

Abstract Title Page
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Title: The Policy Choices of Effective Principals

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Abstract Body

Background / Context:

A vast literature has investigated the efficacy of school leadership. Most of the extant research has been based on teacher perceptions of school leadership, rather than on more direct measures of student performance.¹ A detailed review of the literature on principals through the mid-1990s is provided by Hallinger and Heck (1998). Within the last couple of years, however, researchers have begun to exploit longitudinal data on student test scores to evaluate the impact of principals on student achievement and how that impact varies with the characteristics of principals.

Beteille, Kalogrides, and Loeb (2009), using data from the Miami-Dade school district, relate principal value-added (measured as school value added during a principal's tenure) to teacher mobility and changes in teacher productivity. They find that high-value-added principals are better able to retain high-quality teachers and remove relatively low-quality teachers. Branch, Hanushek and Rivkin (2009), using data from Texas, study both the mobility patterns of principals and the effect of principals on student achievement. They find that, as for teacher labor markets, principals tend to gravitate toward schools with high achieving students and relatively lower proportions of minority students and students in poverty. Also, consistent with recent work on teachers (Hannaway, et al. (2009)), they find greater variation in principal effectiveness in high-poverty schools. Student achievement is positively related to the tenure of a principal at a school and principals who stay in a school tend to be more effective than those who switch schools. Their estimates of principal effectiveness are generated from achievement models with and without school effects, however in all cases they exclude teacher effects. Thus, like the work of Beteille, Kalogrides, and Loeb, their measures of teacher effectiveness include the average quality of teachers at a school during a given principal's tenure.

Coelli and Green (2010) examine the impact of high school principals on graduation probabilities and 12th-grade English exam scores in British Columbia, Canada. When principal quality is assumed to be time invariant, there is no significant effect of principals on graduation rates or test scores. However, if the impact of a principal is allowed to grow with their tenure at a school, they find substantial effects of principals on both the likelihood of graduation and English exam scores. A one-standard-deviation increase in principal quality is associated with about a three percent increase in the probability of graduation and about a four percent increase in exam scores. They estimate that a principal's full effect takes a long time to be realized; after five years a principal's impact is only 75 percent of the eventual maximum effect.

Purpose / Objective / Research Question / Focus of Study:

Rather than look at the relationship between personal characteristics and principal efficacy, we instead focus on the policies that are adopted by effective principals. In particular, we consider how school policies change when there is a change in school leadership and which policy changes are associated with new schools leaders who have been previously effective.

Setting:

David Figlio, together with Cecilia Rouse, Jane Hannaway and Dan Goldhaber, launched a major survey effort of Florida public school principals aimed at determining the ways in which school leaders change the instructional policies and practices of the school in response to changes in the school accountability environment. They attempted to survey the universe of public schools in Florida serving "regular" students, including charter schools but excluding

¹ Notable exceptions include Brewer (1993) and Eberts and Stone (1988).

"alternative schools" such as adult schools, vocational/are voc-tech centers, schools administered by the Department of Juvenile Justice, and "other types" of schools. In this effort, they asked principals a battery of 65 questions regarding school policies, practices and school climate in each of three rounds, covering the 1999/00, 2001/02 and 2003/04 school years. The school surveys asked principals to identify a variety of policies and resource-use areas along a variety of lines, including policies to improve low-performing students, lengthening instructional time, reduced class size for subject, narrowing of the curriculum, scheduling systems, policies to improve low-performing teachers, teacher resources, teacher incentives, and teacher autonomy. The wording of the questions remained constant across the three rounds of the survey, making it easier to directly compare the school responses over time. A copy of the survey instrument is included in the Appendix.

Population / Participants / Subjects:

Our empirical strategy involves investigating whether new principals of different measured performance enact new policies and practices at their new schools. To do this, we need to follow schools before and after the schools received a new principal, and to measure the new principal's performance at his or her previous school. All of these conditions hold at a relatively small subset of schools. Of the 2,586 Florida schools in our sampling frame in 2003/04, 862 (33 percent) had a new principal begin in either the 2002/03 or the 2003/04 school years. Of these, 624 (72 percent) had completed school surveys in 2003/04, and of these, 512 (82 percent) had also completed school surveys in 2001/02. Among these schools, 485 (95 percent) had also completed school surveys in 1999/2000. Of these schools, 112 (23 percent) had a new principal who had been serving as a principal in another Florida public school in 2001/02. Altogether, 13 percent of schools with new principals in 2002/03 or 2003/04 had a principal with previous measured principal experience in 2001/02 and school survey responses in all three rounds of the survey. Table 3 presents some information about the demographics and attributes of these schools, and compares the schools in our analysis to all schools with new principals where we can observe the new principal's prior performance, all schools with new principals, and all schools in the state.

