# Targeted Merit Aid:
# Tennessee Education Lottery Scholarships

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**Targeted Merit Aid: Tennessee Education Lottery Scholarships**

*Abstract: This research provides an overview of the Tennessee Education Lottery Scholarship program. This research reviews the development of the program and provides a description of House bill 787. The research also provides baseline data on higher education in Tennessee. Information related to enrollments, graduates, student-faculty ratios, and tuition-fee rates is provided. This data provides a baseline from which future studies on the impacts of the Tennessee program can be based. The Tennessee experiment provides a unique opportunity for researchers to evaluate the impact of public policy on educational outcomes.*

In June 2003, Tennessee Governor Phil Bredesen signed into law the thirteenth broad-based merit aid program in the United States. Based initially on Georgia's HOPE scholarship model, the Tennessee Education Lottery Scholarship (TELS) program ultimately became the nation's broadest scholarship program with 65% of high school graduates are projected to be eligible to receive a lottery-funded scholarship. This wide pool of eligible students and the program's supplemental awards for low-income students suggest that the current merit aid and need aid classifications may not adequately describe this new broad-based financial aid program.

Scholars have traditionally dichotomized financial aid into two distinct and mutually exclusive categories: merit aid and need aid. A plausible rationale for this dual classification is that until Georgia's lottery-funded HOPE (Helping Outstanding Students Educationally) scholarship program, enacted in 1993, an overwhelming proportion of state or federal supported financial aid was awarded based on students' ability (or inability) to pay. As states have steadily adopted Georgia's scholarship model, which awards all students who maintain a 3.0 grade point average with free tuition to public colleges and universities (or an equivalent amount to attend Georgia private institutions), scholars and policymakers have identified these programs as merit aid. Many scholars contend that these new, politically popular scholarships deplete state funds that were previously (or could potentially be) used for need-based aid. On the other hand, policymakers contend that as state appropriations for higher education decrease and tuition

increases these merit aid programs offer necessary revenue sources to maintain college affordability.

This paper aims to explore the need aid – merit aid dichotomy and to introduce a hybrid classification—targeted merit aid. The first two sections briefly report background information on both need aid and merit aid. The third section outlines the recent scholarly criticism of merit aid programs with particular attention focused on Georgia's HOPE scholarship, which has received the most scholarly attention and is currently struggling to fully fund the program. The targeted merit aid concept is considered by analyzing the new Tennessee Education Lottery Scholarship program, specifically by applying the TELS criteria to three states, Florida, Louisiana, and West Virginia, that currently fund broad-based merit scholarships and comparing the differences between predicted recipients of each program's award criteria. Finally, the paper presents research and policy implications of the Tennessee case and targeted merit aid.

**Need-based Aid**

While higher education institutions have a long history of providing need aid to students, the first broad-based government foray into financial aid for individual students was the 1944 Servicemen's Readjustment Act, or G.I. Bill. Although the G.I. Bill was not "means tested" and was awarded based on students' service to their country during World War II, this broad-based financial aid entitlement set a distinct precedent of federal support for higher education. The Higher Education Act (HEA) of 1965 built from this precedent and created the Educational Opportunity Grant, which would after a few iterations in subsequent reauthorization acts, most notably in 1972, eventually become the Pell Grant in 1980. The 1972 HEA reauthorization also sparked state financial aid funding by offering federal matching funds (Heller, 2002b).

The landmark 1965 HEA, which in addition to the Educational Opportunity Grant also created the first federal student loan and work study programs, was not implemented with the success the higher education community had hoped for. Mumper (1996) attributes this primarily to the implementation strategy of linking federal funds to state college enrollments, rather than individual student financial need. Contrary to current practice, these early financial aid dollars went first to individual institutions, and were then funneled to students.

Shifting the flow of federal funding marked the fundamental policy change of the 1972 HEA reauthorization. By directly funding individual students, based on their ability to pay for higher education, the renamed Basic Educational Opportunity Grant program would award more than one-million students financial aid in the first academic year after the reenactment (Heller, 2002b; Mumper, 1996). According to the ACE Fact Sheet on Higher Education (ACE, 2003) the total Pell Grant expenditures in constant dollars grew from $1.48 billion in 1976 (the first year in which all undergraduates were eligible for Pell Grants) to $9.98 billion in 2001. While this marks a substantial increase, the buying power of Pell shows the opposite trend. In 1976, the maximum award ($1,400) was 72% of the total cost of attendance at a public four-year university; in 2001, the $3,750 maximum award was only 42% of the total cost of attendance at the same institution type. Scholars often point to this diminishing buying power of need aid to support the notion of increasing need-based awards instead of creating new programs based on merit.

The State Student Incentive Grant (SSIG) was another component of the 1972 HEA reauthorization. This new program earmarked federal matching funds for state financial aid efforts directly awarding student in need. Three years prior to the creation of SSIG only 19 states had such programs and their aggregate appropriations were less than $200 million. Ten years later, in 1979, all 50 states had need-based financial aid programs and appropriated in excess of

$800 million. In 2002, their aggregate annual appropriations exceeded $3.8 billion (NASSGAP, 2003; Heller, 2002b). Using constant dollars, from 1974 to 1998, state need aid funding increased 750% (Heller, 2002b). While the SSIG matching funds certainly sparked the creation of state financial aid programs, these funds never represented a substantial proportion of the state aid budgets and as the programs proliferated matching funds quickly maxed out (Heller, 2002b). With no significant increases at the state or federal level, financial aid funding continued to rise steadily with inflation until the dawning of a new type of program two decades later based on the achievement of students rather than need.

**Merit-based Aid**

While the concept of merit aid can be traced back to the California Master Plan crafted by higher education icon Clark Kerr in 1960, the merit classification has now come to be synonymous with the Georgia HOPE scholarship program. Tantamount to the California Master Plan was that tuition would remain affordable through its tiered approach. This meant that aid, in the form of little to no tuition, was provided to poorer students attending community colleges and wealthy students attending University of California, Berkeley and vice versa. Recently, however, merit aid has become synonymous with the Georgia HOPE scholarship program.

Created in the early 1990s, the HOPE program awards academically qualified students with free tuition to attend a public college or university (or the equivalent at a state private postsecondary institution). Since Georgia's experiment with broad-based merit aid a dozen states, including three of Georgia's four bordering states (only Alabama does not have a merit aid program after two failed attempts within the last four years to create such a program). More than half of the states with merit aid programs fund scholarships through lotteries; other common

revenue sources include tobacco settlement funds and state-sponsored video gambling machines. Since the scholarly consideration of merit aid programs focus primarily on the Georgia HOPE program and other lottery-funded programs, the following two sections report more detailed information.

*The Case of Georgia's HOPE Scholarship Program*

In 1993 Georgia's HOPE Scholarship program was established with the passage of a state lottery by voter referendum at the urging of Governor Zell Miller. Using lottery revenues, the HOPE Scholarships provided a financial incentive for high school students to earn a "B" average continue their education after high school and maintain a "B" average in college. Eligible students received a scholarship that covers tuition and fees at a state university and provided for a book allowance. Students who meet the same criteria and choose to attend a private college or university in Georgia received a $3,000 scholarship, which is also renewable if students maintain a 3.0 grade point average.

