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ABSTRACT

This report presents findings and conclusions gleaned from a review of 42 cases of indigenous development in Latin America. Findings indicate that the lack of a legal framework for indigenous rights presents a basic obstacle to indigenous self-development; the most common aspect of successful indigenous development was involvement of indigenous peoples in the development and management of initiatives; and the way in which outside financial and technical assistance was provided was more important to project success than the availability of such assistance. Project failure was related to human rights problems, problems with the security of land and natural resources, lack of community involvement, and marketing problems. Project success was related to the level of necessary skills and knowledge, use of indigenous knowledge, cultural relevance, and successful marketing strategies. Recommendations for successful indigenous self-development focus on basic human rights; maintenance of food security; guarantees for property rights to land, water, and other natural resources; community involvement; maintenance of group solidarity, self-esteem, and cultural pride through bilingual education and literacy training; use of existing indigenous organizing principles; nonexploitative arrangements, appropriate economies of scale, and diversified production; appropriate types of financial assistance and technical assistance; and state support of indigenous self-development. Appendices present case matrices, a coding form, and a Venezuelan case study. (Contains 116 references.) (TD)

Indigenous People and Development in Latin America

A LITERATURE SURVEY AND RECOMMENDATIONS

J. Montgomery Roper
John Frechione
Billie R. DeWalt

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The map on page v was prepared by J. Greg Smith, a graduate student in the Department of Anthropology, University of Pittsburgh.

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Summary

This report represents an effort to synthesize some of the lessons that can be learned from a review of the literature on development directed toward indigenous peoples in Latin America. The goals are (1) to identify those characteristics underlying, enabling, or enhancing the success of such "positive" development projects; (2) to determine those conditions that are significant obstacles to development success; and (3) to extrapolate from this evidence to generate hypotheses and recommendations concerning the best practices for development efforts directed toward aiding indigenous development in the region.

In-depth **information on 42 specific cases of indigenous development in Latin America served as the basic source of data for analysis** and the generation of theory and proposals. The cases represent information from a large number of countries, involve a wide variety of development interventions, and include projects carried out among relatively isolated lowland indigenous groups as well as in "peasantized" indigenous communities. **Of the 42 cases, 28 are considered as basically successful, 8 are viewed as not successful or only nominally successful, and 6 are unclear in relation to outcomes.**

FINDINGS

The Legal Framework

The lack of a legal framework supporting and enforcing indigenous rights at numerous levels presents a basic and often insurmountable obstacle to indigenous self-development. The analysis indicates that:

- Variables associated with broader political-economic issues, primarily with **problems** related to human rights and the legal framework necessary for development, were significant to the failure of **75 percent** of the cases identified as unsuccessful.
- Problems concerning security over land and natural resources were significant to the failure of **63 percent** of the unsuccessful cases. It is interesting to note, however, that although usually seen as a basic prerequisite for successful indigenous development, issues concerning land and natural resource security contributed significantly to success in only **32 percent** of the successful cases. Land and natural resource security is a prerequisite, but by itself does not appear to significantly promote successful development.

Participation, Empowerment, and Self-Determination

While involvement of indigenous peoples at all stages of the development process helps to ensure that local priorities are addressed, what is most important to achieving maximum participation is that development plans are internalized by the participating group. **The most common thread that bound together successful cases of development, and was consistently discussed as important, was the presence or creation of indigenous organizations both at the local level and multicommunity level as a means by which indigenous peoples can be represented in the development process and manage development initiatives.** The analysis indicates that:

- Problems associated with overall community involvement in the development process, principally related to **lack of such involvement**, were primary factors involved in the **failure** of **63 percent** of the unsuccessful cases.
- The involvement of local and macrolevel indigenous organizations in the development process was significant to the **success** of development in **71 percent** of the successful cases. (Well-established indigenous organizations were seen to serve many roles—from political empowerment to project management.)
- Knowledge and skills necessary for the development project or program were significant to the **success** of **61 percent** of the successful cases. (Seventy-seven percent of these cases involved using or building on indigenous knowledge.)

•Issues concerning marketing and economies of scale were discussed as significant to the **success** of **55 percent** of the successful cases that involved marketing, and significant to the **failure** of **57 percent** of the poor cases that involved marketing.

•While many cases made no mention of cultural revaluation or ethnic strengthening, in **43 percent** of the successful cases it was discussed as central to development success.

Financial, Technical and State Support

In most successful and unsuccessful cases of development, outside financial and technical assistance was received—suggesting that while this is an important factor, assistance in itself is no guarantee of success. The analysis indicates that:

•Issues concerning the provision of financial and technical assistance were significant to the success of **64 percent** of the successful cases. (Examination of these cases, and the fact that financial assistance was provided in 71 percent of successful and 88 percent of unsuccessful cases and technical assistance in 89 percent of the successful and 88 percent of the unsuccessful cases, suggests that this significance depended more on how and for what such assistance was provided than simply on its availability.)

CONCLUSIONS

Indigenous peoples are different as a group because they share a history of colonial repression and are viewed as different by external power structures. Negative external categorizations of indigenous people continue, as do the abuses they suffer as a result of such views. Yet, there are many more distinctions than similarities among indigenous groups, and it is clear from the review of specific cases, and of the broader literature, that no general recipe exists from which successful cases of indigenous development have been produced. Each case is unique, with its own permutations and quirks, from the sociocultural aspects of the groups involved to the constantly changing national and global environments which establish important and sometimes crucial conditions that shape adaptations/developments.

Based upon this report, **preliminary recommendations for successful indigenous self-development** may be formulated and summarized as follows.

1. The basic human rights, including full rights as citizens; the right to vote, participate, and be represented in the political system; and the insurance of physical security, of indigenous peoples must be recognized and protected.
2. Food security, as an essential component of group health, must be maintained or enhanced by safeguarding activities appropriate to the indigenous culture, whether involving hunting, gathering, farming, fishing, animal husbandry, craft production, wage labor, or any combination thereof. Priority should be accorded to improving health conditions, including attention to potable water, appropriate sanitation measures, and disease prevention.
3. Secure (demarcated and definitively titled) property rights to land, water, and other natural resources must be obtained and guaranteed.
4. Development efforts oriented towards indigenous peoples must address local concerns and be compatible with autochthonous social, economic, and political systems. To ensure this, indigenous peoples should be involved in planning, implementing, and managing development initiatives.
5. Group solidarity, self-esteem, and cultural pride facilitate development programs and should be maintained or revitalized. Locally based bilingual education and literacy training are an important component in achieving this and are essential to helping provide the human capital for long-term autonomous development.

6. The formation of legally constituted management and coordinating organizations, to direct projects and to ensure representation and participation in the national systems, should be encouraged and should be based, when appropriate, on existing indigenous organizing principles.
7. In order to economically empower indigenous development efforts, there should be: freedom from exploitative labor and market arrangements; appropriate economies of scale and/or market niches; reinvestment of profits into the community and productive enterprises; and diversification of production, particularly towards value-added products.
8. Appropriate types of financial assistance, particularly nonpartisan aid provided with the potential for long-term commitment, should be provided to indigenous groups involved in development projects. For initial organizational and development efforts that often have little economic return, much of this assistance should come in the form of grants rather than loans.
9. Technical assistance and training programs or courses that are appropriate for the development activities being undertaken should be available to indigenous participants. Such assistance should be provided by organizations or individuals sensitive to cultural issues, knowledgeable about the targeted indigenous group, and who can commit long periods of time working with indigenous groups. The goal should be to establish the greatest degree of indigenous autonomy possible given the development activities.
10. Some level of support (even if benign neglect) for indigenous self-development by the state is critical to any chance for successful development by indigenous peoples.


UNITED STATES
MEXICO
CUBA
HAITI
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC
JAMAICA
BELIZE
HONDURAS
GUATEMALA
EL SALVADOR
NICARAGUA
PANAMA
COSTA RICA
VENEZUELA
GUYANA
SURINAME
French Guiana (France)
COLOMBIA
ECUADOR
PERU
BRAZIL
BOLIVIA
PARAGUAY
CHILE
ARGENTINA
URUGUAY
Amazon
MAP 1
Indigenous Development Case Locations
The numbers on the map correspond to the case numbers in Table 1
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0 500 1000 2000
KILOMETERS

I. INTRODUCTION

This report is an effort to systematically synthesize lessons learned from the literature on development ventures directed towards indigenous peoples in Latin America. The primary focus of our efforts has been to review examples that are reported to have had a positive impact on, or in some other way were perceived as benefitting, indigenous communities. Our goals have been: (1) to identify those characteristics underlying, enabling, or enhancing the success of such "positive" development projects; (2) to determine those conditions that are significant obstacles to development success; and (3) to extrapolate from this evidence to generate hypotheses and recommendations concerning the best practices for development efforts directed toward aiding indigenous development in the region.

A. Background

In general, indigenous peoples of Latin America may be defined as those who are the descendants of the human groups that inhabited the region prior to 1492 and who maintain, to varying degrees, unique cultures (often including a distinct language) and self-identifications. While such a designation might seem straightforward, applying it to particular cases can prove to be quite difficult. In an attempt to introduce more precision to the concept, the 1991 World Bank Operational Directive 4.20 on Indigenous Peoples defines indigenous people as "social groups with a social and cultural identity distinct from the dominant society." The directive rightly notes that "...because of the varied and changing contexts in which indigenous peoples are found, no single definition can capture their diversity....They engage in economic activities that range from shifting agriculture in or near forests to wage labor or even small-scale market-oriented activities." The directive suggests that the presence, to varying degrees, of the following characteristics may be used to identify indigenous peoples:

(a) a close attachment to ancestral territories and to the natural resources in these areas;
(b) self-identification and identification by others as members of a distinct cultural group;
(c) an indigenous language, often different from the national language;
(d) presence of customary social and political institutions; and
(e) primarily subsistence-oriented production.

While this refinement is helpful in some instances, it does, in fact, slight numerous indigenous peoples, such as those who have migrated to urban centers and created "ethnic" enclaves far from their ancestral territories and traditional subsistence-oriented productive activities.

It is our opinion that efforts to further refine the concept of "indigenous peoples" is rather fruitless. Suffice it to say that indigenous peoples in Latin America range from some of the most bereft and least healthy populations in the hemisphere to some of the "poorest" (in the sense of being relatively isolated from or marginalized within the monetary economy) but nutritionally healthy populations in the region. They include groups who are highly acculturated, "peasantized," or even urbanized peoples to relatively "traditional" autonomous nomadic groups or village-dwellers and every conceivable type in between. Indigenous groups in Latin America are more notable for their diversity than their similarity. **Consequently, attempts at generalizing about the approximately 40 million indigenous peoples in Latin America are extremely dubious.**

An additional complicating factor, in our estimation, is that many of those involved in indigenous affairs in Latin America (ranging from anthropologists to environmentalists to development agents

to indigenous persons themselves) tend to depict indigenous peoples in an overly romantic fashion, painting them in broad strokes in homogenous terms, characterizing them as environmental guardians, and making sweeping general recommendations (often in very paternalistic terms) about how to protect them from the ravages of Western un-"civilization." Many argue that these groups would fare far better if simply left alone by the larger society. It is, in part, this perspective that has led to the emphasis in indigenous development on "maintaining traditional sociocultural behaviors and beliefs." Some evaluators have gone so far as to deem projects as failures because they have led to changes in sociopolitical organization (see, for example, Arvelo-Jiménez and Perozo 1983 for cases in Venezuela). As Wolf (1982) has emphasized, however, all of these cultures have already been dramatically affected by the more than 500 years of contact with Europe and the rest of the world. For better, and mostly for worse, indigenous peoples have had their cultures altered by direct and indirect contacts with "more developed" societies. It seems clear that "development" will affect indigenous peoples. In our view, it is therefore critical to determine measures that will lead to positive outcomes of this development.

During most of the development era (circa 1950 to present), it may be said that development has generally had significant negative impacts on indigenous peoples in Latin America. In the main, this was because indigenous populations were ignored in development planning and happened to "be in the way" of development efforts (see, for instance, Bodley 1990, Burger 1987, and Davis 1977).

Official indigenous policies of Latin American states during the era were basically integrationist. **Integrationist** policy was designed to integrate the indigenous population into national society, making them citizens equal to the other inhabitants of the nation. Valdez et al. (1977:6) note that this reflects "...the image of Mexican indigenism, and in truth the Panamerican form, that began with the Indigenous Congress of Patzcuaro. It involves an integrationist policy which, by means of mechanisms fundamentally acculturative, strives to subtly erase the ethnic identity of the minority, to put an end to the languages and distinctive cultures and to dissolve these populations within the indifferent homogeneity of the national society." Application of this policy usually resulted in the creation of a new social class situated at the bottom of the social hierarchy, continuing to be exploited and remaining marginal to the society in general.

Regardless of official indigenous policy, most indigenous groups have been victims of state-directed **incorporationist** development approaches—based on geopolitical considerations and most often guided by the military. As Valdez et al. (1977:6) indicate, this approach is "...characterized by a superlative contempt towards the Indian, in which the Indian is considered primitive, subhuman, and totally lacking in the values necessary for the types of developments called for." Under this geopolitical development scheme, the frontier areas are to be intensively colonized by a civil and military population drawn from the national society. The ethnic groups of the area should be quickly eradicated, usually through integration, but if necessary through whatever means that result in the rapid colonization and incorporation of the area. Not only are the indigenous peoples of minimal consequence in this movement, but the possible negative ecological impact of the massive physical disturbances called for must also be overlooked in the interest of national security. The "development" of the Amazonian region of Brazil under the military regime (1964-1985) is the quintessential example of the "application" of this approach and its devastating effects on the indigenous inhabitants of the region (see Davis 1977).

As the pathetic plight of the indigenous groups impacted by development projects received widespread (often worldwide) attention, initiatives to "protect" them were launched. Some proindigenous advocates proposed a conservationist approach, recommending something akin to cultural zoological parks—creating reserves in which contacts between indigenous peoples and the outside world are minimized so that the traditional society could remain intact and in the "natural" equilibrium which is supposedly inherent in their sociocultural systems (the Xingu National Park in Brazil represents an attempt at this approach). Even the most isolated indigenous peoples in Latin America are exploiting introduced species, suffering from introduced diseases, and being affected by processes occurring in the larger society. More importantly, **indigenous peoples often desire greater interaction with western society**. Recognizing that most indigenous peoples are inextricably tied to broader social, political, and economic systems, and seeking to provide indigenous peoples with the tools and capabilities to manage this interaction for their own benefit, a group composed primarily of anthropologists (not indigenous peoples themselves) delineated the basis for what has become the standard underlying rationale for "indigenous development" in the 1971 Declaration of Barbados. The Declaration focused upon the concept of "**self-determination**." Fundamentally, the Declaration proposed that ingredients of self-determination included the securing of rights by the indigenous populations to follow and develop their own cultures and values, based on the guarantee of their traditional territories as inalienable collective property and the guarantee to be free to organize and govern themselves. It also was deemed necessary that the indigenous peoples be given full rights of citizenship in their respective nation-states and that they have financial assistance from the states for educational, social, health, and economic needs—with particular attention to compensation for damages inflicted from colonial and post-colonial activities.

Latin America still has many individuals and groups who advocate integrationist/incorporationist policies. Among enlightened observers, however, self-determination is seen to be the key goal of, and essential precondition for, indigenous development endeavors.

B. Theoretical Considerations

Improving development efforts aimed at indigenous peoples requires the establishment of a theoretical framework within which these efforts can be effectively analyzed and evaluated. From our perspective, **development** is an attempt to direct historical, social, and ecological evolutionary processes toward ends that are viewed as beneficial. Viewed within this context, "development" becomes a type of sociocultural evolution.

A useful starting point for the consideration of development in this vein is presented by Adams (1970:40-41), who notes that

> "Development has become the magic wand of contemporary civilization, but it becomes meaningful evolutionarily if seen as a sequence of changes a society may undergo that are advantageous to that society; it refers to events that will not only be specifically different for different societies, but which must, at some point, also become conflicting and competitive. If evolution is the universal process whereby life becomes more complex, development is the specific means whereby a given viable entity successfully improves its position with respect to its environment. If evolution involves cooperation and competition, natural selection and random variation, adaptation and destruction, then development also involves these very

> same processes. Both evolution and development involve experimentation on the part of a society with new ways of controlling the environment, new ways of organizing itself to adapt to the changing world, and new ways of exploiting both the social and natural resources within its reach. Development inherently requires social invention, both to improve the working of existing operating units and to spawn new units."

Adams (1970:42) concludes that "Development, therefore, implies destruction as well as expansion; not only the destruction of converting natural resources into waste, but also the destruction of one portion of society by another."

Consequently, development (in the sense of a process or processes of change that, hopefully, is/are advantageous to a society) may best be viewed as **semicontrolled sociocultural evolution**. Evolutionary processes in the sociocultural realm are continually occurring as culture-bearers adapt to interminable changes in the socionatural environment of which they are part. This constant adaptation is based largely on the particular configuration of traits that constitute a group's sociocultural system at any one time and the behavioral variation present in all such systems (see Bennett 1976:270; DeWalt 1991:62-64). With regard to indigenous peoples, there are two important implications of the above. First, indigenous peoples are not "tradition-bound" societies but have been continually changing their individual behavior and cultures in order to better survive in their natural and social environment. Second, in these terms, development is an attempt to provide an expanded repertoire of options to indigenous peoples—if you will, increasing the variation within the cultural system.

As sociocultural evolution continues, the configuration and makeup of the traits change. Therefore, what is "traditional" now is different from what was "traditional" then and what will be "traditional" tomorrow. Development agents try to control—to some degree—the outcome of change (i.e., the desired development) at a particular juncture in the process. Semicontrol over the process is attempted by making the socionatural environment more benign through sentient modification (such as providing financial support, guaranteeing traditional territories as inalienable collective property, securing full rights of citizenship for the target group in the respective nation-states, providing training and technical assistance, etc.). Development, then, is considered successful or not successful depending on whether or not it approximates to some degree the preconceived desired outcomes of the development agents or, by some measure, proves to be "advantageous" to portions of the targeted population. In evolutionary terms, the overall process that is occurring is selection. The interaction between variation and selection results in changes in cultural traits—either through adaptation or extinction (Greenwood 1984).

Seen from this perspective, development is still very unpredictable and will have "winners" and "losers," both at the level of sociocultural groups as well as within the targeted sociocultural groups. For example, the *Federación de Centros Shuar/Achuar*—generally considered one of the most successful instances of indigenous development in the region—illustrates effects at both levels. At the interethnic level, the success of the Shuar Federation in obtaining a significant degree of land security and subsequent economic and political power has been achieved largely at the expense of the colonists expanding into the area from the highlands of Ecuador. The sense of "loss" experienced by the colonists was clearly illustrated when they burned one of the Salesian mission buildings in Sucúa in 1969 (Salazar 1977:24)—the Salesians were viewed as the principal western

supporters of the Shuar Federation. At the intraethnic group level, some individual Shuar have become more "successful" (in economic terms) than other Shuar and have decided that a better adaptive strategy for themselves would include the division of communal land rights. This, in turn, would threaten the very basis of the Federation, which served as an important condition for their success in the first place (see Bebbington, et al. 1992:17).

Within this framework, **self-development** becomes an idiom for a desired outcome process that is identified by a particular degree of decision-making power vested in the targeted group. As originally proposed in its ideal form in the Declaration of Barbados (IWGIA 1971), self-development enables the indigenous community to be the prime mover in its own destiny and not just a pawn to be directed by outside agencies, be they paternalistic or blatantly anti-indigenous. The self-determinationist position recognizes the oppression to which the indigenous populations of the Americas, and the world in general, have been subjected and proposes the recognition of the rights of the natives to evolve their own strategies of development in the economic and political realms, without having to adopt patterns of development mirroring those of the larger economic and sociopolitical structure of which they find themselves a part at any particular point (Vallenilla 1976:15-16). As Valdez (1977:6-7) indicates, "This is to say, that the native—and only the native at the same time as he is liberating himself from the colonial and neocolonial ties that continue to oppress him—will be able to redefine his situation in the national context, to determine the necessity and the rhythm of economic and technological changes that might be required, and to define the meaning and manner of his participation in the national system." According to Henriksen (1989:14) "[s]elf-determination is the potential for a people to control their own destinies and self-development is the way in which this unfolds."

Practically, self-development must function within a larger system of economic, political, and social concerns and will, generally, not adhere to the ideal proposed above. For example, one precondition for self-development is that assistance presented to the indigenous group be unconditional (that is, as unencumbered and nonpartisan as possible). By attempting to ensure this type of aid, the aid-providers are reconfiguring the socionatural environment to which the aid-receivers adapt and seeking to increase the odds that the desired outcome will follow. The constraints and possibilities of the system are changed so that the choices of the majority of individuals in the target group will shift in the "proper" direction.

Within the evolutionary framework, the ideal manner to assist self-development is by removing as many constraints as possible, thus giving the target group the widest latitude for making decisions. The oft-stated, hoped-for result is that the decisions will be based on "traditional" frameworks and function to retain more of the traditional flavor of the sociocultural system. However, no matter what the degree of restraints and possibilities in the socionatural environment, decisions will be based on constraints and possibilities prevailing ("traditional") in the indigenous sociocultural system at the time of decision-making. Simply put, particular configurations of constraints/possibilities will result in particular types of decisions. Nonetheless, creating a more benign environment for adaptation by removing perceived constraints will not necessarily result in maintenance of "traditional" values and organizational styles. In fact, **the likely result of increasing the latitude of the decision-making sphere (by removing constraints and expanding possibilities) is even less predictability in outcomes**. For those seeking cultural retention and maintenance, this represents the "danger" of true self-development.

In the final analysis, self-development is often used as a term for differentiating bottom-up from top-down development planning and implementation. Within the present theoretical framework, it might best be seen as including the indigenous group in decisions to reconfigure (through participation in planning and implementation) the socionatural environment that is the setting for adaptation/development and cultural evolution.

C. Methodology

The primary goal of this research was to identify and organize lessons learned from literature on specific development efforts among indigenous peoples in order to generate some broader lessons that could be applied to indigenous development in general. Our goal was not to synthesize the theory or rhetoric concerning what is necessary to achieve positive indigenous development (and there is considerable literature of this type), but rather to try to generate such theory through an analysis of specific cases.

In order to help identify variables and issues around which to organize data collection, we initially reviewed some of the major theoretical and substantive literature concerning indigenous peoples. From these sources, and from our own experiences in teaching about and working with indigenous communities, we produced a review form categorized into major factors that enhance or inhibit development among indigenous peoples. After reviewing several cases with this form, a revised matrix was developed to organize significant information from cases into 19 categories of data. Appendix 1, page A1.1, provides a sample of this matrix, with a more detailed explanation of what types of information were gathered under each category.

We then began systematically collecting cases. A focus was placed on identifying examples in which specific development interventions were made with the goal of benefitting indigenous peoples and which were successful in providing such benefits. To complement this and provide a more complete understanding of the variables affecting positive development projects, specific cases also were examined that did not achieve their goals or that had negative impacts on indigenous participants, as well several cases of development that occurred spontaneously or autonomously among indigenous peoples.

In gathering cases we sought to represent some of the more well-known examples of indigenous development (such as the Shuar, Kuna, and Kayapo), as well as to find information on less well-known cases. In addition to standard literature search procedures, we published an appeal for cases on such electronic mail networks as the Environment in Latin America (ELAN) list, Applied Anthropology (ANTHAP) list, and the Rainforest list, with appeals to forward our request for information to other appropriate lists. The relative lack of response to our request for information indicates that few actual systematic studies of development efforts among indigenous peoples are being done. The most common response we received was an eagerness to see the final results of our study. One major result of our efforts to represent less well-known cases was the information on the Venezuelan Indigenous Development Program, summarized in Appendix 3. The vast majority of literature to come out of the searches, however, did not provide detailed information on specific cases. The majority of cases that we were able to collect came from two main sources—efforts

financed and/or reported by the Inter-American Foundation and Cultural Survival.[1] While we acknowledge the problems raised by relying so heavily on these sources of information, we believe that our findings still provide important lessons for development practitioners and indigenous advocates, and more importantly serve as a starting point for more detailed future studies.

These efforts resulted in the collection of some detailed "codeable" information on 42 specific cases. These cases served as the foundation for the generation of theory and proposals related to indigenous development that are presented in this report. The cases represent information from a large number of countries (see Map 1), involve a wide variety of development interventions, and include projects carried out among relatively isolated lowland indigenous groups as well as in "peasantized" indigenous communities—whose members differ little (except for some maintenance of ethnic identity) from neighboring mestizo or criollo communities. Table 1 presents a list of the indigenous groups, very brief ethnographic characterizations of the groups, general locations, the types of development, the case number used to refer to the group/case throughout the text, and the information sources that were examined for these 42 cases. Appendix 1 contains the data matrices for these cases. In addition to these 42 cases, we examined numerous other cases for which only limited data were available, as well as literature on development theory and general information on several indigenous groups. Nevertheless, we must admit to a certain degree of frustration and disappointment that so few detailed analyses of development efforts among indigenous peoples have been done. **Despite decades of work by anthropologists and others, most work with indigenous peoples is lacking in policy-oriented inquiry about measures that might conceivably have a positive impact on their lives.**

[1] Reviewers of an initial draft of this report suggested that there is more data available than we found. While this is likely true, time and financial limitations placed on the preparation of this report precluded our being able to thoroughly investigate some types of sources. For example, such an investigation would necessitate visits to development-promoting organizations to review—*if permitted*—their documentation of evaluations—*if existing*.

TABLE 1: Indigenous Groups and Cases Examined

Indigenous Group or Community	Ethnographic Characteristics	Country & Region	Development Project(s) or Nature of Development	Case No.	Level of Success	Source(s)
Achuar	Lowland tropical forest group. Horticulture, hunting & gathering.	Peru, lowland	Land demarcation	1	unclear	Reed 1987
		Ecuador, lowland	Cattle ranching	34	poor	Kroeger and Barbira-Freedman 1988
Ayoreode (some Chiquitano)	Lowland tropical forest community of 170 living at a mission station.	Bolivia, Dept. of Santa Cruz, Zapoco	Logging, & agricultural promotion	2	good	Reed 1987; Davis 1985
Bari	Tropical forest shifting cultivators.	Venezuela	Saimadoyi Indigenous Enterprise	3	good	Gouveia 1989
Chinantec	Forest dwelling peasants.	Sierra Juarez, Oaxaca	Forestry development & organization building	4	good	Bray 1991a
	Relocated to become isolated forest peasants. Cattle & shifting subsistence farming.	Mexico, Isthmus of Tehuantepec	Government resettlement, & introduction of intensive agriculture	5	poor	Gates 1988
Chiquitano	Lowland tropical forest group.	Bolivia, Lomerio, El Puquio	Lomerio Forest Management Project, & agricultural development	6	poor	Chase-Smith 1993
Colombian Indians[2]		Colombia, Cauca Province	Cauca Regional Indian Council forestry project	7	poor	Chernela 1987; MacDonald 1987

[2] While it known that the Paez and Guambiano were primarily responsible for organizing the Cauca Regional Indigenous Organization (case 25), it was not entirely clear which indigenous groups were involved with this particular project.

Table 1
(continued)

Indigenous Group or Community	Ethnographic Characteristics	Country & Region	Development Project(s) or Nature of Development	Case No.	Level of Success	Source(s)
Cuatro Pinos cooperative	Highland peasants. Intensive small-scale agriculture & subsistence farming	Guatemala, Santiago Sacatepéquez municipio	Production for export of nontraditional vegetable crops	8	good	von Braun et al. 1989; Immink and Alacorn 1993
Emberá		Panama, eastern	Mapping Project	9	good	Chapin 1994
Guambiano		Colombia	Organization of Regional Indian Council of the Cauca, & land security measures	25	good	Bodley 1990
Huasteca	Peasants.	Mexico, Veracruz	Development efforts of Organización Campesina Popular Independiente de la Huasteca Veracruzana (OCPIHV).	10	good	Ariel De Vidas 1993
Jalq'a	Isolated highland Andean peasants. Weaving & subsistence farming.	Bolivia, town of Irupampa	Reintroduction & marketing of traditional weaving.	11	good	Healy 1992
Kayapo	Lowland Amazon tropical forest group. Horticulture, hunting, & gathering.	Brazil, Xingu	Struggles for land & associated income producing efforts.	12	good	Cummings 1990; Fisher 1994; Maybury-Lewis 1989; Schmink and Wood 1992

Table 1
(continued)

Indigenous Group or Community	Ethnographic Characteristics	Country & Region	Development Project(s) or Nature of Development	Case No.	Level of Success	Source(s)
Kuna Yala	High degree of cultural & political autonomy. Cash cropping, subsistence farming, & textile production.	Panama, Eastern Coast	Mapping Project	9	good	Chapin 1994
			Mola textile production & marketing	13	good	Stephen 1991
			Project PEMASKY, for the protection, study & management of the tropical forests.	14	unclear	Breslin and Chapin 1984; Wright et al. 1988
			Tourism part of project PEMASKY	15	poor	Chapin 1990
Mam	Peasants.	Mexico, Chiapas	Organic Coffee	16	good	Bray 1991b
Mapuche	Peasant herders & subsistence agriculturalists in the dry Andean foothills.	Argentina, Neuquén province	Organization of cooperative stores, & Asociación de Comunidades Mapuches Neuquines	17	good	Breslin 1989
Maya	Diverse peasant communities.	Guatemala, San Marcos, town of San Pedro	Commercial development & modernization, largely in weaving industry.	18	good	Ehlers 1990; Smith 1977
		Mexico, Quintana Roo	Forestry Pilot Plan of Quintana Roo	19	good	Bray et al. 1993
		Mexico, San Cristobal	Ethnic tourism	20	poor	van den Berghe 1995
Mazahua	Peasants. Pottery & subsistence agriculture.	Mexico, State of Mexico	Pottery marketing.	21	good	Papousek 1981

Table 1
(continued)

Indigenous Group or Community	Ethnographic Characteristics	Country & Region	Development Project(s) or Nature of Development	Case No.	Level of Success	Source(s)
Mojeño (& Chimanes, Yuracarés, Movimas)	Lowland tropical forest. Horticulture, hunting & and gathering.	Bolivia, Beni Department, Chimanes Forest	Organization of Central de Pueblos Indígenas del Beni, & struggle for indigenous territory.	22	good	Lehm 1993; Jones 1991
Nahuatl	Peasants. Craft producers & agriculturalists.	Mexico	Craft production & sales (amate bark painting)	23	good	Stephen 1991
Otevaleños	Highland Andean peasants. Textile production & farming.	Ecuador	Textile production & marketing	24	good	Stephen 1991
Paez		Colombia	Organization of Regional Indian Council of the Cauca, & land security measures	25	good	Bodley 1990
Pluma Hidalgo Cooperative	Peasants.	Mexico, Oaxaca	Organic Coffee	26	unclear	Carter 1996
Pume (Yaruro)	Peasantized shifting cultivators/hunters-gatherers of savanna.	Venezuela	Kumani Indigenous Enterprise (and relocation)	27	poor	Gouveia 1989
Purépecha (or Tarascans)	Peasant communities.	Mexico, Michoacan, New San Juan Parangaricutiro	Organization of New San Juan Coop, & community forestry program	28	good	Icaza 1993
Quechua-speakers	Highland Andean peasants, terraced subsistence farming, weaving, and tourism.	Peru, Taquile Island, Lake Titicaca	Weaving & Tourism	29	good	Healy and Zorn 1983

Table 1
(continued)

Indigenous Group or Community	Ethnographic Characteristics	Country & Region	Development Project(s) or Nature of Development	Case No.	Level of Success	Source(s)
Quechua	Diverse highland Andean peasants.	Ecuador, Chimborazo province	Education Fair & its inspiration of literacy programs, & cultural revaluation.	30	good	Kleymeyer and Moreno 1988
Runa[3]	Lowland, tropical forest group. Horticulture, hunting & gathering. Also ranching.	Ecuador	Forestry Management (as part of project LETIMARIN - Land Titling and Resource Management Project), through organization FOIN	31	good	Jahnige 1989; MacDonald 1992
		Ecuador, Napo Region	Program for Use & Management of Natural Resources (PUMAREN), a continuation of LETIMARIN	32	unclear	Shiguango et al. 1993
Sanema		Venezuela	Intercommunity Enterprise of Tujumoto	39	good	Heinen (various)

[3] Runa are also referred to as Quichua in many writings.

Table 1
(continued)

Indigenous Group or Community	Ethnographic Characteristics	Country & Region	Development Project(s) or Nature of Development	Case No.	Level of Success	Source(s)
Shuar	Lowland, tropical forest group. Horticulture, hunting & gathering. Also ranching.	Ecuador, Eastern Lowlands	Organization of Shuar Federation, & development efforts	33	good	Bodley 1990; Federación de Centros Shuar 1976; Harner 1972; Hendricks 1988; 1991; Salazar 1977; 1981; Zallez and Gortaire 1978.
			Specifically cattle ranching	34	poor	Kroeger and Barbira-Feedman 1988
Tojolobales	Peasants.	Mexico, Chiapas	Organic Coffee	35	unclear	Murphy 1995
Tzeltal	Peasants. "Exceed all other Indian municipalities in highland Chiapas...in indices of acculturation (p.255)."	Mexico, Chiapas	Agricultural & social development following conversion to protestantism	36	good	Turner 1979
Wounaan		Panama, eastern	Mapping Project	9	good	Chapin 1994
Yanesha	Lowland, tropical forest tribal group. Horticulture, hunting & gathering.	Peru, Amazon	Creation of Yanesha Forestry Cooperative (COFYAL), & wood-manufacturing	37	unclear	Lázaro et al. 1993; Stocks 1988

Table 1
(continued)

Indigenous Group or Community	Ethnographic Characteristics	Country & Region	Development Project(s) or Nature of Development	Case No.	Level of Success	Source(s)
Yekuana	Lowland, tropical forest tribal group. Horticulture, hunting, & gathering.	Venezuela	Makiritari Union of the Upper Ventuari, Indigenous Enterprise	38	good	Frechione 1981
			Intercommunity Enterprise of Tujumoto	39	good	Heinen 1979; 1983-1984; Heinen and Coppens 1981; 1986; Heinen et al. 1981
Zapotec	Isolated peasant communities.	Mexico, Oaxaca, Quiatoni Region	Integrated resource management	40	poor	Peasant Solidarity Group of Quiatoni and Martinez 1992
	Peasant community of 5,000+. Mostly weavers with part time farming.	Mexico, Teotitlan de Valle	Weaving, crafts, & tourism	41	good	Stephen 1987; 1991; 1992
	Highland peasant forest communities.	Mexico, Oaxaca, Sierra Juarez	Organization of Unión de Comunidades y Ejidos Forestales de Oaxaca, S.C. (UCEFO), & Forestry Management	42	good	Arzola and Fernández 1993; Castañeda 1992

II. ANALYSIS

Table 1 notes—for the 42 cases on which detailed information was collected—those 28 cases that we considered successful (presented as good under "level of success"), those 8 that were unsuccessful or only minimally successful (presented as poor), and those 6 cases that we were unable to categorize (presented as unclear). Classifying cases as successful or unsuccessful was in no way a precise endeavor. For most projects in which the goal was to benefit the indigenous participants, some benefits could be identified. Yet, for the purposes of analysis of individual variables it was necessary to try to separate the data into relatively successful and relatively less successful cases, which also include those few that could be considered real failures. The detailed matrices (Appendix 1) provide an explanation for each case of the bases of the judgement. In general, the categorization of a development project as successful was based on the perspective of the indigenous peoples involved and the reporter's presentation. If such perspectives were not clear, relative success was based on our analysis of the degree to which the project achieved stated objectives and its costs and benefits in terms of such variables as income, health, cultural stability, and political empowerment. In some cases, development events were judged as successful by one author, but not by another. Cattle ranching among the Shuar of Ecuador provides such an example—perceived, on the one hand, as an instance of successful indigenous economic development and, on the other, as a threat to the solidarity of the indigenous organization, the health of the population, and the natural environment. In such cases, attempts have been made to distinguish those characteristics that enabled the beneficial aspects from those that resulted in nonbeneficial aspects, in order to present both perspectives. **In general, the level of success was based only on the reported state of a project for the time period covered by the article(s). We have not attempted to attach our own long-term technical, social, or environmental perspective to projects or make assumptions concerning sustainability**.

In order to help organize the information collected under the somewhat broad matrix categories, a coding form was developed to enter specific pieces of information into a database, using DBaseIII. The coding form is presented in Appendix 2. For each of the 42 cases, 128 specific pieces of data were addressed. By using the coding form, we attempted to identify individual issues that had presented themselves as significant in various cases or that were thought to have a potential influence over development success. While some very basic data analysis was performed, the primary goal of this endeavor was to further organize the data in an effort to observe the relative frequency and effect of specific variables. **While it would have been interesting to perform multivariate controlled analysis to more precisely examine the relationship between variables, the data were not sufficiently robust for such analysis. For much of the literature, many of the specific questions were not addressed so that considerable data were missing**.

In an effort to help identify significant categories of data or sets of issues, the coding form was broken down into the same basic categories of information as the matrix. At the beginning of each category, entry was made on whether any variable or set of variables in that category were discussed by the source as having a significant positive or negative impact on the success of development. Data on issues concerning creation of social space, cultural revaluation, or ethnic strengthening were only entered for positive impacts. This "overview" of the data is presented in Table 2. Both successful and relatively unsuccessful cases had factors that significantly contributed to and inhibited

the success of the project. Positive and negative impacts do not add up to 100 percent within either set of cases (good and poor) because in all cases there were some sets of variables that were not presented as significant to success or failure. In some cases, a single set of variables could be seen to have a significant positive and negative affect on a project at the same time; for example, if a government provided significant support, but civil unrest undermined the project.

While there are several sets of variables and a small number of specific variables that stand out as significant, what became most striking from the data analysis was the lack of a clear set of specific factors that could be associated with successful cases. This reflects the diversity and complexity of indigenous development and the lack of any real "blueprint" to guide development efforts. Rather, it is largely the basic areas of concern, represented by the sets of variables presented in Table 2, that must serve as the starting point for discussions about indigenous development.

In the following sections, we provide a fuller description of the results of our analysis. We will highlight the main recommendations that arise from this analysis, provide an overview of our findings, and include several examples that illustrate both the problems and the potential that exist relative to each factor.

Where data are presented for any particular variable, cases are given only when a definitive affirmative answer was established in the literature examined. In many cases, data could not be recorded due to lack of information available in the particular source(s). While many non-answers may have represented "nos," they were only entered as such when this was clear (which was seldom). For this reason, data for negative responses to the coding form were not given. Finally, it is recognized that some non-answers may actually be affirmatives, so cases may not be presented as evidence of a variable when in fact they are.

Table 2: Impacts on Success of Project

Variables	Impact	Cases with good success (n=28)	Cases with poor success (n=8)
Factors surrounding degree of acculturation (language, subsistence activities, participation in external markets, strong ethnic identity).	Pos	36% (1, 3, 18, 22, 23, 24, 29, 33, 36, 41)	25% (20, 27)
	Neg	7% (3, 30)	25% (27, 34)
Factors concerning tenure and security over land and/or resources.	Pos	32% (1, 2, 3, 4, 28, 31, 33, 38, 42)	13% (34)
	Neg	14% (3, 30)	63% (5, 6, 7, 27, 34)

Table 2 (cont.)

Variables	Impact	Cases with good success (n=28)	Cases with poor success (n=8)
Country background factors (presence of violence, civil unrest, state of economy, government policy, and govt actions).	Pos	39% (1, 3, 8, 10, 18, 19, 28, 33, 36, 38, 39)	13% (20)
	Neg	11% (25, 33, 38)	75% (5, 7, 15, 20, 27, 34)
Knowledge and skills necessary for project, program, or development.	Pos	61% (2, 3, 4, 8, 11, 13, 16, 18, 21, 23, 24, 30, 31, 33, 38, 41, 42)	13% (20)
	Neg	4% (38)	25% (5, 27)
Technology involved with project, program, or development.	Pos	32% (2, 13, 11, 16, 17, 21, 24, 33, 41)	0%
	Neg	0%	50% (5, 6, 15, 40)
Local and macro-level indigenous organizations involved in project.	Pos	71% (1, 2, 4, 8, 9, 10, 13, 17, 19, 22, 23, 24, 25, 28, 29, 31, 33, 38, 41, 42)	25% (7, 34)
	Neg	7% (38, 39)	25% (6, 27)
Issues concerning creation of social space, cultural revaluation, or ethnic strengthening.	Pos	43% (10, 11, 13, 17, 19, 23, 24, 29, 30, 33, 36, 41)	13% (20)
Financial and technical assistance provided in the development process.	Pos	64% (2, 3, 4, 8, 9, 10, 11, 17, 19, 22, 28, 30, 31, 33, 36, 38, 39, 42)	25% (7, 20)
	Neg	7% (19, 33)	38% (5, 6, 27)

Table 2 (cont.)

Variables	Impact	Cases with good success (n=28)	Cases with poor success (n=8)
Issues concerning marketing and economies of scale.	Pos	43% (8, 11, 13, 16, 17, 19, 21, 23, 24, 38, 41, 42)	0%
	Neg	4% (19)	50% (5, 6, 15, 40)
Responsibility for, and community involvement in, the development of project ideas.	Pos	18% (11, 17, 25, 33, 38)	0%
	Neg	0%	38% (3, 27, 34)
Responsibility for, and community involvement in, the setting of project priorities and agendas.	Pos	7% (25, 31)	0%
	Neg	4% (19)	25% (5, 20)
Responsibility for, and community involvement in, project management.	Pos	21% (25, 28, 29, 31, 33, 42)	0%
	Neg	7% (38, 39)	50% (5, 6, 20, 27)
Issues concerning overall community involvement.	Pos	46% (2, 3, 11, 19, 25, 28, 29, 30, 31, 33, 38, 41, 42)	0%
	Neg	7% (4, 39)	63% (20, 40, 6, 7, 5)

A. The Legal Framework: Human Rights, Individual Security, and Land

In much of Latin America, there has existed a social, political, and legal atmosphere that presents a severe obstacle to indigenous self-development. This environment represents a remnant of colonial repression of indigenous peoples and a continued lack of respect for indigenous human rights and their rights as full citizens (Durston 1993; Psacharopoulos and Patrinos 1994). It manifests itself in the violence and lack of personal physical security that indigenous peoples must endure; the malnutrition, undernutrition, and lack of adequate health services that are much too common to

indigenous communities; and the lack of security over lands and resources on which indigenous peoples live and must often serve as the basis for both subsistence and economic endeavors. While some indigenous peoples have overcome these obstacles to pursue self-development initiatives, the removal of these barriers is essential to provide an atmosphere in which a more widespread and secure indigenous development can take place. As Table 2 indicates, of eight cases with poor success for which information was available, six (5, 7, 15, 20, 27, 34) were negatively impacted by adverse conditions represented by the cluster of variables categorized as *country background factors* (most of which fall under the rubric of the legal framework addressed here). What has become increasingly apparent is that **establishing a legal framework that guarantees the basic human rights of indigenous peoples and secure rights to land and other resources is an essential first step in development. An essential second step is insuring that these legal frameworks are enforced and that indigenous people have effective recourse when they make use of the legal system.**

1. Human Rights and Individual Security

Our case studies did not provide much specific evidence concerning the relationship between fundamental human rights and indigenous development. Yet, an examination of the broader literature and history of indigenous development strongly suggests that a certain level of human rights recognition (including guarantee of physical security, food security, and health security) is a fundamental precondition for indigenous development. As MacDonald (1987:41) notes, "...for those tribal people and ethnic minorities who hope to benefit from their own initiatives, economic improvement and human rights often are inseparable."

a. Physical Security

For development to prosper, violence and repression against indigenous peoples must be ended and indigenous peoples provided with a secure environment within which to pursue development interests. While the recognition of indigenous human rights has markedly improved over the last several decades, throughout Latin America violence and repression are still all-too common. Civil wars and uprisings, political instability, the drug trade, and violence directed at indigenous peoples contribute to a range of contemporary human rights abuses and promote a general atmosphere of physical insecurity. Under such conditions, sustained development is improbable and often impossible. In addition to the obvious threats to life and liberty, violence and repression can: harm indigenous dignity and self-confidence; forcibly separate indigenous peoples from their means of production; stifle local organization; prevent implementation of assistance programs; prevent both internal and external investment in productive alternatives; cut off access to markets; and preoccupy governments. Such an atmosphere existed in Guatemala in 1986 when Cultural Survival surveyed the situation of Indians to evaluate the potential for development assistance. It was found that while Indians were in dire need of assistance, political conditions and the memories of recent violence that had accompanied attempts to organize made it impossible to provide direct development assistance (MacDonald 1987:41-42).