Intervention / Program / Practice:

Since many of the 65 principal survey questions were closely related, we collapse the responses into nine policy "domains" in which survey responses are weighted by the standard deviation of the survey responses. The domains included policies aimed at improving the performance of low-performing students; policies aimed at improving the performance of low-performing teachers; policies and practices regarding the quantity and division of instructional time; policies and practices regarding class sizes and informal groupings within classes; policies regarding class scheduling and classroom organization; policies and practices regarding the development and implementation of curriculum, teacher resources, and teacher incentives; and measures of teacher autonomy and control. Table 1 shows the questions that are covered by each of the nine policy domains, as well as the means of the different policies broken down by the school grade that the state of Florida assigned to each school. The table also presents the means and standard deviations of the nine domains in question.

Research Design:

The specific policies and practices within each measured policy domain were then combined to construct a continuous measure of the strength of that policy within a school. To do so, we constructed a standardized measure of each policy and practice, and then averaged these

standardized measures together for a domain-specific policy index.² One potential concern with this approach would be if schools adopt an "either-or" approach to policy choices within a domain; in such a case, principals who were changing from one policy to another within a domain would be observed as not changing the policy index, while in fact there was a lot of movement within the domain. On the other hand, if these policy choices are not substitutes but are rather policy complements, then an index construction that sums standardized policy choices would reflect the intensity of policy choice by a principal/school. We evaluated pairwise correlations between policy measures within a domain and could find virtually no negative correlations between measures within-domain. This evidence suggests that our interpretation of the policy index as a measure of intensity is a reasonable one.

Data Collection and Analysis:

Our key explanatory variable is a measure of the new principal's effectiveness in his or her prior school. In order to gauge principal effectiveness we construct a variety of value-added measures. All of the measures are derived from a cumulative student achievement model that measures achievement by the student's scale score normalized by grade and year. From this equation, we derive four measures of principal quality. The first alternative is to estimate a so-called "gain-score" model where the persistence in past inputs, I , is assumed to equal zero and thus the dependent variable becomes the gain in achievement from one year to the next. Another variation is to exclude teacher time-varying and time-invariant characteristics: In the final alternative we both exclude controls for teacher characteristics and assume complete persistence in prior inputs.

We restrict our analysis to schools that have had a change in leadership between 2001/02 and 2003/04, our two most recent rounds of the school survey. We posit that it takes time for a new principal to exert his or her influence over school policy. Schools might be trending in a particular direction with regard to a given policy domain, and new principals might have the effect of continuing or reversing this trend. Thus we would expect that the change in school policy Z between period $t-1$ and period t would depend on the change in school policy Z between period $t-2$ and period $t-1$ as well as the attributes of the new principal -- most notably his or her previous value added V . We therefore estimate variants of the model

$$\Delta Z_t^{j,k} = \alpha + \beta_1 \Delta Z_{t-1}^k + \beta_2 C_{t-1}^j + \varepsilon_t^{j,k} \tag{1}$$

where the superscript j indexes principals and the superscript k indexes schools. The coefficient b_1 represents the extent to which school policy tends to trend over time in the absence of any change in school leadership. The coefficient b_2 represents the change in current policy associated with the new principal's measured value added at his or her previous school. We estimate this model separately for each of the different policy domains included in the surveys.

Assuming that principals with different measures of value added choose to systematically enact different types of policies and practices, it may be the case that new principals of high value added are more likely to change policies and practices in the school if their measured value added differs considerably from that of their predecessors. The change in policies between 1999/2000 and 2001/02 could reasonably be expected to be determined in part by the principal's predecessor's value added. Therefore, we also estimate models that control for the value added of the predecessor to the new principal.

² The fact that we are averaging together standardized variables within a domain explains why the standard deviations of the domain indices are less than one.

In the last two specifications, which do not control for observed and un-observed teacher characteristics, the estimated principal-by-year effect includes school-wide average teacher quality. Thus these specifications yield principal effectiveness measures that are comparable to those estimated in other recent work (Beteille, Kalogrides, and Loeb (2009), Branch, Hanushek and Rivkin (2009), Clark, Martorell and Rockoff (2009)). As shown by the simple correlations in Table 2, measured principal effectiveness varies greatly, depending on whether or not it includes average teacher quality. We include multiple measures of principal effectiveness in order to gauge the robustness of our findings across different conceptions of principal quality. Figures 1 through 4 present kernel density plots of the four measures of measured principal value added in 2001/02. The figures show the overall distributions of measured value added as well as the distributions of measured value added for the set of principals who have moved to a new school in either 2002/03 or 2003/04 (as these are the principals who would contribute to our analysis.) As can be seen in the figures, there exists considerable variation in our measures of principal value added, regardless of the measure employed. It is also evident that the principals who ultimately move to another school do not appear to be appreciably different in their measures of value added from the overall population of principals statewide in 2001/02.