Initially, HOPE scholarships were reserved for students with a family income below $66,000. When the lottery revenues exceeded expectations, this means test was increased to $100,000 in 1994. The following year the cap was lifted, an action that further increased public support for the program. Another change in the HOPE criteria impacted students who met eligibility requirements for both the merit-based HOPE Scholarship and the need-based Pell Grant. Until 2001, students receiving Pell Grants were only eligible for the $500 book allowance portion of the HOPE Scholarship. The policy adjustment was designed to ensure that low-income families would apply for these federal funds, instead of relying solely on the state funded HOPE

scholarships. Governor Barnes successfully led an initiative to change the policy recognizing that Pell grants are not sufficient to fund the total cost of attending college.

Currently, Georgia policymakers are considering revisions to the HOPE program to reduce costs based on the increasing proportion of eligible students. Since the first year in which all undergraduates were eligible for HOPE, 1996, expenditures have risen from $133.9 million to $360.7 million in 2003 (HOPE Program Summary, 2003). Looking ahead, expenditures are projected to increase at an even greater rate as a result of recent tuition increases. Because HOPE scholarships cover full tuition expenses, Georgia's public colleges and universities resisted tuition increases common in neighboring states bucking a national trend of significant tuition hikes. Suggested strategies to reduce HOPE expenditures include adding an SAT requirement, removing the $500 book allowance, and re-establishing income caps—none of which have popular support among legislators or the general public (Selingo, 2003). Other states with merit aid programs are paying close attention to the current deliberations in Georgia for fear that their programs may fall prey to similar trends.

*Lottery-Funded Merit Aid Programs*

The four most recent states to adopt lotteries (New Mexico, South Carolina, and Tennessee) all have done so with merit-based scholarships earmarked as the primary beneficiary. While not using lottery funds, West Virginia funds its new merit aid program on the proceeds of video gambling (grey machines). Also since 1990, three state legislatures (Florida, Kentucky, and Missouri) have enacted laws to earmark lottery funds for broad-based merit aid, instead of simply adding lottery proceeds to their state's general fund. These trends seem to suggest a public willingness to support lotteries provided the proceeds are allocated to education.

While each of these seven states award merit-based scholarships, there are some key distinctions. In West Virginia, South Carolina, Tennessee, Florida, and Missouri, students initially qualify for scholarships based on high school grade point averages and/or national test scores (SAT / ACT), then must maintain a certain college grade point average to renew their scholarships. However, South Carolina, Florida, and Tennessee all have tiered awards that reward students with exceptional grade point averages and test scores with higher scholarships. The Tennessee program also contains awards for students from low-income households. Missouri's Bright Flight scholarships are not as broad-based, awarding students in the top three percent of all Missouri SAT and ACT test takers.

The Kentucky Educational Excellence Scholarship (KEES) program awards students for their grade point average achievement in high school each year (9th-12th grades). For instance, a student with a 4.0 GPA at the end of the academic year earns $500 toward college, with a sliding scale for students earning at least a 2.5 GPA who earn $125. Students also earn bonuses based on their ACT scores (i.e., 15 ACT = $36, 28 ACT and above = $500). Upon high school graduation, students tally the total awards for each year and the ACT bonus to determine their scholarship amount for each year of college provided they maintain a 2.5 postsecondary grade point average.

The New Mexico Lottery Success Scholarships differs in that eligibility is based entirely on postsecondary performance. High school grade point averages and national test scores are irrelevant. Instead, all students earning a 2.5 grade point average after completing 12 credit hours earn scholarships equal to 100% of tuition at a public New Mexico college or university.

**Criticism of Merit Aid**

Just as voters and elected officials have come to laud merit aid programs, scholarly

consensus has united to question the use of limited public resources in this inequitable manner.

Critics of merit aid programs point to the broader issues of college access and affordability,

specifically substantial tuition increases and their disproportionate affect on low-income

students, which suggest additional financial aid funds should target needy students. Further

exacerbating critics' concerns is the regressivity of lotteries, which have the effect of providing

scholarships for middle and upper-income students with lottery revenues disproportionately from

poorer citizens. This section considers these broader contextual issues surrounding merit aid,

outlines one seminal merit aid study, and further explores the Georgia HOPE program.

*Background*

To set the stage for why scholars have become so critical of broad-based merit aid

programs, a brief review of recent reports help to frame the higher education landscape in which

the rising merit aid trend exists. In the spring of 2002, *Losing Ground: A National Status Report

on the Affordability of American Higher Education*, published by the National Center for Public

Policy and Higher Education, identified the following five national trends:

1. Increases in tuition have made colleges and universities less affordable for most American families
2. Federal and state financial aid to students has not kept pace with increases in tuition
3. More students and families at all income levels are borrowing more than ever before to pay for college
4. The steepest increases in public college tuition have been imposed during times of greatest economic hardship
5. State financial support of public higher education has increased, but tuition has increased more (Callan, 2002)

In addition to identifying these trends, *Losing Ground* presents vivid illustrations of the impact

decreasing affordability has on individuals in six profiles of American students.

During the same year *Access Denied*, a report of the Advisory Committee in Student

Financial Assistance, noted similar trends and offered a comprehensive account of the obstacles

barring access to higher education. To address these problems the report recommends:

1. The nation's longstanding goal to access must be reinstated
2. Need-based grant aid must be increased for low-income students
3. Title VI programs—number, structure, effectiveness—must be reaffirmed as the nation's long-term solution to the access problem
4. Access partnerships between the federal government, states, and institutions must be rebuilt to leverage and target aid on low-income students (Advisory Committee on Student Financial Assistance, 2001)

These recommendations link solutions to the access problem with policy initiatives aimed at addressing the affordability problems. Don Heller's (2001b) recent book, *The States and Public Higher Education Policy: Affordability, Access, and Accountability*, further integrates the three As with empirical analysis and case studies that both draw attention to the challenges facing higher education and offering possible solutions.

*Civil Rights Project report, Who Should We Help?*

Harvard University's The Civil Rights Project report, *Who Should We Help? The Negative Social Consequences of Merit Scholarships*, presents the broadest and deepest consideration of merit aid programs to date. Drawing on evidence from four states, the report focuses on three major themes: (1) a shift from need-based scholarships to merit scholarships; (2) merit scholarships disproportionately award middle and upper class students; and, (3) merit scholarships award a disproportionate and lower percentage of minorities. With regard to the first theme, the report notes that 12 states currently award broad-based merit scholarships. In 2000-2001, these states awarded a combined $863 million in merit scholarships and awarded nearly one-third of that amount, $308 million in need-based scholarships (Heller, 2002a, 17).

Second, merit scholarships award students who would already attend college rather than increase access to students who might not otherwise participate in higher education. Chapter Two of this report considers the college participation rate and merit scholarship rate of Michigan and Florida high schools. Not surprisingly, the high schools with the highest college participation rates also have the highest scholarship rates (Heller and Rasmussen, 2002).

Third, a disproportionately lower percentage of merit scholarships are awarded to minority students. Two chapters focus exclusively on the effects of race in the HOPE Scholarships in Georgia. Dynarski (2002) reports that in the years before HOPE white students were nearly 11 percent more likely to attend college than blacks, but since HOPE that figure has increased to 26 percent more likely. This finding is exacerbated by Cornwell and Mustard's (2002) finding that the large majority of blacks receiving HOPE are attending the state's less selective schools. Similar results are reported among Hispanics for New Mexico's Lottery Success Scholarship (Binder and Ganderton, 2002).

As this study indicates, lotteries have played a major role in the proliferation of broad-based merit scholarships. Often enacted in times of economic decline, lotteries are viewed by some as the silver bullet to solve the problems caused by decreasing higher education funding. However, a growing literature base suggests that states should be equally wary of lotteries for social as well as economic reasons.

