**Florida** 

# State Teacher Policy Yearbook

What States Can Do To Retain Effective New Teachers

# **Acknowledgments**

# **STATES**

State education agencies remain our most important partners in this effort, and their extensive experience has helped to ensure the factual accuracy of the final product. Every state formally received a draft of this edition of the State Teacher Policy Yearbook in August 2008 for comment and correction; states also received a final draft of their reports a month prior to release. All but four states graciously responded to our inquiries. While states do not always agree with our approach, the willingness of most states to acknowledge the imperfections of their teacher policies is an important first step toward reform.

We also thank the many state pension boards that reviewed our drafts and responded to our inquiries.

### **FUNDERS**

The primary funders for the 2008 State Teacher Policy Yearbook were:

- Daniels Fund
- The Joyce Foundation
- Fisher Family FoundationKoret Foundation
- Gleason Family Foundation
   The Teaching Commission
- Houston Endowment

The National Council on Teacher Quality does not accept any funding from the federal government.

### **STAFF**

Sandi Jacobs was project director for the 2008 State Teacher Policy Yearbook. Lead researchers were Kelli M. Rosen and Trisha M. Madden, and Kristen Lemons provided research support. Thank you to Colleen Hale at Summerhouse Studios who designed the print and web versions of the Yearbook and to Jeff Hale for technical support.

# About the Yearbook

The 2008 edition of the *State Teacher Policy Yearbook* provides an in-depth analysis of a critical piece of the teacher quality puzzle: **the retention of effective new teachers**.

Unlike the more comprehensive analysis of all aspects of states' teacher policies provided in the 2007 *Yearbook*, this year's edition focuses on a particular policy issue. The 2009 *Yearbook* will revisit and evaluate the states' progress in meeting the full set of goals first analyzed in 2007, as well as the new goals examined this year.

The third through fifth years of teaching represent an opportunity lost for the health of the teaching profession. Many new teachers leave at this juncture, just at the time that they are becoming consistently effective. Concurrently, school districts confer permanent status — more commonly understood as tenure — at this juncture, absent either the reflection or evidence that this important decision merits.

While school districts are certainly key players in teacher retention, do not underestimate the state's role. Without exception, the state controls virtually every aspect of the teaching profession, particularly licensing and tenure. This edition of the *Yearbook* analyzes what each state is doing to identify teachers' effectiveness; support the retention of valuable, early career teachers; and dismiss those found to be ineffective, with each of these factors measured against a realistic blueprint for reform.

The process used to develop the policy goals that appear in this edition has stayed the same. We began to develop these goals with our own distinguished advisory board, and then sought feedback from more than 100 different policy groups, academics, education think tanks and national education organizations, some of which have perspectives that are quite different from ours. Most importantly, we also consulted with the states themselves. Their feedback was invaluable.

This year's goals meet NCTQ's five criteria for an effective reform framework:

- 1. They are supported by a strong rationale, grounded in the best research available. (A full list of the citations supporting each goal can be found at **www.nctq.org/stpy**.)
- 2. They offer practical, rather than pie-in-the-sky, solutions for improving teacher quality.
- 3. They take on the teaching profession's most pressing needs, including making the profession more responsive to the current labor market.
- 4. They are for the most part relatively cost neutral.
- 5. They respect the legitimate constraints that some states face so that the goals can work in all 50 states.

As is now our practice, in addition to a national summary report, we have customized the *Yearbook* so that each state has its own report, with its own analyses and data. Users can download any of our 51 state reports (including the District of Columbia) from our website at **www.nctq.org/stpy**. Since some national perspective is always helpful, each state report contains charts and graphs showing how the state performed compared to all other states. We also point to states that offer a "Best Practice" for other states to emulate.

We hope this edition of the *Yearbook* serves as an important resource for state school chiefs, school boards, legislatures and the many advocates who press hard for reform. In turn, we maintain our commitment to listen and learn.

Sincerely,

Kate Walsh, President

# **Executive Summary: Florida**

Welcome to the Florida edition of the National Council on Teacher Quality's 2008 *State Teacher Policy Yearbook*. The 2008 *Yearbook* focuses on how state policies impact the retention of effective new teachers.

There is no shortage of data that show a significant percentage of teachers leave just when they are becoming consistently effective. However, at the same time, too many teachers who have *not* become consistently effective achieve permanent status, also referred to as tenure. It is our hope that this report will help focus attention on areas where state policymakers could make improvements that would affect teacher quality and student achievement.

Our policy evaluation is broken down into three areas that encompass 15 goals. Broadly, these goals examine the impact of state policy on 1) identifying effective teachers, 2) retaining those deemed effective and 3) exiting those deemed ineffective.

While Florida is making progress toward meeting some of our goals, significant room for improvement remains in many others. The state completely missed four goals, met a small portion of three, partially met four and fully met four, including one best practice designation.

Florida's best performances are in its requiring of instructional effectiveness in teacher evaluations, its articulated consequences for teachers with unsatisfactory evaluations, its support of differential pay in shortage subject areas and high-needs schools, and performance pay. The state has the most work to do in making tenure decisions meaningful, closing loopholes that allow teachers who have not met licensure requirements to continue teaching and strengthening some policies regarding teacher compensation issues.

Florida's progress toward meeting these goals is summarized on the following page. The body of the report provides a more detailed breakdown of the state's strengths and weaknesses in each area.

Overall Performance: C-

# How is **Florida** Faring?

# Area 1: C

# **Identifying effective teachers**

Florida's efforts to identify teacher effectiveness are headed in the right direction but still leave room for improvement. Although the state has all the elements of a student- and teacher-level longitudinal data system, it does not use this system to provide value-added evidence of teacher effectiveness. Commendably, the state not only directs districts to use both subjective and objective measures of student performance in their teacher evaluations, but also makes student performance the preponderant criterion. However, Florida's probationary period for new teachers is just three years, and the state does not require any meaningful process to evaluate cumulative effectiveness in the classroom before teachers are awarded tenure.

# Area 2: C-

# **Retaining effective teachers**

Florida requires that only some of its new teachers receive mentoring, and the state's requirements for a nonprobationary license have not been shown to advance teacher effectiveness. Although the state does not support retention bonuses or compensation for relevant prior work experience, Florida's other policies regarding teacher compensation are commendable. Florida does give districts authority for how teachers are paid, and it supports both differential pay for teachers working in high-needs schools and shortage subject areas and performance pay. The state also has a flexible pension system that gives teachers a choice between a defined contribution plan and a defined benefit plan. While Florida is commended for providing teachers with the option of a fair, portable defined contribution plan, its defined benefit plan is not fair to all workers. Further, retirement benefits in the defined benefit plan are determined by a formula that is not neutral, meaning that pension wealth does not accumulate uniformly for each year a teacher works.

# Area 3: C-

# **Exiting ineffective teachers**

Although requiring only one formal evaluation a year for new teachers, Florida does require that all teachers who receive an unsatisfactory evaluation be placed on an improvement plan and then made eligible for dismissal if they do not improve. Unfortunately, Florida issues renewable temporary certificates, allowing new teachers who have not passed licensing tests to remain in the classroom for up to three years.

# Goals

Area 1: И	/hat states can do to help identify effective teachers	page
	State data systems	5
	The state should develop a data system that contributes some of the evidence	
	needed to assess teacher effectiveness.	
Goal 2:	Evaluation of effectiveness	8
	The state should require instructional effectiveness to be the <i>preponderant</i> criterion	
	of any teacher evaluation.	
Goal 3:	Tenure	12
	The state should require that tenure decisions be meaningful.	
Area 2: И	/hat states can do to help retain effective teachers	
Goal 1:	Induction	17
	The state should require effective induction for all new teachers, with special emphasis	
	on teachers in high-needs schools.	
Goal 2:	Licensure advancement	20
	The state should ensure that the only factors required when moving from a probationary	
	to a nonprobationary license are those known to advance teacher effectiveness.	
Goal 3:	Pay scales	24
	The state should give local districts full authority for pay scales, eliminating potential barriers	
	such as state salary schedules and other regulations that control how districts pay teachers.	
Goal 4:	Retention pay	28
	The state should support retention pay, such as significant boosts in salary after tenure	
	is awarded, for effective teachers.	
Goal 5:	Compensation for prior work experience	30
	The state should encourage districts to provide compensation for related prior subject-area	
	work experience.	
Goal 6:	Differential pay for shortage areas	33
	The state should support differential pay for effective teaching in shortage and high-need areas.	
Goal 7:	Performance pay	36
	The state should support performance pay, but in a manner that recognizes its infancy,	
	appropriate uses and limitations.	
Goal 8:	Pension flexibility	39
	The state should ensure that pension systems are portable, flexible and fair to all teachers.	
Goal 9:	Pension neutrality	50
	The state should ensure that pension systems are neutral, uniformly increasing pension	
	wealth with each additional year of work.	
Area 3: И	/hat states can do to help exit ineffective teachers	
Goal 1:	New teacher evaluation	55
	The state should require multiple formal evaluations of all new teachers.	
Goal 2:	Unsatisfactory evaluations	59
	The state should articulate consequences for teachers with unsatisfactory evaluations, including	
	specifying that teachers with multiple unsatisfactory evaluations are eligible for dismissal.	
Goal 3:	Licensure loopholes	62
	The state should close loopholes that allow teachers who have not met licensure requirements	
	to continue teaching.	
Appendix	(	67

# **Area 1: Identifying Effective Teachers**

# Goal 1 – State Data Systems

The state should develop a data system that contributes some of the evidence needed to assess teacher effectiveness.

# **GOAL COMPONENTS**

(The factors considered in determining the states' rating for the goal.)

- 1. The state should establish a longitudinal data system with at least the following key components:
  - A unique statewide student identifier number that connects student data across key databases across years;
  - A unique teacher identifier system that can match individual teacher records with individual student records; and
  - An assessment system that can match individual student test records from year to year in order to measure academic growth.
- 2. Value-added data provided through the state's longitudinal data system should be considered among the criteria used to determine teachers' effectiveness.

#### **RATIONALE**

- See appendix for detailed rationale.
- Value-added analysis connects student data to teacher data to measure achievement and performance.
- There are a number of responsible uses for value-added analysis.

# SUPPORTING RESEARCH

Research citations to support this goal are available at www.nctq.org/stpy/citations.

### Figure 1

How States are Faring in the Development of **Data Systems** 



**Best Practice State** Tennessee



States Meet Goal



States Nearly Meet Goal Louisiana, Ohio

16 States Partly Meet Goal Alabama, Arkansas, Delaware, FLORIDA, Georgia, Hawaii, Kentucky, Mississippi,

Missouri, New Mexico, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Utah, West Virginia, Wyoming

31 States Meet a Small Part of Goal

Alaska, Arizona, California, Colorado, Connecticut, District of Columbia, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Oregon, South Dakota, Texas, Vermont, Virginia, Washington, Wisconsin

State Does Not Meet Goal Maryland

# Goal 1 Florida Analysis



### **ANALYSIS**

Florida has a data system with the capacity to provide evidence of teacher effectiveness.

Florida has all three necessary elements of a studentand teacher-level longitudinal data system. It has assigned unique student identifiers that connect student data across key databases across years and has assigned unique teacher identifiers that enable it to match individual teacher records with individual student records. The state also has the capacity to match student test records from year to year in order to measure student academic growth.

However, Florida does not currently use this data system to provide value-added evidence of teacher effectiveness. It appears that only student performance assessment data are used as part of teachers' evaluations.

### SUPPORTING RESEARCH

Data Quality Campaign: www.dataqualitycampaign.org

#### RECOMMENDATION

Florida meets this goal in part. Having all the necessary elements in place, the state should support the use of value-added data to provide part of the evidence of teacher effectiveness, particularly for decisions about granting teachers tenure. Value-added data are also important and necessary for local districts adopting performance pay plans to reliably measure individual teacher and overall school performance.

# **FLORIDA RESPONSE TO ANALYSIS**


Florida recognized the factual accuracy of our analysis. The state added that it does not prevent districts from using student data and making value-added calculations for use in performance appraisals. It has also developed a value table for districts to use in determining student achievement for performance pay plans. The table measures the yearly differences in student performance and assigns values based on the performance of all the students in the state along with four guiding principles.

# **EXAMPLES OF BEST PRACTICE**

**Tennessee** not only has all three elements of a student- and teacher-level longitudinal data system—unique student identifiers that connect student data across key databases across years, unique teacher identifiers that enable the state to match individual teacher records with individual student records, and the capacity to match student test records from year to year to measure student academic growth—it is also the only state that uses this value added data to measure teacher effectiveness by isolating each teacher's impact on individual students' academic growth. It translates this impact into a "teacher effect" score, and then uses it as part of a teacher's evaluation.

Figure 2

Do states use value-added data as a criterion for assessing teacher effectiveness?



<sup>1</sup> Ohio uses value-added data to "improve classroom instruction", but it is unclear whether the information plays any role in teacher evaluations. Tennessee uses value-added data to measure teacher effectiveness by isolating the impact each teacher has on individual students' academic growth, which can be used as part of a teacher's evaluation.

Figure 3

Do state data systems have the capacity to reliably assess teacher effectiveness?

Linique student identifier Unique it dentifier teacher data across identifier ecords and a hard connects system over time ecords and a hard connect system over time ecords and a hard connect system over time ecords and a hard connect connecticut	renably assess te		Liveries	<b>3</b> ;	
that connects teacher data across identifier databases system over time teacher databa		student		_	student
Alabama Alaska Alaska Arizona Arkansas California Colorado Connecticut Delaware District of Columbia FLORIDA Georgia Hawaii Idaho Illinois Indiana Iowa Kansas Kentucky Illinois Indiana Illinois Indiana Illinois Indiana Illinois			Unique teacher		records match with
Alabama Alaska Arizona Arkansas California Colorado Connecticut Delaware District of Columbia FLORIDA Georgia Hawaii Idaho Illinois Illino					
Arizona	Alabama				
Arkansas California Colorado Connecticut Delaware District of Columbia FLORIDA Georgia Hawaii Idaho Illinois Ilndiana Iowa Kansas Kentucky Louisiana Maine Maryland Massachusetts Michigan Minnesota Mississippi Missouri Montana Nebraska Newada New Hampshire New Jersey New Mexico New York North Carolina North Dakota Ohio Oklahoma Oregon Pennsylvania Rhode Island South Carolina South Dakota Tennessee Texas Uyoming Wyoming Wissconsin Wyoming Wissconsin Wyoming Wissconsin Wyoming  Wissconsin Wyoming					
California	Arizona				
Colorado Connecticut Delaware District of Columbia FLORIDA Georgia Hawaii Idaho Illinois Indiana Iowa Kansas Kentucky Louisiana Maine Maryland Massachusetts Michigan Minnesota Mississippi Missouri Montana Nebraska Newada New Hampshire New Jersey New Mexico New York North Carolina North Dakota Ohio Oklahoma Oregon Pennsylvania Rhode Island South Dakota Texas Utah Vermont Virginia Wassington West Virginia Wissconsin Wyoming Idaho I	Arkansas				
Connecticut	California				
Delaware	Colorado				
District of Columbia	Connecticut				
FLORIDA	Delaware				
Georgia	District of Columbia				
Hawaii	FLORIDA				
Idaho	Georgia				
Illinois Indiana Iowa Kansas Kentucky Louisiana Maine Maryland Massachusetts Michigan Minnesota Mississippi Missouri Montana Nebraska Nevada New Hampshire New Jersey New Mexico New York North Carolina North Dakota Ohio Oklahoma Oregon Pennsylvania Rhode Island South Carolina South Dakota Tennessee Texas Utah Vermont Virginia Washington West Virginia Wisconsin Wyoming	Hawaii				
Indiana lowa  Kansas  Kentucky Louisiana  Maine  Maryland  Massachusetts  Michigan  Minnesota  Mississippi  Missouri  Montana  Nebraska  Nevada  New Hampshire  New Jersey  New Mexico  New York  North Carolina  North Dakota  Ohio  Oklahoma  Oregon  Pennsylvania  Rhode Island  South Carolina  South Dakota  Tennessee  Texas  Utah  Vermont  Virginia  Washington  West Virginia  Wisconsin  Wyoming	Idaho				
Kansas Kentucky Louisiana Maine Maryland Massachusetts Michigan Minnesota Mississippi Missouri Montana Nebraska Nevada New Hampshire New Jersey New Mexico New York North Carolina North Dakota Ohio Oklahoma Oregon Pennsylvania Rhode Island South Carolina South Dakota Tennessee Texas Utah Vermont Virginia Washington West Virginia Wisconsin Wyoming	Illinois				
Kentucky Louisiana Maine Maryland Massachusetts Michigan Minnesota Mississippi Missouri Montana Nebraska Nevada New Hampshire New Jersey New Mexico New York North Carolina North Dakota Ohio Oklahoma Oregon Pennsylvania Rhode Island South Carolina South Dakota Tennessee Texas Utah Vermont Virginia Washington West Virginia Wisconsin Wyoming	Indiana				
Kentucky Louisiana Maine Maryland Maryland Massachusetts Michigan Minnesota Mississippi Missouri Montana Nebraska Nevada New Hampshire New Jersey New Mexico New York North Carolina North Dakota Ohio Oklahoma Oregon Pennsylvania Rhode Island South Carolina South Carolina South Dakota Tennessee Texas Utah Vermont Virginia Washington West Virginia Wisconsin Wyoming	lowa				
Louisiana  Maine  Maryland  Massachusetts  Michigan  Minnesota  Mississippi  Missouri  Montana  Nebraska  Nevada  New Hampshire  New Jersey  New Mexico  New York  North Carolina  North Dakota  Ohio  Oklahoma  Oregon  Pennsylvania  Rhode Island  South Carolina  South Dakota  Tennessee  Texas  Utah  Vermont  Virginia  Washington  West Virginia  Wisconsin  Wyoming					
Maine Maryland Massachusetts Michigan Minnesota Mississippi Missouri Montana Nebraska Nevada New Hampshire New Jersey New Mexico New York North Carolina North Dakota Ohio Oklahoma Oregon Pennsylvania Rhode Island South Carolina South Dakota Tennessee Texas Utah Vermont Virginia Washington West Virginia Wisconsin Wyoming					
Maryland					
Massachusetts Michigan Minnesota Mississippi Missouri Montana Nebraska Nevada New Hampshire New Jersey New Mexico New York North Carolina North Dakota Ohio Oklahoma Oregon Pennsylvania Rhode Island South Carolina South Dakota Tennessee Texas Utah Vermont Virginia Washington West Virginia Wisconsin Wyoming					
Michigan Minnesota Mississisppi Missouri Montana Nebraska Nevada New Hampshire New Jersey New Mexico New York North Carolina North Dakota Ohio Oklahoma Oregon Pennsylvania Rhode Island South Carolina South Carolina South Dakota Tennessee Texas Utah Vermont Virginia Washington Wyoming					
Minnesota Mississippi Missouri Montana Nebraska Nevada New Hampshire New Jersey New Mexico New York North Carolina North Dakota Ohio Oklahoma Oregon Pennsylvania Rhode Island South Carolina South Dakota Tennessee Texas Utah Vermont Virginia Washington Wyoming					
Mississippi Missouri Montana Nebraska Nevada New Hampshire New Jersey New Mexico New York North Carolina North Dakota Ohio Oklahoma Oregon Pennsylvania Rhode Island South Carolina South Dakota Tennessee Texas Utah Vermont Virginia Washington Wyoming					
Missouri  Montana  Nebraska  Nevada  New Hampshire  New Jersey  New Mexico  New York  North Carolina  Ohio  Oklahoma  Oregon  Pennsylvania  Rhode Island  South Carolina  South Dakota  Tennessee  Texas  Utah  Vermont  Virginia  Washington  Wyoming					
Montana Nebraska Nevada New Hampshire New Jersey New Mexico New York North Carolina Ohio Oklahoma Oregon Pennsylvania Rhode Island South Carolina South Dakota Tennessee Texas Utah Vermont Virginia Washington Wyoming					
Nebraska Nevada New Hampshire New Jersey New Mexico New York North Carolina North Dakota Ohio Oklahoma Oregon Pennsylvania Rhode Island South Carolina South Dakota Tennessee Texas Utah Vermont Virginia Washington Wyoming					
New Hampshire New Jersey New Mexico New York North Carolina North Dakota Ohio Oklahoma Oregon Pennsylvania Rhode Island South Carolina South Dakota Tennessee Texas Utah Vermont Virginia Washington Wyoming					
New Hampshire New Jersey New Mexico New York North Carolina North Dakota Ohio Oklahoma Oregon Pennsylvania Rhode Island South Carolina South Dakota Tennessee Texas Utah Vermont Virginia Washington Wyoming					
New Jersey New Mexico New York North Carolina North Dakota Ohio Oklahoma Oregon Pennsylvania Rhode Island South Carolina South Dakota Tennessee Texas Utah Vermont Virginia Washington Wyoming					
New Mexico New York North Carolina North Dakota Ohio Oklahoma Oregon Pennsylvania Rhode Island South Carolina South Dakota Tennessee Texas Utah Vermont Virginia Washington Wyoming					
New York  North Carolina  North Dakota  Ohio  Oklahoma  Oregon  Pennsylvania  Rhode Island  South Carolina  South Dakota  Tennessee  Texas  Utah  Vermont  Virginia  Washington  Wyoming					
North Carolina North Dakota Ohio Oklahoma Oregon Pennsylvania Rhode Island South Carolina South Dakota Tennessee Texas Utah Vermont Virginia Washington West Virginia Wisconsin Wyoming					
North Dakota Ohio Oklahoma Oregon Pennsylvania Rhode Island South Carolina South Dakota Tennessee Texas Utah Vermont Virginia Washington West Virginia Wisconsin Wyoming					
Ohio Oklahoma Oregon Pennsylvania Rhode Island South Carolina South Dakota Tennessee Texas Utah Vermont Virginia Washington West Virginia Wisconsin Wyoming					
Oklahoma Oregon Pennsylvania Rhode Island South Carolina South Dakota Tennessee Texas Utah Vermont Virginia Washington West Virginia Wisconsin Wyoming					
Oregon Pennsylvania Rhode Island South Carolina South Dakota Tennessee Texas Utah Vermont Virginia Washington West Virginia Wisconsin Wyoming					
Pennsylvania Rhode Island South Carolina South Dakota Tennessee Texas Utah Vermont Virginia Washington West Virginia Wisconsin Wyoming					
Rhode Island  South Carolina  South Dakota  Tennessee  Texas  Utah  Vermont  Virginia  Washington  West Virginia  Wisconsin  Wyoming			_		
South Carolina  South Dakota  Tennessee  Texas  Utah  Vermont  Virginia  Washington  West Virginia  Wisconsin  Wyoming					
South Dakota  Tennessee  Texas  Utah  Vermont  Virginia  Washington  West Virginia  Wisconsin  Wyoming					
Tennessee  Texas  Utah  Vermont  Virginia  Washington  West Virginia  Wisconsin  Wyoming					
Texas Utah Vermont Virginia Washington West Virginia Wisconsin Wyoming					
Utah  Vermont  Virginia  Washington  West Virginia  Wisconsin  Wyoming					
Vermont Virginia Washington West Virginia Wisconsin Wyoming					
Virginia					
Washington  West Virginia  Wisconsin  Wyoming					
West Virginia Wisconsin Wyoming					
Wisconsin					
Wyoming					
49 40 48 19		40	16	40	10
		49	46	48	19

# **Area 1: Identifying Effective Teachers**

# Goal 2 – Evaluation of Effectiveness

The state should require instructional effectiveness to be the preponderant criterion of any teacher evaluation.