Findings / Results:

Table 6 presents our estimates of equation 1, the model in which principals of different measured qualities affect school policies, holding constant trends in the policy over time.³ As can be seen in the table, there is typically little relationship between measures of principal value added and deviations from a school's trajectory in a given policy domain. However, in the case of several policy domains, the evidence suggests that principals with different measured value added enact systematically different policies. Table 7 presents a parallel analysis, but this time also controls for the *former* principal's measured value added in 2001-02. The notion here is that now we can explicitly differentiate the "quality" of the current principal from that of his or her predecessor when investigating changes in school policies and practices between 2001-02 and 2003-04. As can be seen in the table, these results are very similar to those found in Table 6. Our general pattern of findings -- that "better" new principals reduce reliance on teacher incentives, potentially increase energies devoted to improving low performing students and teachers, and introduce enhanced scheduling systems in the school.

Conclusions:

While still very preliminary, this paper provides new evidence of the role that principals play in shaping school policies. Using survey data on school policies in three time periods matched with principal value-added measures based on student test scores, we are able to determine the relationship between principal effectiveness and the policies of the schools that principals lead. Principals with stronger prior performance appear to systematically reduce focus on teacher incentives and concentrate more on other types of policies aimed at improving the performance of low-performing teachers and students -- and principals who are measured as strong independent of the quality of their teachers apparently also focus more resources on teachers. Although much more analysis needs to be done, our initial findings highlight the role of principals in shaping school policy and suggest that policies aimed at recruiting and retaining effective principals are likely to have important effects on school policy. .

³ The table includes both the four models described in the text as well as two intermediate models that calculate principal value added controlling for measured teacher attributes but not teacher fixed effects.

Appendices

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Appendix A. References

References are to be in APA version 6 format.


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
Appendix B. Tables and Figures

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
**Figure 1: Distribution of principal value added,
all principals in 2001/02 and those moving to a new school between 2001/02 and 2003/04
Model: complete persistence, no teacher controls**



**Figure 2: Distribution of principal value added, all principals in 2001/02 and those moving to a new school between 2001/02 and 2003/04
Model: partial persistence, no teacher controls**



**Figure 3: Distribution of principal value added,
all principals in 2001/02 and those moving to a new school between 2001/02 and 2003/04
Model: complete persistence, controls for teacher fixed effects**



**Figure 4: Distribution of principal value added, all principals in 2001/02 and those moving to a new school between 2001/02 and 2003/04
Model: partial persistence, controls for teacher fixed effects**




Table 1
Variables making up domains, 2001-02 survey variable means

Domain/Variable	School Grade in 2002		
	A/B/C	D	F
Policies to Improve Low-Performing Students (mean = -.0011, standard deviation = .505)			
Require grade retention	0.76	0.82	0.79
Require summer school	0.40	0.57	0.36
Require before/after school tutoring	0.44	0.62	0.68
Require in-school supplemental instruction	0.79	0.86	0.89
Require tutoring	0.61	0.72	0.82
Require Saturday classes	0.05	0.14	0.14
Require other policy	0.30	0.29	0.50
Lengthening Instructional Time (mean = .0039, standard deviation = .4513)			
Sponsor summer school	0.53	0.60	0.67
Sponsor year-round classes	0.01	0.01	0.00
Sponsor extended school year	0.19	0.24	0.25
Sponsor Saturday school	0.10	0.21	0.31
Sponsor after-school tutoring	0.78	0.88	0.86
Sponsor other school services	0.33	0.27	0.41
Average length of school day 1 st and 4 th grade (in minutes)	376.41	376.09	382.31
Reduced Class Size for Subject (mean-.0019, standard deviation = .8286)			
Math	0.23	0.27	0.43
Reading	0.43	0.56	0.61
Writing	0.28	0.40	0.36
Low academic performance	0.44	0.55	0.68
Narrowing of Curriculum (mean = .0005, standard deviation = .8607)			
Minimum time spent on math	0.67	0.81	0.86
Minimum time spent on reading	0.71	0.87	0.86
Minimum time spent on writing	0.62	0.81	0.75
Minimum time spent on social studies	0.43	0.45	0.61
Minimum time spent on art/music	0.59	0.64	0.71
Scheduling Systems (mean = .0008, standard deviation = .4655)			
Block scheduling	0.35	0.43	0.52
Common prep periods	0.90	0.92	0.92
Subject matter specialist teachers	0.59	0.75	0.85
Organize teachers into teams	0.95	0.95	0.96
Looping	0.43	0.41	0.33
Multi-age classrooms	0.29	0.37	0.46
Other schedule structure	0.11	0.07	0.15
Policies to Improve Low-Performing Teachers (mean = .0009, standard deviation = .5335)			
Closer teacher supervision	0.98	0.99	1.00

