

Moral Education in Lithuania: An Educology of Teaching Understanding and Caring versus Teaching Reasoning

Lilija Duobliene
Professor and Chairman
Department of Educology
Vilnius University, Lithuania

Introduction by Co-Editors

The intention of the introduction adheres to the meaning of the following statement from the first paragraph in the Recurring Editorial that started in the 2005 issue of cd-IJE.

“The format for future content recognizes the existence of the newly forming body of knowledge, i.e. philosophy of educology, as knowledge about educology, and the existence of the already developing body of knowledge, i.e. educology, as knowledge about education.”

*Professor Duobliene’s paper, in accord with the Recurring Editorial, is: (1) within the **phenomenological philosophy of educology** perspective, and; (2) in contrast to the experiential, rationalistic, and analytical **philosophy of educology** perspectives.*

From the editorial’s perspective, the paper is considered to be based on a philosophy of knowledge, i.e. on an epistemology, developed within the general philosophy of existentialism. And, from this perspective, its epistemology involves the methodology, i.e. knowledge of the method, of systematic phenomenology, as knowledge about a method for doing general philosophy, i.e. doing ontology, metaphysics, epistemology, logic, ethics, and aesthetics, from an existentialist perspective. Included in doing general philosophy, with this methodology, i.e. with this knowledge of method, is the essential step of “bracketing off” all indirect knowledge or “secondary knowledge,” that, from this perspective, is acquired through the mediation of sensory and/or reflectively oriented reasoning, so as to retrieve direct knowledge or “primary knowledge” through the immediacy of a non-sensory or pre-reflectively oriented “intuition.”

Through the step of “bracketing,” in the steps involved in conducting the systematic phenomenological method of doing philosophy, an “epoch” can be retrieved in human consciousnesses that is a retrieval of, i.e. a return to, a pure consciousness that is, then, immediately intuited or grasped by an “uncluttered mind,” i.e. a mind unaffected by sensory and/or reflectively reasoned “content knowledge.”

It is not this “bracketing” step involved in the retrieval of a pure consciousness, however, that Professor Duobliene is interested in, for as she says:

“On discussing retrieval to pure consciousness, phenomenology philosophers speak about epoche or bracketing of the content of experience. But our interest is the phenomenological point of primordial experience which appeared later on and is related to radical reflection. What is it and how does it correlate with other reflections used in education?”

Professor Duobliene’s interest, then: (1) is not in a “bracketing” methodology for doing phenomenology, for it; (2) is in a “radical reflection” methodology for doing phenomenology, and, whereby, a radical reflective oriented phenomenology is a “moral philosophy” dealing:

“with the possible application of phenomenology into education, with the way it makes the concept of reflection change, and how in its very essence, this encourages a moral relationship with the world, thus being fairly suitable for the ethics teaching.”

From the perspective of the Recurring Editorial, the meaning of the word ‘education’, as in the phrases “reflections used in education” and “phenomenology into education,” can be used: (1) to refer to a process, i.e. the educational process in which someone meets to manage the teaching of someone to study, learn, and accept or not accept something, as educatively experiencing something, somewhere, and; (2) to refer to knowledge about this process, i.e. educology.

Also, from this perspective, then, the meaning of the word ‘educology’ is used to refer to knowledge about the educational process and the meaning of the word ‘education’ is used to refer to the process, whereby, then, Duobliene’s phrases: (1) “reflections used in education” implies “reflections used in the educational process,” not, “reflections used in educology,” i.e., not reflections used in the knowing process conducted for the purpose of knowing about educative experiences that organically inhere in educational processes, and; (2) “phenomenology into education” implies “phenomenology into the educational process,” not, “phenomenology into educology,” i.e. not phenomenology used in the knowing process conducted for the purpose of knowing about educative experiences that organically inhere in educational processes.