*Regressive Nature of Lotteries*

Shifting from a descriptive view of the lottery states to their economic implications, perhaps the most often cited problem by lottery opponents is their claim that lotteries prey on the poor. The longitudinal study of Indiana lottery players' expenditures and participation between 1988 and 1992 by Pirong-Good and Mikesell (1995) reveal that the total lottery expenditures of low-income households increased by nearly 10 percent. Herring and Bledsoe (1994) find similar evidence from their study in the Detroit metropolitan area. While this study does not show a significant difference in annual dollar expenditures between those with annual incomes less than $10,000 and those making more than $60,000, when lottery expenditure is measured as a

percentage of income the least affluent respondents spend eight times more than the wealthiest respondents. Finally, in their study of Texas lottery games Price and Novak (2000) test the regressivity of three popular lottery games—lotto, three-digit numbers games, and instant games. Results show instant games to be the most regressive based on the increased participation of low-income and minority players and lowest participation rates among college graduates. These three studies build on the works of many other scholars (Clotfelter and Cook, 1987; Borg and Mason, 1988) who cite similar evidence of regressivity. These findings raise red flags for policymakers, especially given the historic trends of decreases in net dollars for education among lottery states.

*The Case of Georgia HOPE*

In addition to the findings included in *Who Should We Help?*, two economic studies of the HOPE scholarship program raise questions about who is offered HOPE (Dynarski, 2000) and who loses HOPE (Dee and Jackson, 1999). Dynarski (2000) finds that HOPE has likely increased the college attendance rate of 18 and 19 year olds by more than 7 percentage points compared to other southeastern states. However, the down side to this increased participation is that it comes overwhelmingly from white students of middle and high income families. In fact, the racial gap in college attendance has increased with a rise of 12.3 percentage points among white students while the attendance rates of African American students have not increased at all relative to other neighboring states (Dynarski, 2000).

Dee and Jackson (1999) study the 1996 freshman cohort at Georgia Tech to determine who is most likely to lose the HOPE scholarship. In alignment with previous studies, the authors find that African American students are more likely (10 percent) to lose HOPE than white students. This, however, is not the focus of their study, rather the effect of a students' course of

study. Specifically, the study finds that students in sciences, engineering, and computing are 21 to 51 percent more likely to lose HOPE than students in other programs (Dee and Jackson, 1999). This raises a new concern that students may make decisions based on finances to avoid these fields, which prompts the authors to recommend alternative retention standards that take into account programmatic differences instead of the uniform 3.0 cutoff.

Not withstanding the significant economic concerns with HOPE scholarships, critics appear to be equally concerned with the paradox exacerbated by the regressivity of HOPE's funding source. As an example, when South Carolina was considering a lottery ballot initiative to fund HOPE-style scholarships the Georgia program's problems with retention and the disparate effects by race and income level did not go unnoticed. Edward McMullen, Jr., president of the South Carolina Policy Council Education Foundation, focused on the regressive nature of HOPE in a warning to his state's policymakers. McMullen offered the following three examples to illustrate his concerns:

1. In Georgia's 10 poorest counties, the lottery sold an average of $218 worth of tickets for every man, woman, and child in 1997. In the 10 richest counties, however, per-person lottery sales averaged only $177.
2. In 1997, students in the 10 poorest counties received 7 cents in education aid for every dollar spent on the lottery in their counties, compared to an average of 19.8 cents for students from wealthier counties.
3. Since HOPE was established, the number of African American students attending public colleges in Georgia has actually fallen by 3 percent (McMullen, 2000).

A similarly shocking trend is now surfacing as Georgia debates adding income caps to the HOPE eligibility criteria. Supporters of reinserting a means test cite findings that the 20 ZIP codes with the most lottery winners had annual family incomes below and state's median, by contrast in the 20 counties with the most HOPE recipients family incomes were 72 percent higher (Selingo, 2003). Despite these startling figures, income caps do not appear to be a likely alternative. Scholars are quick to point out that adding an SAT test requirement would likely

reduce the number and proportion of eligible minorities and low-income students, thereby further highlighting merit aid's disparate impact.

**Tennessee Education Lottery Scholarship program**

In November 2002, Tennessee voters overwhelmingly passed a referendum in support of implementing a lottery with its proceeds earmarked for college scholarships. Becoming the thirteenth state to offer broad-based merit scholarships, Tennessee policymakers quickly looked to models in other states, particularly Georgia's HOPE program. As the lottery scholarship criteria were being considered, national and state education leaders from higher education provided information and advice based on the merit aid experience in other states. This expert advice, often disaggregated to allow elected officials to consider how students in their districts would fare under various scenarios, helped to shape the legislative approach in determining appropriate scholarship criteria and award amounts.

After considering hundreds of scholarship program iterations, Tennessee enacted a scholarship program that awards students who earn a 3.0 grade point average or 19 ACT score a base scholarship of $3,000. Supplemental awards of $1,000 can be earned by students who either earn a 3.75 GPA and 29 ACT or students who meet the base criteria and have a family income below $36,000. Also, the Tennessee program includes an Access award equal to one-half the amount of the base award with need supplement, $2,000, to students earning a 2.75 grade point average and 18 ACT.

The appended chart shows that legislators did not consider the 3.0 GPA 'or' 19 ACT base criteria until late in the session. Prior to the 'or' scenario, consensus had built on a 3.0 GPA 'and' 19 ACT base criteria. In fact, the Tennessee House of Representatives were only able to secure

enough votes for the 3.0 'or' 19 because a sizable coalition determined that the Senate would never pass the scholarship bill with the 'or' provision, which would ultimately give the General Assembly another year to consider eligibility criteria. When the Senate called their bluff and adopted the House version of the scholarship with the 'or' provision, the Tennessee Education Lottery Scholarship program swelled by $80,000,000 and more than 25,000 students (a 40% increase from the 'and' provision). Despite the politics involved, it appears that this change was initially based on legislators' concerns that too few low-income and African American students would qualify. Since income caps were quickly rejected, the only scenario by which this disparate impact could be assuaged was to broaden the pool of eligible students. For example, applying the 3.0 GPA 'and' 19 ACT criteria African American students represented 6 percent of total projected eligible students. By changing the 'and' to 'or' the percentage of African American eligible students doubled to 12 percent. Additionally, while 11.5 percent of potential scholarship recipients are African American, 22.4 percent of student eligible for the base award and need supplement are African American.

While the Tennessee Education Lottery Scholarship program was originally conceived in the legislature and in the public as a replication of Georgia's HOPE scholarship program, the enacted program is much broader and includes means tested components. In fact, the TELS program is the only broad-based merit aid program to award larger scholarships to poorer students. Therefore, it appears that TELS could be termed 'targeted' merit aid. Due to the wide pool of expected eligible students, some may suggest the term 'blanket' merit aid would be more appropriate; however, this disregards the intent of policymakers to craft scholarship criteria to ensure that those students who need financial aid most would be included. This distinction, although not affecting the total cost of the program, clarifies the intent of the program to be as

inclusive as fiscally possible for the sake of equity rather than a blanket attempt to maximize the number of students receiving scholarships.

**Research Design**

Using Tennessee's new lottery scholarship program as a natural experiment, this study applies Tennessee's targeted aid approach to similar merit aid programs in other states. Data from the ACT, Inc. were analyzed across a three year time span 2001-2003. While our sample of comparison programs is limited to states in which a sizeable proportion of high school students take the ACT text, results are consistent in all three comparison states.