Assign aide to teachers	0.30	0.52	0.59
Assign mentor to teachers	0.89	0.87	0.92
Provide additional professional development	0.99	1.00	1.00
Provide development/improvement plan	0.97	0.96	1.00
Other improvement strategy	0.14	0.13	0.20
Teacher Resources (mean = .0027, standard deviation = .6418)			
Minutes per week for collaborative planning/class preparation	450.12	452.75	424.09
Days per year for individual professional development	3.24	3.94	5.08
Funds per student per year for professional development	\$14.71	\$28.48	\$45.53
Teacher Incentives (mean = .0006, standard deviation = .5782)			
Monetary reward	0.29	0.22	0.29
Comp/release time	0.56	0.56	0.71
Choice of class	0.17	0.20	0.30
Attendance at conferences and workshops	0.64	0.65	0.71
Special leadership position/assignment	0.63	0.67	0.85
Other incentives	0.25	0.25	0.44
Teacher Control (1 = No Influence / 5 = Complete Control) (mean = .0003, standard deviation = .6818)			
Teacher control of establishing curriculum	3.39	3.40	3.33
Teacher control of hiring new full-time teachers	2.90	2.75	3.00
Teacher control of budget spending	3.20	2.97	3.15
Teacher control of teacher evaluation	1.84	1.74	2.07

Table 2
Correlation of Principal Value-Added Measures

	Teacher Characteristics, Partial Persistence	Teacher Characteristics, Complete Persistence	No Teacher Characteristics, Partial Persistence	No Teacher Characteristics, Complete Persistence
Teacher Characteristics, Partial Persistence	1.000			
Teacher Characteristics, Complete Persistence	0.863	1.000		
No Teacher Characteristics, Partial Persistence	0.401	0.245	1.000	
No Teacher Characteristics, Complete Persistence	0.381	0.400	0.787	1.000

Table 3**Characteristics of Schools Receiving New Principals who had been at Other Schools as Compared to All Schools**

Student body attribute	Schools with new Principals who had been at other schools and had prior survey data	School with new principals who had been at other schools, incomplete survey data	All schools with new principals	All schools in Florida
% black	.270 (.250)	.286 (.253)	.285 (.267)	.269 (.228)
% Asian	.019 (.018)	.017 (.017)	.016 (.017)	.017 (.07)
% Hispanic	.147 (.187)	.164 (.191)	.199 (.231)	.185 (.190)
% free or reduced price lunch	.4778 (.258)	.507 (.255)	.550 (.246)	.526 (.246)
% disabled	.211 (.067)	.209 (.071)	.211 (.079)	.218 (.099)
%English language learners	.123 (.166)	.140 (.170)	.172 (.200)	.157 (.163)
School size	663 (439)	627 (439)	623 (469)	551 (450)

Note: Standard Deviations are in parentheses beneath means

Table 4: Relationship between measures of principal prior value added and 2002 school grades of principals' new schools

School grade in 2002 of principal's new school	Principal value added measure					
	No teacher controls, complete persistence	No teacher controls, partial persistence	Teacher controls, complete persistence	Teacher controls, partial persistence	Teacher fixed effects, complete persistence	Teacher fixed effects, partial persistence
A	.130 (.180)	.084 (.208)	.126 (.180)	.079 (.207)	.462 (.198)	.246 (.207)
B	.100 (.124)	.084 (.144)	.097 (.127)	.080 (.142)	.421 (.259)	.211 (.160)
C	.122 (.183)	.127 (.197)	.120 (.180)	.124 (.193)	.400 (.225)	.217 (.233)
D	.111 (.128)	.111 (.133)	.110 (.126)	.109 (.130)	.336 (.239)	.166 (.171)
F	.045 (.183)	.041 (.286)	.043 (.188)	.039 (.294)	.434 (.240)	.217 (.210)
All new principals	.116 (.164)	.100 (.188)	.114 (.163)	.096 (.186)	.418 (.224)	.220 (.206)

Notes: Standard deviations are in parentheses. Definitions of principal value added are described in the text.

