Title of paper

Values Acquisition and Moral Development: An Integration of Freudian, Eriksonian, Kohlbergian and Gilliganian Viewpoints

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Abstract

Consider the following important questions: Should values be transmitted or developed? As children grow up, what, if anything, should change in values acquisition? How important are locus of control issues in moral development? and Why might process versus product elements be crucial in the development of values? One key element missing in the values literature is a model that integrates major theoretical viewpoints and has the potential to guide teachers, parents, and others who work with children and adolescents. This paper will offer a synthesis of the theories offered by Sigmund Freud (personality elements of the id, ego, and superego), Erik Erikson (identity formation), Lawrence Kohlberg (moral development), and Carol Gilligan (female versus male moral development) in order to explain how values are acquired and maintained, moral decisions are made, and mental health is established and perpetuated. This two-stage model will highlight how the socialization process initially claims a powerful influence upon children, and then around adolescence an entirely new cognitive developmental moral decision-making process is theoretically available to be used to sustain the individual throughout adulthood. It is crucial to understand that this new state is not inevitable or guaranteed in any way, since many adults continue to function upon values established during childhood with little or no reflection upon or modification of these values.

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Viewpoints

The psychological topics of values and moral development in children as they grow into adulthood have long captured the interest of parents, educators, religious leaders, politicians, youth group workers, and concerned citizens. Such topics have also attracted the serious interest of prominent theorists, researchers, scholars, and practitioners. Lapsley (1996) suggested that "the study of moral functioning has been one of the most enduring and central of all the various research enterprises to be found within the scholarly psychological literature" (p. xiii). Wynne (1986) suggested that "the transmission of moral values has been the dominant educational concern of most cultures throughout history" (p. 4). More recently, the escalation of school violence in America has caused many to suggest that young people are suffering from problems of character (see Smagorinsky & Taxel, 2005).

This paper will take the seemingly disparate theoretical perspectives of Sigmund Freud, Erik Erikson, Lawrence Kohlberg, and Carol Gilligan on the topic of moral development and offer a two-stage theoretical model that incorporates key ideas from all of those viewpoints. The proposed model employs existing research findings in the clinical, quantitative, and qualitative research of Freud, Erikson, Kohlberg, Gilligan, and others in an attempt to find concordance rather than distinctiveness in those points of view.

Briefly stated the theory looks like this: Stage 1 (transmission approach to values) begins at birth, extends through childhood, and focuses upon socialization within the contexts of home, school, and society. and Stage 2 (developmental approach to values) is first readily and fully accessible around adolescence, extends into adulthood, and focuses upon cognition and

individuation. The author will offer theoretical evidence for this two-stage theory and behavioral

examples that demonstrate why such a paradigm demands a profound change in teaching and

imparting human values. This approach to understanding values and moral development has

important implications for teachers, parents, and others who work with children and adolescents.

It is important at the onset to understand the complex inter-relationship that exists

between values and moral development in American society. Some values such as taste in

music, food, or clothing style are often thought to be a personal choice in a free society where

differences can be accepted or even appreciated. Those are in stark contrast to more universal

values such as honesty, respect for property and the law, compassion, loyalty, contributing to

society, etc., that are so crucial for people living in a democracy. Kohlberg (1975) suggested that

while cheating is a moral issue in school, tidiness in schoolwork is a value, but not a moral value.

While this example may highlight the bi-polar extremes here, it is also important to recognize

that many subjectively chosen values such as music, food choices, or attire are used by some

people as outward signs of deeper, hidden values that do have a moral basis. For example,

consider today how profiling leads us to be suspicious of one's patriotism and benign intentions

if a person is dressed in traditional Middle Eastern garb. Is a behavioral rule in the classroom or

home unfair or unjustified? It is in this light where the lines between morals and values so often

blur that I wish to merge together so much that has been researched and written on the topics of

moral and values development. I do so while knowing full well that focusing on different

value/moral elements might lead to different conclusions and insights.

Values/Moral Historical Benchmarks

A few benchmarks in the historical development of values and moral development will be

offered to the reader in order to set the stage for the integrative model proposed by this paper.

The author readily acknowledges that this is neither an extensive nor a formal in-depth review of

these psychological topics, since such work is well beyond the scope of this paper. Readers

should be forewarned that while philosophy offers valuable insights to this topic, this paper will

focus primarily on psychological contributions to values development. The following

perspectives highlight the theoretical and philosophical depth and breadth that exists among

several prominent thinkers on the topics of values and moral development.

Over 70 years ago, John Dewey (1933) reminded us that even when moral education is

not explicitly taught in the classroom, the school setting offers a moral milieu that he referred to

as the "hidden curriculum." Dewey (1964) suggested that: "the teacher is a trainer of mind, a

former of character…" (p. 197). As an extension of such thinking, Dewey (1910) postulated

three distinct levels of moral conduct: 1) behavior satisfies instincts and fundamental needs, 2)

behavior is regulated by *standards of society*, and 3) conduct is regulated by a standard that is

both social and rational, as well as examined and critiqued through personal reflection (see p.