In 5 of the 14 cases (7, 20, 27, 35, 37) of development examined in which the outcomes were unclear or poor, development efforts were disrupted or undermined by the presence or outbreak of violence and civil unrest. In San Cristobal, Mexico, ethnic tourism among the Maya was disrupted by the Zapatista uprising in 1993-94 (van den Berghe 1995), which also caused many Tojolobales in

(Goodland 1982). High rates of sickness and disease sap the social energy necessary in a community to pursue development alternatives and, in some cases, can completely decimate communities. Most indigenous communities are interested in gaining access to western health care (IWGIA 1989). **Introduced health care systems should be incorporated with traditional systems and provided without preconditions.** Kroeger and Barbira-Freedman (1988:233), who examined the negative nutritional and health impacts of modernization among the Shuar, state that what is needed is the "...training of local health workers able to bridge the cognitive gaps between primary healthcare and traditional healing systems." When tied to preconditions, such as political support or involvement in development programs, health care systems can divide communities and lead to resentment against the state. This was observed among the Zapotec of the Quiatoni region of Oaxaca, for example, who complain that the Rural Clinic of the Mexican Social Security Institute does not provide consultation or medicines to groups that do not meet the goals laid down by specific development projects (Peasant Solidarity Group of Quiatoni and Martinez 1992).

c. Food Security

The ability to maintain a diet of sufficient caloric and nutritional value—or food security—will also often be a precondition to, and should be a goal of, development efforts. Where sufficient economic stability exists, food security can be achieved through nonsubsistence activities. Undernutrition and malnutrition also shift peoples' focus from the potential of the near future to the necessities of the immediate present and constrain the community energy that is necessary to pursue development alternatives. Some argue that autonomous development should seek to recover self-sufficiency, primarily by strengthening traditional subsistence strategies (Chase-Smith 1987). Subsistence-based self-sufficiency, however, was identified as a main goal by development planners (including indigenous planners) in only 4 of 42 cases reviewed (2, 27, 36, 40). While subsistence self-sufficiency may be appropriate for a small number of isolated tribal groups, it is unrealistic for the vast majority of Latin America's indigenous population. Many indigenous groups have been involved in trade and market economies for hundreds of years and are highly peasantized. In addition, increasing population and decreasing availability of land necessitates that not all communities can subsist from the produce of their own land. This is already the case in highland and peasant communities throughout Latin America (Bebbington 1996; von Braun et al. 1989; Smith 1977). For most of Latin America's indigenous population, food security involves garnering sufficient income from productive activities to supplement any subsistence activities (See Box 2). It is for this reason that food security (as opposed to self-sufficiency) should be emphasized as a goal.

Economic stability can be critical to communities that rely on marketing goods for food security. Where such stability is insecure, communities that maintain high degrees of food production in addition to pursuing other economic strategies will maintain greater food security as economic conditions fluctuate. In communities with little participation in market economies and little access to markets (such as some lowland groups), food security may involve ensuring sufficient access to land and natural resources.

Chiapas to flee their homes, abandoning organic coffee crops that were part of a project with great potential (Murphy 1995:34). In Peru, the insurgency led by *Sendero Luminoso* (Shining Path) fostered economic instability, threatening forest product markets central to the success of a fledgling forestry program among the Yanesha (Lázaro et al. 1993). In Colombia, Quira (1989), president of the National Indigenous Organization of Colombia (ONIC), has noted the difficulties in indigenous political development because of the warfare between government forces and guerilla organizations. The Regional Indian Council of Cauca (CRIC), for example, has found itself caught between drug lords, guerrillas, the Colombian army, and large-scale lumbering companies in their efforts to implement a forestry management program (MacDonald 1987) (see Box 1).

Box 1: Human Rights and Personal Security

The Regional Indigenous Council of Cauca

In 1971, the Regional Indigenous Council of Cauca (CRIC) was formed with the primary goal of helping Indian communities pursue and recuperate reservations. In the 1980s, CRIC began focusing on development issues and established a forestry project to encourage communities to plant trees and provide them with technical assistance in forestry (Chernela 1987). CRIC has come to represent over 50 communities.

In nearly all its efforts, CRIC has met with considerable resistance. They have found themselves caught between drug lords, guerrillas, the Colombian army, and large-scale lumber companies. In response to efforts to retake lost reservation lands, CRIC experienced a retaliation from the local power structure. This included attempts to block Indian assemblies and, in 1974, assassinations and the militarization of key areas (the latter based on claims that CRIC was linked to M19 leftist guerrillas). By 1979, 30 CRIC leaders were imprisoned (including a president) and, by 1982, CRIC claimed that 82 members had been killed by the state, church, and economic interests opposed to its objectives (Bodley 1990).

In their most recent efforts, CRIC has had to compete for community attention with drug traffickers and, along with its communities, has been harassed by military that often suspect indigenous peoples of complicity with the drug lords or the rebel movement. In 1987, 239 indigenous people were arrested. MacDonald (1987:42) states that the Department of Cauca is "laced with fuses leading to different powder kegs, any one of which could explode with CRIC as a target." Under these conditions, project gains have fallen far below expectations. Yet local interest and CRIC devotion to the project has endured, leaving one to wonder what its potential could be in the absence of such obstacles.

b. Health Security

Some level of health security, including access to western health care, will in many cases be a precondition for the initiation of development endeavors. In most cases, enhancing health security must involve attention to potable water, appropriate sanitation, and disease prevention measures. Most observers agree that indigenous communities were at one time secure in their access to a nutritional balance of foods through various subsistence activities and maintained decent health through traditional healing methods and good nutrition. Five hundred years of interaction with western society, modernization, and a growing participation in market economies, however, has irreversibly changed the nature of most indigenous cultures. Indigenous peoples have been exposed to western diseases that are unfamiliar to traditional health care systems, and changes in subsistence and economic activities have affected the nature of food procurement and nutrition

Box 2: Food Security, Nutrition, and Production for Export

Guatemala's Cuatro Pinos Cooperative (von Braun et al. 1989)
In six villages in and around the municipio of Santiago Sacatepéquez, the Cuatro Pinos cooperative has developed into a significant productive enterprise based on the production of vegetables, including cauliflower, broccoli, and snow pea for export. Prior to the initiation of the project, these highland peasants maintained most of their small plots (averaging only .7 hectares) in corn and beans. Of the family heads, 10-15 percent worked in Guatemala City, with access to land below subsistence level. Severe protein calorie malnutrition was common.

With the development of vegetable crops for export, those involved in the project had net returns per unit of land considerably higher than for corn (15x for snow peas). Communities experienced a 21 percent increase in local employment for agriculture and considerably lowered migration. Despite the fact that most land was now in vegetable crops, those involved were found to have more corn available for consumption and a higher calorie intake (p. 12). The authors conclude that "[t]he nutritional benefits of economic growth, as shown in this study, are substantial but can be further enhanced by appropriate health- and nutrition-oriented social infrastructure. The effects of health programs conducted by the export crop cooperative in participating communities support this conclusion" (p. 13).

d. Monitoring Development

As indigenous communities choose to enter market economies, shift production strategies, change labor roles, and pursue other activities, it is important that health and food security be monitored (Dewalt and Thompson 1983; Scrimshaw and Hurtado 1987). Special attention should be paid to changing diets and nutrition as economic development efforts have sometimes been found to negatively impact these (see Lunven 1982; Dewey 1979). Even among groups viewed as having some of the greatest development success, changes in economic activities can have negative health impacts. Such problems have been reported among the Shuar, for example, who have adopted cattle ranching (Kroeger and Barbira-Freedman 1988).

2. Land and Natural Resource Security

Land and natural resource security is a significant *prerequisite* to development. Indigenous development throughout Latin America is obstructed and undermined by the lack of land demarcation, clear titles, respect by competing economic interests of legally defined indigenous land and resources, and by concessions granted to mineral, oil, and other resources on indigenous land. While successful development has often ensued where indigenous groups have been able to end such situations, such rights by themselves were not a major factor in promoting this development. In 23 of the 42 cases reviewed (1, 2, 4, 5, 6, 7, 9, 10, 12, 14, 15, 19, 22, 25, 27, 28, 31, 32, 33, 34, 36, 37, 42), concern over security for land or natural resources was a primary factor stimulating development. In 63 percent of the unsuccessful cases (5, 6, 7, 27, 34), factors concerning tenure and security over land and/or resources significantly contributed to the problems experienced, while in 32 percent of the successful cases (1, 2, 3, 4, 28, 31, 33, 38, 42), these issues significantly contributed to the success experienced.

Since the arrival of the first Spaniards in Latin America, indigenous peoples have experienced a systematic appropriation of lands and natural resources on which they have depended for survival. For many indigenous groups, the land they inhabit and the natural resources found there have both economic and cultural significance, and many indigenous leaders and advocates see land rights as an essential prerequisite for self-development (Coc 1989; Ewen 1994). Expropriation of, and encroachment on, indigenous lands and resources has often led to abandonment of traditional land use patterns and adoption of unsustainable strategies, hastened cultural and community dissolution, and produced serious negative impacts on health and nutrition. In addition to the economic and cultural disruptions caused by external pressures on lands and resources, lack of security hinders the ability of indigenous groups to invest in their resources or pursue long-term management strategies. Vickers (1983:27) states that "Ultimately these questions [concerning development] devolve on the material issues of land rights and the protection of natural resources, for no native culture can survive if its environmental underpinnings are denied or destroyed." Chase-Smith (1987:9) properly notes that "Indigenous peoples cannot have control over their own development if they do not control their territory and its resources."

a. Communal Territory

Granting communal land rights enhances indigenous people's ability to invest in and benefit from their land and is often a first step to regaining increased autonomy, self-determination, ethnic pride, and cultural cohesion—all of which contribute to indigenous development. For a number of indigenous groups, particularly in the lowlands, the most basic development concern is the titling and demarcation of land (e.g., see CEREC 1992). In 12 cases, this was a primary goal of development efforts (1, 9, 12, 14, 22, 25, 27, 31, 32, 33, 34, 37). Throughout South America, indigenous political movements have increasingly brought distinct communities together for the primary purpose of gaining secure legal rights to land. The Regional Indian Council of the Cauca, Colombia (Chernela 1987), the Shuar Federation (Salazar 1977), the Federation of Indian Organizations of the Napo (MacDonald 1992), and the Center for Indigenous Communities of the Beni, Bolivia (Lehm 1993), all organized with the initial purpose of obtaining secure rights to land. Some of the indigenous groups that are often cited as the most successful in having pursued autonomous development are those that have been able to gain communal titles to land. The Kuna of Panama and the Kayapo of Brazil represent just two examples of such success (See Box 3).

In most Latin American countries, efforts to gain communal titles to land are hindered by complex legislative obstacles, many instituted as part of agrarian reforms that generally favor private titling. The belief that private property is necessary to stimulate economic development, however, is uninformed by the realities of property relations on communal lands (Bromley 1989). It has recently been shown that "...security of tenure in communal systems is usually much higher than assumed...and does not constrain incentives to invest" (Binswanger and Deininger n.d.:3). Furthermore, "...where community structures are intact and local accountability mechanisms in place, communal tenure systems provide security of tenure, risk-sharing, and a low-cost land administration system. Efficiency losses are likely to be very modest" (Binswanger and Deininger n.d.:4). In addition, as Palomino (1989:100) notes, for many indigenous groups, land, culture and community are one complete unit. The Indian community cannot exist without land, and efforts to privatize can thus destroy the community.

Box 3: Land Security and Development

The Kuna

The Kuna are a unique case among indigenous people in that they have largely escaped the impact of the colonial encounter that most Latin American indigenous groups have faced. The Kuna received relative autonomy when they went to war in 1925 with the newly formed state of Panama (Nietschmann 1988). Living in a relatively isolated situation, "the Kuna have evolved into the 20th century largely on their own terms. Never conquered nor subjugated, they are the sole masters of their territory" (Breslin and Chapin 1984:31), which is viewed as the heart of Kuna culture. Today, some 30,000 Kuna live in more than 60 villages located on small islands along a 200 kilometer stretch of the Atlantic coast of Panama in the Comarca of San Blas. Their control over their land has largely given them control over their own development. They have controlled tourism on their land and have become, perhaps, the best-educated indigenous group in Central-America (Breslin and Chapin 1984:31).

The Kayapo

The Kayapo are well-known for the aggressive defense of their territory against encroachment. Turner (1995:105) reports that "...perhaps thirty settlers, ranchers and more transient invaders...were killed by Kayapo between 1970 and 1990, and many others were driven off by armed attacks."

This aggressive defense, coupled with the ability to mobilize large groups for protest, has resulted in considerable land security for the Kayapo. The Kayapo number only about 4,000 persons, living in 14 autonomous villages, but have been granted a combined area in demarcated reserves of roughly 100,000 square kilometers (10,000,000 hectares) located in the middle Xingu River drainage. The magnitude of such territorial concessions is unprecedented when compared to other groups successful in gaining land claims such as the Shuar, Runa, and Kuna, whose populations are much larger.

Interestingly, the Kayapo have achieved such land security despite the fact that they were not "officially" organized. In responding to resistance and development concerns, indigenous peoples of Latin America have generally created organizations by adopting essentially nonindigenous political, legal, and administrative forms. However, as Turner (1995:99-100) notes, "The Kayapo of Central Brazil, by any standard one of the most politically successful Amazonian peoples, are an exception from this point of view. Their indigenous social organization possesses more differentiated political institutions and more developed forms of collective organization than most Amazonian peoples."

Nevertheless, there continue to be obstacles to indigenous peoples gaining control over their land. In some countries, for example, to gain access to community land, indigenous peoples must form representative organizations that can be given the status of legal corporate entities (see Box 4). Indigenous peoples generally lack such organization and while some groups (such as the Shuar) have adapted to these regulations, many other indigenous communities have not. **Such restrictions should be abolished, and the state should seek alternative ways to grant titles to indigenous communal lands without forcing state-defined organizational structures on indigenous communities. Alternatively, indigenous groups should be assisted in obtaining the proper legal status and adapting to state-defined restrictions.**

Box 4: Land and Legal Requirements

Venezuela's *Empresas Indígenas*

An unprecedented Amerindian development program emerged in Venezuela in the early 1970s—known as the *Empresas Indígenas* (Indigenous Enterprises) program—which was housed in the agency in charge of agrarian reform (the *Instituto Agrario Nacional* [IAN]). A primary goal of this program was to provide some form of security to rights to land. However, under Venezuela's agrarian reform law of 1961, land titles could not be granted unless a legal juridical structure existed. Therefore, indigenous communities or groups of communities could not receive title to land until they were legally incorporated (see Heinen and Coppens 1981:584, Gouveia 1989:112-115). Moreover, the organizational structure of the legal entity was set by law and based on the model of Venezuela's peasant enterprises. All Indigenous Enterprises were required to have: a General Assembly; a duly elected Administrative Council (consisting of a president, vice-president, treasurer, and secretary elected by the General Assembly); and a Supervisory Council. At least the president and vice president in the Administrative Council had to be literate according to legal requirements (Arvelo-Jiménez & Perozo 1983:515; Gouveia 1988:51). Thus, in order to obtain land titles, indigenous groups were required to adopt new organizational structures that often conflicted with traditional modes of sociopolitical organization.

b. Government Resource Concessions

Ending government concessions to resources on indigenous lands enables indigenous peoples to develop and benefit from those resources and can present new development options. In many cases, even when territorial rights are present, land rights do not include subsurface rights, water rights, and rights to trees. Resident indigenous populations are deprived of the potential economic benefits of such valuable resources, and government concessions for these are given to separate entities (Van Cott 1994). Resource rights concessions to outside interests were observed in 11 of 42 cases reviewed (2, 4, 5, 6, 12, 15, 22, 27, 28, 33, 42). Under such conditions, indigenous peoples are often exploited for their labor, and techniques of resource extraction can have severe impacts on the soils, waters, flora, and fauna on which indigenous peoples may depend. In the Chimán forest of Lowland Bolivia, for example, Mojeño and other indigenous residents of the Multiethnic Territory must contend with the impacts caused by logging companies with concessions to forests surrounding the Territory. Impacts include flooding caused by roads and soil compaction that disrupt drainage, blocking of streams, dispersion of game from logging activities, and reduction of game from loggers' hunting (Jones 1991:41-42). In the Ecuadorian Amazon, oil extraction has had serious negative impacts on indigenous peoples (see Kimerling 1991). The Waorani and other Indians have been forced off land and experienced massive environmental problems with oil spills, poisoning of water, and loss of biodiversity. The indignity to indigenous peoples is exacerbated by a continued lack of consultation and compensation (Hitchcock 1994:12-13).

Ending such exploitative relationships represented an important step to successful development in 5 cases (1, 2, 4, 28, 42). Other groups have achieved some success, but concessions continue (6, 12, 22, 31, 33). In some cases, indigenous groups successfully developed these resources through community enterprises. In Mexico in the early 1980s, several cases were observed where indigenous organizations were able to resist the government's renewal of long-term forestry contracts to outside companies and take control of their resources to develop their own forestry organizations.

Successful forestry programs were initiated among Maya in Quintana Roo (Bray et al. 1993), Zapotec in Oaxaca (Castañeda 1992), and Chinantec of Oaxaca (Bray 1991a). On the other hand, one of the primary impediments to the Lomerio Forestry Management Project among Chiquitano of Bolivia (Chase-Smith 1993) has been that outside timber companies still maintain concessions to many of the best forests in and around participating communities. Other groups, such as the Kayapo, rather than developing their resources independently have negotiated concession agreements with Brazilian companies (Turner 1995).

c. Land Disputes

Land and resource security requires sustained government recognition of indigenous rights and protection from external encroachment and expropriation. Too frequently, when valuable resources have been identified on indigenous lands, states have not hesitated to seek to develop them. Cummings (1990:94), referring to experiences in the Brazilian Amazon, notes that it "becomes clear that the protection offered by Indian reserves is easily revoked in the interests of economic development." In addition, throughout Latin America, indigenous peoples face external encroachment on their lands and expropriation of their resources by ranchers, colonists, logging companies, miners, and others. Encroachment was seen in 20 of the 42 cases examined (11 successful cases, and 5 unsuccessful cases) and is found in both the highlands and lowlands (1, 3, 6, 7, 9, 10, 12, 14, 15, 17, 19, 22, 25, 27, 31, 32, 33, 34, 36, 37).

Disruptive land disputes are not limited to contests between indigenous peoples and powerful economic interests, but also are seen between separate indigenous communities and indigenous communities and other communities. These disputes often do not involve territorial boundaries, but rather problems of communal lands and, in many cases, of individual plots of land. The current privatization of agrarian reform land occurring in Mexico, Honduras, and other Latin American countries should be sensitive to the kind of land tenure system existing in, and preferred by, indigenous communities (DeWalt and Rees 1994).

d. Resource Sustainability

Finally, **sustained development success requires the adoption of ecologically sustainable strategies.** Indigenous control over land and natural resources does not ensure long-term security for the broader community. This requires that land-use strategies are sustainable. While state development strategies have a long history of environmental problems, strategies adopted by indigenous communities also often threaten the sustainability of natural resources. In some forestry cooperatives in Mexico, for example, economic pressure threatens to undo the equilibrium with nature (Bray et al. 1993). Some Kayapo strategies of development, which include giving concessions to mining and lumber interests, also have been criticized for their lack of sustainability (Turner 1995). Indigenous communities should be encouraged to adopt strategies that will maintain resources for future generations.

3. Summary: The Legal Framework

It seems clear from the literature review that the lack of a legal framework supporting and enforcing indigenous rights at numerous levels presents a basic and often insurmountable obstacle to indigenous self-development. The foundation for building indigenous development projects must include guarantees of human rights, food and health security, and rights to land and natural

resources. We found that where human rights abuses have been prevalent, indigenous development has been absent; and where local outbreaks of violence and repression have occurred, existing development efforts have been disrupted and undermined. Undernutrition, malnutrition, and disease represent further assaults that can decimate indigenous communities. While western health care technology can serve an important role in combating these problems, introduced systems must complement traditional systems. Secure access to food also is essential, but does not necessarily depend on subsistence self-sufficiency; rather—for most of Latin America's indigenous population—it involves garnering income from productive activities. We believe that monitoring of health and nutrition changes should accompany all development endeavors.

We also observed that for many indigenous communities, gaining secure rights to land and natural resources was often a first step towards autonomous development. Some of the most successful indigenous groups are those that have gained legal rights to communal land. In many Latin American countries, however, efforts to gain communal land titles are hindered by complex legal obstacles. In addition, indigenous groups that have successfully ended government concessions to resources on their land have often been able to make productive use of those resources. In general, the continued encroachment on and expropriation of indigenous lands and resources makes it clear that security requires both demarcation of land and enforcement of land rights. Long-term security also relies on the development of ecologically sound and sustainable economic strategies.

B. Participation, Empowerment, and Self-Determination

While land, food, health, and human rights security will help to provide an atmosphere within which development can take place, development that benefits indigenous peoples is defined in general by their participation and empowerment. For development efforts to meet the desires and needs of and to benefit indigenous peoples, they must actively participate in the programs. For participation to take place, energy and enthusiasm must be generated that can be transferred into autonomous development efforts. This participation must enhance indigenous empowerment within the broader social, political, and economic environment.

1. Project Control and Self-Determination

Development efforts oriented towards indigenous peoples must address local concerns and be compatible with autochthonous social, economic, and political systems. Even the most innocuous top-down development approaches oriented towards indigenous peoples have been criticized for their failure to adequately address indigenous concerns and their tendency to conflict or negatively interfere with existing social, political, and economic systems. Generally, the failure of such ventures is characterized by a lack of interest on the part of the indigenous peoples who are supposed to benefit, which translates into a lack of effective participation. Many have suggested that the key to ensuring that development addresses local concerns, is compatible with existing culture, and maximizes local participation lies in control by the affected population over all stages of development. Such a policy of self-determination has been demanded by indigenous leaders and advocates (e.g., Ewen 1994; IWGIA 1989) and has gained increasing attention among development planners (see Box 5).

Box 5: A Model of Self-Determination

Taquile Island: a Model of Self-Determination (Healy and Zorn 1983)
The Quechua-speaking Taquile islanders of Lake Titicaca, Peru, have successfully controlled the pace and nature of tourism and weaving development on the island and their entrance into a broader market economy. Change on the island has taken place through the planning of local committees with approval of the community, often in response to changing market needs. Nearly the entire community has been involved at some level. Local committees are elected to oversee the development of various aspects of tourism and to control the pace of growth. Several restaurants have been developed on the island and fishing has become a new occupation in order to cater to tourists. Yet, in many cases committees have decided not to cater to tourist desires when these were viewed as threats to the community in some way. "Islanders have established rules and prices that they and the tourists are expected to respect" (p. 5). As the community wishes to maintain a "traditional" Andean feel, all household improvements are subject to approval by an island commission.

Major factors that have supported self-determination include: (1) indigenous Taquileños purchase of the island from land owners in the 1930s; (2) distance by boat ride from the nearest town—Healy and Zorn note that "[i]solation allowed the islanders to keep outside entrepreneurs at arm's length while the community developed facilities and management skills" (p. 8); and (3) "an officially sanctioned monopoly" provided by the Peruvian Coast Guard and Ministry of Tourism to the Taquileños which licensed them to carry travelers and issue regulations and tariffs (p. 8).

While tourism has brought many advantages to the residents, these also threaten to unravel the cultural strengths on which the tourism market was built. Through self-determination, Taquile Islander's have largely chosen the path they have pursued, yet this in no way insures a long-term stable transition from traditional to modern.

Control over all phases of project planning, while an ideal ultimate goal, is not necessary, nor is it even realistic in every circumstance; what is important is that the indigenous participants adopt and internalize development. Often, indigenous peoples lack the knowledge or experience to identify potential solutions. Reed (1987:40) declares that "local populations, in isolation, often have difficulty identifying the regional and national aspects of the problems they confront." Of the 28 projects reviewed that provided the greatest benefits for indigenous peoples, nonindigenous peoples had the primary responsibility for developing the ideas for the project in 7 cases (3, 8, 11, 33, 36, 38, 42) and for setting the priorities and agenda in 3 cases (11, 19, 33). Among the Jalq'a of Bolivia, for example, the idea for the reintroduction of traditional weaving came entirely from the outside. The key to initiating the project was that, based on traditional weaving, it naturally fit into existing cultural systems, was approved by local leadership and deities, and harnessed local enthusiasm (Healy 1992). As Alvarsson (1990:4) notes, what is important for the development program or project is that "it is conceived of as local, indigenous, endemic or autochthonous by the people concerned. It is not necessarily initiated from within the society itself: the important point is that the community adopts the idea and makes it their own."

Maximum involvement by the target population in the planning process, and ultimate responsibility for management, helps to ensure that local concerns and priorities are addressed. While local ***initiation*** of development planning may not be necessary to achieve participation, ***involvement*** in development planning and control over management appears vital. Issues concerning overall community involvement were discussed as an important factor in leading

to success in 46 percent of the cases that most benefitted indigenous peoples (2, 3, 11, 19, 25, 28, 29, 30, 31, 33, 38, 41, 42). And in 63 percent of the cases with little benefit for indigenous peoples, it was an important factor in leading to the problems experienced. In all cases reviewed that enhanced indigenous well-being for which data were available, indigenous communities or community representatives were involved in the planning process (information was not clear for cases 8 and 36). In all but one of the projects reviewed that showed some level of success and for which information was available, management was eventually controlled by indigenous peoples. (Based on information from 25 successful cases. The one case that did not appear to be managed by indigenous peoples was the Tzeltal Protestant conversion case [case 36, Turner 1979].)

Community involvement helps to ensure that indigenous peoples will adopt the development ideas. It gives the targeted beneficiaries the opportunity to voice concerns and prepare for the project's implementation. While indigenous peoples may not have the primary responsibility for setting the project agenda, it is particularly important that they take part in planning the scale and time-frame for the development process and have a clear understanding of the responsibilities involved. Projects must be compatible with the time requirements of personal and communal responsibilities. Local concerns and priorities must be clearly understood and serve as the foundation for development planning if projects are to succeed. As MacDonald (1992:230) notes "...those who promote sustainable development must recognize the Indians' broad concerns and adapt to local priorities if they hope to be accepted." Such concerns and priorities are often specific to a particular community and cannot be generalized for indigenous people in other areas. Barbarán (1996) argues that the failure of the state to involve indigenous peoples in development planning in Argentina led to the incorporation in development programs of mechanisms that exclude the Indians because of required technical skills, organizational structures, political relationships and economic facilities. This led to project failures, the reinforcement of vertical power relationships, and dependency on state support.

Where achievable, indigenous peoples should lead the process of their own development, not just be involved, and they should never simply be spectators. The empowerment gained through self-determination feeds self-confidence and dignity, which often translates into energy for the implementation and maintenance of development programs. Through self-determination, local peoples may seek to alter existing social, political, and economic systems, adapting them to new initiatives or the broader political economy. When such decisions are locally adopted, they may open up alternatives for new forms of development previously not achievable. When such decisions are imposed from the outside, however, they can be disastrous (see Box 6).

While self-determination is a factor that is common to development that benefits indigenous peoples, it in no way guarantees successful development. Indigenous peoples can make poor decisions, experience management problems, and confront many of the same problems that have plagued top-down development. In 5 of the 8 cases of relatively unsuccessful development, indigenous peoples were the prime agents involved in planning and implementation (6, 7, 15, 34, 40) (see Box 7). There are also limits to self-determination. Indigenous peoples can only pursue alternatives that either they can support autonomously or for which they can gain support from outside sources. Indigenous peoples are also limited by broader laws, which encompass the rights of other groups and the rights of individuals within indigenous communities.

some cases, this is accompanied by an individual and group lethargy towards work and a lack of social mechanisms to help the poor. Hewitt (1984:34), for example, cites such factors among Mexican rural peasants in the mid-twentieth century, noting that "psychological factors had replaced economic or political ones as the principal stumbling blocks in the way of raising levels and increasing the general wellbeing of rural people." The barrier this presents to development efforts is often exacerbated by the fact that many abuses have been perpetrated in the name of development (see Bodley 1990).

In 43 percent of the successful cases examined, issues concerning cultural revaluation were discussed as significant to the success of the project (8, 10, 11, 13, 16, 17, 19, 23, 24, 30, 33, 36). Chase-Smith (1987) notes that without confidence and dignity for one's culture "people are not capable of assuming the power that autonomy implies." Kleymeyer and Moreno (1988:40) state that "By revitalizing indigenous identity and pride, it has been a cultural means to promote development ends, as well as a cultural end in itself..." Under these circumstances it is important to move slowly, build confidence, and seek to encourage self-determination. Rapid implementation of projects with multiple components and responsibilities on the part of the target population would only lead to mistrust and lack of participation. In the Chimborazo province of Ecuador, for example, the *Feria Educativa* (education fair) provides an excellent example of seeking to spur self-determination and interest in development by building ethnic pride and creating an environment in which local people can consider their position and potential solutions (Kleymeyer and Moreno 1988) (see Box 15 for greater detail).

The value of confidence and ethnic pride to autonomous development can be seen among a number indigenous groups who have become some of the best known "success stories." These include the Shuar, Kuna, and Kayapo. The tradition of fierceness and independence among the Kayapo, for example, has provided them not only with continued confidence and dignity, but external notoriety and respect as well—which they have used to enhance their power (also see Box 3). Schmink and Wood (1992:269) note that "The Kayapo warrior tradition, honed in battle with *seringueiros* [rubber tappers] and *castanheiros* [brazilnut collectors] earlier in this century, gained them more time and territory than most other tribes in Brazil. It also brought them notoriety, which itself was turned to their advantage."

Development that builds on cultural expressions and seeks to strengthen ethnicity and cultural cohesion also has a much better chance of success because that energy is often refocused into the project (see Kleymeyer 1993). Among the Jalq'a of Bolivia, for example, a team of anthropologists reintroduced traditional weaving both as a means to reconnect the Jalq'a with their art and cultural expressions and as a productive enterprise (see Box 8). Wali (1990) found that projects that worked to reinforce ethnic identity among the Mapuche and Aymara of Chile resulted in higher production and greater local control of land and resources. Wali (1990:12) argues that "community autonomy, acceptance, and responsibility each work in their own way to reinforce group identity, enhance self-esteem, and empower project participants." Stephen (1991), in an examination of the success of weaving among four indigenous communities, notes that in all cases self-management and successful entrepreneurship are linked to an internal reinforcement of local cultural identity (13, 23, 24, 41).

Box 6: The Antithesis of Self-Determination

Rice Cultivation in the Uxpanapa Resettlement Project (Gates 1988)
The antithesis of self-determination is illustrated by the intensive rice cultivation project introduced as part of the Uxpanapa Resettlement Project. In 1974, the Mexican government relocated 3,000 Chinantec families from Oaxaca to the Isthmus of Tehuantepec due to the construction of the Cerde Oro Dam. Indians were given tenure to 60,000 ha of virgin forest and introduced to mechanized rice cultivation. The program was entirely conceived and run by the Mexican government and, from the beginning, was criticized for lack of consultation with indigenous peoples. Rice cultivation was not initiated with the concerns of the Chinantec in mind, but rather the food shortages throughout Mexico. As Gates notes, the "[p]urpose was to integrate the Chinantecs into the national economy, help to offset the country's basic food deficit and serve as a model for increasing productivity on the tropical southeastern frontier" (p. 18). The result has been utter failure. The majority of Chinantecs derive little if any income from rice, barely subsisting from traditional slash-and-burn cultivation. Resentment over the loss of autonomy and exclusion from decision-making processes has helped to foster a climate of mistrust and hostility and resistance to participation in new project ventures.

Box 7: Limits of Self-Determination

The Kayapo (Turner 1995)
Many have viewed the Kayapo as a prime example of the success of indigenous resistance and autonomous development. Through resistance against the state, and often armed confrontations with those who encroached on their territory, the approximately 4,000 Kayapo received demarcated reserves of roughly 100,000 square kilometers located in the middle Xingu River drainage. This is a truly unprecedented amount of land to be granted to such a small indigenous group and represents a great victory for the Kayapo. In achieving this, the Kayapo were highly successful in defining themselves to the outside, often using alliances with environmental groups to present themselves as native environmentalists.

Since gaining greater control over their territory, however, the Kayapo have become infamous for their fall from grace as "ecologically noble savages." Development ventures by Kayapo leaders reflect some of the limits of self-determination. As Turner (1995:104) notes, "The revelation that some Kayapo were indeed aiding and abetting the logging of their own forest and the pollution of their own rivers with mercury and mud by gold miners was for many the end of the heady conjuncture of indigenous resistance and green activism that inspired the coming together of so many environmentalist and indigenist NGOs to support the Kayapo..."

2. Cultural Revaluation: Tradition and Change

Building confidence and dignity for one's culture—or cultural revaluation—is often a first step towards the empowerment necessary for autonomous development and must precede or accompany any effort of self-determination and political organization. For many indigenous groups, the long history of political, social, economic, and physical repression has led to mistrust, suspicion, and fear of new persons and situations and a lack of self-confidence and ethnic pride. In

Box 8: Cultural Revaluation

The Jalq'a of Bolivia: Cultural Revaluation for Project Energy (Healy 1992)
The Jalq'a of Irupampa, Bolivia, had experienced an erosion of traditional culture and community cohesion. In the reintroduction of the lost art of traditional fine weaving designs as a development plan to market fine weavings, development practitioners first sought to "create a space in which the entire community could explore the cultural roots that gave the Jalq'a their identity and that inspired the master weavings of the past" (p. 27). The organization responsible for initiating the project, ASUR, "realized that revival of Jalq'a weaving depended on the renewal of Jalq'a culture..." (p. 32). As part of the cultural revaluation, ASUR brought an archive of pictures of over 300 traditional motifs on which women could base their work. They also encouraged a strengthening of ritual and community life and revitalization of traditional songs. The enthusiasm of revitalization of traditional ways was channeled into revival of weaving, which was invaluable because the work was exhausting. This cultural revaluation was further supported by the success of the museum exhibits of the Jalq'a art, which "created a new respect among many city dwellers not only for the Jalq'a, but for the other ethnic groups in the region" (p. 30).

Planning initiated from outside the community should initially focus on existing cultural forms in order to preserve (or build) confidence and dignity. The goal should be to encourage self-determination so that indigenous groups can make their own identifications of what is important to the group's culture and ethnicity. Those who advocate cultural revaluation often confuse it with recapturing or reintroducing something "traditional," or simply building on or strengthening existing indigenous strategies and organizations. While this may be appropriate for initial stages of cultural revaluation, it has too often led to antimodernization proposals for broader indigenous development based on external views of what indigenous culture "should" be. There are problems with this view of cultural revaluation. First, what is commonly seen as "traditional" often represents indigenous adaptations to the colonial encounter and will naturally change when situations of colonial domination are removed. In addition, such proposals ignore the evolutionary dynamic of culture.

Smith (1977), for example, examined the cargo/fiesta system of Indians in the Guatemala highlands, arguing that it was not some great wealth leveler that had helped to keep indigenous communities in harmony for countless centuries, but rather an artifact of colonial ecology perpetuated by an outside world. He notes (1977:36) that "cargo participation seems more a response to imposed limitations than a wellspring of community cohesion." He found that communities that had been economically successful had significantly altered the cargo system.

Given the opportunity, indigenous peoples may choose cultural adaptations to the broader social, economic, and political environment that embrace "nontraditional" cultural features and culture change. The key to cultural revaluation is building and maintaining dignity and self-confidence in one's culture, not the specific elements of which it is composed. Durston (1993) states that "the fundamental resources for indigenous success are their own culture and the *appropriation of universal knowledge...*" (emphasis added). Wilmer (1993:55), who examined political movements and activism of indigenous peoples around the world, indicates that "It would be incorrect to say, however, that indigenous peoples simply oppose modernization or progress. Instead, they insist on

the right to define and pursue development and progress in a manner consistent with their own cultural context. They advocate the right to choose the degree and terms of their interaction with other cultures." In some cases, cultural-revaluation-based-development may occur through drastic cultural changes, such as in the Protestant conversion of Tzeltal Indians of Chiapas, Mexico (see Box 9). More commonly, development involves changes related to organizational structures, education, and economic involvement in broader markets (which are discussed in greater detail below).

Box 9: Cultural Revitalization and Change

Tzeltal Protestant Conversion: Cultural Revaluation and Change

Cultural revaluation and change associated with the conversion of about one-half of a community of 4,000 Tzeltal Indians in Chiapas from folk-Catholicism to a type of evangelical Protestantism is given credit for the subsequent development of those Tzeltal (Turner 1979). One of the main factors identified in positive advances of converts was the end of Catholic beliefs in rigid social order. Protestantism preached that individuals could make a difference and change their own circumstances. Such a feeling of empowerment is a central theme in cultural revitalization associated with development. Turner (1979) argues that poverty was decreased through increased food production, the end of liquor indebtedness to Ladinos (since Protestantism prohibited liquor), and an end to the fear of witchcraft (which enabled individuals to seek profits). Furthermore, disease decreased with the introduction of a western health clinic, and illiteracy decreased through introduction of bilingual schooling.

As Table 3 shows, most cases reviewed for this study involved new knowledge, skills, and technology, usually building on preexisting assets. There is no pattern, however, concerning level of success and the use of new or preexisting knowledge, skills, or technology.

Table 3: Knowledge, Skills, and Technology Used Specifically for Development Efforts Examined

	Knowledge and Skills		Technology	
	Good Cases	Poor Cases	Good Cases	Poor Cases
Based primarily on existing	**21%** (11, 13, 23, 24, 28, 41)	**13%** (20)	**18%** (11, 19, 24, 39, 41)	**13%** (20)
Based largely on existing with some new	**43%** (2, 4, 8, 16, 19, 21, 29, 30, 31, 36, 39, 42)	**38%** (7, 15, 40)	**36%** (2, 4, 8, 13, 16, 18, 19, 21, 36, 42)	**50%** (6, 7, 15, 40)
Based primarily on new	**25%** (3, 9, 10, 17, 25, 33, 38)	**38%** (5, 27, 34)	**11%** (17, 33, 38)	**13%** (5)

Bebbington (1993), for example, in his examination of indigenous movements and development in highland Ecuador, argues that the promotion of "traditional agriculture" as the basis for development is not always necessary. He (1993:275) states that "...some 'alternative' goals, such as local control of the development process and cultural revalorization, are pursued through conventional means—such as the promotion of agrochemicals, new crop varieties, and market-oriented production." He argues that discussions of indigenous technical knowledge (ITK) often ignore the fact that this is dynamic and adaptive, stating that "ITK is a dynamic response to changing contexts constructed through farmers' practices as situated agents..." For the cases Bebbington (1993:287) examined, it was found that "indigenous cultural identity hinges more on sustained and corporate rural residence, and not so much on retaining traditional technologies. The implication is that indigenous economy and culture must constantly adapt in order to survive and sustain group cohesion and forms of self-management."

Recently emerged ethnic federations, which are generally not reflective of any "traditional" indigenous organization, are playing an important role in strengthening and developing ethnic identities in ways that lend themselves to the new challenges of indigenous life and development. Ethnic revitalization can be seen as one of the principal motivations behind recent indigenous political movements. The Shuar Federation, for example, in the process of strengthening ethnic pride, is recreating a history of cooperation, not just among Shuar, but with other ethnic groups as well, many of which were historically enemies of the Shuar (Hendricks 1988). In addition, the Federation is actively building a place for itself among communities by using existing notions of external knowledge and power to empower themselves in the eyes of constituent communities.

Cultural revaluation also involves improving external categorizations of a group's culture. Jenkins (1994) notes that ethnic identity is not simply a matter of how a group views itself in relation to the outside world, but is also strongly influenced by external categorizations of a group. Identity is not simply created autonomously, but is constructed at a boundary of interaction between the group and the outside (Barth 1969). In a number of countries, efforts to deny indigenous identity in the hopes of incorporating indigenous groups into the national fold have generally only further marginalized and maligned indigenous groups. Mariqueo (1989:109-110) notes that as a means to solve the "Indigenous problem" in Chile, Pinochet simply stated that "we are all Chileans," robbing the word Mapuche of any legal meaning. Therefore, significant strides would be taken towards the revaluation of a group's identity if it also experiences a revaluation in the broader society. The exposition of Jalq'a weavings at museum exhibits in Bolivia, for example, created an increased recognition and respect for the indigenous culture. This external recognition played an important role in the internal revaluation that was taking place (Healy 1992). In addition, in many regions, a social atmosphere that has looked down on indigenous peoples as backward, uneducated, and an obstacle to development has enabled and underlaid many of the worst abuses that indigenous peoples have suffered at the hands of the state and broader society. A broader revaluation of attitudes towards indigenous peoples and culture could have meaningful impacts on policy and other aspects of indigenous development that involve interaction with nonindigenous groups.

Bilingual education and literacy training can be an important means to cultural revaluation, as well as a means to broader social, political, and economic empowerment. One of the most important underlying factors in the loss of cultural dignity and cohesion is the loss of language and changes in values that are instilled in young people at mission schools. Lundbergt (1990) relates

how education has been used by authorities to alienate Amuesha children of Peru from their own local culture and promote assimilation into the larger national society. He states that the role of education in preparing children for approaching changes is good, but that they should also be taught in their own language and about their own culture. Bilingual education and literacy training help to promote continuity in communities, prevent exploitation by outsiders, enhance self-confidence and dignity, support political organization and self-determination, and lend themselves to management and accounting skills necessary for managing development.

Increasingly, indigenous communities and organizations are seeking education programs that help to prevent the outmigration and alienation of children, as well as provide communities with valuable human capital for empowerment and development. Using radio, the Shuar Federation has pursued a program of bilingual education (Salazar 1977) as has the Center for Indigenous Communities of the Beni in Bolivia (Lehm 1993). Most indigenous leaders recognize the need for education if they are to interact with broader political and economic systems—and not be exploited. Arambiza (1989), a leader of the Center for Indigenous Peoples and Communities of Eastern Bolivia (CIDOB), for example, argues that the lack of implementation of adequate educational policies is one of the main problems facing lowland indigenous communities in Bolivia. Education provides indigenous peoples with a perspective of communities within the broader political economy so that they can more successfully adapt their own development initiatives. Some of the greatest strides that indigenous groups have made in promoting their own development have taken place with the help, and often leadership, of members of the community who have received training outside the community. The Center of Indigenous Communities of the Beni, for example, was initiated by mission-educated Mojeño (Jones 1990). In the 1970s, Kayapo leaders sent their children to mission schools as a means of helping protect the group from outside pressures. Returning Kayapo have become some of the most outspoken and well-known indigenous leaders in Latin America and have been extraordinarily successful in obtaining land rights and interacting with nonindigenous groups (Turner 1995). On the other hand, educating a few members of a group can create an incipient class structure, whereby those individuals educated in the language and culture of the national society—if not subject to community supervision—can manipulate their culture-broker roles to their own advantage (see Box 10).