Table 5: Correlations between measures of principal prior value added and new school student body attributes

New school student body attribute	Principal value added measure					
	No teacher controls, complete persistence	No teacher controls, partial persistence	Teacher controls, complete persistence	Teacher controls, partial persistence	Teacher fixed effects, complete persistence	Teacher fixed effects, partial persistence
% black	0.07 (0.30)	0.21** (0.00)	0.08 (0.26)	0.22** (0.00)	-0.03 (0.70)	0.02 (0.83)
% Asian	0.11 (0.11)	0.05 (0.45)	0.12+ (0.10)	0.06 (0.40)	0.18** (0.01)	0.10 (0.16)
% Hispanic	0.17* (0.02)	0.11 (0.12)	0.17* (0.02)	0.11 (0.14)	0.10 (0.18)	0.03 (0.68)
% free or reduced price lunch	0.08 (0.29)	0.17 (0.02)	0.07 (0.31)	0.17* (0.02)	-0.04 (0.57)	-0.00 (0.98)
% disabled	0.00 (0.98)	-0.05 (0.47)	-0.00 (0.99)	-0.06 (0.44)	0.02 (0.74)	0.03 (0.70)
%English language learners	0.11 (0.12)	0.09 (0.22)	0.11 (0.14)	0.09 (0.24)	0.13+ (0.08)	0.06 (0.41)
School size	-0.09 (0.21)	-0.04 (0.57)	-0.09 (0.23)	-0.04 (0.62)	-0.16* (0.03)	-0.11 (0.11)

Notes: Standard errors of correlations are in parentheses. Correlations marked **, * and + are statistically significant at the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels, respectively. Definitions of principal value added are described in the text.

Table 6: Estimated effects of new principal's prior value added measures on school policies and practices

Policy domain	Principal value added measure					
	No teacher controls, complete persistence	No teacher controls, partial persistence	Teacher controls, complete persistence	Teacher controls, partial persistence	Teacher fixed effects, complete persistence	Teacher fixed effects, partial persistence
Improve low-performing students	0.516 (0.458)	0.293 (0.426)	0.518 (0.462)	0.288 (0.429)	0.870* (0.359)	0.760* (0.350)
Increased instructional time	0.257 (0.405)	0.009 (0.369)	0.243 (0.409)	-0.014 (0.372)	0.281 (0.322)	0.049 (0.313)
Reduced class size for subject	0.239 (0.992)	0.702 (0.872)	0.270 (0.994)	0.745 (0.874)	0.545 (0.748)	0.585 (0.709)
Narrowing of curriculum	-0.722 (1.022)	-0.439 (0.940)	-0.733 (1.026)	-0.434 (0.942)	-0.280 (0.783)	-0.243 (0.737)
Scheduling systems	0.808* (0.390)	0.485 (0.360)	0.804* (0.394)	0.468 (0.364)	0.399 (0.299)	0.381 (0.297)
Improve low performing teachers	0.555 (0.420)	0.796* (0.380)	0.544 (0.424)	0.786* (0.384)	0.284 (0.329)	0.495 (0.318)
Teacher resources	-0.351 (2.158)	2.016 (1.960)	-0.392 (2.172)	1.927 (1.971)	3.246* (1.622)	4.482** (1.543)
Teacher incentives	-1.505** (0.569)	-1.056+ (0.535)	-1.535** (0.575)	-1.069+ (0.540)	-0.903* (0.446)	-0.486 (0.450)
Teacher autonomy	0.258 (0.545)	0.018 (0.498)	0.286 (0.550)	0.038 (0.502)	0.245 (0.424)	0.276 (0.414)

Notes: Dependent variable is the change in policy domain from 2001/02 to 2003/04. Standard errors are in parentheses. Correlations marked **, * and + are statistically significant at the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels, respectively. Definitions of principal value added are described in the text. Number of observations=63 for class size and narrowing of curriculum, 103 to 112 for other measures. All models control for change in policy domain from 1999/2000 to 2001/02.

Table 7: Estimated effects of new principal's prior value added measures on school policies and practices, models controlling for former principal's value added as well