*Professor Duobliene’s article, then, is one in educology, whereby, from the perspective of the Recurring Editorial, the meaning of the word ‘educology’ is used to refer to knowledge about educative experiences organically inhering in **educational processes** as these processes are conducted in developing democracies in the world. Specifically, from the experiential philosophy of educology perspective of the Recurring Editorial, Professor Duobliene’s article is oriented as one in **axiologic educology** of moral education, i.e. commonly known as “philosophy of education,” more than it is as a scientific or praxiologic educology of moral education, e.g. commonly known as “psychology and sociology of moral education,” in Lithuania’s developing democracy. Its object of knowledge, from the editorial perspective, as the subject on which the article is focused, is the existence of educative experiences organically inhering in educational processes, quoting Duobliene, existing:*

“in the didactic possibilities of phenomenology as moral philosophy,”

*i.e., from the perspective of the Recurring Editorial, educative experiences in **educational processes** that develop democratically healthy body, mind, psyche, and habit growth in teachers and students in a developing democracy in the world.*

*Her article alludes to the existence of reflective thinking experiences, i.e. from the perspective of the Recurring Editorial, experiences in **knowing processes** that develop democratically healthy body, mind, psyche, and habit growth in **educologists** in a developing democracy in the world, however, the allusion is made:*

“with the way it makes the concept of reflection change, and how in its very essence, this encourages a moral relationship with the world, thus being fairly suitable for ethics teaching.”

This “way,” from Professor Duobliene’s perspective, makes the concept of reflective thinking experiences change from experiences conducted by “reflection on action” and “reflection in

action” to experiences conducted as “reflection as action,” i.e. to reflective thinking experiences “correlated” and conducted “radically.”

*From the editorial’s perspective, by phenomenologically orienting her **axiologic educology**, Professor Duobliene implicitly has asked the question:*

“What are good, worthwhile, or valuable educative experiences organically inhering in educational process conducted in developing democracies in the world, specifically, the one in Lithuania?”

*And, Professor Duobliene, from the editorial’s perspective, by intention, does not account for “radical” reflective thinking experiences, as experiences of “reflection on, in, or as action,” being oriented epistemologically by **philosophy of educology**, i.e. as being oriented by the question:*

“What is knowledge?”

and, more specifically,

“What is knowledge about educative experiences organically inhering in educational processes conducted in developing democracies in the world, specifically in Lithuania?”

or

“What is educology?”

*In short, by intention, Professor Duobliene, in doing **axiologic educology**, though alluding to the method of phenomenology to be used in educative experiences organically inhering in educational processes involving the step of “bracketing,” does not account for the method, as such. She accounts for the method of phenomenology to be used in educative experiences organically inhering in educational processes as a method involving “radical reflection,” whereby, then, students using this phenomenological method can and will become morally educated.*

Author’s Abstract

The aim of this paper is to present the didactic possibilities of phenomenology as moral philosophy. It deals with the possible application of phenomenology into education, with the way it makes the concept of reflection change, and how in its very essence, this encourages a moral relationship with the world, thus being fairly suitable for the ethics teaching.

The present analysis also points towards the applicability of the phenomenological method in ethics lessons, especially in Lithuanian schools. Then follows exposition of the application of the phenomenological method in secondary school ethics lessons, based on documents issued by the Ministry of education of Lithuania, as well as approved textbooks and publications of other Lithuanian authors.

Author’s Introduction

Phenomenology, one of the schools of modern philosophy, has a peculiar feature that appeals to education philosophers: it aims at bringing the person back to the natural and existential sources of his being in the world.

The application of such philosophical aspect presents no misinterpretations when dealing with human morality, life meaningfulness and harmony amongst human beings.

For the utter surprise of the author of the present paper, Lithuanian educologists have left an absolute vacuum in the scientific research of phenomenology as applicable to education, in spite of the fact that phenomenological education has been widely popularized in many countries through numerous publications and Lithuanian philosophers, for more than a year, have been expanding this philosophical school. Lithuanian education philosophers and practitioners simply avoid phenomenology, giving priority to other education systems, such as: realistic, pragmatic, behaviorist, and re-constructionist. And this is not a mere coincidence. This confidence in the above-mentioned schools is based on their comfortable point of view to the world, as it can be known, measured and valued according to specific criteria, and on their basis makes the pertinent changes. Contrastingly, the phenomenological method, which denies the possibility to comprehend the world, seems unsuitable and difficult to apply to education. Nevertheless, considerable attention is given to this paradigm in several countries and it is even suggested to educators.

The author of the present paper thinks it is quite a paradoxical occurrence, and thus worth a deeper study, to see that though there are no theoretical works in this field, the phenomenological method is slowly 'making its way' into the educational system of Lithuania. Education philosophy is forced to admit what is already happening. Therefore, this study aims to go deeper into reflection of Lithuanian experience and diffusion but in a wider context.