3. Sociopolitical Organizations: Management, Representation, and Empowerment

In addition to pursuing human rights, land and resource security, and strengthening ethnic pride, indigenous organizations provide a means to manage development programs and initiate independent development plans. The involvement of community and multicommunity indigenous organizations was discussed as a primary factor contributing to project success in 71 percent of the successful cases (1, 2, 4, 8, 9, 10, 13, 17, 19, 22, 23, 24, 25, 28, 29, 31, 33, 38, 41, 42). In terms of numerical representation, this was the single most important set of factors of those examined (see Table 2). Many analysts are beginning to see such organizations as the key to grassroots development (Bebbington 1996; Reed 1987; MacDonald 1992). MacDonald (1987:45) reflects this position, noting that "...grassroots development then becomes, to a large extent, organization building, which can improve both economic and human rights."

Box 10: Culture-Broker Elites

The Kayapo: Education and Corruption (Turner 1995)
Chief Pombo was raised by a Brazilian family and became fluent in Portuguese. He returned to the Kayapo as a young man and was appointed a village chief by the Brazilian Indian Service. He granted gold mining concessions in 1976 and logging concessions in 1979. With the proceeds from the concessions, "Pombo acquired an airplane, town houses and a hotel in ...[a] nearby Brazilian town" (p. 106). During the 1970s, a number of Kayapo children were sent to Brazilian schools, and by the mid-1980s they had grown into young men and become "leaders." Like Pombo, they developed lavish lifestyles in their roles as middlemen between the Kayapo and Brazilians. As they spent money and established themselves on equal footing with the regional Brazilian elite, "The common villagers continued to live in poverty, suffering from the effects of increasing environmental degradation: the destruction of forest hunting and gathering resources by logging activities and the pollution [by mercury] of rivers by gold miners...and many Kayapo now show dangerously high levels of mercury contamination" (p. 109). (It is important to note that significant intracultural differences existed among the various Kayapo communities. Some never permitted logging or mining in their areas [p. 110].)

Finally, a coalition of young "commoners," mature adults, and some "older" chiefs decided to move against the mature, middlemen chiefs and their logging and mining concession policies. This began with the Gorotire revolt of August-September 1994, when a large group of Gorotire Kayapo moved against the main gold mine in their territory where 3,000 miners were working. "The Kayapo assaulted the mine, burned the miners' shelters, broke their machines and threw them in the flooded pits....They drove out the terrified and unresisting miners..." (p. 112). It ended in December 1994 at a meeting of leaders from all of the Kayapo villages, who unanimously decided "...to expel all miners and loggers, and terminate all mining and logging concessions on Kayapo land" (p. 113). "This decision was implemented in January-February 1995 by the Federal Police..." (p. 113).

Regardless of the scale of development or level of organization involved, maximum community involvement and oversight can help provide stability, trust, and greater community cohesion. The level of indigenous organization necessary to control planning and management generally relates to the scale of the development intervention. Small-scale development programs require less formal organization and may be manageable through households, kin networks, or simple communal organizations. Larger projects, involving multiple communities or significant inputs, require larger organizations and may have less direct community control. In most cases reviewed, however, community-level political bodies had the final say over projects affecting them, regardless of scale. Table 4 shows the frequency of primary responsibility for initial and final management for various organizations. As community participation in development initiatives becomes an increasingly recognized marker of success, maximum community involvement in the planning and management is a means to that end, particularly when communal resources are involved.

a. Organization at the Household or Kinship Level

While most successful projects eventually involved management at the community or multicommunity level, several important examples of development took place at the level of the household or kinship group (see Table 4). These cases involved autonomous development rather than the introduction of projects and built upon existing family networks. Zapotec weavers in the Mexican town of Teotitlan de Valle, for example, built their own successful management and

marketing networks of cooperation based on existing fictive kinship and family ties. Government officials who had previously attempted to develop weaving cooperatives among the Zapotecs failed because "they were not integrated with local networks of production and distribution attached to kin relations" (Stephen 1987:48). Even in such cases where the household or kin group is the central level of decision making, community control of the overall process of development can help ensure long-term stability and community cohesion. Community control over the process of development was discussed as critical to the success of weaving for the community of Teotitlan de Valle, Mexico (see Box 11).

Table 4: Primary Project Management Responsibility	Initial Management		Final Management	
	Good Cases	Poor Cases	Good Cases	Poor Cases
International Development Organization	1 (8)	--	--	--
Government	--	2 (5, 27)	--	--
Multicommunity or Macro-Level Indigenous Organization	8 (9, 13, 16, 17, 22, 25, 31, 33)	2 (7, 40)	7 (9, 8, 13, 17, 22, 25, 33)	2 (6, 40)
NGO	1 (11)	1 (6)	--	
Community	9 (2, 3, 4, 12, 28, 29, 38, 39, 42)	--	11 (2, 3, 4, 11, 12, 19, 28, 29, 38, 39, 42)	1 (27)
Non-indigenous Entrepreneurs	--	1 (20)	--	1 (20)
Missionaries/Church	1 (36)	--	1 (36)	--
Indigenous Household or Community Subsection	5 (18, 21, 23, 24, 41)	--	5 (18, 21, 23, 24, 41)	--

b. Community Level Organization

In many indigenous communities, extrahousehold organization is minimal and generally not sufficient to handle the responsibilities entailed in the management of a development project or program. In 12 of 28 successful cases for which information was available, it was necessary to develop local-level organizations to run the project as part of the development process (2, 3, 4, 8, 13, 17, 28, 29, 33, 38, 39, 42). With larger development initiatives, and when development is oriented towards an entire community or involves communal resources, organizational systems based on close kinship ties and reciprocal subsistence relations are generally insufficient for management responsibilities. In lowland South America, for example, the managerial capacity of such systems seems to be limited to 100 to 200 persons. Studies have suggested that beyond this

size the ability of the system to organize cooperative activities to the satisfaction of all parties breaks down and intercommunity conflicts can arise (Arvelo-Jimenez 1971; Lathrap 1968). Once development efforts extend beyond the limits of kinship-based social organization and, especially when they involve introduced economic activities, such organizational forms appear to be a significant hindrance to successful development (Erasmus 1961; Frechione 1981).

Box 11: Community Control

Zapotec of Teotitlan: Community Control Over Development

While the management and marketing of weaving development among the Zapotec of Teotitlan de Valle has taken place primarily at the level of family kinship systems, the overall process of development (including tourism) is subject to community control. Stephen (1987:46) argues that an "examination of the history of development in the community provides useful insights for how indigenous communities can appropriate economic development for their own use. Community control of resources and the maintenance of strong local ethnic identity are critical in this process."

The community has actively worked to integrate development with local cultural identity. Decision-making takes place in open meetings led by local authorities, where community members decide to what projects the community will commit. Participation in community decision-making and rights to community resources requires male participation in civil cargos. While the community welcomes tourists and importers, they do not tolerate inappropriate behavior and several unruly Americans have been forcibly expelled.

Such community control has enabled the Zapotec to maintain intensive contact with capitalism, while not decimating the cultural life of the community. "Ritual life has been refocused, but remains an integral part of family and community life" (Stephen 1987:46). This is enhanced through money brought into the community that is invested in community works such as schools, marketplace, irrigation, etc.

While community level management organizations should incorporate or build on existing organizations or organizing principles, some form of representative management responsible to the larger community may be most successful. For community-level management, in at least 13 successful cases, local organizations necessary to manage the program incorporated or built on existing organizations (2, 4, 12, 13, 22, 23, 24, 25, 28, 29, 33, 41, 42). While some management decisions were made through community consensus, in most cases management organizations or business enterprises were created specifically for that purpose, with posts filled through democratic processes. Based on an analysis of several small-scale development efforts on the Peruvian coast, Clinton (1991:74) argued that "the local organizations crucial to grassroots development only operate well when people are involved in them democratically." Consensus decision-making, however, can be too cumbersome to programs that require decisive management (Bray 1991a) and democratically based business enterprises can experience similar problems. In the Zapotec forestry project, for example, various posts in the Community Forest Enterprises (CFEs) are filled by election and are salaried. The CFEs are responsible for forest management under the oversight of community assemblies (Arzola and Fernández 1993) (see Box 12). One concern is that the general assemblies sometimes make decisions that lessen the productivity of the community forestry enterprises. These include such practices as rotating trained people to other posts and providing low wages for those involved in management (Arzola and Fernández 1993). While most organizations were built on

democratic models, Icaza (1993) argues that the Communal Council of the Purépecha (Mexico) is unique in its formality. Democracy is mediated with a strong Aristotelian basis, creating almost a republican monarchy. What was important in this case is that the new management system built on existing community organization.

Strong community oversight helps to ensure that management staff are honest with community resources and development capital and provides a greater sense of trust and involvement. Most indigenous communities are unfamiliar with the management and administrative requirements of development programs, particularly with accounting. Involvement by the broader community helps dispel suspicion of corruption and jealousy over positions of power. Such concerns were addressed in the Purépecha forestry program by maintaining all executive posts subordinate to democratic decision-making and all operations community-owned and operated (Icaza 1993). In the Zapotec forestry project (Casteñeda 1992), this problem was addressed through the creation of review commissions with complete oversight of administration and accounting (see Box 12).

Accommodations for management staff may be necessary to ensure that new responsibilities do not interfere with existing ones. For some indigenous communities, management responsibilities can cause problems in pursuing other community and family responsibilities, particularly when individuals maintain involvement in subsistence activities. In the Yanesha forestry project, leaders responsible for the management of the multicommunity organization (COFYAL) overseeing the 21-community project found it difficult to manage the scale of the project with other responsibilities. Lázaro et al. (1993:51) state that "planners failed to fully realize and analyze the consequences for the Yanesha of the scale chosen for the forestry project. The enterprise that evolved, though significantly smaller than an elephantine plan originally proposed by AID and TSC, has proven to be far larger than the participating Yanesha communities can sustain without huge personal sacrifice and significant social consequences for an already fully employed workforce." Some communities, such as those Zapotec involved with Community Forestry Enterprises and UCEFO, have overcome this problem by instituting paid posts into which community members are elected (Arzola and Fernández 1993). In general, such organizational and management problems should be anticipated through better development planning.

c. Macro-level Organizations

In cases where development efforts can benefit from intercommunity cooperation and involvement, macro-level sociopolitical organizations are playing a fundamental role in indigenous development. Thirteen of the 28 (46 percent) projects that most benefitted indigenous peoples involved multiple community participation (8, 9, 10, 12, 13, 17, 19, 22, 25, 31, 33, 38, 42). These projects often involved land tenure issues, political empowerment, forestry, and natural resource management. Multicommunity organizations involved in planning, implementing, and/or managing (see Table 4) these development activities included economic unions and ethnic political organizations. While these organizations do not represent "traditional" forms of indigenous organization, a number of them have come to occupy positions of power within the broader political landscape. Among the Shuar, for example, there is no history of strong centralized leadership or a tradition of intercommunity cooperation. Yet the Shuar Federation (Ecuador) has become one of the most powerful in Latin America (Salazar 1977; Hendricks 1988).

Box 12: Management and Community Involvement

Zapotec Forestry Enterprises and UCEFO

For years, the forests of the Zapotec of Sierra Juarez and Oaxaca, Mexico, had been exploited by large lumber companies with government concessions. In the early 1980s, when 30-year contracts came up for renewal, many communities resisted, seeking to develop their own forestry development organizations. Ten communities not only formed their own Community Forestry Enterprises (CFEs) to manage resources, but also joined together to form the *Union de Comunidades y Ejidos Forestales de Oaxaca* (UCEFO) to provide technical assistance and marketing support. These new organizations were built from traditional assembly structures, which maintain a high degree of control over management as well as deciding directly on the distribution of profits (Arzola and Fernández 1993).

Management posts within each community's CFE are filled through election by the general assembly. Initially, this work was unpaid and obligatory, fitting in with the existing complex hierarchy of religious, civil-political, and agrarian posts in which adult men must serve. The workload overwhelmed traditional authorities, however, and it became necessary to institute paid leadership posts (Arzola and Fernández 1993). CFE posts receive training in accounting, preparation of documentation, measuring volume of wood, classification of products, and other necessary skills (Castañeda 1992).

Some communities created review commissions to evaluate administration and accounting, giving greater collective control and building community trust. Members are elected in assembly and rotate yearly. "The communities that have a Review Commission for their unit have been able to continually work without internal problems. A great tranquility exists with respect to the handling of funds and, above all, there is good participation in the assemblies" (Castañeda 1992:343).

In 1985, forest plagues required training in pest control, which led to the creation of UCEFO to provide technical services, community training, and pursue other projects. "One aspect that turned out to be extremely important for achieving the organization of the communities was the constant communication" (Castañeda 1992:336).

UCEFO enabled local CFEs to negotiate with the government for the right to administer their own forest service. UCEFO provides support to CFEs for forest management and provides administrative and financial training to each set of new leaders. UCEFO expenses are paid by CFEs based on the volume of wood produced. Eighty percent of UCEFO staff are community members, while the remainder are outside professionals. Top posts are elected by the 105 member Assembly of Representatives, made up of authorities from each community, CFE coordinators, community oversight committees, and delegates from each community (Arzola and Fernández 1993).

In addition to providing technical services, UCEFO has 2 industrial plants, one producing telephone poles, the other charcoal. "The UCEFO has shown that its development model has helped to raise the standard of living of group members. Above all, it prevents the exodus of its people to cities and outside of the country" (Castañeda 1992:339). It has become a model for community organization in forestry development in Mexico.

Economic unions unify communities or families based on a productive activity, such as forestry. An example of this is the Union of Forest Ejidos and Communities of Oaxaca (UCEFO), which helps to manage technical services in forest management and marketing for 10 member communities (Arzola and Fernández 1993) (see Box 12). Such economic unions have so far appeared to be more common in the highlands among peasantized Indians (especially in Mexico) and are serving significant roles in program management (see Table 4) and in providing resources for member community development.

Indigenous ethnic and pan-ethnic political organizations are also coming to serve a fundamental role in community development. In a number of cases, ethnic or panethnic federations—such as the well-established and recognized Kuna congress, Shuar-Achuar Federation, or the Federation of Indian Organizations of Napo (FOIN)—serve primary management roles in multicommunity projects (see Table 4). Most of these organizations mobilized for the primary purpose of gaining secure rights to land and resources (Clay 1984), which was the basis of several of the projects reviewed (including 9, 12, 22, 31, 33). Increasingly, however, communities are demanding that these organizations serve the role of development initiators and providers (Bebbington et al. 1992).

One area of development in which lowland indigenous organizations have increasingly become involved is forestry management. Relatively large-scale forestry management projects have recently been initiated through indigenous organizations among the Quichua of Ecuador (Jahnige 1989), the Runa of Ecuador (Shiguango 1993), the Yanesha of Peru (Lázaro et al. 1993), and by the Cauca Regional Indian Council (MacDonald 1987). While initial progress for some of these cases could be judged, the long-term success of these projects and the potential of indigenous political organizations in running them is unclear.

Some are beginning to look at these organizations as a possible panacea for indigenous development by serving a political role in fighting for land and indigenous rights, strengthening indigenous identity, helping to bring assistance to communities, and initiating and managing development projects (i.e., political, social, and economic empowerment). Reed (1987) argues that indigenous political organizations represent an alternative to top-down organizations. Through such larger organizations, indigenous communities can interact at the level of the larger society without compromising indigenous values, while they also can receive and manage development assistance in a more appropriate manner.

Others question this role for indigenous political organizations. Bebbington et al. (1992), while agreeing that such organizations hold a key position in indigenous development, question their ability to directly provide development. They argue that the traditional role of such organizations as support and service providers to communities as a whole may interfere with their ability to behave as business entities. Bebbington et al. (1992:16) argue that "although the provision of such services is invaluable, it is not sustainable economic development. Even when federations have embarked on more-ambitious economic projects, most have ended up delivering services."

The key to success in these larger scale projects at the local level relies on the success of larger indigenous organizations and their ability to involve individual communities in the planning and management process. At the multicommunity level, most organizations are run by elected representatives chosen by community representatives. Newly formed indigenous organizations, with little prior experience, face greater difficulties with the organizational tasks necessary to carry out large-scale projects. In the Lomerio forestry project in Bolivia (Chase-Smith 1993), for example, too little attention was initially paid to multicommunity consensus building, leading to conflict. Among the Yanesha, community involvement began with a series of community workshops concerning resource management and development issues in an effort to generate development ideas. The Yanesha Forestry Cooperative (COYFAL) that developed owes its progress primarily to its

ability to continually incorporate communities into its work, allowing the Yanesha to fully control the cooperative's administration and direction (Lázaro 1993).

Regionally based indigenous development support organizations represent a third type of macro-level indigenous organization. These groups, such as the Interethnic Association for the Development of the Peruvian Amazon (AIDESEP), are often multiethnic and serve a variety of functions from political support to funnelling funding and assistance to communities. In general, their role is more along the lines of support NGOs. They are generally not representative and not directly involved in the management of development programs (see Box 14).

d. Organizational Self-Determination

If organizations are to be a success, the choice of organizational form must rest with the community. Locally developed forms of social organization represent adaptations of existing social institutions to new situations and problems (Wali 1990) and are thus more likely to mesh with the communities' broader sociocultural system. Vozza (1987:38), for example, notes that "The transformation of simple peasant groups into genuine communities can only be brought about if spontaneous and traditional forms of integration and participation are strengthened and allowed to mature, with the resulting process of coordination and unification at local and regional levels." He argues that while such autonomously produced organizations may not be perfectly democratic, and may initially be somewhat paternalistic, as homegrown systems they have a better chance of success.

Too often NGOs, missionaries, or state agency employees impose their own expectations regarding organizational form. Such rationales often rest with broader political interests (Chase-Smith 1987). The failure of outside-imposed organizational schemes for development is apparent in Venezuela's *Empresas Indígenas* program (see Appendix 3) and in the cooperative model of development in Ecuador studied by Vozza (1987). In both cases, organizational structures were embraced primarily as a means of obtaining land, credit, and technical assistance and were generally alien to the sociocultural reality within which they were introduced and provided little additional benefit as organizing structures.

4. Economic Empowerment

Raising the standard of living for most indigenous peoples requires economic empowerment. Historically, indigenous peoples have experienced economic exploitation and dependency and, thus, now find themselves at the bottom of the class structure, the poorest members of the population. Essentially, all indigenous peoples participate to some degree in the broader market economy, whether to purchase tools or in full trade. Their position in this system is still generally characterized by exploitation and weakness. The key to economic empowerment and development is to improve on that relationship, freeing indigenous peoples from exploitative relationships and providing them with the tools to compete in the broader economy on an equal footing with other cultural groups. In 43 percent of the successful cases of development, issues concerning marketing and economies of scale were identified as significant to success (8, 11, 13, 16, 17, 19, 21, 23, 24, 28, 41, 42); while in 50 percent of unsuccessful cases, these issues were identified as having a significant impact on the problems experienced (5, 6, 15, 40). When we take into account only those cases that clearly involved the marketing of goods (21 successful and 7 unsuccessful cases), these percentages rise to 55 and 57 percent respectively.

a. Freedom from Middlemen

One of the primary ways in which indigenous peoples can improve their economic position is to gain greater independence from exploitative middlemen. Many communities experience problems with exploitative monopolists who offer low market prices for goods, charge high prices for products, and often provide credit at exorbitant rates (Ballesteros 1989). At their worst, such arrangements can result in relations of semifuedal debt peonage. The prevalence of this problem is suggested by the fact that in 13 (11 successful) of the cases examined, indigenous peoples sought to gain independence from such exploitative relationships as a primary goal (2, 4, 7, 12, 17, 19, 21, 27, 33, 36, 38, 39, 42). Many indigenous leaders raise the issue of exploitative middlemen as a primary problem (IWGIA 1989). Ending such relations often serves as a first step in improving incomes and increasing purchasing power. Such independence also is important in building self-confidence and pride.

Box 13: Freedom from Middlemen through Cooperative Stores

The Mapuche: Freedom from Middlemen and Organization

Development among a group of Mapuche communities in the Neuquén province of highland Argentina began with achieving freedom from exploitative middlemen through the formation of a set of cooperative stores. By organizing these stores together into a union, the Mapuche have been able to successfully petition for land rights and state resources.

Prior to the development of a cooperative store, the Mapuche community of Colipilli, with 500 families on 15,900 ha, had to travel 20 miles to shop at a little *boliche*, or general store, and to sell products (such as raw wool, mohair, and heavy weavings). The store owner determined prices of goods sold and purchased, and the trip took 1 day. This situation was common to Mapuche communities throughout the region, and leaders identified the exploitation of their communities by the *boliches* as a primary concern.

In 1975, a Salesian missionary and a Mapuche organized a cooperative store. Within 14 years, there were 18 stores in various communities, linked together under the *Asociación de Comunidades Mapuches Neuquines*. The stores hold a variety of basic goods, and members receive a discount and preference for use of the *Asociación* truck. Mapuche also sell products through stores to one another, and the truck takes wool and hides to Zapala, where a warehouse, office, and bunkhouse were built with IAF support (started in 1982). A committee is elected annually to run each store, headed by a president who oversees operations and personnel. The *Asociación* commission coordinates staples and seeks wider markets for Mapuche goods. It is hoped that eventually the stores will become cooperative and the *Asociación* a regional federation representing all 33 local communities in the region.

Breslin (1989:42) notes that the "18 Mapuche communities have been able to escape the exploitative grip of the *boliches*, lower their costs for staples and agricultural supplies by almost 30 percent, and begin to exercise some control over the sale of their products." In addition, the Mapuche have become much more confident, and the *Asociación* has had additional benefits, including gaining a court victory over a land dispute with a judge's family, and a voice with the government. One Mapuche summed up the benefit of the organization as follows: "these new houses we're building with government assistance, the agricultural extension services—we never got them before. It all comes because we organized ourselves" (Breslin 1989:43).

Often, the development of indigenous-operated transport systems and community stores is an extremely important means of breaking the power of middlemen. This was the case for the autonomous development that took place in the town of San Pedro in the Guatemalan highlands (Smith 1977). The development of indigenous transportation systems combined with the location of the town as a market center were key factors in its development success. For many communities, the creation of cooperative stores can be a great step towards increased autonomy. This was seen among the Zapotec of the Quiatoni region of Oaxaca. While nearly every productive endeavor that the community undertook failed, some community members considered the program an overall success for its establishment of a cooperative store (Peasant Solidarity Group of Quiatoni and Martinez 1992). The development of cooperative stores was also the first step in autonomous development among a group of Mapuche villages in Argentina (see Box 13) (Breslin 1989).

Papousek's (1981) study among the Mazahuas of central Mexico found that the exploitative relationships of monopolists do not necessarily represent a self-reproducing socioeconomic structural pyramid. Rather, they are often created by one or a small group of individuals whose removal from the system may lead to openings that allow development to occur. In his first visit to the region, Papousek found little development and expected little in the near future. Upon his return 12 years later, however, he found the community had experienced a total turn-around. The single most important factor was the death of a powerful *padrón*. While many community members had thought highly of this individual, he had considerable control of trade and transport and prevented autonomous development by anyone else.

b. Market Involvement

If indigenous peoples are to develop economically, they must obtain a comparative advantage in the market. In most successful projects, a key was identifying and understanding markets before the initiation of the project or by making the project respond to existing market pressures. It is clear that for freedom from middlemen to be empowering, indigenous communities must have alternate means to market their products In several unsuccessful cases (including 6, 15, and 40), an important factor in the failure of the project was that development planners sought to enter markets without market pressure to do so, thus finding difficulties gaining sufficient profits from their goods to support the development program. In 9 of the successful cases, indigenous peoples or development planners responded directly to market pressures (8, 10, 12, 18, 21, 23, 24, 29, 41). This was true for all of the organic coffee production cases in Mexico. Tourism on Taquile island of Lake Titicaca has also succeeded largely because islanders have successfully responded to the market (Healy and Zorn 1983). The importance of such an understanding is underscored by the problems experienced by the Chiquitano forestry project in Bolivia. Chase-Smith (1993) relates that organizers failed to study market conditions and thus were caught off guard by a market glut of their primary wood product, considerably undermining the efforts that had gone into organization and production.

Identifying or developing a market niche and/or innovative market strategy can enable indigenous peoples to gain a comparative advantage with nontraditional goods. In 7 of the 28 (25 percent) most successful projects, production was oriented to specialized market niches (11, 13, 16, 23, 24, 29, 41). Only 1 of 8 of the minimally successful projects focused on specialized markets (case 15). A market for Jalq'a artisans, for example, was developed using museum exhibits to help sell high quality weavings as art rather than as basic textiles (Healy 1992). Several coffee growing

communities in Mexico have been able to tap into a growing interest in organic products and gourmet coffee, in some cases developing their own coffee brand (Carter 1996; Hernandez and Bray 1991). The popular success of Rainforest Crunch in the United States, while not primarily an indigenous product, represents another good example of creating a unique market niche.

Nontraditional goods that require intensive human, rather than technological, inputs may particularly favor indigenous production. In many highland cases, for example, indigenous peoples have access to too little land to be able to compete through traditional crops. In some cases, nontraditional crops, such as flowers and vegetables, have met with considerable success. In the Cuatro Pinos cooperative in highland western Guatemala, for example, members have achieved considerable success growing vegetable crops for export, although the average member has access to only .7 hectares of productive land (von Braun et al. 1989). Intensive labor is more important than extensive land for this type of production, and large exporters have increasingly contracted out with small landholders.

In many regions, improving incomes and production may, in fact, depend on intensification as population growth continues to increase pressure on natural resources. As Bebbington (1996:1162-1163) notes "...the intensification of agriculture, natural resource management and rural livelihood is a critical poverty alleviation and growth challenge....whether the emphasis is on increased output per unit input, increased output per unit area and time, increased income per unit input, or increased use of inputs, the general development concern behind an interest in intensification is similar: to enhance the output and income deriving from the use of a given bundle of natural resources....with the added interest that this intensification be sustainable." In most cases examined, including all the organic coffee cases, intensification relied on increased human rather than technological inputs. Organic coffee production among the Tojolobales of Chiapas, Mexico, for example, introduced terracing, organic composting, and improved caretaking of coffee plants (Murphy 1995).

Where indigenous peoples choose to market products that favor indigenous production or serve a special market niche, achieving economies of scale may be necessary to adequately compete in the broader markets. This often represents a source of power for middlemen, who are able to pool products from a number of communities to receive a better profit. Some communities simply cannot compete alone in national markets and must organize with other communities to improve their standing. If resources are pooled, large or multicommunity projects may achieve economies of scale that enable the communities involved to compete in the market with traditional goods. In 13 of 28 (46 percent) successful projects, multifamily or multicommunity resources were pooled to achieve economies of scale (3, 8, 11, 13, 17, 19, 24, 29, 33, 38, 39, 41, 42); compared to 2 of 8 for the relatively unsuccessful projects (6, 27). Leaders of the forestry project, PUMAREN, in Ecuador, for example, recognized that individual communities did not have enough forest to sustain an enterprise and were able to convince communities to work together (Shiguango et al. 1993). Such multicommunity or multifamily enterprises not only increase market power, but also benefit from sharing resources and infrastructure (such as a sawmill) whose use may be inefficient when employed by a smaller number of participants.

c. ***Reinvestment and Diversification***

Reinvestment into community enterprises, particularly towards diversifying value-added products, is an important way to boost profits and strengthen project autonomy. In 13 of the

28 (46 percent) successful projects, profits were reinvested into the project or community (3, 4, 11, 13, 18, 23, 24, 28, 33, 38, 39, 41, 42); compared to 1 of 8 for unsuccessful projects (27)—possibly due to lack of profits. In an effort to gain independence from wood buyers, for example, profits were not divided in the Zapotec forestry project, but used to capitalize community companies by purchasing equipment and machinery and paying for labor (Castañeda 1992). In some cases, finances were reinvested into microenterprises that helped to strengthen communities' market positions and autonomy from processing monopolists through the diversification of products and production of value-added products (processed products). Of the projects identified as successful, 9 pursued local-level processing in order to add value to raw goods (such as trees through carpentry shops or coffee through processing) (2, 4, 8, 11, 18, 21, 28, 38, 42). This was a primary use for technological inputs. Diversification of production has the added benefit of helping to protect communities against possible market shifts in the value of various products. This was very successful among the Purépecha of Mexico's New San Juan cooperative who built a vertically integrated forest products industry that drives towards diversifying production and delivering finished products that capture greater profits (Icaza 1993). In the Cuatro Pinos cooperative (von Braun et al. 1989), development of infrastructure necessary to locally process and freeze fresh produce has reduced the risk of a sudden collapse of the marketing channel and given the cooperative the ability to directly market to international buyers, rather than going through large, local purchasing companies. Loss of markets for railroad ties, the primary product produced by the Maya of Quintana Roo (Bray et al. 1993), on the other hand, has left them searching for new products.

5. Summary: Participation, Empowerment, and Self-Determination

Our findings suggest that while the involvement of indigenous peoples at all stages of the development process helps to ensure that local priorities are addressed, what is most important to achieving maximum participation is that development plans are internalized by the participating group. Self-determination should be an underlying factor of indigenous development, but in no way guarantees successful development. We also found that those groups more likely to participate in development activities are often confident and have relatively strong ethnic pride. Where confidence and dignity are lacking, cultural revaluation must often precede development efforts. In addition, projects that reinforced ethnic identity through the production of marketable goods were highly successful. What has become clear to us is that cultural revaluation is not equivalent to regaining "traditional" Indian ways, but may entail cultural changes. Dignity and ethnic identity are maintained as long as changes are at the discretion of the indigenous community. Improving external categorizations of Indians would further support local revitalization. Bilingual education and literacy programs also would help to build community confidence and provide valuable human capital for development planning and management. Local programs would further support community cohesion by ensuring that children do not have to become alienated from their communities when they are educated.

We found that **the most common thread that bound together successful cases of development, and that was consistently discussed as important, was the presence or creation of indigenous organizations both at the local level and multicommunity level as a means by which indigenous peoples can be represented in the development process and manage development initiatives.** The choice of organizational form must rest with the indigenous community. While some management decisions were made through community consensus, in most cases, management

organizations were built—based on existing community organizations or organizing principles—specifically for that purpose, with posts filled through democratic processes. Where communities were not directly responsible for management, strong oversight often provided stability, trust, and greater community cohesion.

It also has become clear that improving indigenous welfare requires improving the position of indigenous peoples within the broader market economy at a number of levels. For some groups, gaining independence from exploitative middlemen, often through the development of indigenous transport systems and community stores, was a primary means to economic empowerment. An understanding of markets was central to most successful projects, which either responded to market pressures, sought to build and fill a market niche, or pooled resources to achieve economies of scale. For projects that showed some of the greatest success, reinvestment of profits into community enterprises was seen as an important way to boost profits and strengthen indigenous autonomy, often by bypassing processing monopolists, diversifying products, and producing value-added products.

C. Development Support

1. Financial and Technical Assistance

Most indigenous communities lack the resources and expertise necessary to plan and implement development projects on an entirely autonomous basis. Financial and technical assistance must, therefore, play a fundamental role in indigenous development, but is certainly no guarantee of success. While self-determination and autonomous development are goals of indigenous peoples, indigenous leaders generally recognize the need for external support and have increasingly sought alliances with nonindigenous organizations that can enhance indigenous communities' access to resources (see Ewen 1994; and IWGIA 1989). One of the leaders of the Center for Indigenous Peoples and Communities of Eastern Bolivia (CIDOB) (Arambiza 1989:161), for example, states that what is needed is: "Support for our own proposals for economic and social development...[and] support for our own proposals for education based on our languages and our cultures, support for fundamental services, for example health, and also based on our knowledge of traditional and natural medicine." In 71 percent (20 of 28) of the successful cases (2, 3, 4, 8, 9, 10, 11, 13, 16, 17, 19, 21, 29, 30, 31, 33, 36, 38, 39, 41), and 88 percent (7 of 8) of the unsuccessful cases (5, 6, 7, 15, 20, 27, 40—case 34 likely also received financial assistance, but it is not clear for which aspect of development examined) outside financial help was received. Technical support was provided in 37 of the 42 cases examined; including 89 percent (25 of 28) of those cases identified as most beneficial to indigenous peoples (information was not clear for cases 23, 25, 39), and 88 percent (7 of 8) of those with minimal benefit or that were complete failures (case 27 did not involve assistance). In 64 percent of successful cases, outside assistance was presented as a primary factor in achieving success (2, 3, 4, 8, 9, 10, 11, 17, 19, 22, 28, 30, 31, 33, 36, 38, 39, 42). Consequently, this is the second most important set of variables in terms of impact on multiple cases, following indigenous organizations (see Table 2).

The focus of support for indigenous communities should be to foster and enhance self-determination and autonomous development, building on indigenous initiatives, concerns, and agendas. Thus, assistance should be provided without "strings attached" that do not

relate directly to the program for which funding is targeted. In most successful projects, outside organizations that provided support did so primarily at the request of indigenous peoples. Funding and assistance were used to train indigenous personnel for organizations, provide basic infrastructure, and generally enhance indigenous autonomy over their projects. The Inter-American Foundation, one of the leading providers of assistance to indigenous grassroots development, for example, only supports projects that are created at the local level, are market- and goal-oriented, and are proposed by indigenous organizations with a proven record of community support (Hirschman 1984; Carter 1996). In Mexico, on the other hand, programs have received criticism for implicitly or explicitly being tied to support for the national PRI party. Zapotec Indians of the community of Teotitlan de Valle, for example, have often spurned government assistance for this reason, opting instead to depend on their own contacts through kin relations for credit and other necessary inputs. Many did not want to feel dependent on the PRI patronage system and end up owing political debts to officials (Stephen 1991).

a. Financial Support

Funding should be provided to organizations that truly represent indigenous interests and maintain significant degrees of community input and oversight. Great care and responsibility should be taken on the part of funding organizations concerning how money is provided for community development, as the promise of funding can lead to corruption at any level. In most cases reviewed, funding went either to local-level NGOs (on behalf of indigenous communities), to second- or third-level indigenous organizational structures, or directly to communities. Only in cases of development where the government was the primary initiator of the project did financial support come through the government. In many areas, indigenous organizations have emerged both as major forces in soliciting money on behalf of constituent communities and as a means to funnel money to these communities—often through larger projects than individual communities could independently pursue (see Box 14). Evaristo Nugkuag (1989:151), one-time president of AIDESEP (Interethnic Association of the Development of the Peruvian Amazon), however, warns against channeling funding through intermediary organizations rather than directly to indigenous organizations. He includes within these intermediary organizations, "the nominally indigenous organizations at the international level...[that] are, however, often bureaucratic and have weak connections with our people." Chase-Smith (1984:6), for example, notes, that following the U.N. NGO *Conference on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples* held in Geneva, "a growing 'Indian movement' in Latin America impinged on the European and to a lesser degree on the North American consciousness." Within a short time, foundation and private moneys began to flow to various Indian leaders with no evaluation of their legitimacy. Chase-Smith (1984:6) notes that "In some cases European romanticism, guilt and a desire to be in on the 'action' played into the ambitions of unscrupulous individuals and political factions, weakening the efforts of community-based organizations in rural areas."

Indigenous peoples must be provided with improved access to credit to serve as a funding alternative for sustained economic development initiatives. Davis and Partridge (1994:40) of the World Bank note that "Unfortunately, in many countries, indigenous people do not have access to traditional forms of finance because of their poverty and lack of collateral for loan guarantees." Some have used this argument to suggest privatizing indigenous communal land. This is a poor solution, unless agreed upon by a clear majority within an indigenous community, because it could undermine ethnic revitalization and any hope of *community* development. Rather, governments and

other funding sources should seek innovative ways to provide loans for indigenous communities and organizations. In highland areas, even where land is owned individually, the lack of adequate access to credit often prohibits small farmers from being able to take risks to pursue more profitable endeavors (Immink and Alarcon 1993:319). von Braun et al. (1989:11-12) note that while the return on vegetable crops grown on minifundios by the Cuatro Pinos cooperative in Guatemala's western highlands made inputs well worth while, "the input costs per hectare for snow peas...are on average about 4 times higher than for traditional vegetables and 13 times higher than for maize. Short-term financing of inputs poses a problem to small farmers and indicates the importance of rural credit."

Box 14: Financial Support and Indigenous Organizations

Peru's Interethnic Association of the Development of the Peruvian Amazon (AIDESEP)
In one example, AIDESEP solicited funds from Cultural Survival for a logging development project among the Ayoreode (Reed 1987). Resources were allocated directly to local groups and managed by their councils. Reed (1987:20) noted that "AIDESEP does not attempt to acquire or accumulate the capital to undertake economic development projects directly....[L]eaders suggest that such a procedure would have the undesirable consequence of creating an independent agency with power over local groups and resources....[The] task...is to provide the arena in which diverse Indian groups can share various resources and experiences to solve mutual problems."

For credit programs to be successful, however, the broader economy must be relatively stable. The hyperinflation experienced by most Latin American countries in the 1980s often affected the real cost of credit at a more rapid rate than was felt in rural markets where small-scale farmers sold their goods, making it difficult or impossible to keep up payments even when production had been successful. Drastic economic fluctuations are further damaging when development involves marketing of products because of the instability of the value of goods produced. For example, fluctuations in market prices associated with economic downturns threatened the timber industry in Bolivia (Chase-Smith 1993), preventing the Lomerio Forest Management project from breaking even or turning a profit.

In many instances, grants to promote indigenous self-determination and organization should initially precede loans for economic development. For many communities that are just beginning the process of revaluation and development, loans with a fixed payback period may not be feasible. Indigenous development, particularly in the early stages, may move at a slower pace than theorists, and certainly loan officers, would find acceptable. In addition, many of the most important measures of initial development, while being stimulated through funding, may not involve financial gains. Kleymeyer (1992) notes that grassroots projects, even failed ones, can generate commitment and skills that poor people can rechannel into new and more ambitious efforts of development. While initial capital input from outside organizations may be required, it is apparent that eventually it will be necessary to "increase capital accumulation within the community in order to lessen dependence on outside sources" (Chase-Smith 1987:8).

b. Training and Technical Support

Sufficient training and assistance should be given on all aspects of a project necessary to implement and manage a development program. In many cases, the first efforts of technical

support should be to help foster the generation of autonomous ideas for community improvement. This often involves addressing low self-confidence and a lack of cultural pride and helping to build local organizations. Many suggest that training indigenous peoples to analyze their own cultures within a broader context is a key to helping them to arrive at their own conclusions concerning the best directions for development (Varese 1985). Brunner and Guzman (1989), for example, propose a participatory evaluation approach to education development projects in which an indigenous group of evaluators is established and responsible for organizing and implementing evaluations, as well as interpreting results. In general, education plays a key role in enabling self-analysis and idea formulation (see Box 15). Kleymeyer (1992:28) reflects on such efforts among the Sikuani of Colombia, stating that "by allowing them to examine their culture from within, participatory research provided the Sikuani with a powerful tool for problem-solving that unleashed the latent creativity in their own culture and provided means for reconciling tradition and change."

Box 15: Supporting Indigenous Cultural Revaluation and Idea Development

La Feria Educativa (Kleymeyer and Moreno 1988)
La Feria Educativa (education fair) enters Quechua villages in Ecuador's Chimbarazo province by invitation and performs native and native-based music and songs using traditional language and symbols. Many of the acts represent current problems faced by the Quechua. The performers encourage people to identify their own most important problems. The immediate task is to gain a rapport with a people who are wary of investing resources and energy to another scheme from above and to stimulate them to think about their development concerns. "According to the Feria's strategy, this collective recognition of how a problem is rooted within the local reality is a prerequisite for building the resolve and summoning the energy and creativity necessary to identify and implement solutions" (p. 37).

The fair is often the first contact campesinos have with an innovative program managed by the *Servicio Ecuatoriano de Voluntarios Chimborazo*. The more long-term task is to stimulate campesino organizations to participate in a broad program of local development. The goal is to use "adult education as a platform for a variety of development activities in indigenous communities, including literacy training centers, communal bakeries, self-managed artisanal workshops, reforestation efforts..." (p. 34).

Between 1979 and 1987, the fair visited over 750 communities and helped pave the way for 1,050 literacy training centers. It also helped pave the way for the establishment of 32 community bakeries, 45 artisan-managed workshops, 145 community centers, and planting of more than 200,000 trees. In addition, the fair helped give rise to 9 local federations representing over 150 villages and organizations.

Support organizations should provide training relative to any technology being adopted for the project or program, using their expertise to advise indigenous peoples on the pros and cons of technology in terms of necessary care and maintenance, time requirements, initial and extended costs, and fit to the natural conditions. Technological inputs were a significant aspect of project success in 32 percent of the successful cases (2, 11, 13, 16, 17, 21, 24, 33, 41) and were significant to the problems experienced in half of the unsuccessful cases (5, 6, 15, 40). While technological inputs can be important to indigenous development, particularly in diversifying production and producing value-added products, care must be taken as there is a considerable history of failed development efforts involving the introduction of technology and mechanization to indigenous

communities. Often this involves improper technology for the given physical environment. The Uxpanapa resettlement project in Mexico (Gates 1988) provides one example where temperate technology was applied to tropical forests through large-scale mechanized rice production. The result was failure. In some cases, even the requirement of simple new technology can be an impediment if it is not easily accessible to indigenous communities. In the case of the Zapotec integrated management project, INI provided funding for the development of apiculture but failed to follow up with promised technical support and medicines. Indigenous peoples did not independently have access to the medical technology needed to care for the bees, and many bees died from disease (Peasant Solidarity Group of Quiatoni and Martinez 1992). Many projects also experience conflicts in adapting new technology, as well as organizations and skills, to existing sociocultural environments. These problems can be experienced even when indigenous peoples choose the direction of development. Social scientists can serve a valuable role by combining a knowledge of indigenous development with a detailed understanding of local conditions to provide input on potential concerns that can then be monitored over time (Cernea 1991).

Support organizations must also provide the necessary knowledge and skills to implement and maintain a project over time. In most cases reviewed, knowledge and skills proved more significant than technology in affecting the outcome of development initiatives. In 61 percent of the successful cases, knowledge and skills were discussed as an important factor to success (2, 3, 4, 8, 11, 13, 16, 18, 21, 23, 24, 30, 31, 33, 38, 41, 42). **One of the most important aspects of knowledge relates to the management necessary to run projects as business enterprises,** as most indigenous communities simply do not have such experience. In only 5 of all the cases reviewed (successful: 3, 23, 24, 41; unclear: 1) was it clear that local-level organizations had prior management experience with similar types of development initiatives. In at least 19 cases, local organizations did not have such experience (successful: 2, 5, 8, 11, 12, 13, 17, 22, 25, 29, 33, 36, 39, 42; unsuccessful: 5, 6, 15, 27; unclear: 37). Chase-Smith (1993) notes (referring to the experience of the Chiquitano in Bolivia's Lomerio Forestry Management Project) that "When forest management also has to provide income for local peoples and their organization, it becomes a task demanding business experience...Indians...have never kept accounts...and [community organizations responsible for management] are selected by...a delicate political process based on consensus." Bebbington et al. (1992:17) further underscore this issue, stating that "at the administrative level, lack of expertise in modern accounting methods is perhaps the thorniest problem," often leading to misplaced money and accusations of impropriety where they may not exist. Such lack of managerial experience nearly devastated the now powerful Federation of Indian Organizations of the Napo (FOIN) soon after its formation. Leon (1987) reports that "In the early 1970s, FOIN received from a European aid organization a grant of a size that it had never managed. Managerial problems lost them not only their funding, but, more importantly, the confidence and support of much of their constituent communities." Since that time, FOIN has received training on management and record keeping, received new funding, and regained the support of local communities.