38).

Jean Piaget (1932/1965) proposed a two-stage theory of moral development in addition to

his more well-known stage theory of cognitive development. Piaget's first stage (called moral

realism, morality of constraint, or heteronomous morality) suggested that the young child views

rules as sacred and unalterable structures and egocentrically believes others view such rules in

the same way. There is a tendency for the child to judge actions during this stage, based upon

the magnitude of consequences for such actions. In Piaget's second stage (moral relativism,

morality of cooperation, or autonomous morality) that coincides with early adolescence, rules are

viewed as being important, but are also open to modifications based upon intentionality,

consequences, and situational variables. The older child now possesses more advanced cognitive

skills and is capable of placing himself/herself in the role of another person that results in a

distinctively different moral viewing point unavailable earlier in development. Personal change

occurs through cognitive disequilibrium that challenges our existing mental beliefs. In theory,

such a mental state motivates us toward crisis resolution by eventually establishing equilibrium

where modified schema allow us to more effectively adapt (Inhelder & Piaget, 1955/1958).

Values clarification approaches have also had a significant influence on the field of

moral/values development (Simon, Howe, & Kirschenbaum, 1972; Kirschenbaum 1977). This

non-indoctrination approach offered moral/ethical/value dilemmas that were relatively brief for

classroom use. The primary goal was to create cognitive disequilibrium whereby students would

question their own values, judgments, and behavioral actions. It was assumed that the engaging

nature of the dilemmas allowed students to project themselves into the scenes and these

situations were realistic dilemmas that students might one day face in life. Such classroom

exercises were hoped to lead to a greater student awareness of values, moral judgments, and

actions while promoting the view that often there would be no "right" or "correct" solution to

these dilemmas. Frequently this led to relativistic thinking through the assumption that people

could hold different values and thus might think and act differently in the same circumstance.

Wynne (1986) offered the suggestion that "on the whole, school is and should and must

be inherently indoctrinative" (p. 9), since "without effective moral formation the human

propensity for selfishness--or simply the advancement of self-interest--can destructively affect

adult institutions" (p. 5). He spoke of the need for the deliberate transmission of moral values

through the "Great Tradition in Education" in terms of such learning tools as the Ten

Commandments. Wynne (1986) suggested that children must learn a certain body of "doctrine"

to function on a day-to-day basis in society and "it is ridiculous to believe children are capable

of objectively assessing most of the beliefs and values they must absorb to be effective adults"

(p. 9). Here we have a system where good moral conduct needs to be rewarded, wrongful

conduct needs to be punished, and life only "occasionally generates dilemmas" (p. 7).

Former Secretary of Education William Bennett (1993), a proponent of character education,

suggested that "unlike courses in moral reasoning this approach employs stories, poems, essays,

and other writings that illustrate right and wrong and good and bad" (p. 11). Virtues and vices

are presented to the student for comparison and contrast and Bennett emphasized that education

involves "the training of heart and mind toward the good" (p. 11). His literary examples draw

heavily upon historical examples and deal with value-laden topics such as honesty, compassion,

courage, work, perseverance, faith, loyalty, friendship, responsibility, and self-discipline. Well

worth noting here is that values need to be directly transmitted to children, adolescents, and

adults and such values seem rarely to come into conflict in our daily lives.

The nexus for me to organize my thinking more deeply on this topic was the

thought-provoking topical question: "Should values be developed rather than transmitted?"

contained in the book *Taking Sides: Clashing Views on Controversial Educational Issues* (Noll,

1993). The present essay is an expansion and extrapolation of a response to this question and is

based upon an earlier published work that outlined the bipolar distinctions and developmental

sequencing of the transmission and developmental approaches to values acquisition (Herman,

1997). Healthy values acquisition moves from infancy to childhood where conditioning, social

learning, and unconscious processes have much more powerful influences than the cognitive

abilities that are still under developmental construction. The child also gradually adopts more

than a familial view through exposure to school and social situations. In adolescence and

adulthood, it is the cognitive-developmental approach that holds the potential to override and

re-shape the values previously incorporated into the personality of the child. The current paper

attempts to further advance this integrative model; clarify the theoretical connections between the works of Sigmund Freud, Erik Erikson, Lawrence Kohlberg, and Carol Gilligan; and offer a two-stage personality-theory model of values and moral development.

Freud's Contributions to Moral Development

It should not surprise us that when considering the connections between psychoanalytic theory and moral/values development readers think of Sigmund Freud's superego element of the personality. Freud (1933/1965) suggested that conscience and morality were embodied in the superego dimension of the human personality as a result of "identification--that is to say, the assimilation of one ego to another, as a result of which the first ego behaves like the second in certain respects, imitates it and in a sense takes it up into itself" (p. 63). Nye (1981) clarified that process in an example of a boy's identification with his father by suggesting that "This means that he incorporates his father's values and standards within himself" (p. 23) and this process also provides a social function in that familial and cultural norms are passed on from one generation to another. In a similar way, a young girl might unconsciously incorporate her mother's value system. Note that identification employs powerful unconscious processes.