*Data source*

The ACT database includes geographic, demographic, and academic information on all students who completed the ACT test. Most of the student characteristics data and academic data (including high school GPA) are self-reported by students immediately before they complete the exam. ACT studies reveal, however, that these self-reported data are 90 percent accurate (Maxey and Ormsby, 1971). Primarily used by colleges and universities for institutional planning, the data are available to specific queries and reported in the aggregate. For our purposes, we sorted the data by the appropriate scholarship criteria in each state, high school GPA and ACT score, then further sorted by race and family income level.

We must note that these data clearly have limitations. More importantly, the students we report as eligible, based on the ACT database, do not necessarily reflect the actual number of recipients. However, as an example of data reliability, the West Virginia PROMISE website states that 4,300 students received PROMISE awards for the 2002-2003 academic year; the ACT

database projects 4,266, suggesting that these data provide an adequate basis for comparison. Again, the intent is not analyze the precise effects of each state's merit aid program, rather our aim is to illustrate that broader scholarship criteria can be expected to yield a more diverse pool of scholarship recipients.

*Case selection*

Based on the Tennessee experience in shifting from a dual GPA and ACT scholarship criteria to an either / or criteria, we selected other broad-based merit aid programs with both GPA and ACT criteria. This narrowed the selection pool from twelve potential comparison states to three—Florida, Louisiana, and West Virginia. It should be noted that each of these three states also have a significant proportion of their students completing the ACT. Louisiana and West Virginia are both considered ACT states with more than 60% of graduating seniors taking this test, the percentage of high school graduates taking the ACT in 2003 is 80 percent and 63 percent respectively, which is consistent with proportions in 2001 and 2002. Florida is considered a hybrid state since students take either (or both) the ACT and SAT. In 2003, 42 percent of Florida graduating seniors completed the ACT, compared to 57 percent who completed the SAT. According to the ACT database, between 51,000 and 56,000 Floridian students took the ACT from 2001-03. During the same time period, the number of high school graduates each year varied between 121,000 and 132,000, which corroborates the 42 percent figure reported by ACT (WICHE, 2003). We acknowledge that the EIS data does not reflect population data for Florida, nor for Louisiana and West Virginia; however, the general trend is consistent among all three states.

Unfortunately, our data are insufficient to compare Tennessee to states with only a single GPA requirement such as the Georgia HOPE program. In Georgia, Nevada, and South Carolina,

an overwhelming majority of students take the SAT instead of the ACT. In fact, in none of these states do more than one-third of high school graduates take the ACT.

*Data analysis*

Based on the aggregate nature of the data, we report descriptive statistics on the number and percentage of students eligible for scholarships under various scenarios for each of the four states over three years. Particularly, we consider how the scholarship criteria impact the total number and percent of all scholarship recipients and the percent eligible for African American students and students with family incomes of $36,000 or less. The purpose of the study is not to show correlations, predict eligibility, or identify determinants; rather we simply seek to illustrate the impact of broadened eligibility criteria on traditionally underrepresented groups of students. These aggregate data, while ill suited for multivariate analysis, provide a common data source for cross-state comparison that is sufficient for our analysis.

**Findings**

The results of our analysis illustrate, not surprisingly, that if comparison states were to implement the 'or' scholarship criteria the number and percent of recipients would increase significantly. Table 1 reports data on each state's scholarship recipients. Table 2 shows the impact of applying the 3.0 GPA or 19 ACT criteria of TELS to each comparison state's program. Finally, Table 3 reports the effect of changing the comparison state's scholarship criteria from 'and' to 'or.'

After completing analysis for all three years, we found that results did not substantively differ by year; however, they differed substantially by state and by scholarship criteria.

Therefore, for the sake of clarity, we report the most recent 2003 data for the scholarship criteria analysis. Results for all three years are included in appendices (B-D).

The first table details the number and percent of students who qualify under each state's scholarship criteria. The percentage of high school senior ACT test-takers who would be eligible for scholarships in each of the comparison states, Florida, Louisiana, and West Virginia, is less than 40 percent, compared to greater than 65 percent of similar students in Tennessee. When these comparisons are disaggregated to consider African American students and low-income students, the distinctions are even more stark.

**Table 1**

| | | Total | African-American | % | Income less than $36,000 | % | % Eligible (Total) | % Eligible (African American) | % Eligible (Income less than $36,000) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Florida** | Total | 55,784 | 10,054 | 18.0% | 16,115 | 28.9% | | | |
| | 3.0 GPA & 20 ACT | 21,197 | 1,415 | 6.7% | 3,639 | 17.2% | 38.0% | 14.1% | 22.6% |
| **Louisiana** | Total | 37,336 | 10,775 | 28.9% | 13,884 | 37.2% | | | |
| | 2.5 GPA & 20 ACT | 14,850 | 1,834 | 12.4% | 3,690 | 24.8% | 39.8% | 17.0% | 26.6% |
| **West Virginia** | Total | 11,728 | 375 | 3.2% | 4,028 | 34.3% | | | |
| | 3.0 GPA & 21 ACT | 4,288 | 38 | 0.9% | 1,139 | 26.6% | 36.6% | 10.1% | 28.3% |
| **Tennessee** | Total | 42,772 | 7,163 | 16.7% | 13,560 | 31.7% | | | |
| | 3.0 GPA or 19 ACT | 28,466 | 3,194 | 11.2% | 7,893 | 27.7% | 66.6% | 44.6% | 67.0% |

Within both sub-groups in each comparison state, the proportion of eligible African Americans and low-income students is more than doubled in Tennessee. While African American recipients in Louisiana represent a larger proportion of scholarship recipients than in Tennessee, this appears to be based on the demographic distinctions between the two states—Louisiana has a greater proportion of African Americans overall than does Tennessee. A similar relationship exists in the comparison of West Virginia and Tennessee among low-income students. However, the greatest differences are apparent in the percent of students (overall and by sub-group) who are eligible for the scholarships. In Tennessee, where more than two-thirds of

low-income students are eligible for merit aid, it is difficult to argue that students who need the scholarships most are being left out. Indeed, they receive awards in droves.

Table 2 considers the impact of applying the Tennessee Education Lottery Scholarship (TELS) criteria in each of the three comparison states. Not surprisingly, both the number and percentage of students receiving scholarships would increase dramatically based on the broader Tennessee criteria. Each of the three states would increase the total number of scholarship recipients by at least 19 percent as in Louisiana. Florida would increase recipients by 25 percent and West Virginia by more than one-third.