Policy domain	Principal value added measure					
	No teacher controls, complete persistence	No teacher controls, partial persistence	Teacher controls, complete persistence	Teacher controls, partial persistence	Teacher fixed effects, complete persistence	Teacher fixed effects, partial persistence
Improve low-performing students	0.473 (0.464)	0.275 (0.441)	0.468 (0.468)	0.265 (0.445)	0.839* (0.370)	0.723* (0.358)
Increased instructional time	0.183 (0.425)	-0.024 (0.398)	0.173 (0.429)	-0.044 (0.402)	0.193 (0.335)	-0.104 (0.328)
Reduced class size for subject	0.567 (1.044)	0.744 (0.951)	0.584 (1.045)	0.778 (0.955)	0.368 (0.774)	0.223 (0.731)
Narrowing of curriculum	-0.991 (1.046)	-0.524 (1.013)	-0.997 (1.049)	-0.511 (1.019)	-0.732 (0.806)	-0.559 (0.770)
Scheduling systems	0.697+ (0.397)	0.460 (0.370)	0.698+ (0.402)	0.454 (0.375)	0.450 (0.304)	0.446 (0.303)
Improve low performing teachers	0.573 (0.446)	0.770+ (0.407)	0.556 (0.450)	0.752+ (0.412)	0.293 (0.353)	0.487 (0.341)
Teacher resources	-1.064 (2.243)	1.249 (2.077)	-1.123 (2.255)	1.137 (2.092)	2.412 (1.701)	3.685* (1.614)
Teacher incentives	-1.247* (0.582)	-0.879 (0.554)	-1.278* (0.587)	-0.895+ (0.560)	-0.793+ (0.459)	-0.473 (0.455)
Teacher autonomy	0.382 (0.565)	0.108 (0.525)	0.413 (0.570)	0.143 (0.530)	0.270 (0.442)	0.313 (0.434)

Notes: Dependent variable is the change in policy domain from 2001/02 to 2003/04. Standard errors are in parentheses. Correlations marked **, * and + are statistically significant at the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels, respectively. Definitions of principal value added are described in the text. Number of observations=57 for class size and narrowing of curriculum, 95 to 104 for other measures. All models control for change in policy domain from 1999/2000 to 2001/02 as well as the school's former principal's value added measure in 2001/02.

**AN INDEPENDENT EVALUATION
OF FLORIDA'S A+ PLAN**

University of Florida
Gainesville, FL

The Urban Institute
Washington, DC

Princeton University
Princeton, NJ



SURVEY OF SCHOOL PRINCIPALS

Please complete this questionnaire with information about:

All responses to this survey will be kept strictly confidential. This school will never be identified by name or any other manner that could allow another researcher, government official, or member of the public to infer its identity.

Please return your completed questionnaire to:

Princeton Survey Research Center
169 Nassau Street
Princeton University
Princeton, NJ 08542-7007

If you have questions, please call Ed Freeland at 1-800-305-0950

1. Is all of the information about this school shown on the front label correct?

(Circle one)

YES 1

NO 2 → (If "No," please correct any erroneous information on the front page, then go to Question 2.)

2. Please fill out the following information about the person completing this survey:

YOUR NAME: _____

TITLE: _____

TELEPHONE: _____ FAX: _____

EMAIL ADDRESS: _____

BEST TIMES TO REACH YOU (if necessary for clarification):

MON	TUE	WED	THU	FRI
(A.M./P.M.)	(A.M./P.M.)	(A.M./P.M.)	(A.M./P.M.)	(A.M./P.M.)

3. Are any of the following statements true for the school named on the front of this questionnaire?

	(Circle one on each line)	
a. This school teaches <u>only</u> prekindergarten and/or kindergarten students	YES	NO
b. This school teaches <u>only</u> postsecondary (beyond grade 12) or adult education students	YES	NO
c. This school serves <u>only</u> exceptional/special, alternative, vocational, or juvenile justice populations	YES	NO
d. This school is no longer in operation – Please report closing date: _____	YES	NO
e. The school named on the front of this questionnaire is a non-public school	YES	NO
f. The institution or organization named on the front of this questionnaire is not a school – Please explain:	YES	NO

4. If you answered "Yes" to any of the above statements in Question 3, do not complete this questionnaire. Please return the questionnaire in the enclosed self-addressed, stamped envelope. If none of the statements in Question 3 apply to this school, please proceed to Question 5.

A. SCHOOL CHARACTERISTICS

5. What type of school is this?

(Circle one)

REGULAR elementary or secondary 1

CHARTER 2

Elementary or secondary with a MAGNET or SPECIAL EMPHASIS – e.g., science/math, performing arts, foreign language, talented/gifted, etc. *Please identify the type of magnet or special emphasis school:*

_____ 3

OTHER *Please describe:*

_____ 4

6. Does your school use a “whole school” reform model?

(Circle one)

NO 1

YES 2



<i>If Yes, please tell us which reform model your school uses:</i>	<i>(Circle one on each line)</i>	
1. Accelerated Schools Project.....	YES	NO
2. Coalition for Essential Schools	YES	NO
3. Comer School Development Program.....	YES	NO
4. Core Knowledge.....	YES	NO
5. Modern Red Schoolhouse	YES	NO
6. Success for All and/or Roots and Wings.....	YES	NO
7. Other, including self-developed – <i>Please describe:</i>	YES	NO

7. How long is the school day for students in this school?



a. 1 st GRADE	b. 4 th GRADE	c. 7 th GRADE	d. 10 th GRADE
____ Hours and ____ Minutes	____ Hours and ____ Minutes	____ Hours and ____ Minutes	____ Hours and ____ Minutes
<i>Check here <input type="checkbox"/> if this school does not have this grade.</i>	<i>Check here <input type="checkbox"/> if this school does not have this grade.</i>	<i>Check here <input type="checkbox"/> if this school does not have this grade.</i>	<i>Check here <input type="checkbox"/> if this school does not have this grade.</i>

B. STAFF CHARACTERISTICS AND CURRENT PERSONNEL POLICIES

8. Does this school use any of the following to reward teacher performance, independent of incentives used by the district?