In adolescence and even later in adulthood we sometimes find more of our parents in our heads and behaviors than we had earlier come to realize. The realization that we are not exactly the person we had previously come to know (unconscious processes are at work here) can be a shocking and disconcerting discovery. Hope for the future rests in the possibility of becoming more than we currently are and more like what we consciously wish to be at that pivotal point in the lifespan. Only by finding which artifacts (identifications) of childhood hold personal meaning can we hope for a reorganized personality to successfully confront adulthood.

Less obvious for some readers is the Freudian importance of the ego personality structure in cognitive moral judgment functioning and values acquisition.. Allen (2000) reminded us that the "ego has the capacity to delay satisfaction of the id's demands until an appropriate object is found that will allow gratification without harmful side effects" (p. 24). Allen further suggested that such ego functioning is accomplished through secondary (more conscious than unconscious) processes including intellectual functioning such as thinking, evaluation, planning, and decision making. This more cognitive, conscious, and flexible mechanism for making moral judgments more fully represents Freud's reality-oriented (ego) arm of the personality and the indispensable relationship between ego and superego functioning.

It is unfortunate that the full richness and complexity of Freud's personality theory is not more fully appreciated. For example, note the lack of any mention of ego functioning by the following writer. Kohlberg (1970) highlighted alternative theoretical moral teaching and learning viewpoints when he proposed that "a Skinnerian will speak of proper schedules of reinforcement, a Freudian will speak of the importance of the balance of parental love and firmness which will promote superego identification" (p. 57). The oversimplification of Freudian theory (often done for purposes of highlighting/advancing contrasting viewpoints) has led to some confusion regarding those ideas. Psychoanalytic theory therefore offers us dual components of moral development: 1) superego (where the harsh and rigid set of expectations guide us in terms of unconscious childhood identifications) and 2) ego (where cognitive flexibility can lead to wrestling with moral issues in a logical or defensive manner and counterbalancing the id drives and the societal restraints of the superego).

A Neo-Freudian (Blos, 1962; 1967; 1979) highlighted two important themes in adolescent development: 1) de-idealization of the parent and 2) individuation (where a person

strives to become a distinct individual).   Peter Blos (1979) proposed that "Individuation implies

that the growing person takes increasing responsibility for what he does and what he is, rather

than depositing this responsibility on the shoulders of those under whose influence and tutelage

he has grown up" (p. 148).   The adolescent developmental task of individuation sets the stage

for a discussion of the well known and important work of Erik Erikson on identity formation.

Erikson's Contributions to Moral Development

Equally unclear in the general professional literature are the ideas of Erik Erikson

regarding the process of identity formation. Josselson (1980) seemed to concur when she stated

that "Erikson's concept of ego identity has been widely misused and misunderstood" (p. 202).

One common limitation is the tendency to oversimplify the concept of identity in the quest to

answer questions such as: "Who am I?" and "Who do I wish to become?" While such a view of

identity might be a worthy intellectual connection for novice readers, it is only a beginning and

hardly sufficient for more critical readers who desire to grasp more fully what Erikson had in

mind when he wrote about identity formation. Fortunately, we can easily delve into primary

sources to solve this problem and more deeply understand Erikson's ideas.

When an adolescent is confronting the personal crisis element of identity formation

he/she is asking questions like those stated earlier—"Who am I?" Such a crisis element extends

over a considerable period and demands reflection, analytical thinking, and an awareness of

cultural alternatives. As a psychoanalyst, Erikson (1964) proposed that "identity ...is not the sum

of childhood identifications, but rather a new combination of old and new identification

fragments" (p. 90). In another source, Erikson (1963) clarified the process elements by stating

that ego identity "is the accrued experience of the ego's ability to integrate all identifications with

the vicissitudes of the libido, with the aptitudes developed out of endowment, and with the

opportunities offered in social roles" (p. 261).

Identity is therefore often more of a process than an end-product, since Erikson (1959)

stated, "A sense of identity is never gained nor maintained once and for all" (p. 118). The

commitment elements can be seen in decisions made regarding career, relationships with

significant others, religious practices, acting on values, etc.   As anyone who works with

adolescents knows, the human personality is flexible and adolescence is a period of the lifespan

during which exploration can lead to sudden and rapid changes in commitments and new

personal-crisis events. Healthy identity formation is also best thought of as an integrative

process as can be seen by the following statement: "Identity means an integration of all previous

identifications and self-images, including negative ones" (Erikson quoted in Evans, 1976, p.

297). Fidelity is one of the primary goals during the adolescent period where "the opportunity to

fulfill personal potentialities ...in a context which permits the young person to be true to himself

and true to significant others...[and to] sustain loyalties ...in spite of inevitable contradictions of

value systems" (Erikson, 1968, p. 290) promotes ego identity formation.