As the object of study is the phenomenological method in ethics teaching, it seems relevant to provide some background information as to what the situation is in teaching ethics in Lithuania.

In Lithuanian secondary schools most subjects were taught following the principles of realism, and this was the case of ethics as well, usually integrated into other disciplines. The teaching and learning methods were memorization, logical analysis, and some interpretation. This was the teaching style in the period between the two world wars, and it continued to be so even afterwards, during the Soviet occupation. (Duobliene, 2000). The difference lies in the fact that during Soviet times there was a kind of ideological or soc-realistic shade.

Nowadays, more than 10 years after the restoration of our independence in 1991, the situation has changed. Ethics is now a school subject of its own, no longer included within the syllabus of other disciplines, and even three different trends can be found in the teaching of this subject (Duobliene, 2002). The first one, developed by J. Baranova, offers interpretation of philosophical texts and is based on conservative hermeneutics, sometimes capturing existentialist insights. The second one is L. Degesys's oriented to J. Dewey tradition on the teaching from experience and logical thinking. And there is a third one, presented by T. Sodeika, who proposes an authentic relationship with the world, applying the phenomenological method. The latter seems especially progressive if we take into account the students' attention, aesthetical practice and dialogical relationship with the world. How is this method adopted in Lithuania?

To be more precise, the aim of the present study is to analyze the phenomenological method as the most suitable for moral education, grounding this research on the insights of

phenomenology philosophers and education philosophers, as well as on their practical application. Then a reference can be made to the Lithuanian experience in ethics teaching.

With this clear aim in mind, this research makes several points: it presents the idea that phenomenology by its very essence leads us to a moral relationship with the world. Then it shows that the application of the phenomenological method and the phenomenological reflection is well in keeping with the development of social skills and the responsibility for the others and the world. Finally, it exposes the already evident cases of application of the phenomenological method to ethics teaching in Lithuania.

For this purpose, philosophical, and educational literature, as well as Lithuanian textbooks education documents have been analyzed.

Moral Relationship with the World

When talking about morals, we use the following concepts: responsibility, care, generosity, friendship, and others. We usually understand them as values that society considers worth seeking, values which can be passed on to others, and which can also be instilled in the educational process. We tend to associate them as clear, intentional and rational actions of the person. However, phenomenology philosophers see these values as something completely natural to the way human existence expresses itself. This perception of such values as something ordinary to be found and cherished in everyday life provides a different way of being in the world.

One of the first philosophers to study care for the world was the existentialist Martin Heidegger. He stimulated the human conscience by inviting man to care for the world, which is dominated by oblivion. Only an authentic relationship with the world, "being-in-the-world" or simply "being-in" as such (Dasein), can be real and valuable, as it is full of generosity. (Heidegger, 1999). This is said when for the first time one experiences the place where the truth of the being lies. M. Heidegger's existentialist phenomenology is further developed by E. Levinas and M Merleau- Ponty. They direct the existentialist's care for the world towards the care for *the other* and the sense of responsibility for *the other*.

M. Merleau- Ponty develops the meditations on care but drawing a turn towards social relationships, where there will always be *the other* (Merleau - Ponty, 2000). Man's existence cannot be disconnected from the existence of *the other*. Any person's experience and that of *the other*, their impressions intersect, therefore subjective meanings are inseparable from inter-subjectivity.

M. Merleau- Ponty dwells not only in the conscience, but also in the body. In his opinion, the world is given to us through bodily structures. Then the body adjusts the projects created by the conscience. In the words of A. Sverdiolas, a Lithuanian scientist, the body is the border of our conscience or at least the limit of its field (Sverdiolas, 2002, p. 228). When describing the structures of the will, we discover and reveal the body's spontaneity, we uncover the veil of our body's intrinsic intentionality, uncontrolled by conscience.

In bodily actions M. Merleau- Ponty perceives manifestations of certain pre-reflective, primordial or natural relationship to the world. In our actions there is always something primordial, previous to our consciousness and our already accepted and learnt norms of behavior.