	<i>(Circle one on each line)</i>	
a. Monetary reward (including one-time cash bonus)	YES	NO
b. Comp/release time	YES	NO
c. Choice of class	YES	NO
d. Attendance at conferences and workshops	YES	NO
e. Special leadership position/assignment (e.g., mentor teacher, staff or curriculum development)	YES	NO
f. Other incentives – <i>Please describe:</i>	YES	NO

9. Does this school structure schedules and staff in any of the following ways?

	<i>(Circle one on each line)</i>	
a. Block scheduling	YES	NO
b. Common preparation periods	YES	NO
c. Subject matter specialist teachers (to assist other teachers)	YES	NO
d. Organize teachers into teams, such as by grade	YES	NO
e. Looping	YES	NO
f. Multi-age classrooms	YES	NO
g. Other – <i>Please describe:</i>	YES	NO

10. During regular school hours, how much total time do teachers have per week for collaborative planning? _____ Hours and _____ Minutes per week

11. Apart from time for collaborative planning, how much total time do teachers have per week for class preparation during regular school hours? _____ Hours and _____ Minutes per week

12. How many total days of professional development per year (including summer) are required of teachers in this school (excluding re-certification)? Please include days required by the state, district and school.

(Circle one)

- None 0
- One day or less per teacher 1
- 2 - 3 days per teacher 2
- 4 - 5 days per teacher 3
- 6 - 7 days per teacher 4
- More than 7 days per teacher 5

13. Approximately how much in funds from all sources (e.g., Title 1, other grants, allocation from district) does this school have available for sponsoring and/or running its own professional development activities each year? \$ _____ in total

14. What special measures does this school take to try to improve low-performing teachers?

	(Circle one on each line)	
a. Supervise teachers more closely	YES	NO
b. Assign an aide to teachers	YES	NO
c. Assign teachers to mentors or master teachers	YES	NO
d. Provide additional professional development for individual teachers	YES	NO
e. Provide development/improvement plan	YES	NO
f. Other – <i>Please describe:</i>	YES	NO

C. SCHOOL SERVICES AND COURSE OFFERINGS

15. Does this school sponsor:

	(Circle one on each line)	
a. Summer school?	YES	NO
b. Year-round classes?	YES	NO
c. Extended school year?	YES	NO
d. Saturday school?	YES	NO
e. After-school tutoring	YES	NO
f. Other services – <i>Please describe:</i>	YES	NO

16. What is the average number of students (*not student-teacher ratio*) for a regular class?

a. 1 st GRADE	b. 4 th GRADE	c. 7 th GRADE	d. 10 th GRADE (mathematics)
_____ Students	_____ Students	_____ Students	_____ Students
<i>Check here <input type="checkbox"/> if this school does not have this grade.</i>	<i>Check here <input type="checkbox"/> if this school does not have this grade.</i>	<i>Check here <input type="checkbox"/> if this school does not have this grade.</i>	<i>Check here <input type="checkbox"/> if this school does not have this grade.</i>

17. Are 4th grade students in this school assigned to smaller “class units” for any of the following reasons? If “Yes,” what is the average number of students in each class unit?

	<i>(Circle one on each line)</i>			If “Yes,” what is the average number of students in each class unit?
a. Math instruction	NO	YES	➔	_____ Students
b. Reading instruction	NO	YES	➔	_____ Students
c. Writing instruction	NO	YES	➔	_____ Students
d. Low academic performance	NO	YES	➔	_____ Students
e. Gifted academic performance	NO	YES	➔	_____ Students
<i>Check here <input type="checkbox"/> if this school does not have this grade</i>				

18. Does this school have a policy on the minimum amount of time 4th grade students must spend on the following academic subjects? If “Yes,” what is the minimum number of hours per week?