**Table 2**

| | | Total | African-American | % | Income less than $36,000 | % | % Eligible (Total) | % Eligible (African American) | % Eligible (Income less than $36,000) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Florida** | Total | 55,784 | 10,054 | 18.0% | 16,115 | 28.9% | | | |
| Current criteria | 3.0 GPA & 20 ACT | 21,197 | 1,415 | 6.7% | 3,639 | 17.2% | 38.0% | 14.1% | 22.6% |
| TELS criteria | 3.0 GPA or 19 ACT | 35,557 | 4,817 | 13.5% | 9,802 | 27.6% | 63.7% | 47.9% | 60.8% |
| Net gain (TELS) | | 14,360 | 3,402 | | 6,163 | | | | |
| | | | | | | | | | |
| **Louisiana** | Total | 37,336 | 10,775 | 28.9% | 13,884 | 37.2% | | | |
| Current criteria | 2.5 GPA & 20 ACT | 14,850 | 1,834 | 12.4% | 3,690 | 24.8% | 39.8% | 17.0% | 26.6% |
| TELS criteria | 3.0 GPA or 19 ACT | 22,109 | 4,369 | 19.8% | 6,982 | 31.6% | 59.2% | 40.5% | 50.3% |
| Net gain (TELS) | | 7,259 | 2,535 | | 3,292 | | | | |
| | | | | | | | | | |
| **West Virginia** | Total | 11,728 | 375 | 3.2% | 4,028 | 34.3% | | | |
| Current criteria | 3.0 GPA & 21 ACT | 4,288 | 38 | 0.9% | 1,139 | 26.6% | 36.6% | 10.1% | 28.3% |
| TELS criteria | 3.0 GPA or 19 ACT | 8,174 | 178 | 2.2% | 2,661 | 32.6% | 69.7% | 47.5% | 66.1% |
| Net gain (TELS) | | 3,886 | 140 | | 1,522 | | | | |
| | | | | | | | | | |
| **Tennessee** | Total | 42,772 | 7,163 | 16.7% | 13,560 | 31.7% | | | |
| TELS criteria | 3.0 GPA or 19 ACT | 28,466 | 3,194 | 11.2% | 7,893 | 27.7% | 66.6% | 44.6% | 67.0% |
| FL criteria | 3.0 GPA & 20 ACT | 16,166 | 946 | 5.9% | 3,404 | 21.1% | 37.8% | 13.2% | 34.9% |
| LA criteria | 2.5 GPA & 20 ACT | 19,100 | 1,206 | 6.3% | 4,162 | 21.8% | 44.7% | 16.8% | 37.7% |
| WV criteria | 3.0 GPA & 21 ACT | 14,240 | 719 | 5.0% | 2,780 | 19.5% | 33.3% | 10.0% | 30.1% |

More striking than the additional number of eligible students, however, is the increased number of low-income and African American students who would receive scholarships. In Florida, the percent of eligible African Americans triples when applying the TELS criteria. In Louisiana, the percent doubles. Among low-income students in all three comparison states, the

proportion of these students receiving scholarships under the TELS criteria is within only a few percentage points of the overall proportion of low-income graduates. For example, in Florida, low-income students represent 28.9 percent of the 55,784 total ACT test-takers from the class of 2003. If the TELS criteria were adopted, 27.6 percent of recipients from this class would be low-income students—only 1.3 percent less than the population.

The final rows of Table 2 report the inverse of those above. That is, how would Tennessee fare were they to adopt the criteria of comparison states. The results are consistent with those in Table 1, which further highlights the significant and disproportionate effect of these 'and' criteria when compared to the 'or' criteria of Tennessee.

The final chart (Table 3) considers the impact of uncoupling the GPA and ACT requirements in each state; that is, switching the 'and' to an 'or' as happened to the TELS eligibility criteria at its inception. These results, perhaps, are most illustrative of the inclusive impact of broadening merit aid eligibility criteria. For instance, by changing the 'and' to an 'or' each state nearly doubles the percentage of total number of African American recipients, which results in more than triple the percent of eligible African Americans. Likewise, the percent of eligible low-income students more than doubles in each state and, in Louisiana, this percentage increases by nearly 60 percent. Furthermore, of the 11,097 additional students who would be eligible if Louisiana implemented the 'or' provision, one-half of the newly eligible students would come from low-income households (5,506). In Florida and West Virginia, roughly 40 percent of the additional students would come from low-income households. Given this higher percentage of additional students who are African American and low-income, one could argue that these students are being 'targeted' by these broader programs.

**Table 3**

| | | Total | African-American | % | Income less than $36,000 | % | % Eligible (Total) | % Eligible (African American) | % Eligible (Income less than $36,000) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Florida** | Total | 55,784 | 10,054 | 18.0% | 16,115 | 28.9% | | | |
| Current criteria | 3.0 GPA & 20 ACT | 21,197 | 1,415 | 6.7% | 3,639 | 17.2% | 38.0% | 14.1% | 22.6% |
| FL (or criteria) | 3.0 GPA or 20 ACT | 34,580 | 4,590 | 13.3% | 9,449 | 27.3% | 62.0% | 45.7% | 58.6% |
| Net gain (OR) | | 13,383 | 3,175 | | 5,810 | | | | |
| | | | | | | | | | |
| **Louisiana** | Total | 37,336 | 10,775 | 28.9% | 13,884 | 37.2% | | | |
| Current criteria | 2.5 GPA & 20 ACT | 14,850 | 1,834 | 12.4% | 3,690 | 24.8% | 39.8% | 17.0% | 26.6% |
| LA (or criteria) | 2.5 GPA or 20 ACT | 25,947 | 6,387 | 24.6% | 9,196 | 35.4% | 69.5% | 59.3% | 85.3% |
| Net gain (OR) | | 11,097 | 4,553 | | 5,506 | | | | |
| | | | | | | | | | |
| **West Virginia** | Total | 11,728 | 375 | 3.2% | 4,028 | 34.3% | | | |
| Current criteria | 3.0 GPA & 21 ACT | 4,288 | 38 | 0.9% | 1,139 | 26.6% | 36.6% | 10.1% | 28.3% |
| WV (or criteria) | 3.0 GPA or 21 ACT | 7,602 | 153 | 2.0% | 2,432 | 32.0% | 64.8% | 40.8% | 62.9% |
| Net gain (OR) | | 3,314 | 115 | | 1,293 | | | | |

## Discussion

The Tennessee Education Lottery Scholarship program does not appear to fit into the merit aid or need aid classification. As a scholarship program that awards an overwhelming majority of college-bound students, can this really be considered a *merit* scholarship? On the other hand, despite the high proportion of low-income students who receive TELS awards, students' ability to pay is not considered for the base scholarship. Thus it seems that Tennessee may have enacted a scholarship program that incorporates aspects of both *merit* and *need* yet cannot be accurately described by either.

This study attempts to illustrate with a common database the mitigating effects on the rising criticism of merit aid programs by applying the 'or' criteria to three states' programs. Granted, this line of reasoning would be more compelling if other broad-based merit aid programs, most notably Georgia, were also included. Cursory analysis of Georgia's HOPE program, using the imperfect ACT database to consider an SAT state, shows that Georgia's sole 3.0 GPA criteria awards scholarships in proportions more similar to Tennessee than Florida, Louisiana, and West Virginia. However, the 'or' provision of Tennessee's program remains the

most inclusive of the thirteen merit aid programs. Therefore, we explore the notion that the

Tennessee program, proposed with noble intentions, enacted as a political compromise, and

predicted to award a merit scholarship to nearly every incoming freshman attending a four-year

college, has implications for the study and implementation of merit aid.

**Implications**

*Research*

The most important research implication of the Tennessee scholarship program is the

potential to encourage scholars to recognize the differentiation within merit aid programs. As

reported in the merit aid overview, each state's criteria not only differ, but differ substantially.

One distinction that appears particularly relevant in light of our findings is noting whether merit

aid programs have a standardized test requirement. The proportion of underrepresented students

awarded scholarships in the three comparison states' programs do not differ significantly.

However, when compared to programs that do not require standardized test differences are

considerable.

Researchers could also consider the impact of various financial aid models (merit, need,

targeted) on basic higher education goals, such as graduation and retention rates of recipients,

percentage of recipients staying in-state for college and employment, or satisfaction with college

experience. Analyzing programs based on their explicit goals could clarify the intended and

unintended consequences. For instance, West Virginia's Promise Scholarship program was

specifically designed to keep West Virginia students in-state both while in college and after

postsecondary graduation. Therefore, the more rigorous 3.0 GPA and 21 ACT requirement may

be appropriate as these students are more likely to graduate college than students who must only meet the GPA requirement.