In the philosophy of M. Merleau- Ponty, morality is a bodily responsiveness to an obligation, an imperative sense of responsibility, felt unconsciously, expressed through body language, responding in a pre-personal, pre-conventional way, as if awakened by *the other*, responding to his look, and at the same time, to his humanity. This is very precisely presented by D.M. Levin (Levin, 1998). This moral imperative also captures the traces of the past. It is embodied in the person as a natural gift. When he discusses body language, M. Merleau- Ponty constantly refers back to the description of babyhood. The first stage in the formation of the person is based on natural sensory reactions. The child still does not know nor distinguishes social or moral order, he responds to everything with a sort of rudimentary feeling, and is full of primordial solicitude, compassion and genuineness, quite different from adults, who stick to universally accepted moral principles and consensus. M. Merleau- Ponty invites us to reawaken the restrained primordial responsiveness and, following the example of the childlike stage, to retrieve to the stage of natural responses to the world. (M. Merleau- Ponty, 2000). A similar description of such primordial responsiveness in the formation of personality can be found in the works of other phenomenology philosophers such as M. Buber and E. Levin, though each of them would take it from a particular angle.

E. Levinas criticizes M. Heidegger's authentic experience "there is" (*es gibt*), on the grounds that this would mean an impersonal care and therefore, amoral. E. Levinas instead suggests turning from *existence* toward *the One who exists* (Levinas, 1995) as he places the most importance in the care for *the other*, the face of the other and responsibility for him. The relationship with *the other* begins as a sense of responsibility. By turning to *the other*, the person experiences moral order. Responsibility involves the person and this responsibility goes beyond the limits of what the person does. Responsibility already begins at the very moment when the other sees me. And this means *giving* no matter whether the other person knows or recalls that. In brief, E. Levinas does not establish ethics norms, but he creates an ethics philosophy.

The moral philosophy of E. Levinas, M. Merleau- Ponty and other phenomenology pursuers is a philosophy based upon moral responsibility, care, and openness to *the other*. Moral relationships demand solicitous look and sensitivity in the perception of moral traces that are manifest though indescribable in words.

When discussing moral education, it is important to bear in mind the latent potentiality that can be expressed through the body (Levin, 1998). Then D.M. Levin put forward the following question: how should the technical aspect of education be combined with the development of that potentiality? And he answers: "If there is a 'proto-moral' predisposition already ordering the nature of the body, then the task of moral education, its 'civilizing' work, will not need to be impositional, forcing on the body an order that is entirely alien; it can afford to work hermeneutically, bringing forth and developing a potential intimated by the traces." (Levin, 1998, p. 365)

Phenomenological Method and Phenomenological Reflection in Lithuanian Education

One of the significant factors in the formation of personality during the educational process is the student's way of thinking. Every educational system has its own thinking and reflection paradigm.

On discussing retrieval to pure consciousness, phenomenology philosophers speak about *epoch e* or bracketing of the content of experience. But our interest is the phenomenological

point of primordial experience which appeared later on and is related to radical reflection. What is it and how does it correlate with other reflections used in education?

Reflection is traditionally understood as reflection on action, widely discussed as such in J. Dewey's works (Dewey, 1933) and for many years already being implemented in schools. Such reflection, related to critical thinking and identified with rationalism, is especially popular in Lithuania as well. This teaching method grew quite remarkably after the fall of the Soviet Union, with the restoration of the independence, as a whole wave of innovation flowed into Lithuania.

Another concept of reflection, this time reflection in action, is the one offered by Donald A. Schon (1983) and it is applied to creative work, design and construction. This is a rather intuitive reflection in which thinking and doing are, as much as possible and simultaneously, comprised in time. This reflection is usually applied to unexpected situations that call for flexibility in planning, arranging and performing technical operations. In Lithuania there is hardly any mention of such reflection, or none at all.

In order to promote the existentialist and phenomenological stance, the Lithuanian philosopher T. Sodeika suggests that it be aimed at existentialist understanding, instead of reflection, as the former is quite different from critical thinking or D.A. Schon's thinking-and-doing (reflection in action). It would rather be a way of life and in such case "activity of understanding can be grasped exclusively as an aspect of being, i.e., as an aspect which can be only experience" (Sodeika, 1995, p.45.). T. Sodeika shares M. Heidegger's and G. Steiner's emphasis on the living contact with things, because reflective knowledge is secondary. Critical reflection is confusing; it is based on something not articulated. From Sodeika's texts it is obvious that he definitely sees reflection as a kind of critical thinking that reflects upon things of the past, which means presenting a secondary product from something already given.