Support organizations can also play an important role in providing information concerning markets, as well as helping indigenous communities develop the necessary vertical integration with markets. In a number of cases examined, support organizations played a critical role in identifying or developing markets for nontraditional indigenous products. Cases examined in detail for which such assistance was provided include 8, 11, 21, 29, and 41. Cultural Survival, for example, has sought to provide this service to communities through Cultural Survival Inc., developing markets for such

products as Rainforest Crunch (Clay 1992) (see Box 16). In the Jalq'a weaving case, the development team—ASUR—worked tirelessly to establish markets through art exhibits (Healy 1992).

Box 16: Market Support

Cultural Survival and Brazil Nuts (Clay 1992)
While Cultural Survival started as an advocacy group, they soon realized that "...it is also necessary to get involved in negotiations to give [indigenous peoples] a better price for their products. Otherwise, a group will enter the market economy at the bottom—and stay there forever. People who are discriminated against socially and culturally can't be expected to compete as equals in the marketplace" (p. 31). Cultural Survival helped mostly nonindigenous brazil nut gatherers in Acre, Brazil, improve their marketing power by removing middlemen, transport systems, and processing. In 1989, nut gatherers received only 4-5 cents/lb, only 2-3 percent of the New York wholesale price. The remainder of the value went to traders and nut-shelling factories. A cooperative to transport nuts was organized, doubling the income. In 1990, a nut-processing plant was constructed, and communities continue to work to add value to local products. The long term viability of co-ops relies on diversifying production and income. As Clay (p. 34) notes, "The less dependent a co-op is on one product or buyer, the less it risks financial failure."

Another area where technical support can provide significant benefits is in training to develop baseline and follow-up surveys of land use, tenure data, social factors, economic conditions, and land inventories. This was clearly seen in 4 successful cases (9, 19, 31, 33), though information was not available for most cases. Such information serves as an important tool for evaluating project success and possible negative impacts. When indigenous peoples choose to alter economic, political, and social organizations in the process of development, the potential details of how this may affect the overall culture is never clear. As mentioned, health and nutrition are a primary concern. In addition, the roles and status of women have often been negatively affected by changing economic strategies. For example, while Smith (1977) judged the autonomous development of weaving in San Pedro, Guatemala, as a great success, Ehlers (1990) found that this development took place largely through exploitative labor of women and loss of women's economic and political status. Monitoring of development, with inclusion of male and female researchers, would help to identify the emergence of such problems, giving the developing group the opportunity to affect their development before such patterns become entrenched. Stiles (1987) argues that one key to success lies in follow-up work with communities by someone with the ability to keep an open mind, listen, and who has basic a understanding of the traditional and modern socioeconomics of the area. Training indigenous organizations' personnel, or members of the community itself, to carry out monitoring and follow-up surveys and studies is one alternative to searching for outside individuals with these skills. As mentioned, social scientists should play an important role in such training and monitoring (Cernea 1991).

c. Support Providers

As Table 5 shows, **nonindigenous organizations, such as NGOs or international development agencies, can play an important role in providing assistance. In approaching communities, trust-building activities and the ability to speak the indigenous language can be of central**

importance in overcoming a history that has left indigenous peoples wary of outside agencies. In the case of the forestry project in Quintana Roo (Bray et al. 1993:39), for example, a German technical team brought in by the government to provide ideas and support "quickly met with rejection from the Maya, who had learned through long and bitter experience that little good came from outside." In addition, the team spoke no Maya and was trying to promote management ideas that fell outside local concern. After restructuring the project to meet local concerns, assistance was accepted. In many cases, trust-building activities may need to precede actual assistance. This was seen in 8 cases (10, 11, 28, 30, 31, 36, 40, 37). For some projects, traditional means were used to develop local support. Among the Jalq'a of Bolivia, this involved gaining the acceptance of local deities (Healy 1992), while among the Zapotec of Oaxaca, it involved building support through local fiestas (Peasant Solidarity Group of Quiatoni and Martinez 1992).

Table 5: Groups That Provided Technical Support

	Successful Cases	Unsuccessful Cases
Government	**46%** (3, 8, 10, 12, 18, 19, 21, 22, 29, 30, 33, 36, 41)	**38%** (5, 20, 40)
Local or National NGO	**32%** (4, 8, 9, 10, 11, 22, 30, 33, 38)	**13%** (6)
International funding or development agency	**25%** (2, 4, 8, 13, 24, 29, 33)	**25%** (6, 27)
2nd or 3rd level indigenous political organization	**21%** (2, 9, 10, 11, 16, 31)	**25%** (6, 7)
2nd or 3rd level indigenous producers union	**11%** (4, 19, 42)	**13%** (40)
Other non-local indigenous organizations	**7%** (22, 31)	**0%**
Missionary Groups	**25%** (3, 16, 22, 33, 36, 38, 39)	**25%** (20, 34)
International NGO	**14%** (8, 31, 33, 42)	**13%** (15)

Indigenous development often requires long-term commitments from support organizations. Wali (1990:13) in an examination of ethnic revitalization and development in Chile states that "The process of maintaining ethnicity by fostering community autonomy, acceptance, and responsibility clearly results in a slower pace of economic development than some theorists would find acceptable. It also may involve higher commitments of staff time and resources by NGOs. Yet these projects have harnessed the opportunity to continue growing in sustainable ways because they have been responsive to community norms and elicited community participation. They suggest that other indigenous groups also can find their way in a changing world if they are empowered to explore the potential of their own technologies and social institutions and mold them to the needs of

development." Often, NGOs, international development organizations, and other groups that view indigenous development in terms of packaged "projects" or "programs" do not provide the extended input necessary to support long-term development. The Jalq'a weaving project in Bolivia, however, provides an excellent example of the kind of detailed input that is often necessary to make a project work and to which most nonlocal organizations simply cannot commit (see Box 17).

Box 17: Long-Term, Detailed Technical Support

***Antropólogos del Sur Andino* and Technical Support for the Jalq'a** (Healy 1992)
The reintroduction and marketing of traditional weaving among the 76 Jalq'a families of Irupampa, Bolivia, is a case in which the factors of successful development were achieved directly through intensive outside technical assistance for every stage of development. In 1985, two Bolivian anthropologists formed the group ASUR (*Antropólogos del Sur Andino*) and received a grant from IAF. Their goal was to reintroduce the lost art of fine designs into traditional weaving, raising incomes and revitalizing a community that had been experiencing a loss of cohesion and cultural erosion. While a fluency in Quechua and expertise in Andean textiles were considerable advantages for the duo, their greatest asset was that they were "more interested in the Jalq'a as a people than as artisans who could be trained to be economically productive" (p. 26).

While ASUR was responsible for introducing the development idea to the community, the project was founded in consultation with the local peasant organization and proceeded at a pace determined by participants. ASUR realized that the first priority of the project must be cultural revaluation, and they sought to "create a space in which the entire community could explore the cultural roots" (p. 27). They also used traditional means of gaining acceptance, such as asking a shaman to conduct a ritual to consult traditional mountain deities in the inauguration of a community workshop.

A primary goal of support was to establish self-sufficiency. ASUR recruited teachers from experienced women in nearby communities, developing a corp of 20 master weavers to teach others. To help revive the lost art of creating fine designs, ASUR also brought an archive of pictures of over 300 traditional motifs for women to base their work on.

ASUR "realized that revival of Jalq'a weaving depended on the renewal of Jalq'a culture, but they also knew that the revival would not long survive unless it became economically viable" (p. 32). After 2 years, ASUR collected the best textiles for display in Sucre, followed by a larger display at the *Museo Nacional de Arte* in La Paz. ASUR also brought the exhibit to Paris, Geneva, and Washington DC. Using exhibits to familiarize the public with the art, ASUR helped to create a market and sold the works in museum shops.

To support long-term autonomous development and the numerous microenterprises that were being established around the weaving trade, ASUR initiated literacy training as well as courses in accounting and business management. In addition, "ASUR is constantly working with the Jalq'a to seek ways to add value and cut costs" (p. 33).

The importance of this manner of assistance is underscored by the fact that past projects with similar goals had failed, despite knowledgeable technicians, because of a "mutual incomprehension that prevailed between project managers and potential beneficiaries" (p. 26). Javier Medina, an official of the *Fondo de Inversión Social*, believes that this model can be spread throughout the country. In fact, when an "international development agency's effort to promote a crafts program among the people of Tarabuco began floundering...ASUR was asked to step in" (p. 32). Using the methodology developed among the Jalq'a, ASUR helped to organize communal workshops, reinforced local ritual life, and reintroduced traditional yarns, resulting in another success story. With financial assistance from the International Labor Organization of the UN and COTESU (the development arm of the Swiss government), ASUR workshops have spread to 5 additional communities.

One of the benefits of support from missionary groups and the Catholic Church has been the long time frame in which they have been involved with indigenous communities. Missionary or church support served an important role in 7 cases of successful development (3, 16, 22, 33, 36, 38, 39), though it was likely a factor in even more cases. While missionary groups and the Catholic Church have received considerable criticism for their historical role in destabilizing and conquering "traditional" indigenous peoples, they have come to play a central role among many indigenous communities. Increasingly, religious groups have become involved in providing political, economic, and technical support to indigenous communities (see boxes 9 and 18).

Box 18: A Missionary Profile

A Jesuit and the Yekuana (Frechione 1981)

Juan Basco (pseudonym) represented the Civil Society of the Friends of Jesus the Worker. This Jesuit organization was headquartered in Caracas, Venezuela, in the Technical Institute of Jesus the Worker, a vocational high school. Basco came to Venezuela from Spain where he received his education in mechanics and electronics. His desire was to undertake missionary work which would be based upon a practical, applied approach. He intended to direct training programs in technical material in the underdeveloped countries of the world. Basco spent 12 years developing programs and teaching in the Institute before becoming involved in the *Unión Makiritare del Alto Ventuari* indigenous development project. During this period, he became disenchanted with the traditional missionary system prevalent in Venezuela and other less-developed countries. He felt that the system lacked respect for the indigenous peoples affected by it. He noted (personal communication to Frechione, July 1978) that "It [the mission system] is a basically integrative, dominate-subordinate system. The missionary arrives in the area, bringing his own style of life, erecting his house and church and having the Indians, more or less, work for him. The Indian is introduced to the monetary system and made to function within that system. The culture of the Indian is largely ignored or, in fact, repudiated."

In 1970, Basco designed a proposal for applying his approach to missionary work. The guiding principles of his approach were a respect for the indigenous culture and the provision of aid and support to the people with "no strings attached." Basco traveled to the Gran Sabana area of Venezuela to locate a site where his plan might be implemented. The initiation of his project in the Gran Sabana was, however, undermined by political problems. Basco discussed his ideas and concerns about indigenous development with an anthropologist who worked in the La Salle Foundation in Caracas. This anthropologist introduced Basco to a Yekuana Amerindian named Pedro (pseudonym), whose work with his fellow Yekuana was known by this anthropologist. In late 1971, Basco presented his proposal for an indigenous development project to a skeptical Pedro. Past experience had taught Pedro that promises of support for such projects from the government and from other institutions frequently went unfulfilled. At the time, Pedro had no immediate plans to return permanently to the Ventuari region. After approximately four months of meetings and discussions, Pedro tentatively agreed to participate in the development project, but only if substantial aid was forthcoming. Basco and Pedro both agreed that development in the tropical forest area could be achieved only with the assistance of modern equipment and technology. They decided that they did not want to arrive in the forest with "only a machete."

Basco felt that a community-based organization with judicial and legal powers was absolutely necessary for the proper functioning of the development project. Pedro and Basco agreed that the indigenous inhabitants of the area required their own economic development not only to enhance their quality of life, but also to provide them with the economic and political power to function as a viable interest group within the Venezuelan national system. UMAV would be the legal arm of the Yekuana, with its power based upon the success of its economic sector.

External support should be oriented towards increasing indigenous peoples' control over the development process. Clay (1987) warns that while local development can benefit from outside ideas and funds, there is a danger that communities will become dependent on these sources or specialists. Reed (1987:16) further warns that non-Indian agencies often offer solutions that include "non-Indian personnel and objectives that conflict with indigenous values and goals." Finally, Chase-Smith (1987:8) warns that "it is also clear that unless Indian groups have a clear platform for their own autonomous development and insist on it as a condition for their alliance, they will end up as the subordinated partner." In some cases, nonindigenous organizations take responsibility for project management in the initial phases of development (5, 18, 19, 21, 23, 24, 27, 41). Often this is to enable local individuals to be adequately trained. There is always the danger that support organizations will balk at giving up control. This was the case in the Chiquitano forestry project (see Box 19). Chase-Smith (1987) argued that, at times, it is better for indigenous groups to bypass NGOs and go directly to funding sources to avoid such power struggles. Yet, in most cases, indigenous groups initially lack the organization and necessary skills to do so.

Box 19: Management Support and the Problem of Control

The Chiquitano Forestry Project, Bolivia
Management of the Chiquitano Forestry Project was initially controlled by the NGO responsible for bringing the project to the community, *Apoyo para las Comunidades Indígenas del Oriente Boliviano* (APCOB), in the name of the *Central InterComunal del Oriente Lomerio* (CICOL). APCOB assumed responsibility for managing funds, carrying out technical functions, and maintaining political relations with the government. In the second phase of the project, CICOL began to challenge APCOB's control, which led to an internal dispute within APCOB concerning its role in the project and undermined the internal equilibrium of the project. APCOB then withdrew from the project entirely.

For many projects, the best hope of ensuring long-term support and local control is to train indigenous peoples to organize and maintain support networks themselves and provide their organizations with the necessary linkages to other organizations, funding sources, inputs, and training. In several cases, outside technicians helped to train local individuals, who then trained others in the community. In the Jalq'a weaving project (Healy 1992), the anthropological team was able to develop a training corps of local women, who were then used to train others. In other cases, indigenous support organizations developed at a secondary or tertiary level of organization (i.e., serving multiple communities), serving separately from organizations responsible for project management. Technical support was provided by indigenous organizations in 15 cases (successful cases: 2, 4, 10, 16, 19, 28, 31, 42; unsuccessful: 6, 7, 40; unclear: 1, 32, 35, 37). Such support networks (typically federations or unions) do not face many of the problems of traditional technical assistance providers in terms of language barriers, mistrust, and limited availability. Nine Zapotec communities of Oaxaca, Mexico, involved in forestry, for example, organized a union funded by the communities to provide technical assistance and promote development alternatives (Castaneda 1992). In Peru, AIDESEP helped to train Achuar regional councils to demarcate their land (Reed 1987).

Macro-level indigenous political organizations are serving an increasing role both in funneling and directly providing assistance. Organizations such as the Federation of Indian Organizations of the

Napo [FOIN] or the Center for Indigenous Peoples and Communities of Eastern Bolivia [CIDOB] have received increasing attention for their real and potential role in supporting local community development. In addition to directly providing assistance, Bebbington et al. (1992:20) notes that "federations can broker this transaction and potentially become a potent force for multiplying its effect." Reed (1987) argues of indigenous organizations that "as a collectivity, local groups can share expertise and resources beyond those of any single group, [and] confederations develop the strength of numbers to articulate Indians' demands to regional power brokers, national governments and international agencies." An example of the potential of these organizations is seen in CIDOB's role in providing assistance to Bolivia's Ayoreode community of Zapoco. Reed (1987:19) notes that CIDOB's "ability to marshal expertise and funds to defend the communities' land and timber has been at the heart of this grassroots development." For the Huasteca of Mexico, changes in state policy towards decentralization of support networks served to provide indigenous organizations with a powerful indigenous support network funded by the government (see Box 20) (Ariel de Vidas 1993).

Bebbington (1996:1174-1175) warns that while these organizations have great potential, care must be taken in having such organizations assume additional roles. He states that "if policy makers were to ask the federations to perform many additional roles for which they are not adequately prepared, then this could do more damage than good to the organizations. It would overburden them with administrative complications, and swamp their still fragile management capacity. Similarly, any rapid increase in the financial resources passing through these organizations would be likely to create both strains and inappropriate incentives, and could encourage dishonesty and corruption as easily in them as in government or NGOs."

Experience of other indigenous organizations could serve an important role in helping to train personnel from newly formed organizations and indigenous development enterprises and was seen in 3 cases: 2 successful and 1 unclear in project outcomes (22, 31, 32). In project LETIMARIN and PUMAREN, for example, indigenous technical staff visited the Kuna's project Pemasky in Costa Rica and received intensive training by Kuna who visited Ecuador. Training in forest management was also received by the Yanesha Forestry Cooperative (Shiguango et al. 1993, MacDonald 1992).

In general, these organizations are likely to require extended assistance in gaining access to resources, financial support, and appropriate technology, among other things. While local NGOs and religious organizations serve an important role, some state support is required.

2. The Role of the State

Some level of support (even if benign neglect) for indigenous self-development within the state is critical to any chance for successful development by indigenous peoples. Nation-states and their governments are central players in the success of indigenous development, having a direct or indirect impact on essentially every factor discussed in this report—through direct action, policy, and state programs (see Table 6). In at least 64 percent of the successful cases and 63 percent of the unsuccessful cases, the government undertook some action to aid the project or program. Generally, states can help to ensure a supportive legal, political, economic, and social climate. More specifically, states could serve a key role in making financial and technical support available.

Table 6: State Policy and Action

	Successful Projects	Unsuccessful Projects	Unclear Projects
State undertook direct action to aid project or program.	**18 cases - 64%** (3, 8, 10, 12, 17, 18, 19, 21, 22, 24, 25, 29, 33, 36, 38, 39, 28, 41)	**5 cases - 63%** (5, 6, 20, 27, 40)	**0**
State provided some degree of technical support.	**13 cases - 46%** (3, 8, 10, 12, 18, 19, 21, 22, 29, 30, 33, 36, 41)	**3 cases - 63%** (5, 20, 40)	**0**
Development positively affected by state policy.	**10 cases - 36%** (3, 8, 10, 12, 19, 33, 36, 38, 39, 41)	**2 cases - 25%** (20, 27)	**0**
Development negatively affected by state policy.	**6 cases - 21%** (12, 22, 25, 31, 33, 38)	**5 cases - 63%** (5, 6, 15, 27, 34)	**2 cases - 33%** (1, 32)

The involvement of the state is complicated by the fact that a modern state is not a homogeneous entity, but a complex structure wherein conflicting interests representing a society's power relations occupy different positions and are in constant competition. This heterogeneity is further complicated by government changes over time. The complex effect this can have on indigenous development is highlighted by the presence of positive and negative state impacts on individual cases (see Table 6). For example, the efforts of one agency to aid indigenous development can be hindered by the efforts of another to support national resource development. Heinen and Coppens (1986:365) note that, for Venezuela, "at one point we counted more than 20 government agencies involved with indigenous affairs in the state of Bolívar alone." Thus, we believe that an official voice within the state representing indigenous interests and development and possessing adequate financial resources may be most beneficial. The higher the level of this agency within the government structure, the more likely it will be successful at supporting indigenous development endeavors.

The state is the primary, if not only, institution that can ensure that legal mechanisms and physical infrastructure necessary to support development efforts are in place. The state is responsible for land titling, as well as resource concessions, and may be the only institution with sufficient coercive power to ensure that resource rights are respected. The state also is responsible for recognizing and ensuring the political and human rights of the indigenous peoples as citizens, with the right to vote and to participation and representation in the political system. Existing state institutions and infrastructure also could serve a valuable role in making bilingual education available to indigenous populations, as well as ensuring access to health care. Moreover, the state is in a position to promote the education of its nonindigenous population in the values of multiculturalism and ethnic diversity, enhancing the general population's view of its indigenous cocitizens. In addition, Annis (1987) notes that "income-generating projects ... lose their impact in the absence of physical infrastructure." He argues that "Small farmers, for instance, also need water to irrigate their crops, roads to get their crops to market, and markets in which to sell their produce. Yet projects designed to build or improve infrastructure—whether housing, potable water, irrigation,

or roads—can rarely be carried out independently of the greater financial resources and legal authority of the state."

States could also serve a primary role in providing long-term access to financial and technical assistance. To do so, government personnel must work on building trust among communities for government support programs. While most governments have a poor track record concerning support of indigenous development, Mexico's INI has implemented projects that have benefitted rural populations. Recent efforts to give greater resource allocation power to indigenous councils has seen success among the Huasteca of Veracruz, who have taken advantage of this change (see Box 20). Unfortunately, this regional funding strategy was already in demise by around 1993-94 (Fox 1994) and, in mid-1996, there were proposals to dismantle the development functions of INI, leaving it as only a research organization. Its development functions were to be transferred to other government ministries, making it unlikely that indigenous-sensitive development would occur.

Box 20: State Support and Indigenous Organizations

Huasteca development and the State (Ariel De Vidas 1993)
The *Organización Campesina Popular Independiente de la Huasteca Veracruzana* (OCPIHV) began as a somewhat militant organization opposed to the state, with a primary focus on reclaiming land. Over time, OCPIHV has redefined its relationship to the state, learning to take advantage of recent state programs that sought to decentralize development efforts, giving the organization considerable power and autonomy to pursue indigenous development.

In the mid 1980s, the OCPIHV movement that began as a fight for land in the 1970s transformed into fight to control the production and commercial process of the region. The demands of self-management of the organizations coincided at this time with a burgeoning process of state decentralization. In 1990, the *Fondo Regional de Solidaridad* (FRS) of Chicontepec was formed as a branch of PRONASOL, a new government program to aid rural communities. In this region, FRS was made up of 5 organizations of producers. Each organization has representatives in the directive council and the general assembly. FRS is responsible for evaluating and approving projects for funding. Individual organizations are responsible for executing projects, with the technical support of INI (paid for by FRS). OCPIHV was able to procure a significant role within this new framework, as it was the only organization with social and political proposals. Most other indigenous organizations opposed FRS and the *Instituto Nacional Indigenista* (INI), seeking independence rather than participation. OCPIHV succeeded in initiating a number of projects incorporating cattle, beans, chilies, and corn in 37 communities with 1131 beneficiaries.

OCPIHV also pursued other avenues of government support. Various ranching projects received funding through Banrural and the *Secretaría de Agricultura y Recursos Hidráulicos* (SARH). Funding for maize and bean projects were pursued through *Recursos Municipales Básicos* and the *Secretaría de Desarrollo Social* (Sedesol). The *Fondo Nacional de Empresas en Solidaridad* (Fonaes) supported a chile project through FRS and SARH. Projects were also initiated with the *Programa de Mujeres en Solidaridad* (such as chicken farming). OCPIHV also managed cultural recovery programs within the framework of the *Fondos de Solidaridad para la Promoción del Patrimonio Cultural de los Pueblos Indígenas*, supported by INI through FRS. Such programs helped, with economic programs, to reinforce indigenous identity in the face of local oppression.

In many cases, one of the greatest supportive roles a nation-state could play would be as sustainer of political and economic stability over time; thereby, providing a secure sociopolitical environment for indigenous evolution and development. One of the problems with policy that has affected indigenous people has been the significant fluctuations that have accompanied every coup or election. This is apparent in many Latin American countries and is demonstrated by the Quichua's experience in Ecuador (see Box 21).

Box 21: Political Stability

The Federation of Indian Organizations of the Napo and the Ecuadorian State (MacDonald 1992)
In the late 1970s and early 1980s, the Office of Indian Affairs (OIA) and the Fund for Development of the Urban and Rural Marginal Populations (FODERUMA) helped strengthen and draw FOIN into the national political scene. OIA helped many indigenous groups obtain essential corporate status and helped some communities gain land titles. Also, the Forest Law of 1981 supported indigenous interests and enabled them to look for alternatives to ranching. In 1984, however, a change in government administration resulted in a shift of focus to the development of the Amazon. The role of the OIA changed from support to directorate, undermining the role indigenous groups were forming for themselves. FODERUMA began directly funding communities, which was interpreted by older indigenous organizations as an effort to establish hegemony over Indian communities and weaken federations. This forced FOIN and others into a defensive posture.

3. Summary: Financial, Technical and State Support

In most successful and unsuccessful cases of development, outside financial and technical assistance was received—suggesting that while this is an important factor, assistance in itself is no guarantee of success. Our review of the cases indicates no clear strategy for providing financial assistance, as the specifics on how money was used and to whom it was provided were rarely available. Generally, funding should be provided without "strings attached" that do not relate directly to the program for which funding is targeted. Funding agents should be wary of corruption at the level to which funding is provided and ensure that finances reach their objectives. It is clear that indigenous peoples need greater access to credit; however, this must be accompanied by a relatively stable economy. For communities that are just beginning the process of revaluation and organization, grants may be preferable to loans.

It has also become clear that sufficient training and technical assistance should be given on all aspects necessary to implement and manage the development program by organizations who have the best interests of indigenous recipients in mind, do not have separate agendas, and who can provide long-term support. The goal of technical support should be to foster the highest degree of autonomy and self-determination possible given the nature of the development program. Priority should be given to developing the means for indigenous peoples to analyze their own cultures within a broader context. We found that one of the most critical areas of support lies in providing the necessary knowledge and skills to run projects as business enterprises, which must include training in accounting. While nonindigenous, nonlocal organizations can play an important role in providing assistance, in many cases trust-building activities may be needed to overcome a history of negative

experiences with outsiders, and such organizations may be unable to provide the extended support network that is necessary. We found that indigenous-run support networks often overcame these obstacles and suggest that where such networks are absent, nonindigenous support organizations may do best by helping them to develop.

Finally, nation-states and their governments are clearly central players in the success of indigenous development, having a direct or indirect impact on essentially every variable discussed in this report. States are responsible for ensuring that the legal framework, as well as necessary physical infrastructure, is in place to support indigenous peoples. States can provide a policy atmosphere that supports indigenous projects and peoples and can serve an important role in providing long-term financial and technical support. In many cases, the state would prove most effective by providing some political and economic stability over time; thereby, providing a secure sociopolitical environment for indigenous evolution and development.

III. CONCLUSIONS

One of the questions that was initially raised in putting together this work was: What is it that makes indigenous peoples different in terms of development concerns? It is our belief that, on the one hand, indigenous peoples are different as a group because they share a history of colonial repression. Perhaps more importantly, indigenous peoples are looked at as different by external power structures. Negative external categorizations of indigenous people continue, as do the abuses they suffer as a result of such views. What is more, state policy and action often distinguish indigenous peoples as different, even when espousing a nationalist rhetoric. Such observations do little, however, in terms of illuminating specific schemes with which to approach indigenous development.

The truth is that there are many more distinctions than similarities among indigenous groups, and it is clear from the review of specific cases and of the broader literature that no general recipe exists from which successful cases of indigenous development have been produced. Each case is unique, with its own permutations and quirks, from the sociocultural aspects of the groups involved to the constantly changing national and global environments, which establish important and sometimes crucial conditions that shape adaptations/developments.

A. Findings

Bearing this diversity in mind, there were several important findings concerning the significance of a number of the broader sets of variables that are presented in Table 2. Taking into consideration the limitations of the data utilized in this report—in terms of comparability, reliability, and scope—we found the following of particular interest and significance.

1. Concerning Development Failure

•Variables associated with broader political-economic problems, primarily related to human rights and the legal framework necessary for development, were significant to the failure of **75 percent** of the cases identified as unsuccessful.

•Problems concerning security over land and natural resources were significant to the failure of **63 percent** of the unsuccessful cases. Concerning this set of variables, it is interesting to note that, although seen as a basic prerequisite for successful indigenous development, issues concerning land and natural resource security contributed significantly to success in only **32 percent** of the successful cases. Land and natural resource security is a prerequisite, but by itself does not appear to significantly promote successful development.

• Problems associated with overall community involvement in the development process, principally related to lack of such involvement, were primary factors involved in the failure of **63 percent** of the unsuccessful cases.

2. Concerning Development Success

•The involvement of local and macrolevel indigenous organizations in the development process was significant to the success of development in **71 percent** of the successful cases. Well-established

indigenous organizations were seen to serve many roles—from political empowerment to project management.

•Issues concerning the provision of financial and technical assistance were significant to the success of **64 percent** of the successful cases. Examination of these cases, and the fact that financial assistance was provided in 71 percent of successful and 88 percent of unsuccessful cases and technical assistance in 89 percent of the successful and 88 percent of the unsuccessful cases, suggests that this significance depended more on how and for what such assistance was provided than simply on its availability.

•Knowledge and skills necessary for the development project or program were significant to the success of **61 percent** of the successful cases. Seventy-seven percent of these cases involved using or building on traditional knowledge.

•Issues concerning marketing and economies of scale were discussed as significant to the success of **55 percent** of the successful cases that involved marketing, and significant to the failure of **57 percent** of the poor cases that involved marketing.

•Finally, while many cases made no mention of cultural revaluation or ethnic strengthening, in **43 percent** of the successful cases it was discussed as central to development success.

B. Indigenous Development Scenario

When these broader findings are combined with the vast array of specific factors discussed in this report and found in the general literature on the subject, a scenario that might approach a suitable ecumenical model for indigenous development begins to emerge. At present, this scenario is very broadly painted and impressionistic. It would include, but not be limited to, the following.

1. Outside Support

•**State Support:** Without some support (or, at least, benign neglect) from the nation-state(s) in which they reside, indigenous development efforts are likely to fail. An official voice within the state representing indigenous interests and development and possessing adequate financial resources greatly stimulates indigenous development projects. The higher the level of this agency within the government structure, the more likely it will be successful at supporting indigenous development endeavors. Such an agency can help to ensure that legal mechanisms are in place to implement various aspects of the development structure, beginning, most importantly, with the capability to provide secure and definitive title to communally held lands, waters, and other resources located in/on indigenous territories.

•**Objective, Nonpartisan, and Long-Term Financial and Technical Assistance:** Theoretically, with this type of aid, the participants are able to plan and direct their own cultural and economic development. However, financial assistance is rarely distributed without the expectation of returns, and the expectation is often of some type of economic success. In indigenous development projects, evaluations of "success" should focus on general improvements in the overall quality of life (especially as perceived by the indigenous peoples) rather than on economic success in the sense of generating profits and paying back aid (plus interest). The time period for which technical assistance

will be necessary will vary greatly, but aid providers should plan from the beginning to be in for the long-term. An important aspect of assistance is to attempt to free indigenous peoples from exploitative outsiders, ensure access to markets, and encourage focus on products that fit a market niche or the sufficient pooling of resources to compete in the broader markets.

•**Development Planners, Implementers, and Advisors Knowledgeable about and Sensitive to the Targeted Sociocultural System:** Such "sponsoring" organization personnel, from the state, NGOs, religious missions, international development agencies, or any combination thereof, should be well-educated about the target group (in some cases, this may include fluency in the indigenous language) and should carry the least amount of baggage as possible in the sense of their own agenda.

•**Training Programs:** Training programs or courses for indigenous participants, and that are appropriate for the development activities being undertaken, should be available and will enable the indigenous peoples to more quickly take control of the development process. Thus, programs might involve training in administration, law, accounting, health, pedagogy, agronomy, forestry, veterinary medicine, language, etc. Such programs should be administered or assisted by persons knowledgeable about and sensitive to the sociocultural system of the target group. Training should include general education (preferably bilingual when appropriate) and literacy training which serves to enhance indigenous group self-analysis and organization-building capabilities, while reducing the potential for outside exploitation.

2. Indigenous Group(s) Characteristics

•**Desire to Participate in Development:** Naturally, groups that actually desire to undertake development activities, generally to have greater access to western goods, education, and health care, will be better positioned for success than groups upon which development is imposed for any number of reasons.

•**History of Ability to Effectively Organize against Imposed Domination:** Some of the tribal-level indigenous groups (Shuar, Kuna, Kayapo, Yekuana) that are currently most successful in development efforts have a history of being able to organize the relatively autonomous, and quite often wholly antagonistic, communities and villages that constitute the group at a "pan-tribal" (or partially pan-tribal) level for a greater good when faced with an outside threat and, then, to return to relatively autonomous units once the threat has dissipated. This organizational ability is an important ingredient in development endeavors and may be based on a fairly high degree of shared self-identity/group solidarity, thus, viewing one another as members of a group in contradistinction to "others" in the face of a widespread threat. It is interesting to note that many of the groups are also perceived by outsiders as quite aggressive. They have literally fought off encroachment into their territories by Spaniards during the colonial period (Shuar and Yekuana), national governments after the independence era (Kuna), national resource exploiters like miners, loggers, and ranchers in more recent times (Kayapo), and even other indigenous groups (Shuar vs. Inka and Yekuana vs. Yanomamo). Their fierce reputations often serve to keep representatives of the national society out of their territories as well as development agents from trying to work with them. Given these considerations, development agents may often actually be shying away from groups that represent "best-bets" for success. It is significant that many of the most successful indigenous development projects had their roots in effective resistance movements.

•**Significant Degree of Group Solidarity and Pride:** Indigenous groups possessing a significant degree of group solidarity and esteem (pride/dignity) in their own cultures appear to be more likely to be able to organize autonomous development as well as at what would, traditionally, be artificially higher and more complex levels as noted above. Such groups also are able to coordinate a relatively

large number of peoples, which is often a very useful ingredient in resistance movements or development activities.

•**Tradition of Communal Sharing/Reciprocity:** The existence of some degree of communal sharing/reciprocity as a cultural value, even if only at the extended household or small community level, appears to facilitate introduced cooperative development activities. This represents one of those "traditional" characteristics seen as so important, and considered necessary to maintain, in development projects by indigenous self-development advocates. Such a "tradition" also is likely to favor reinvestment of profits to community/development enterprises rather than to individuals.

•**Subsistence Self-Sufficiency or Food Security:** Groups that are less dependent on imported food items and modern technology have a greater chance of surviving the vicissitudes of national and international markets in relation to specific development activities. Thus, for example, if prices for the products of their development projects drop, they will better be able to weather such changing conditions than would groups who depend solely on the income of their production to buy essential foods.

3. At the Outside Support/Indigenous Group Interface

•The crucial ingredient at this linkage point is mutual respect between outside support agents and the indigenous peoples, with the full participation of the target group in all phases of development, including planning, implementation, and management.

C. Preconditions and Goals

Based on the data analysis presented in this report and our review of numerous other sources (which often included input from indigenous peoples), refined preconditions and goals for successful indigenous self-development may be formulated and summarized as follows. We also believe that these fairly represent the aspirations of numerous indigenous advocacy groups as well as of a large number of indigenous spokespersons.

•Regardless of specific development efforts, but potentially aided by the development process, the basic human rights, including full rights as citizens; the right to vote, participate, and be represented in the political system; and the insurance of physical security, of indigenous peoples must be recognized and protected.

•Food security, as an essential component of group health, must be maintained or enhanced by safeguarding activities appropriate to the indigenous culture, whether involving hunting, gathering, farming, fishing, animal husbandry, craft production, wage labor, or any combination thereof. Priority should be accorded to improving health conditions, including attention to potable water, appropriate sanitation measures, and disease prevention.

•Secure (demarcated and definitively titled) property rights to land, water, and other natural resources must be obtained and guaranteed.

•Development efforts oriented towards indigenous peoples must address local concerns and be compatible with autochthonous social, economic, and political systems. To ensure this, indigenous peoples should be involved in planning, implementing, and managing development initiatives.

•Group solidarity, self-esteem, and cultural pride facilitate development programs and should be maintained or revitalized. Locally based bilingual education and literacy training are an important component in achieving this and are essential in helping to provide the human capital for long-term autonomous development.

•The formation of legally constituted management and coordinating organizations, to direct projects and to ensure representation and participation in the national systems, should be encouraged and should be based, when appropriate, on existing indigenous organizing principles.

•In order to economically empower indigenous development efforts there should be: freedom from exploitative labor and market arrangements; appropriate economies of scale and/or market niches; reinvestment of profits into the community and productive enterprises; and diversification of production, particularly towards value-added products.

•Appropriate types of financial assistance, particularly nonpartisan aid provided with the potential for long-term commitment, should be provided to indigenous groups involved in development projects. For initial organizational and development efforts that often have little economic return, much of this assistance should come in the form of grants rather than loans.

•Technical assistance and training programs or courses, that are appropriate for the development activities being undertaken, should be available to indigenous participants. Such assistance should be provided by organizations or individuals who are sensitive to cultural issues, knowledgeable about the targeted indigenous group, and can commit to the long term. The goal should be to establish the greatest degree of indigenous autonomy possible given the development activities.

•Some level of support (even if benign neglect) for indigenous self-development by the state is critical to any chance for successful development by indigenous peoples.

D. Future Directions

As we have already mentioned, it was quite frustrating to assemble cases that offered very much in the way of lessons learned about indigenous development. We were forced to rely heavily on cases documented by Cultural Survival Inc. and the Inter-American Foundation—two organizations whose grassroots development work with indigenous peoples is well known. Much less documentation about experiences was available from what were likely to be the more large-scale efforts of organizations like USAID, the World Bank, and national governments. Further detailed literature searches would likely track down important documents from these groups. One of the primary problems with such development evaluations, however, is that the approaches to development of these organizations are often sectoral, and thus it is difficult to disaggregate analysis relevant to indigenous peoples from other groups.

We also came to recognize that many of the efforts that achieved success were likely to run into difficulties in the long-term sustainability of development. As mentioned under "Theoretical Considerations," we view development as part of an evolutionary process. Thus, documenting the longer-term impacts of projects is quite important. For these reasons, **at the present time we believe that it would be most meaningful to carry out comparative research that would follow**

up on some of the most well-documented cases of indigenous development. For such a project, a single individual (or a small team) would make a selection of cases based on the literature that we have surveyed. We believe that for such a follow-up study it would be most useful to distinguish between "samples" of peasantized and tribal groups, carrying out separate examinations of each. While many differences exist among indigenous peoples within these two broad categories, we believe that more specific and useful analysis could be done by making this analytical distinction. Using a carefully crafted list of enabling conditions, constraints, and indicators (a good start would be to begin with the list contained in Appendix 2), the investigator or team would spend two weeks to a month engaged in a focused, qualitative research effort for each category of indigenous peoples.

Such research would have a number of advantages over work carried out previously. First, the investigator or research team would provide a "common measurement" instrument in their person(s), getting away from the inherent biases that are present in the case studies we have sampled. When many different individuals with very distinctive theoretical, thematic, and ideological orientations study development projects, it is often difficult to adequately interpret their findings in a comparative context. A second advantage of now doing a comparative study is that, because these cases have been previously documented, there would be an opportunity to study the effects of development over a period of time (realistically ranging from 5 to 25 years). This longer-term perspective would be useful in providing pertinent evidence concerning lessons learned about indigenous development schemes. Finally, of course, these investigators would have the advantage of the extensive literature review and recommendations/ hypotheses that we have developed in this research.

In the context of a general comparative study of indigenous development, there also are a number of specific issues that merit attention. Among these are the following:

1. Markets for Indigenous Products

It is apparent that indigenous development will require involvement in production for the world market. We need to determine how indigenous peoples can engage in production that benefits them and their communities—how they can gain a comparative advantage. What market niches can indigenous people most successfully exploit? For example, it has been argued that indigenous knowledge of tropical forests and "traditional" agricultural techniques, if combined with modern technological know-how, could yield economically and ecologically sustainable development (DeWalt 1994; Posey 1983). Yet detailed development and market-oriented studies that could lead to such integration has been limited. Another question that needs to be addressed is if there is, or could be, a market niche based on a strategy of "produced by indigenous people" (i.e., like the marketing of organic products)?

Finally, the long-term role that existing specialized market niches will play to indigenous development is unclear. As the market for organic coffee grows, for example, larger producers are drawn into the picture, competing with indigenous producers. The effect of the radical restructuring of markets taking place throughout Latin America through such agreements as NAFTA is also yet to be determined. How will indigenous producers maintain or strengthen their position as markets continue to grow?

2. Indigenous Political Organizations

From our research, it is apparent that a key element that can contribute to meaningful development is how effectively indigenous communities can mobilize to defend and utilize resources. Some communities have done this very successfully, while others have been much less effective. We need to know if certain forms of "traditional" political organization predispose some groups to be more effective in mobilizing for development. Alternatively, it may be that the ways in which national and state governmental organizations interact with indigenous groups is the key element. Still another topic of investigation is to determine whether effective training programs can be designed to facilitate the formation of indigenous political organizations.

In addition, while some are beginning to look at second- and third-level indigenous political organizations as a possible panacea for indigenous development, others question their ability to serve a sustained role in both politics and development. What are the limits to expansion of these rapidly growing organizations? What is their effectiveness in making transitions from fighting for land and human rights to managing and developing newly acquired communal resources? What are the key factors that enable them to their maintain local-level support once territories have been granted and there is no longer an overarching message or goal around which constituents can be mobilized?

3. Maintenance of Community Cohesion during Economic Development

As we stated earlier, development implies that there will be winners and losers in the process of change. The introduction or development of new resources may lead to much greater conflict within indigenous communities as people struggle to gain greater control over resources, and economic stratification replaces traditional hierarchies. It is important to examine instances in which these struggles have not led to substantial divisiveness. What have been the conditions under which community cohesion has been maintained and/or enhanced during the process of development? Can models for maintaining community cooperation and cohesion be developed and applied to other development projects?

4. Broader Government Policy toward Indigenous Peoples

Another important finding of our research was how critical the legal framework is within which indigenous communities operate. A myriad of laws and changes in regulatory frameworks affecting indigenous peoples have been promulgated within Latin American countries over the past twenty years. We need to determine which of these legal and regulatory frameworks have been most effective for promoting the development of indigenous communities. We also need to determine which laws and other mechanisms have been most inimical to development of indigenous peoples. In addition, what are the conditions that have made states willing to change policy frameworks to better favor indigenous interests? Through such a comparative study, it may be possible for international organizations like the World Bank to recommend legal frameworks that are more beneficial than others in promoting or enhancing development agendas.

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Appendix 1
Case Matrices

Case No. 1

Group & Location	**Achuar of lowland Peru**
Source	Reed, Richard. 1987. "Federations of Indian Communities: Strategies for Grassroots Development," *Cultural Survival Quarterly* 11(1):16-20.
Project Focus & Components	Land demarcation project
Scale & Time Frame	(not discussed - article focus primarily on actions of the *Asociación Interétnica de Desarollo de la Selva Peruana* - AIDESEP)
Land Security	Tenuous. Land and resources increasingly threatened by private industry and national development policies. Govt. not proceeding with assurances to demarcate land, thus the project.
Idea Initiation	Encroachment on Achuar land, and lack of government response, caused Achuar to seek out assistance in demarcating land from AIDESEP.
Setting Agenda & Priorities	"Rather than continuing to depend on external agencies, the Achuar have established their own program to define the extent of their landholdings and press these claims to the national land reform bureaucracies. (20)"
Knowledge and Skills	Achuar lacked resources or expertise, so turned to AIDESEP.
Technology	(not discussed)
Organization	Achuar organized to address problem. AIDESEP organized in early 1980 as coalition of indigenous groups of the Peruvian tropical forest. By 1987 represented over 50% of 220,000 indians in area. Seeks to build on existing relations within and between communities to create regional alliances. "While AIDESEP maintains a presence and a program at the national and international levels, its strength remains firmly rooted in its decentralized, federated structure in the Peruvian Amazon (20)." Local communities form regional agencies that seek local solutions. Delegates link to form pan-ethnic representative entity.
Culture and Ethnicity	(not discussed)
Financial Assistance	AIDESEP solicited funds, on behalf of Achuar, from Cultural Survival for surveys and legal procedures. "AIDESEP does not attempt to acquire or accumulate the capital to undertake economic development projects directly .... leaders suggest that such a procedure would have the undesirable consequence of creating an independent agency with power over local groups and resources.... Task... is to provide the arena in which diverse Indian groups can share various resources and experiences to solve mutual problems (20)."
Technical Assistance	AIDESEP has provided training to regional council, and is undertaking studies of necessary legal procedures.
Project Management	Achuar
Community Involvement	(Not discussed at this level. Article refers generally to "Achuar")
Govt. Involvement	Despite assurances, govt. has not began to define extent of Achuar land for reservation status. Govt. development policies also supporting encroachment on the Indian land.
Marketing	(not a factor)
Other	
Overall Success	Not clear: project in very early stages, but shows important role that indigenous federations can play.