#### Figure 4

How States are Faring in Evaluating Teacher Effectiveness

- #
- 1 Best Practice State FLORIDA
- States Meet Goal South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas
- States Nearly Meet Goal
- 11 States Partly Meet Goal
  Alabama, Connecticut, Delaware, Georgia,
  lowa, Mississippi, Missouri, New Jersey,
  New Mexico, North Carolina, Oklahoma
- 22 States Meet a Small Part of Goal
  Alaska, Arizona, California, Colorado, Hawaii,
  Illinois, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland,
  Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota,
  Nebraska, Nevada, Ohio, Pennsylvania,
  Utah, Virginia, Washington, West Virginia,
  Wisconsin
- 14 States Do Not Meet Goal
  Arkansas, District of Columbia, Idaho, Indiana,
  Maine, Montana, New Hampshire, New York,
  North Dakota, Oregon, Rhode Island, South
  Dakota, Vermont, Wyoming

# **GOAL COMPONENTS**

(The factors considered in determining the states' rating for the goal.)

- The state should either require a common evaluation instrument in which evidence of student learning is the most significant criterion or should specifically require that student learning be the preponderant consideration in local evaluation processes. Evaluation instruments, whether state or locally developed, should be structured so as to preclude a teacher from receiving a satisfactory rating if found ineffective in the classroom.
- Evaluation instruments should require classroom observations that focus on and document the effectiveness of instruction.
- 3. Teacher evaluations should consider objective evidence of student learning, including not only standardized test scores, but also classroombased artifacts such as tests, quizzes and student work.

### **RATIONALE**

- ▶ See appendix for detailed rationale.
- Teachers should be judged primarily by their impact on students.

# SUPPORTING RESEARCH

► Research citations to support this goal are available at www.nctq.org/stpy/citations.

# Goal 2 Florida Analysis



# **ANALYSIS**

Florida policy requires local districts to develop teacher evaluation instruments that are "primarily based on the performance of students assigned to their classrooms." Evaluation instruments include classroom observations that document teacher effectiveness as well as objective evidence of improved student learning, as measured by state assessment data or, for grades or subjects not tested by the state assessment, local assessments as well as peer evaluations. In addition to evidence of student learning, other criteria include, for example, a teacher's knowledge and skills as well as a demonstrated ability to maintain discipline. Although Florida does not require a common evaluation instrument, the state clearly directs districts to base local evaluation instruments on a preponderance of evidence of student learning.

### **SUPPORTING RESEARCH**

2007 Florida Statutes, Title XLVIII, Chapter 1012, Section 34.3

#### **RECOMMENDATION**

Florida meets this goal, and the state's policies in this area earn it a "Best Practice" designation. Florida is commended for directing local districts to use both subjective and objective measures of student performance, including state assessment data, in their teacher evaluations and for making student performance the *preponderant* criterion in the teacher evaluation.

# **FLORIDA RESPONSE TO ANALYSIS**

Florida recognized the factual accuracy of our analysis.

Figure 5
State efforts to consider classroom effectiveness

	Requires evaluation to include classroom observation		Requires evidence of student learning to be the preponderant criterion for teacher evaluatio
Alabama			
Alaska			
Arizona			
Arkansas			
California			
Colorado			
Connecticut			
Delaware			
District of Columbi	 a □		
FLORIDA			
Georgia			
Hawaii	_		
Idaho			
Illinois			
Indiana			
lowa			
Kansas			
Kentucky			
Louisiana <sup>1</sup>			
Maine			
Maryland			
Massachusetts			
Michigan			
Minnesota <sup>2</sup>			
Mississippi			
Missouri			
Montana			
Nebraska			
Nevada			
New Hampshire			
New Jersey			
New Mexico			
New York			
North Carolina			
North Dakota			
Ohio			
Oklahoma			
Oregon			
Pennsylvania			
Rhode Island			
South Carolina			
South Dakota			
Tennessee			
Texas			
Utah <sup>3</sup>			
Vermont			
Virginia			
Washington			
West Virginia			
Wisconsin			
Wyoming			
	29	15	4



**Florida** explicitly requires teacher evaluations to be based primarily on evidence of student learning. The state requires evaluations to rely on classroom observations as well as objective measures of student achievement, including state assessment data. **South Carolina, Tennessee** and **Texas** also structure their formal evaluations so that teachers cannot get an overall satisfactory rating unless they also get a satisfactory rating on classroom effectiveness.

# Figure 6

# Sources of Objective Evidence of Student Learning

Many educators struggle to identify possible sources of objective student data. Here are some examples.

- Standardized test scores
- Periodic diagnostic assessments
- Benchmark assessments that show student growth
- Artifacts of student work connected to specific student learning standards that are randomly selected for review by the principal or senior faculty, scored using rubrics and descriptors
- Examples of typical assignments, assessed for their quality and rigor
- Periodic checks on progress with the curriculum coupled with evidence of student mastery of the curriculum from quizzes, tests and exams

#### Figure 5

- 1 Louisiana has an *optional* teacher evaluation system that does make explicit the need to include objective measures of student learning as part of the teacher evaluation.
- 2 Although Minnesota does not have policies regarding teacher evaluations, the state has implemented an optional teacher evaluation system based on evidence of student learning as measured by observations and objective measures, such as student achievement data.
- 3 For teachers participating in Utah's career-ladder program, in which teachers earn incentives for taking on additional responsibilities, teacher evaluations must include evidence of student achievement gains.

Figure 7 Do states direct how teachers should be evaluated? Districts must State provides guidance but use state-All districts developed State instrument OR local equivalent does not approve locally must use approves locally State has no role in statedeveloped developed approved developed evaluation instruments instrument by state instruments instrument Alabama Alaska Arizona Arkansas California Colorado Connecticut Delaware District of Columbia 1 **FLORIDA** П П П Georgia Hawaii Idaho Illinois Indiana П lowa П Kansas Kentucky Louisiana П Maine Maryland Massachusetts Michigan Minnesota Mississippi Missouri 1 Montana Nebraska П Nevada **New Hampshire** П **New Jersey** New Mexico П New York North Carolina П North Dakota Ohio Oklahoma Oregon П П П Pennsylvania **Rhode Island** 1 South Carolina South Dakota Tennessee П Texas Utah Vermont Virginia Washington West Virginia Wisconsin Wyoming 8 4 2 15 22

Figure 7

<sup>1</sup> The District of Columbia, Montana, Rhode Island and South Dakota have no state policies regarding any aspect of teacher evaluations.

# **Area 1: Identifying Effective Teachers**

Goal 3 - Tenure

# The state should require that tenure decisions be meaningful.

### Figure 8

# How States are Faring on Tenure



0 Best Practice States



States Meet Goal



States Nearly Meet Goal



States Partly Meet Goal



States Meet a Small Part of Goal Connecticut, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kentucky, Michigan, Missouri, New Mexico, North Carolina



42 States Do Not Meet Goal

Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas,
California, Colorado, Delaware, District
of Columbia, **FLORIDA**, Georgia, Hawaii,
Idaho, Kansas, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland,
Massachusetts, Minnesota, Mississippi,
Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire,
New Jersey, New York, North Dakota, Ohio,
Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode
Island, South Carolina, South Dakota,
Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Vermont, Virginia,
Washington, West Virginia, Wisconsin,
Wyoming

#### **GOAL COMPONENTS**

(The factors considered in determining the states' rating for the goal.)

- 1. A teacher should be eligible for tenure after a certain number of years of service, but tenure should not be granted automatically at that juncture.
- 2. The state should articulate a process, such as a hearing, that local districts must administer in considering the evidence and deciding whether a teacher should receive tenure.
- 3. Evidence of effectiveness should be the preponderant criterion in tenure decisions.
- 4. The minimum years of service needed to achieve tenure should allow sufficient data to be accumulated on which to base tenure decisions; five years is the ideal minimum.

### **RATIONALE**

- ▶ See appendix for detailed rationale.
- Tenure should be a significant and consequential milestone in a teacher's career.

# SUPPORTING RESEARCH

 Research citations to support this goal are available at www.nctg.org/stpy/citations.

# Goal 3 Florida Analysis



#### **ANALYSIS**

Florida does not require any process to ensure that tenure decisions are meaningful.

Florida has a three-year probationary period for new teachers. This may be extended to four years if prescribed by the school district and agreed to in writing by the employee at the time of reappointment.

Although Florida, unlike most states, does require teacher effectiveness to be the *preponderant* criterion in teacher evaluations (see Goal 1.2), there is no indication that cumulative evidence from these evaluations is considered as part of a process to determine whether to award tenure.

#### **SUPPORTING RESEARCH**

2007 Florida Statutes, Title XLVIII, 1012.33 (3)(a) and (3)(c)

# **RECOMMENDATION**

Florida does not meet this goal. The awarding of tenure is a milestone in every teacher's career and should be afforded the respect it deserves, regardless of whether the state is bestowing a lifetime or limited-term position. The state should consider extending the minimum probationary period for tenure to five years, which would allow for the accumulation of sufficient data on teacher effectiveness to support meaningful tenure decisions. Although it is appropriate for teachers to achieve tenure after a certain number of years, tenure should not automatically be granted at this juncture. To justify this leap in professional standing, most notably a tremendous advantage in due process, the state should identify a process, such as a hearing, that local districts would be required to administer, where the cumulative evidence of teacher effectiveness would be considered for each teacher and a determination made of whether to award tenure. Teacher effectiveness in the classroom, rather than the completion of a number of years of experience, should be the *preponderant* criterion in tenure decisions.

# **FLORIDA RESPONSE TO ANALYSIS**

Florida asserted, based on the following excerpt from the applicable statute, that its tenure decisions are based on a process that ensures their meaningfulness: "The member must have been recommended by the district school superintendent for such contract and reappointed by the district school board based on successful performance of duties and demonstration of professional competence." The state added that NCTQ's analysis correctly points out that Florida's annual evaluations require student performance to be the primary component.

### SUPPORTING RESEARCH


1012.33(3)(a)(3)

#### **LAST WORD**

It is not clear from this statute that the state specifically requires district school boards to use evidence of teacher impact on student learning in making tenure decisions. Florida is ahead of many states in that it has an evaluation instrument that could review cumulative evidence of effectiveness. Florida should consider the adoption of a formal process that districts would be required to use that would ensure that they consider cumulative data that reflect teacher effectiveness in making tenure decisions.

Figure 9

How are tenure decisions made?



1 lowa and New Mexico. However, teacher effectiveness based on multiple years of data is not preponderant criterion.



# **EXAMPLES OF BEST PRACTICE**

Unfortunately, no state has an exemplary policy that NCTQ can highlight as best practice for granting tenure. Only **lowa** and **New Mexico** consider evidence of teacher effectiveness when making tenure decisions, although it is not the preponderant criterion. **New York City**, however, has taken some significant steps that could serve as a model for both states and districts.

In February 2008, the New York City Department of Education launched its Principals' Portal, allowing the city's 1,500 principals access to a Tenure Toolkit, designed to ensure that the city's teachers achieve a certain level of effectiveness prior to being granted what should be a meaningful title. To achieve this objective, principals are encouraged to work with their teachers throughout the entire three-year probationary period and to utilize the Teacher Development Toolkit, which offers resources for improvement. The city's criteria for granting tenure include "significant professional skill," evidenced by lesson plans and observations, and "a meaningful, positive impact on student learning," measured by a broad range of possible student work products, including reports, projects and test scores. Interestingly, initial tenure numbers indicate a trend toward discretion. The number of teachers denied tenure, as well as those placed on an extended probationary period, has doubled from the previous school year, before the Toolkit was implemented on the Portal.

FLORIDA<sup>1</sup> No 1 2 3 4 5 policy year years years years years

Figure 10 How long before a teacher earns tenure?

- Figures 10 & 11

  1 Period may be extended to four years if prescribed by district and agreed to by employee.

  2 Period may not "exceed" two years.

  3 District may extend period to three years on individual basis.

  4 New teachers with three consecutive satisfactory evaluations may qualify after one year.

Figure 11				3		
How long before a	t <b>each</b> No	er ear 1	ns ten 2	<i>ure?</i> 3	4	5
	policy	year	years	years	years	years
Alabama						
Alaska						
Arizona						
Arkansas						
California						
Colorado						
Connecticut						
Delaware						
District of Columbia						
FLORIDA <sup>1</sup>						
Georgia						П
Hawaii				$\overline{\Box}$		$\overline{\Box}$
Idaho		$\overline{\Box}$				
Illinois						
Indiana						
lowa						
Kansas						
Kentucky						
•						
Louisiana						
Maine <sup>2</sup>						
Maryland <sup>3</sup>		Ш				
Massachusetts						
Michigan		Ш				Ш
Minnesota						
Mississippi						
Missouri						
Montana						
Nebraska						
Nevada <sup>4</sup>						
New Hampshire						
New Jersey						
New Mexico						
New York						
North Carolina						П
North Dakota						
Ohio						
Oklahoma						П
Oregon						
Pennsylvania						
Rhode Island						
South Carolina						
South Dakota						
Tennessee						
Texas						
Utah						
Vermont						
Virginia						
Washington						
West Virginia						
Wisconsin						
Wyoming						
	1	3	7	33	5	2

# **Area 2: Retaining Effective Teachers**

# Goal 1 - Induction

The state should require effective induction for all new teachers, with special emphasis on teachers in high-needs schools.

# **GOAL COMPONENTS**

(The factors considered in determining the states' rating for the goal.)

- 1. The state should require that new teachers be provided with a high-quality mentoring experience.
- The state should ensure that new teachers receive mentoring of sufficient frequency and duration, especially in the first critical weeks of school.
- Mentors should be carefully selected based on evidence of their own classroom effectiveness and subject-matter expertise. Training should be provided to mentors, and their performance as mentors should be evaluated.
- 4. Induction programs should include only strategies that can be successfully implemented even in a poorly managed school. Such strategies include intensive mentoring, seminars appropriate to grade level or subject area, a reduced teaching load and frequent release time to observe other teachers.

# **RATIONALE**

- ► See appendix for detailed rationale.
- Too many new teachers are left to "sink or swim" when they begin teaching.
- Vague requirements simply to provide mentoring are insufficient.
- New teachers in high-needs schools are particularly in need of quality mentoring.

#### **SUPPORTING RESEARCH**

• Research citations to support this goal are available at www.nctq.org/stpy/citations.

### Figure 12

# **How States are Faring on Induction**



- 1 Best Practice State South Carolina
- 9 States Meet Goal Alabama, Arkansas, Indiana, Kentucky, Louisiana, Massachusetts, New Jersey, North Carolina, West Virginia
- 14 States Nearly Meet Goal
  Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Iowa,
  Kansas, Maine, Michigan, Mississippi,
  Nebraska, New York, Oklahoma, Rhode Island,
  Utah, Virginia
- 9 States Partly Meet Goal Arizona, California, Maryland, Missouri, New Mexico, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, Washington
- 5 States Meet a Small Part of Goal FLORIDA, Idaho, South Dakota, Texas, Wisconsin
- States Do Not Meet Goal Alaska, District of Columbia, Georgia, Hawaii, Illinois, Minnesota, Montana, Nevada, New Hampshire, North Dakota, Oregon, Vermont, Wyoming

# Goal 1 Florida Analysis



Figure 13

State Meets a Small Part of Goal

# **ANALYSIS**

Florida requires that some of its new teachers receive mentoring. Only teachers completing a district alternative certification program are required to have a mentor, and adjunct (part-time) teachers are required to be assigned a peer mentor by their principals for the first year of their employment.

National Board certified teachers who mentor are eligible for a bonus (10 percent of the prior fiscal year's statewide average salary for classroom teachers).

#### SUPPORTING RESEARCH

Florida Statutes Title XLVIII, Chap. 1012, Arts. 56, 57 and 72

# **RECOMMENDATION**

Florida meets only a small part of this goal. The state should require that new teachers are provided with a high-quality mentoring experience. To ensure that provided support is meaningful, the state should require induction strategies that can be implemented successfully, even in poorly managed schools, such as intensive mentoring, seminars appropriate to grade level or subject area, a reduced teaching load and/or frequent release time to observe other teachers.

The state should also set a timeline in which mentors are assigned to at least all new teachers in high-needs schools, but ideally to all new teachers throughout the state, soon after the commencing of teaching, to offer support during those critical first weeks of school. Mentors should be required to be trained in a content area or grade level similar to that of the new teachers, and the state should mandate a method for performance evaluation.

#### **FLORIDA RESPONSE TO ANALYSIS**

Florida was helpful in providing NCTQ with facts that enhanced our analysis.

Does <b>Florida</b> policy articulate the elements of an effective ind program?	uction
Mentoring for all new teachers	NO <sup>1</sup>
Mentoring of sufficient frequency and duration	NO
Mentoring provided at beginning of school year	NO
Careful selection of mentors	NO
Mentors must be trained	NO
Mentors must be evaluated	NO
Use of a variety of effective	NO

induction strategies

Mentor is compensated

NO

NO

<sup>1</sup> State only requires mentors for alternative certification and adjunct teachers.

# **EXAMPLES OF BEST PRACTICE**

**South Carolina** requires that all new teachers, prior to the start of the school year, be assigned mentors for at least one year. Districts carefully select mentors, who must undergo additional training, based on experience and similar certifications and grade levels. Adequate release time is mandated by the state so that mentors and new teachers may observe each other in the classroom, collaborate on effective teaching techniques and develop professional growth plans. Mentor evaluations are mandatory and stipends are recommended.

Figure 14

Do states have policies that articulate the elements of effective induction?




Figure 15			
Do states have p	olicies tha	t articulate	the
elements of effect	ctive induc		C.
	No induction	Limited/weak induction	Strong induction
Alabama			
Alaska			
Arizona			
Arkansas			
California			
Colorado			
Connecticut			
Delaware			
District of Columbia			
FLORIDA			
Georgia			
Hawaii			
Idaho			
Illinois			
Indiana			
Iowa			
Kansas			
Kentucky			
Louisiana			
Maine			
Maryland			
Massachusetts			
Michigan			
Minnesota			
Mississippi			
Missouri			
Montana			
Nebraska			
Nevada			
New Hampshire			
New Jersey			
New Mexico			
New York			
North Carolina			
North Dakota			
Ohio			
Oklahoma			
Oregon			
Pennsylvania			
Rhode Island			
South Carolina			
South Dakota			
Tennessee			
Texas			
Utah			
Vermont			
Virginia			
Washington			
West Virginia			
Wisconsin			
Wyoming			
	13	14	24

# **Area 2: Retaining Effective Teachers**

# Goal 2 - Licensure Advancement

The state should ensure that the only factors required when moving from a probationary to a nonprobationary license are those known to advance teacher effectiveness.

### Figure 16

# How States are Faring on Licensure Advancement

- \*
- 1 Best Practice State
  New Mexico
- O States Meet Goal
- •
- States Nearly Meet Goal Arkansas, Ohio
- 13 States Partly Meet Goal
  California, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Louisiana,
  Maine, North Carolina, South Carolina,
  Tennessee, Utah, Vermont, Washington,
  Wisconsin
- 13 States Meet a Small Part of Goal Arizona, Colorado, Delaware, FLORIDA, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Massachusetts, Nebraska, New Hampshire, Oklahoma, Rhode Island
- Alabama, Alaska, Connecticut, District of Columbia, Kentucky, Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nevada, New Jersey, New York, North Dakota, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Dakota, Texas, Virginia, West Virginia, Wyoming

# **GOAL COMPONENTS**

(The factors considered in determining the states' rating for the goal.)

- 1. The state should base advancement from a probationary to a nonprobationary license on evidence of classroom effectiveness.
- 2. The state should not require teachers to fulfill general, nonspecific coursework requirements to advance from a probationary to a nonprobationary license.
- 3. The state should not require teachers to have an advanced degree as a condition of permanent licensure.

# **RATIONALE**

- ▶ See appendix for detailed rationale.
- The point of the probationary licensure period should be to determine teacher effectiveness.
- Most state requirements for achieving permanent certification have not been shown to impact teacher effectiveness.

# **SUPPORTING RESEARCH**

• Research citations to support this goal are available at www.nctq.org/stpy/citations.

# Goal 2 Florida Analysis



# State Meets a Small Part of Goal

### **ANALYSIS**

Florida's requirements for moving from a probationary to a nonprobationary license include factors that have not been shown to advance teacher effectiveness.

To advance from a "Temporary" certificate to a "Professional" certificate, the state requires teachers to demonstrate "mastery of general knowledge (e.g., passing scores on basic skills exam),""mastery of subject area knowledge (e.g., passing scores on subject area exam)" and "mastery of professional preparation and education competence (e.g., passing scores on competency exam)."

#### SUPPORTING RESEARCH

2007 Florida Statutes, Title XLVIII, 1012.56

#### RECOMMENDATION

Florida meets only a small part of this goal. Although Florida does not require advanced degrees or random coursework to attain permanent licensure, the state's criteria are not based on factors that measure or advance teacher effectiveness

The state also places students at risk by requiring passage of licensure exams to attain professional licensure rather than for an initial license. Florida's policy allows teachers who may not be able to pass the tests to teach on a provisional license (see Goal 3.3).