Erikson (1970) wrote more specifically on the topic of moral development and

identity formation:

> Adolescence has always been seen as an interim stage with an alternately
>
> invigorating and confusing sense of an overdefined past that must be left behind
>
> and of a future as yet to be identified—and identified with….A majority of young
>
> people, then, see no reason to question 'the system' seriously, if only because they
>
> have never visualized another. (p. 12)

The identity process was clarified by Erikson (1970) when he suggested the importance of "reviving

and recapitulating the fragmentary experiences of childhood for the sake of recombining them

actively in a new wholeness or experience. Such unification must obviously count on the workings

of the ego" (p. 16). Adolescence then ideally becomes a life-review or reflective point where the

individual can to some degree critically examine past learning and re-shape herself or himself before

entering into adulthood. It is equally important to note that Erikson recognized that many youth

would derive great comfort in their childhood identifications and be unmotivated to take the risks

needed to re-invent themselves at this point in the lifespan.

Kohlberg's Contributions to Moral Development

Lawrence Kohlberg (1975) offered a fine summary of his cognitive-developmental moral

stage theory where moral dilemmas were used to research moral development and could be

employed to elevate moral reasoning. His most advanced and idealistic universal ethical

principle stage (Stage 6) included allowing personal conscience and cognitively sophisticated

abstract principles to guide moral behavior. The problem of moral behavior not always matching

moral reasoning offers us a clue that other internal processes and external contextual issues

might be at work. Kohlberg suggested that in childhood, moral reasoning was situational and

was based upon rewards and punishments, while later, a justice and law emphasis was found

based upon an older adult's more mature cognitive skills and an internalized moral standard.

One key to understanding Kohlberg's theory is to understand that he focused upon

dilemmas that involve a moral choice: "choosing between two (or more) of these values as they

conflict in concrete situations of choice" (1975, p. 672). His contention appears to be that such

events in life are pervasive, stress producing, and crucial benchmarks in living healthy lives.

Kohlberg (1975) suggested that his cognitive developmental approach was not

indoctrinative and that changes could occur in reasoning rather than beliefs. He also contrasted

his view with values-clarification approaches that offer students no "right" answers. Links

between moral development and participating in a democracy, as originating in Dewey's earlier

work, and the influence of Piaget on Kohlberg's theory, are both well documented.

Gilligan's Contributions to Moral Development

Carol Gilligan (1982) offered a critique of Freud, Piaget, Erikson, and Kohlberg based

upon a masculine bias in those theorists' viewpoints, and proposed that gender identity for males

is tied to separation and individuation while gender identity for females is tied to attachment and

intimacy. The underlying premise is that males and females grow up in a gender stereotyped

society where boys are taught to value independence, assertiveness, achievement, and

individuation, while girls are taught to value connectedness, caring, sensitivity, and concern for

others (Kaplan, 2004). Gilligan (1982) clarified that "The different voice I describe is

characterized not by gender but theme" (p. 2). Unfortunately, many have found it tempting to

view Gilligan's work as a distinctive and alternative view to Kohlberg's theory.

Extreme caution is urged here, since Gilligan and Attanucci (1988) summarized the

gender issues in moral development as follows:

(a) Concerns about both justice and care are represented in people's thinking about

real-life dilemmas, but people tend to focus on one set of concerns and minimally

represent the other. And

(b) There is an association between moral orientation and gender such that men

and women use both orientations, but Care Focus dilemmas are most likely to be

presented by women and Justice Focus dilemmas by men (p. 223).

Lyons (1990) pointed out that stereotypical gender differences found in females being

more caring and males being more justice oriented mean that these gender differences are not

absolute and the two orientations are not mutually exclusive. A similar conclusion is found

when we juxtapose moral development with research on androgynous individuals where extreme

versions of stereotypical masculine and feminine traits were not found to be as mentally healthy

or flexible as androgynous women and men (see Bem, 1977; Stake, 2000). Healthy human

beings need a moral repertoire whereby they can function in nurturing *or* justice-oriented modes

to be most flexible and adaptive in life. The author of this paper views Gilligan's developmental

sequence for male/female moral development as complementing and extending the work of

Kohlberg rather than comprising an alternative theoretical view.

A Two-Stage Pragmatic Model

How can the reader make sense of all the different approaches to values/moral

development mentioned thus far? When so many prominent theorists and research findings lead

us to a similar conclusion, a model that can synthesize and incorporate these views rather than

attempt to pit one view against another seems long overdue. The ideas presented in this paper

thus far lend themselves quite nicely to fitting into the following two-stage paradigm.