Case No. 2

Group & Location	**Ayoreode of Zapoco, province of Nuflo de Chavez, Santa Cruz, Bolivia**
Sources	Reed, Richard 1987 "Federations of Indian Communities: Strategies for Grassroots Development." *CS Quarterly* 11(1):16-20. Davis, Shelton 1985 "The Ayoreode-Zapoco Communal Sawmill: A Social Forestry Project in Eastern Bolivia." *Grassroots Development* 9(2):2-9.
Project Focus & Components	Construction of a sawmill and self-management of a modern logging operation. Combined with development of a cooperative store, agricultural promotion program, and women's craft production.
Scale & Time Frame	One old mission community of 140. Plans began in 1982. Lumbering operation operating for 3 years at time of report.
Land Security	Prior concessions to outside lumber companies to indigenous land. Appears that land is titled and communal.
Idea Initiation	Indians in area had been working for outside firms to cut timber from their traditional forests. Project developed by group Ayuda Para el Campesino del Oriente Bolivian (APCOB), group of anthropologists and linguists. Project forms part of larger program being pursued by Central de Pueblos y Communidades Indigenas del Oriente Boliviano (CIDOB).
Setting Agenda & Priorities	APCOB, CIDOB, and community organization.
Knowledge and Skills	To some degree, built on existing logging experience. However, "although the Ayoréode have a sophisticated knowledge of the environment, they possess no framework to protect, manage, and develop their forests (Davis 1985:4)." Required training in all aspects of sawmill operation, administration, and accounting, as well as in truck and tractor operation and maintenance.
Technology	Sawmill, chainsaws, truck, and tractor.
Organization	APCOB formed in 1978, CIDOB in 1982. Problems in the community concerning the initial functioning of the project led to the formation of a formal community self-management committee to sign contracts, plan work schedules, and resolve problems. It was expected that this would lead to the eventual self-management of the project.
Culture and Ethnicity	Work appears to fill a cultural and psychological void from 30 years of mission dependence. May also stem out-migration.
Financial Assistance	APCOB received funding directly from IAF ($120,000 over 2 years) to initiate the project. Cultural Survival has provided core support for CIDOB institutional expenses, including limited salaries, and funding for meetings. IAF capital provided for this project. Reed, 1987:19 notes that CIDOB's "ability to marshal expertise and funds to defend the communities' land and timber has been at the heart of this grassroots project."
Technical Assistance	Core support provided by APCOB staff and hired workers. 3 APCOB staff lived in the community, including the project director, a forester, and mechanic. Worked with Ayoreode to provide technical, organizational, and administrative skills to operate and manage community sawmill, trucks and tractors. Conducted survey of forest resources, inventory of commercial trees, demarcation of land area, and assessment of previous logging. APCOB hired master sawmill foreman to organize mill's 1st two years. Also held series of training workshops in natural resources protection, accounting, adult literacy, and nutrition.
Project Management	APCOB responsible for overall management of first 5 years. Then it is hoped that community can control.
Community Involvement	Community involvement in all phases. Initially, some factional rivalries in the town. These were largely mediated when APCOB encouraged the community to develop a self-management committee (which was not present from the beginning. On broader level, communities discuss local issues and elect members to zonal level organizations, which appoints delegates to CIDOB. Local Indian agency enables community to originate plans that define their long-range goals.
Govt. Involvement	In 1970s govt. providing Church and Japanese firms unrestricted access to forests in region of Zapoco community. Indians applied to Center for Forestry Development, and received license to develop resources.
Marketing	Lumber was to be driven to sale in Santa Cruz. Project had serious problems with road, however, and mega-inflation of the mid 1980s negated almost any profit. It is hoped that broader CIDOB project will provide better, more efficient marketing venues.
Other	Project designed to not interfere with subsistence activities as previous private logging operations had done, and included a component to boost agricultural production.
Overall Success	Good (bordering on nominal): lumbering operation working successfully, and expects to be self supporting soon, though has not met expectations. Agriculture has increased 30% with promotion program, and new balance achieved with logging work. Logging also designed to conserve soil and game, unlike private clear cutting operations. Ayoreode not in control of management as yet. Most activities still overseen by APCOB. Serious problems with transportation and marketing experienced.

Case No. 3

Group & Location	Bari (Motilones) of the Sierra Perija, northwestern Venezuela
Source	Gouveia, L. 1988. "Obstacles to Collectivization among Indigenous Communities: Two Venezuelan Cases," *Mid-American Review of Sociology* XIII(1):41-58. 1989. "State Intervention in Indigenous Economies: The Case of Venezuelan Indian Collectives." PhD dissertation, Department of Sociology, University of Kansas.
Project Focus & Components	Saimadoyi Indigenous Enterprise; focus on cattle herding.
Scale & Time Frame	Capuchin missionary presence entrenched prior to enterprise formation. Also, in 1979, Bari received 90 head of cattle and other inputs related to cattle herding project. Enterpirse was created in 1982--after 3 days of meetings with IAN (National Agrarian Institute) personnel and with the local priest's "recommendation." In 1986, the community of Saimadoyi had a population of about 300.
Land Security	Saimadoyi located in national indigenous reserve created in 1961--but which encompasses only about 9 % of Bari territory in 1900. "The legal guarantees offered by this juridical form of an Indian reserve are not totally clear....For one thing, part of the Indian reserve overlaps a Forest preserve that comes under a totally different set of legislative measures" (p. 188).
Idea Initiation	Top-down by IAN--but with cooperation of Bari.
Setting Agenda & Priorities	IAN initiated cattle herding agenda by offering opportunity to Bari. However, Bari took over through their enterprise structure.
Knowledge and Skills	Developed cattle herding skills over two-year period prior to formation of enterprise under guidance of local priest and sporadic visits by IAN field personnel.
Technology	Low-level
Organization	Indigenous Enterprise modeled after peasant enterprises of Venezuela. Under limited structural-organizational models permitted by the agrarian reform law, all Indigenous Enterprises were required to have: a General Assembly; an Administrative Council (consisting of a president, vice-president, treasurer, and secretary elected by the General Assembly); and a Supervisory Council. At least the president and vice president in the Administrative Council had to be literate according to legal requirements. Illiteracy rate among adult Bari is about 25 %.
Culture and Ethnicity	Not discussed, but obviously Bari--as a fairly isloted and aggresive group--maintained high level of ethnic pride and group solidarity.
Financial Assistance	Credit from IAN in the form of 90 head of cattle and other inputs to be paid back in 5 years with no interest.
Technical Assistance	Long-term From Capuchin missionary order; sporadic and short-term from IAN personnel.
Project Management	Well-managed under Indigenous Enterprise structure.
Community Involvement	All community members cooperate in enterprise activities.
Govt. Involvement	Originally state planned and funded; state involvement minimal at time of report.
Marketing	None mentioned--some involvement in sales of food and working as wage laborers.
Other	Bari aggresively defended their territory against encroachment.
Overall Success	Very Good at time of last report.

Case No. 4

Group & Location	**Chinantec of Santiago Comaltepec, Sierra Juarez, Mexico**
Source	Bray, David Barton. 1991. "The Struggle for the Forest: Conservation and Development in the Sierra Juárez," *Grassroots Development* 15(3):13-25.
Project Focus & Components	Forestry development. Efforts to end exploitative forest contracts with outside companies that had concessions for 25 years, and develop independent forestry programs.
Scale & Time Frame	Single community of approximately 2,000. Project began in 1983.
Land Security	Community occupies over 18,000 ha of communal forest land.
Idea Initiation	Many communities organized to resist renewal of govt. supported contracts to company, and decided to pursue forestry independently.
Setting Agenda & Priorities	Community democratic decision making.
Knowledge and Skills	Required some training in forestry management and carpentry, but built on existing forestry experience.
Technology	Built a sawmill.
Organization	Developed a forestry enterprise, *Unidad de Aprovechamiento Forestal Cerro Comal* in 1983. Inter-community association *Unión Zapoteca-Chinanteca de la Sierra Juárez* (UZACHI) also formed. To increase its presence, helped form a confederation in Oaxaca in 1991: *Sociedad de Silvicultores de Oaxaca, S.C.* Hopes to become the second significant forestry organization to emerge in Oaxaca (after UCEFO).
Culture and Ethnicity	(not discussed)
Financial Assistance	IAF gave support for training in forest management and carpentry. Sawmill and biosphere reserve interests each received support from associated NGOs, and associated international donor support. ERA had Ford Foundation $$.
Technical Assistance	With IAF $ support, *Estudios Rurales y Asesoría* (ERA) along with Servicios Comunitarios began training on all aspects of forestry and carpentry. For sawmill training, and inventory of forest resources, Comaltepec relied on support of ERA, a newly founded NGO with funding from the Ford Foundation. UZACHI providing markings of which trees to cut, and teaching how to selectively cut to leave seed stock.
Project Management	Community makes major decisions, and elects president, who seems to have considerable control.
Community Involvement	Community assembly democratically approved a land use plan in 1988. At times the community found itself split over the fate of the forests between conservationists, community foresters, and national timber interests. Sawmill shut down for a time when a bioreserve proponent was elected president.
Govt. Involvement	Community had to confront govt. to resist renewal of forest concessions. (govt. involvement in project not mentioned)
Marketing	Received 1st permit in 1983, and began selling to FAPATUX pulp mill (company that had previously controlled contracts). By 1987, sawmill was in operation, and sales of sawn timber and logs began. Profits were reinvested into equipment, and carpentry shops.
Other	
Overall Success	Good/excellent: Project has brought increased capital flow and incomes, and community has helped to form a number of support organizations. Community has bought a tractor and put into a secondary school, clinic, and municipal hall. Entire community appears to be benefitting. Some concern over volatility of such a high level of democratic control over a business enterprise.

Case No. 5

Group & Location	**Chinantec, Uxpanapa resettlement zone, in Isthmus of Tehuantepec (originally from Oaxaca)**
Source	Gates, Marilyn. 1988. "Lessons from the Uxpanapa Resettlement Project, Mexico," *Cultural Survival Quarterly* 12(3):18-20.
Project Focus & Components	Resettlement from Oaxaca homeland by construction of Cerro de Oro Dam to virgin rainforest. Government aimed to transform the wilderness into an intensive modern agricultural enclave, with a focus on rice production. "Purpose was to integrate the Chinantecs into the national economy, help to offset the country"s basic food deficit and serve as a model for increasing productivity on the tropical southeastern frontier" (18).
Scale & Time Frame	3,000 families. Project initiated in 1974.
Land Security	Chinantec given tenure over 60,000 ha.
Idea Initiation	Government. Could not justify the investments involved in developing such a remote wilderness, however, just to provide a few thousand families a new home, so hoped to use project to boost food production as well.
Setting Agenda & Priorities	Government. Received criticism before project began for lack of consultation with the Chinantecs, but ignored.
Knowledge and Skills	Intensive systems totally unfamiliar to Chinantec.
Technology	Project based on unfounded assumptions concerning use of temperate technology in tropical forests. Large-scale mechanized rice production failed. Have since shifted from annuals to cattle and rubber. Government was warned of potential problems with its emphasis on physical infrastructure and economic priorities rather than social processes.
Organization	(non discussed)
Culture and Ethnicity	Totally ignored by government.
Financial Assistance	Provided by government, but not sufficient to overcome programs basic lack to fit to existing conditions.
Technical Assistance	Given by government to some degree. However, when equipment broke down, and disease occurred in crops, agricultural extension was lacking. Again, support not nearly enough to outweigh lack of project fit to environment.
Project Management	Government. (local involvement not discussed)
Community Involvement	Community resentment developed over their loss of autonomy and exclusion from decision making process, leading to a climate of mistrust and hostility. This has led Chinantecs to resist participation in new projects.
Govt. Involvement	The government was the primary player in the project, and country and policy factors had a considerable influence. The Mexican economy was having problems, and the country experiencing food shortages. "The dislocated Chinantecs have served as little more than guinea pigs in ill-conceived agricultural experiments" (18). The government focused on economic development with little understanding or concern for support of social processes. Most planned steps of the project received outside criticism. The development agency was aware of these concerns, but perceived an urgency in turning Uxpanapa into a productive granary.
Marketing	Poor access to markets due to road condition hurt any potential for the area to serve broader markets, and isolates the group.
Other	
Overall Success	Failure: Land degradation and poverty have resulted. Majority derive little if any income from project activities, barely subsisting from traditional slash and burn cultivation.

Case No. 6

Group & Location	**Chiquitano, El Puquio, Lomerio, Bolivia.**
Source	Chase-Smith, Richard. 1993. "Indians, Forest Rights, and Lumber Mills," *Cultural Survival Quarterly* (Spring):52-55.
Project Focus & Components	Lomerio Project. Forest plan based on agreement that 21 communities would cede customary rights over forests to *Central InterComunal del Oriente Lomerio* (CICOL) to manage for everyone. Included installation of lumber mill and nursery, and plans to manage natural pastures, improve breed of cattle, institute small garden projects, bee keeping, carpentry workshops, and a marketing program for peanuts.
Scale & Time Frame	21 communities involved. Initiated in 1984.
Land Security	Chiquitano could not receive government concessions to much of the best land. Individual vs. communal rights became a serious issue of conflict undermining the project.
Idea Initiation	Pressured by ranchers and timber industry, and encouraged by other Indian organizations, Chiquitanos organized (1982-1984) and began talking with APCOB (group of anthropologists and foresters) about ways to protect their territory, and exploit resources in new ways to generate cash. Had participated in training workshops associated with Ayoréode project, and saw potential.
Agenda & Priorities	CICOL and APCOB worked together to establish.
Knowledge & Skills	CICOL and participating communities had no experience in business or account keeping.
Technology	Built lumber mill powered by diesel generator, and a nursery. Project owns a truck for transporting logs, and a tractor for moving in mill yard. 1 truck can not provide sufficient logs/day to mill. Project was planned to involve extensive road building, 2.5 miles/year, but needs even more - requires more investment in machinery and labor than planned.
Organization	Organized the *Central InterComunal del Oriente Lomerio* (CICOL) prior to project. No history of community organizing.
Culture and Ethnicity	Like many in Amazon, Chiquitanos are establishing a new identity. Only since about 1982 have Chiquitanos reestablished contact with other Chiquitanos in other colonial centers.
Financial Assistance	1984, CICOL and APCOB asked Oxfam America and HIVOS, a Dutch organization, to support project. Funds from HIVOS for building mill.
Technical Assistance	APCOB support in forest inventory and initial management. Initial studies overly optimistic and limited in scope. Eventually abandoned under conflict with CICOL about management control.
Project Management	At first, APCOB"s technical team dominated all aspects of the project in the name of CICOL. They managed funds, carried out technical functions, and maintained political relations with government. In phase 2 CICOL began to challenge APCOB"s control, leading to a dispute that undermined the internal equilibrium and led to conflicts within APCOB. APCOB abandoned the project.
Community Involvement	1) In initial implementation phases, APCOB paid too little attention to multi-community consensus-building. "Issues of individual, community, and inter-community rights to land and trees would later become divisive, and disgruntled Indians, priests, and timber barons would use theme to drive a wedge between communities (53)." 2) CICOL representatives chosen by consensus by participating communities.
Govt. Involvement	In 1985, CICOL presented a plan to the government for managing the forests and producing lumber. CICOL yet to secure best areas for logging, despite 7 years of lobbying by CICOL, APCOB, and *Centro de Pueblos y Comunidades Indígenas del Oriente Boliviano* (CIDOB). Concession to much of area given to another lumber company - serves as pretext for not granting further concessions.
Marketing	Overly optimistic of cost/benefits. No one had studied market conditions for tropical wood in Santa Cruz region, and 3 year depression in market came as a surprise. CICOL had agreement with CIDOB to use its lumber depot in Santa Cruz to market lumber. But lumber glut occurred, and logs were sold at whatever price could be gotten.
Other	CICOL partial aim to gain greater independence from Catholic Church. Church fought back, promoting idea that each Chiquitano has private property rights to forest resources. Led to some communities separating from CICOL.
Overall Success	Nominal: Overcame some organization obstacles, and have greater control over resources, and have found new ways to meet needs for cash income that respect the long-term perspectives of their cultural heritage. However, inter-community conflict threatens project, and the mill has yet to break even. Have achieved some reforestation with seedlings from the nursery. The author argues that the project "must be judged as part of a long, slow process of trial and error in which capitalist market principles clash with communal subsistence principles, in which principles of scientific management clash with management based on local knowledge, and in which imminent poverty and local need clash with principles of harmony, balance, and sustainability (55)."

Case No. 7

Group & Location	Indians in highland Cauca province of Colombia
Source	MacDonald, Theodore Jr. 1987 Grassroots Development: Not Just Organic Farming and Good Faith. CS Quarterly 11(1):41-45. Chernela, Janet 1987 Environmental Restoration in SW Colombia. CS Quarterly 11(4):71-3.
Project Focus & Components	Forestry project run by Regional Indian Council of Cauca (CRIC) to encourage communities to plant trees, and provide them with technical assistance in forestry. Community environmental education important component.
Scale & Time Frame	CRIC claims over 50 affiliated communities. Project going for just over one year when evaluation took place.
Land Security	Communal holdings (*resguardos*), but pressured by lumbering interests and others.
Idea Initiation	CRIC concerned with erosion of topsoil and declining availability of cheap fuel wood.
Setting Agenda & Priorities	Appears to have been CRIC.
Knowledge and Skills	(not discussed)
Technology	CRIC works primarily with native tree species. Set up tree nurseries. Basically employs simple technology.
Organization	CRIC, a regional Indian council maintains primary control over project. CRIC includes 50 permanent employees at the central office, including specialists of: lawyers, accountants, agronomists, medical practitioners, bilingual education specialists, veterinarian and journalist. Author argues that such federations are excellent mechanisms to extend grassroots development, as well as present a united defense against rural violence. "Grassroots development then becomes, to a large extent, organization building, which can improve both economic and human rights (MacDonald 1987:45)."
Culture and Ethnicity	(not discussed)
Financial Assistance	Cultural Survival for 1 year, renewed for 1 year.
Technical Assistance	CRIC providing assistance to local communities. Conduct training phase in each community, and visit projects at intervals thereafter.
Project Management	CRIC moving at pace it sees as "safe" in the current situation in the initial phases of this project. Program is seen by man as a "model for community resource management (Chernela 1987:72)."
Community Involvement	At annual CRIC Congress, community reps. unanimously supported work of the resource management project. Each nursery run by local cabildo.
Govt. Involvement	Author argues that economic improvement and human rights often are inseparable. Also notes that while some feel grassroots development is beyond the political, it is often very affected by political concerns on many levels. Communities and CRIC are hassled by military that often suspect them of complicity with drug lords or rebel movement, and generally caught in the middle of regional struggles.
Marketing	The project is competing with a multinational pulp corp., which provides economic and other incentives to communities to lease community land. While the corporation brings money to communities, it also destroys soils.
Other	CRIC is having to compete for community attention with drug traffickers. They are caught between drug lords, guerrillas, the Colombian army, and large scale lumbering companies. The author states that the Department of Cauca is "laced with fuses leading to different powder kegs, any one of which could explode with CRIC as a target" (MacDonald 1987:42).
Overall Success	Nominal (in first year): Technical team established 2 experimental nurseries, have undertaken modest reforestation in only 5 communities, and developed a plan to expand their activities. Achievements at the community level are not discussed. Overall, gains are well under expectations, but fragile political environment must be taken into account. Best measure may be vote of community representatives to continue the project.

Case No. 8

Group & Location	Cuatro Pinos Cooperative, in and around municipio Santiago Sacatepéquez, Guatemala
Source	von Braun, Joachim, David Hotchkiss, Maarten Immink 1989 "Nontraditional Export Crops in Guatemala: Effects on Production, Income, and Nutrition." *International Food Policy Research Report No. 73.*
Project Focus & Components	Organization of Cuatro Pinos cooperative, and export of nontraditional vegetables including snow peas, broccoli, cauliflower, and parsley. Storage and processing facilities for the export vegetables. 1981: Rapid expansion of cauliflower, broccoli, and snow pea production and direct exports by cooperative to US. 1987: Further expansion of coop; construction of own freezing, processing facilities; 20 % of exports to Europe.
Scale & Time Frame	Cuatro Pinos in 6 villages. 1978: Implementation of agricultural programs - maize improvement, traditional vegetables; contract with ALCOSA through Swiss Group for broccoli and cauliflower production in Santiago Sacatepéquez (p.29). In 1979 177 members; by 1987 expanded to 1,150 members.
Land Security	No big farms in area so no serious conflicts over land. Cooperative members average .94 hectare (p. 36).
Idea Initiation	Prior to study, severe protein calorie malnutrition. 10-15% of family heads worked in the capital, with access to land below subsistence level. 1976: an earthquake. Swiss Group came to rebuild Santiago Sacatepéquez. 1977: Swiss Group's development programs included food aid, literacy courses, along with reconstruction work in villages; formation of groups that later formed the cooperative.
Setting Agenda & Priorities	Not entirely clear. Appears Swiss Group largely involved.
Knowledge and Skills	Based on nontraditional crops. Required new skills and knowledge, building on farming knowledge.
Technology	Storage and processing facilities for the export vegetables are in Santiago, the base of the coop. Project based more on intensive labor than technology.
Organization	Cooperative controls production, and increasingly gaining greater control over marketing.
Culture and Ethnicity	Not discussed.
Financial Assistance	Banco Nacional de Desarrollo Agrícola (BANDESA) provided farm-level credit. Author's state that "The input costs per hectare for snow peas, however, are on average about 4 times higher than for traditional vegetables and 13 times higher than for maize. Short-term financing of inputs poses a problem to small farmers and indicates the importance of rural credit (pp.11-12)."
Technical Assistance	International development assistance played a catalytic role. Authors state that "The institutional support and know-how transfer was probably the most important ingredient for the growth of the cooperative (p.29)." USAID, and Latin American Agribusiness Corporation S.A. - LAAD - Provided seed money (loans) to private company Alimentos Congelados S.A. (ALCOSA) to open export channel (p.28). Swiss Group (Swiss NGO) stimulated formation of the coop., implemented its programs, and assisted in securing access to the export channel through private exporters. ALCOSA provided technical training, and export channel, and infrastructure facilities such as cold storage. Instituto de Ciencias y Tecnologias Agrícolas (ICTA) provided technical assistance on agriculture technology. The Institute of Nutrition of Central America and Panama (INCAP) developed vegetable processing equipment.
Project Management	Cooperative controls ongoing management.
Community Involvement	Membership initially open to all and by free choice, though only 5 women in coop. Not everyone in communities is in coop, which has now closed to new membership. Members obliged to participate in scheduled meetings and pay 1-time membership fee of Q38. Everyone can participate in export production.
Govt. Involvement	In 1982-5 GNP down seriously, and devaluing of quetzal. Traditional exports decreasing faster than nontraditionals. Govt. policy for agriculture, laid out in the 1984-6 National Development Plan, emphasized diversification of export-oriented agricultural production and increased production of food commodities (p.24). Authors state that "Food and agricultural policy plays a key role in shaping the commercialization of traditional agriculture (p.26)."
Marketing	Success determined largely by increased demand for crops in U.S. and European markets and growing labor-land ratio on small farms. Access to good roads and infrastructure also increased adoption rates: connection to paved Pan-American Highway (about 5 km away). Authors note that local processing and freezing of fresh produce have been initiated, reducing the risk of a sudden collapse of the marketing channel. Cooperative now exporting independently from the ALCOSA outlet to the US and Europe.
Other	"The nutritional benefits of economic growth, as shown in this study, are substantial but can be further enhanced by appropriate health-and nutrition-oriented social infrastructure. The effects of health programs conducted by the export crop cooperative in participating communities support this conclusion (p.13)."
Overall Success	Excellent: Those involved in the project had net returns per unit of land considerably higher than for maize (15x for snow peas), and had more maize available for consumption. A 45% increased labor input, with only about half from the family, led to a 21% increase in local employment for agriculture. Also employment for screening and packing vegetables at coop. headquarters. Involved communites experienced less out-migration. Involved families experienced higher calorie intake. Authors state that "The Case Study shows, however, that with appropriate access to resources and markets and effective assistance in institution-building at the community level, the poor in the Western Highlands can substantially improve their income and welfare (p.13)."

Case No. 9

Group & Location	**Emberá, Wounaan, and Kuna of eastern Panama**
Source	Chapin, Mac. 1994. "Indigenous Peoples Put Themselves on the Map," *Grassroots Development* 17(2):39-41.
Project Focus & Components	To map indigenous land claims in the Darién Province, as the first phase in counteracting threats. Three stages planned, each around a workshop: detailed surveying, construction of composite maps, and final touches.
Scale & Time Frame	Over 100 communities surveyed and mapped. Final maps expected to take total of one year to complete.
Land Security	Tenuous, purpose of project is to help strengthen this aspect.
Idea Initiation	A last stretch of highway being proposed from Panama into Colombia, threatening to bring encroachment from loggers, cattle ranchers, and landless colonists from the country's interior provinces to indigenous lands and resources. Indigenous congresses of Emberá, Wounaan, and Kuna and the *Centro de Estudios y Acción Social Panemeño* (CEASPA) decided to map region for use by indigenous groups.
Setting Agenda & Priorities	Indian congresses.
Knowledge and Skills	Required survey and mapping assistance.
Technology	(not discussed)
Organization	Built out of existing indigenous congresses and CEASPA.
Culture and Ethnicity	(not discussed)
Financial Assistance	Technical, logistical, and financial assistance from at least 16 Panamanian and international conservation and development organizations.
Technical Assistance	(See financial assistance.) Several cartographers from the *Instituto Geográphico Nacional* and the National University assisted. Each stage oriented around a workshop, in which 3 Indian coordinators met with surveyors.
Project Management	Joint congresses of involved indigenous groups with aid of other organizations.
Community Involvement	Participation by communities involved.
Govt. Involvement	(not discussed)
Marketing	(not relevant)
Other	--
Overall Success	Excellent: achieved goals with broad support. "For the first time there is clear demarcation of the areas used by indigenous peoples of the Darién and the ways in which they manage the area's natural resources." "Data will be crucial as indigenous leaders engage in discussions over the future of their region" (p. 40).

Case No. 10

Group & Location	Huasteca of Veracruz, Mexico
Source	Ariel De Vidas, Anath 1993. "Una piedrita en los zapatos de los caciques. Ecos y repercusiones de las políticas de desarrollo rural en la Huasteca veracruzana," *Estudios Sociológicos* XI(33):741-767.
Project Focus & Components	Organization of "*la Organización Campesina Popular Independiente de la Huasteca Veracruzana* (OCPIHV). Transition from a somewhat militant resistance group to organization responsible for funneling development aid. Pursued largely through the Pronasol program.
Scale & Time Frame	OCPIHV base movements began around 1972, and their involvement in the *Fondo Regional de Solidaridad* (FRS) *de Chicontepec*, a branch of Pronasol began in 1990. Through FRS, OCPIHV has projects affecting at least 37 communities, and 1131 families, but also pursues other projects.
Land Security	Modern cattle ranching, occurring in the region since the middle of the 20th century, led to the concentration of land by caciques. Indigenous campesinos often displaced. Initiation of OCPIHV was largely in response to this, and sought to retake land. While achieving some success, land availability still appears poor.
Idea Initiation	Huastecas in Veracruz some of the most marginalized of indigenous populations. Considerable campesino discontent, and land scarcity. In 1970s militants organized resistance to caciquiles. Movement initiated by group of militants associated with the Ho-Chi-Minh movement. In mid 1980s, focus shifted from opposition to negotiation with government. Government"s initiation of regional Pronasol program simply provided OCPIHV a venue for pursuing their goals.
Setting Agenda & Priorities	OCPIHV has worked to make proposals to pursue through FRS, and through other means.
Knowledge and Skills	Often introduced. OCPIHV often seeks to reorient communities from focus on traditional subsistence crops to more intensive and economically profitable ventures, such as chilies, chicken raising, and cattle.
Technology	(Not discussed, though does not appear that projects involve significant infusion of new technology so much as technical skills.)
Organization	OCIHV officially formed in 1979, and added the P in 1984. In mid 1980s, relative rise of OCPIHV owed itself largely to the lack of any other independent campesino organization in the region. Government FRS formed in 1990, incorporating OCPIHV.
Culture and Ethnicity	In addition to the productive projects, OCPIHV managed cultural recovery programs within the framework of the *Fondos de Solidaridad para la Promoción del Patrimonio Cultural de los Pueblos Indígenas*, supported by INI through FRS. Such programs helped, with economic programs, to reinforce indigenous identity in the face of local oppression.
Financial Assistance	Pursued and received from numerous sources, mostly government. FRS provided bulk of funding, but also from *Agricultura y Recursos Hidráulicos* (SARH), *Banrural*, *Recursos Municipales Básicos*, *Secretaría de Desarrollo Social* (Sedesol), and *Fondo Nacional de Empresas en Solidaridad* (Fonaes).
Technical Assistance	Initial movement aided locally by group of teachers, campesinos and students, and associated with various leftist movements. Government ended up providing majority of support, largely through INI.
Project Management	Self management was the goal. OCPIHV was responsible for the management of many projects. Not clear the extent to which local organizations were involved. This did represent a considerable change from government managed programs of the past.
Community Involvement	Not totally clear how communities involved in OCPIHV. Does appear that some convincing was necessary in many cases to get campesinos to participate in projects that sought to play down traditional subsistence cultivars.
Govt. Involvement	Initially, movement met with repression from the state. But then movement turned to negotiation. Despite the fact that OCPIHV arose in opposition to the government, and has recently run against the PRI in local elections, OCPIHV has been the recipient of considerable government assistance in achieving its current position. Government served the primary role in support of OCPIHV through INI, FRS, and various programs. Govt. *Programa Nacional de Solidaridad* (Pronasol) has had an important role in seeking to improve rural economies. Within the context of a new economic opening, government sees growing importance in the self-management of excluded sectors. In this context, the interests of OCPIHV and the government converged, and OCPIHV was able to establish a privileged role in local development.
Marketing	OCPIHV seeking to develop projects which enable previously subsistence based communities to market goods.
Other	1985 director of OCPIHV assassinated by caciques.
Overall Success	Good (though not entirely clear). From the perspective of the OCPIHV organization, a great success in regaining some land, and entering the development process. In at least some communities, there is apparent success in terms of increased incomes and health, increased women"s economic and political participation, and improved ethnic pride. Overall long term success in communities not entirely clear.

Case No. 11

Group & Location	**Jalq'a of Irupampa, south-central Bolivia**
Source	Healy, Kevin. 1992. "Back to the Future: Ethnodevelopment Among the Jalq'a of Bolivia," *Grassroots Development* 16(2): 22-34.
Project Focus & Components	Reintroduction and Marketing of Traditional Weaving.
Scale & Time Frame	One Community, 76 families. Started in 1985.
Land Security	(not discussed - not an apparent issue)
Idea Initiation	2 Bolivian anthropologists, Martínez (fluent in Quechau) and Cereceda (an authority on Andean textiles and curator of numerous museum exhibits) introduced the idea. Hoped it would combat the extreme poverty and unraveling of traditional culture and community structure.
Setting Agenda & Priorities	Project founded in consultation with peasant organization, and proceeded at pace determined by participants.
Knowledge and Skills	While project sought to build on traditional knowledge, much of this had been forgotten. Mostly, had lost knowledge of how to produce fine designs, not how to weave.
Technology	Weaving based on existing technology - looms.
Organization	Martínez and Cereceda started org. *Antropólogos del Sur Andino* (ASUR) to help revive lost weaving art.
Culture and Ethnicity	ASUR"s first task was to "create a space in which the entire community could explore the cultural roots that gave the Jalq'a their identity and that inspired the master weavings of the past (27)." ASUR "realized that revival of Jalq'a weaving depended on the renewal of Jalq'a culture, but they also knew that the revival would not long survive unless it became economically viable" (32). ASUR encouraged strengthening of ritual life among all communities it was invited into. Always sought blessings of deities. Enthusiasm of revitalization of traditional ways was channeled into the revival of weaving.
Financial Assistance	Martínez and Cereceda received an IAF grant to explore the possibility of reviving weaving in the region. Continued funding provided by IAF for wool and yarns.
Technical Assistance	Support from ASUR throughout project. Brought archive of pictures of over 300 traditional motifs for women to base work on. ASUR Recruited teachers from experienced women in near communities. Eventually developed corp of 20 master weavers to teach course. ASUR also works with the Jalq'a to seek ways to add value and cut costs. Literacy training, and courses in accounting and management established by ASUR to support microenterprizes. Greatest asset of ASUR was that they were "more interested in the Jalq'a as a people than as artisans who could be trained to be economically productive." (26) (Past projects with similar goals had failed, despite positive markets and knowledgeable technicians because of "mutual incomprehension that prevailed between project managers and potential beneficiaries" 26.)
Project Management	ASUR helped in getting program off the ground. Community then assumed primary responsibility, while ASUR continued to help in the creation of markets, and setting up Museum displays.
Community Involvement	Community involved in all phases. Shaman (aysiri) asked to conduct ritual ceremony consulting traditional mountain deities to inaugurate workshop (deities approved of the project). 72 of Irupampa"s 76 families bought stock in the village"s microenterprises.
Govt. Involvement	(none apparent)
Marketing	After 2 years, ASUR collected best of textiles for display in Sucre. This was followed by larger display at *Museo Nacional de Arte* in La Paz. Created a market by using museum exhibits to familiarize public with art, and then selling it in museum shops. Exhibit travelled to Paris, Geneva, and US Smithsonian. Set up a museum and ethnic art shop in renovated colonial convent in Sucre, which serves as the primary marketing source. After apparent success, microenterprizes for spinning and dyeing have been established to guarantee supplies at low cost. Also microenterprizes to use leftover wool to make hats and mattresses developed.
Other	Pace of the work can be difficult, and some experience problems trying to fit it in with responsibilities to our children and other tasks.
Overall Success	Excellent: In addition to considerable economic gains, Jalq'a have experienced a rebuilding of community life and revitalization of traditional songs, weaving, and sense of selves within universe. Ethnic pride has been renewed, more people are staying in the community, and women"s new economic role are enhancing their social role. ASUR has been able to reproduce this project in at least 5 other communities, and the Jalq'a now serve as a model to other indigenous communities.

Case No. 12

Group & Location	**Kayapo of the Xingu region of Brazil.**
Source	Schmink, Marianne, and Charles Wood 1992 *Contested Frontiers in Amazonia.* New York: Columbia University Press.
Project Focus & Components	Efforts to have territory (Gorotire reserve) demarcated and titled, and associated income producing efforts.
Scale & Time Frame	1978 decree defined an area of 2,738,085 ha. of the Gorotire reserve, but demarcation did not take place. In 1985, an agreement was reached to demarcate a 3,262,960 ha reserve.
Land Security	Kayapo were experiencing encroachment by ranchers, and FUNAI initially did little to help. Kayapo went on the attack, killing 20 people, Event did little to stop encroachment, however. Now, Kayapo have succeeded in obtaining unprecedented expanses of territory.
Idea Initiation	Kayapo leaders sought to protect lands and resources from external encroachment, and obtain just compensation for mining concessions on their lands. The land issue was complicated by gold, as garimpeiros flooded the area in the early 1980s. An expulsion of garimpeiros from mining concessions in Cumaru led to a serious uprising. Kayapo initially refused to reopen concessions but eventually agreed in 1985 on the condition that land was demarcated.
Setting Agenda & Priorities	Kayapo leaders played the primary role in keeping the process moving and defining agenda and priorities, but leaders of different communities often pursued separate agendas. Various state agencies were central to the titling and demarcation process.
Knowledge and Skills	Education of a number of Kayapo leaders was important in their ability to confront the state and effectively pursue external support.
Technology	(NA)
Organization	In 1981, 16 chiefs came together for 10 day meeting to discuss a unified strategy to land issues. Chiefs often pursued own agendas, however, when it came to actions. For example, concerning opposition to mineral mining, one chief instead signed contracts with a company to mine the region, gaining 5% of the production. Operation opposed by several other chiefs.
Culture and Ethnicity	"The Kayapó warrior tradition, honed in battle with seringueiros and castanheiros earlier in this century, gained them more time and territory than most other tribes in Brazil. It also brought them notoriety, which itself was turned to their advantage" (Schmink and Wood 269).
Financial Assistance	(not discussed)
Technical Assistance	International interest in the Kayapo provided Kayapo with the credibility and opportunity to serve as spokesmen for the region's indigenous people, and support of external groups helped to politically empower them in confronting the state.
Project Management	Chiefs were primarily responsible for representing communities, while FUNAI was largely responsible for land titling issues (though see Govt. Involvement).
Community Involvement	(Unclear of the extent of involvement of community members in the process)
Govt. Involvement	FUNAI is the Brazilian organization designated to deal with Indian Affairs, but was initially unable (or at times unwilling) to protect indigenous lands. In 1981 the state govt. changed titling requirements so that (in addition to requiring FUNAI support) the ministries of Land Affairs and Interior must approve land allocations. FUNAI also giving contracts to lumber companies on Kayapo land. FUNAI local leaders largely restricted in their actions by broader political processes, and constantly removed or replaced when supported issues that were not supported at other levels.
Marketing	(NA)
Other	
Overall Success	Good: Eventually Kayapo achieved land grants and demarcation. Leaders also established a pragmatic approach of negotiating agreements for concessions on Kayapo lands. Wealth has set them apart from other groups. In 1985, purchased an airplane and hired pilot to carry them between villages, make shopping trips, and patrol borders. Also bought video cameras to document interviews with officials and record own ceremonies and dances.

Case No. 13

Group & Location	Kuna of Panama
Source	Stephen, Lynn. 1991. "Culture as a Resource: Four Cases of Self-managed Indigenous Craft Production in Latin America," *Economic Development and Cultural Change* 40(1):101-130.
Project Focus & Components	Craft development and Marketing. Creation of a Mola (traditional woman"s garb) cooperative for production and sales.
Scale & Time Frame	Commercialization of Molas began in 1960s. Cooperative formed in 1968. By 1985 mola cooperative included 17 local chapters and 1,469 members.
Land Security	Have been able to maintain a sufficient land base from colonial period through the 20th century. Political independence resulted in maintenance of communal lands. During 19th century private land replaced communal property in many areas.
Idea Initiation	San Blas store owners and traders began to accept molas for merchandise in the 1960s. Cooperative development rose out of women"s desire to receive better prices than those offered by intermediaries.
Setting Agenda & Priorities	Cooperative (Leaders of cooperative also gained entrance to the Kuna Congress, though its role in cooperative activities is unclear.)
Knowledge and Skills	Have been involved in the production for exchange of craft products of agricultural production from colonial period into the 20th century, and have had experience in local and regional market systems. Molas defined as a traditional art form by the Kuna, began around 1860s.
Technology	Sewing machines. (Though appears some sew by hand)
Organization	Cooperatives based on sociedads, which built on traditional organizational principles of cooperative labor. Include nonkin groups organized for commercial purposes. May include entire community, or some part. Membership is voluntary and gained through cash investment or labor contribution that entitles member to share of profits. Establishment of Mola cooperatives in some communities became way for women to maintain control over production and receive higher price per mola than through an intermediary. Organized in 1968. Gained legal status in 1974.
Culture and Ethnicity	While aspects of ethnicity have been commoditized, self-management and successful entrepreneurship have been used to reinforce cultural identity and institutions. Reciprocal labor and goods exchanges have been maintained, labor and resources reinvested into community ritual and political institutions, and craft production integrated with agricultural, subsistence, and ceremonial activities and cycles.
Financial Assistance	1978 cooperative received a grant from IAF to purchase greater quantities of cloth in bulk and additional sewing machines.
Technical Assistance	Cooperative originated in sewing school under direction of Peace Corps volunteer.
Project Management	Cooperative started and run by women. Each member owns an equal share of assets and has equal right to profits. Each must provide an equal share of labor toward production effort (role of Congress unclear, if any). Overhead used to pay administrator of the co-op, for office supplies, and for fuel for cooperative"s boat. Cooperative members involved in all aspects of production.
Community Involvement	Significant portion of income is reinvested in community institutions. Participation appears voluntary.
Govt. Involvement	(not discussed)
Marketing	Since 18th century Kuna producing for exchange. Since 19th century much experience with coconut. "A history of production for exchange is tied to the ability...to take advantage of existing marketing networks and skills when tourism and export markets opened up for their craft products" (110). Molas sold directly by producers to tourists through cooperative network, or to Kuna and foreign middlemen who sell them abroad, including US and Europe. Large scale marketing has made molas a primary tourism symbol of Panama. In areas where cooperative has a strong foothold, has driven intermediaries out of business. In other areas, intermediaries have raised prices offered for molas.
Other	Cooperative chapters also engaged in bulk purchase and resale of staples and savings and loans programs. Had own store in 1969.
Overall Success	Good/Excellent: "Have been able to direct their successful economic endeavors not only to promote individual gains but also to support community innovations and strengthen noncapitalist institutions, such as kin and ritual kin, compadrazgo, networks, reciprocal labor exchanges, and rituals" (105). Market prices have steadily risen through the 1970s, out-pacing inflation.

Case No. 14

Group & Location	**Kuna Yala, Comarca of San Blas, Panama**
Source	Wright, R. Michael, Brian Houseal, and Cebaldo de Leon. 1988 "Kuna Yala: Indigenous Biosphere Reserve in the Making." In John Bodley (ed.), *Tribal Peoples and Development Issues: A Global Overview*. Mountain View, CA: Mayfield Publishing Company. Pp. 352-356. Breslin, Patrick, and Mac Chapin. 1984. "Conservation Kuna-Style," *Grassroots Development* 8(2):26-35.
Project Focus & Components	Efforts to initiate and implement project PEMASKY (*Proyecto de Estudio para el Manejo de Areas Silvestres de Kuna Yala*). Includes conservation, research, traditional agriculture, and tourism. While much of the project is still in planning phases, land demarcation has begun.
Scale & Time Frame	(project in planning stages, so not yet clear). Appears idea initiated around 1980.
Land Security	Comarca de Kuna Yala, established in 1938, is a reservation of tropical jungle 124 mi long and averaging 16 mi. wide from the Continental Divide to the coast on the Caribbean side of Panama. Traditionally provided a buffer between Kuna land and islands, and the outside. A road built by USAID into reservation (for benefit of Kuna), also opened area to outside settlement. Kuna attempts to establish an agricultural community to protect the entrance failed.
Idea Initiation	Kuna decided to join tourism, scientific research and a protected area in order to gain outside support for their cultural preservation goals. Designation of buffer as biosphere reserve recognized as way to achieve all goals.
Setting Agenda & Priorities	Kuna
Knowledge and Skills	(not discussed)
Technology	(not discussed)
Organization	Group of young Kuna spearheading the project, which has received the blessing of the Kuna General Congress.
Culture and Ethnicity	A main purpose of the project is to protect Kuna culture from outside intrusion. Concept of biosphere reserves coincide directly with Kuna concept of Kuna Yala (Kuna place).
Financial Assistance	Bulk of financial resources provided by IAF, and World Wildlife Fund-U.S., and the Kuna.
Technical Assistance	Advice sought from CATIE (*Centro Agronómico Tropical de Investigación y Ensénanza*) in Costa Rica, and the Smithsonian Tropical Research Institute in Panama.
Project Management	Kuna
Community Involvement	Volunteers from island communities come to Pemasky to help demarcate the border of the reservation. Project has received blessing of Kuna Congress.
Govt. Involvement	(not discussed)
Marketing	(not a factor in the project)
Other	
Overall Success	Not Clear. Still in planning stages and demarcation of territory.