# **FLORIDA RESPONSE TO ANALYSIS**

Florida asserted that both the Temporary and Professional certificates meet NCLB standards because they require demonstration of subject matter content. It pointed out that teachers applying for a Temporary certificate may demonstrate subject matter knowledge by holding a degree with a major or 30 semester hours of specified credit in the content area to be taught. Teachers exercising these options must then pass subject matter tests prior to the issuance of the Professional certificate.

The state added that the requirements for professional education competence include testing as well as "demonstration of teaching."

Lastly, Florida reiterated that its Professional certificate is its highest certificate and that it does not offer "an advanced, or level III certificate." The state was unclear from the rationale whether the goal was to have these requirements met prior to issuing the state's standard or advanced certificate.

### **LAST WORD**

Florida's requirements are too vague to ensure that evidence of teacher effectiveness plays a role in the advancement of licensure. The state's requirements may meet NCLB requirements for teacher qualifications, but the state should consider how evidence of effectiveness can be used as a factor in licensure advancement.

Figure 17 Do states require teachers to show evidence of effectiveness before conferring permanent licensure?<sup>1</sup>


permanentileen	No evidence of effectiveness	Some evidence of effectiveness	Preponderant evidence of effectiveness
Alabama			
Alaska			
Arizona			
Arkansas			
California	$\overline{}$		
Colorado			
Connecticut			
Delaware			
District of Columbia			
FLORIDA			
Georgia			
Hawaii			
Idaho			
Illinois			
Indiana			
lowa			
Kansas			
Kentucky			
Louisiana			
Maine	ᆜ		
Maryland			
Massachusetts			
Michigan			
Minnesota			
Mississippi			
Missouri			
Montana			
Nebraska			
Nevada			
New Hampshire			
New Jersey			
New Mexico			
New York			
North Carolina			
North Dakota			
Ohio			
Oklahoma		$\overline{}$	
Oregon			
Pennsylvania			
Rhode Island			
South Carolina			
South Dakota			
Tennessee			
Texas			
Utah			
Vermont			
Virginia			
Washington			
West Virginia Wisconsin			
Wyoming			
	35	15	1



# **EXAMPLES OF BEST PRACTICE**

In addition to three years' teaching experience and completing the mentoring requirement, New Mexico requires new teachers to submit a professional development dossier to advance from the probationary to nonprobationary certificate. The dossier is divided into five strands, including evidence of teacher effectiveness and evidence of student learning, and teachers must meet or exceed the standards in all strands to advance.

Figure 18 Do states require teachers to earn advanced degrees before conferring permanent licensure?



1 Connecticut, Kentucky, Maryland, New York and Oregon.

1 Permanent licensure refers to the right to practice; permanent status, or tenure, is a condition of employment. In most states, the conferral of each is separate and unrelated.

Figure 19

Do states require teachers to take additional, nonspecific coursework before conferring permanent licensure?



1 Alabama, Alaska, Connecticut, District of Columbia, Idaho, Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nevada, New Jersey, North Dakota, Pennsylvania, South Dakota, Texas, Virginia, West Virginia and Wyoming.

# **Area 2: Retaining Effective Teachers**

Goal 3 – Pay Scales

The state should ensure that the only factors required when moving from a probationary to a nonprobationary license are those known to advance teacher effectiveness.

# Figure 20

# How States are Faring on Pay Scales



**Best Practice States** 



States Meet Goal



States Nearly Meet Goal



31 States Partly Meet Goal

Alaska, Arizona, California, Colorado, Connecticut, District of Columbia, FLORIDA, Idaho, Iowa, Kansas, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, North Dakota, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Dakota, Utah, Vermont, Virginia, Wisconsin, Wyoming



States Meet a Small Part of Goal

Illinois, Rhode Island, Texas



( ) 17 States Do Not Meet Goal

Alabama, Arkansas, Delaware, Georgia, Hawaii, Indiana, Kentucky, Louisiana, Mississippi, Missouri, North Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma, South Carolina, Tennessee, Washington, West Virginia

# **GOAL COMPONENTS**

(The factors considered in determining the states' rating for the goal.)

- 1. While the state may articulate teachers' starting salaries, it should not require districts to adhere to a state-dictated salary schedule that sets minimum pay for every level.
- 2. The state should discourage districts from tying additional compensation to advanced degrees. The state should eliminate salary schedules that establish higher minimum salaries or other requirements to pay more to teachers with advanced degrees.
- 3. The state should discourage salary schedules that imply that teachers with the most experience are the most effective. The state should eliminate salary schedules that require that the highest steps on the pay scale be determined solely by seniority.

# **RATIONALE**

- ► See appendix for detailed rationale.
- Compensation reform can be accomplished within the context of local control.
- There is an important difference between a state setting the minimum teacher salary and setting a salary schedule.

#### SUPPORTING RESEARCH

Research citations to support this goal are available at www.nctq.org/stpy/citations.

# Goal 3 Florida Analysis



State Partly Meets Goal

# **ANALYSIS**

Florida gives local districts the authority for pay scales, eliminating barriers such as state salary schedules and other regulations that control how districts pay teachers. When determining salary schedules, districts must base a portion of each employee's compensation on performance, as demonstrated by the personnel assessment system, and consider "prior professional experience in the field of education."

# SUPPORTING RESEARCH

2007 Florida Statutes Title XLVIII, sections 1012.22 and 1012.27(2)

# RECOMMENDATION

Florida meets this goal in part. Although the state is commended for not requiring local districts to adhere to a state-dictated salary schedule, it should articulate policies that definitively discourage districts from tying compensation to advanced degrees as well as assuming teachers with the most experience are the most effective, thereby ensuring that the highest steps on the pay scale are not determined solely by seniority.

# **FLORIDA RESPONSE TO ANALYSIS**

Florida recognized the factual accuracy of our analysis.

Figure 21 What role does the state play in deciding teacher pay rates?

teucher pay rute	Sets minimum salary schedule	Sets minimum salary	Gives full authority to districts
Alabama			
Alaska			
Arizona			
Arkansas			
California			
Colorado			<b>1</b>
Connecticut			
Delaware			
District of Columbia			
FLORIDA			
Georgia			
Hawaii			
Idaho			
Illinois			
Indiana			
lowa			
Kansas			
Kentucky			
Louisiana		П	
Maine			
Maryland			
Massachusetts			
Michigan		$\overline{\Box}$	
Minnesota			
Mississippi			
Missouri			
Montana			
Nebraska			
Nevada			
New Hampshire			_
New Jersey			
New Mexico			
New York			
North Carolina			
North Dakota	_		
Ohio			_
Oklahoma			
Oregon			
Pennsylvania			
Rhode Island			2
South Carolina			
South Dakota			
Tennessee			
Texas			
Utah			
Vermont			
Virginia			
Washington			
West Virginia Wisconsin			
Wyoming			
	17	8	26



# **EXAMPLES OF BEST PRACTICE**

Unfortunately, NCTQ cannot highlight any state's policy in this area. Twenty-six states do not require districts to adhere to salary schedules or minimum salary requirements, giving them full control of teacher pay rates. No state has yet articulated a policy that discourages tying compensation to advanced degrees or basing salary solely on years of experience.

Figure 22 What role does the state play in deciding teacher pay rates?




Figure 21

- 1 Colorado gives districts option of a salary schedule, a performance pay policy or a combination of both.
- 2 Rhode Island requires that local district salary schedules are based on years of service, experience and training.

	Yes	No
Alabama		
Alaska	Ī	
Arizona		
Arkansas		
California		
Colorado <sup>1</sup>		
Connecticut		
Delaware		
District of Columbia	$\overline{\Box}$	
FLORIDA		
Georgia		
Hawaii		
Idaho <sup>2</sup>		
Illinois		
Indiana		
Iowa		
Kansas		
Kentucky		
Louisiana		
Maine	$\overline{}$	
Maryland		
Massachusetts		
Michigan		
Minnesota		
Mississippi		
Missouri		
Montana	$\overline{\Box}$	
Nebraska		
Nevada		
New Hampshire		
New Jersey		
New Mexico		
New York		
North Carolina		
North Dakota		
Ohio		
Oklahoma		
Oregon		
Pennsylvania		
Rhode Island <sup>3</sup>		
South Carolina		
South Dakota		
Tennessee		
Texas		
Utah		
Vermont		
Virginia		
Washington West Virginia		
West Virginia		
Micconcin		
Wyoming		
Wisconsin Wyoming		

- 1 If districts choose to have salary schedules, one variable must be teachers' education.
- 2 Idaho refers to "education index" in district-determined
- Schedules.
   Rhode Island requires local district salary schedules to include teacher "training."

# **Area 2: Retaining Effective Teachers**

Goal 4 – Retention Pay

The state should support retention pay, such as significant boosts in salary after tenure is awarded, for effective teachers.

### Figure 24

# How States are Faring on Retention Pay



0 Best Practice States



O States Meet Goal



States Nearly Meet Goal



O States Partly Meet Goal



O States Meet a Small Part of Goal



51 States Do Not Meet Goal

Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas,
California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware,
District of Columbia, **FLORIDA**, Georgia,
Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas,
Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland,
Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota,
Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska,
Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New
Mexico, New York, North Carolina, North
Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon,
Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina,
South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah,
Vermont, Virginia, Washington, West Virginia,
Wisconsin, Wyoming

# **GOAL COMPONENTS**

(The factors considered in determining the states' rating for the goal.)

- 1. The state should encourage districts to provide a significant pay increase to teachers awarded tenure, provided tenure is based on sufficient data to determine effectiveness
- The state should not support longevity bonuses, which are awarded at the end of teachers' careers and do not provide effective retention strategies.

#### **RATIONALE**

- ▶ See appendix for detailed rationale.
- Connecting additional compensation to the awarding of tenure would help teacher retention.

### SUPPORTING RESEARCH

 Research citations to support this goal are available at www.nctq.org/stpy/citations.



# **EXAMPLES OF BEST PRACTICE**

Unfortunately, NCTQ cannot highlight any state's policy in this area.

# Goal 4 Florida Analysis



# **ANALYSIS**

Florida does not support retention pay for effective teachers, such as significant boosts in salary after tenure is awarded. It is up to local districts to determine salary schedules and/or policies.

# **SUPPORTING RESEARCH**

2007 Florida Statutes Title XLVIII, sections 1012.22 and 1012.27(2)

# **RECOMMENDATION**

Florida does not meet this goal. The state should encourage local districts to provide a significant pay increase to teachers awarded tenure, provided tenure is based on sufficient data to determine effectiveness. Offering financial incentives for classroom performance is a valuable tool for keeping effective new teachers in the school system, rather than more commonly employed incentives such as longevity bonuses, which are awarded toward the end of teachers' careers and are not connected to teachers' effectiveness.

# **FLORIDA RESPONSE TO ANALYSIS**

Florida recognized the factual accuracy of our analysis. The state added that it supports performance pay based on teacher effectiveness but "does not employ the tenure salary jump required by this item to obtain an effectiveness-based salary."

# **Area 2: Retaining Effective Teachers**

# Goal 5 – Compensation for Prior Work Experience

The state should encourage districts to provide compensation for related prior subject-area work experience.

# Figure 25

How States are Faring on Compensation for Prior Work Experience

- \*
- Best Practice State
  North Carolina
- 1 State Meets Goal California
- States Nearly Meet Goal
- 3 States Partly Meet Goal Delaware, Georgia, Texas

Wyoming

- States Meet a Small Part of Goal
- Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas,
  Colorado, Connecticut, District of Columbia,
  FLORIDA, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa,
  Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland,
  Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota,
  Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska,
  Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey,
  New Mexico, New York, North Dakota, Ohio,
  Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode
  Island, South Carolina, South Dakota,
  Tennessee, Utah, Vermont, Virginia,
  Washington, West Virginia, Wisconsin,

# **GOAL COMPONENTS**

(The factors considered in determining the states' rating for the goal.)

 The state should encourage districts to compensate new teachers with relevant prior work experience through mechanisms such as starting these teachers at an advanced step on the pay scale. Further, the state should not have regulatory language that would block such strategies.

# **RATIONALE**

- ▶ See appendix for detailed rationale.
- Districts should be allowed to pay new teachers with relevant work experience more than other new teachers.

# **SUPPORTING RESEARCH**

 Research citations to support this goal are available at www.nctq.org/stpy/citations.

# Goal 5 Florida Analysis



### **ANALYSIS**

Florida does not encourage local districts to provide compensation for related prior subject-area work experience. However, the state does not seem to have regulatory language blocking such strategies.

# RECOMMENDATION

Florida does not meet this goal. The state should encourage local districts to compensate new teachers with relevant prior-work experience, through mechanisms such as starting these teachers at an advanced step on the pay scale.


# **FLORIDA RESPONSE TO ANALYSIS**

Florida recognized the factual accuracy of our analysis. The state added that "the NCTQ rationale statement, 'For example, the hiring of a new high school chemistry teacher with 20 years experience as a chemical engineer is most certainly a great boon to any district' is true, provided the expert engineer is able to relate the content to ... the students s/he is to be teaching. Florida has provided entry into the profession for content experts for more than 20 years, and has seen these types of individuals be very successful and not. We continue to recruit them and work on better ways to select them and to develop them to be as effective as teachers as they were in their previous careers."

### **LAST WORD**

Florida's point is well taken. Not all candidates with relevant prior experience will become exemplary teachers. However, as long as experience is a significant component of salary schedules, there is a need to compensate these career changers in a way that takes their past work into consideration.

Figure 26 Do states direct districts to compensate teachers for related prior work experience?



1 California, Delaware, Georgia, North Carolina and Texas.

# **EXAMPLES OF BEST PRACTICE**

North Carolina compensates new teachers with relevant prior-work experience by awarding them one year of experience credit for every year of fulltime work, after earning a bachelor's degree, that is related to their area of licensure and work assignment. One year of credit is awarded for every two years of work experience completed prior to earning a bachelor's degree.

### **Area 2: Retaining Effective Teachers**

### Goal 6 - Differential Pay for Shortage Areas

The state should support retention pay, such as significant boosts in salary after tenure is awarded, for effective teachers.

#### **GOAL COMPONENTS**

(The factors considered in determining the states' rating for the goal.)

- 1. The state should support differential pay for effective teaching in shortage subject areas.
- 2. The state should support differential pay for effective teaching in high-needs schools.
- 3. The state should not have regulatory language that would block differential pay.

#### **RATIONALE**

- ▶ See appendix for detailed rationale.
- States should take the lead in addressing chronic shortages and needs.

#### **SUPPORTING RESEARCH**

 Research citations to support this goal are available at www.nctq.org/stpy/citations.

### Figure 27

How States are Faring on Differential Pay for Shortage Areas



0 Best Practice States



17 States Meet Goal

Arkansas, California, **FLORIDA**, Georgia, Hawaii, Kentucky, Louisiana, Massachusetts, Mississippi, Nevada, New York, Ohio, Oklahoma, Tennessee, Texas, Virginia, Wyoming

- - 3 States Nearly Meet Goal Maryland, Pennsylvania, Washington
- 5 9
  - States Partly Meet Goal Colorado, Iowa, North Carolina, Utah, Wisconsin
- - 9 States Meet a Small Part of Goal Connecticut, Illinois, Montana, Nebraska, New Hampshire, Oregon, South Carolina, South Dakota, Vermont
- 17 States Do Not Meet Goal

Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Delaware, District of Columbia, Idaho, Indiana, Kansas, Maine, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, New Jersey, New Mexico, North Dakota, Rhode Island, West Virginia

## Goal 6 Florida Analysis



State Meets Goal

#### **ANALYSIS**

Florida supports differential pay in which a teacher can earn additional compensation by teaching certain subjects or working at a school classified as high needs. As of the 2007-2008 academic year, each district school board had adopted a salary schedule, subject to negotiation, with differential pay for instructional personnel as well as school-based administrators. Two of the determining factors for differentiated pay are "critical shortage areas" and "school demographics."

Teachers who are National Board Certified are eligible to receive a 10-percent annual bonus, but this type of differential pay is not tied to high-needs schools or subject-area shortages.

#### **SUPPORTING RESEARCH**

Florida Statute Title XLVIII Chapter 1012.22 (c) 4: http://www.nbpts.org/resources/state\_local\_information/Florida

#### RECOMMENDATION

Florida meets this goal. Florida is commended for its differential pay incentives for both teaching certain subjects and working in a high-needs school.

#### **FLORIDA RESPONSE TO ANALYSIS**

Florida recognized the factual accuracy of our analysis.

# **EXAMPLES OF BEST PRACTICE**

Seventeen states meet this goal, and although NCTQ has not singled out one state's policy for best practice honors, **Louisiana**, **Nevada**, **New York** and **Texas** are commended for not only supporting differential pay for teaching in shortage subject areas and in high-needs schools but also for offering meaningful incentive amounts.

**California**, **Georgia** and **Hawaii** are also noteworthy because these states provide incentives for National Board Certified teachers to work in high-needs schools.

Figure 28

Figure 28

Do states provide incentives to teach in high-needs schools or shortage subject areas?

	High-nee Differentia pay	ds schools Loan forgiveness	Shortage so Differential pay	Loan forgiveness	No support
Alabama					
Alaska					
Arizona					
Arkansas					
California					
Colorado					
Connecticut <sup>1</sup>					
Delaware					
District of Columbia					
FLORIDA					
Georgia					П
Hawaii					
Idaho					
Illinois					
Indiana					
lowa					
Kansas					
Kentucky					
Louisiana					
Maine					
Maryland <sup>2</sup>					
Massachusetts					
Michigan					
Minnesota					
Mississippi					
Missouri					
Montana					
Nebraska					
Nevada					
New Hampshire					
New Jersey					
New Mexico					
New York					
North Carolina					
North Dakota					
Ohio					
Oklahoma					
Oregon					
Pennsylvania					
Rhode Island					
South Carolina					
South Dakota <sup>3</sup>					
Tennessee				П	
Texas					
Utah					
Vermont					
Virginia					
Washington					
West Virginia					
Wisconsin					
Wyoming					
vv yourning					
	22	7	20	9	17

<sup>1</sup> Connecticut offers mortgage assistance and incentives to retired teachers.

<sup>2</sup> Maryland offers tuition reimbursement for retraining in the areas of mathematics and science, if the teacher agrees to teach in the public school system for at least two years following certification. It also offers a stipend to alternate route candidates who agree to teach math, science or special education in a state public school for at least three years.

<sup>3</sup> South Dakota offers scholarships and signing bonuses.

## **Area 2: Retaining Effective Teachers**

## Goal 7 – Performance Pay

The state should support performance pay, but in a manner that recognizes its infancy, appropriate uses and limitations.

#### Figure 29

### How States are Faring on Performance Pay



**1** Best Practice State Tennessee



11 States Meet Goal
Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, FLORIDA,
Iowa, Minnesota, Ohio, South Carolina,
South Dakota, Texas, Utah



5 States Partly Meet Goal Kentucky, Louisiana, Michigan, Missouri, North Carolina



31 States Do Not Meet Goal

Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, District of Columbia, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Kansas, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Mississippi, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, North Dakota, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Vermont, Virginia, Washington, West Virginia, Wisconsin, Wyoming

#### **GOAL COMPONENTS**

(The factors considered in determining the states' rating for the goal.)

- 1. The state should support performance pay efforts, rewarding teachers for their effectiveness in the classroom.
- The state should allow districts flexibility to define the criteria for performance pay; however, the state should ensure that districts' criteria are connected to evidence of student achievement.
- 3. Any performance pay plan should allow for the participation of all teachers, not just those with students who take standardized tests.

#### **RATIONALE**

- ▶ See appendix for detailed rationale.
- Performance pay is an important retention strategy.
- States should set guidelines for districts to ensure that plans are fair and sound.

#### **SUPPORTING RESEARCH**

► Research citations to support this goal are available at www.nctq.org/stpy/citations.

## Goal 7 Florida Analysis



State Meets Goal

#### **ANALYSIS**

Florida supports performance pay. When determining salaries, local districts are required to base a portion of compensation on performance, as evaluated by the instructional personnel assessment system. Districts are also eligible to participate in the Merit Award Program "that provides for an assessment and a merit award based on the performance of students assigned to the employee's classroom."

To determine awards, assessment is based primarily on student performance, "as measured by statewide standardized tests, or, for subjects and grades that are not measured by the statewide assessment program, by national, state, or district-determined testing instruments that measure the Sunshine State Standards, curriculum frameworks, or course descriptions for the content area assigned and grade level taught." The state requires that at least 60 percent of the determination is based on student performance and not more than 40 percent is based upon the principal's evaluation, attendance or other criteria.

The amount of the award is at least 5 percent of a district's average teacher's salary, but not more than 10 percent, regardless of the teacher's years of experience.

#### SUPPORTING RESEARCH

Florida Code, Title XLVIII, 1012.22(1)(c) and 1012.225 f

#### RECOMMENDATION

Florida meets this goal. The state is commended for recognizing performance pay and connecting it to student achievement, and for doing it in a manner that allows local districts the flexibility to define criteria by which it is awarded and enabling all teachers to participate, not just those with students who take standardized tests.

#### **FLORIDA RESPONSE TO ANALYSIS**

Florida recognized the factual accuracy of our analysis.

Figure 30

### Do states support performance pay?

	Supports perfomance pay	Does not support performance pay	Connects performance pay to evidence of student achievement	Open to all teachers
Alabama	1			
Alaska	<b>1</b>			
Arizona				
Arkansas				
California <sup>2</sup>				
Colorado				
Connecticut				
Delaware				
District of Columbia				
FLORIDA				
Georgia				
Hawaii				
Idaho				
Illinois				
Indiana				
lowa				
Kansas				
Kentucky				
Louisiana				
Maine				
Maryland				
Massachusetts				
Michigan				
Minnesota				
Mississippi				
Missouri Montana				
Nebraska				
Nevada				
New Hampshire				
New Jersey				
New Mexico				
New York				
North Carolina				
North Dakota				
Ohio	1			
Oklahoma				
Oregon				
Pennsylvania				
Rhode Island				
South Carolina				
South Dakota	1			
Tennessee				
Texas				
Utah				
Vermont				
Virginia				
Washington				
West Virginia				
Wisconsin				
Wyoming				
	20	31	16	13



#### **EXAMPLES OF BEST PRACTICE**

**Tennessee** requires differentiated pay plans, which may include performance pay. If districts choose to include a performance component, it must be based on student achievement gains and be criterion-based so that all teachers meeting the standard, not just those with students who take standardized tests, are eligible for the reward. Although the state does not dictate specific incentive amounts, it requires that the awards be significant enough to make a difference to teachers.