Stage 1: Social Transmission Approach [External Control Model]
<u>Major Theorists/Proponents</u>: (Wynne and Bennett [character education],
Freud and Erikson [superego and childhood identifications], Bandura
[modeling and social learning], Skinner [conditioning], Gilligan [gender
role stereotypes])

Societal rule makers (parents, teachers, etc.) have the first and therefore most powerful

opportunity to influence the character of children. Several different psychological ideas

discussed so far might be at work here, such as imitation, modeling, identification (recall this is

unconscious), rewarding rule following, punishing rule breaking, etc. This external-locus-of-

control process of socialization offers children simplistic guidance in terms of what to do and

what not to do. As a child later grows more cognitively mature the explanation for such rules'

existence also seems important, but this approach virtually ignores such an emphasis.

Kirschenbaum (1992), an early values clarification proponent, alluded to a dual system of values

acquisition when he stated "the traditional approaches of inculcating and modeling values always

were, and always will be, the predominant means of values education" (p. 772).

The social-cognitive approach of Albert Bandura (1977, 1986) offers us a clue to the

transmission processes at work during modeling or observational learning. For example, the

observation of a father's aggressive behavior and fighting amongst peers might encourage a

young boy to act aggressively. A young girl might observe her caring mother and play with dolls

resulting in later nurturing acts. Such environmental influences are similar to those important

factors considered by behaviorists such as Skinner, but the social cognitive approach also adds to

the equation personal cognitive factors that will be covered in the next section.

B.F. Skinner (1948) provided us with keen insights related to the behavioral-conditioning

and external-locus-of-control power of society:

Each of us has interests which conflict with the interests of everybody else.

That's our original sin, and it can't be helped. Now, "everybody else" we call

"society." It's a powerful opponent, and it always wins. Oh, here and there an

individual prevails for a while and gets what he wants. Sometimes he storms the

culture of a society and changes it slightly to his own advantage. But society wins

in the long run, for it has the advantage of numbers and age. Many prevail

against one, and men against a baby. Society attacks early, when the individual

is helpless. It enslaves him almost before he has tasted freedom. (p. 104)

The transmission approach hedonistically strives to keep tradition and links with the past

intact in a self-serving way to perpetuate its own influence. Process features are considered far

less important than the end-product outcomes. The principle of the end justifying the means can

be seen in this indoctrination approach. It seeks adherence to the behavioral and moral end

product without consideration of the motivational reasons for compliance. The gradual building

of internal cognitive control mechanisms is seen as a societal threat in terms of disrespect for the

past and a fear that the societal value system might be replaced. The questioning of the

relevancy or applicability of rules is met with disdain, and guilt is one primary weapon used to

keep an individual's behavior under proper social control. The transmission approach rejects

relativism (where right and wrong are not always clear due to contextual circumstances or

competing values) and instead opts for absolutism on the basis that personal cognitions threaten

its influential power and out of a fear of being superseded by an alternative value system.

   Values acquisition by way of the transmission approach provides a necessary, but not

sufficient, condition for mental health. It is entirely possible that a person might not move on to

the developmental values approach during the life-span. Marcia (1980) captured the essence of

this circumstance in his description of foreclosure individuals who "are committed to

occupational and ideological positions that are parentally chosen rather than self chosen" (p.

161). Mental health requires the ability to recreate these conscious/unconscious lessons of

childhood for the cognitive/emotional scrutiny of a more advanced and sophisticated process.

   Since values and morals are often associated with specific genders and powerfully

transmitted (consciously and unconsciously) through the socialization process, the exploration of

gender specific values and expectations is relevant to this paper. Gender roles (what it means to

be male and female) are socialized ideals transmitted to vulnerable children when they first learn

both what sex they are and that this fact is irreversible. Lupetow, Garovich-Szabo, and Lupetow

(2001), in a meta-analysis of many previous studies, presented findings that for the years

between 1974 and 1997 gender stereotypes "are not decreasing, if anything they are intensifying"

(p. 23). Such results downplay the impact of the sociocultural change model and more strongly

support an evolutionary model of sex-dimorphism resulting from biological predispositions. It

seems important to note that for the model proposed in this paper sex typing is still powerfully

transmitted perhaps through a complex interaction of biological and sociocultural factors.

Stage 2: Cognitive Developmental Approach [Internal Control Model]
Major Theorists/Proponents: (Dewey, Piaget, Bandura [self-efficacy], Kirschenbaum [values clarification], Freud [ego strength], Erikson [ego identity formation], Blos [individuation], Kohlberg, and Gilligan)

The process of individuation is seen as one way to conceptualize the adolescent striving

for individual uniqueness, self-control, self-responsibility, and finding one's own way in life.

Such adult maturity demands ego strength and dramatic changes in confronting life as compared

with childhood experiences. A parallel psychoanalytic interpretation of such a transition can be

seen in Erikson's theory where the adolescent is striving for ego identity through primarily the

use of conscious integration of childhood identifications into a new view of self and the world.