In contrast with the Lithuanian philosopher, the phenomenology pursuers of other countries do not refuse the use of reflection in education, but give it a different sense and meaning. A. Bleackley follows phenomenological insights and presents yet another kind of reflection with the name of reflection-as-action, not a conquest of the world or the formation of the world through structural constructions, but rather an active "immersion" into the world, a natural relationship with it, as M. Heidegger would put it. This means an aesthetical action rather than a functional or technical one. (Bleackley, 1999). Reflection-as-action is then an instantaneous sensitivity or responsiveness based on the model of the body intertwining with the world. According to him, the focus is no longer on the ego-logical relationship with the world but on the eco-logical. Such reflection provides a continuation of the aesthetical relationship through an ethical one, full of care for the surrounding world.

In the phenomenology of M. Merleau-Ponty reflection is defined as reflection on the unreflective, in other words, reflection comes across a content that is not subject to reflection, as reflection cannot be separated from the unity of action of body and conscience. Otherwise, it would become a second product deprived of the naivety to be found in the primordial stage. Paraphrasing M. Merleau-Ponty, within such reflection the world appears as strange and paradoxical, since reflection pulls us with intentional strings that join us to it, thus making these ties visible to our eyes (Merleau-Ponty, 2000). This reflection is also evident in the social relationship when responding to *the other*, and therefore it is of vital importance in the process of social and moral education.

If we compare the phenomenological reflection of M. Merleau-Ponty and Bleackley with the denial of reflection of T. Sodeika, we may see that both philosophical trends deal with the same issue, the difference lying in the fact that T. Sodeika follows M. Heidegger and analyses reflection in the context of his minding. According to T. Sodeika, theoretical knowledge based on critical thinking can only be considered a second product, if compared to the empirical perception. However, T. Sodeika 's existential perception, as other famous philosophers understand it, should correspond to phenomenological or existentialist reflection.

Phenomenological reflection -- whether radical- or post- Heideggerian -- is one of many others. Together with phenomenological reflection, we can mention reflection on action, reflection as action; there are still other forms suggested by some theorists, such as reflection for action, and reflection as postmodern maneuver, developed by education philosopher R. Uscher. Unfortunately, none of these conceptions is developed in Lithuania, except reflection on action.

Forms of Phenomenological Education in the Teaching of Ethics and its Application in Lithuania

Phenomenological reflection and phenomenological method are inseparable from experience, the same way as J. Dewey's defined reflection is related to experience. Therefore, teaching of reflection methods and forms are very similar. The same importance is given to conversation, dialogue, creative activity, dramatization, interpretation, etc. It is not a mere coincidence that M. Green often quotes J. Dewey in his own works meant to be used for the implementation of phenomenology in education. Nevertheless, the common elements of these systems are evident only when discussing teaching forms, whereas the main difference lies in the aims they pursue and the emphasis places in those forms. Let us go deeper into these aspects.

The first source should be M. Green, whose philosophy of education and its application has already been developed for years. As part of the methods applicable to moral education he includes dialogue and creative activity, for he considers moral education as an inseparable process within social education. Therefore it is of great importance to be able to communicate with others and to feel empathy for them. We can find something of this sort in Lithuania.

The general syllabus for teaching Ethics in secondary schools has been recently approved in Lithuania and the themes included in it corresponds to the study of philosophical Ethics, such as wisdom, love, suffering, responsibility, the meaning of life, and so on (General Curricula, 2000). The general syllabus for Ethics in general schools has also been approved and it consists of four themes or parts: I - I, I - You, I - We, I - It (General Curricula, 2003). The second and third parts include topics that are devoted to develop the social and moral relationship with the world and others. In the guidelines of these topics, it is clearly stated that the theme "I - You" should be understood under the light of M. Buber's concept of dialogue (I - Thou), which means that it should encourage a special relationship with a friend, an acquaintance or any other and E. Levinas concept of *the other*. The topics are presented in such a way that the student who follows this syllabus should constantly feel the need of caring for *the other*, the world and its creatures. Obviously, the respect for others is also an important element in the other topics to be discussed, but this phenomenological aspect of special care, conscientiousness and need of dialogue is particularly fostered in the second part of the syllabus. The remaining parts focus their attention mostly on the social commitment and active participation.