### Figure 30

- Alaska, Alabama, Ohio and South Dakota fund pilot programs.
   California only offers incentives to teachers in underachieving schools.

### **Area 2: Retaining Effective Teachers**

## Goal 8 – Pension Flexibility

The state should ensure that pension systems are portable, flexible and fair to all teachers.

#### **GOAL COMPONENTS**

(The factors considered in determining the states' rating for the goal.)

- 1. Participants in the state's pension system should have the option of a defined contribution plan as their primary pension plan.
- 2. Participants in the state's pension system should be vested no later than the third year of employment.
- 3. Mandatory employee and employer contribution rates should not be unreasonably high. Excessively high employee contribution rates are particularly problematic for teachers with lower salaries, while excessive employer contributions commit district resources that could otherwise be spent on salaries or incentives.
- 4. Defined benefit plans should offer the option of a lump-sum withdrawal upon employment termination. This option at minimum should include employee contributions and accrued interest at a fair interest rate. In addition, withdrawal options from either defined benefit or defined contribution plans should include funds contributed by the employer.
- 5. Defined benefit plans should allow participants to purchase time for unlimited previous teaching experience at the time of employment. Teachers should also be allowed to purchase time for all official leaves of absence, such as maternity and paternity leave.

#### **RATIONALE**

- See appendix for detailed rationale.
- Anachronistic features of teacher pension plans disadvantage teachers early in their careers.
- Pension plans also disadvantage teachers early in their careers by overcommitting employer resources to retirement benefits.

#### Figure 31

### How States are Faring on Pension Flexibility



**Best Practice States** 



State Meets Goal Alaska



States Nearly Meet Goal California, Ohio, South Carolina, South Dakota, Virginia



19 States Partly Meet Goal

Alabama, Arizona, Colorado, FLORIDA, Idaho, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Maine, Michigan, Minnesota, Nebraska, New Jersey, Oregon, Utah, Vermont, Washington, Wisconsin, Wyoming



14 States Meet a Small Part of Goal

Connecticut, Delaware, Hawaii, Illinois, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Mississippi, Missouri, New York, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Tennessee



12 States Do Not Meet Goal

Arkansas, District of Columbia, Georgia, Massachusetts, Montana, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Mexico, North Carolina, Rhode Island, Texas, West Virginia

#### SUPPORTING RESEARCH

Research citations to support this goal are available at www.nctq.org/stpy/citations.

Figure 32 on page 43 provides a glossary of pension terms.

## Goal 8 Florida Analysis



State Partly Meets Goal

#### **ANALYSIS**

Florida offers the option of defined contribution plans or defined benefit plans for all teachers. The state provides new teachers with very informative literature describing the advantages, disadvantages and estimated benefit payouts for each type of plan. New teachers choose one plan at the time of employment and are allowed to change their plan once during their active employment. Florida teachers also participate in Social Security.

There is no employee contribution for either of Florida's pension plans. The current employer contribution rate of 6.28 percent is reasonable.

Vesting is a key component in pension plans. In defined contribution plans, full vesting entitles teachers to access their funds and any available employer contributions. Florida's defined contribution plan vests after year one.

In defined benefit plans, vesting guarantees a teacher's eligibility to receive lifetime monthly benefit payments and be fully entitled to all other additional benefits. When vested teachers stop working in a particular system, they may leave their funds in the system and later receive benefits when they reach the defined retirement age, or they may withdraw some or all of the funds according to the plan's guidelines. Nonvested teachers may only withdraw funds; they may not receive retirement benefits. Florida's defined benefit plan does not vest until year six.

Because Florida teachers do not make contributions to the defined benefit plan, they may only withdraw contributions they have made for reasons such as purchased time. Further, teachers who remain in the field of education but enter another pension plan (such as in another state) will find it difficult to purchase the time equivalent to their prior employment in the new system because they are not entitled to any employer contribution. However, for teachers leaving the state,

they could use their one-time opportunity to switch to the defined contribution plan.

The ability to purchase time is important because defined benefit plans' retirement eligibility and benefit payments are often tied to the number of years a teacher has worked. Florida's plan allows teachers to purchase time for approved leaves of absence, up to a total of two years. The state's plan also allows vested teachers to purchase time, up to five years, for in-state private and out-of-state public school teaching experience. This provision is a disadvantage to teachers who move to Florida with more teaching experience. Florida does keep the purchase price relatively low, by allowing teachers to purchase years immediately upon employment, but years are only credited once teachers have vested.

#### SUPPORTING RESEARCH

http://dms.myflorida.com/human\_resource\_support/ retirement http://www.publicfundsurvey.org/ publicfundsurvey/contributionrates.asp

#### RECOMMENDATION

Florida meets this goal in part. The state is commended for offering teachers the option of defined contribution plans. The portability of such plans is attractive to an increasingly mobile teacher workforce. However, if Florida maintains its defined benefit plan, it should consider allowing vesting after year three instead of year six.

Because purchasing time can be structured as generally cost neutral to the fund, teachers should be allowed to transfer unlimited time from previous teaching experience, and this purchase should be allowed on the first day of employment in the new school system.

Within its provision for approved leaves of absence, Florida should also explicitly allow teachers to purchase parental leave for up to one year per leave. Payment should be allowed at the time of leave without requiring interest.

#### **FLORIDA RESPONSE TO ANALYSIS**

Florida was helpful in providing NCTQ with facts that enhanced our analysis. The state indicated that the analysis' introductory paragraph and description of vesting are "primarily correct."

Florida noted that when teachers end their employment, while they might not have any member contributions to withdraw in the defined benefit program, they can withdraw all contributions made to the employer's deferred compensation account (457 or 403(b) plans). Because there is no mandatory employee contribution to the defined benefit program, teachers may contribute even more to these accounts.

The state contended that while its pension plan is not portable outside of Florida, it is portable throughout the state, including not just schools districts, but also community colleges, state universities, participating charter schools, and other organizations including state and county governments.

In addition, Florida asserted that its regulations are "designed to allow members to purchase service with an employer for which the member had retirement plan coverage but cannot receive a retirement benefit," and that if they were vested in their previous plans they may not purchase time in Florida, noting that "the inclusion

of any employer-funded contributions in an amount refunded to a member is a retirement benefit making that period of service ineligible for purchase." The state also found that the recommendation to purchase unlimited leaves of absence without charging interest represents a significant cost to the retirement plan. "While both of these proposals sound very member friendly, Florida has constitutional and statutory provisions requiring actuarially sound funding of defined benefit plans."

Florida added that the analysis includes no reference to any advantages offered by a defined benefit plan such as disability and survivor benefits, nor does it make reference to Florida's Deferred Retirement Option Program.

Finally, Florida found that this goal and its rationale, as well as the citations that form the basis for the analysis, include "anecdotal references and generalities" and "some inaccuracies and gaps in a full explanation of how pension design and funding are implemented." The state found the goal to "champion the defined contribution plan," and in response, the state provided an extensive defense of defined benefit plans and their advantages for teachers.

#### **LAST WORD**

Florida does not provide a statewide deferred compensation program, so participating in such a plan is only an option for those whose local district provides one. While the state is commended for the portability of its pension system to varying education institutions within the state, the plan is still not portable across state lines.

Florida's rationale for limiting the purchase of prior service to five years does not work for all teachers. There are states, including Florida, that do not vest until after five years of service. Thus, nonvested teachers may be moving into Florida with more than five years of experience. In addition, even if teachers are vested they may find it a better financial decision to move their years of experience from their original pension system to their next state. When deciding benefits, teachers' years of service from their original state will be multiplied by their final average salary in that state; their final average salary in their last state is likely to be much higher. Thus, depending on the circumstances, if teachers are allowed

to purchase all of their previous experience, they may end up with higher benefits. Both the purchase of prior experience and leaves of absence can be formulated to be cost neutral to the state.

The scope of NCTQ's analysis does not include disability or survivor benefits or DROP programs. While these benefits may be advantages in certain defined benefit plans, they do not alter the fundamental flaws of these plans in terms of flexibility and fairness. Further, as described in the rationale of Goal 2.9, a DROP program may be perceived as an additional benefit, but it is only a temporary fix to a structural problem—retirement at an early age without reduction of benefits. DROP programs do create incentives for some teachers to remain past their eligible retirement, but they do so at a high cost.

NCTQ's purpose is not to deny the positive aspects of defined benefit programs, but to bring to light their cost and unfair treatment of teachers in certain situations. The option of being able to choose a defined contribution plan is inherently better than being mandated into a defined benefit plan. While defined contribution plans are not without their risks, the option allows teachers to decide for themselves whether or not they find those risks acceptable. As discussed in the rationale for this goal, states have a responsibility to educate their employees on their options and how to invest at different stages in life. Even if all teachers would opt for the stability of defined benefit plans, these plans disadvantage teachers who move into or out of the state, or enter teaching later in life, both of which are becoming increasingly more common. Defined contribution plans may provide less than defined benefit plans to those who spent their entire careers in one system, but the payouts to career teachers are at the expense of mobile teachers, career switchers and taxpayers.

#### **FOOD FOR THOUGHT**

#### West Virginia's Cautionary Tale

Education and individual retirement planning advice is a critical aspect of any state's pension plan, as evidenced by the tribulations of West Virginia's teacher pension system. In 1991, facing financial troubles, West Virginia closed its defined benefit Teachers' Retirement System (TRS) to new members and opened the Teachers' Defined Contribution plan (TDC). However, after widespread dissatisfaction with TDC account balances, it was closed to new members in 2005, and TRS was reopened. In 2008, the state legislature gave TDC participants a one-time option to switch their account balances from TDC to TRS in order to receive retirement payments according to the defined benefit formula. Over 78 percent of teachers elected to transfer.

While these events may appear to argue against states' offering defined contribution plans, West Virginia's experience should be viewed as a cautionary tale of the need for proper investment education. The implementation of the defined contribution plan was not handled well. In fact, some teachers believe they were so poorly advised that they have filed suit against the investment firm managing the plan. About three-fourths of teachers invested solely in low-yield, low-risk annuities that performed only slightly better than some savings accounts. For example, the Associated Press found that from May 2005 to May 2008, these annuities provided only their guaranteed 4.5 percent annual return. Over this same time period, the S&P 500 had an average rate of return of over 7 percent per year.

Defined contribution plans provide teachers flexibility in their retirement savings, but such plans are not without risk. States have a responsibility to educate teachers on their financial options and how to invest at different stages in life.

Figure 32

Sources: Barron's Dictionary of Finance and Investment Terms, Seventh Edition and California State Teachers' Retirement System's glossary, http://www.calstrs.com/Members/Defined%20B enefit%20Program/glossary.aspx.

#### Figure 32

### Glossary

#### **Benefit Formula:**

Formula used to calculate the amount teachers will receive each month after retirement. The most common formula used is *years of service x final average salary x benefit multiplier*. This amount is divided by 12 to calculate monthly benefits.

#### **Benefit Multiplier:**

Multiplier used in the benefit formula. It, along with years of service, determines the total percentage of final average salary that a teacher will receive in retirement benefits. In some plans, the multiplier is not constant, but changes depending upon retirement age and/or years of service.

#### **Defined Benefit Plan:**

Pension plan that promises to pay a specified amount to each person who retires after a set number of years of service. Employees contribute to them in some cases; in others, all contributions are made by the employer.

#### **Defined Contribution Plan:**

Pension plan in which the level of contributions is fixed at a certain level, while benefits vary depending on the return from the investments. Employees make contributions into a tax-deferred account, and employers may or may not make contributions. Defined contribution pension plans, unlike defined benefit pension plans, give the employee options of where to invest the account, usually among stock, bond and money market accounts.

#### **Lump-sum Withdrawal:**

Large payment of money received at one time instead of in periodic payments. Teachers leaving a pension plan may receive a lump-sum distribution of the value of their pension.

#### **Pension Wealth:**

The net present value of a teacher's expected lifetime retirement benefits.

#### **Purchasing Time:**

A teacher may make additional contributions to a pension system to increase service credit. Time may be purchased for a number of reasons, such as professional development leave, previous out-of-state teaching experience, medical leaves of absence or military service.

### **Service Credit/Years of Service:**

Accumulated period of time in years or partial years, for which a teacher earned compensation subject to contributions.

#### **Supplemental Retirement Plan:**

An optional plan to which teachers may voluntarily make taxdeferred contributions in addition to their mandatory pension plans. Employees are usually able to choose their rate of contribution up to a maximum set by the IRS; some employers also make contributions. These plans are generally in the form of 457 and 403(b) programs.

#### **Vesting:**

Right an employee gradually acquires by length of service to receive employer-contributed benefits, such as payments from a pension fund.

Figure 33 Do state pension systems have a defined contribution option? Defined benefit plan with defined Defined contribution benefit plan supplemental Choice of defined benefit or defined Defined Hybrid plan<sup>1</sup> contribution contribution plan plan only only plan Alabama Alaska П П Arizona **Arkansas** California Colorado Connecticut Delaware District of Columbia **FLORIDA** Georgia Hawaii Idaho Illinois Indiana Iowa Kansas Kentucky Louisiana Maine Maryland Massachusetts Michigan Minnesota Mississippi Missouri Montana Nebraska Nevada **New Hampshire New Jersey New Mexico** New York North Carolina North Dakota Ohio Oklahoma Oregon Pennsylvania Rhode Island South Carolina South Dakota Tennessee Texas Utah Vermont П П П Virginia Washington West Virginia Wisconsin Wyoming 30 3 3 14 1

Figure 33


1 A hybrid plan has components of both
a defined benefit plan and a defined contribution plan.



#### EXAMPLES OF BEST PRACTICE

Alaska provides a fair and flexible defined contribution pension plan for all teachers. This plan is also highly portable, as teachers are entitled to 100 percent of employer contributions after five years of service. **South Dakota**'s defined benefit plan has some creative provisions, which makes it more like a defined contribution plan. Most notably, teachers are able to withdraw 100 percent of their employer contributions after three years of service. In addition, Florida, Ohio and South Carolina are noteworthy for offering teachers a choice between a defined benefit plan and a defined contribution plan.

Figure 34 Do state pension systems have a defined contribution option?



<sup>1</sup> A hybrid plan has components of both a defined benefit plan and a defined contribution plan.

Figure 35

## What is a reasonable rate for pension contributions?

### Reasonable Mandatory Contribution Rate Range:

- 4-7 percent each for teachers and districts in states participating in Social Security
- 10-13 percent each for teachers and districts in states not participating in Social Security

Analysts generally agree that workers in their 20's with no previous retirement savings should save, in addition to Social Security contributions, about 10-15 percent of their gross income in order to be able to live during retirement on 80 percent of the salary they were earning when they retired. While the recommended savings rate varies with age and existing retirement savings, NCTQ has used this 10-15 percent benchmark as a reasonable rate for its analyses. To achieve a total savings of 10-15 percent, teacher and employer contributions should each be in the range of 4-7 percent. In states where teachers do not participate in Social Security, the total recommended retirement savings (teacher plus employer contributions) is about 12 percent higher, to compensate for the fact that these teachers will not have Social Security income when they retire. In order to achieve the appropriate level of total savings, teacher and employer contributions in these states should *each* be in the range of 10-13 percent.

#### Sources:

http://personal.fidelity.com/planning/retirement/plan\_overview.shtml.cvsr?refpr=rrc54

http://www.schwab.com/public/schwab/research\_strategies/market\_insight/retirement\_strategies/planning/how\_much\_should\_you\_save\_for\_retirement\_play\_the\_percentages.html https://personal.vanguard.com/us/planningeducation/retirement/PEdRetInvHowMuchToSaveContent\_jsp#early

#### Figure 36


- 1 There is no employee contribution for income below \$6,000.
- 2 The rate is 3 percent of pay up to \$5,000, 3.6 percent of pay up to \$15,000.
- 3 The rate is 3 percent until 10 years of service, after which there is no employee contribution.
- 4 The rate is 4.26 for the defined benefit plan. The rate varies for the defined contribution plan with a minimum of 5 percent.





Figure 38

Do states permit teachers to purchase time for previous teaching experience?<sup>1</sup>



- 1 Alaska only offers a defined contribution plan; purchase of time does not apply.
- 2 Hawaii, Idaho, Minnesota, New York, Oregon and Tennessee.
- 3 Arizona, California, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Louisiana, Missouri, New Hampshire, North Dakota, South Carolina, South Dakota and Utah.

Figure 39

Do states permit teachers to purchase time for leaves of absence?<sup>1</sup>



- 1 Alaska only offers a defined contribution plan; purchase of time does not apply.
- 2 California, Connecticut, District of Columbia, Florida, Indiana, Kentucky, Louisiana, Massachusetts, Michigan, Montana, New Jersey, North Carolina, Oklahoma, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Vermont, Virginia and Washington.
- 3 Alabama, Arizona, Delaware, Illinois, Iowa, Maryland, Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, North Dakota, Ohio and Utah allow at least one year per leave and an unlimited number of leaves.

Figure 37
1 The employer contribution is 15 percent for employees hired prior to July 2005.

Figure 40

How many years before teachers vest?



#### iaure 40 & 41

- 1 Florida's defined benefit plan does not vest until year six; teachers vest in the state's defined contribution plan after one year.
- 2 Ohio's defined benefit plan does not vest until year five; teachers vest in the state's defined contribution plan after one year.
- 3 South Carolina's defined benefit plan does not vest until year five; teachers vest immediately in the state's defined contribution plan.
- 4 Based on Washington's Plan 2. The state also offers a hybrid plan in which teachers vest immediately in the defined contribution component and vest in the defined benefit component after 10 years.

Alabama		3 years or less	4 or 5 years	6 to 9 years	10+ years
Arkansas	Alabama				
Arkansas	Alaska				
California	Arizona	П			
Colorado Connecticut Colorado	Arkansas				
Connecticut	California	П			
Delaware District of Columbia LLORIDA¹ Discorgia Discorg	Colorado				
District of Columbia	Connecticut		$\overline{\Box}$		
BEORIDA1  Georgia  Glawaii  Glaho  Ilinois  Indiana  Gentucky  Gousiana  Alaine  Alaryland  Alassachusetts  Alichigan  Al	Delaware				
dawaii daho linois ndiana dana dana dana dana dana dana da	District of Columbia				
Alawaii	FLORIDA <sup>1</sup>				
Alawaii	Georgia				
llinois	Hawaii				
Indiana	ldaho				
Indiana	llinois				
Cansas Ca	ndiana				
Gentucky Ouisiana Alaine Alain	owa				
Gentucky Ouisiana Alaine Alain	Kansas				
Alaine Al	Kentucky				
Maine Maryland Massachusetts Michigan Minnesota Mississisppi Missouri Montana Mebraska Mevada Mew Hampshire Mew Hampshire Mew Mexico Morth Carolina Morth Dakota Moregon Mennsylvania Mouth Carolina Mouth Carolina Mouth Carolina Moregon Mennsylvania Mouth Carolina Mouth Carolin	ouisiana				
Maryland	Maine				
Massachusetts  Michigan  Minnesota  Mississippi  Montana  Mebraska  Mevada  Mew Hampshire  Mew Jersey  Morth Carolina  Morth Dakota  Morth Dakota  Moregon  Mennessee  Mennessee  Mermont  Mermont  Moremont  Mores Virginia  Mosconsin					
Michigan  Minnesota  Mississippi  Missouri  Montana  Mebraska  Mevada  Mew Hampshire  Mew Jersey  Mew Mexico  Morth Carolina  Morth Dakota  Morth Dakota  Moregon  Mennesylvania  Mouth Carolina <sup>3</sup> Mouth Carolina <sup>3</sup> Mouth Carolina <sup>3</sup> Mouth Carolina <sup>3</sup> Mouth Dakota  Moregon  Mennessee  Mennessee  Mermont  Moremont  Moremont  Moremont  Moremont  Morest Virginia  Moscotsin	Massachusetts				
Minnesota Mississippi  Missouri  Montana  Mebraska  Mevada  Mew Hampshire  Mew Jersey  Mew Mexico  Mew York  Morth Carolina  Morth Dakota  Moregon  Mennsylvania  Morde Island  Mouth Carolina <sup>3</sup> Mouth Carolina <sup>3</sup> Mouth Carolina <sup>3</sup> Mouth Dakota  Moressee  Mexas  Moremont  Mermont  Moremont  Moremont  Morest Virginia  Morest Vi					
Alississippi Alissouri Alontana Bebraska Bevada Bew Hampshire Bew Jersey Bew Mexico Bew York Borth Carolina Borth Dakota Bregon Brennsylvania Brode Island Brouth Carolina Brode Island Brouth Dakota Brode Island Br	Minnesota				
Alissouri  Alontana  Alebraska  Alevada  Alew Hampshire  Alew Jersey  Alew Mexico  Alew York  Alorth Carolina  Alorth Dakota  Chio²  Cheinsylvania  Alouth Carolina³  Couth Carolina³  Couth Dakota  Couth Carolina³  Couth Dakota  Couth Carolina³  Couth Dakota  Couth Carolina³  Couth Dakota  Couth Carolina³  Couth Carolina³  Couth Dakota  Couth Carolina³  Couth Carolina³  Couth Dakota  Couth Carolina³  Couth					
Montana	Missouri				
Alebraska	Montana				
Idevada	Viebraska				
New Hampshire	Nevada				
New Jersey					
New Mexico					
Sew York	New Mexico				
North Carolina					
North Dakota					
Oklahoma					
Oklahoma					
Pregon					
Pennsylvania					
Rhode Island  Gouth Carolina <sup>3</sup> Gouth Dakota  Gennessee  Gexas  Jtah  Germont  Girginia  Vashington <sup>4</sup> Vest Virginia					
South Carolina <sup>3</sup>					
Jouth Dakota					
rennessee					
exas					
Vest Virginia					
Vermont					
Vashington <sup>4</sup>					
Vashington <sup>4</sup>					
Vest Virginia					
Visconsin					
vyoning 📙 📙 📙					
	vyoming	Ш			

Figure 42
What funds do states permit teachers to withdraw from their defined benefit plans if they leave after five years?