Around adolescence the individual is first capable of conducting a reflective examination

of his/her childhood learning in the values, beliefs, and morals domain. New cognitive skills

such as those described by Piaget and others and well over a decade of social experiences in and

out of the family setting set the stage for this life-review process. Since some values are

transmitted through unconscious (primary) processes, it is likely that getting a handle on this

transmitted value content can be very difficult. Of course, values which have been transmitted,

but cannot be dredged up for analysis, maintain a behavioral grip on us and make it theoretically

impossible to understand or modify. Any attempt to accomplish this task must rely upon making

the unconscious conscious, reflection, thinking, and conscious (secondary) integrative processes.

One approach that holds reflective promise has emerged from family therapy in the form

of having youth and adults create a detailed list of rituals, myths, and customs from their family

of origin (see Wolin, Bennett, & Noonan, 1976; Wamboldt & Wolin, 1988). That task leads a

person to write down in some detail his/her family rituals (topics might include issues of

membership, boundaries, habits, and gender roles) and influential myths (stories, legends, and

folk tales) whereby transmitted values can be more deeply explored and understood. Hints of

unconscious processes at work here are reflected in participants sometimes saying something

like: "I don't know why as a middle-aged male I still need to make my bed so perfectly…with

hospital corners every morning before I leave the house for work….Wait a minute, my father

was a sergeant in the Army, maybe that explains this!" Such "do's" and "don'ts" learned even

in early childhood can offer keen insights into current as well as past behaviors and open the

door for personal analysis, possible modification, and future behavioral change.

This is a unique chance (perhaps theoretically not the only chance, but likely the most

ideal chance) in the lifespan to re-build or re-shape one's life around an internal-locus-of-control

model, if one is prepared for challenging risk taking and reflection upon the lessons one learned

in childhood. It is as though the transmitted values and belief systems that helped a person

survive childhood are now no longer sufficient for adulthood. One key ingredient is ownership

of these values, since the fact that no child can choose his/her parents or family of origin means

that childhood values are not self-chosen. While we have few real personal value choices in

childhood, such choices and responsibilities in adulthood are dramatically expanded and even

demanded. A solid foundation of family values offers the adolescent the chance to discover

individual uniqueness (fidelity) while still maintaining connections to family heritage. That is

obviously a delicate balance and it would be hypothesized that an unduly harsh upbringing might

bring about the perceived need for greater autonomy (even an overreaction filled with overindulgence) and a too-lax (neglectful or indulgent) upbringing would offer few solid values upon which to build. The authoritative parenting style where a balance between freedom and limits/rules as well as discussions of such issues are maintained in a warm and nurturing environment seems to promote self-reliance and social competence (see Baumrind, 1971, 1991).

Gender stereotypes might be transmitted through various biological and sociocultural means ranging from genetic predisposition to modeling to identification (remember that identifications are at least in part unconscious). The cognitive developmental approach suggests that human beings are capable of rising above these stereotypical views of what biology and society suggest that males and females "should" be like. Here an internal locus of control would have to reign over external control mechanisms already established. The idealistic results might include a person who can transcend the stereotypes of what it means to be male or female based on earlier sex typing in order to establish an androgynous gender-role identity. Such flexibility might allow human beings to use care-based reasoning to confront interpersonal dilemmas *and* justice-based reasoning to confront societal dilemmas. Pleck (1983) proposed the use of a gender-role transcendence approach where, in competence situations, an individual should be judged as a "person" and not on the basis of masculinity, femininity, or androgyny.

The developmental approach functions on the principle that internal and external control mechanisms can peacefully coexist with cognition as the central guiding force. It is integrative rather than adversarial in nature. Cognition is also the primary thoughtful mechanism that allows situational (contextual) variables to guide behavioral choices when basic rules of proper behavior are in conflict with each other. The process mechanisms are considered an important cognitive feature, since critical thinking holds the power to reinvent or redesign values and beliefs.

Reasoning is considered valuable and honored in its own right for its ability to help the child, adolescent, or adult be adaptive and integrative, understand related factors such as emotions, and allow for changes during the lifespan. The reasons or rationale we offer both in private self-talk and for public scrutiny are considered prominent features. This means that such an approach to values acquisition can manage a dual focus on process *and* end product. For example, such cognitive abilities can help the individual spot instances where individual (personal) values and group (socialized) values conflict and figure out a rationale for selecting one behavioral response over another or even how to creatively satisfy the demands of both value systems.

Bandura (1997) has employed the motivational construct of self-efficacy to describe competence in life situations. He defined self-efficacy as "beliefs in one's capabilities to organize and execute the courses of action required to produce given attainments" (p. 3). The cognitive elements of this construct can guide a person in becoming more confident in using his/her cognitive skills, integrating personal values, changing self viewpoints, and acting in ways congruent with such values. Most recently, Bandura (2004) has written about how the technology of communications has used modeling as a key vehicle for the diffusion of ideas, values, and styles of behavior, but also has focused upon the self-directed and self-regulative cognitive processes that can counter such powerful social influences.