Case No. 15

Group & Location	Kuna Yala of Panama
Source	Chapin, Mac. 1990. "The Silent Jungle: Ecotourism Among the Kuna Indians of Panama," *Cultural Survival Quarterly* 14(1):42-45.
Project Focus & Components	Ecotourism in the "Kuna park", as part of project Pemasky (Project for the Study of the Management of Wildland Areas of Kuna Yala)
Scale & Time Frame	Pemasky launched in 1983. Paper written after 6 years.
Land Security	Core of park encompasses some 60,000 hectares. Initiated to some degree because of threats from outside. Project included demarcating the limits of Kuna homeland.
Idea Initiation	(not discussed)
Setting Agenda & Priorities	Kuna in charge.
Knowledge and Skills	(not discussed)
Technology	25 km of Road leading to camp highly treacherous because of the mud. Transportation difficulties made construction of basic tourism infrastructure nearly impossible. So camp lacks basic facilities for nature tourists.
Organization	(not discussed)
Culture and Ethnicity	(not discussed)
Financial Assistance	Pemasky had combined funding from the Smithsonian Tropical Research Institute, World Wildlife Fund, Inter-American Foundation, and the Agency for International Development.
Technical Assistance	Help with studies and inventories in park. Kuna technical team visited Costa Rica to tour hotel facilities in better known park areas.
Project Management	In first years, staff developed a management plan for the park.
Community Involvement	Kuna staff running project.
Govt. Involvement	Panamanian Tourist Institute focuses on hotels, casinos, night life, and shopping centers. Natural beauties of Panama never stressed, so no tourist infrastructure has been developed around natural areas. Also, Panama not as peaceful as Costa Rica.
Marketing	Kuna were not able to set up any arrangements with tourist agencies in Panama City or the US. No conservation group sought a permanent relationship with the Kuna. Also "neither the Kuna nor any of the outsiders promoting ecotourism realized the importance of the wider national context in which this kind of tourism, which caters to a select crowd, flourishes." (44)
Other	
Overall Success	Failure: tourism simply never developed to support Pemasky to the extent that it was hoped.

Case No. 16

Group & Location	**Mam Indians of Chiapas, Mexico.**
Source	Bray, David. 1991. "Where Markets and Ecology Meet: Organic Coffee from the Sierra Madre of Chiapas," *1991 in Review* (Inter-American Foundation), p. 37.
Project Focus & Components	Organic coffee.
Scale & Time Frame	1980s (not clear how many communities involved).
Land Security	(not discussed)
Idea Initiation	Coffee productivity on small plots was among the lowest in world, and Mam could not afford fertilizers. Organic option was the only way to reduce costs and raise productivity. *Organization Indigenas de la Sierra Madre de Motozintla* "San Isidro Labrador", *Sociedad de Solidaridad Social* (ISMAM), with help from agronomists connected to the Catholic Church in town of Motozintla carried out an initial problem analysis and came up with the idea. Profited from experience of the *Union de Comunidades de Indigenas de la Region del Istmo*, which had been producing and marketing organic coffee.
Setting Agenda & Priorities	ISMAM
Knowledge and Skills	Builds off of prior coffee experience, but requires more human input. Must learn better crop care techniques, composting and terracing.
Technology	Required composting, and terracing: 1) made tons of organic compost; 2) transformed hillsides into terraces that would retain moisture and organic matter sufficient to meet international certification standards.
Organization	ISMAM pre-existing organization. (local level not discussed)
Culture and Ethnicity	(not discussed)
Financial Assistance	In 1990, IAF gave a push to ISMAM"s efforts through a grant to help ISMAM expand its range.
Technical Assistance	Initial problem identifying support from Catholic agronomists.
Project Management	ISMAM
Community Involvement	(not discussed)
Govt. Involvement	(not discussed)
Marketing	Product appeared as Cafe Mam, distributed by Royal Blue Organics, of Oregon.
Other	
Overall Success	Good: By 1989-90 season, ISMAN had received international organic certification from the German-based International Forum of Organic Agriculture Movements (IFOAM). "Organic techniques increase productivity and improve the quality of the bean. Farmer"s incomes would go up even if the coffee was not sold as organic."

Case No. 17

Group & Location	**Mapuche of dry Andean foothills of Neuquén region of Argentina**
Source	Breslin, Patrick 1989 "The Mapuche Find Their Voice." *Grassroots Development* 13(2):36-43.
Project Focus & Components	Development of cooperative stores to free selves from exploitative intermediaries, and organization between stores to empower communities.
Scale & Time Frame	First store started in 1975. Now 17 stores helping 18 communities, with plans for 33 total stores.
Land Security	Reservations scattered on some of the poorest land (largely desert) in the Andean foothills. Continued concern is land. Continuing encroachment on reserves, and hemmed in by national parks.
Idea Initiation	Previously had to travel 20 miles to shop at a little boliche, or general store, and to sell products (raw wool and mohair, and heavy weavings). Store owner determined prices, trip took 1 day. In 1969, Salesian Padre Berreto invited caciques (local leaders) to 5 day meeting. All had similar problems: boliches cheated their people; land was poor; work was lacking; ranchers were taking their lands (yet little resulted from meeting). In 1975 a Salesian Padre and local Mapuche came up with plan for 1st cooperative.
Setting Agenda & Priorities	Initially developed by Salesian Padre and local Mapuche individual. Once cooperative stores took hold, commission developed to further manage.
Knowledge and Skills	(not discussed)
Technology	Truck takes wool and hides to Zapala, where a warehouse, office, and bunkhouse were built.
Organization	With help of bishop's office, formed *Asociación de Comunidades Mapuches Neuquines* to link stores. President works with commission of one delegate from each agrupación having a store. Commission coordinates staples, and seeks wider markets for Mapuche goods. Eventually hope stores will become cooperative, and Asociación a regional federation representing all 33 local communities. Asociación has had additional benefits: 1) It proved to the government that the Mapuche could cooperate for the benefit of all, gaining them a court victory over a land dispute with a judges family. Has gained them a voice with the government. State: "these new houses we're building with government assistance, the agricultural extension services - we never got them before. It all comes because we organized ourselves." (p.43).
Culture and Ethnicity	(not discussed)
Financial Assistance	IAF support (starting in 1982) used to by trucks, build warehouse, office, and bunkhouse. Small revolving credit fund also set up, but decapitalized through inflation, and poor management. 2nd IAF grant used to buy 2 pickup trucks and 9 one-way radios to provide market information. 3rd IAF grant to strengthen activities in southern Neuquén, and set up better loan fund, and support agricultural extension office. Total funding over 3 grants of 602,000, benefitting 3,000 Mapuche over 8 years.
Technical Assistance	Assistance of Salesian padre in starting a cooperative store. Initially worked out of church.
Project Management	Program is now run by commission of elected representatives from each cooperative store.
Community Involvement	Appears all Mapuche are fee to join cooperative. Members get a discount and preference for use of the organization's truck, but all can buy there.
Govt. Involvement	Asociación proved to the government that the Mapuche could cooperate for the benefit of all, gaining them a court victory over a land dispute with a judges family. Has gained them a voice with the government.
Marketing	One-way radios bought to provide market information show the importance of inflation and changing prices daily in marketing of goods.
Other	
Overall Success	Good: There are now 17 stores in various communities. Hold variety of goods. Author states that "18 Mapuche communities have been able to escape the exploitative grip of the boliches, lower their costs for staples and agricultural supplies by almost 30 percent, and begin to exercise some control over the sale of their products." (p.42) Some note that the true success is that Mapuche are now speaking out, and are much more confident in themselves.

Case No. 18

Group & Location	**Maya town of San Pedro in the highlands of San Marcos, western Guatemala**
Source	Smith, Waldemar R. 1977 *The Fiesta System and Economic Change.* New York: Colombia University Press. (all notes refer to except those noted as Ehlers) Ehlers, Tracy Bachrach 1990 *Silent Looms: Women and Production in a Guatemalan Town.* Boulder: Westview Press.
Project Focus & Components	Primarily weaving development, and associated modernization.
Scale & Time Frame	Town experienced economic takeoff since WWII. Discussion of development covers period of 3 decades in the town of over 10,000.
Land Security	Agriculture does not contribute as much to development, though subsistence IS secure with good agricultural land.
Idea Initiation	Prior to economic takeoff, much of population worked in handicrafts, in combination with subsistence. No specific project or program associated with development, but rather a general community process. 4 Factors emerge as important to degree of development. Most important are demographic factors, and national economic factors (including infrastructure development). Also significant are: geographic factors, and strategic decisions by national political and religious organizations that bear directly on Indian Communities.
Setting Agenda & Priorities	Appears primarily on household level.
Knowledge and Skills	Weaving skills present before largescale development. Weaving now employs greater technology though.
Technology	Some machine knitting factories developed.
Organization	(not discussed)
Culture and Ethnicity	Author argues that one of the primary factors identified with the success of the community is the productive vitality of the Indian family. Family willingness to live below their means puts in excellent position to succeed. Entrepreneurs maintain customary standard of living, deferring improvements in favor of investments. Indian household more dynamic, children and wives work. Because of success and market position relative to other communities, see selves as higher class than many other indians. Yet, San Pedro differs from classic colonial cities because it is tied to its hinterland through ties of kinship and common ethnic heritage.
Financial Assistance	While assistance was not discussed, availability of new capital due to geographic location of town discussed as important.
Technical Assistance	(not discussed)
Project Management	An autonomous, generalized community development.
Community Involvement	Smith (1977) refers to the development as community process, yet Ehlers (1990) finds that the majority of women have lost the autonomy they had as weavers and traders selling to a local market. Decreasing female status with transition from traditional cottage industry with piece-work employment. Ehlers argues that women's efforts to maximize business opportunities have a ceiling. 1) They are undercapitalized, and must rely on labor of their daughters in law; 2) Also work in the internal market and have little or no access to the external market where men are investing in transport and large-scale trade.
Govt. Involvement	No specific government programs discussed concerning weaving development, but government road building brought new level of economic integration to the region that was key to the development process. Expansion of the schooling system with govt. support was also important in preventing outmigration. Finally, general growth of Guatemala's economic infrastructure was important.
Marketing	Prior to development takeoff, Indians were peasant producers largely confined to regional market. Region had a demand for hardware, textiles, and other foreign goods, and produced a small surplus of wheat, wool and handwoven textiles. Immigrants that arrived provided the connection between local and external economy. Most established general stores. Expansion of markets, and location of San Pedro as a commercial market center of the highlands was of central importance. Since 1950, Indian community members developed and elaborated their trade advantages by investing in new kinds of capital and selling in expanding markets. Market position of San Pedro has enabled expanding opportunities.

Case No. 18 (continued)

Other	The geographic and demographic characteristics of San Pedro were key to its development. The community benefitted from historical status as preindustrial farming and trading community, and its proximity to the department capital. Also, as a town with a large concentrated population, the San Pedro community was "preadapted" to growth when it occurred. Advantages of large concentrated populations begins with specialization of labor: town was able to support a variety of full time specialists even before development. Another advantage (of size) is that many educated San Pedranos settle in their native town to live and work.
Overall Success	Good: San Pedro has become a dynamic, developing economy, with an evolving class structure, and modernizing culture. San Pedro unique as an Indian community of Highland San Marcos. Only one to advance into competitive position in national economy. Native handwoven cloth produced for international market, and weaving industry continues to absorb labor. Variety of industries have sprung up. Some machine knitting factories established. Smith (1977:180) summarizes that the "vigorous family organization, in conjunction with expanding commercial opportunities and a strong, concentrated population, have allowed San Pedro to break the constraints that hem in small Indian villages. The benefits of a concentrated, highly organized population, added to its central location, allowed San Pedro to mitigate the common problems of population pressure, minifundismo and dependence on plantation labor through the elaboration of nonagrarian industries and commerce. This development then promoted the rapid cultural modernization that lifted the town to its premier position in regional life."

Case No. 19

Group & Location	Maya of Quintana Roo, Mexico
Source	Bray, David Barton, Marcelo Carreón, Leticia Merino, and Victoria Santos 1993. "On the Road to Sustainable Forestry," *Cultural Survival Quarterly* (Spring):38-41.
Project Focus & Components	Pilot Plan of Quintana Roo (Forestry). Training and organizing ejidos to mange their own forests.
Scale & Time Frame	Eventually involved 14-19 communities and almost 1 million acres. Program began in 1984.
Land Security	Ejido land.
Idea Initiation	Maya have found themselves hemmed in by encroaching development. In 1950s did not recognize the value of forests, and exploited by large companies. In 1970s began exploiting forests directly. In the 1980s the progressive governor, supportive forestry undersecretary, and grassroots protests came together to give rise to project.
Setting Agenda & Priorities	A german technical team, brought in to provide support for communities, "quickly met with rejection from the Maya, who had learned through long and bitter experience that little good came from outside..(39)". Further, Maya weren"t attracted to managing mahogany trees, but were interested in agriculture and health clinics. After a period of hostility, the team refocused on Maya interests - prices received for railroad ties.
Knowledge and Skills	States that the experience "shows that the indigenous peoples don"t inherently have the skills needed to manage sustainable industrial production...(41)". Taught to scale logs.
Technology	In 1978, a technical team began promoting new forest knowledge, encouraging ejidos to inventory forests. For replanting, Organization of Forest Production Ejidos of the Mayan Zone of Quintana Roo (OEPF-Zona Maya) maintains nurseries in several ejidos. Also has 2 sawmills, and 2 portable sawmills.
Organization	Initially built upon ejido unions. Fraud by unions led to conflict within and between ejidos. Unions dissolved, and in 1986, OEPF-Zona Maya was born with 14 ejidos. Organized its own technical team. OEPF General Assembly elects officers for 2-year terms. Supervise the technical department. "Reveals that traditional social systems can provide raw materials to build new forms of organization necessary to run a modern forest-products business (41)."
Culture and Ethnicity	Project built on cultural values concerning value of the land, showing "that indigenous values are an indispensable bedrock for a system of sustainability to work..."(41)
Financial Assistance	OEPF received funding from MacArthur Foundation for carpentry workshops. Generally, Maya can afford to support only the most minimal technical services.
Technical Assistance	German technical team support, but team young, inexperienced, and spoke no Mayan. OEPF support in maintaining nursery, and encouraging inventorying. OEPF technical team still led by first foresters who arrived in 1984, "lending trust and continuity to the technical support (40)." Department trains and supervises community members in managing and harvesting the forests. Also conduct research leading to better management.
Project Management	Each ejido decides what to do with forest. Taught to manage own sales, and forests. Supervision by OEPF.
Community Involvement	OEPF-Zona Maya, put more control in communities. Mayan President of OEPF stated that "before, the campesinos didn"t know what forest production was; the buyers were the ones who know and told us what to do. Now the ejido is the owner because the campesino is organized and knows his work." All members of involved ejidos are benefitting.
Govt. Involvement	Progressive governor supported program.
Marketing	Negotiated contracts directly with ferrocarriles, rather than going through intermediates. Prices have stagnated since initial surge, and the railroad tie business is declining. This puts increased pressures on OEPF to find new products, and markets for less known species. Certification of sustainability would open up US and other markets committed to supporting sustainably harvested tropical timbers.
Other	Officials associated with the corrupt union attempted to sabotage, and kick out technical teams.
Overall Success	Good (long term not clear): Initially, the price received for mahogany went from 1,000 to 25,000 pesos per cubic yard, leading to a burst of prosperity, improved homes and diet, school supplies and clothing purchases. "Maya also gained a new sense of themselves in relation the forests (40)". Economic pressure threatens to undo equilibrium with nature. Could lose it all if do not take steps. Sustainable forestry is still in the future.

Case No. 20

Group & Location	**Maya, (and Zinantecs, and Chamula) of communities surrounding San Cristóbal of the Chiapas Highlands,**
Source	van den Berghe, Pierre L. 1995. "Marketing Mayas: Ethnic Tourism Promotion in Mexico," *Annals of Tourism Research* 22(3):568-588.
Project Focus & Components	Ethnic Tourism IN San Cristóbal. Tourist industry based around the indigenous population. Indigenous participation is primarily in crafts and produce market.
Scale & Time Frame	Tourism began in 1970s, when San Cristóbal was "discovered" by more adventurous travelers. Flow of tourists increased over time from a few backpackers, to organized tours. Flow of tourists now 400-800 per day. While San Cristóbal is primarily a mestizo town, many surrounding indigenous communities are involved in its development, and some serve as tourist stops.
Land Security	(not discussed as an issue)
Idea Initiation	Mestizo community, responding to a growing flow of tourists, initially focused on indigenous and colonial past. There was a refocus on living Maya, however, when foreign tourists showed an increasingly interest in them. Beginning of tourism in San Cristóbal coincided with attempts to organize indigenous crafts production.
Setting Agenda & Priorities	Government has had a large influence over the overall development of tourism, through the *Ruta Maya* program, an attempt to promote ecologically friendly tourism in the May cultural area, to halt the pillage of archeological sites by grave robbers, and the save the remaining patches of tropical rain forest from being converted into cattle pastures. In San Cristóbal, tourism was set primarily by Mestizo entrepreneurs, who were strongly influenced by the desires of the tourists.
Knowledge and Skills	Indigenous peoples have benefitted from crafts production, built on traditional knowledge.
Technology	For indigenous peoples, traditional technology has been used in the tourism trade.
Organization	(none discussed)
Culture and Ethnicity	Foreign interest in traditional Indian ways has brought new respect from Mestizo neighbors, as they are able to capitalize on this.
Financial Assistance	INI and others have supported the initiation of craft cooperatives in surrounding towns. Lack of access to loans, and other assistance, however, has largely kept Indians from the entrepreneurial opportunities of the mestizos in town who serve as middle men.
Technical Assistance	Several cooperatives with sales outlets established, under initiative of INI, the Catholic Archdiocese, and a number of private individuals.
Project Management	Primary control over tourism in San Cristóbal area is run by Mestizo intermediaries, while indigenous peoples serve more as tourees. Government also involved in many aspects of the industry.
Community Involvement	Indian Involvement: has been limited compared to involvement of mestizos. Two textile cooperatives do have shops in the crafts market, and many Indians bussed in daily to trade. 2 reasons why Indians have not become more involved: 1) entrepreneurial niches preempted by mestizos, and 2) some opted not to participate (eg. Zinacantecos were more interested in development to come from increased crop sales to town, and highly controlled tourism).
Govt. Involvement	Government has served a supportive role in developing the region"s tourism industry. The have come to feel that area can benefit more from ethnic tourism than from logging and ranching, especially considering the area"s ecologically devastation. INI held 1st weaving fair in 1972, founded 1st potters cooperative in Amatenango in 1973. *Fondo Nacional de Artesanias* (FONART) opened a purchasing office in San Cristóbal in 1974, leading to the formation of a large weaving cooperative San Jolobil in 1977. INI modernization efforts have facilitated access of outsiders to Indian communities and of Indians to mestizo urban areas.
Marketing	San Cristóbal tourism development responding primarily to market pressures. INI has helped to develop and market crafts industry for indigenous peoples, and FONART serves a marketing role.
Other	Chiapas uprising of 1994, briefly occupied San Cristóbal, threatening tourism in the region.
Overall Success	Nominal (unclear): Indians have not been the primary beneficiaries of tourism development, but have served as the primary tourees. Benefits have included: 1) improved relations with mestizos and growing pride in Indian heritage; and 2) some (especially Chamula women) involved themselves directly in tourist trade, thus improving their income. In general, Indians have had none of the advantages of Mestizo intermediates.

Group & Location	Mazahuas, State of Mexico, Mexico
Source	Papousek, Dick A. 1981 *The Peasant-Potters of Los Pueblos: Stimulus situation and adaptive processes in the Mazahua region in central Mexico.* Assen, The Netherlands: Van Gorcum.
Project Focus & Components	Pottery and piñata crafts development and modernization in 3 pueblos, including agricultural development. Over 10 year period, pottery went from side activity to primary economic activity of many.
Scale & Time Frame	Author reported on changes that took place over a 10 year period for the 3 communities of approximately 8,000 inhabitants.
Land Security	Division of land in favor of the mestizos, reflecting process of domination under which Indians were forced into most marginal areas. 3 villages have use of 5,600 ha. of land, most of poor quality. About 1/2 is ejidal. Also includes *Comunidad indigena* land belonging to Indian village, and some private ownership. Best part of land is in usufruct to individual villagers. Not enough land for self-sufficiency.
Idea Initiation	Lack of productive land and growing population required reliance on other sources of livelihood. This was not specifically a development project, but independent community development spurred by population growth, technology and skill improvements, the death of a major monopolist, and for some the development of the factories with govt. support.
Setting Agenda & Priorities	Government responsible for development of factories for pottery production that enabled glazing, but most community development took place autonomously with no clear guidance.
Knowledge and Skills	Community allready involved in pottery. Innovations in pottery styles important to development, as was the initiation of piñata production.
Technology	Many houses have their own kilns, but costs prohibit 2nd firing that is necessary to glaze pottery. Factories introduced by government enabled this, but not used to great extent. Trucks were important introduction as freed community members from monopolists who sold fuel for kilns. Artificial fertilizers have been used to increase agricultural yields.
Organization	(not discussed)
Culture and Ethnicity	(not discussed)
Financial Assistance	Government assistance in building and running factory, but hugely inefficient, as costs exceeded additional income.
Technical Assistance	Government provided technical assistance for factories (see below).
Project Management	No clear project for most of community. Factories run largely by govt. (see govt. involvement below).
Community Involvement	Development in the community was a generalized process that took place primarily through individual and family actions.
Govt. Involvement	Author stresses that the primary government involvement (the building of factories for firing pottery) was hardly an influence. Factories eventually became village property - one in each village. Govt. paid to train people in factory operation. Also offering use of Casa de las Artesanías (started in 1969) to market goods in effort to break monopolies of middlemen, though not always successful in finding markets. In San Juanico factory build in 1970. With help of Japanese technician, cheap, 2 large gas kilns were built. Also had tunnel kiln to make tiles. Villagers were unsure of the ownership, which led to feeling of insecurity and distrust. Gas kiln allowed double firing so could put on glazes that could not do with high cost of wood. Also allowed diversification of pottery. After 5 years, some problems with factories. Lack of funds led to delays in paychecks, and lack of materials. Enthusiasm died down. Lack of capable management. Financial situation unclear to villagers, because books in hands of an outsider. Factories set up at too large a scale. Overall influence of factories minimal.
Marketing	One of the most important factors in the development of the community was the death of a single monopolist in 1966. Though viewed as positive patron while living, had villagers in his grip. Many now own trucks and can do their own sales. Government marketing program offered through *Casa de las Artesanias*, but offered little net profit as "sales on the world market offered few prospects, partly because no one had done market research" (p.92).
Other	
Overall Success	Good: Author first visited area in 1967 and found serious poverty and economic hierarchy. Author returned to area after 7 years expecting a gloomy economy. Found potters had increased and modernization taking place. Previous social structure considerably changed towards greater equality.

Case No. 22

Group & Location	**Mojeño (and to a lessor degree Chimanes, Yuracarés, and Movimas) humid subtropical Chimanes Forest, Beni Department, Bolivia**
Source	Lehm, Zulema 1993 *El Bosque de Chimanes: Un Escenario de Conlictos Sociales (1986-1993).* Trinidad: Centro de Investigación y Documentación para el Desarrollo del Beni.
Project Focus & Components	Organization of the *Centro del Pueblos Indigenas del Beni* (CPIB - Confederation of Indigenous Communities of the Beni), and struggle for indigenous territory in the Chimanes Forest.
Scale & Time Frame	Management plans for the Chimanes Forest began as early as 1978. Indigenous peoples organized in 1987, and received territory in 1990. The Chimanes Forest area includes about 6,200 inhabitants: 2,170 Chimanes, 2,188 Mojeños, 181 Yuracarés, and 28 Movimas.
Land Security	Land and resource security was the primary initial concern of the indigenous organization. In 1986 the Government changed the legal status of the forest from temporary reserve, opening 579,000 ha to logging. Indigenous lands in the forest were being designated as permanent production forest for logging, and existing logging activities were causing a considerable strain on local resources.
Idea Initiation	The state, conservation organizations, lumber companies, and various NGOs were involved in negotiations concerning a broad management plan for the Chimanes Forest, but were not involving indigenous peoples in the discussion. Most of the forest was designated as permanent production forest for lumber concessions. In 1987, in Trinidad trinitarios living in an urban neighborhood known as *la Zona del Cabildo Indigenal de Trinidad*, with the help of the *Confederación de Indígenas del Oriente Boliviano* (CIDOB), located in Santa Cruz, organized a meeting attended by the Cabildos of the communities riberañas del Mamoré and some located on the road from Trinidad to Santa Cruz. The formed the *Central de Cabildos Indigenales Mojeños*, which later became the CPIB.
Setting Agenda & Priorities	CPIB was primarily responsible for organizing resistance to the state, and promoting the interests of forest communities.
Knowledge and Skills	CPIB received assistance on organizational skills and strategies for pursuing land claims from CIDOB.
Technology	(NA)
Organization	CIDOB was central in helping to organize CPIB, which served as the umbrella organization for several local regional organizations, including the *Sub-Central Indígena de San Ignacio de Mojos*, which encompassed communities in the Chimanes Forest. Thus: 1) The Central was composed primarily of urban indians with strong ties to Trinidad; 2) Organization permitted the formation of federations without imposing on local level organizations and traditions. Ties formed between urban and rural Cabildos; 3) rural communities incorporated relatively late into process, but served growing role. Reducción experience has had important effects on culture - such as their organization in Cabildos, with a structure of between 12-20 (cargos), solidly established with the capability of representation that can transcend individual settlements.
Culture and Ethnicity	See above comments concerning Cabildos. (otherwise not discussed)
Financial Assistance	(not discussed)
Technical Assistance	CIDOB and some state institutions such as the *Servicio Nacional de Educación Popular* (SENALEP) and NGOs such as CIDDEBENI, helped leaders in San Javier, San Ignacio, San Lorenzo, San Francisco, and the region of the National Park of Isiboro-Sécure set up Sub-centrales de Cabildos.
Project Management	The subcentrales and CPIB were involved in pursuing land claims, with community support. Management issues in the Chimanes Forest were largely controlled by the *Comité Cívico del Beni*, which represents the social organizations and non-state institutions of the region (with indigenous representation largely absent). The Civic Committee came up with Beni Forest Policy to control logging, introduced to el Centro de Desarrollo Forestal-Regional Norte, which was meant to regulate the extraction of wood. 7 wood companies were given concessions. In 1987, the Programa Chimanes was formed to work towards a sustainable use of the forest resources. Initially, this group included: *la liga de Defensa del Medio Ambiente* (LIDEMA), *la Estación Biológica del Beni*, *el Instituto de Ecología de la Universidad Mayor de San Andrés*, Conservation International, representatives of the wood companies and of the *Centro de Desarrollo Forest - Regional Norte*. Two years later, under conflict, the Programa Chimanes was reformed with the withdrawal of the *Instituto de Ecología de la UMSA* and Conservation International, and the addition of the *Universidad Técnica del Beni* and the *Central de Pueblos Indígenas del Beni*. The Programa Chimanes was later placed under the *Centro de Desarrollo Forestal*, reducing its role.
Community Involvement	Communities represented in region Cabildos, and active in protest for territory and land rights.

Case No. 22 (continued)

Govt. Involvement	The primary actors in the Bolivian State included the president of the republic, the Ministry of Campesino Affairs (which includes other groups like the Centro de Desarrollo Forestal - charged with forestry administration). In 1986 this latter organization was decentralized into the Centro de Desarrollo Forestal Regional Norte. Also, the *Instituto Indigenista Boliviano*: charged with interest of indigenous people, did little up till indigenous movement. Now plays line between state and local interests - patrimonial role. When indigenous organizations mobilized a march on the Capital in 1990, were able to obtain a presidential decree designating indigenous territory.
Marketing	(NA)
Other	
Overall Success	Good: Organization was able to insert itself in the planning process for the Chimanes Forest and gain a multi-ethnic indigenous territory.

Case No. 23

Group & Location	Nahuatl of Ameyaltepec, Guererro, Mexico
Source	Stephen, Lynn. 1991. "Culture as a Resource: Four Cases of Self-managed Indigenous Craft Production in Latin America," *Economic Development and Cultural Change* 40(1):101-130.
Project Focus & Components	Craft development and marketing. Amate bark paintings.
Scale & Time Frame	Bark painting initiated in 1960s.
Land Security	Have been able to maintain a sufficient land base from colonial period through the 20th century. Currently, every household has access to land either through communal or ejidal lands given to community through agrarian reform. Some private land in community, but subject to collective control. All land perceived as communal property.
Idea Initiation	After 20-year period of economic instability, entered tourist market. Experimenting with various materials, found amate bark as practical alternative to pottery, for which a marketing network was already established. Amate bark better portability.
Setting Agenda & Priorities	Not a development project or program. Decision making done at local level.
Knowledge and Skills	Have been involved in the production for exchange of craft products of agricultural production from colonial period into the 20th century, and have had experience in local and regional market systems. Initially involved in pottery. Used same motifs when switched to amate bark paintings.
Technology	(Not discussed, but appears readily available technology)
Organization	Built on existing forms of organization. "Extended kin and compadrazgo ties function simultaneously as family, ceremonial, and production relationships" (121).
Culture and Ethnicity	While aspects of ethnicity have been commoditized, self-management and successful entrepreneurship have been used to reinforce cultural identity and institutions. Reciprocal labor and goods exchanges have been maintained, labor and resources reinvested into community ritual and political institutions, and craft production integrated with agricultural, subsistence, and ceremonial activities and cycles. Group maintains a civil cargo system.
Financial Assistance	(not discussed)
Technical Assistance	(not discussed)
Project Management	Household is basic unit of production.
Community Involvement	Significant portion of income is reinvested in community institutions.
Govt. Involvement	(not discussed)
Marketing	Sea salt business goes back to 1800s, gives tradition of dealing with mestizos. "Their previous marketing experience was critical to their ability to move into the economic niche provided by the tourism market" (115). Sales now include exporting to the US.
Other	Craft production conducted between agricultural seasons.
Overall Success	Good: "Have been able to direct their successful economic endeavors not only to promote individual gains but also to support community innovations and strengthen noncapitalist institutions, such as kin and ritual kin, compadrazgo, networks, reciprocal labor exchanges, and rituals" (105).

Group & Location	Quechua Speaking Otevaleños of Ecuador
Source	Stephen, Lynn. 1991. "Culture as a Resource: Four Cases of Self-managed Indigenous Craft Production in Latin America," *Economic Development and Cultural Change* 40(1):101-130.
Project Focus & Components	Weaving and craft development and marketing. Textiles include wool ponchos, wall hangings, belts, and bags.
Scale & Time Frame	Canton of Otavalo includes about 75 Indian communities. Production for exchange has taken place since colonial times.
Land Security	Have been able to maintain a sufficient land base from colonial period through the 20th century. However, recent work suggests that land is in short supply in some communities, with landless and land-poor peasants often working in the district capital at weaving.
Idea Initiation	Responding to growing demand for native textiles, particularly through tourism.
Setting Agenda & Priorities	Otavaleños responsible for own development. Household family workshops are primary means of production, while recent emergence of medium and large-scale commercial workshops have been seen.
Knowledge and Skills	Have been involved in the production for exchange of craft products or agricultural production from colonial period into the 20th century, and have had experience in local and regional market systems. Craft production based on traditional knowledge.
Technology	Textiles produced on treadle looms (introduced by Spanish) and traditional backstrap looms.
Organization	Production and marketing building primarily off existing institutions of organization. "Extended kin and compadrazgo ties function simultaneously as family, ceremonial, and production relationships" (121). Development of larger-scale craft workshops a new development.
Culture and Ethnicity	While aspects of ethnicity have been commoditized, self-management and successful entrepreneurship have been used to reinforce cultural identity and institutions. Reciprocal labor and goods exchanges have been maintained, labor and resources reinvested into community ritual and political institutions, and craft production integrated with agricultural, subsistence, and ceremonial activities and cycles. Socioeconomic differentiation tied to entrepreneurial success has not lessened participation in reciprocal goods and labor exchanges associated with the ceremonial cycle. Participating in ceremonial institutions is a way of laying to rest local suspicions that individuals are trying to separate themselves from the community. Such relationships also serve for recruitment in an often competitive environment.
Financial Assistance	(not discussed)
Technical Assistance	In early 1960s weaving cooperative established in Otavalo with help of the Peace Corps.
Project Management	Management at level of production.
Community Involvement	Significant portion of income is reinvested in community institutions.
Govt. Involvement	During the 1950s the government initiated programs to promote tourism in places such as the Saturday market of Otavalan textiles.
Marketing	"A history of production for exchange is tied to the ability...to take advantage of existing marketing networks and skills when tourism and export markets opened up for their craft products" (110). In 1951, opened Centro Textil in Otavalo City. Otavalo long served as marketing system, and by 1980 at least 75 stores selling textiles, most owned and operated by Quechua-speaking Indians.
Other	Continue to engage in subsistence activities.
Overall Success	Good/Excellent: "Have been able to direct their successful economic endeavors not only to promote individual gains but also to support community innovations and strengthen noncapitalist institutions, such as kin and ritual kin, compadrazgo, networks, reciprocal labor exchanges, and rituals" (105).

Case No. 25

Group & Location	**Paez, Guambiano (possibly other groups) of Cauca Province of Colombia.**
Source	Bodley, John H. 1990. *Victims of Progress*. Mountain View, CA: Mayfield Publishing Company. Pp. 162-165.
Project Focus & Components	Organization of the Regional Indian Council of the Cauca (CRIC), and efforts to reclaim land.
Scale & Time Frame	CRIC organized in 1971, and represented 45 Indian reserves by 1973.
Land Security	Indians allocated communally held reservations (*resguardos*) in 16th century by Spanish. Increasingly, Indian reservations were ignored or eliminated in the 20th century. 7 original objectives of CRIC included: 1) Recuperation of reservation lands; 2) Increasing the size of reservations; 4) stopping payment of illegal land rents.
Idea Initiation	1971 2,000 Indians met from 10 reserves and organized CRIC. CRIC seen as way to combat land problems. CRIC was the earliest of such organizations to be formed in Colombia.
Setting Agenda & Priorities	Representatives from each reserve made up governing body of CRIC.
Knowledge and Skills	(not discussed)
Technology	(not discussed)
Organization	Local Indian Councils (or Cabildos) joined to form the federation, CRIC, the first of its kind in Colombia, which then became responsible for a number of development and tenure security initiatives.
Culture and Ethnicity	Indians see selves as unique because of ancestry, language, dress, customs, and especially because of economic egalitarianism.
Financial Assistance	(not discussed)
Technical Assistance	(not discussed)
Project Management	Leaders of local Cabildos responsible for management of CRIC, which in turn fights for land rights.
Community Involvement	Cabildo system
Govt. Involvement	Legal appeals for land made to INCORA (*Instituto Colombiano de la Reforma Agraria*), with limited success. On the local level, the power structure retaliated to CRIC efforts. This included attempts to block Indian assemblies, and in 1974 assassinations and the militarization of key areas (claiming CRIC was linked to M19 leftist guerrillas). By 1979 30 CRIC leaders were imprisoned (including president). In 1982, CRIC claimed 82 members had been killed by the state, church, and economic interests opposed to its objectives. 1987 239 indigenous people arrested.
Marketing	(not discussed)
Other	Leftist guerrillas also claimed responsibility for killing 7 CRIC members, who were considered counter-revolutionaries.
Overall Success	Good considering circumstances: In the first 3 years 5,000 hectares had been recovered, and illegal rents abolished. CRIC seen as a model organization by many other indigenous groups, but violence and instability in area make all efforts very difficult.

Case No. 26

Group & Location	**Pluma Hidalgo cooperative in Oaxaca, Mexico.**
Source	Carter, Tom. 1996. "Foreign Aid Success," *The Washington Times*, Tuesday, May 14.
Project Focus & Components	Organic coffee development. Hoping to re-establish reputation for internationally renowned gourmet coffee.
Scale & Time Frame	(not discussed)
Land Security	Cooperative ejido.
Idea Initiation	Privatization of coffee industry in 1989 left many small coffee growers in the lurch. Also experienced a decline in world coffee prices. Organic coffee could still get decent market price. Cooperative approached IAF to help get organic coffee concern going.
Setting Agenda & Priorities	Set by cooperative.
Knowledge and Skills	Built on preexisting coffee knowledge and expertise, with addition of organic techniques.
Technology	Requires more human input (working with shade varieties that can bring in more money).
Organization	Built on pre-existing cooperative organization.
Culture and Ethnicity	(not discussed)
Financial Assistance	IAF support.
Technical Assistance	(not discussed)
Project Management	Community cooperative management, though appears that IAF helps to monitor while their money is involved.
Community Involvement	(appears decision making at community level through cooperative organization).
Govt. Involvement	(not discussed)
Marketing	Markets to US and elsewhere through Aztec Harvest. Ben and Jerry"s is just one company that purchases their products.
Other	Area was a prime coffee growing area.
Overall Success	Not Clear: (impacts not discussed) Shade varieties mimic natural levels of vegetation, and have less negative impact on environment.

Case No. 27

Group & Location	Pume (Yaruro) of Apure State in Venezuela
Source	Gouveia, L. 1988. "Obstacles to Collectivization among Indigenous Communities: Two Venezuelan Cases," *Mid-American Review of Sociology* XIII(1):41-58. 1989. "State Intervention in Indigenous Economies: The Case of Venezuelan Indian Collectives." PhD dissertation, Department of Sociology, University of Kansas.
Project Focus & Components	Kumani Indigenous Enterprise. Provided land to marginalized Pume and introduced cattle herding. Pume were living in "unoccupied" state lands not yet claimed by nationals. They had small slash-and-burn plots, but most men had to engage in wage labor to make ends meet.
Scale & Time Frame	Organized in 1978 by IAN (National Agrarian Institute) and OMAFI (Ministerial Office for Frontier and Indigenous Affairs); involved 42 families "recruited" from 3 different settlements. Basically in disarray by 1986.
Land Security	Enterprise members (3 communities) were given "provisional" title to a 30,000 ha ranch that had been appropriated under the agrarian reform law and turned over to IAN to c reate the Kumani enterprise. Pume were **relocated** to Kumani. Land security tenuous--failure of Pume to repay financial obligations according to timetable "would result in the dispossession of...this land and other means of production they might own at the time" (p. 234).
Idea Initiation	Completely top-down by IAN and OMAFI; the Pume were recruited to participate in a pre-planned project.
Setting Agenda & Priorities	IAN and OMAFI--although there was an organizational structure created, with positions filled by Pume, but it never functioned effectively because of lack of knowledge and experience of Pume in cattle herding.
Knowledge & Skills	Generally lacked knowledge and skills for cattle herding; government officials ran operation.
Technology	Low-level
Organization	Indigenous Enterprise modeled after peasant enterprises of Venezuela. Under limited structural-organizational models permitted by the agrarian reform law, all Indigenous Enterprises were required to have: a General Assembly; an Administrative Council (consisting of a president, vice-president, treasurer, and secretary elected by the General Assembly); and a Supervisory Council. At least the president and vice president in the Administrative Council had to be literate according to legal requirements. Literacy a problem--for males about 60% and almost 100% for women.
Culture and Ethnicity	One aspect of project could be viewed as promoting cultural revaluation among the highly "peasantized" Pume.
Financial Assistance	Credit from IAN in the form of 3,890 head of cattle and about 100 other animals to be paid back over 15 years at 3% interest (see land security above).
Technical Assistance	Various technical assistants hired by state to teach Pume cattle ranching; most left because of hostility (including death threats) from nationals in the region.
Project Management	Poorly managed because of lack of expertise of Pume and of technical assistance. By 1985, instead of growing, the cattle herd had been reduced by 50%.
Community Involvement	Three communities were created at Kumani, spread some distance from one another. No real kinship links among members of the three communities. Basic lack of intercommunity solidarity. In fact, one community was expelled from ranch for lack of participation.
Govt. Involvement	State planned, initiated, and run. In addition, "rumors" of state corruption in relation to enterprise management.
Marketing	None mentioned.
Other	Indigenous peoples in this region of Venezuela were thought of as animals and, in the past, had been hunted by local nationals (cattle ranchers). From 1978 to 1986, locals robbed cattle from Pume and raided their homes. Interethnic atmosphere very negative.
Overall Success	Failure at time of last report.

Case No. 28

Group & Location	**Purépecha (or Tarascans) Indians, New San Juan Parangaricutiro, Michoacan, Mexico**
Source	Icaza, Pedro Alvarez. 1993. "Forestry as a Social Enterprise," *Cultural Survival Quarterly* (Spring):45-47.
Project Focus & Components	Organization of New San Juan (NSJ), and development of forestry program.
Scale & Time Frame	All of New San Jaun (6 neighborhoods) involved. Began in 1981.
Land Security	Volcano in original San Juan forced relocation in 1940s to New San Juan. Provided with community land of 45,000 acres - 62% commercially exploitable. Designated as an indigenous community ejido. Forests used on individual basis, though community owned.
Idea Initiation	In 1975 NSJ joined Union of Forest Ejidos and Communities. At this time over 300 small woodworking shops in hands of individual members, and much clandestine cutting was taking place. Group of advisors and community organizers won over opinion leaders of New San Juan to idea of forming a community enterprise to manage forests.
Setting Agenda & Priorities	Communal Council.
Knowledge & Skills	Forest management and technical services learned.
Technology	Maintain nurseries. Sawmills.
Organization	Joined Union of Forest Ejidos and Communities in 1975. Local organizations built on existing community organization. Communal Council, is unique in formality. Mediates democracy with a strong Aristotelian basis, creating almost a republican monarchy. Council composed of enterprise directors, administrators of common property, technical committee, and 10 representatives from each of NSJ"s 6 neighborhoods.
Culture and Ethnicity	(not discussed)
Financial Assistance	
Technical Assistance	Affiliation with official National Peasant Confederation provides easy passage through bureaucracy needed to get annual cutting permits. In 1988 received right to administer its own forest technical services.
Project Management	According to author, primary reason for success #2) is an efficient, technically proficient administration that depends on a well-paced and sustainable use of the forest. Operations run by community enterprise.
Community Involvement	According to author, primary reason for success #1) is an ingenious and participatory communal organization. Community involved in all phases, building on traditional community organization. The Communal Assembly is the highest authority, and names all executive posts. All operations are community-owned and operated. The general assembly approved the formation of a community enterprise in 1981. Due to history of failed attempts to organize, needed to win local confidence by producing small but achievable gains. Began holding information assemblies every month. In first year, created at least part-time work for 120 people. Rather than trying to police individuals, enterprise sought to harmonize individual interests and harness on behalf of the community. Community voted to continue reinvesting all profits.
Govt. Involvement	According to author, primary reason for success #4) is the political and economic backing from the government. The enterprise has depended heavily on official favor, and has had close relations with the government. Received control of technical services. Delicate balance between individual and community shaken by breaking up of ejidos, and NAFTA.
Marketing	According to author, primary reason for success #3) is a diversified and integrated forest industry; and #5) is a willingness to reinvest profits. In addition to forest management, NSJ has built vertically integrated forest products industry. Produces wood and pine chips, and slats for packing. Has a factory that makes moldings, and furniture. NSJ is also investing in agriculture and fruit growing. Author states that "thanks to reinvesting most of its profits, New San Juan has sawmills and drying ovens, winches, tractors, and avocado groves, as well as a shopping center, a warehouse...computerized administrative control (45)."
Other	
Overall Success	Excellent: Organization has received much attention for its success, and ability to integrate community and individual interests. Seen as a model of production and organization. Project has generated jobs, money, and infrastructure development. Today the project maintains around 900 permanent workers. In 1984 received "Forest Merit Award". 1988 received right to administer its own forest technical services. 1990 reached sales of about 5 million. However, NSJ has reached its capacity in sawmills and carpentry shops. Finishes cutting long before cutting season ends. Unclear whether will survive new reform and NAFTA pressures.