	Less than their own contribution	Only their own contribution		Their own contribution and part of the employer contribution plus interest	and full employer
Alabama					
Alaska <sup>2</sup>					
Arizona					
Arkansas					
California					
Colorado					
Connecticut					
Delaware					
District of Columbia	П		П	П	П
FLORIDA <sup>3</sup>	$\overline{\Box}$	$\overline{\Box}$	$\overline{\Box}$	$\overline{\Box}$	
Georgia					
Hawaii					
Idaho					
Illinois					
Indiana <sup>4</sup>					
lowa					
Kansas					
Kentucky					
Louisiana					
Maine					
Maryland					
Massachusetts					
Michigan					
Minnesota					
Mississippi					
Missouri					
Montana					
Nebraska					
Nevada <sup>5</sup>					
New Hampshire					
New Jersey					
New Mexico					
New York					
North Carolina					
North Dakota					
Ohio <sup>6</sup>					
Oklahoma					
Oregon <sup>7</sup>					
Pennsylvania					
Rhode Island					
South Carolina <sup>8</sup>					
South Dakota					
Tennessee					
Texas					
Utah <sup>9</sup>					
Vermont					
Virginia					
Washington <sup>10</sup>					
West Virginia					
Wisconsin					
Wyoming					
,	3	3	35	5	1

#### Figure 42

- Some states' withdrawal policies vary depending on teachers' years of service.
   Year five is used as a common point of comparision.
- 2 As of July 1, 2006, Alaska only offers a defined contribution plan to new members, which allows teachers leaving the system after five years to withdraw 100 percent of the employer contribution.
- 3 Since Florida teachers do not contribute to the defined benefit plan, the only funds participants could withdraw upon leaving are those made for special circumstances such as purchasing time. Florida also has a defined contribution plan, which allows teachers with at least one year of service who are leaving the system to withdraw 100 percent of the employer contribution.
- 4 Teachers transferring to another governmental retirement plan may also withdraw the amount necessary to purchase creditable service in the new plan.
- 5 Most teachers in Nevada are in a noncontributory defined benefit system, and thus do not have contributions to withdraw. The small minority that are in a contributory system may withdraw their contributions plus interest.
- 6 Ohio has two other pension plans. Ohio's defined contribution plan allows teachers with at least one year of service who are leaving the system to withdraw 100 percent of the employer contribution. Exiting teachers with at least five years of experience in Ohio's combination plan may withdraw their employee-funded defined contribution component, but must wait until age 50 to withdraw funds from the employer-funded defined benefit component.
- 7 Oregon only has a hybrid retirement plan, which allows exiting teachers to withdraw their contributions plus earnings from their defined contribution component; they still receive the employer-funded defined benefit payments at retirement age.
- 8 South Carolina also has a defined contribution plan, which allows exiting teachers to withdraw 100 percent of their contributions and employer contributions, plus interest.
- 9 Since Utah teachers do not contribute to the defined benefit plan, the only funds participants could withdraw upon leaving are those made for special circumstances such as purchasing time.
- 10 Washington also has a hybrid retirement plan, which allows exiting teachers to withdraw their contributions plus earnings from their defined contribution component; they still receive the employer-funded defined benefit payments at retirement age.

## **Area 2: Retaining Effective Teachers**

### Goal 9 – Pension Neutrality

The state should ensure that pension systems are neutral, uniformly increasing pension wealth with each additional year of work.

#### Figure 43

### How States are Faring on Pension Neutrality

- Best Practice States Alaska, South Dakota
- 1 State Meets Goal Minnesota
- 5 States Nearly Meet Goal Ohio, Oregon, South Carolina, Washington, Wisconsin
- 30 States Partly Meet Goal Alabama, Arkansas, Colorado, Delaware, FLORIDA, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Kansas, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, Michigan, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, North Carolina, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Vermont, Virginia, West Virginia
- State Meets a Small Part of Goal Pennsylvania
- 12 States Do Not Meet Goal
  Arizona, California, Connecticut, District of
  Columbia, Iowa, Kentucky, Massachusetts,
  Mississippi, Missouri, New York, Rhode Island,
  Wyoming

#### **GOAL COMPONENTS**

(The factors considered in determining the states' rating for the goal.)

- The formula that determines pension benefits should be neutral to the number of years worked. It should not have a multiplier that increases with years of service or longevity bonuses.
- 2. The formula for determining benefits should preserve incentives for teachers to continue working until conventional retirement ages. Eligibility for retirement benefits should be based on age and not years of service.

#### **RATIONALE**

- ► See appendix for detailed rationale.
- It is unfair to all teachers when pension wealth does not accumulate in a uniform way.
- Pension systems affect when teachers decide to retire as teachers look to maximize their pension wealth.

#### **SUPPORTING RESEARCH**

 Research citations to support this goal are available at www.nctq.org/stpy/citations.

### Goal 9 Florida Analysis



### State Partly Meets Goal

#### **ANALYSIS**

Florida's defined benefit pension system is based on a benefit formula that is not neutral, meaning that each year of work does not accrue pension wealth in a uniform way.

To qualify as neutral, a pension formula must not only utilize a constant benefit multiplier to determine retired teachers' benefits, but it must also rely on an eligibility calendar based on age, rather than years of service. In most defined benefit plans, pension wealth peaks for teachers the year they become eligible for retirement, and then it declines every year they work beyond eligibility. Plans that base retirement on years of service create unnecessary peaks, and plans that allow a low retirement age create incentives to retire early. Therefore, plans that base retirement on an age in line with Social Security are likely to create the most uniform accrual of wealth.

Florida's pension plan does not utilize a constant benefit multiplier. Instead, the state's multiplier is constant at 1.6 percent through 30 years of service or age 62, and then it increases .02 percent to .03 percent for each succeeding year up to a maximum of 1.68 percent. In addition, teachers may opt for early retirement with unreduced benefits based on years of service. Teachers with 30 years of service may retire at any age, while other vested teachers with less than 30 years of service may not retire until age 62. Therefore, teachers who begin their careers at age 22 can reach 30 years of service by age 52, entitling them to 10 additional years of unreduced retirement benefits beyond what other teachers would receive who may not retire until age 62. Not only are teachers being paid benefits by the state well before Social Security's retirement age, but these provisions may also encourage effective teachers to retire early, and they fail to treat equally those teachers who enter the system at a later age and give the same amount of service.

Florida's defined contribution plan is neutral because teachers' pension wealth increases in a uniform way.

#### SUPPORTING RESEARCH

http://dms.myflorida.com/human\_resource\_support/ retirement

#### RECOMMENDATION

Florida meets this goal in part. The state is commended for offering a neutral defined contribution plan. However, Florida should not only utilize a constant benefit multiplier within its defined benefit plan, but it should also consider increasing its retirement age to align with Social Security and no longer basing eligibility on years of service. These changes would result in a pension plan that treats all teachers more equitably, regardless of where they are in their careers.

#### FLORIDA RESPONSE TO ANALYSIS

Florida noted that it has a "uniform reduction for early retirement of 5 percent a year for every year under age 62. This reduction is subsidized since the actuarial reduction is closer to 7 percent per year. Teachers who chose early retirement do not consider the subsidized 5 percent reduction to be 'fair;' instead, these teachers often consider it to be too high."

Florida added that "if a teacher enters a system in middle or late career, that teacher will be closer to normal retirement age and therefore receive an unreduced benefit after working fewer years. Is this fair to the teacher that entered the retirement system immediately after college?" The state explained that in 1978, the Florida Retirement System switched from having unreduced retirement only at age 62, to include unreduced retirement for those who earned 30 years of service. The change can be attributed to teachers believing that the system was not fair to those who entered directly after college. The state further noted that defined contribution plan teachers are receiving unreduced benefits regardless of age, and asked "should the defined contribution plan members be required to meet a minimum age before being able to access their funds so all members are treated fairly and 'retirement wealth' is distributed equitably?"

Florida contended that its increase in multiplier after a certain age and years of service is a retention tool. It also noted other retention tools that encourage its teachers to stay beyond initial retirement age include a deferred retirement option program and a return-to-work program. Florida "provides renewed membership for retirees who return to work in retirement-covered positions. They accrue service towards a future retirement benefit and have the same plan membership choices as newly hired members who have not retired."

#### **LAST WORD**

It is not surprising that employees, in any profession, would think of any reduction in their retirement benefits as "too high," even one that is connected to the ability to retire early. Defined benefit payments must be considered in terms of what a teacher is expected to receive in his or her lifetime, not simply in a single year. If teachers retire early and the actuarial reduction is close to 7 percent in Florida, then their benefit should be reduced close to 7 percent because that is what will produce a "fair" amount over their lifetimes.

The guestions that Florida poses about fairness are not at odds with NCTQ's rationale for this goal. Teachers' total pension wealth, which can be measured by its net present value, should be the same for all teachers who worked the same number of years (assuming similar salary histories). It is fair and appropriate that two teachers who both worked 30 years have the same pension wealth, but two teachers with the same pension wealth do not necessarily have the same monthly benefit payments. If teachers are expected over their lifetimes to receive more payments, then their monthly payments should be reduced. It is the case that teachers who entered the field later in their careers may reach retirement age after working fewer years, but if so, their retirement wealth will be lower because years of service are factored into the calculation of benefits.

For example, if Ms. Smith started teaching at age 22 and worked for 30 years and then can retire with unreduced benefits at age 52, she will receive a much greater pension over her lifetime than Ms. Jones, who started teaching at age 35 and retires with 30 years of service at age 65. NCTQ is not suggesting that Ms. Smith should be forced to continue working until she is 65, but rather, that Ms. Smith and Ms. Jones are entitled to the same overall pension benefits based on years of service. If Ms. Smith is permitted to retire at age 52, her monthly benefits should be reduced to account for the fact that she is likely to receive at least 13 additional years of benefits more than Ms. Jones.

Defined contribution plans are fair, regardless of age, because the accounts are worth the same for teachers who worked the same number of years. One teacher who worked 30 years from age 22 to age 52 and one teacher who worked for 30 years from age 32 to 62 will have, on average, similar account balances. It is up to each individual to decide how he or she would like to spread that money across retirement. The 62-year-old teacher may want to start drawing on it immediately or buy an annuity to receive monthly payments, while the younger retiree may want to roll it into another investment account because there are tax penalties for withdrawing retirement money before federally set ages. The 52-yearold teacher may choose to work in a different career, just as the 62-year-old teacher may have done before switching to a teaching career. They both will receive the same pension values from teaching over their lifetimes because they both gave an equal amount of service to the teaching profession.

As discussed in the last word to Goal 2.8 and the rationale for this goal, DROP programs and some return-to-work programs do create incentives for some teachers to remain past their eligible retirement, but they do so at a high cost. These programs mean that districts still must find the funds to pay pension benefits to teachers at a relatively young age when those dollars could be more effectively spent elsewhere.

### Figure 44

# Does pension wealth in **Florida** accumulate uniformly for all teachers?

Benefit formula is determined by a multiplier that does not change based on years of service

NO

Retirement eligibility is based on age, not years of service<sup>1</sup>


NO

<sup>1</sup> This only refers to determining retirement eligibility, not retirement benefits.

#### **EXAMPLES OF BEST PRACTICE**

**Alaska** offers a defined contribution pension plan that is neutral, with pension wealth accumulating in an equal way for all teachers for each year of work. **Minnesota** and **South Dakota** offer defined benefit plans that have neutral formulas. Both states' plans have formula multipliers that do not change relative to years of service, and they do not allow unreduced benefits to retirees below age 65.

Figure 45
What kind of multiplier do states use to calculate retirement benefits?



- 1 Alaska has a defined contribution plan, which does not have a benefit multiplier.
- 2 Arizona, California, Connecticut, District of Columbia, Florida, Iowa, Kentucky, Massachusetts, Mississippi, Missouri, New Hampshire, New York, Ohio, Rhode Island and Wyoming.

#### Figure 46

- All calculations are based on a teacher who starts teaching at age 22, earns a starting salary of \$35,000 that increases 3 percent per year, and retires at the age when s/he is first eligible for unreduced benefits. The calculations use states' current benefit formulas and do not include cost of living increases. The final average salary was calculated as the average of the highest three years of salary, even though a few states may vary from that standard. Age 65 was used as the point of comparision for standard retirement age because it is the minimum eligibility age for unreduced Social Security benefits.
- 2 Does not apply to Alaska's defined contribution plan.
- 3 Minnesota provides unreduced retirement benefits at the age of full Social Security benefits or age 66, whichever comes first.
- 4 Massachusetts's formula has many options for retirement. A teacher with 35 years of experience at age 57 would reach the maximum benefit
- 5 Applies only to Ohio's defined benefit plan.

Figure 46

How much do states pay for each teacher that retires with unreduced benefits at an early age?<sup>1</sup>

Total amount in benefits paid per teacher from the time of retirement until age 65 Earliest retirement age that a teacher who started teaching at age 22 may receive