The syllabus is presented together with a set of achievement standards, which in fact have nothing to do with phenomenological education, let alone, with the teaching of Ethics. To justify the idea of including them it could be explained that these established standards are by no means used as assessment criteria of the students' performance, but rather serve the purpose of setting example as to what should be emphasized and attained. One of those principles states that one of the most important skills to be developed is the ability to experience the existential relationship, to undergo an authentic being in, called *ordinary or everyday experience*. As the students pay attention to authenticity, they get an insight of the harmony existing within themselves and the surrounding world, of the unity of body and intellect, in a word, a natural relationship. Another skill to be fostered as listed in those principles is called *descriptive*, also attributed to phenomenology. It implies the ability to describe and retell the experienced phenomena in one's own way, thus developing an open rather than a normative approach to the surrounding world, which means that there may be several and different points of view and ways of expressing them. Apart from these mentioned skills, the list includes *analytical*, *problem-solving*, and *normative* skills, these three last ones not being part of the phenomenological education. Admittedly, it could be said that such a mixture of different skills and attitudes towards education is fallacious as it disrupts the balance of a growing personality, but on the other hand it could be justified by stating that when those standards were under discussion, the authors (among them the author of the present paper) had in mind the need of a gradual transition of the teaching of ethics out of the purely rationalist thinking in vogue at that moment. These are the very first steps that will lead to a change in the way of approaching and relating with the world, first of all in the teachers and later on in the children. Ultimately, it will be an alternative for those who feel the lack of an authentic sense of living.

Phenomenological education cannot be dissociated from teaching how to choose; however, this requires granting a certainty variety of choices. (Denton, 1970, Green, 1990). Reconsidering M. Green's position, will power and the ability to choose guarantees the intentionality of an action, that is, aimed at a certain goal. It is precisely by choosing how we realize our lives, create ourselves and form the morality of the self.

The representatives of phenomenological education propose to integrate the use of narrations, artistic creation and imagination in the process of teaching moral principles, as this helps to establish an aesthetical and ethical relationship with the world. When students tell each other their own impressions and experiences, whatever the case may be, they will have the opportunity to reflect on the values sorting them with a personal hierarchy or scale. (Green, 1990, 1991) They will make choices by themselves and this will give ground to their moral decision. For this education it is useful to make resort to Literature lessons, interpretation of fiction books, comparing the experiences of the depicted characters with one's own. The philosopher of education David E. Denton claims that literature lessons should give the students the chance to learn metaphorical language, since metaphors hold much more than the precise concept the words express, because their aim is not just to provide information for reasoning (Denton, 1970). He also affirms that we are not supposed to teach how to explain things but to understand them, because teaching how to explain implies that there already is a premise stating the existence of objective information that do not depend on the person's involvement in the world or the present situation where that information is under discussion. In contrast, understanding is just the activity of body and intellect applied to an already determined situation (Denton, 1970). So he offers another concept: explanation – as – understanding.

In Lithuania, soon after the declaration of the independence, it was J. Baranova who gave a start to this trend, with her manuals and lectures where she proposed a gradual transition from old realism. Her works encourage existentialist experiences and insights instead of logical and universal normative values (Baranova, 1998) She arranged a selection of texts complemented with illustrations and poetry. She suggests beginning from everyday life experiences, insights, poems, and metaphors and then take some fiction and philosophy texts. In this there is a passage from existentialist hermeneutics to a more conservative stance. Another of J.Baranova's suggestion is the study of works of art, such as paintings, sculptures, photographs and films, from a moral philosophy point of view. This partly corresponds to the proposals of some representatives of phenomenological education as regards the use metaphorical language when teaching literature and other branches of the humanities, as metaphors allow the reflection on the unreflective. Most probably this gradual study presented by J. Baranova nurtured the appearance of new methods and practices.