One challenge researchers often face is gaining access to these data on state programs, but perhaps by outlining the relevance of data analysis to increase efficiency policymakers or administrators would be more likely to release the data. Should these studies grow, policymakers would have useful data to consider when existing financial aid programs are altered or new programs created.

*Policy*

There are two primary implications of targeted merit aid: (1) the potential to broaden access to poor and minority students, and (2) the potential to bankrupt the merit aid program. From the preliminary evidence presented in applying TELS criteria to other states, it is apparent that broader aid programs benefit students, especially African American and low-income students. However, policymakers will likely be cautious to expose the fiscal health of merit programs by significantly increasing the number of students. Means testing remains the most efficient way target financial aid, but income caps appear to have become unsustainable. Therefore, the only means by which minority and low-income students can equitably participate in merit aid programs is to cast a wide net.

Ultimately, this notion of targeted merit aid and Tennessee's scholarship program provides a new model for policymakers to consider that awards underrepresented students at higher rates than other merit aid programs. To sustain this model's viability, states must continue to collect student-level data (especially income data) to better inform policymakers. The mounting evidence exposing the *unintended* consequences of merit aid programs may soon force

elected officials to consider how criteria affect minority and low-income students, particularly those students in their districts.

In Georgia currently and even before scholarships have been awarded in Tennessee, scholarship program expenses are expected to soon outpace lottery revenue. This leaves elected officials with the difficult task of determining how to reduce costs, which leaves one of two options: (1) reduce awards amounts or (2) eliminate eligible students. If the latter is agreed upon without income information on recipients, policymakers are left to craft eligibility revisions based on anecdotal evidence from their constituents. However, as the disproportionate effects by race and income are reported, state elected officials may find reinvigorated opposition to reducing the pool of eligible students if evidence detailing which students will be left out becomes publicly transparent. Indeed, this may be the Tennessee's contribution to the policy debate. By beginning with such a wide pool of eligible students, if revised criteria can be shown to disproportionately eliminate poor and black students from eligibility, these consequences can no longer be classified as unintentional.

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# Appendix A

| Approving body | Requirements and Award Amounts | HOPE (base) | HOPE w/ Merit supplement | HOPE w/ Need supplement | HOPE Access Grant | Technical Skills Grant |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Education Lottery Task Force February 27, 2003 $158,858,000 | Amount (public) | $4,000 | $5,000 | $5,000 | N / A | $1,500 |
| | Amount (private) | $2,000 | $5,000 | $3,000 | N / A | N / A |
| | GPA | 3.00 | 3.75 | 3.00 | N / A | N / A |
| | ACT | and 19 | and 29 | and 19 | N / A | N / A |
| | Income cap | $100,000,000 | $100,000,000 | $36,000 or less | N / A | N / A |
| Senate Education cmte March 19, 2003 $149,600,000 | Amount (public) | $4,000 | $5,000 | $5,000 | N / A | $1,500 |
| | Amount (private) | $2,000 | $3,000 | $3,000 | N / A | N / A |
| | GPA | 3.00 | 3.75 | 3.00 | N / A | N / A |
| | ACT | and 19 | and 29 | and 19 | N / A | N / A |
| | Income cap | $100,000,000 | $100,000,000 | $36,000 or less | N / A | N / A |
| Senate Finance cmte April 15, 2003 $159,000,000 | Amount (public) | $4,000 | N / A | N / A | N / A | $1,500 |
| | Amount (private) | $4,000 | N / A | N / A | N / A | N / A |
| | GPA | 3.00 | N / A | N / A | N / A | N / A |
| | ACT | and 19 | N / A | N / A | N / A | N / A |
| | Income cap | N / A | N / A | N / A | N / A | N / A |
| House Education cmte May 1, 2003 $154,306,000 (added sunset in 2005 & review of ASPIRE program) | Amount (public) | $3,000 | $4,000 | $4,000 | N / A | $1,250 |
| | Amount (private) | $3,000 | $4,000 | $4,000 | N / A | N / A |
| | GPA | 3.00 | 3.75 | 3.00 | N / A | N / A |
| | ACT | and 19 | and 29 | and 19 | N / A | N / A |
| | Income cap | N / A | N / A | $36,000 or less | N / A | N / A |
| House Senate cmte May 13, 2003 $154,306,000 | Amount (public) | $3,000 | $4,000 | $4,000 | N / A | $1,250 |
| | Amount (private) | $3,000 | $4,000 | $4,000 | N / A | N / A |
| | GPA | 3.00 | 3.75 | 3.00 | N / A | N / A |
| | ACT | and 19 | and 29 | and 19 | N / A | N / A |
| | Income cap | N / A | N / A | $36,000 or less | N / A | N / A |
| General Assembly May 21-22, 2003 $239,006,000 | Amount (public) | $3,000 | $4,000 | $4,000 | $2,000 | $1,250 |
| | Amount (private) | $3,000 | $4,000 | $4,000 | $2,000 | N / A |
| | GPA | 3.00 | 3.75 | 3.00 | 2.75 | N / A |
| | ACT | **or** 19 | **and** 29 | **or** 19 | **and** 18 | N / A |
| | Income cap | N / A | N / A | $36,000 or less | $36,000 or less | N / A |

# Appendix B

| Florida | | Total | African-American | % | Income less than $36,000 | % | % Eligible (Total) | % Eligible (African American) | % Eligible (Income less than $36,000) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2003 | Total | 55,784 | 10,054 | 18.0% | 16,115 | 28.9% | | | |
| | 3.0 GPA & 20 ACT | 21,197 | 1,415 | 6.7% | 3,639 | 17.2% | 38.0% | 14.1% | 22.6% |
| 2002 | Total | 51,935 | 9,357 | 18.0% | 15,278 | 29.4% | | | |
| | 3.0 GPA or 20 ACT | 20,310 | 1,388 | 6.8% | 4,555 | 22.4% | 39.1% | 14.8% | 29.8% |
| 2001 | Total | 51,118 | 9,090 | 17.8% | 15,320 | 30.0% | | | |
| | 3.0 GPA or 19 ACT | 20,440 | 1,265 | 6.2% | 4,708 | 23.0% | 40.0% | 13.9% | 30.7% |
| **Louisiana** | | | | | | | | | |
| 2003 | Total | 37,336 | 10,775 | 28.9% | 13,884 | 37.2% | | | |
| | 2.5 GPA & 20 ACT | 14,850 | 1,834 | 12.4% | 3,690 | 24.8% | 39.8% | 17.0% | 26.6% |
| 2002 | Total | 36,360 | 10,314 | 28.4% | 13,367 | 36.8% | | | |
| | 2.5 GPA & 20 ACT | 14,595 | 1,693 | 11.6% | 3,511 | 24.1% | 40.1% | 16.4% | 26.3% |
| 2001 | Total | 37,165 | 9,954 | 26.8% | 13,755 | 37.0% | | | |
| | 2.5 GPA & 20 ACT | 15,168 | 1,741 | 11.5% | 3,922 | 25.9% | 40.8% | 17.5% | 28.5% |
| **West Virginia** | | | | | | | | | |
| 2003 | Total | 11,728 | 375 | 3.2% | 4,028 | 34.3% | | | |
| | 3.0 GPA & 21 ACT | 4,288 | 38 | 0.9% | 1,139 | 26.6% | 36.6% | 10.1% | 28.3% |
| 2002 | Total | 11,451 | 337 | 2.9% | 4,017 | 35.1% | | | |
| | 3.0 GPA & 21 ACT | 4,266 | 46 | 1.1% | 1,145 | 26.8% | 37.3% | 13.6% | 36.6% |
| 2001 | Total | 11,857 | 331 | 2.8% | 4,439 | 37.4% | | | |
| | 3.0 GPA & 21 ACT | 4,203 | 36 | 0.9% | 1,290 | 30.7% | 35.4% | 10.9% | 29.1% |
| **Tennessee** | | | | | | | | | |
| 2003 | Total | 42,772 | 7,163 | 16.7% | 13,560 | 31.7% | | | |
| | 3.0 GPA or 19 ACT | 28,466 | 3,194 | 11.2% | 7,893 | 27.7% | 66.6% | 44.6% | 67.0% |
| 2002 | Total | 44,307 | 7,676 | 17.3% | 14,885 | 33.6% | | | |
| | 3.0 GPA or 19 ACT | 28,742 | 3,313 | 11.5% | 8,381 | 29.2% | 64.9% | 43.2% | 66.5% |
| 2001 | Total | 43,949 | 7,382 | 16.8% | 14,777 | 33.6% | | | |
| | 3.0 GPA or 19 ACT | 28,758 | 3,203 | 11.1% | 8,376 | 29.1% | 65.4% | 43.4% | 66.3% |