Alaska²  Minnesota³		of retirement until age 65	22 may receive unreduced benefits
Minnesota³ \$0 65 South Dakota \$0 65 Washington \$0 65 Arizona \$271,275 51 California \$310,028 61 Indiana \$317,728 55 New Hampshire \$321,326 60 Oregon \$361,536 58 Wisconsin \$416,007 57 Rhode Island \$430,013 59 Texas \$443,421 60 Michigan \$468,590 52 Kansas \$492,342 54 Tennessee \$499,973 52 Montana \$518,228 47 Connecticut \$520,009 57 Vermont \$520,655 52 New Jersey \$525,117 55 Virginia \$531,068 52 Iowa \$551,428 55 Idaho \$551,743 56 North Dakota \$551,743 56 North Dakota \$551,743 56 North Carolina \$568,555 52 Maryland \$562,308 52 New York \$557,518 52 Maryland \$562,308 52 North Carolina \$577,687 55 Nebraska \$577,687 55 Nebraska \$577,687 55 Delaware \$577,927 52 District of Columbia \$585,737 52 Massachusetts⁴ \$594,296 57 Wyoming \$615,994 54 Maine \$621,861 47 Mississippi \$621,861 47 Mississippi \$621,861 47 Mississippi \$624,786 52 New Mexico \$730,686 47 Louisiana \$780,983 51 Colorado \$789,343 51 Kentucky \$791,679 49	A11 . 2	until age 65	unreduced benefits
South Dakota         \$0         65           Washington         \$0         65           Arizona         \$271,275         51           California         \$310,028         61           Indiana         \$317,728         55           New Hampshire         \$321,326         60           Oregon         \$361,536         58           Wisconsin         \$416,007         57           Rhode Island         \$430,013         59           Texas         \$443,421         60           Michigan         \$468,590         52           Kansas         \$492,342         54           Tennessee         \$499,973         52           Montana         \$518,228         47           Connecticut         \$520,009         57           Vermont         \$520,655         52           New Jersey         \$525,177         55           Virginia         \$531,068         52           lowa         \$551,748         56           North Dakota         \$551,743         56           Oklahoma         \$551,743         56           FLORIDA         \$557,112         52           New York		40	65
Washington         \$0         65           Arizona         \$271,275         \$1           California         \$310,028         61           Indiana         \$317,728         \$5           New Hampshire         \$321,326         60           Oregon         \$361,536         \$8           Wisconsin         \$416,007         \$7           Rhode Island         \$430,013         \$9           Texas         \$443,421         60           Michigan         \$468,590         \$2           Kansas         \$492,342         \$4           Tennessee         \$499,973         \$2           Montana         \$518,228         47           Connecticut         \$520,009         \$7           Vermont         \$520,655         \$2           New Jersey         \$525,117         \$5           Virginia         \$531,068         \$2           lowa         \$551,428         \$5           Idaho         \$551,743         \$6           North Dakota         \$551,743         \$6           Oklahoma         \$551,743         \$6           FLORIDA         \$557,112         \$2           New York		•	
Arizona \$271,275 51 California \$310,028 61 Indiana \$317,728 55 New Hampshire \$321,326 60 Oregon \$361,536 58 Wisconsin \$416,007 57 Rhode Island \$430,013 59 Texas \$443,421 60 Michigan \$468,590 52 Kansas \$492,342 54 Tennessee \$499,973 52 Montana \$518,228 47 Connecticut \$520,009 57 Vermont \$520,655 52 New Jersey \$525,117 55 Virginia \$531,068 52 Iowa \$551,428 55 Idaho \$551,743 56 North Dakota \$551,743 56 North Dakota \$551,743 56 Varyland \$557,112 52 New York \$557,518 52 Maryland \$562,308 52 North Carolina \$572,010 57 South Carolina \$577,687 55 Nest Virginia \$537,687 55 Delaware \$577,927 52 District of Columbia \$587,792 52 District of Columbia \$587,792 52 Utah \$624,786 52 Utah \$624,786 52 New Mexico \$730,686 47 Pennsylvania \$780,983 51 Colorado \$789,343 51 Kentucky \$791,679 49		•	
California         \$310,028         61           Indiana         \$317,728         55           New Hampshire         \$321,326         60           Oregon         \$361,536         58           Wisconsin         \$416,007         57           Rhode Island         \$430,013         59           Texas         \$443,421         60           Michigan         \$468,590         52           Kansas         \$492,342         54           Tennessee         \$499,973         52           Montana         \$518,228         47           Connecticut         \$520,009         57           Vermont         \$520,655         52           New Jersey         \$525,117         55           Virginia         \$531,068         52           lowa         \$551,428         55           Idaho         \$551,743         56           North Dakota         \$551,743         56           Oklahoma         \$551,743         56           FLORIDA         \$557,112         52           New York         \$557,518         52           Maryland         \$568,555         52           Illinois	3	• •	
Indiana \$317,728 55 New Hampshire \$321,326 60 Oregon \$361,536 58 Wisconsin \$416,007 57 Rhode Island \$430,013 59 Texas \$443,421 60 Michigan \$468,590 52 Kansas \$492,342 54 Tennessee \$499,973 52 Montana \$518,228 47 Connecticut \$520,009 57 Vermont \$520,655 52 New Jersey \$525,117 55 Virginia \$531,068 52 Iowa \$551,428 55 Idaho \$551,743 56 North Dakota \$551,743 56 North Dakota \$551,743 56 Oklahoma \$551,743 56 FLORIDA \$557,112 52 New York \$557,518 52 Maryland \$562,308 52 Illinois \$572,010 57 South Carolina \$577,142 50 Hawaii \$577,687 55 Nebraska \$577,687 55 Nest Virginia \$537,687 55 Delaware \$577,927 52 District of Columbia \$585,737 52 Massachusetts4 \$594,296 57 Wyoming \$615,994 54 Maine \$621,861 47 Mississippi \$621,861 47 Mississippi \$621,861 47 Pennsylvania \$650,011 57 Arkansas \$681,789 50 Ohio5 \$687,265 52 New Mexico \$730,686 47 Louisiana \$780,983 51 Kentucky \$791,679 49			
New Hampshire         \$321,326         60           Oregon         \$361,536         58           Wisconsin         \$416,007         57           Rhode Island         \$430,013         59           Texas         \$443,421         60           Michigan         \$468,590         52           Kansas         \$492,342         54           Tennessee         \$499,973         52           Montana         \$518,228         47           Connecticut         \$520,009         57           Vermont         \$520,655         52           New Jersey         \$525,117         55           Virginia         \$531,068         52           Iowa         \$551,428         55           Idaho         \$551,743         56           North Dakota         \$551,743         56           Oklahoma         \$551,743         56           FLORIDA         \$557,112         52           New York         \$557		•	
Oregon         \$361,536         58           Wisconsin         \$416,007         57           Rhode Island         \$430,013         59           Texas         \$443,421         60           Michigan         \$468,590         52           Kansas         \$492,342         54           Tennessee         \$499,973         52           Montana         \$518,228         47           Connecticut         \$520,009         57           Vermont         \$520,655         52           New Jersey         \$525,117         55           Virginia         \$531,068         52           Iowa         \$551,428         55           Idaho         \$551,428         55           Idaho         \$551,743         56           North Dakota         \$551,743         56           Oklahoma         \$551,743         56           FLORIDA         \$557,112         52           New York         \$557,518         52           Maryland         \$562,308         52           North Carolina         \$578,555         52           Illinois         \$577,010         57           South Carolina			
Wisconsin         \$416,007         57           Rhode Island         \$430,013         59           Texas         \$443,421         60           Michigan         \$468,590         52           Kansas         \$492,342         54           Tennessee         \$499,973         52           Montana         \$518,228         47           Connecticut         \$520,009         57           Vermont         \$520,655         52           New Jersey         \$525,117         55           Virginia         \$531,068         52           lowa         \$551,428         55           Idaho         \$551,743         56           North Dakota         \$551,743         56           Oklahoma         \$551,743         56           FLORIDA         \$557,112         52           New York         \$557,518         52           Maryland         \$562,308         52           North Carolina         \$	•	•	
Rhode Island         \$430,013         59           Texas         \$443,421         60           Michigan         \$468,590         52           Kansas         \$492,342         54           Tennessee         \$499,973         52           Montana         \$518,228         47           Connecticut         \$520,009         57           Vermont         \$520,655         52           New Jersey         \$525,117         55           Virginia         \$531,068         52           Iowa         \$551,7428         55           Idaho         \$551,743         56           North Dakota         \$551,743         56           Oklahoma         \$551,743         56           FLORIDA         \$557,112         52           New York         \$557,518         52           Maryland         \$562,308         52           North Carolina         \$568,555         52           Illinois         \$577,010         57           South Carolina         \$577,687         55           Nebraska         \$577,687         55           West Virginia         \$577,687         55           Dela			
Texas \$443,421 60 Michigan \$468,590 52 Kansas \$492,342 54 Tennessee \$499,973 52 Montana \$518,228 47 Connecticut \$520,009 57 Vermont \$520,655 52 New Jersey \$525,117 55 Virginia \$531,068 52 lowa \$551,428 55 Idaho \$551,743 56 North Dakota \$551,743 56 North Dakota \$551,743 56 FLORIDA \$557,112 52 New York \$557,518 52 Maryland \$562,308 52 Illinois \$572,010 57 South Carolina \$568,555 52 Illinois \$577,687 55 Nebraska \$577,687 55 Nebraska \$577,687 55 Uest Virginia \$557,687 55 Delaware \$577,927 52 District of Columbia \$585,737 52 Massachusetts4 \$594,296 57 Wyoming \$615,994 54 Maine \$621,861 47 Mississippi \$621,861 47 Mississippi \$621,861 47 Pennsylvania \$650,011 57 Arkansas \$681,789 50 Ohio <sup>5</sup> \$687,265 52 New Mexico \$730,686 47 Louisiana \$780,983 51 Colorado \$789,343 51 Kentucky \$791,679 49	Wisconsin	\$416,007	57
Michigan       \$468,590       52         Kansas       \$492,342       54         Tennessee       \$499,973       52         Montana       \$518,228       47         Connecticut       \$520,009       57         Vermont       \$520,655       52         New Jersey       \$525,117       55         Virginia       \$531,068       52         lowa       \$551,428       55         Idaho       \$551,743       56         North Dakota       \$551,743       56         Oklahoma       \$551,743       56         FLORIDA       \$557,112       52         New York       \$557,518       52         Maryland       \$568,555       52         Illinois       \$572,010       57         South Carolina       \$568,555       52         Illinois       \$577,687       55         Nebraska       \$577,687       55         Nest Virginia       \$577,687       55         Delaware       \$577,927       52         District of Columbia       \$585,737       52         Massachusetts <sup>4</sup> \$594,296       57         Wyoming       \$615,994	Rhode Island	\$430,013	59
Kansas         \$492,342         54           Tennessee         \$499,973         52           Montana         \$518,228         47           Connecticut         \$520,009         57           Vermont         \$520,655         52           New Jersey         \$525,117         55           Virginia         \$531,068         52           Iowa         \$551,428         55           Idaho         \$551,743         56           North Dakota         \$551,743         56           Oklahoma         \$551,743         56           FLORIDA         \$557,112         52           New York         \$557,518         52           Maryland         \$562,308         52           North Carolina         \$568,555         52           Illinois         \$577,61         57           South Carolina         \$577,687         55           Nebraska         \$577,687         55           West Virginia         \$577,687         55           West Virginia         \$577,687         55           Delaware         \$577,927         52           District of Columbia         \$585,737         52		\$443,421	60
Tennessee \$499,973 52  Montana \$518,228 47  Connecticut \$520,009 57  Vermont \$520,655 52  New Jersey \$525,117 55  Virginia \$531,068 52  lowa \$551,428 55  Idaho \$551,743 56  North Dakota \$551,743 56  Oklahoma \$551,743 56  FLORIDA \$557,112 52  New York \$557,518 52  Maryland \$562,308 52  Illinois \$572,010 57  South Carolina \$577,142 50  Hawaii \$577,687 55  Nebraska \$577,687 55  Nebraska \$577,687 55  West Virginia \$585,737 52  District of Columbia \$585,737 52  District of Columbia \$585,737 52  Massachusetts4 \$594,296 57  Wyoming \$615,994 54  Maine \$621,861 47  Mississippi \$621,861 47  Georgia \$624,786 52  Utah \$624,786 52  Alabama \$625,747 47  Pennsylvania \$650,011 57  Arkansas \$681,789 50  Ohio <sup>5</sup> \$687,265 52  New Mexico \$730,686 47  Louisiana \$780,983 51  Colorado \$789,343 51  Kentucky \$791,679 49	Michigan	\$468,590	52
Montana         \$518,228         47           Connecticut         \$520,009         57           Vermont         \$520,655         52           New Jersey         \$525,117         55           Virginia         \$531,068         52           Iowa         \$551,428         55           Idaho         \$551,743         56           North Dakota         \$551,743         56           Oklahoma         \$551,743         56           FLORIDA         \$557,112         52           New York         \$557,518         52           Maryland         \$562,308         52           North Carolina         \$568,555         52           Illinois         \$572,010         57           South Carolina         \$577,687         55           Nebraska         \$577,687         55           West Virginia         \$577,687         55           Delaware         \$577,927         52           District of Columbia         \$585,737         52           Massachusetts <sup>4</sup> \$594,296         57           Wyoming         \$615,994         54           Maine         \$621,861         47	Kansas	\$492,342	54
Connecticut         \$520,009         57           Vermont         \$520,655         52           New Jersey         \$525,117         55           Virginia         \$531,068         52           lowa         \$551,428         55           Idaho         \$551,743         56           North Dakota         \$551,743         56           Oklahoma         \$551,743         56           FLORIDA         \$557,743         56           FLORIDA         \$557,743         56           FLORIDA         \$557,743         56           New York         \$557,518         52           Maryland         \$562,308         52           North Carolina         \$568,555         52           Illinois         \$572,010         57           South Carolina         \$577,687         55           Nebraska         \$577,687         55           Nebraska         \$577,687         55           Nest Virginia         \$577,687         55           Delaware         \$577,927         52           District of Columbia         \$585,737         52           Wyoming         \$615,994         54	Tennessee	\$499,973	52
Vermont         \$520,655         52           New Jersey         \$525,117         55           Virginia         \$531,068         52           Iowa         \$551,428         55           Idaho         \$551,743         56           North Dakota         \$551,743         56           Oklahoma         \$551,743         56           FLORIDA         \$557,112         52           New York         \$557,518         52           Maryland         \$562,308         52           North Carolina         \$568,555         52           Illinois         \$572,010         57           South Carolina         \$577,687         55           Nebraska         \$577,687         55           Nest Virginia         \$577,687         55           Nest Virginia         \$577,687         55           Delaware         \$577,927         52           District of Columbia         \$585,737         52           Massachusetts <sup>4</sup> \$594,296         57           Wyoming         \$615,994         54           Maine         \$621,861         47           Mississippi         \$624,786         52	Montana	\$518,228	47
New Jersey         \$525,117         55           Virginia         \$531,068         52           Iowa         \$551,428         55           Idaho         \$551,743         56           North Dakota         \$551,743         56           Oklahoma         \$551,743         56           FLORIDA         \$557,112         52           New York         \$557,518         52           Maryland         \$562,308         52           North Carolina         \$568,555         52           Illinois         \$572,010         57           South Carolina         \$577,687         55           Nebraska         \$577,687         55           Nest Virginia         \$577,687         55           Delaware         \$577,927         52           District of Columbia         \$585,737         52           Massachusetts <sup>4</sup> \$594,296         57           Wyoming         \$615,994         54           Maine         \$621,861         47           Mississippi         \$621,861         47           Georgia         \$624,786         52           Utah         \$625,747         47	Connecticut	\$520,009	57
Virginia         \$531,068         52           Iowa         \$551,428         55           Idaho         \$551,743         56           North Dakota         \$551,743         56           Oklahoma         \$551,743         56           FLORIDA         \$557,112         52           New York         \$557,518         52           Maryland         \$562,308         52           North Carolina         \$568,555         52           Illinois         \$572,010         57           South Carolina         \$577,687         55           Nebraska         \$577,687         55           Nebraska         \$577,687         55           West Virginia         \$577,687         55           Delaware         \$577,927         52           District of Columbia         \$585,737         52           Massachusetts <sup>4</sup> \$594,296         57           Wyoming         \$615,994         54           Maine         \$621,861         47           Mississippi         \$621,861         47           Georgia         \$624,786         52           Utah         \$625,747         47	Vermont	\$520,655	52
Iowa	New Jersey	\$525,117	55
Idaho       \$551,743       56         North Dakota       \$551,743       56         Oklahoma       \$551,743       56         FLORIDA       \$557,112       52         New York       \$557,518       52         Maryland       \$562,308       52         North Carolina       \$568,555       52         Illinois       \$572,010       57         South Carolina       \$577,687       55         Nebraska       \$577,687       55         Nebraska       \$577,687       55         West Virginia       \$577,687       55         Delaware       \$577,927       52         District of Columbia       \$585,737       52         Massachusetts <sup>4</sup> \$594,296       57         Wyoming       \$615,994       54         Maine       \$621,861       47         Mississippi       \$621,861       47         Georgia       \$624,786       52         Utah       \$624,786       52         Utah       \$625,747       47         Pennsylvania       \$650,011       57         Arkansas       \$681,789       50         Ohio <sup>5</sup> \$687,2	Virginia	\$531,068	52
North Dakota       \$551,743       56         Oklahoma       \$551,743       56         FLORIDA       \$557,112       52         New York       \$557,518       52         Maryland       \$562,308       52         North Carolina       \$568,555       52         Illinois       \$572,010       57         South Carolina       \$577,142       50         Hawaii       \$577,687       55         Nebraska       \$577,687       55         West Virginia       \$577,687       55         Delaware       \$577,927       52         District of Columbia       \$585,737       52         Massachusetts <sup>4</sup> \$594,296       57         Wyoming       \$615,994       54         Maine       \$621,861       47         Georgia       \$624,786       52         Utah       \$624,786       52         Utah       \$624,786       52         Alabama       \$625,747       47         Pennsylvania       \$680,011       57         Arkansas       \$681,789       50         Ohio <sup>5</sup> \$687,265       52         New Mexico       \$730,68	Iowa	\$551,428	55
Oklahoma         \$551,743         56           FLORIDA         \$557,112         52           New York         \$557,518         52           Maryland         \$562,308         52           North Carolina         \$568,555         52           Illinois         \$572,010         57           South Carolina         \$577,142         50           Hawaii         \$577,687         55           Nebraska         \$577,687         55           West Virginia         \$577,687         55           Delaware         \$577,687         55           Delaware         \$577,927         52           District of Columbia         \$585,737         52           Massachusetts <sup>4</sup> \$594,296         57           Wyoming         \$615,994         54           Maine         \$621,861         47           Georgia         \$624,786         52           Utah         \$624,786         52           Utah         \$625,747         47           Pennsylvania         \$650,011         57           Arkansas         \$681,789         50           Ohio <sup>5</sup> \$687,265         52           <	Idaho	\$551,743	56
FLORIDA         \$557,112         52           New York         \$557,518         52           Maryland         \$562,308         52           North Carolina         \$568,555         52           Illinois         \$572,010         57           South Carolina         \$577,687         55           Hawaii         \$577,687         55           Nebraska         \$577,687         55           West Virginia         \$577,687         55           Delaware         \$577,687         55           Delaware         \$577,927         52           District of Columbia         \$585,737         52           Massachusetts <sup>4</sup> \$594,296         57           Wyoming         \$615,994         54           Maine         \$621,861         47           Mississippi         \$621,861         47           Georgia         \$624,786         52           Utah         \$624,786         52           Utah         \$650,011         57           Arkansas         \$681,789         50           Ohio <sup>5</sup> \$687,265         52           New Mexico         \$730,686         47	North Dakota	\$551,743	56
New York         \$557,518         52           Maryland         \$562,308         52           North Carolina         \$568,555         52           Illinois         \$572,010         57           South Carolina         \$577,142         50           Hawaii         \$577,687         55           Nebraska         \$577,687         55           West Virginia         \$577,687         55           Delaware         \$577,927         52           District of Columbia         \$585,737         52           Massachusetts <sup>4</sup> \$594,296         57           Wyoming         \$615,994         54           Maine         \$621,861         47           Mississippi         \$621,861         47           Georgia         \$624,786         52           Utah         \$624,786         52           Utah         \$650,011         57           Arkansas         \$681,789         50           Ohio <sup>5</sup> \$687,265         52           New Mexico         \$730,686         47           Louisiana         \$780,983         51           Colorado         \$789,343         51	Oklahoma	\$551,743	56
Maryland         \$562,308         52           North Carolina         \$568,555         52           Illinois         \$572,010         57           South Carolina         \$577,142         50           Hawaii         \$577,687         55           Nebraska         \$577,687         55           West Virginia         \$577,687         55           Delaware         \$577,927         52           District of Columbia         \$585,737         52           Massachusetts <sup>4</sup> \$594,296         57           Wyoming         \$615,994         54           Maine         \$621,861         47           Mississippi         \$621,861         47           Georgia         \$624,786         52           Utah         \$624,786         52           Alabama         \$625,747         47           Pennsylvania         \$650,011         57           Arkansas         \$681,789         50           Ohio <sup>5</sup> \$687,265         52           New Mexico         \$730,686         47           Louisiana         \$780,983         51           Colorado         \$789,343         51	FLORIDA	\$557,112	52
North Carolina         \$568,555         52           Illinois         \$572,010         57           South Carolina         \$577,142         50           Hawaii         \$577,687         55           Nebraska         \$577,687         55           West Virginia         \$577,687         55           Delaware         \$577,927         52           District of Columbia         \$585,737         52           Massachusetts <sup>4</sup> \$594,296         57           Wyoming         \$615,994         54           Maine         \$621,861         47           Mississippi         \$621,861         47           Georgia         \$624,786         52           Utah         \$624,786         52           Utah         \$625,747         47           Pennsylvania         \$650,011         57           Arkansas         \$681,789         50           Ohio <sup>5</sup> \$687,265         52           New Mexico         \$730,686         47           Louisiana         \$780,983         51           Colorado         \$789,343         51           Kentucky         \$791,679         49	New York	\$557,518	52
Illinois         \$572,010         57           South Carolina         \$577,142         50           Hawaii         \$577,687         55           Nebraska         \$577,687         55           West Virginia         \$577,687         55           Delaware         \$577,927         52           District of Columbia         \$585,737         52           Massachusetts4         \$594,296         57           Wyoming         \$615,994         54           Maine         \$621,861         47           Georgia         \$624,786         52           Utah         \$624,786         52           Utah         \$625,747         47           Pennsylvania         \$650,011         57           Arkansas         \$681,789         50           Ohio5         \$687,265         52           New Mexico         \$730,686         47           Louisiana         \$780,983         51           Colorado         \$789,343         51           Kentucky         \$791,679         49	Maryland	\$562,308	52
South Carolina         \$577,142         50           Hawaii         \$577,687         55           Nebraska         \$577,687         55           West Virginia         \$577,687         55           Delaware         \$577,927         52           District of Columbia         \$585,737         52           Massachusetts4         \$594,296         57           Wyoming         \$615,994         54           Maine         \$621,861         47           Georgia         \$624,786         52           Utah         \$624,786         52           Utah         \$625,747         47           Pennsylvania         \$650,011         57           Arkansas         \$681,789         50           Ohio5         \$687,265         52           New Mexico         \$730,686         47           Louisiana         \$780,983         51           Colorado         \$789,343         51           Kentucky         \$791,679         49	North Carolina	\$568,555	52
South Carolina         \$577,142         50           Hawaii         \$577,687         55           Nebraska         \$577,687         55           West Virginia         \$577,687         55           Delaware         \$577,927         52           District of Columbia         \$585,737         52           Massachusetts <sup>4</sup> \$594,296         57           Wyoming         \$615,994         54           Maine         \$621,861         47           Georgia         \$624,786         52           Utah         \$624,786         52           Utah         \$625,747         47           Pennsylvania         \$650,011         57           Arkansas         \$681,789         50           Ohio <sup>5</sup> \$687,265         52           New Mexico         \$730,686         47           Louisiana         \$780,983         51           Colorado         \$789,343         51           Kentucky         \$791,679         49	Illinois	\$572,010	57
Hawaii       \$577,687       55         Nebraska       \$577,687       55         West Virginia       \$577,687       55         Delaware       \$577,927       52         District of Columbia       \$585,737       52         Massachusetts4       \$594,296       57         Wyoming       \$615,994       54         Maine       \$621,861       47         Mississippi       \$621,861       47         Georgia       \$624,786       52         Utah       \$624,786       52         Alabama       \$655,747       47         Pennsylvania       \$650,011       57         Arkansas       \$681,789       50         Ohio5       \$687,265       52         New Mexico       \$730,686       47         Louisiana       \$780,983       52         Missouri       \$780,983       51         Colorado       \$789,343       51         Kentucky       \$791,679       49	South Carolina	\$577,142	50
Nebraska         \$577,687         55           West Virginia         \$577,687         55           Delaware         \$577,927         52           District of Columbia         \$585,737         52           Massachusetts <sup>4</sup> \$594,296         57           Wyoming         \$615,994         54           Maine         \$621,861         47           Mississippi         \$621,861         47           Georgia         \$624,786         52           Utah         \$624,786         52           Alabama         \$625,747         47           Pennsylvania         \$650,011         57           Arkansas         \$681,789         50           Ohio <sup>5</sup> \$687,265         52           New Mexico         \$730,686         47           Louisiana         \$780,983         52           Missouri         \$789,343         51           Colorado         \$789,343         51           Kentucky         \$791,679         49	Hawaii	-	55
West Virginia         \$577,687         55           Delaware         \$577,927         52           District of Columbia         \$585,737         52           Massachusetts4         \$594,296         57           Wyoming         \$615,994         54           Maine         \$621,861         47           Mississippi         \$621,861         47           Georgia         \$624,786         52           Utah         \$624,786         52           Alabama         \$625,747         47           Pennsylvania         \$650,011         57           Arkansas         \$681,789         50           Ohio5         \$687,265         52           New Mexico         \$730,686         47           Louisiana         \$780,983         52           Missouri         \$789,343         51           Colorado         \$789,343         51           Kentucky         \$791,679         49	Nebraska		55
Delaware         \$577,927         52           District of Columbia         \$585,737         52           Massachusetts4         \$594,296         57           Wyoming         \$615,994         54           Maine         \$621,861         47           Mississippi         \$621,861         47           Georgia         \$624,786         52           Utah         \$624,786         52           Alabama         \$625,747         47           Pennsylvania         \$650,011         57           Arkansas         \$681,789         50           Ohio5         \$687,265         52           New Mexico         \$730,686         47           Louisiana         \$780,983         52           Missouri         \$780,983         51           Colorado         \$789,343         51           Kentucky         \$791,679         49	West Virginia		55
District of Columbia         \$585,737         52           Massachusetts4         \$594,296         57           Wyoming         \$615,994         54           Maine         \$621,861         47           Mississippi         \$621,861         47           Georgia         \$624,786         52           Utah         \$624,786         52           Alabama         \$625,747         47           Pennsylvania         \$650,011         57           Arkansas         \$681,789         50           Ohio5         \$687,265         52           New Mexico         \$730,686         47           Louisiana         \$780,983         52           Missouri         \$780,983         51           Colorado         \$789,343         51           Kentucky         \$791,679         49			
Massachusetts4       \$594,296       57         Wyoming       \$615,994       54         Maine       \$621,861       47         Mississippi       \$621,861       47         Georgia       \$624,786       52         Utah       \$624,786       52         Alabama       \$625,747       47         Pennsylvania       \$650,011       57         Arkansas       \$681,789       50         Ohio <sup>5</sup> \$687,265       52         New Mexico       \$730,686       47         Louisiana       \$780,983       52         Missouri       \$780,983       51         Colorado       \$789,343       51         Kentucky       \$791,679       49			
Wyoming       \$615,994       54         Maine       \$621,861       47         Mississippi       \$621,861       47         Georgia       \$624,786       52         Utah       \$624,786       52         Alabama       \$625,747       47         Pennsylvania       \$650,011       57         Arkansas       \$681,789       50         Ohio <sup>5</sup> \$687,265       52         New Mexico       \$730,686       47         Louisiana       \$780,983       52         Missouri       \$789,343       51         Colorado       \$789,343       51         Kentucky       \$791,679       49		, .	
Maine       \$621,861       47         Mississippi       \$621,861       47         Georgia       \$624,786       52         Utah       \$624,786       52         Alabama       \$625,747       47         Pennsylvania       \$650,011       57         Arkansas       \$681,789       50         Ohio <sup>5</sup> \$687,265       52         New Mexico       \$730,686       47         Louisiana       \$780,983       52         Missouri       \$789,343       51         Colorado       \$789,343       51         Kentucky       \$791,679       49			
Mississippi       \$621,861       47         Georgia       \$624,786       52         Utah       \$624,786       52         Alabama       \$625,747       47         Pennsylvania       \$650,011       57         Arkansas       \$681,789       50         Ohio <sup>5</sup> \$687,265       52         New Mexico       \$730,686       47         Louisiana       \$780,983       52         Missouri       \$789,983       51         Colorado       \$789,343       51         Kentucky       \$791,679       49			
Georgia       \$624,786       52         Utah       \$624,786       52         Alabama       \$625,747       47         Pennsylvania       \$650,011       57         Arkansas       \$681,789       50         Ohio <sup>5</sup> \$687,265       52         New Mexico       \$730,686       47         Louisiana       \$780,983       52         Missouri       \$780,983       51         Colorado       \$789,343       51         Kentucky       \$791,679       49			
Utah       \$624,786       52         Alabama       \$625,747       47         Pennsylvania       \$650,011       57         Arkansas       \$681,789       50         Ohio <sup>5</sup> \$687,265       52         New Mexico       \$730,686       47         Louisiana       \$780,983       52         Missouri       \$780,983       51         Colorado       \$789,343       51         Kentucky       \$791,679       49			
Alabama       \$625,747       47         Pennsylvania       \$650,011       57         Arkansas       \$681,789       50         Ohio <sup>5</sup> \$687,265       52         New Mexico       \$730,686       47         Louisiana       \$780,983       52         Missouri       \$780,983       51         Colorado       \$789,343       51         Kentucky       \$791,679       49	_		
Pennsylvania       \$650,011       57         Arkansas       \$681,789       50         Ohio <sup>5</sup> \$687,265       52         New Mexico       \$730,686       47         Louisiana       \$780,983       52         Missouri       \$780,983       51         Colorado       \$789,343       51         Kentucky       \$791,679       49			
Arkansas       \$681,789       50         Ohio5       \$687,265       52         New Mexico       \$730,686       47         Louisiana       \$780,983       52         Missouri       \$780,983       51         Colorado       \$789,343       51         Kentucky       \$791,679       49			
Ohio5       \$687,265       52         New Mexico       \$730,686       47         Louisiana       \$780,983       52         Missouri       \$780,983       51         Colorado       \$789,343       51         Kentucky       \$791,679       49	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·		
New Mexico       \$730,686       47         Louisiana       \$780,983       52         Missouri       \$780,983       51         Colorado       \$789,343       51         Kentucky       \$791,679       49		•	
Louisiana       \$780,983       52         Missouri       \$780,983       51         Colorado       \$789,343       51         Kentucky       \$791,679       49			
Missouri       \$780,983       51         Colorado       \$789,343       51         Kentucky       \$791,679       49			
Colorado         \$789,343         51           Kentucky         \$791,679         49			
Kentucky \$791,679 49		•	
•			
Nevada \$834,090 52	·		
	Nevada	\$834,090	52

## **Area 3: Exiting Ineffective Teachers**

### Goal 1 - New Teacher Evaluation

### The state should require multiple formal evaluations of all new teachers.

#### **GOAL COMPONENTS**

(The factors considered in determining the states' rating for the goal.)