The method that offers the closest correspondence with phenomenological education in Lithuania is presented by T. Sodeika, who also cooperated with J.Baranova in the arrangement of the Philosophy manuals for XI-XII grades, where there are some visible elements of phenomenological education (T. Sodeika, J. Baranova, 2000). The texts presented in this manual are meant to be not just analyzed but used for another purpose: to "hook" or catch the reader's concern with a certain thought and lead him further, towards the consideration of his own experiences, reflections, and eventually to experiences themselves. Such manual should really encourage an authentic relationship with the world. In the preface the authors offer an original conception of the world compared to the traditional understanding of the world taught in schools. They suggest comprehending the world by entering it, grasping its meaning by being-in and experiencing it, rather than rational way to acquire knowledge about it. That is why the selected texts deal with topics such as what is conversation (M. Montaigne); meditation (J.B. Lotz), discussion (K. Jaspers) and they serve as methods for class-work. They should lead to *understanding* rather than *explain*, which reminds of D.E. Denton's suggested change in educational methods. Following this scheme, work takes place moving in a triangle: interpretation, discussion, and meditation. The selection of texts was grounded on phenomenological anthropology, and many of them are devoted to the consideration of the body and the senses. Besides, the manuals also have illustrations (R. Magritte, S. Dali, P. Klee, P. Bruegel, and others), photographs, film shots, which incite a personal grasping and interpretation of moral issues. The questions that come together with the texts are open to free and metaphorical thinking, to make each one express his experience and insights about the topics discussed.

T. Sodeika has offered the method of meditation to Lithuanian teachers and students for around a decade; however, it was not possible until now to make an exposition of its principles and arranged them in a manual available for all wanting to learn it. There are 10 principles for meditation listed in the preface of the manual.

T. Sodeika has still one more method for schools: film reviews with interpretations. Such sessions are usually part of the programme of seminars with teachers of ethics and philosophy; nevertheless, there is no clear methodology published for this yet. So, this visual-aesthetical teaching material is yet to come to light in the future, to supplement the already existing set of phenomenological methods.

Phenomenological education requires special preparation and significant effort on the part of the teachers. D.E. Denton relates educational method with motivation, which arises from the dissonance between feelings and notions, the empirical and the rationalist. (D.E. Denton, 1970). The teacher must be ready for such dissonances and “grab” them so as to lead to students to comply with the requirements of the given situation: to go on a trip, to solve an exercise, to dance, to sing, or draw. In this way, there is relation between and combination of feelings (bodily reactions) and understanding (whether personal or guided), all in all enhancing the unity of the person. But still, there must be more than one alternative way of understanding and reacting. In this point the already mentioned Philosophy manuals for XI-XII grades proved successful in their choice of questions that come with texts or pictures, for they “awaken” several moods or reactions which should lead the students to sort them out and make them match the demands of the environment by searching within his relationship with the world and the others using their experiences on the light of suggested texts. What is more, the manual presents more than one text for each topic, but instead the student is given the opportunity to choose, to create his own personality and experience a sense of fulfillment. It could be claimed that there is a wider choice of texts than other alternatives.

Summarizing what has been said so far about moral education, we can resort to Green’s statement:

“It is there that I think moral education ought to culminate, there that Conscience is formed. Perhaps we can invent a pedagogy for responsibility and interexistentiality and critique – and, always, the renewal of hope.” (Green, 1991)

Conclusions

Following the assertions of philosophers, the phenomenological relationship with the world is essentially ethical, as it encourages the care for the other, it makes us turn towards *the other* and be responsible for Him, which means being social. A new point of view develops with reference to reflection, this being understood as an aesthetical and ethical relationship all in one. The phenomenological reflection- reflection as action- is directed to the evaluation and understanding of both personal and common experiences, to a communal activity, and the formation of values. Thus, action has a clearly social and moral dimension.

The Lithuanian pedagogical literature there is no study of the phenomenological education, whereas in most general and secondary schools of Lithuania the phenomenological method is already being applied in the teaching of Ethics.

There is a textbook called “Philosophy manual for XI- XII grades”, with encourages a clear phenomenological relationship with the world and study of the suggested texts and illustrations, which are to be understood rather than explained. There is a series of questions leading to an open discussion of experiences, impressions and thoughts.

The syllabus of ethics for general school is arranged in such a way as to foster a caring relationship with *the other* in response to the phenomenological approach of turning towards *the other*.

The priority of the syllabus of ethics for secondary school is philosophical ethics and the interpretation and comprehension of philosophical and literary extracts.

Phenomenological skills, such as everyday experience and the sense of being interwoven with the surrounding world are fostered in both general and secondary school and guidelines for moral education.

Some examples of the application of phenomenological education can already be found in Lithuanian schools; however, the further development of this trend will depend upon the future conceptions of education.

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