One common critique of Kohlberg was that he failed to adequately consider the influence of society on values development. The two-stage model described here helps us understand that Kohlberg was describing the "add-on" component that occurs primarily after the transmission approach has had its opportunity to inculcate values to the young. The developmental approach also allows for life-span developmental corrections (not only at adolescence), although such

modifications will be neither easy nor inevitable. At the mirco-level individuals and at the

macro-level societies might be able to employ the developmental process to reinvent themselves.

Case Interview Example

What does adolescent identity formation look like in a real person? How does this values

struggle play out in the human personality? The various theoretical references presented thus

far fail to capture how these warring values factions exist inside a human being. This section

will attempt to bridge such a gap and offer pragmatic insights. The following quotations from a

video-taped interview conducted by the author (Herman, 1986) will serve to illustrate several of

the points developed so far. The interview was done with an approximately 22 year-old female

Korean-American college student who was invited to come to the campus television studio to

speak about anything she wished (no mention of a topic was given). Readers should remember

that case study research offers rich details, but the widespread generalizability of such a finding

should be supported by other forms of research. I believe that Cecilia's adolescent experiences

depicted here are typical of other adolescents, but readers should document this for themselves.

Videotape Transcript Excerpts

Cecilia: "There was an adjustment that I had to go through when I started college…before I
started college and I guess you could say I'm still going through this right now…and that was
knowing that I ran my life and not my parents or my grandparents or my family."
Analytical Comments: Notice that Cecilia corrects herself with respect to when this

adjustment began which was well before the start of her collegiate career. Ownership and

boundary issues permeate this emotionally and intellectually based comment.

Cecilia: "Hey, these people are not living my life for me and I don't want them to. But I've let
them and it was a big adjustment for me to figure out: What do I want?... If I went along and
did what they expected of me—I still wouldn't know *me*!"
Analytical Comments: Cecilia continues to describe adolescent identity issues here and

frames the problem around personal ownership versus parental control. She expresses the

thoughtful realization that not confronting this crisis would mean the potential loss of

identity. Note the awareness of choices here and the helplessness of childhood where we

have no choice but to blindly allow our parents to make decisions for us. The risk

associated with not asking "What do I want?" is to deny self-discovery.

Cecilia: "Before [leaving home] I really didn't have to do anything—everything was all
thought-out for me. But now, I had to do the thinking and that there was a big adjustment."
Analytical Comments: Here we see that decision making was not a part of Cecilia's

childhood circumstance, but now things have changed. At least at the naïve surface level,

having someone make decisions for you allows you to escape the responsibility for decision

making. Unfortunately, this also leaves Cecilia rather unprepared as a young adult when

she must make her own responsible decisions without much practice in this domain.

Cecilia: "There's a sort of a happiness that goes along with it—to know that I'm in control of my
own life!"
Analytical Comments: Cecilia demonstrates how taking charge of her life has brought

her personal fulfillment and happiness. She also demonstrates a sense of pride in her

struggle and accomplishments. A sense of fidelity is established when Cecilia knows she

must accept the challenge and be true to herself in order to control her own life.

Cecilia: "Well, being the oldest, I was more or less like-- a mother to my younger brothers.…As
I got older too, I just realized: I'm doing my mom's job! Or They're not doing their job!...
Before, my parents were more or less gods!—they told everyone what to do, but the
person…well, the person couldn't question or ask as to why or have a different opinion."
Analytical Comments: Note that the discovery of what should be reasonably expected

from a daughter comes at adolescence and not during childhood. Her more advanced

cognitive capacity and richer social experiences help Cecilia make this discovery. It is as if

the child lacks the capacity to understand the powerlessness of childhood, but this insight

emerges more clearly in adolescence and resentment can occur as a result. A childhood

identification might be revealed here when she readily accepted the role of caring for her

brothers in later childhood without questioning its appropriateness as she is doing now

later in adolescence.

Cecilia: "I became so involved with my brothers, whatever happened to them happened to me. I became a nobody. I was everybody else but me…. I had no time to think about what I wanted. I was just so filled with a sense of duty and responsibility that I didn't have time to stop and think about: What do I want? When I did finally get around to thinking: What do I want to do? I thought that was sort of a selfish question."

Analytical Comments: Cecilia seems to describe a loss of personhood here—she is a

person who has been cut-off from her true self. The sense of duty and responsibility are

values that have been deeply etched into her personality (perhaps through childhood

identifications). Guilt seems to emerge when she begins to ask deeper questions about her

own future and search for her identity.

Cecilia's reference to her parents: "As much as I love then, I don't want to be like them."

Analytical Comments: Note the emotional tone of anger that results in a wish to reject

all the characteristics of her parents. Love seems to survive this acid test when it might be

expected that anger would give way to hate. At least hate does not seem to emerge at the

conscious level here. Cecilia also demonstrates the need for individuation here.