- 1. The state should require that all new, nonpermanent teachers receive at least two formal evaluations annually.
- 2. New teachers should be formally evaluated at least once during the first half of their first year.

#### **RATIONALE**

- ► See appendix for detailed rationale.
- Evaluations are an important tool for providing support and holding teachers accountable.

#### SUPPORTING RESEARCH

 Research citations to support this goal are available at www.nctq.org/stpy/citations.

#### Figure 47

How States are Faring on New Teacher Evaluation



Best Practice States
Kansas, Oklahoma



13 States Meet Goal

Alabama, Delaware, Idaho, Kentucky, Maryland, Nebraska, Nevada, New Jersey, North Dakota, Ohio, South Carolina, Washington, West Virginia



9 States Nearly Meet Goal

Arizona, Indiana, Minnesota, Missouri, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, Utah, Wyoming



1 State Partly Meets Goal Arkansas



17 States Meet a Small Part of Goal

Alaska, California, Colorado, Connecticut, **FLORIDA**, Georgia, Hawaii, Illinois, Louisiana, Massachusetts, Michigan, New Mexico, New York, Oregon, Texas, Virginia, Wisconsin



**9** States Do Not Meet Goal

District of Columbia, Iowa, Maine, Mississippi, Montana, New Hampshire, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Vermont

### Goal 1 Florida Analysis



State Meets a Small Part of Goal

#### **ANALYSIS**

Florida requires new teachers to be formally evaluated once a year. The state's policy does not include any guidelines on when these evaluations should occur.

#### **SUPPORTING RESEARCH**

Florida Statute 1012.34

#### RECOMMENDATION

Florida meets only a small part of this goal. The state should require that all new, untenured teachers be formally evaluated at least twice annually and that the first evaluation occur within the first half of their first school year. By doing so, the state will ensure that local districts more efficiently determine whether teachers are demonstrating appropriate classroom skills.

The point of requiring that one evaluation occur early in the year is to be able to immediately offer feedback and support to new teachers, especially if the observation indicates any unsatisfactory performance. That way, the teacher and school or district leadership can implement a plan for improvement, rather than potentially allow an ineffective new teacher to remain in the classroom without any evaluation until late in the year.

#### **FLORIDA RESPONSE TO ANALYSIS**

Florida asserted that it requires each local district to maintain a system for the demonstration of professional education competence, which is required for beginning teachers working under the Temporary certificate and not having completed an approved teacher preparation program. The state added that it also has a statute that provides a period during every teacher's first 97 days of employment when either party can terminate employment without breach of contract. "School districts evaluate teachers during this time to determine whether employment will be continued."

#### SUPPORTING RESEARCH

Florida Statutes 1012.56(8)(b) and 1012.33

#### **LAST WORD**

A statute that allows districts to determine whether teachers' employment should be continued after the first few months of teaching does not accomplish the same purpose as requiring multiple, formal evaluations for new teachers. The statute the state cites provides no mechanism for teachers to receive feedback and support and, furthermore, does not help districts to identify or address new teachers' performance issues that may not be readily apparent in their first weeks in the classroom.

### **EXAMPLES OF BEST PRACTICE**

Both **Kansas** and **Oklahoma** require new teachers to be formally evaluated twice a year. In Kansas, each evaluation must be scheduled not later than the 60th day of the semester, and in Oklahoma, the first evaluation must be completed before November 15, ensuring that new teachers are assessed and receive feedback early in the year, and that unsatisfactory performance is addressed with an improvement plan.

Figure 48

How many times do states require districts to evaluate a new teacher during a school year?




Figure 49

- 1 Alabama, Missouri, North Carolina and West Virginia require one formal evaluation, but also three observations with follow-up conferences.
- 2 Arkansas also requires three observations by a mentor.
- 3 Washington and Delaware require one formal evaluation, but also two observations with follow-up conferences.
- 4 Third year teachers are only evaluated twice in Tennessee.


Figure 49

How many times do states require districts to evaluate a new teacher during a school year?

evaluate a new teacher during a school year?					
	Not addressed	1 time	2 times	3 or more times	
Alabama <sup>1</sup>					
Alaska					
Arizona					
Arkansas <sup>2</sup>					
California					
Colorado					
Connecticut					
Delaware <sup>3</sup>					
District of Columbia					
FLORIDA					
Georgia					
Hawaii					
Idaho		П			
Illinois					
Indiana					
lowa					
Kansas					
Kentucky					
Louisiana					
Maine					
Maryland					
Massachusetts					
Michigan					
Minnesota					
Mississippi					
Missouri <sup>1</sup>					
Montana					
Nebraska					
Nevada					
New Hampshire					
New Jersey					
New Mexico					
New York					
North Carolina <sup>1</sup>					
North Dakota					
Ohio					
Oklahoma					
Oregon					
Pennsylvania					
Rhode Island					
South Carolina					
South Dakota					
Tennessee <sup>4</sup>					
Texas					
Utah					
Vermont					
Virginia					
Washington <sup>3</sup>					
West Virginia <sup>1</sup>					
Wisconsin					
Wyoming					
,					
	9	19	14	9	

Figure 50

Do states require districts to evaluate new teachers early in the school year?



- 1 Alabama, Delaware, Idaho, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, Maryland, Nebraska, Nevada, New Jersey, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, South Carolina, Washington and West Virginia.
- South Carolina, Washington and West Virginia.

  2 District of Columbia, Iowa, Maine, Mississippi, Montana, New Hampshire, Rhode Island, South Dakota and Vermont.

### **Area 3: Exiting Ineffective Teachers**

## Goal 2 - Unsatisfactory Evaluations

The state should articulate consequences for teachers with unsatisfactory evaluations, including specifying that teachers with multiple unsatisfactory evaluations are eligible for dismissal.

#### **GOAL COMPONENTS**

(The factors considered in determining the states' rating for the goal.)

- The state should require that all teachers who have received a single unsatisfactory evaluation be placed on an improvement plan whether or not they have tenure.
- The state should require that all teachers who receive two consecutive unsatisfactory evaluations or two unsatisfactory evaluations within five years be formally eligible for dismissal — whether or not they have tenure.

#### **RATIONALE**

- See appendix for detailed rationale.
- Negative evaluations should have meaningful consequences.
- Employment status should not determine the consequences of a negative evaluation.

#### SUPPORTING RESEARCH

 Research citations to support this goal are available at www.nctq.org/stpy/citations.

#### Figure 51

How States are Faring on Consequences for Unsatisfactory Evaluations

- 善
- Best Practice States
- 9 States Meet Goal Alaska, Colorado, FLORIDA, Illinois, Louisiana, Mississippi, New Mexico, Oklahoma, Washington
- 5 States Nearly Meet Goal
  Delaware, Georgia, Hawaii, South Carolina,
  Texas
- 13 States Partly Meet Goal
  Alabama, Arkansas, California, Connecticut,
  Iowa, Michigan, Missouri, New York,
  North Carolina, Oregon, Pennsylvania,
  Utah, West Virginia
- 1 State Meets a Small Part of Goal Arizona
  - District of Columbia, Idaho, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, North Dakota, Ohio, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Tennessee, Vermont, Virginia, Wisconsin, Wyoming

## Goal 2 Florida Analysis



State Meets Goal

#### **ANALYSIS**

Florida requires local districts to place teachers who receive an unsatisfactory evaluation on an improvement plan. If a teacher does not successfully correct the deficiencies being addressed in the improvement plan, he or she is formally eligible for dismissal at the superintendent's discretion.

#### SUPPORTING RESEARCH

Florida Statute Title XLVIII 1012.34(3)(d)

#### RECOMMENDATION

Florida meets this goal. The state is commended for requiring that all teachers who receive an unsatisfactory evaluation, regardless of whether they have tenure, be placed on an improvement plan and for making a teacher eligible for formal dismissal after two consecutive unsatisfactory evaluations.

#### **FLORIDA RESPONSE TO ANALYSIS**


Florida recognized the factual accuracy of our analysis.

### **EXAMPLES OF BEST PRACTICE**

**Illinois** and **Oklahoma** both require that teachers who receive unsatisfactory evaluations be placed on improvement plans. Teachers in Illinois are then evaluated three times during a 90-day remediation period and are eligible for dismissal if performance remains unsatisfactory. Oklahoma's improvement plan may not exceed two months and if performance does not improve during that time, teachers are eligible for dismissal.

Figure 52

Do states specify that teachers with multiple unsatisfactory evaluations are eligible for dismissal?



1 Alaska, Colorado, Delaware, Florida, Hawaii, Illinois, Louisiana, Mississippi, New Mexico, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, South Carolina and Washington.

Figure 53

- Any teacher with an unsatisfactory evaluation is immediately dismissed.
- 2 Kentucky does require multiple observations the year following an unsatisfactory evaluation.
- 3 Teachers in low-performing schools can be dismissed after just one negative rating.
- 4 Only teachers on annual contracts are eligible for dismissal after unsatisfactory evaluations.

Figure 53

# What are the consequences for teachers who receive unsatisfactory evaluations?

Improvement Eligible for plan after dismissal after multiple a single unsatisfactory unsatisfactory No articulated rating ratings consequences Alabama Alaska П Arizona Arkansas П California Colorado П Connecticut Delaware П District of Columbia **FLORIDA** П Georgia Hawaii<sup>1</sup> Idaho Illinois Indiana lowa Kansas Kentucky<sup>2</sup> Louisiana Maine Maryland П Massachusetts П П Michigan Minnesota П П Mississippi Missouri П Montana Nebraska П П Nevada **New Hampshire** П **New Jersey New Mexico** П New York North Carolina<sup>3</sup> П North Dakota Ohio Oklahoma Oregon Pennsylvania Rhode Island South Carolina<sup>4</sup> South Dakota Tennessee Texas Utah Vermont Virginia Washington West Virginia Wisconsin Wyoming 26 13 23

## **Area 3: Exiting Ineffective Teachers**

## Goal 3 – Licensure Loopholes

The state should close loopholes that allow teachers who have not met licensure requirements to continue teaching.

#### Figure 54

## How States are Faring on Closing Licensure Loopholes

- Best Practice States
  Colorado, New Jersey
- 5 States Meet Goal
  Illinois, Nevada, New Mexico, South Carolina,
  Virginia
- 10 States Nearly Meet Goal Alabama, Arkansas, Connecticut, District of Columbia, Georgia, Massachusetts, North Dakota, Ohio, Pennsylvania, West Virginia
- 2 States Partly Meet Goal lowa, Wyoming
- 3 States Meet a Small Part of Goal Michigan, Vermont, Wisconsin
- 29 States Do Not Meet Goal
  Alaska, Arizona, California, Delaware,
  FLORIDA, Hawaii, Idaho, Indiana, Kansas,
  Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland,
  Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana,
  Nebraska, New Hampshire, New York, North
  Carolina, Oklahoma, Oregon, Rhode Island,
  South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah,
  Washington

#### **GOAL COMPONENTS**

(The factors considered in determining the states' rating for the goal.)

- 1. Under no circumstances should a state award a standard license to a teacher who has not passed all required licensing tests.
- 2. If a state finds it necessary to confer conditional or provisional licenses under limited and exceptional circumstances to teachers who have not passed the required tests, the state should ensure that requirements be met within one year.

#### **RATIONALE**

- ▶ See appendix for detailed rationale.
- Teachers who have not passed licensing tests may place students at risk.

#### **SUPPORTING RESEARCH**

 Research citations to support this goal are available at www.nctq.org/stpy/citations.

### Goal 3 Florida Analysis



#### **ANALYSIS**

Florida allows new teachers who have not passed required state licensing tests to teach for up to three years on a temporary certificate. Although the state requires teachers to pass its general knowledge test in the first year of teaching, it allows teachers to practice for up to three years without passing its required content test.

#### **SUPPORTING RESEARCH**

2008 Florida Statute 1012.56

Florida Department of Education: http://www.fldoe.org/edcert/cert\_types.asp

#### **RECOMMENDATION**

Florida does not meet this goal. The state should ensure that all teachers pass all required licensure tests before they enter the classroom. Exceptions place students at risk of having teachers who lack sufficient or appropriate subject-matter knowledge. If, under limited and exceptional circumstances, such conditional or provisional licenses are deemed necessary, the state should allow only one additional year for teachers to meet testing requirements.

#### **FLORIDA RESPONSE TO ANALYSIS**

Florida asserted that although the statements in the analysis are correct, the state's Temporary certificate meets NCLB standards because it requires the demonstration of subject-matter content. "Passing the subject-matter portion of the certification exam is one option, in addition to presenting a bachelor's or higher degree major or presenting a bachelor's or higher degree with 30 semester hours of specified credit in the content area, as means for demonstrating subject area knowledge." A teacher choosing the latter two options must pass the subject-matter exams prior to being awarded the Professional certificate.

#### **LAST WORD**

The demonstration of content mastery through subjectmatter testing is a vital part of ensuring teacher effectiveness in the classroom. Florida's current policy potentially allows new teachers who have not passed these exams to teach for up to three years. The state is strongly urged to strengthen its requirements and mandate that all teachers pass subject-matter tests before teaching.

Figure 55 How long can new teachers practice without passing licensing tests?

without passing licensing tests?					
	No deferral	Up to 1 year	Up to 2 years ι	3 years or more (or inspecified)	
Alabama					
Alaska					
Arizona					
Arkansas					
California					
Colorado					
Connecticut					
Delaware					
District of Columbia					
FLORIDA					
Georgia					
Hawaii					
Idaho					
Illinois					
Indiana					
lowa <sup>1</sup>					
Kansas					
Kentucky					
Louisiana					
Maine					
Maryland					
Massachusetts					
Michigan					
Minnesota					
Mississippi					
Missouri					
Montana <sup>2</sup>					
Nebraska <sup>2</sup>					
Nevada <sup>3</sup>					
New Hampshire					
•					
New Jersey New Mexico	_				
New York					
North Carolina					
North Dakota					
Ohio					
Oklahoma					
Oregon					
Pennsylvania					
Rhode Island					
South Carolina					
South Dakota					
Tennessee					
Texas					
Utah					
Vermont					
Virginia					
Washington					
West Virginia					
Wisconsin					
Wyoming <sup>4</sup>					
	7	12	8	22	



### **EXAMPLES OF BEST PRACTICE**

Both Colorado and New Jersey require that all new teachers must pass all required subjectmatter tests as a condition of initial licensure.

Figure 56 How long can new teachers practice without passing licensing tests?<sup>1</sup>




1 Montana and Nebraska do not currently require licensing tests.

- 1 lowa only requires subject-matter testing for elementary teachers.
- 2 Montana and Nebraska do not currently require licensing tests.
- 4 Wyoming only requires subject-matter testing for elementary and social studies teachers.

Figure 57

Do states still award emergency licenses?<sup>1</sup>



- 1 Not applicable to Montana and Nebraska, which do not require subject-matter testing.
- 2 Colorado, Illinois, Nevada, New Jersey, New Mexico, South Carolina and Virginia.
- and virginia.

  3 Alabama, Alaska, Arkansas, Connecticut, District of Columbia,
  Georgia, Idaho, Iowa, Kansas, Maryland, Massachusetts, New
  Hampshire, New York, North Carolina, North Dakota, Oregon,
  Vermont, Washington, West Virginia and Wyoming.

### **Appendix**

Area 1: Goal 1
State Data Systems

#### **Rationale**

# Value-added analysis connects student data to teacher data to measure achievement and performance.

Value-added models are an important tool for measuring student achievement and school effectiveness. Value-added models measure the learning gains made by individual students, controlling for students' previous knowledge. They can also control for students' background characteristics. In the area of teacher quality, value-added models offer a fairer and potentially more meaningful way to evaluate a teacher's effectiveness than previous methods used by schools.

For example, it used to be that a school might have only known that its fifth-grade teacher, Mrs. Jones, consistently had students who did not score on grade level on standardized assessments of reading. Once the school had access to value-added analysis, it learned that Mrs. Jones' students were reading on a third-grade level when they entered her class, and that they were above a fourth-grade performance level at the end of the school year. While not yet reaching appropriate grade level, Mrs. Jones' students had made more than a year's progress in her class. Because of value-added data, the school was able to see that Mrs. Jones is an effective teacher.

The school would not have been able to see this without a data system that connects student data with teacher data. Furthermore, multiple years of data are necessary in order to make meaningful determinations about teacher effectiveness. Value-added analysis cannot occur without both student and teacher identifiers and the ability to match test records over time.

# There are a number of responsible uses for value-added analysis.

Assessing Individual Teachers: With three years of good data, value-added analysis can successfully identify the strongest and weakest teachers. It is not as useful at distinguishing differences among teachers in the middle range of performance. This is why value-added analysis should only be used to provide part of the evidence of teacher effectiveness.

School Performance: Value-added analysis can accurately assess the learning gains and losses made within a single school, with less risk of measurement error. The U.S. Department of Education is now working with states to pilot something akin to value-added analysis, known as "student growth" models, to determine schools' Adequate Yearly Progress (AYP). Student growth models are not as effective as value-added models at

controlling for other factors besides the quality of the teacher. However, these models are still valuable for providing a measure of academic improvement for the school overall, leaving open their potential use for determining schoolwide bonuses. A good value-added model is a subset of a student growth model; it is able to more precisely separate out nonschool effects on learning, making it possible to better distinguish the impact of an individual teacher.

Applicability to All Teachers: Many critics of value-added models dismiss them because they can only be used for teachers in tested subjects. While some subjects do not lend themselves to a value-added model, more teachers may be eligible than may be immediately obvious. For example, student reading scores are affected by the quality of social studies and science instruction, not just instruction in language arts. Reading comprehension is directly connected to student learning of broad subject matter, including history, geography and science.

High School: A value-added model is theoretically most useful at the high school level, because high school teachers are typically assigned many more students, making results more reliable within a given year. Data from an elementary class size of 20 to 30 students can produce relatively unstable results for a single year. A high school teacher, however, will be assigned on average 120 students, yielding a much more stable, reliable indicator of actual teacher performance. Use at the high school level would require states to adopt reliable pre- and post-tests in core subject areas.

**Pilots:** States can directly and indirectly encourage districts to implement value-added analysis. By piloting value-added analysis in districts or schools, the states can encourage development of this valuable tool for eventual statewide use. Other programs, such as state-sponsored pay-for-performance programs that base bonuses, in part, on teachers' ability to produce student academic gains, can also encourage experimentation with value-added analysis.

**Evaluating Teacher-Preparation Programs:** Another innovative use for value-added technology is its inclusion in the evaluation of teacher-preparation programs. Value-added analysis that can measure the effectiveness of program graduates can provide valuable information that will hold poor teacher-preparation programs accountable, as well as identify strong programs that can be models for best practices.

### Area 1: Goal 2

### **Evaluation of Effectiveness**

#### Rationale

## Teachers should be judged primarily by their impact on students.

While there are many factors to be considered when a teacher is formally evaluated, nothing is more important than effectiveness in the classroom. Unfortunately, many evaluation instruments used by districts, some of which are mandated by states, are structured so that teachers can earn a satisfactory rating without any evidence that they are sufficiently advancing student learning in the classroom. It is often enough that they just appear to be trying, not necessarily succeeding.

Many evaluation instruments give as much weight, or more, to factors that do not have any direct correlation with student performance—for example, taking professional development courses, assuming extra duties such as sponsoring a club or mentoring, and getting along well with colleagues. Some instruments express a hesitation to hold teachers accountable for student progress. Teacher evaluation instruments should include factors that combine both human judgment and objective measures of student learning.

A teacher evaluation instrument that focuses on student learning could include the following components:

#### A. Observation

- 1. Ratings should be based on multiple observations by multiple persons, usually the principal and senior faculty, within the same year to produce a more accurate rating than is possible with a single observation. Teacher observers should be trained to use a valid and reliable observation protocol (meaning that the protocol has been tested to ensure that the results are trustworthy and useful). The observers should assign degrees of proficiency to observed behaviors.
- 2. The primary observation component should be the quality of instruction, as measured by student time on task; student grasp or mastery of the lesson objective; and efficient use of class time.
- 3. Other factors often considered in the course of an observation can provide useful information—
- Questioning techniques and other methods for engaging class;
- Differentiation of instruction;
- Continual student checks for understanding throughout lesson;
- Appropriate lesson structure and pacing;
- Appropriate grouping structures;

- Reinforcement of student effort; and
- Classroom management and use of effective classroom routines.

Some other elements commonly found on many instruments, such as "makes appropriate and effective use of technology," or "ties lesson into previous and future learning experiences," may seem important to document but can be difficult to do so reliably in an observation. Too many elements often end up distracting the observer from focusing on answering one central question: "Are students learning?"

#### B. Objective Measures of Student Learning

Apart from the observation, the evaluation instrument should provide evidence of work performance. Many districts use portfolios, which create a lot of work for the teacher and may be unreliable indicators of effectiveness. Good and less-cumbersome alternatives to the standard portfolio exist—for example:

- The value that a teacher adds, as measured by standardized test scores (see Goal 1.1);
- Periodic standardized diagnostic assessments;
- Benchmark assessments that show student growth;
- Artifacts of student work connected to specific student learning standards that are randomly selected for review by the principal or senior faculty and scored using rubrics and descriptors;
- Examples of typical assignments, assessed for their quality and rigor; and
- Periodic checks on progress with the curriculum (e.g., progress on textbook) coupled with evidence of student mastery of the curriculum from quizzes, tests, and exams.

# Area 1: Goal 3 Tenure

### Rationale

### Tenure should be a significant and consequential milestone in a teacher's career.

The decision to give teachers tenure (or permanent status) is usually made automatically, with little thought, deliberation or consideration of actual evidence. State policy should reflect the fact that initial certification is intended to be temporary and probationary, and that tenure is intended to be a significant reward for teachers who have consistently shown effectiveness and commitment. Tenure and advanced certification are not rights implied by the conferring of an initial teaching certificate. No other profession, including higher education, offers practitioners this benefit after only a few years of working in the field.