# Appendix C

**Florida**

| | | Total | African-American | % | Income less than $36,000 | % | % Eligible (Total) | % Eligible (African American) | % Eligible (Income less than $36,000) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2003 | Total | 55,784 | 10,054 | 18.0% | 16,115 | 28.9% | | | |
| Current criteria | 3.0 GPA & 20 ACT | 21,197 | 1,415 | 6.7% | 3,639 | 17.2% | 38.0% | 14.1% | 22.6% |
| TELS criteria | 3.0 GPA or 19 ACT | 35,557 | 4,817 | 13.5% | 9,802 | 27.6% | 63.7% | 47.9% | 60.8% |
| Net gain (TELS) | | 14,360 | 3,402 | | 6,163 | | | | |
| 2002 | Total | 51,935 | 9,357 | 18.0% | 15,278 | 29.4% | | | |
| Current criteria | 3.0 GPA & 20 ACT | 20,310 | 1,388 | 6.8% | 4,555 | 22.4% | 61.2% | 32.0% | 47.7% |
| TELS criteria | 3.0 GPA or 19 ACT | 34,201 | 4,568 | 13.4% | 9,908 | 29.0% | 65.9% | 48.8% | 64.9% |
| Net gain (TELS) | | 13,891 | 3,180 | | 5,353 | | | | |
| 2001 | Total | 51,118 | 9,090 | 17.8% | 15,320 | 30.0% | | | |
| Current criteria | 3.0 GPA & 20 ACT | 20,440 | 1,265 | 6.2% | 4,708 | 23.0% | 61.4% | 31.3% | 48.8% |
| TELS criteria | 3.0 GPA or 19 ACT | 34,415 | 4,273 | 12.4% | 10,035 | 29.2% | 67.3% | 47.0% | 65.5% |
| Net gain (TELS) | | 13,975 | 3,008 | | 5,327 | | | | |

**Louisiana**

| | | Total | African-American | % | Income less than $36,000 | % | % Eligible (Total) | % Eligible (African American) | % Eligible (Income less than $36,000) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2003 | Total | 37,336 | 10,775 | 28.9% | 13,884 | 37.2% | | | |
| Current criteria | 2.5 GPA & 20 ACT | 14,850 | 1,834 | 12.4% | 3,690 | 24.8% | 39.8% | 17.0% | 26.6% |
| TELS criteria | 3.0 GPA or 19 ACT | 22,109 | 4,369 | 19.8% | 6,982 | 31.6% | 59.2% | 40.5% | 50.3% |
| Net gain (TELS) | | 7,259 | 2,535 | | 3,292 | | | | |
| 2002 | Total | 36,360 | 10,314 | 28.4% | 13,367 | 36.8% | | | |
| Current criteria | 2.5 GPA & 20 ACT | 14,595 | 1,693 | 11.6% | 3,511 | 24.1% | 40.1% | 16.4% | 26.3% |
| TELS criteria | 3.0 GPA or 19 ACT | 21,900 | 4,229 | 19.3% | 6,797 | 31.0% | 60.2% | 41.0% | 50.8% |
| Net gain (TELS) | | 7,305 | 2,536 | | 3,286 | | | | |
| 2001 | Total | 37,165 | 9,954 | 26.8% | 13,755 | 37.0% | | | |
| Current criteria | 2.5 GPA & 20 ACT | 15,168 | 1,741 | 11.5% | 3,922 | 25.9% | 40.8% | 17.5% | 28.5% |
| TELS criteria | 3.0 GPA or 19 ACT | 22,768 | 4,194 | 18.4% | 7,314 | 32.1% | 61.3% | 42.1% | 53.2% |
| Net gain (TELS) | | 7,600 | 2,453 | | 3,392 | | | | |

**West Virginia**

| | | Total | African-American | % | Income less than $36,000 | % | % Eligible (Total) | % Eligible (African American) | % Eligible (Income less than $36,000) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2003 | Total | 11,728 | 375 | 3.2% | 4,028 | 34.3% | | | |
| Current criteria | 3.0 GPA & 21 ACT | 4,288 | 38 | 0.9% | 1,139 | 26.6% | 36.6% | 10.1% | 28.3% |
| TELS criteria | 3.0 GPA or 19 ACT | 8,174 | 178 | 2.2% | 2,661 | 32.6% | 69.7% | 47.5% | 66.1% |
| Net gain (TELS) | | 3,886 | 140 | | 1,522 | | | | |
| 2002 | Total | 11,451 | 337 | 2.9% | 4,017 | 35.1% | | | |
| Current criteria | 3.0 GPA & 21 ACT | 4,266 | 46 | 1.1% | 1,145 | 26.8% | 37.3% | 13.6% | 28.5% |
| TELS criteria | 3.0 GPA or 19 ACT | 8,160 | 149 | 1.8% | 2,684 | 32.9% | 71.3% | 44.2% | 66.8% |
| Net gain (TELS) | | 3,894 | 103 | | 1,539 | | | | |
| 2001 | Total | 11,857 | 331 | 2.8% | 4,439 | 37.4% | | | |
| Current criteria | 3.0 GPA & 21 ACT | 4,203 | 36 | 0.9% | 1,290 | 30.7% | 35.4% | 10.9% | 29.1% |
| TELS criteria | 3.0 GPA or 19 ACT | 8,417 | 139 | 1.7% | 2,977 | 35.4% | 71.0% | 42.0% | 67.1% |
| Net gain (TELS) | | 4,214 | 103 | | 1,687 | | | | |

**Tennessee**

| | | Total | African-American | % | Income less than $36,000 | % | % Eligible (Total) | % Eligible (African American) | % Eligible (Income less than $36,000) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2003 | Total | 42,772 | 7,163 | 16.7% | 13,560 | 31.7% | | | |
| TELS criteria | 3.0 GPA or 19 ACT | 28,466 | 3,194 | 11.2% | 7,893 | 27.7% | 66.6% | 44.6% | 67.0% |
| FL criteria | 3.0 GPA & 20 ACT | 16,166 | 946 | 5.9% | 3,404 | 21.1% | 37.8% | 13.2% | 34.9% |
| LA criteria | 2.5 GPA & 20 ACT | 19,100 | 1,206 | 6.3% | 4,162 | 21.8% | 44.7% | 16.8% | 37.7% |
| WV criteria | 3.0 GPA & 21 ACT | 14,240 | 719 | 5.0% | 2,780 | 19.5% | 33.3% | 10.0% | 30.1% |