Case No. 29

Group & Location	**Quechua-speaking group on Taquile Island, Lake Titicaca, Peru**
Source	Healy, Kevin, and Elayne Zorn. 1983. "Lake Titicaca's Campesino-Controlled Tourism," *Grassroots Development* 6(2):3-10.
Project Focus & Components	Weaving, and Tourism development over time (not a specific project or program). Development of: 1) weaving markets; 2) boating coops; 3) tourism management committees; 4) restaurants; 5) fishing coops; 6) community run artisan store; 7) community museum.
Scale & Time Frame	Involved the entire community/island. Weaving marketing started in 1968. Tourism as early as 1977.
Land Security	Mobilized savings during 1930s to purchase island from landowners. Land ownership appears private (not clear if there is communal land).
Idea Initiation	For weaving, US Peace Corps assisted in creating a cooperative to market weavings based on the structure of traditional and legal authority figures. For tourism, community took advantage of circumstances following a blurb on the island in the South American Handbook.
Setting Agenda & Priorities	Seem to be set by community body, and local committees. Tourism committees in primary control of tourism development. Community seeking to control the pace of growth, though at times this is undermined by a lack of control over boating, and outside development interests.
Knowledge and Skills	Weaving based on traditional activities. Tourism management, boat building and maintenance, and fishing new.
Technology	Tourism sought to capture "authentic andean" experience, so little introduced goods. Tourists boarded with families on island. Growth of technology in community controlled by community bodies. Used boats to ferry tourists.
Organization	Management of weaving and tourism built on traditional community political systems. Boat coops built on cooperative tradition.
Culture and Ethnicity	Have sought to maintain a traditional Andean feel, and control the type of development, though increased money and population are beginning to threaten maintenance of traditional culture.
Financial Assistance	Grant from IAF enabled boat coops to purchase spare parts. To keep weavings in community, IAF contributed to a fund to purchase fine, old pieces for a local museum.
Technical Assistance	With help of outside anthropologist, community museum developed to preserve and display older, better textiles.
Project Management	Community control. "Over the past six years, the islanders have established rules and prices that they and the tourists are expected to respect (5)." Artisan store seeks to prevent locals from undercutting one another"s prices, though difficult to control.
Community Involvement	All involved in weaving. Every family involved in tourism at some aspect, whether through boating, boarding tourists, etc. Each household directly receives tourist income from lodging and meals. Household improvements inspected and approved by island commission. Violations have occurred in community agreements concerning sale of textiles. Also, "Women have not reaped a fair share of benefits from the tourist boom nor has their relative status on the island improved (8)." Market shifts have displaced female labor.
Govt. Involvement	Peruvian Coast Guard and Ministry of Tourism licensed Taquileños to carry travelers and issued regulations and tariffs. Islanders obtained an officially sanctioned monopoly. New regulations placed on boats carrying tourists, could turn control over to private, Puno companies.
Marketing	Locals have responded to changing market needs both in tourism market (eg. by providing fish), and in types of textiles being weaved. Boat building has evolved into a mini-industry.
Other	"From the outset... had certain advantages - a spectacular landscape, an unforced friendliness, colorful and highly visible folk practices, and a thriving crafts tradition." "Isolation allowed the islanders to keep outside entrepreneurs at arm"s length while the community developed facilities and management skills." (p.8)
Overall Success	Good/Excellent: Author states that "Taquile"s six years of tourism departs from the conventional pattern and shows that a community can set the terms for tourist development and capture the lion"s share of the benefits."(8) Tourism and weaving sales have increased trade and communication with mainland, and brought new personal income. Agricultural production has also boosted. Tourist traffic has encouraged the wearing of traditional garb, reinforcing local pride in dress, workmanship, and native traditions. Community has gained skills in administration, communal organization, and lobbying. However, population growth (largely from reverse migration), threatens self sufficiency. Community is experiencing a growing garbage disposal problem, public drunkenness, and increasing acquisition of consumer goods. There are still problems in health and nutrition, and infant mortality is still high. Social stratification has also increased. The author notes that: "today Taquiloños walk a narrow path between holding to tradition and accepting change" (9).

Case No.30

Group & Location	Quichua of Eastern Ecuador
Source	MacDonald, Theodore. 1992. "From Reaction to Planning: An Indigenous Response to Deforestation and Cattle Raising," in T. Downing, S. Hecht, H. Pearson, and C. Garcia-Downing (eds.), *Development or Destruction: The Conversion of the Tropical Forest to Pasture in Latin America*. Boulder: Westview Press. Pp: 213-234. Jahnige, Paul J. 1989. "Project Letimaren: Indigenous Resource Management in Ecuador's Upper Amazon. *Cultural Survival Quarterly* 13(4):73-74.
Project Focus & Components	Forestry management project (LETIMARIN). Three-phase project includes: land titling and institution building; training in resource management technologies; and implementation of a broad regional management program. (Article reported only on first of two phases.)
Scale & Time Frame	LETIMARIN planned to involve 43 communities. Initiated in 1988.
Land Security	While some held small plots, general lack of title for community lands—titling was a primary objective of project. Encroachment by colonists a problem.
Idea Initiation	Unclear. Came out of joint concerns by USAID regarding the impacts of a road project and FOIN (Federation of Indigenous Organizations of Napo) regarding constituency's demands for tangible action.
Setting Agenda & Priorities	Appears FOIN was able to dictate the pace of the project. It was their idea to deal with land tenure and institution building first.
Knowledge and Skills	Considerable training required for "technical staff." Implementation of forestry management just beginning, but expected to work within standing forests or expand on traditional agricultural systems and function best using community-based concepts of land use.
Technology	(Not discussed. See Knowledge and Skills)
Organization	Institution building primary focus of initial phases. FOIN established a "technical staff" of high school educated, Quichua-speaking Indians to serve as a permanent work group.
Culture and Ethnicity	(not discussed)
Financial Assistance	Initial economic support for creation of FOIN by OXFAM-UK and Cultural Survival. USAID, recognizing poor relations with government, directly funded first phase of LETIMARIN through FOIN.
Technical Assistance	Cultural Survival helped to train FOIN technical staff and gather land use and tenure data. Technical staff visited Kuna's project Pemasky in Panama and received training by Kuna in Ecuador, in collaboration with Cultural Survival. Also, training in forest management by Yanesha Forestry Cooperative. For communities, FOIN hired specialist to conduct seminars on logging economics and techniques.
Project Management	So far, FOIN and their "technical staff" responsible for project management.
Community Involvement	FOIN research teams built support by meeting with communities.
Govt. Involvement	Early 1980s, Office of Indian Affairs and the Fund for Development of the Urban and Rural Marginal Populations (FODERUMA) helped strengthen FOIN and their interests, as did the Forest Law of 1981. In 1984, political change shifted policy to Amazonian development and put indigenous groups on defensive.
Marketing	Income generating production systems seen as important—this was the purpose of Yanesha involvment.
Other	Earthquake in region brought initial USAID attention.
Overall Success	Good: increased ethnic pride and community cohesion. Organizational structure for LETIMARIN in place, though success of implementation not yet clear.

Case No. 31

Group & Location	**Quechua of the Chimborazo province in highland Ecuador**
Source	Kleymeyer, Chuck, and Carlos Moreno 1988 "La Feria Educativa: A Wellspring of Ideas and Cultural Pride." *Grassroots Development* 12(2):32-40.
Project Focus & Components	Activities of La Feria Educativa (the education fair), a group of young indigenous musicians. By using cultural expression through stories, songs, plays, etc., group has been able to plant ideas of self-development in communities, building interest in development and education. Also builds ethnic pride. Task is "to spark campesino organizations in Chimborazo Province to participate in a broad program of local development." (p.33)
Scale & Time Frame	Since 1979, has visited over 750 communities.
Land Security	(not discussed)
Idea Initiation	Program is managed by the *Servicio Ecuatoriano de Voluntarios Chimborazo* (SEV), which evolved from earlier govt. efforts sponsored by the *Unidad de Educación para el Desarrollo*. Both use "adult education as a platform for a variety of development activities in indigenous communities, including literacy training centers, communal bakeries, self-managed artisanal workshops, reforestation efforts..." (p.34).
Setting Agenda & Priorities	La Feria agenda set by SEV.
Knowledge and Skills	One of the primary tasks is to help develop literacy programs.
Technology	(NA)
Organization	La Feria has been a motivating force in the establishment of numerous indigenous organizations. For itself, one of the greatest challenges has been coping with organizational challenges brought on by its own success. Has become more bureaucratic and inwardly focused.
Culture and Ethnicity	A primary goal of La Feria is to help build ethnic pride, and build on this to for the pursuit of development initiatives. Group speaks in Quechua. Task is to gain rapport with a people who are wary of investing limited resources and social energy to yet another scheme from above. Feria enters village by invitation, and performers play music, sing songs, have plays - many representing current problems faced by Quechua. Then encourage people to identify their own most important problems. Important is their ability to use local idiom, and symbols. Authors state that "By revitalizing indigenous identity and pride, it has been a cultural means to promote development ends, as well as a cultural end in itself.... it has been an example for all the people of Chimborazo, and Ecuador, of what indigenous people can accomplish by drawing upon their own internal resources and cultural heritage." (p.40)
Financial Assistance	Over 15 year period, 1975-1989, Unidad and SEV have received $1.2 million from IAF. Additional $1.1 million raised in counterpart donations, (cash, labor, materials and land) from indigenous communities and public and private entities.
Technical Assistance	La Feria not directly responsible for providing this.
Project Management	La Feria run out of SEV.
Community Involvement	Large part of La Feria task is to build community involvement and concern. Seek to involve locals in the performances, and have them identify their own concerns. "According to the Feria's strategy, this collective recognition of how a problem is rooted within the local reality is a prerequisite for building the resolve and summoning the energy and creativity necessary to identify and implement solutions." (p.37)
Govt. Involvement	La Feria is often the first contact campesinos have with the innovative program managed by the Servicio Ecuatoriano de Voluntarios Chimborazo (SEV). SEV evolved from earlier govt. effort sponsored by Unidad de Educación para el Desarrollo.
Marketing	(not discussed)
Other	
Overall Success	Excellent: Since 1979, La Feria has visited over 750 communities; helped pave the way for 1050 literacy training centers; helped pave way for Unidad de Educación para el Desarrollo establishment of 32 community bakeries, 45 artisan-managed workshops, 145 community centers, and planting of more than 200,000 trees. Many communities joining to form local federations (now 9 representing over 150 villages and organizations. Has seen success unprecedented in other provinces. Women now speaking out. Pride in native language.

Case No. 32

Group & Location	**Runa, and Quechua speakers of Northern Ecuadorian Amazon.**
Source	Shiguango, Jaime, C. Avilés, and D. Irvive. 1993. "An Experiment in Rainforest Conservation," *Cultural Survival Quarterly* (Spring):56-59.
Project Focus & Components	Project PUMAREN (Program for the Use and Management of Natural Resources). To link land claims and natural resource management at the local level. To build on traditional knowledge, developing economic alternatives that do not destroy the resources. To support land claims by showing ability to manage lands, and economically profit.
Scale & Time Frame	Pilot project focused on 3 communities. Organizational phases preparing for larger implementation, though. Initiated in 1988.
Land Security	Large areas of land claims, some areas already adjudicated, others in process, or being fought for. Lands have come under severe pressures from oil exploration.
Idea Initiation	Federation of Indigenous Organizations of Napo (FOIN) established PUMAREN as a resource management arm, to work with communities, in 1988. Birth of PUMAREN followed earthquake, and events associated with it, including creation of a new road, which led to exploitation of indians by lumber companies. FOIN realized a need to provide alternatives.
Setting Agenda & Priorities	FOIN and PUMAREN staff, in consult with communities.
Knowledge and Skills	(not discussed)
Technology	(not discussed)
Organization	Organization to serve indigenous communities developed in 1973: Federation of Indigenous Organizations of Napo (FOIN) - represents over 60 Runa communities. In 1980 FOIN joined with other federations to form the Confederation of Amazonian Indian Nationalities of Ecuador (CONFENIAE). PUMAREN created by FOIN. Formed committee to plan and manage pilot project from community members, PUMAREN, and FOIN. Committee established a Forest Management Team, staffed by PUMAREN members and local people.
Culture and Ethnicity	(not discussed)
Financial Assistance	Since 1991, World Wildlife Fund"s Tropical Forestry Program has supported pilot project activities.
Technical Assistance	FOIN established PUMAREN with the support of Cultural Survival. Cultural survival taught PUMAREN team to conduct surveys. FOIN helped in training of team in land-use planning and resource management. Team visited other projects including: agroforestry project in Napo, Awá Land Delimitation Project on Ecuador"s Pacific coast, and Project PEMASKY, a Kuna effort in Panama. Kuna from PEMASKY organized a 4 month course in land-use planning, protected areas, determining land-use capacity, mapping techniques, and forest inventory. For 3 months, 6 PUMAREN members received intensive training in Peru with COFYAL. PUMAREN"s 6 member staff, all indigenous federation members, work as team to help member communities develop and implement sustainable land use alternatives. Also work with FOIN"s Land Rights Department to support federation efforts to obtain legal recognition of territory.
Project Management	Representatives of 3 pilot communities, PUMAREN, and FOIN formed an organizing committee to guide the process. Since then, "the committee has helped plan and coordinate work, including developing a work plan and structure based on community priorities, ongoing training of PUMAREN and designated community members in developing forest management plans. (59)."
Community Involvement	PUMAREN works with local communities. Pilot project based on community requests. Regional resource-management plan revised in a series of workshops with communities, and FOIN directors. Communities have each designated areas of their forests for production, and other uses.
Govt. Involvement	Inability of govt. to protect indian lands from colonist invasion.
Marketing	1) Recognized that individual communities did not have enough forest to sustain an enterprise, so communities agreed to work together. 2) One of the more difficult parts of the project is figuring out how to use many of the tree species in the forest. Only a few species are sold on the broader markets. Some international traders, however, who want to promote locally run, environmentally sensitive enterprises, are interested in helping market other species.
Other	
Overall Success	Not Yet Clear (good): have only completed the organizational and planning phases. Little has been implemented.

Case No. 33

Group & Location	Shuar of lowland Ecuador
Source	Bodley, John H. 1990. *Victims of Progress*. Mountain View, CA: Mayfield Publishing Company. Pp. 160-162.
Project Focus & Components	Organization of Shuar Federation, and efforts to develop its communities independently. Land Claims, cattle ranching, bilingual education, radio station.
Scale & Time Frame	As of 1978 contained 20,000 members in 160 local centers and 13 regional associations. Organization initiated in 1964.
Land Security	A primary issue leading to Shuar organization. Gaining individual titles proved too time consuming, so went for communal land through IERAC. By 1975 95,704 hectares securely in community titles.
Idea Initiation	Pressure from colonization on lands led to organization, with support of Salesian missionaries.
Setting Agenda & Priorities	Shuar have been in firm control over their development.
Knowledge and Skills	Cattle introduced
Technology	(not discussed)
Organization	1964 created corporate body based on regional associations of many Shuar communities. *Federción de Centros Shuar* became a legal entity. No history of such organization among Shuar. There are elected officials with carefully specified duties and five specialized commissions to deal with health, education, and land.
Culture and Ethnicity	While many traditional patterns have been abandoned, there was a concerted effort to strengthen language and cultural identity. Bilingual education was implemented and broadcast over radio.
Financial Assistance	Obtained financial and technical assistance from various national and international agencies.
Technical Assistance	Obtained financial and technical assistance from various national and international agencies. Salesian missionary support for organization.
Project Management	Shuar Federation
Community Involvement	Federation officials are elected.
Govt. Involvement	Ministry of education gave Federation right to run its own school program. However, "government has also forcefully attempted to prevent the Shuar from promoting the political organization of other Ecuadorian Indians and generally seems opposed to the idea of Ecuador becoming a multiethnic nation" (162).
Marketing	(not discussed)
Other	
Overall Success	Good (unclear): (Good for objectives - Unclear overall) Shuar have been one of the first to so completely take control of their own development process. They have strengthened language and cultural identity, and secured a resource base. However, the Federation faces problems from a growing economic differentiation and emergence of educated and salaried elite, which may not fit into the Shuar egalitarian ideal. It is also possible that the land base may prove inadequate.

Case No. 34

Group & Location	**Shuar of eastern Ecuador**
Source	Kroeger, Axel, and Francoise Barbira-Freedman 1988. "Cultural Change and Health: The Case of South American Rainforest Indians," In J. Bodley (ed.), *Tribal Peoples and Development Issues: A Global Overview.* Mountain View, CA: Mayfield Publishing Company. Pp. 221-236.
Project Focus & Components	Not reporting on a specific project, but the general development of cattle ranching and population growth that the Shuar are undertaking.
Scale & Time Frame	(A general discussion about the adoption of ranching among Shuar throughout eastern Ecuador in the 1970s and early 80s.)
Land Security	Tenuous tenure in many cases is what has led to Shuar adoption of cattle ranching. Shuar have had some success in gaining rights to land.
Idea Initiation	Facing encroachment threats and political weakness, Shuar choose to adopt ranching to protect lands.
Setting Agenda & Priorities	(not discussed)
Knowledge and Skills	Many of these developments based on introduced technology and knowledge, leading to acculturation.
Technology	(not discussed)
Organization	Shuar federation developed, and has become one of the most powerful ethnic federations in Latin America.
Culture and Ethnicity	Development choices led to acculturation.
Financial Assistance	(not discussed)
Technical Assistance	Support for Shuar provided by missionaries in a number of endeavors.
Project Management	(not discussed)
Community Involvement	(not discussed)
Govt. Involvement	(not discussed)
Marketing	(not discussed)
Other	
Overall Success	Nominal (from this perspective): Article presents the "down side" to what has often been thought of as indigenous autonomous development. While Shuar have increased their political power, maintained some control over land, and entered the cash economy, the increased population associated with development has also meant an increase in disease. Care of livestock and other aspects of acculturation have also led to problems, including loss of women"s roles, and friction in communities. Authors suggest that "training of local health workers able to bridge the cognitive gaps between primary health care and traditional healing systems could limit to some extent the negative consequences of acculturation on health" (233).

Case No. 35

Group & Location	**Tojolobales (mostly), Chiapas, Mexico**
Source	Murphy, Ellen C. 1995. "La Selva and the Magnetic Pull of Markets: Organic Coffee-Growing in Mexico," *Grassroots Development* 19(1):27-34
Project Focus & Components	Organic coffee production. Author reported on initial 3yr phase of the project. Long term goal is to take advantage of lucrative organic coffee niche in international market.
Scale & Time Frame	Bringing under production: 200 ha the 1st year, 300 the second, and 500 more the final year, with roughly the same number of participating farmers. First year involved members of 30 different communities.
Land Security	Ejido land.
Idea Initiation	*Union de Productores de Cafe de la Frontera Sur* (UNCAFESUR), confederation representing 10 small-scale coffee producer organizations in southern Mexico, with combined membership over 4,400 families. Hoped to take advantage of economies of scale and market niche.
Setting Agenda & Priorities	UNCAFESUR and *Unión de Ejidos de la Selva* (La Selva), based in Las Margaritas, Chiapas.
Knowledge and Skills	Project building on existing knowledge of coffee production. Participants given training in organic techniques, terracing of sloping fields to hold topsoils, organic composting, appropriate pruning, intercropping with bananas and other trees to provide shade (also with secondary food and cash crops). Participants also have learned to establish nurseries, harvesting techniques, drying, storing, and transporting.
Technology	Introduction of composting and terracing (involving mostly human input). Also provided with an electronic coffee-bean sorter.
Organization	A farmer is chosen by his peers in each community to serve as the extensionist for the program. He is responsible for sharing information with the community. La Selva and Union of Producers were pre-existing organizations, and project largely built on these.
Culture and Ethnicity	(not discussed)
Financial Assistance	IAF grant to La Selva in 1992 for 1) improving the quality and production of coffee while conserving natural resources, and 2) strengthening the organizational base of participating groups. MacArthur Foundation providing funds La Selva to purchase an electronic coffee-bean sorter, instal a tasting lab, and for training. Max Haavelar considered La Selva venture so promising, it agreed to temporarily offer farmers small financial incentive per kilo of organic coffee grown for 1st 3 years.
Technical Assistance	La Selva sponsors the program for cultivation and marketing of organic coffee. Agronomists regularly visit the community elected extensionist to train in organic techniques. In addition, a team of 8 agronomists make village visits to supervise and monitor the progress of each community. A detailed file is kept on each farmer involved in the program, with continued follow up after harvest. Baseline study by IAF.
Project Management	La Selva is responsible for development of the organic coffee program, administering the program on behalf of UNCAFESUR.
Community Involvement	Community elects local extensionist. Participation in the project is on volunteer basis. The "initial high level of interest in the program was soon tempered by the hard work involved in balancing the demands of milpa and cash crop cultivation (32)," particularly the hard work necessary for initial terracing. Many who dropped out, signed up again after seeing the gains by those who stuck it out. Baseline study suggested that those participating are able to afford taking risks and waiting for long-term benefits.
Govt. Involvement	
Marketing	Harvested coffee transported to processing plant run by UNCAFESUR, where sorted, and then sold to a company for roasting. La Selva reached an agreement with Dutch coffee-broker organization Max Haavelar, which sold through European solidarity markets. Marketing has exceeded expectations. Wholesalers now refer to coffee as "Las Margaritas" as taste and quality have justified its own appellation.
Other	1) The area is premium for coffee growing, and not having used chemicals in the past (because so poor) means that they could obtain organic certification for crops in record time. 2) Turmoil in region in 1993-94 caused many to flee homes. Half the crop was likely lost, leading to lower volume than anticipated. Many communities now cut off because of turmoil. "Primary impediments to the program thus far have not been with the technical side of the model but stem from the political uncertainty in the region (34)."
Overall Success	Not Clear (good): Farmers felt they were crucial to performance of coffee, and more in control of production levels. Increased work available to young, so migration decreasing. Success can be measured by involvement of nearly 1000 farmers, and ability to market goods. However, expenses for farmers are greater than previously, when doing nothing, and net revenues not yet growing.

Case No. 36

Group & Location	**Tzeltal Indians in municipality of Oxchuc, Chiapas**
Source	Turner, Paul R. 1979. "Religious Conversion and Community Development," *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion* (18(3):252-260
Project Focus & Components	Agricultural and social development following conversion to protestantism. Includes terracing of land.
Scale & Time Frame	About 2000 Indians, 1/2 of the Community. Started in 1940s/50s.
Land Security	Only 1/3 of the land is cultivatable, and Ladinos had expropriated large portions during Carranza presidency. Prior to conversion, a severe land shortage problem. Land owned by sub-clans.
Idea Initiation	In late 1940s and early 1950s conversion from folk-Catholicism to a type of evangelical protestantism. Author proposes that oppression caused by fear of witchcraft may have been a main cause. Protestant Missionaries largely responsible, to combat: 1) Poverty: poor land and inadequate harvests, liquor indebted. 2) Disease: inadequate diet, reliance on shaman, poor hygiene. 3) Illiteracy: mistrust between Ladino teacher and Tzeltals.
Setting Agenda & Priorities	(not discussed)
Knowledge and Skills	(not discussed)
Technology	Terracing land
Organization	Protestant mission important organization in place.
Culture and Ethnicity	Protestantism rejected witchcraft, which had threatened individual entrepreneurship. It also rejected the Catholic oriented fixed hierarchical structuring of people, and encouraged social mobility. Protestantism made claims that people can take positive action to bring about change.
Financial Assistance	Appears considerable funds made available from government, possible through INI.
Technical Assistance	Protestantism introduced bilingually so all could understand the teachings. Western-trained medical practitioners provided health care at a clinic. Government INI provided support.
Project Management	(not discussed)
Community Involvement	Approximately 1/2 of community converted, while after a time nearly all went to the clinic once seeing the positive effects it had on health. Missionary only accepted converts when entire family converted, so as not to disrupt importance of traditional family decision making.
Govt. Involvement	INI has established a number of schools using native teachers. Participation of government seen as key. Made it possible for linguistic missionaries from the US to work with indigenous groups for last 40 some years. Government also protected missionaries and converts from Ladino reprisals. Government has invested millions of pesos in highland region in medical facilities, schools, and other construction projects as part of its national program for underdeveloped Indian Communities. Because of their openness to directed change programs, their municipality has received disproportionate amount of federal aid.
Marketing	(not discussed)
Other	
Overall Success	Good: 1) Poverty decreased: Terracing increased corn yields by 500%. Protestant abstainers no longer liquor indebted. Converts no longer intimidated by threats of witchcraft on those who save money. 2) Better health. 3) Literacy: protestantism increased interest in bilingual education. "They exceed all other Indian municipalities in highland Chiapas in education, the acceptance of scientific medicine, and other indices of acculturation." (255).

Case No. 37

Group & Location	**Yanesha Forest Cooperative of Peruvian Amazon**
Source	Lázaro, Manuel, Mario Pariona, and Rober Simeone. 1993. "A Natural Harvest," *Cultural Survival Quarterly* (Spring):48-51.
Project Focus & Components	Creation of Yanesha Forestry Cooperative (COFYAL), and wood-manufacturing development. COFYAL dual purpose: 1) protects natural resources on communal territories from indiscriminate use; 2) impedes exploitation by wood companies. Source of employment.
Scale & Time Frame	Multiple communities: initially involved 5 of 11 communities in the valley. Scale has been a main problem experienced, that was not adequately identified by planners: "The enterprise that evolved, though significantly smaller than an elephantine plan originally proposed..., has proven to be far larger than the participating Yanesha communities can sustain without huge personal sacrifice and significant social consequences for an already fully employed workforce (51)." Project initiated in 1986.
Land Security	Titles obtained for community land just prior to forestry initiative. USAID was funding a Peruvian road project with the stipulation that coordination take place with local and native communities. Pushed Peru to formally recognize Yanesha communities and grant titles.
Idea Initiation	Massive USAID supported road building project threatened Yanesha. Planning process that led to Co-op began with series of community workshops in 1984, facilitated by *Proyecto Especial Pichis-Palcuzu* (PEPP), which had administered the road building/colonization project for the government, and the Tropical Science Center (TSC).
Setting Agenda & Priorities	Workshops selected wood-manufacturing project based upon sustained-yield forest management. Also debated issues such as structure for the enterprise, its size and marketing needs, and time frame for implementing effort.
Knowledge and Skills	"Silvicultural techniques now being developed and applied in the Yanesha forests are a unique combination of scientific research and technology, provided by the TSC technical assistance team, and sophisticated traditional knowledge, provided by Yanesha foresters (50)." Familiarity with nuances of environment became a big help in applying strip regeneration. Adaptation of strip shelterwood system to naturally regenerate strips, developed by TSC, closely mimics traditional gardening system. The harvest cycle also closely mimics the traditional slash-and burn forest gardening.
Technology	Technical package included portable sawmill and machinery. Mostly human inputs.
Organization	With PEPP"s help, committee of community representatives proposed a co-op as the most appropriate structure, because it resembles the Yanesha"s traditional way of deciding communal issues. The committee organized communal assemblies to provide a constant line of communication between itself and each community. Yanesha Forestry Cooperative (COFYAL) founded in 1986. Involved communities and non-Yanesha administrator.
Culture and Ethnicity	No history of organization such as attempted in this case.
Financial Assistance	When PEPP support ended in 1988, co-op obtained financial and technical support from World Wildlife Fund"s Tropical Forestry Program
Technical Assistance	PEPP and TSC support in organization of COYFAL. Worked with Yanesha to analyze and project land use and population trends for following decade. Involved trust building activities. Communities signed a two-year agreement with PEPP for training, technical assistance, and logistical support.
Project Management	COYFAL, with community over control.
Community Involvement	Essential to learning process were weekly planning and evaluation meetings of all co-op members - crucial to overcoming challenges that emerged during organizational phase. COYFAL"s progress derives entirely from the constant incorporation of communities into its work, allowing the Yanesha to fully control the co-ops administration and direction. Problem experienced is that competing demands on members" time led to a variety of social and economic problems in and between families.
Govt. Involvement	Government Project led to Yanesha project.
Marketing	COFYAL is the first indigenous coop in Amazonia to export forest products to Europe and United States. Shining path war led to economic instability, which threatens markets for forest products.
Other	
Overall Success	Not entirely clear (good). Gather products in sustainable manner from natural forests.

Case No. 38

Group & Location	**Yekuana (Makiritare); Asenöña, Upper Ventuari River, Amazonas State, Venezuela**
Source	Frechione, John. 1981. "Economic Self-Development by Yekuana Amerinds in Southern Venezuela." Ph.D. dissertation. Department of Anthropology, University of Pittsburgh. 1985. "Unión Makiritare del Alto Ventuari: Autodeterminación por los Indios Yekuana en el sur de Venezuela," *Montalbán* 16:7-46. 1990. "Supervillage Formation in the Amazonian Terra Firme: The Case of Asenöña," *Ethnology* XXIX(2):117-133.
Project Focus & Components	Unión Makiritare del Alto Ventuari (UMAV) began as movement to have improved access to western goods, education, and health care; during creation became embroiled in land security issue. Primary economic development activity is cattle herding
Scale & Time Frame	Planning began in 1971 between a member of the Jesuit religious organization and an acculturated Yekuana from the Ventuari region; meetings with Yekuana from the Ventuari region took place in mid-1972 in Asenöña; UMAV officially registered in late 1972; UMAV is basically a single community-based organization with members in a number of other communities in the region; in 1978, the membership of UMAV was more than 118 adult Yekuana (representing more than 48 nuclear family households); by 1993, the membership was more than 180 adults.
Land Security	Two provisional titles to 20,000 hectares of territory granted in 1975; note that the titles indicate 10,000 has each, but that the boundaries actually correspond to an area of about 130,000 has; Yekuana territory in the upper Ventuari River region was subject to encroachment (not by colonists) by a naturalized Venezuelan entrepreneur from late 1969 to May 1977—the court case was decided in favor of the Yekuana.
Idea Initiation	Idea to form UMAV was the result of discussions between a Jesuit "missionary" and an "acculturated" Yekuana.
Setting Agenda & Priorities	Executive Council of UMAV (President, Vice President, Secretary, Treasurer, and two general representatives).
Knowledge and Skills	During early years of UMAV, the primary resource for knowledge and skills was the Jesuit advisor; he trained various individuals in mechanics, carpentry, and agronomy. Some Yekuana also received technical training at Jesuit schools in a number of locations throughout Venezuela; others had practical experience in cattle herding from work on ranches in the llanos of Venezuela. More recently, a significant number of Yekuana are pursuing high school education in nearby cities—usually at Catholic-run institutions.
Technology	Shortwave radios, solar panels, tractors, bulldozers, tugboat and barge, mechanic's tools (i.e., wrenches, screwdrivers, welding equipment, etc.), motorized carpentry tools, sawmill
Organization	UMAV is administered by a managing council consisting of a president, vice-president, secretary, treasurer, and two general representatives. The members of the council are elected by the general assembly for a period of two years and may be re-elected indefinitely. Decisions taken by the council require a supporting vote from at least four of its members. All adult inhabitants (male and female) of Asenöña (the headquarters of UMAV) and some persons from other Yekuana villages in the region are members of UMAV and have the right to vote for the managing council and to speak at general assemblies. Decisions taken by the general assembly require positive votes from more than half of the members present. The only official overlap between the UMAV organization and the traditional sociopolitical system is found in the supervisory council that acts as a consultant to UMAV. This council consists of three male Yekuanas who are considered by the community to be the most knowledgeable individuals on traditional matters. Whenever UMAV has plans for a new activity, the supervisory council is consulted to ensure that there is no conflict between the new and the traditional.
Culture and Ethnicity	A fundamental objective of UMAV is "...the fulfillment of the Yekuana respecting and enlarging their culture." However, not much has been done in this area. The school in Asenöña was supposed to address the culture issue but, even by 1993, was providing a mostly "criollo"-style education—even though classes were taught by Yekuana teachers and presented bilingually.
Financial Assistance	loan from Venezuelan Agriculture and Ranching Bank, Ministry of Agriculture and Animal Husbandry, salaries from government agencies for teachers and medics, PRODESUR, Jesuits
Technical Assistance	(asesores) primarily Jesuit "missionaries" or lay persons associated with the Jesuits and, later, with CEPAI (Centro de Educación, Promoción y Autogestión Indígena—an NGO formed by the same Jesuit cofounder of UMAV—although no longer a Jesuit-related organization). Assistance ended in about 1990, when the Yekuana requested the withdrawal of a number of CEPAI advisors living in Asenöña. That appropriate technical assistance is still required is illustrated by the death of about 30 to 40 head of water buffalo (out of a herd of about 220) in 1993 due to an epidemic attributed to lack of proper veterinary care.

Case No. 38 (continued)

Project Management	Projects are basically run by Yekuana with some technical assistance, up to about 1990, from advisors noted above. One problem noted with project management is that persons trained in certain skills (such as cattle herd management) are under no obligation to work in their areas of expertise, and often "retire" from such duties when they desire, leaving such endeavors in less capable hands.
Community Involvement	Actual community involvement in new development activities is highly variable. Overall, the initiation of a new activity is frequently met with enthusiasm and cooperation. However, if an endeavor involves sustained periodic maintenance, it is likely to receive less and less attention from community members. This, in turn, leads to conflicts in that persons who continue to work are less inclined to look favorably on a community-wide distribution of benefits.
Govt. Involvement	UMAV has had generally good relations with government agencies and ministries, some of which have assisted the organization in various ways.
Marketing	Marketing of cattle and water buffalo has experienced problems from the beginning because of transport difficulties. Asenöña is rather isolated from its markets for beef (no land transport and fluvial transport problematic because of waterfalls that must be portaged) and the only efficient way to transport meat is by air. This was not considered a very significant drawback in 1985 when cattle sales began because air transport was still rather cheap—artificially so, being based on subsidised fuel costs). As the price of fuel and, therefore, airplane rental have increased, profits from beef sales have decreased. Discussions have taken place to consider alternative solutions—such as a refrigerated barge to ship meat by river. It also should be noted that one reason the marketing of beef is profitable is because labor costs are not considered in the cost/benefit calculations. The communal labor involved is viewed as a "free" input—such work is not directly compensated.
Other	As noted above under marketing, economic restructuring in Venezuela is expected to have a major and negative impact on the economic development activities of UMAV—already in 1993, with government subsidies for goods, such as outboard motors, discontinued, there were less outboards in Asenöña than there had been in 1978. Especially detrimental are the rising fuel and transportation costs which might make the marketing of beef and other goods produced by the Yekuana untenable.
Overall Success	Very Good: UMAV has had its share of problems, but it has now weathered almost a quarter century of operation in the extremely variable seas of the Venezuelan sociopolitical environment.

Case No. 39

Group & Location	**Yekuana (Makiritare) and Sanema (Yanomami); Upper Erebato River region, Bolívar State, Venezuela**
Source	Heinen, H.D. 1983-1984. "Traditional Social Structure and Culture Change among the Ye'kuana Indians of the Upper Erebato, Venezuela," *Antropológica* 59-62:263-297 Heinen, H.D., J. Velásquez, and R. Tomedes. 1981. "Informe sobre la Empresa Indígena Intercomunitaria Tujumoto" (Caracas: Instituto Agrario Nacional)
Project Focus & Components	Empresa Indígena Intercomunitaria Tujumoto; began as movement to have improved access to western goods, education, and health care; economic development activities began with cultivation of new crops (coffee, cacao, fruit trees, and African palms), with cattle herding introduced later.
Scale & Time Frame	Planning began in 1959 between a member of the Foucauld Fraternity (a French Catholic religious organization) and a group of Yekuana from the Erebato River region; the French Catholic "missionary" and 42 Yekuana established the community of Santa Maria de Erebato in mid-1959; in 1964, a French agronomist arrived to begin introduction of new cultigens; cattle were introduced in some areas in late 1960s; the Empresa Indígena Intercommunitaria Tujumoto was founded with the help of personnel from the National Agrarian Institute in October 1975, by 77 family heads (71 from 6 Yekuana settlements and 6 from 1 Sanema settlement); by 1978, the membership was more than about 468 adults (299 Yekuana and 169 Sanema).
Land Security	Information on land titling for the Yekuana-Sanema of the Erebato region could not be found. This enterprise is, however, located within the boundaries of the Caura River Forest Reserve.
Idea Initiation	Idea to form Tujumoto apparently based on discussions among Yekuana, Sanema, personnel from National Agrarian Institute (IAN) and, likely, members of Foucauld Fraternity.
Setting Agenda & Priorities	The management of intercommunity activities is handled by the Administrative Committee; each indigenous community is legally a production unit with administrative autonomy and is headed by a "chief" and a treasurer (the chief of each community form part, with full rights, of the enterprise's Supervisory Council; some activities (such as coffee production) are carried out by individual communities, others (such as cattle herding) are intercommunity activities.
Knowledge and Skills	From 1959 to 1975, the primary resource for knowledge and skills was from members of the Foucauld Fraternity. During this period, some Yekuana also received technical training at schools in a number of locations throughout Venezuela; others had practical experience from working in Venezuelan towns. More recently, a significant number of Yekuana (as well as Sanema) are pursuing high school education in nearby cities.
Technology	shortwave radios, mechanic's tools (i.e., wrenches, screwdrivers, welding equipment, etc.), motorized carpentry tools; tractor
Organization	The Empresa Tujumoto consists of a General Assembly, which should convene at least once a year. The General Assembly is the supreme organ of the organization and is composed of each and every one of the active members of the organization. It elects the Administrative Committee which consists of a President, Vice-President, Secretary, Treasurer, and Spokesman. The third organ of the cooperative is the Supervisory Council, which includes the headman of each of the communities as well as other traditional leaders and ritual specialists.
Culture and Ethnicity	Not discussed; relatively isolated and autonomous population possessing ethnic pride and group solidarity.
Financial Assistance	Basically government loans.
Technical Assistance	(asesores) primarily Foucauld "missionaries"
Project Management	Well-managed under Indigenous Enterprise structure.
Community Involvement	Not directly addressed. Does not appear to present problems.
Govt. Involvement	Tujumoto has had generally good relations with government agencies and ministries, some of which have assisted the organization in various ways.
Marketing	Coffee has been successully marketed.
Other	
Overall Success	Very Good at time of last report.

Case No. 40

Group & Location	**Zapotec Indian hamlets in Quiatoni region of Oaxaca, Mexico.**
Source	Peasant Solidarity Group of Quiatoni and Eucario Angeles Martinez 1992. "Integrated Resource Management: A Zapotec Community's Approach," In T. Downing, S. Hecht, H. Pearson, and C. Garcia-Downing (eds.), *Development or Destruction: The Conversion of Tropical Forest to Pasture in Latin America.* Boulder: Westview Press. Pp. 345-352.
Project Focus & Components	Integrated resource development. Projects included fruit trees, vegetable gardens, chicken farms, pigs, rabbits, bees, fish. Also opened several cooperative stores.
Scale & Time Frame	Solidarity group includes 6 groups of communities with total of 37 families (250 persons). Project ran 1983-88.
Land Security	13,000 inhabitants over 537 sq. km of land. Communally owned forest. Secure tenure, though impoverished land.
Idea Initiation	Cultivation of an ornamental flower failed after 10 years from disease. Unable to find a cure with govt. help, so began looking for alternatives. Towards end of 1983, work groups organized, often supported and/or led by Quiatoni who had moved to cities.
Setting Agenda & Priorities	Community representatives.
Knowledge and Skills	Projects involved building on traditional knowledge, reviving traditional knowledge, and new innovations.
Technology	Very simple in all cases.
Organization	Work groups seem to be an innovation introduced from outside Quiatoni"s having returned. Seeking to build on traditional forms of organization.
Culture and Ethnicity	(not discussed)
Financial Assistance	Received *Instituto National Indigenista* (INI) loan for apiculture, but INI failed to provide follow up technical assistance. Lack of capital perceived as a main impediment to achieving some goals. Received loans for coop. stores from NGOs.
Technical Assistance	Training given in apiculture, crops, preparation and consumption of foods, and different forms of organization. Community groups pursued technical support on their own when govt. INI support failed. Lack of medicines and technical help a main problem in greater success.
Project Management	Bimonthly meetings of representatives from different communities used to discuss, reflect, analyze projects, and plan future work. (not clear who manages at the local level)
Community Involvement	Theater works and different socio-cultural events were used to promote the projects, with village fiestas being the main way. Those involved in projects were primarily families who can take risks, and have the $. Have actively sought to include women and children. 4 solidarity groups withdrew for various reasons, including hassle of getting to meetings, and lack of economic resources.
Govt. Involvement	1) Some support from INI, but treatments for flower disease failed, and did not provide sufficient follow up for apiculture. 2) One goal, is to get the state to respect peasant"s work and schedules. Requests to govt. need to be calendarized according to community schedules. Also want to guarantee advancement of all govt. programs. State that Rural Clinic of *Instituto Mexicano del Seguro Social* (IMSS) does not give consultation or medicines to groups that do not meet requirements of various projects. "Such an approach leads to apathy or hatred toward the institution."
Marketing	Crafts project failed after being unable to create a market.
Other	Drought caused wells and some reservoirs to dry up.
Overall Success	Nominal: few apparent economic benefits, and many projects have failed. Increasing recognition of need to conserve natural resources. Authors speak positively, stating that "the dream of production for self-sufficiency in 1983 is becoming a reality in 1986." This is largely through the creation of consumer cooperative stores in several communities to sell basic products at lower prices.