To make tenure meaningful, states should require a clear process, such as a hearing, for districts to use when considering whether or not a teacher advances from probationary to permanent status. This would ensure that the local district reviews the teacher's performance before a determination is made. This also protects the teacher's rights, as he or she is fully aware of the process and has an opportunity to participate.

States should also ensure that evidence of effectiveness is the preponderant (but not the only) criterion for making tenure decisions. However, most states confer tenure at a point that is too early for the collection of sufficient and adequate data that reflect teacher performance. Ideally, states would accumulate five years' worth of such data. This robust data set would prevent effective teachers from being unfairly denied tenure based on too little data, while also preventing the states from granting tenure to ineffective teachers.

# Area 2: Goal 1 Induction

#### Rationale

# Too many new teachers are left to "sink or swim" when they begin teaching.

Most new teachers find themselves overwhelmed and undersupported at the outset of their teaching careers. Although differences in preparation programs and routes to the classroom do affect readiness, even teachers from the most rigorous programs need support once they take on the myriad responsibilities of a teacher of record. A survival of the fittest mentality prevails in many schools; figuring out how to successfully negotiate unfamiliar curricula, discipline and management issues, and labyrinthine school and district procedures is often considered a rite of passage. However, the frustrations of the new teacher are not limited to low performers. Many talented new teachers become disillusioned early on by the lack of support they receive, and it may be the most talented who will more likely explore other career options.

## Vague requirements simply to provide mentoring are insufficient.

Although many states have recognized the need to provide new teachers with mentoring, state policies merely indicating that mentoring should occur will not ensure that districts provide new teachers with quality mentoring experiences. While allowing flexibility for districts to develop and implement programs in line with local priorities and resources, states also should identify the minimum requirements for these programs in terms of the frequency and duration of mentoring and the qualifications of those serving as mentors.

# New teachers in high-needs schools are particularly in need of quality mentoring.

Retaining effective teachers in high-needs schools is especially challenging. States should ensure that districts place special emphasis on mentoring programs in these schools, particularly when limited resources may prevent the district from providing mentoring to all new teachers.

### Area 2: Goal 2 Licensure Advancement

#### Rationale

## The point of the probationary licensure period should be to determine teacher effectiveness.

Most states grant new teachers a probationary license that must later be converted to an advanced or permanent license. A probationary period is sound policy; it provides an opportunity to decide whether individuals merit permanent licensure. However, very few states require any real decision making about teacher performance or effectiveness in determining whether teachers will advance from their probationary license. Instead, states generally require probationary teachers to fulfill a set of requirements to receive advanced certification. Thus, the ending of the probationary period is based on whether a checklist has been completed, rather than on teacher performance and effectiveness.

## Most state requirements for achieving permanent certification have not been shown to impact teacher effectiveness.

Unfortunately, not only do most states fail to connect advanced certification to actual evidence of teacher effectiveness, but the requirements teachers most often have to fulfill are not even related to teacher effectiveness. The most common requirement for permanent licensure is the completion of additional coursework, often resulting in a master's degree. Requiring teachers to obtain additional training in their teaching area would be meaningful; however, the requirements are usually vague, allowing the individual to fulfill coursework requirements from long menus that include areas of no connection or use to that teacher in the classroom. As for requiring a master's degree, this is an area in which the research evidence is quite conclusive: Master's degrees have not been shown to make teachers more effective. This is likely due in no small part to the fact that teachers generally do not attain master's degrees in their subject areas. According to the National Center for Educational Statistics, less than one-fourth of secondary teachers' master's degrees are in their subject area, and only seven percent of elementary teachers' master's degrees are in an academic subject.

In addition to their dubious value, these requirements may also serve as a disincentive to teacher retention. Talented probationary teachers may be unwilling to invest their time and resources in more education coursework. Further, these teachers may well pursue advanced degrees that facilitate their leaving teaching.

# Area 2: Goal 3 Pay Scales

#### **Rationale**

## Compensation reform can be accomplished within the context of local control.

Teacher pay is, and should be, largely a local issue. Districts should not face state-imposed regulatory obstacles that prevent them from paying their teachers the way they see fit; different communities have different resources, needs and priorities. States should remove any barriers to districts' autonomy in deciding the terms for teacher compensation packages.

The state can ensure that all teachers are treated fairly by determining a minimum starting salary for all teachers. However, a state-mandated salary schedule that locks in pay increases or requires uniform pay deprives districts of the ability to be flexible and responsive to supply and demand problems that they may face.

### There is an important difference between a state setting the minimum teacher salary and setting a salary schedule.

What is the difference between establishing a minimum starting salary and a salary schedule? Maine, for example, set a minimum starting salary of \$30,000 for its teachers in 2007-2008. No district is allowed to pay less. In contrast, Washington, like many states, has established a salary schedule that lays out what the minimum salary has to be at every level. A teacher who has been teaching for four years and has a master's degree must not be paid less than \$40,998. A teacher who has been teaching for four years and does not have a master's degree may not be paid less than \$34,464. While most districts exceed the state minimum, setting the salary schedule forces districts to adhere to a compensation system that is primarily based on experience and degree status, even when they would like to have other options.

It should also be noted that the minimums set by many states — whether a minimum starting salary or a complete schedule — are woefully out-of-date, having gone without updating for 20 years or more in some cases. The starting salary in Louisiana, for example, has been just over \$12,000 since 1987; the mini-

mum of \$18,000 in Massachusetts dates to 1988. Rather than maintain policies that do not provide any meaningful guidance to districts or assurance to teachers, states should remove these regulations and send a clear message to districts that they can decide how to compensate their teachers.

### Area 2: Goal 4 Retention Pay

#### **Rationale**

## Connecting additional compensation to the awarding of tenure would help teacher retention.

Starting salaries for teachers have risen significantly in many states over the last decade. While this may help to attract promising candidates, the small pay increases that generally follow, particularly in the first few years of teaching, may be detrimental to retention. Most state and district salary schedules provide only small percentage increases in the early years, with the percentage increases widening later on. Longevity bonuses are also common. A better strategy would be to connect a significant pay increase to the awarding of tenure, but only if tenure were based on a determination of effectiveness.

This pay increase, whether it was a significant salary increase paid out over the course of a year or a single lump-sum payment, would serve two important and complementary purposes. First, connecting this payment to a meaningful process for awarding tenure to effective teachers would enhance public understanding that tenure is not awarded automatically to just anyone. In addition, it would provide an important retention strategy, as teachers at the beginning of their careers would know that they will receive additional compensation at the conclusion of their probationary periods.

#### Area 2: Goal 5

### Compensation for Prior Work Experience

### **Rationale**

# Districts should be allowed to pay new teachers with relevant work experience more than other new teachers.

State and district salary structures frequently fail to recognize that new teacher hires are not necessarily new to the workforce. Some new teachers bring with them deep work experience that is directly related to the subject matter they will teach. For example, the hiring of a new high school chemistry teacher with 20 years experience as a chemical engineer is most certainly a great boon to any district. Yet most salary structures would place this individual at the same point on the schedule as a new teacher straight out of college. Compensating these teachers commensurate with their experience is an important

retention (as well as recruitment) strategy, particularly when other nonteaching opportunities in these fields are likely to be more financially lucrative.

As discussed in Goal 2.3, specifics of teacher pay should largely be left to local decision making. However, states should use policy mechanisms to inform districts that it is not only permissible but also necessary to compensate new teachers with related prior work experience accordingly.

# **Area 2: Goal 6**Differential Pay for Shortage Areas

#### **Rationale**

# States should take the lead in addressing chronic shortages and needs.

As discussed in Goal 2.3, states should ensure that state-level policies (such as a uniform salary schedule) do not interfere with districts' flexibility in compensating teachers in ways that best meet their individual needs and resources. However, when it comes to addressing chronic shortages, states should do more than simply get out of the way. States should provide direct support for differential pay for effective teaching in shortage subject areas and high-needs schools. Attracting effective and qualified teachers to high-needs schools or filling vacancies in hard-to-staff subjects are problems that are frequently beyond a district's ability to solve. States that provide direct support for differential pay in these areas are taking an important step in promoting the equitable distribution of quality teachers. Short of providing direct support, states can also use policy levers to indicate to districts that differential pay is not only permissible but necessary.

# Area 2: Goal 7 Performance Pay

#### **Rationale**

#### Performance pay is an important retention strategy.

Performance pay provides an opportunity to reward those teachers who get consistent results from their students. The traditional salary schedule used by districts pays all teachers with the same inputs (i.e., experience and degree status) the same amount regardless of outcomes. Not only is this inconsistent with most other professions, it may also create a disincentive for high-achieving teachers to stay in the field, because there is no opportunity for financial reward for their success.

Many opponents of performance pay object to the premise that money will motivate teachers to work harder to advance student achievement. This objection is not groundless, particularly with performance pay frequently discussed as a combination of a carrot and a stick. Performance pay should not be viewed as an incentive for teachers to work harder, but as a means to compensate teachers based on student outcomes.

## States should set guidelines for districts to ensure that plans are fair and sound.

Performance pay plans are not easy to implement well. There are numerous examples of both state and district initiatives that have been undone by poor planning and administration. The methodology that allows for the measurement of teachers' contributions to student achievement is still developing, and any performance pay program must recognize its limitations (see Goal 1.1 for more on the appropriate uses of this methodology). There are also inherent issues of fairness that should be considered when different types of data must be used to assess the performance of different kinds of teachers.

States can play an important part in supporting performance pay by setting guidelines (whether for a state-level program or for districts' own initiatives) that recognize the challenges in implementing a program well. Because this is an area in which there is still much to learn about best practice, states should consider piloting local initiatives as a way to expand the use of and the knowledge base around performance pay.

# Area 2: Goal 8 Pension Flexibility

#### Rationale

# Anachronistic features of teacher pension plans disadvantage teachers early in their careers.

Teacher salaries are just one part of the compensation package that teachers receive. Virtually all teachers are also entitled to a pension, which, after vesting, will continue to provide compensation for the rest of their lives after retirement. In an era when pension benefits have been declining across industries and professions, teachers' pensions remain a fixture. In fact, nearly all states continue to provide teachers with a defined-benefit pension system, an expensive and inflexible model that neither reflects the realities of the modern workforce nor provides equitable benefits to all teachers.

To achieve the maximum benefits from a defined-benefit pension plan, a teacher must begin and end his or her career in the same pension system. While a teacher who leaves the system early may receive some benefits, teachers who leave before the point of vesting — which is as much as 10 years or more in some states — are generally entitled to nothing more than their own contributions plus some interest. This may well serve

as a retention strategy for some, but on a larger scale, this approach fails to reflect the realities of the current workforce. The current workforce is increasingly mobile, with most entering the workforce expecting to change jobs many more times in their careers than previous generations. All workers, including teachers, may move to jobs in other states without any intention of changing careers. To younger teachers in particular, a defined benefit plan may seem like a meaningless part of the compensation package. A pension plan that cannot move across state lines and requires a long-term commitment may not seem like much of a benefit at all.

There is an alternative. A defined contribution plan is fair to all teachers, at all points in their careers. Defined contribution plans are more equitable because each teacher's benefits are funded by his or her own contributions, plus contributions made by the employer specifically on the behalf of that individual. This is fundamentally more equitable than defined benefit plans, which require new teachers to fund the benefits of retirees. Moreover, defined contributions are inherently portable and give employees flexibility and control over their retirement savings.

# Pension plans also disadvantage teachers early in their careers by overcommitting employer resources to retirement benefits.

The contributions of employers to their workers' retirement benefits is a valuable benefit: it is important to ensuring that individuals have sufficient retirement savings. Compensation resources, however, are not unlimited, and they must fund both current salaries and future retirement benefits. Mandated employer contributions to many states' teacher pension systems are extremely high, leaving districts with little flexibility to be more innovative with their compensation strategies. This is further exacerbated for states in which teachers also participate in the Social Security program, meaning that the district must pay even more toward the retirement of each teacher.

This approach to compensation disadvantages teachers early in their careers, as the commitment of resources to retirement benefits almost certainly depresses salaries and prevents incentives. Lower mandatory employer contribution rates (in states where they are too high; there are certainly states where they are shamefully low) would free up compensation resources to implement the kinds of strategies suggested by this edition of the *Yearbook*.

# Area 2: Goal 9 Pension Neutrality

#### Rationale

# It is unfair to all teachers when pension wealth does not accumulate in a uniform way.

In addition to the ways defined benefit pension systems disadvantage teachers described in Goal 2.8, the way pension wealth accumulates in some systems further compounds this inequity. All pension systems use a multiplier to calculate the benefits an individual is entitled to receive based on salary levels and years of service. For example, a pension system may have a multiplier of 2.0. Pension benefits are determined by multiplying average final annual salary by years of service by the multiplier of 2.0. Thus, someone working fewer years with a lower final salary will appropriately receive less in benefits than someone with more years of service and/or a higher final salary. However, the multiplier in many pension systems is not fixed; it increases as years of service increase. When a higher multiplier is used, teachers receive even more generous benefits than they would based only on final salary and years of service.

Another way that pension benefits are not awarded fairly is through the common policy of setting retirement eligibility at different ages and years of service. In Hawaii, for example, a teacher with 30 years of service may retire at age 55, while other teachers may not retire until age 62. This means that a teacher who started teaching in Hawaii at age 25 can reach 30 years of service at age 55 and receive seven additional years of full retirement benefits beyond what a teacher that started at age 32 and cannot retire with full benefits until age 62 would receive. A fair system would set a standard retirement age for all participants, without factoring in years of service.

# Pension systems affect when teachers decide to retire as teachers look to maximize their pension wealth.

The year teachers reach retirement eligibility by age and/or years of service, their pension wealth peaks; pension wealth then declines for each year they work beyond retirement age. Plans that allow retirement based on years of service create unnecessary peaks, and plans that allow a low retirement age create an incentive to retire earlier in one's career than may be necessary. For every year teachers continue to work beyond their eligibility for unreduced retirement benefits, they lose that year of pension benefits, thus decreasing their overall pension wealth.

Although their yearly pension benefits would continue to rise as they earn additional service credit, it would only be at a small percentage per year, which would not make up for the loss of each year of benefits.

To try to balance this incentive to retire, some states have created DROP (Deferred Retirement Option Plan) programs. DROP programs allow participants to place their monthly pension benefits in a private investment account while still teaching and earning a salary, thus retaining those benefits. These teachers are, in effect, earning their pension and salary at the same time, and often at a relatively young age.

A DROP program is a band-aid on the problem; it does not fix what is structurally wrong — retirement at an early age without reduction of benefits. For example, the hypothetical teacher above decides to forgo retiring at age 47 in order to wait and qualify for her state's DROP program at age 55. She now has 33 years of service and has reached a pension equal to 66 percent of her salary. She remains in DROP for the maximum allowable five years. During that time, her five years of lost pension benefits plus her five years of mandatory employee pension contribution have been deposited in a private investment account. Upon retiring at age 60, she would receive the total of that private account plus a lifetime pension benefit annually of 66 percent of her final salary. With the lump-sum payment of her DROP account and monthly pension benefit, she will receive 100 percent of her final average salary for at least 10 years, and, depending on the state, she may also receive Social Security benefits. This generous guaranteed payout would be hard to find in any other profession.

DROP programs do create an incentive for some teachers to remain past their eligible retirement, but at a high cost. DROP programs mean that districts still must find the funds to pay pension benefits to teachers at a relatively young age when those dollars could be more effectively spent.

### Area 3: Goal 1 New Teacher Evaluation

#### **Rationale**

## Evaluations are an important tool for providing support and holding teachers accountable.

Individuals new to a profession frequently have reduced responsibilities coupled with increased oversight. As competencies are demonstrated, new responsibilities are added and supervision decreases. Such is seldom the case for new teachers, who generally have the same classroom responsibilities as veteran teachers, including responsibility for the academic progress of their students, but may receive limited feedback on their performance. In the absence of good metrics for determining who will be an effective teacher before individuals begin to teach, it is critical that schools and districts closely monitor the performance of new teachers.

States should require that districts formally evaluate new teachers at least twice annually. A formal evaluation means that the observation results in a rating that becomes part of the teacher's record. Evaluations should not be treated as formalities; they are an important tool for identifying teachers' strengths and areas that need improvement. Although the goal should always be to provide feedback and support that will help teachers to address perceived weaknesses, evaluations also serve an important purpose in holding weak teachers accountable for continuing poor performance.

The state should specifically require that districts evaluate new teachers early in the school year. This policy would help to ensure that new teachers get the support they need early on and that supervisors are aware from the beginning of the school year which new teachers (and their students) may be at risk. The requirement of at least one additional evaluation provides important data about the teacher's ability to improve. Data from evaluations from the teacher's early years of teaching can then be used as part of the performance-based evidence used to make a decision about tenure.

# Area 3: Goal 2 Unsatisfactory Evaluations

#### Rationale

# Negative evaluations should have meaningful consequences.

Teacher evaluations are too often treated as mere formalities, rather than as important tools for rewarding good teachers, helping average teachers to improve and holding weak teachers accountable for poor performance. State policy should reflect the importance of evaluations so that teachers and principals alike take their consequences seriously. Accordingly, states should specify the consequences of negative evaluations. First, teachers that receive a negative evaluation should be placed on improvement plans. These plans should focus on performance areas that directly connect to student learning and should outline noted deficiencies, define specific action steps necessary to address these deficiencies and describe how progress will be measured. While teachers that receive negative evaluations should receive support and additional training, opportunities to improve should not be unlimited. States should articulate policies wherein two negative evaluations within five years are sufficient for justifying dismissal of a teacher.

# Employment status should not determine the consequences of a negative evaluation.

Differentiating consequences of a negative evaluation based on whether a teacher has probationary or nonprobationary status puts the interests of adults before the interests of students. Ideally, weaknesses and deficiencies would be identified and corrected during the probationary period: if the deficiencies were found to be insurmountable, the teacher would not be awarded permanent status. However, in the absence of meaningful tenure processes based on teacher effectiveness, limiting significant consequences to the probationary period is insufficient. Any teacher who receives a negative evaluation, regardless of employment status, should be placed on an improvement plan, and any teacher who receives multiple negative evaluations, regardless of employment status, should be eligible for dismissal.

# Area 3: Goal 3 Licensure Loopholes

#### **Rationale**

## Teachers who have not passed licensing tests may place students at risk.

While states clearly need a regulatory basis for filling classroom positions with a small number of people who do not hold full teaching credentials, many of the regulations used to do this put the instructional needs of children at risk, year after year. For example, schools can make liberal use of provisional certificates or waivers provided by the state if they fill classroom positions with persons who may have completed a teacher preparation program but who have not yet passed their state licensing tests. These allowances may be made for up to three years in some states. The unfortunate consequence is that students' needs are neglected in an effort to extend personal consideration to adults who are unable to meet minimal state standards.

While some flexibility may be necessary because licensing tests are not always administered with the frequency that is needed, the availability of provisional certificates and waivers year after year signals that even the state does not put much stock in its licensing standards or what they represent. States accordingly need to ensure that all persons given full charge of children's learning are required to pass the relevant licensing tests in their first year of teaching, ideally before they enter the classroom. Licensing tests are an important minimum benchmark in the profession, and states that allow teachers to postpone passing these tests are abandoning one of the basic responsibilities of licensure.

**Board of Directors** 

Stacey Boyd, Chair

Chief Executive Officer, The Savvy Source for Parents

Chester E. Finn, Jr.

President, The Thomas B. Fordham Institute

Ira Fishman

Chief Operating Officer and Partner, Patton Boggs LLP

Marti Watson Garlett

Vice President, Academic Programs and Professional

Licensure, Laureate Education, Inc.

Jason Kamras

Director of Human Capital Strategy for Teachers,

District of Columbia Public Schools 2005 National Teacher of the Year

Donald N. Langenberg

Chancellor Emeritus, University System of Maryland

Clara M. Lovett

President Emerita, Northern Arizona University

Carol G. Peck

President and Chief Executive Officer, Rodel Charitable

Foundation of Arizona

Kirk T. Schroder

President, Virginia Board of Education (1998 - 2002) Managing Partner, Schroder Fidlow & Titley, PLC

Danielle Wilcox Consultant

Kate Walsh, President

National Council on Teacher Quality

**Advisory Board** 

Steven J. Adamowski Hartford Public Schools

Sir Michael Barber *McKinsey and Company* 

Founder, Prime Minister's Delivery Unit

Roy E. Barnes

former Governor, State of Georgia

Alan D. Bersin

California State Board of Education

Lawrence S. Braden

Saint Paul's School, New Hampshire

Cynthia Brown

Center for American Progress

Andrew Chen EduTron

Jo Lynne DeMary

Virginia Commonwealth University

former Virginia Superintendent of Public Instruction

Paula S. Dominguez

Rhode Island House of Representatives

Cheryl Ellis

Sugar Creek Charter School

Michael Feinberg The KIPP Foundation

Eleanor S. Gaines

Grayhawk Elementary School, Arizona

Michael Goldstein

The Match School, Massachusetts

Eric A. Hanushek
The Hoover Institution
Frederick M. Hess

American Enterprise Institute

Paul T. Hill

Center on Reinventing Public Education

E.D. Hirsch

Core Knowledge Foundation

Michael Johnston

Mapleton Expeditionary School of the Arts, Colorado

Frank Keating

former Governor, State of Oklahoma

Martin J. Koldyke

Academy for Urban School Leadership

Wendy Kopp Teach For America Amy Jo Leonard

Turtle Mountain Elementary School, North Dakota

Deborah M. McGriff
NewSchools Venture Fund

Ellen Moir

New Teacher Center
Robert H. Pasternack
Maximus Inc.

Michael Podgursky

University of Missouri-Columbia

Michelle Rhee

District of Columbia Public Schools

Stefanie Sanford

Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation

Laura Schwedes

KIPP: STAR College Prep Charter School

Thomas Toch Education Sector Daniel Willingham University of Virginia



## National Council on Teacher Quality

1341 G Street NW, Suite 720, Washington, DC 20005 Tel: 202-393-0020 Fax: 202-393-0095 Web: www.nctq.org

NCTQ is available to work with individual states to improve teacher policies. For more information please contact:

Sandi Jacobs Vice President sjacobs@nctq.org 202-393-0020