**Tennessee**

| | | Total | African-American | % | Income less than $36,000 | % | % Eligible (Total) | % Eligible (African American) | % Eligible (Income less than $36,000) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2002 | Total | 44,307 | 7,676 | 17.3% | 14,885 | 33.6% | | | |
| TELS criteria | 3.0 GPA or 19 ACT | 28,742 | 3,313 | 11.5% | 8,381 | 29.2% | 64.9% | 43.2% | 66.5% |
| FL criteria | 3.0 GPA & 20 ACT | 15,517 | 858 | 5.5% | 3,378 | 21.8% | 35.0% | 11.2% | 31.9% |
| LA criteria | 2.5 GPA & 20 ACT | 18,686 | 1,141 | 6.1% | 4,257 | 22.8% | 42.2% | 14.9% | 35.2% |
| WV criteria | 3.0 GPA & 21 ACT | 13,739 | 658 | 4.8% | 2,863 | 20.8% | 31.0% | 8.6% | 27.6% |
| 2001 | Total | 43,949 | 7,382 | 16.8% | 14,777 | 33.6% | | | |
| TELS criteria | 3.0 GPA or 19 ACT | 28,758 | 3,203 | 11.1% | 8,376 | 29.1% | 65.4% | 43.4% | 66.3% |
| FL criteria | 3.0 GPA & 20 ACT | 15,747 | 902 | 5.7% | 3,560 | 22.6% | 35.8% | 12.2% | 34.1% |
| LA criteria | 2.5 GPA & 20 ACT | 18,810 | 1,145 | 6.1% | 4,358 | 23.2% | 42.8% | 15.5% | 36.2% |
| WV criteria | 3.0 GPA & 21 ACT | 13,868 | 671 | 4.8% | 2,970 | 21.4% | 31.6% | 9.1% | 28.8% |

# Appendix D

| | | Total | African-American | % | Income less than $36,000 | % | % Eligible (Total) | % Eligible (African American) | % Eligible (Income less than $36,000) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Florida** | | | | | | | | | |
| 2003 | Total | 55,784 | 10,054 | 18.0% | 16,115 | 28.9% | | | |
| Current criteria | 3.0 GPA & 20 ACT | 21,197 | 1,415 | 6.7% | 3,639 | 17.2% | 38.00% | 14.07% | 22.58% |
| FL (or criteria) | 3.0 GPA or 20 ACT | 34,580 | 4,590 | 13.3% | 9,449 | 27.3% | 61.99% | 45.65% | 58.63% |
| Net gain (OR) | | 13,383 | 3,175 | | 5,810 | | | | |
| 2002 | Total | 51,935 | 9,357 | 18.0% | 15,278 | 29.4% | | | |
| Current criteria | 3.0 GPA & 20 ACT | 20,310 | 1,388 | 6.8% | 4,555 | 22.4% | 39.11% | 14.83% | 29.81% |
| FL (or criteria) | 3.0 GPA or 20 ACT | 33,182 | 4,339 | 13.1% | 9,554 | 28.8% | 63.89% | 46.37% | 62.53% |
| Net gain (OR) | | 12,872 | 2,951 | | 4,999 | | | | |
| 2001 | Total | 51,118 | 9,090 | 17.8% | 15,320 | 30.0% | | | |
| Current criteria | 3.0 GPA & 20 ACT | 20,440 | 1,265 | 6.2% | 4,708 | 23.0% | 39.99% | 13.92% | 30.73% |
| FL (or criteria) | 3.0 GPA or 20 ACT | 33,292 | 4,041 | 12.1% | 9,641 | 29.0% | 65.13% | 44.46% | 62.93% |
| Net gain (OR) | | 12,852 | 2,776 | | 4,933 | | | | |
| | | | | | | | | | |
| **Louisiana** | | | | | | | | | |
| 2003 | Total | 37,336 | 10,775 | 28.9% | 13,884 | 37.2% | | | |
| Current criteria | 2.5 GPA & 20 ACT | 14,850 | 1,834 | 12.4% | 3,690 | 24.8% | 39.77% | 17.02% | 26.58% |
| LA (or criteria) | 2.5 GPA or 20 ACT | 25,947 | 6,387 | 24.6% | 9,196 | 35.4% | 69.50% | 59.28% | 85.29% |
| Net gain (OR) | | 11,097 | 4,553 | | 5,506 | | | | |
| 2002 | Total | 36,360 | 10,314 | 28.4% | 13,367 | 36.8% | | | |
| Current criteria | 2.5 GPA & 20 ACT | 14,595 | 1,693 | 11.6% | 3,511 | 24.1% | 40.14% | 16.41% | 26.27% |
| LA (or criteria) | 2.5 GPA or 20 ACT | 25,624 | 6,166 | 24.1% | 8,865 | 34.6% | 70.47% | 59.78% | 84.83% |
| Net gain (OR) | | 11,029 | 4,473 | | 5,354 | | | | |
| 2001 | Total | 37,165 | 9,954 | 26.8% | 13,755 | 37.0% | | | |
| Current criteria | 2.5 GPA & 20 ACT | 15,168 | 1,741 | 11.5% | 3,922 | 25.9% | 40.81% | 17.49% | 28.51% |
| LA (or criteria) | 2.5 GPA or 20 ACT | 26,546 | 6,089 | 22.9% | 9,340 | 35.2% | 71.43% | 61.17% | 85.64% |
| Net gain (OR) | | 11,378 | 4,348 | | 5,418 | | | | |
| | | | | | | | | | |
| **West Virginia** | | | | | | | | | |
| 2003 | Total | 11,728 | 375 | 3.2% | 4,028 | 34.3% | | | |
| Current criteria | 3.0 GPA & 21 ACT | 4,288 | 38 | 0.9% | 1,139 | 26.6% | 36.56% | 10.13% | 28.28% |
| WV (or criteria) | 3.0 GPA or 21 ACT | 7,602 | 153 | 2.0% | 2,432 | 32.0% | 64.82% | 40.80% | 62.94% |
| Net gain (OR) | | 3,314 | 115 | | 1,293 | | | | |
| 2002 | Total | 11,451 | 337 | 2.9% | 4,017 | 35.1% | | | |
| Current criteria | 3.0 GPA & 21 ACT | 4,266 | 46 | 1.1% | 1,145 | 26.8% | 37.25% | 13.65% | 28.50% |
| WV (or criteria) | 3.0 GPA or 21 ACT | 7,528 | 140 | 1.9% | 2,445 | 32.5% | 65.74% | 41.54% | 63.19% |
| Net gain (OR) | | 3,262 | 94 | | 1,300 | | | | |
| 2001 | Total | 11,857 | 331 | 2.8% | 4,439 | 37.4% | | | |
| Current criteria | 3.0 GPA & 21 ACT | 4,203 | 36 | 0.9% | 1,290 | 30.7% | 35.45% | 10.88% | 29.06% |
| WV (or criteria) | 3.0 GPA or 21 ACT | 7,768 | 126 | 1.6% | 2,719 | 35.0% | 65.51% | 38.07% | 58.10% |
| Net gain (OR) | | 3,565 | 90 | | 1,429 | | | | |