Case No. 41

Group & Location	Zapotec of Teotitlán de Valle, Oaxaca, Mexico
Source	Stephen, Lynn. 1992. "Marketing Ethnicity," *Cultural Survival Quarterly* (Winter):25-27. Stephen, Lynn. 1991. "Culture as a Resource: Four Cases of Self-managed Indigenous Craft Production in Latin America," *Economic Development and Cultural Change* 40(1):101-130. Stephen, Lynn. 1987. "Zapotec Weavers of Oaxaca: Development and Community Control" *Cultural Survival Quarterly* 11(1). Pp:46-48.
Project Focus & Components	Weaving and craft development and Marketing. Not a project or program per se.
Scale & Time Frame	Community of Teotitlán (population of about 5,000) has experienced growth in industry since at least the 1960s. Tourism began in 1950s.
Land Security	Have been able to maintain a sufficient land base from colonial period through the 20th century, though now about 50% of the community is landless (greater proportion among weaving households). Community lands were present.
Idea Initiation	Weaving for exchange present long before tourism market available. In 1950s, arrival of tourism, and completion of Pan American Highway. Community responded to market, and subsistence farmers largely abandoned communal cultivation and became primarily weavers.
Agenda & Priorities	Community has controlled its own process through open meetings.
Knowledge and Skills	Built largely on existing weaving knowledge. Have been involved in the production for exchange of craft products of agricultural production from colonial period into the 20th century, and have had experience in local and regional market systems. Use traditional Zapotec motifs as well a Navajo, and reproductions of modern artists such as Miró, Picasso, and Escher.
Technology	Textiles produced on treadle looms (introduced by Spanish in colonial period) and traditional backstrap looms. All producers own looms. Introduction of factory spun wool.
Organization	Necessary organization is built primarily on traditional forms, including fictive kinship and family ties, which provide a network of cooperation. Merchants rely overwhelmingly on kin and godchildren to provide finished goods. Govt. efforts to organize cooperatives were not integrated with local networks of kin relations. Most weavers prefer to make their own contacts.
Culture and Ethnicity	Maintenance of a strong ethnic identity is seen as key to the positive results seen. While aspects of ethnicity have been commoditized, self-management and successful entrepreneurship have been used to reinforce cultural identity and institutions. Reciprocal labor and goods exchanges have been maintained, labor and resources reinvested into community ritual and political institutions, and craft production integrated with agricultural, subsistence, and ceremonial activities and cycles.
Financial Assistance	Provided by government at times, but most prefer to borrow from their own contacts, who provide more favorable and flexible terms, and often provided training as well.
Technical Assistance	Some assistance provided by merchants.
Management	Household is basic unit of production, and responsible for its own development, but overall process is overseen by community.
Community Involvement	Community control of resources seen as another key to success of autonomous development. "Decision-making is made in open meetings led by local authorities. Members of the community decide what projects the community will undertake. In order to participate in community decision-making and to have rights to community resources such as land, water and forest areas, each household is required to provide a male laborer for approximately 10-15 days of communal labor per year and to accept appointments to civil cargos. (1987:48)" The community has a strong measure of control over development. Tourists and importers are welcomed, but inappropriate behavior is not tolerated. Several Americans have been forcibly expelled. Much of the money brought into community invested in community works and institutions. Weaving is the primary source of income for 90% of community (80% weavers/10% merchants).
Govt. Involvement	Mexican govt. has used tourism in Oaxaca, and economic policies favoring craft industries as alternative income-generating strategy in rural areas. Efforts in community have been supportive, though not a huge success. Govt. BANFOCO (*Banco de Fomento de Cooperativas*) has extended credit through loans to artisans for the purchase of materials. Failed because did not offer training in how to market products. Contacts could be made with Oaxacan merchants that paid more than working with BANFOCO, and taught merchandising skills. FONART (*Fondo Nacional de Artesania*) supplies material and credit, and acts as a market, having national stores and huge inventories of crafts. Has experienced some success in village, but eventually died down because "cooperative members had few skills in bargaining with industrial bureaucrats in internal management.... The group was also plagued by problems of jealousy between local members vying for control (1987:47)." Self investment in the community helps to prevent dependence on PRI patronage system, and prevents political debt to officials.

Case No. 41 (continued)

Marketing	Weavers sold wares during colonial era. "A history of production for exchange is tied to the ability...to take advantage of existing marketing networks and skills when tourist and export markets opened up for their craft products" (1991:110). Initially sold rugs and blankets primarily to tourists. Now sell directly to US and Europe. Have worked with government created markets, but prefer to establish own merchants. Between 1970 and 80 merchant sector tripled from 35 to 110 households.
Other	
Overall Success	Excellent: Overall standard of living has risen in community, and wealthier merchant sector has expanded to include many more families. A middle class has emerged. Intensive contact with capitalism has not decimated cultural life of community. Influx of cash invested in public works projects such as schools, marketplace, irrigation.

Case No. 42

Group & Location	**Zapotec communities of Oaxaca, Mexico**
Source	Arzola, Rodolfo López, and Patricia Gerez Fernández 1993. "The Permanent Tension," *Cultural Survival Quarterly* (Spring):42-44.
Project Focus & Components	Creation of Forest Raw Material Producer Units (UPMPF) and organization of *Union de Comunidades y Ejidos Forestales de Oaxaca, S.C.* (UCEFO) to provide technical support and promote development in communities.
Scale & Time Frame	UCEFO resources include 300,000 acres, and 10 involved communities. Project began in 1983.
Land Security	Ejido community land. Ending concessions to timber companies a necessary step in the development process.
Idea Initiation	Finnish silviculturalists that govt. had invited to look into ways to manage forests as an integrated whole helped develop sustainability plans. Communities responsible for initiating development.
Setting Agenda & Priorities	Community assemblies.
Knowledge and Skills	Communities had little experience in managing forests and less in managing business. Both required training. CFE foresters learned to control and combat forest pests, run a nursery, and reforestation techniques.
Technology	Inputs included backhoes, trucks, office equipment, sawmills, and tractors.
Organization	Adapted a traditional system to the demands of forest management and forest industries. 1st organized CFEs, then in 1985, UCEFO. Both organizations have oversight committees.
Culture and Ethnicity	(not discussed)
Financial Assistance	(not discussed)
Technical Assistance	1) Advice received from Finnish silviculturalists. 2) UCEFO was developed as a second level organization dedicated to technical services and training. Provides support to CFEs for forest management, also provides administrative and financial training to each set of new leaders. Paid by CFEs based on volume of wood produced. "The principal characteristic distinguishing UCEFO from other ejido unions is its emphasis on training... (43)."
Project Management	Management by CFEs, and UCEFO, with community oversight. CFEs can fall prey to internal conflicts that can stop production for months.
Community Involvement	Total community involvement and oversight at all phases. In negotiations with timber industry, went about deliberations democratically. General assemblies of each community established guidelines for local forestry enterprises, giving birth to the first CFEs. Adult men serve in complex hierarchy of religious, civil-political, and agrarian posts, which are obligatory, unpaid, and rotate annually. At first, workload overwhelmed traditional unpaid authorities of CFEs. Became necessary to devise more business-oriented mechanisms, and institute paid leadership posts. All posts filled through election in general assembly. Each CFE has oversight committee that conducts periodic internal audits to help control common property. 80% of UCEFO are community members. UCEFO top posts elected by 105 member Assembly of Representatives, made up of authorities from each community, CFE coordinators, community oversight committees, and delegates from each community. Assembly also decides how to distribute the profits. At times general assemblies make decisions that lesson the productivity of CFEs (eg. rotation of trained people to other posts, low wages placed on management).
Govt. Involvement	UCEFO and CFEs negotiated with govt for right to administer their own forest service.
Marketing	UCEFO has 2 industrial plants, one producing telephone poles, the other charcoal.
Other	1) Communities received support from national organizations in fighting renewal of timber concessions. 2) Although forestry is the key source of income, local economies are relatively diversified. 3) Tensions between community traditions and demands of enterprise are yet to be resolved. People are in fields during planting season - leading to lack of labor for forestry work.
Overall Success	Excellent: "Locally, community forestry enterprises (CFEs) enable people to both profit from and care for the forests. On a wider scale, the Union of Forest Ejidos and Communities of Oaxaca (UCEFO) offers technical services in forest management" (42). Besides jobs, the communities have built municipal offices, athletic courts, bridges, and churches. Also, increased profits.

Case No. 42

Group & Location	Zapotec of Sierra Juarez and northern and southern mountain ranges of Oaxaca, Mexico
Source	Castañeda, Javier. 1992. "Union of Forest Ejidos and Communities of Oaxaca." In T. Downing, S. Hecht, H. Pearson, and C. Garcia-Downing (eds.), *Development or Destruction: The Conversion of Tropical Forest to Pasture in Latin America*. Boulder: Westview Press. Pp. 333-344.
Project Focus & Components	Organization, forestry management and economic growth. 1) Ended contracts with exploitative timber companies; 2) formed Community Forestry Enterprises; 3) formed UCEFO technical support organization; 4) implemented forest management program.
Scale & Time Frame	Nine communities make up UCEFO. From 1982 to 1985, organization building and initiation of forest management through UPMPF. In 1985, UCEFO created and has since been providing technical services.
Land Security	Appear to be community cooperatives with communal land. In 1982, exploitative government-supported forest leases to timber companies were ended.
Idea Initiation	Municipalities that today belong to UCEFO began a process of exchange and common identification of goals. Accepted proposal of group of experts with experience in forestry use and development to form Forest Raw Material Producer Unit (UPMPF).
Setting Agenda & Priorities	Assembly of communal land holders.
Knowledge and Skills	Members of UPMPF and UCEFO received training for jobs, including accounting and record keeping. Communities lacked technical knowledge for many aspects of forest management and therefore created UCEFO.
Technology	No new technology discussed, though technical skills important.
Organization	Created UPMPF and UCEFO, as well as review commissions to overlook each. "Their experience and organizational ability, developed from the times of the Mexican Revolution, have been the essential premise toward the creation of a common organization" (p. 335). The specifics of the forest enterprise were very different from existing community dynamics.
Culture and Ethnicity	(not discussed)
Financial Assistance	In initial efforts, many organizations did not integrate into broader levels and still depended on local industry due to lack of funding.
Technical Assistance	UCEFO was formed to provide technical services, community training, and pursue other projects. Community members trained in accounting, preparation of documentation, measuring volume of wood, classification of products.
Project Management	Both UPMPF and UCEFO managed by assembly of representatives, overseen by review commission. Separate organizations within UCEFO have different responsibilities (e.g., Commission on Planning and Agreements; Operations; Support and Services).
Community Involvement	In organization phase, constant communication with communities key, resulting in confidence in community representatives. For continued management, review commission created to evaluate administration and accounting, giving greater collective control, and building community trust. Review commission made up of a delegate from each community. "The communities that have a Review Commission for their unit have been able to continually work without internal problems. A great tranquility exists with respect to the handling of funds and, above all, there is good participation in the assemblies" (p. 343). All community members have right to participate in General Assembly, which is the highest authority of UPMPF and UCEFO, and appoints leadership positions.
Govt. Involvement	In 1982, industrial forest concessions were renewed by presidential decree. Some communities responded by gaining writs against the decree. Appears that UCEFO has since gained the favor of the government through its success.
Marketing	(1) View that successful use of the forests required multicommunity organization. (2) In effort to gain independence from wood buyers, did not divide profits, but capitalized community companies: equipment, machinery, labor, capital and wages.
Other	Before organizing UPMPF, communities conducted a test with 500-1,000 cubic meters of uncut timber to see if they could handle organizational needs and to give members training in all areas of work.
Overall Success	Excellent: UCEFO is now seen as a model organization by other groups. Communities have achieved independence from intermediaries and reinvested profits into health clinics, places for child care, and potable water, as well as other profit making ventures. Communities have improved living standards and prevented exodus to the cities. UCEFO has generated over 1,300 jobs.

Appendix 2
Database Coding Form

Database Coding Form

Sources:
Indigenous Group:
Project Name:

I. INDIGENOUS GROUP BACKGROUND FACTORS

A. According to the literature, do factors involved with the degree of acculturation contribute significantly to the success of development (y/n)?

B. According to the literature, do factors involved with the degree of acculturation negatively affect development success (y/n)?

C. Location of group: (1. Mexico; 2. Guatemala; 3. Honduras; 4. El Salvador; 5. Nicaragua; 6. Costa Rica; 7. Panama; 8. Colombia; 9. Ecuador; 10. Peru; 11. Bolivia; 12. Paraguay; 13. Chile; 14. Argentina; 15. Brazil; 16. Venezuela)

D. Degree of acculturation:

1. Does the group maintain a distinct language (y/n)?
2. Does the group maintain traditional subsistence activities (y/n)?
3. Prior to the project/program/development did the group conduct regular business in external markets (y/n)?
4. Does the group maintain a strong sense of ethnic identity (y/n)?

II. LAND TENURE AND SECURITY ISSUES

A. Did issues concerning tenure and security over land or resources contribute significantly to development success (y/n)?

B. Were problems experienced concerning tenure and security issues (y/n)?

C. Amount of land occupied (in hectares)?

D. Is encroachment on land taking place (y/n)?

E. Government concessions to resources on land occupied by the indigenous group: (1. are currently being given; 2. were ended prior to or as part of development; 3. are not present).

F. Presence of land tenure: (1. no tenure; 2. tenure developed as part of project; 3. tenure existed prior to project; 4. some tenure, but not as much as is wanted.)

G. Land holding (1. communal; 2. private; 3. both)

H. Is land title (1. definite, or 2. provisional)

I. Was concern over security for land or natural resources a primary factor stimulating the development project/program (y/n)?

III. COUNTRY BACKGROUND FACTORS

A. Did issues related to country background factors (IIIC-IIIG) contribute significantly to development success (y/n)?

B. Were problems experienced related to country background factors (y/n)?

C. Is there a history of violence to indigenous people (y/n)?

D. Does civil unrest or the threat of violence currently exist in the region (y/n)?

E. What has been the state of the economy over the period of the project: (1. strong; 2. average; 3. weak).

F. Was the project positively affected by the government's policy environment (y/n)?

G. Was the project negatively affected by the government's policy environment (y/n)?

H. Did the government undertake any direct action to aid the project or program (y/n)?

IV. CHARACTERISTICS OF DEVELOPMENT

A. Which of the following are major components of the project:

1. forestry
2. natural resource management
3. land demarcation or titling
4. coffee
5. organization building
6. weaving/crafts
7. tourism
8. cattle ranching
9. general agriculture development
10. Ethnic pride

B1. Does the project explicitly seek to strengthen subsistence and self sufficiency (y/n)?

B2. Does the project seek to gain independence from exploitative relationships (such as middlemen) (y/n)?

C. Time period of project, or from start of project to one year before article date?

D. Is the focus of the project on: (1. multiple communities; 2. a single community; 3. individuals; 4. an organization)

1. Does the project involve more than one community (y/n)?
2. How many communities are involved?
3. How many families involved?

V. NECESSARY KNOWLEDGE OR SKILLS

A. Did issues concerning knowledge and skills contribute significantly to the success of development (y/n)?

B. Were problems experienced concerning knowledge and skills (y/n)?

C. Knowledge and skills were based on: (1. primarily on existing or traditional knowledge; 2. new knowledge or skills required, but incorporated or built on existing knowledge; 3. primarily new)

D. What were new skills and knowledge used for?

VI. TECHNOLOGY

A. Did issues concerning project technology contribute significantly to the success of development (y/n)?

B. Were problems experienced concerning technology (y/n)?

C. Technology was based: (1. primarily on existing; 2. some introduced; 3. primarily on introduced)

D. What was the purpose of the new technology?

VII. ORGANIZATION

A. Did issues concerning organization contribute significantly to the success of development (y/n)?

B. Were problems experienced concerning organization (y/n)?

C. What were the primary levels of indigenous organization involved in the project: (1. none; 2. community level only; 3. 2nd or 3rd level/multi-community indigenous organizations only (eg. any macro level beyond community); 4. community level and larger level organization; 5. macro-level organization definitely, community level possibly; 6. local level definitely, macro-level possibly; 7. household or some other subsection of the community)

D. Organizations necessary to implement and manage the project on the local level (1. were not present; 2. existed prior to project initiation; 3. were developed as part of the project; 4. were not necessary)

E. Local level organizations (1. built on or incorporated existing organizations or structures; 2. were developed apart from existing organization)

F. Did local level organizations have prior management experience with similar development projects (y/n)?

G. Were multiple local organizations developed to deal separately with issues such as planning, training, management, and marketing (y/n)?

H. Was there a pre-existing local-level communal social organization (y/n)?

I. Organizations involved in the project at the multi-community level (1. existed prior to project; 2. were developed as part of the project; 3. were not involved).

J. Did multi-community level organizations have prior management or project implementation experience in similar projects (y/n)?

VIII. SOCIAL SPACE AND CULTURAL STRENGTHENING

A. Were issues concerning the creation of social space, or cultural revaluation important to the success of the project (y/n)?

B. If so, in what way?

IX. ASSISTANCE AND SUPPORT

A. Did issues concerning assistance and support contribute significantly to the success of the project (y/n)?

B. Were problems experienced concerning assistance and support (y/n)?

C. For what part of the project was financial assistance received: (1. none; 2. planning; 3. organization; 4. training; 5. implementation; 6. marketing; 7. all stages involved in project; 8. multiple stages, but not all; 9. provided but not clear if restricted to certain phases)

D. From whom was funding provided?

E. Was the availability of money tied to restrictions not directly related to the project (y/n)?

F. Was technical support or training given (y/n). For which of the following:
1. Identification of problems and potential solutions (y/n)?
2. Organization building (y/n)?
3. Management skills (y/n)?
4. Training (y/n)?
5. New technology or skills (y/n)?
6. Baseline studies or follow up (y/n)?
7. Marketing (y/n)?

G. Were the following organizations involved in giving technical support:
1. Government (y/n)?
2. Local or national NGO (y/n)?
3. International funding or development agency (y/n)?
4. 2nd or 3rd level indigenous political organization (y/n)?
5. 2nd or 3rd level indigenous producers union (y/n)?
6. Other, non-local, indigenous organizations (y/n)?
7. Missionary groups (y/n)?
8. International NGO (y/n)?

H. Did potentially project threatening conflicts occur between indigenous beneficiaries and support organizations (y/n)?

I. Were the following clear factors of technical support:
1. Sensitivity to cultural issues (y/n)?
2. Ability to speak local language (y/n)?
3. Use of indigenous staff (y/n)?

J. Was political support provided (y/n)?

X. ECONOMIES OF SCALE AND MARKETING FACTORS

A. Did issues concerning marketing and economies of scale contribute significantly to the success of development (y/n)?

B. Were problems experienced concerning marketing or economies of scale (y/n)?

C. Did the project involve the marketing of goods (y/n)?

D. Were market conditions studied prior to project initiation (y/n)?

E. Did the project: (1. respond to market pressures for products; 2. seek to create a market; 3. seek to enter an existing market without pressure to do so; 4. take control of a prior exploitative situation; 5. involve more than one of the above)

F. Were the resources of multiple communities or families pooled in an effort to achieve economies of scale (y/n)?

G. Was processing done on a local level to add value to products (y/n)?

H. Was the product oriented towards specialized markets (y/n)?

I. Are profits reinvested into the project or community (y/n)?

XI. IDEA DEVELOPMENT

A. Did issues concerning the development of project ideas contribute significantly to the success of the project (y/n)?

B. Were problems experienced concerning idea development (y/n)?

C. Was the community (or representatives) involved (y/n)?

D. Who had primary responsibility for the development of the ideas for the project: (1. international development organization; 2. government; 3. macro-level indigenous organization; 4. NGO; 5. Community; 6. multiple sources; 7. other indigenous group; 8. missionaries or church; 9. household, individuals or some other subsection of the community)

XII. PRIORITIES AND AGENDA

A. Did issues concerning the setting of priorities and project agenda contribute significantly to project success (y/n)?

B. Were problems experienced concerning the setting of priorities and project agenda (y/n)?

C. Was the community (or representatives) involved (y/n)?

D. Primary responsibility of: (1. international development organization; 2. government; 3. macro-level indigenous organizations; 4. NGO; 5. Community; 6. non-indigenous entrepreneurs; 7. household, individual or other subsection of community; 8. missionaries or church)

XIII. MANAGEMENT

A. Did issues concerning project management contribute significantly to development success (y/n)?

B. Were problems experienced concerning project management (y/n)?

C. Was responsibility for management phased (y/n)?

D. Initial management responsibility of: (1. international development organization; 2. government; 3. macro-level indigenous organizations; 4. NGO; 5. Community; 6. non-indigenous entrepreneurs; 7. missionaries or church; 8. individuals, household, or other subsection of community)

E. Final management responsibility of (1. government; 2. macro-level indigenous organization; 3. NGO; 4. Community level organization; 5. non-indigenous entrepreneurs; 6. missionaries or church; 7. individuals, household, or other subsection of community)

F. Did project leaders experience problems balancing project demands and other personal or community demands (y/n)?

G. Were organization staff compensated through payment for their involvement (y/n)?

H. Did project threatening tension develop between those responsible for project management and others (y/n)?

XIV. COMMUNITY INVOLVEMENT

A. Did issues concerning community involvement contribute significantly to the success of the project (y/n)?

B. Were problems experienced concerning community involvement (y/n)?

C. Were special activities necessary to gain community acceptance (y/n)?

D. Did the project involve (1. men; 2. women; 3. both)

E. Not including gender, were restrictions placed on participation (y/n)?

F. Were major decisions made in communal bodies (1. yes; 2. some; 3. no)

G. Were important management or decision making positions filled through democratic process (y/n)?

H. Was there some form of community oversight built into the project (y/n)?

I. Were there immediate benefits available to participation (y/n)?

J. Are benefits from the project felt by the whole community (y/n)?

K. Were problems experienced balancing the demands of project participation (not organizational management) with existing demands (y/n)?

XV. IMPACTS

A. What was the overall level of Success for the Project (1. Excellent; 2. Good; 3. Nominal; 4. Failure; 5. not clear)

Appendix 3
A Little-Known Case: Venezuela's *Empresas Indígenas*

A Little-Known Case: Venezuela's *Empresas Indígenas*

I. Outline

1. Beginning in the early 1970s, an unprecedented Amerindian development program emerged in Venezuela, mandated by the Venezuelan Congress and housed in the agency in charge of agrarian reform—the *Instituto Agrario Nacional* (IAN). This project was known as the *Empresas Indígenas* (Indigenous Enterprises) program.

In 1971, the Indigenous Development Program was approved by the Director of the National Agrarian Institute (IAN) and, in January 1972, the Office of Land Titles for Indigenous Communities was created. This office was to grant land titles to the Amerinds and to work in cooperation with the Indigenous Development Program. However, it must be noted that under Venezuela's agrarian reform law of 1961, land titles could not be granted unless a legal juridical structure existed. Therefore, indigenous communities or groups of communities could not receive title to land until they were legally incorporated (see Heinen and Coppens 1981:584, Gouveia 1989:112-115). The indigenous enterprises, based upon the model of the peasant enterprises (*empresas campesinas*), were seen as the mechanism to meet the requirements of the agrarian reform law.

2. The Indigenous Enterprises program was a state-directed Indian development project (a situation fairly unique in Latin America and the Caribbean), designed and implemented by various individuals within a number of Venezuelan state agencies. This does not mean that it received the complete support of the Venezuelan state. A state is not homogeneous, but a complex structure wherein conflicting interests representing society's power relations occupy different positions and are in constant competition. The indigenous advocates (*indigenistas*) who promoted the program were able to do so because of a novel set of circumstances that converged to shape Venezuela in the 1970s and 1980s. Nonetheless, actual state support for the Indigenous Enterprises was generally minimal and sporadic.

3. At the same time, efforts were made by the indigenous activists to create an "organized Indian movement." During 1972 and 1973, six regional Indigenous Federations were formed in the states and federal territories where indigenous groups were significantly represented. In April 1973, the Indigenous Confederation of Venezuela was created (Valdez 1977:16-18). This organized Indian movement, as it was called, was principally a top-down endeavor and not a native-created movement. "According to the IAN indigenistas, the rationale behind the support for these organizations was basically that within a realistic evaluation of Venezuela's political reality, groups that remained outside of political parties or powerful pressure groups such as the Venezuelan Peasant Federation, had very little chance of having their demands heard, let alone obtaining state resources to which they were entitled" (Gouveia 1989:117-118). The organized Indian movement was an attempt to bestow such power on the indigenous populations.

4. The basic goals and activity areas of the Indigenous Development Program read like a contemporary indigenous development advocate's wish list:

- •land grants with collective (communal) titles sufficiently extensive to allow for the integral development of the Indian communities;
- •research, promotion, and constitution of indigenous collective economic organizations that are faithful to, and further consolidate, the traditional socioeconomic structures of each ethnic group;
- •support for and promotion of the organized Indian movement in order to channel the ethnic potentialities toward the achievement of the their basic rights as Venezuelans and as autochthonous ethnic minorities; and

•respect, promotion, and fortification of the autochthonous ethnic cultures as necessary conditions for the Indians' participation in the country's socioeconomic process.

5. Under the limited structural-organizational models permitted by the agrarian reform law, all Indigenous Enterprises were required to have: a General Assembly; an Administrative Council (consisting of a president, vice-president, treasurer, and secretary elected by the General Assembly); and a Supervisory Council. At least the president and vice president in the Administrative Council had to be literate according to legal requirements (Arvelo-Jiménez & Perozo 1983:515; Gouveia 1988:51).

Such a structure was deemed necessary because the agrarian reform law required the existence of a registered and juridically constituted organization to receive title to land (this was the primary goal of the program in its first stages). Secondarily, the enterprises "...would grant Indian communities the access to material support virtually denied to them until that time" (Gouveia 1989:107-108)—this meant state support as well as access to credit from lending institutions.

6. The enterprise program was clearly top-down development. However, enterprises were not imposed on groups; participation was completely voluntary, with the ideal being that all inhabitants of the affected community or communities would be members. Generally, IAN personnel went to the communities and, in meetings lasting up to three days, explained the enterprise structure and its benefits to the community (land titles and the possibility of financial assistance). The community then decided, based on consensus decision making, whether or not to form an enterprise. It was hoped that after the enterprise was created, the participants would, over time, work to adapt the organizational structure to better fit the particular social and cultural characteristics of the indigenous group—in this way, promoting **self-determination** within the enterprise framework. As Heinen (1983-1984:294) notes for one "successful" intercommunity enterprise, "It is clear that the organizational framework of the cooperative, as defined legally by outside consultants, was used by the Indians only in transactions with Venezuelan government agencies. In their day-to-day activities, they very much proceeded as they wished."

7. In order to prepare the Amerinds for the management of the Indigenous Enterprises and the specialized economic development projects undertaken through them, IAN and CODESUR offered courses in various subjects, such as the cultivation of cacao, the cultivation of coffee, mechanics, ceramics, and the **administration of the Enterprises**. Participation in these courses was voluntary and, throughout, the government agencies involved stressed the importance of taking into account the cultural variability present and the need to respect and reinforce the values of each culture. Between March and November 1976, IAN conducted nine workshops on enterprise management that included individuals from 149 communities and 20 ethnic groups (Valdez 1977:40).

8. In 1976, the Section of Land Titles for Indigenous Communities was eliminated and, thereafter, indigenous land titling requests were handled by a single staff member in IAN's general land office (Gouveia 1989:110). The rationale behind this policy change was expressed by the Director of Land Titles who noted that there were no Indians in Venezuela and it was not worthwhile to distinguish between peasants and Indians (Arte y Vida 1977:18). This decree brought an end, at least for the time being, to the granting of land titles to indigenous communities as well as an end to the majority of assistance programs designated for the Indigenous Enterprises. Moreover, the director and a number of staff of the Indigenous Development Program were fired in early 1977.

9. Between 1977 and 1979, the Indigenous Program operated at a very minimal level. In 1979, the former director was rehired and the program regained momentum, creating new enterprises.

10. Between 1971 and 1983, 68 indigenous enterprises were formed (52 involving a single community, and 16 involving several communities), encompassing 141 indigenous communities, 3,152 families, and 13 different "ethnic" groups. In addition, IAN provided land titles (although in almost all cases, only provisional, not definite, titles) for nearly 1,380,000 hectares to 156 communities (including most of the enterprise communities), benefitting 4,134 families.

11. In 1985, the program director was fired again and, at present, a Program of Indigenous Development/Indigenous Enterprises has not resurfaced as a "state" endeavor.

II. Summary

12. Fundamentally, a number of indigenous rights advocates found themselves in appropriate government agencies (IAN, CODESUR, National Border Council) at an opportune time in Venezuelan history. Utilizing and manipulating various legal mechanisms, they moved quickly to do what they could to benefit—in their perceptions—the indigenous populations of Venezuela. Foremost was the endeavor to provide some form of security to rights to land. Working under the agrarian reform law, they had to create a legally recognized organizational structure within the strictures of that law in order to be able to grant land titles. Moreover, the indigenous legal organizations had to have an economic component—some sort of production beyond the subsistence level and seen as benefitting the nation. The developers of the Indigenous Enterprises never really envisioned any large-scale production within the enterprises. "Yet in order to receive government support and **protection from eviction under the agrarian reform law**, more compelling reasons than basically maintaining a subsistence economy with small-scale production for the market had to be given to those who controlled IAN's, and most importantly, credit agencies' budgetary decisions" (Gouveia 1989:104; emphasis added). Another important factor to recognize is that the indigenous peoples themselves wanted (and, at times required) some participation in the larger economy. They desired cash for their acquired needs for industrially produced products (axes, machetes, clothing, aluminum pots, etc.) as well as government assistance for education and health services both inside and outside the communities.

For all of these reasons, Indigenous Enterprises were formed very quickly (and admittedly with almost no background research) in two bursts—from 1975-1978 (51) and 1979-1983 (17).

State support for an organized Indian movement and for an Indigenous Development Program effectively ended in about 1985. Presently, "Indian Affairs" are under the jurisdiction of the Dirección de Asuntos Indígenas (DAI), which was officially created in 1979 and housed in the Ministry of Education. It has been most concerned with, and made progress in, instituting a regime of intercultural/bilingual education in indigenous areas (Heinen and Coppens 1986:370).

III. Results

As based on goals of Indigenous Development Program (I.4):

13. **Land Titling**—c. 1,380,000 hectares (138,000 sq km) to 156 communities benefitting 4,134 families.

Considerations

•Of the approximately 156 communal land titles granted by IAN between 1972 and 1983, only two were definite titles—all others were "provisional." Provisional titles gave the

beneficiaries the rights to use and benefit from the land in question during a temporary or probationary period, supposedly to assure that the land was used for the intended purposes. The probationary period had no set duration and, in most, was arbitrarily defined by government officials (Gouveia 1989:139, endnote 34). Provisional titles, thus, served to keep the indigenous population in a vulnerable position in relation to land security. These titles could be rescinded as changes in state policy or administration might decree. In fact, in the mid-1980s a legal confrontation between a rancher and an indigenous group with a provisional land title to the area where the ranch was located resulted in the Ministry of Agriculture and Animal Husbandry voiding the Indians' provisional title and, thus, calling into question the legality of all of the provisional communal land titles granted by IAN to indigenous groups between 1972 and 1983 (Arvelo-Jiménez 1992:131-132; Gouveia 1989:140, endnote 37).

•According to Arvelo-Jiménez and Perozo (1983:520) "The designers of the Enterprise appear to have put aside the fact that the official granting of land to indigenous communities has always implied both the fragmentation of tribal territory and a reduction of the original territorial base." The amount of land granted in titles by IAN during the Indigenous Development Program era represents only a very small percentage of what might be considered the "traditional" territory occupied by indigenous groups in Venezuela at the beginning of the 1970s. For example, the Yekuana were said to occupy "traditionally" an area of about 30,200 sq km. Between 1972 and 1983, eight communal titles were granted to a number of Yekuana communities, totaling 228,000 hectares (2,280 sq km) or only 8 percent of the "traditional" territory.

The current attempt to divide the State of Amazonas (where the majority of the indigenous population is concentrated) into new administrative units appears to represent a significant threat to indigenous land rights. The new *municipios*—each with elected mayors—do not correspond with traditional indigenous systems for decision making, and they often overlap indigenous territories, dividing groups among different *municipios* (Colchester 1996).

14. **Constitution of Indigenous Collective Economic Organizations**—68 Indigenous Enterprises formed (52 involving a single community, and 16 involving several communities), encompassing 141 indigenous communities, 3,152 families, and 13 different "ethnic" groups.

Considerations

•Pre-implementation research was done on **only one** enterprise—the Warao *Empresa Indígena de Hobure* in the Orinoco Delta (Heinen and Coppens 1981: 581-582)—of the 68.

•The structure of the indigenous collective economic organizations was set by law and, therefore, the ability to modify this structure in any particular case to be "faithful to, and further consolidate, the traditional socioeconomic structures of each ethnic group" was quite limited. Only one case is mentioned in which the constitution of the Supervisory Council was modified to include all of the traditional leaders of the communities affected (Heinen and Coppens 1981:591).

•The basic problem according to some critics was that the primary units of production and consumption were not found at the community (or intercommunity) level, but were subcommunity and, consequently, the communal sharing patterns assumed by the program advocates to be compatible with—and preadpted to—the enterprise structure did not actually exist (Morales and Arvelo-Jiménez 1981). In fact, critics stated "...that the empresas' collective structure and western-style decision-making system conflict with the traditional organization of Venezuelan Indian communities...[and constitute] a unilateral imposition of

a state that is committed to activities that are most beneficial to the capitalist economy" (Gouveia 1989:134-135).

•By the mid-1980s, **only three** of the 68 enterprises were viewed by some as "successful"—and one of these was initially formed outside of the state's Indigenous Development Program. However, relatively in-depth evaluations of the enterprises are available for only five cases.

15. **Support for and Promotion of the Organized Indian Movement**—six regional Indigenous Federations and the Indigenous Confederation of Venezuela were created during 1972 and 1973.

Considerations

•The creation of the federations and confederation was intimately linked to the birth of the Indigenous Development Program. The federations and the confederation are at the heart of what the indigenous advocates termed the organized Indian movement. Their main purpose was to provide representation for indigenous groups within the Venezuelan political system. State support ranged from fairly strong, at the beginning of the program, to outright opposition by 1977 (Gouveia 1989:118).

•Lack of official support for these organizations as well as conflicting interests led to fragmentation and, in fact, the creation of new federations. By the late 1980s, the leadership of the organized Indian movement had become much less forceful and visible; although somewhat more autonomous from the national political parties (Gouveia 1989:119).

16. **Respect, Promotion, and Fortification of Ethnic Cultures**—very few direct efforts were made to fulfill this goal.

Considerations

•According to Gouveia's (1989:115-116) analysis, the designers of the Indian Development Program "...proposed a series of activities that were clearly aimed at the articulation of an indigenista 'counter-ideology.' This counter-ideology included the promotion of collective organizations and self-determination as they [the designers] seemed interested in promoting a new degree of 'ethnic' solidarity...among the Indian communities."

•Direct attempts to fulfill this endeavor appeared to fade into the background as the emphasis on securing land titles and creating enterprises consumed the time and effort of the relatively few state officials involved in the program. As Gouveia (1989:117) notes, "...IAN staff complained about the meager material and logistical support they received for fulfilling objectives here."

IV. Failure/Success Factors

17. Overall, the Indigenous Development Program and its Indigenous Enterprises component are viewed as failures. In their review of the program, Arvelo-Jiménez and Perozo (1983:519-520) note that, "We have not carried out a systematic and complete study of any Indigenous Enterprise, nor do we have at our disposal exhaustive quantitative data for the 80 [sic] Enterprises created since 1973; nonetheless, we have first-hand knowledge, obtained from interviews and spontaneous reports from Indians, about the difficulties and conflicts arising at the core of various Enterprises among the Kariña, Akawaio and Pemon, of southeast Venezuela, and among Guahibo, Piaroa and Ye'cuana Enterprises in the Federal Territory of Amazonas. Based on this, we conclude that **the balance is negative** and we believe that a careful and responsible analysis should begin about the controversial results that the Enterprises have produced in some indigenous communities and taking into consideration the possible consequences on their social systems." Gouveia (1989:134) echoes this impression when she notes the "...apparently dismal quantitative results of the Indian program."

Even proponents of indigenous enterprises admit that the majority of the currently (for 1981) established Indigenous Enterprises have problems" (Heinen and Coppens 1981:575).

18. *Factors Related to Failure*—Two Indigenous Enterprises, considered to be failures, have been "evaluated" to some degree: the Warao of Hobure in the Orinoco River Delta (see Heinen 1979; Heinen and Coppens 1981); and the Pume (Yaruro) of Kumani in Apure State (see Gouveia 1989). Critiques have focused primarily on problems in **design** or **implementation** as follow.

•**Lack of consistent, coordinated, and long-term state support**, primarily in terms of training and financial assistance during the implementation stage. Gouveia (1989:393) indicates that, at the broadest level, "The 'state' can still be made accountable for whatever problems we may find with these empresas...."

The Venezuelan state flip-flopped considerably on its support of the Indigenous Development Program from 1970 to 1985, creating a highly unpredictable environment for the evolution of the program.

•**Lack of basic knowledge of indigenous sociocultural systems on the part of project designers** (Arvelo-Jiménez and Perozo 1983:520). Very little research was carried out on the indigenous societies prior to attempts at implementing the enterprise organizational structure. For instance, one fundamental—idealistic—proposition held by the enterprise program designers was that most of these societies were characterized by community- or group-level reciprocal relations in terms of production and consumption and would be preadapted to the enterprise's communal structure. In general, this did not seem to be the case (Morales and Arvelo-Jiménez 1981).

•**State program implementers constrained by lack of knowledge of indigenous groups and pressure to produce results quickly** (Heinen and Coppens 1981:598). Implementers were generally government officials from urban areas of the country. As government officials, they were expected to produce results quickly to satisfy the demands of the regional, national, and international markets (Arvelo-Jiménez and Perozo 1983:520). At times, this led to the officials assuming more and more control of the enterprise, disengaging even further the indigenous peoples from planning and operating the organizations and treating them simply as a labor force (Heinen and Coppens 1981:598).

•**Lack of appropriate advisors over the long term**. Because indigenous groups often lack understanding of Western economic and political systems, advisors ("with a true intercultural perspective") are required to provide organizational input and "patient work" over the long term; without this ingredient, "...many of the recently founded enterprises are destined to failure" (Heinen 1979:24, cited in Arvelo-Jiménez and Perozo 1983:517).

•**Global imposition of an organizational structure whose design was not suited to many of the indigenous sociocultural systems** (Morales and Arvelo-Jiménez 1981:620-621). According to critics, this is the main design flaw contributing to failure of many of the enterprises. The designers of the indigenous enterprise structure adapted it from the peasant enterprise model and attempted to apply the three-tiered representative democratic structure (General Assembly, Administrative Council, and Supervisory Council) universally to the numerous diverse indigenous societies in the country. This structure was meant to coordinate production and consumption at the communal or intercommunal level. However, more in-depth studies indicate that, for the majority of the indigenous groups in Venezuela, traditional production and consumption units are subcommunal (from nuclear to extended family households). Therefore, the enterprise structure imposes a new decision making framework on the indigenous population that impedes self-determination and undermines the traditional sociopolitical system. However, the critics appear to be more concerned with

the changes (which they view as negative) related to the adoption of the enterprise structure rather than how the traditional system contributes to the failure of the enterprises. Two of their main concerns are: usurpation of the authority and power of traditional elders by younger, mission-educated Indians (those most likely to be elected to the Administrative Council because of the literacy requirement for officers in this body); and population nucleation and permanence leading to increased pressure on subsistence resources and possible environmental degradation (Heinen and Coppens 1981:595-596) and health problems. However, the designers of the enterprise program were compelled to create the organizational structure within Venezuelan law (and particularly that of the agrarian reform law) and hoped that the structure could be adapted over time to individual cases.

As Gouveia (1988::46) summarizes, "...proponents of the *empresa* program were too vague about their conceptualization of traditional communal arrangements....On the other hand, Morales and Arvelo (1981), failed to appreciate the significance of community-wide patterns of cooperation in such activities as the clearing of fields. They also underestimate the importance of communal ownership of critical means of production, such as land, which, especially in the case of Indian communities, encourages strategies for maintaining territorial integrity."

•**Relocation of indigenous groups and heterogeneous reconstitution**. In most cases, communal lands granted to indigenous populations under the Indigenous Development Program included at least part of their "traditional" and still-occupied territory. However, in the case of the Pume of Kumani, persons from various small communities were relocated to a ranch that had been turned over to IAN during the agrarian reform. Thus, they were not as familiar with the new environment nor did they have a strong spiritual and historical attachment to the land. Moreover, the persons forming the enterprise were not closely related and, in many cases, did not even know each other prior to their move to Kumani.

19. *Factors Related to Success*—Three Indigenous Enterprises, considered to be successful, have been "evaluated:" the Barí of Saimdoyi (see Gouveia 1989); the Yekuana-Sanema of the Erebato River region (see Heinen, Velásquez, and Tomedes 1981; and Heinen 1983-1984); and the Yekuana of the Upper Ventuari River region (see Frechione 1981).

•**The long-term presence of external, relatively objective and culturally sensitive advisors who assist the indigenous community in its relations with the national political and economic systems**. The common denominator among the three enterprise cases considered to be successful was the presence prior to, and during, the implementation of the program of missionaries dedicated to ideals of indigenous rights and self-determination. For example, French missionaries had been involved with the Yekuana and Sanema of the Upper Erebato River since 1959—introducing activities related to the agricultural production of new crops for subsistence and for sale—and the Yekuana-Sanema Intercommunity Indigenous Enterprise of Tujumoto was founded in 1975; Capuchin missionaries had been involved with the Barí since the early 1960s—introducing some cattle—and the Barí Indigenous Enterprise of Saimadoyi was formed in 1982 (with the "recommendation" of the local priest); and a Jesuit began working with the Yekuana of the Upper Ventuari River region in 1971 specifically with the intention of creating an indigenous economic self-development project—which was founded in late 1972 as the Unión Makiritare [Yekuana] del Alto Ventuari (UMAV). The French and Capuchin religious orders have continued to play important roles in the Saimadoyi and Erebato enterprises, while direct Jesuit presence in the Upper Ventuari ended in about 1990.

In addition to serving as informed "links" between the indigenous and national systems, the missionary-advisors also contributed technical assistance in new development activities—such as cattle herding, cacao and coffee production, and infrastructural projects—as well as **financial support**. Unlike the unstable and often conflictive environment created by the state for indigenous development, the missionary-advisors provided a considerable degree of long-term security for such endeavors.

•**Pre-existing forms of communal and/or intercommunal cooperative activities**. Although the traditional basic units of production and consumption among most of the indigenous groups involved in the enterprise program were subcommunity, there also existed, in many cases, community-level reciprocal work groups that could form the foundation for more complex forms of communal organization, such as those envisioned within the enterprise program (Gouveia 1988:44). For example, among the Barí, fishing involving the whole community traditionally took place once a week, gardens—although cultivated at the household level—were cleared by all of the men in the community, and land was communally "owned" and used on an usufruct basis. Moreover, among the Yekuana, garden clearing was not only regularly communal but, at times, intercommunal.

•**Communal land security**. The fundamental goal of the Indigenous Development Program was to grant communal land titles to indigenous populations in Venezuela. The enterprises were formed to provide the juridical units that would hold the titles. Therefore, in most cases, the enterprise was created prior to the granting of land titles. The struggle to protect their traditional territories was quite often the initial impetus for indigenous organization and cooperation in relation to the national system. In general, the titles gave the indigenous populations some degree of security in their battle to retain the areas they had occupied for centuries, and success in this endeavor could be built upon in the activities planned for the economic aspects of the enterprises.

Interestingly, only one of the successful enterprises under consideration here received communal land titles through the Indigenous Development Program. UMAV, which was originally formed outside of the Indigenous Development Program, received communal land titles through IAN in 1975 (Frechione 1981:250). The Barí of Saimadoyi were located in an Indian Reserve and, therefore, did not require additional titling (Gouveia 1989:397). Information on land titling for the Yekuana-Sanema of the Erebato region could not be found. This enterprise is, however, located within the boundaries of the Caura River Forest Reserve.

•**Relative autonomy, self-sufficiency, and internal social cohesion**. Relatively autonomous and less acculturated indigenous populations appear to incorporate a higher degree of pre-existing communal relationships and social/ethnic identification that can serve as the basis for more complex cooperative organizations than do more acculturated groups with more intense linkages to the national and international economic systems (Gouveia 1989:404). Groups that are self-sufficient—retaining subsistence systems based on traditional activities and not relying on imported foodstuffs and expensive technology—can more easily buffer changes in the encompassing economic system. For example, rising food, fuel, equipment, or fertilizer costs would not impact them to the degree that they would more "linked" groups; nor would decreased prices for products they produce be as likely to lead to collapse.

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