Cecilia: "I found out a lot of things about me that I never really knew. And sometimes it requires me to do some even more thinking. I can see that I have grown….And there were times when I just got so afraid of what might come or couldn't work through a problem, that I just wanted them to run my life. And then I recall, we tried that once, remember? I would rather work through these difficulties myself than go back and have somebody run my life. That I realize is much easier—you don't have to think!"

Analytical Comments: Cecilia is able to reflect on the self-discovery process here and

realize that the process of asking deeper and deeper questions really never ends. Note the

references to cognitive processes in terms of thinking, recalling, and self-monitoring. She

also offers insights into her fears that during difficult times it is tempting to return to the

child-like situation in which decisions will be made for a person and a person can escape

responsibility. Cecilia exhibits the courage to own her own life and realizes that the easiest way to survive life is not always the healthiest. The easier path in life (following parental wishes) describes foreclosure where commitment is made without a personal crisis.

Cecilia: "This didn't happen overnight; it took years for me to finally realize this!"

Analytical Comments: When Cecilia reflects upon her identity formation, she knows that it has been a long and arduous task that will continue on into adulthood. Yet she seems convinced that her quest has been both necessary and worthwhile.

Some Implications for Parents, Educators, and Others

What does this two-stage model mean for those who live and work with children and adolescents? How important are locus-of-control issues? Why might process versus product elements be so important? A few key points are identified here for the reader, but this is certainly not an exhaustive list of implications. Readers are encouraged to take the ideas presented here and seek additional ramifications based upon the theory and research referenced in this paper.

* Values and morals need to be effectively transmitted (from society) ***and*** developed (within a person, cognitively) in order for the individual to successfully confront the perplexing dilemmas in life and strive toward mental health.

* Self-control and self-monitoring is promoted best by the more cognitive-developmental approach. That is where individual responsibility is promoted and internal cognitive control is able to monitor transmitted external control mechanisms (some of which have been internalized).

* Rules in the home and classroom are primarily transmitted at first to children. Discussions regarding why those rules are important, exceptions to the rules, and conflicts between rules are best dealt with through the cognitive-developmental approach.

* How much children should be involved in the construction of household or classroom rules would seem to rely upon the nature of the rule, the child's level of cognitive maturity, and the child's willingness to pursue the developmental values approach. Note that most of these developmental strategies become moot if one is using a transmission approach to impart values.

* Self-discipline in adolescence is most easily attained when earlier childhood values have been established (good and bad behavior differentiated, rationale for judging good and bad outlined, and open communication [lack of defensiveness] promoted). Adolescence ideally allows one an opportunity for fine tuning one's personal values system rather than needing to scrap so much of one's childhood values (this might be difficult, due to unconscious influences) and designing an entirely new values and belief system.

* Since the developmental approach depends upon the values laid down in the transmission approach, a weak transmission foundation provides the adolescent with less to work with in the vices-and-virtues domain during adolescence.

* The extent to which individuals need to individuate (separate) themselves from their transmitted values/beliefs might vary depending upon their individual, familial, parental, gender, and social characteristics as they strive to become unique people. The extremes here of having too much attachment to parents or societal standards, on the one hand, and the need for too much separation from parents or societal standards, one the other hand, would seem problematic in this mentally healthy process. As Gilligan (1982) astutely noted: "Attachment and separation anchor the cycle of human life, describing the biology of human reproduction and the psychology of human development" (p. 151). Individuation empowers us as a change agent by giving us personal choices so that we can resist being enslaved by adherence to sex-role stereotypes and other societal expectations.

* The transmission approach produces behavior that is highly influenced by whoever holds power or authority over the person at a particular moment in time. Authoritarian parents may revel in pleasure when their children obey their strict rules, but be seriously disappointed when such children fail to stand up for themselves when they encounter other authority figures in life.

Concluding Remarks

My desire is that this paper might help the reader move toward a different conceptualization of values acquisition and moral development. As Herman (1997) suggested "we must pay attention to how, when, and why we choose to take a particular approach to promoting distinct values, in addition to which values we choose to impart" (p. 154).

This paper has paid homage to several major theories and forged a two-stage model of values transmission and values development that might integrate major psychological theories into a practical paradigm that clarifies several key points in the values acquisition process. I hope that as readers take the best ideas that psychological theory and research have to offer and find connections instead of the often-written-about distinctions, we can obtain new insights. Instead of juxtaposing and arguing about the preference for the transmission or development of values, this paper attempts to suggest that all of the theories mentioned here have their rightful place in the big picture of promoting positive values and moral behavior among children, youth, and adults in America. The model presented here would seem to apply to other industrialized societal settings, but only cross-cultural research could document this generalization. Perhaps this paper will be a unique contribution to the professional literature in promoting a truce among embattled theoretical camps that jockey for credibility and prominence in the public and professional arenas. In the end, it seems not only possible, but necessary, to value both the transmission and developmental approaches and understand how an integrated synthesis might promote remarkably different research paradigms, practical models, and more impressive results.

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