	<i>(Circle one on each line)</i>			If “Yes,” what is the minimum amount of time per week?
a. Math	NO	YES	➔	_____ Hours and _____ Minutes
b. Reading	NO	YES	➔	_____ Hours and _____ Minutes
c. Writing	NO	YES	➔	_____ Hours and _____ Minutes
d. Art/Music	NO	YES	➔	_____ Hours and _____ Minutes
e. Science.....	NO	YES	➔	_____ Hours and _____ Minutes
f. Social Studies	NO	YES	➔	_____ Hours and _____ Minutes
<i>Check here <input type="checkbox"/> if this school does not have this grade</i>				

19. What special measures, if any, does this school take to try to improve the performance of low-performing students?

	<i>(Circle one on each line)</i>	
	YES	NO
a. Require grade retention	YES	NO
b. Require summer school for grade advancement	YES	NO
c. Require before-school or after-school tutoring	YES	NO
d. Require in-school supplemental instruction	YES	NO
e. Require Saturday classes	YES	NO
f. Require tutoring – in-school or after school	YES	NO
g. Other – <i>Please describe:</i>	YES	NO

D. SCHOOL DECISION-MAKING

20. Using a scale from 1 to 5, where 1 is “No influence” and 5 is “Complete control,” indicate how much actual influence you think each of the following has on decisions concerning the following activities in this school.

	N/A	<i>(Circle one on each line)</i>				
		No influence	←————→			Complete control
a. Establishing curriculum						
1. School district management	<input type="checkbox"/>	1	2	3	4	5
2. Principal	<input type="checkbox"/>	1	2	3	4	5
3. Teachers at this school	<input type="checkbox"/>	1	2	3	4	5
4. Parents	<input type="checkbox"/>	1	2	3	4	5
b. Hiring new full-time teachers						
1. School district management	<input type="checkbox"/>	1	2	3	4	5
2. Principal	<input type="checkbox"/>	1	2	3	4	5
3. Teachers at this school	<input type="checkbox"/>	1	2	3	4	5
4. Parents	<input type="checkbox"/>	1	2	3	4	5
c. Deciding how this school’s budget will be spent						
1. School district management	<input type="checkbox"/>	1	2	3	4	5
2. Principal	<input type="checkbox"/>	1	2	3	4	5
3. Teachers at this school	<input type="checkbox"/>	1	2	3	4	5
4. Parents	<input type="checkbox"/>	1	2	3	4	5
d. Evaluating teachers						
1. School district management	<input type="checkbox"/>	1	2	3	4	5
2. Principal	<input type="checkbox"/>	1	2	3	4	5
3. Teachers at this school	<input type="checkbox"/>	1	2	3	4	5
4. Parents	<input type="checkbox"/>	1	2	3	4	5

E. SCHOOL RESOURCES

21. Approximately how much additional revenue does this school raise annually through other sources of income (e.g., PTAs, community or business sponsorship, athletic or parking fees, etc.)?

- a. \$ _____ .00 per year
- b. Please identify the major source of this additional revenue: _____

22. Has the district provided any direct technical assistance (e.g. instructional coaches, specialist teachers, etc.) in this school this year?

YES1 →

NO2

a. If "YES," about how many total hours of combined district staff time is provided in your school per week?

_____ hours

23. Has the district provided additional financial resources for school programs, services, or materials (e.g., Professional development, hiring consultants/instructional coaches, books and materials or funding for a comprehensive school reform model, etc.) at this school this year?

YES1 →

NO2

a. If "YES," how much was the estimated total value of the financial support?

\$ _____ .00

F. SCHOOL CLIMATE AND PARENTAL INVOLVEMENT

24. Indicate, on a scale from 1 (not at all accurate) to 5 (very accurate), how accurately each of the characteristics listed below describes this school's climate.

	(Circle one on each line)				
	Not at all accurate	←————→			Very accurate
a. Staff morale is low	1	2	3	4	5
b. Staff support and encourage each other in their work	1	2	3	4	5
c. Teachers have a good understanding of what's expected of them	1	2	3	4	5
d. Teachers with three or fewer years of total experience at this school are excellent	1	2	3	4	5
e. Teachers with more than ten years of total experience at this school are excellent	1	2	3	4	5
f. Student disruption interferes with learning in this school	1	2	3	4	5
g. Parents worry about violence in this school	1	2	3	4	5
h. Parents monitor the academic progress of their children closely	1	2	3	4	5

G. OPTIONAL FINAL COMMENTS

25. Is there anything about this school's policies or the A+ Plan that is not covered above and that you think is relevant for our project? *Please use the space below to answer this question.*

**THANK YOU FOR ASSISTING US WITH THIS
IMPORTANT SURVEY. YOUR TIME AND
EFFORT ARE GREATLY APPRECIATED.**

Please return completed survey to
Princeton Survey Research Center
169 Nassau Street
Princeton University
Princeton, NJ 08542-7007