program, and expanding it to certain state-run schools that do not currently participate. While there is some evidence of effectiveness in spite of its flaws, it is the sheer popularity of the bonus program that provides the most heartening evidence to jurisdictions contemplating similar initiatives" [emphasis added]. (http://www.performanceincentives.org/data/files/directory/ConferencePapersNews/Vig dor1.pdf)



State	Performance Pay Program	Results
	"South Dakota INCENTIVESplus is a financial incentive system that targets educators in high-need schools in mainly rural areas. The system includes professional development and financial incentives to principals and instructional staff based on gains in student achievement. OVERVIEW South Dakota INCENTIVESplus is funded by a five-year \$20 million grant from the U.S. Department of Education. Forty-two Title I elementary and secondary schools in 10 South Dakota school districts currently participate in the INCENTIVESplus project. The program was started during the 2007-08 school year. South Dakota INCENTIVESplus links performance and teacher pay, offering incentives to schools and individuals that are able to improve student performance. Money from the INCENTIVESplus project is distributed via a three-tier approach to participating schools and educators. - The first tier will be school-based, with all principals and instructional staff in the eligible schools receiving awards based on student achievement at the school level. Award amounts range from \$750 to \$4,000. - The second tier provides individual awards to principals and teachers based on factors such as effective individual performance, individual leadership roles and responsibilities, and classroom increases in student achievement. Award amounts range from \$350 to \$1,000. - The third tier is based on recruitment and signing incentives for teachers in hard-to-fill positions within participating schools. Award amount is up to \$5,000 per teacher."	"An outside evaluator will implement a mixed-method evaluation by collecting, analyzing and interpreting qualitative and quantitative data. The evaluation will be designed to measure the impact of the incentive system and to evaluate its implementation." (http://doe.sd.gov/secretary/incentives_plus.asp) (No evaluation or research found.)




State	Performance Pay Program	Results
	http://doe.sd.gov/secretary/incentives_plus.asp	
	Related Links	
	http://doe.sd.gov/secretary/documents/IncentivesPLUS_brochure.pdf	
TX	Texas Successful Schools Awards System (1992-2001)	Student Achievement:
		"A direct relation to student achievement levels is much harder to establish,
	"In 1993, the Texas Education Agency (TEA) began rating schools	because plans are rarely introduced in isolation and often accompany
	on test scores and other factors in an accountability system combining	a range of new policy initiatives, fiscal interventions, and curricular changes
	deregulation for schools with high expectations for students of all races	
	and income levels. The Texas Successful Schools Awards System has	Eight years of annual assessment and school-based rewards and sanctions in Texas
	been an integral component of this policy direction, with \$2.5 million state	have produced steadily rising achievement gains. In 1994, barely half of Texas students
	funding annually allocated for these cash awards. In 1998, 13.5% of Texas	passed the TAAS math exam. In 1998 that figure had risen to 80%, and the number of
	schools earned awards in the Exemplary, Recognized, or Acceptable	Black and Hispanic children who passed the test doubled to 64% and 72%, respectively.
	categories.	The number of schools receiving the Exemplary award rose from 67 in 1994 to 683 in
		1998 (Palmaffy, 1998, p. 29)" (From: Raham, H. (2000). Cooperative Performance
	The yardstick for the TEA ratings is the Texas Assessment of Academic	Incentive Plans. Peabody Journal of Education, 75(4), 151-152.*)
	Skills (TAAS), a series of annual tests in reading and math for Grades 3 to	
	8 and Grade 10. Unlike the Kentucky system, Texas schools are not	"State policymakers recognized three fundamental problems with the Successful
	rewarded simply for making progress each year, but must reach a set of	Schools Award Program. First, the criteria for awards were complicated and not
	absolute benchmarks to improve their standing. The percentage of	understood by many teachers and school administrators. Second, the monetary awards
	students passing each of the tests, the dropout rate, attendance, an average	were too small to stimulate change in the behavior of teachers, schools, and districts.
	growth indicator, and a significant gain factor are considered. Since the	Lastly, there was a significant delay between the performance of schools and districts
	ranking system was created in 1993, the thresholds have been raised	and award distribution.
	annually for each category. In 1998, to qualify as Exemplary, schools	
	must score in the top quartile of the state on TAAS, have a dropout rate of	A formal evaluation of the Successful Schools Awards Program recognized these
	1% or less, have an attendance rate of at least 94%, and at least 90% of all	limitations and suggested ways to improve state performance pay programs (Texas
	students must pass all tests. In 2000, an Acceptable rating will require a	Education Agency, 1998). The Texas Education Agency determined that awards from
	school to have 50% (rather than 40% in 1998) of its students pass all	Successful Schools Awards should be in the form of salary supplements for all
	TAAS exams. Students with limited English proficiency or special	professional staff and sufficiently large to be meaningful to recipients. The evaluation
	education needs may be exempted from TAAS, but no other allowances	recommended that eligibility criteria be transparent and fixed for awards to serve as
	are made for a school's socioeconomic or demographic circumstances as	incentives, and that performance awards be based on multiple indicators. A longitudinal
	part of the state drive to raise standards for all students (Palmaffy, 1998).	measure of improvement in student achievement—a "value-added" measure—was



State	Performance Pay Program	Results
		suggested to better recognize the success of schools serving large populations of
	The cash awards to qualifying schools are calculated by enrollment,	disadvantaged students."
	with the average award in 1998 being \$2,430. The award must be used	(http://ritter.tea.state.tx.us/opge/progeval/TeacherIncentive/TEEG_120108.pdf)
	primarily for the purposes of the enhancement of academics and cannot be	
	a substitute for any regular funds. Campus committees make the decisions	
	about the manner in which the performance bonuses are used. At the other	
	end of the scale, schools designated as Low Performing receive sanctions,	
	assistance, and close monitoring. If improvements do not occur, these	
	schools may be reconstituted." [From: Raham, H. (2000). Cooperative	
	Performance Incentive Plans. <i>Peabody Journal of Education</i> , 75(4), 142-	
	158.]	
	Related Links	
	http://ritter.tea.state.tx.us/opge/progeval/TeacherIncentive/TEEG_120108.	
	<u>pdf</u>	
	http://ritter.tea.state.tx.us/reports/incentives.pdf	

^{*}Also see: Kelley, C., Conley, S., & Kimball, S. (2000). Payment for Results: Effects of the Kentucky and Maryland Group-Based Performance Award Programs. *Peabody Journal of Education*, 75(4), 159-199.







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