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ABSTRACT

This booklet provides an overview of security technology product areas that might be appropriate and affordable for school applications. Topics cover security concepts and operational issues; security issues when designing for new schools; the role of maintenance; video camera use; walk-through metal detectors; duress alarm devices; and a partial list of possible security measures to address various security issues such as outsiders on campus, fights on campus, vandalism, theft, parking problems, bomb threats, and teacher safety. A second section addresses how schools can prepare to deal with bomb threats and the illegal use of explosives, including responding to bomb threats, evacuation, search techniques and teams, and handling the news media. (GR)

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# SCHOOL VIOLENCE:

# PHYSICAL

# SECURITY

Utah State Office of Education

EF 005 155

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# Physical Facility & Security Issues

## **Preface**

At any particular school, Security is the product of funding, facilities, building age, building layout, administrators, teachers, parents, kids, personalities, campus order, security personnel, procedures, the neighborhood, policies, the school board, local law enforcement, fire codes, local government, politics, and reputation. No two schools have identical and successful security programs. Therefore, a security solution for one school cannot just be replicated at other schools with complete success.

Although security products can certainly have many different applications, this document covers products that can be applicable to some of the issues of violence in schools: Video surveillance, weapon detection, entry control, and duress alarms.

Feedback from law enforcement agencies, schools, and product manufactures/vendors is welcome, especially regarding any oversights or errors on our part. This document is intended to provide an overview of security technology product areas that might be appropriate and affordable for school applications.

## **Security Concepts and Operational Issues**

The security industry has thousands of security products on the market. Some of them are excellent, but many claim to be "The very best of its kind " And, unfortunately, there are a significant number of customers in the country who have been less than pleased with the ultimate cost, maintenance requirements, and effectiveness of security technologies they have purchased. Schools have been no exception to this and have a few inherent problems of their own:

- 1) Schools do not usually have the funding for aggressive and complete security programs.
- 2) Schools generally lack the ability to produce effective security technology products and services at the lowest bid.
- 3) Many school security programs cannot afford to hire well-trained security personnel
- 4) School administrators and their staff rarely have training or experience in security technologies.
- 5) Schools have no infrastructures in place for maintaining or upgrading security devices when something breaks. It is often difficult to have it repaired or replaced.
- 6) Issues of privacy and potential civil rights lawsuits may prohibit or complicate the use of some technologies.

Effectiveness, affordability, and acceptability are difficult tradeoffs and, occasionally, a seemingly ineffective solution to a security problem is chosen because of lack of funding or pressure from the community to do something.

However, a good argument should be made for applying every physical security approach in every school. Appropriate preparation should include security system design and an evolving plan beginning with defining a particular school's risk. A school's risk can be divided into two basic areas, the risk to people and the risk to property.

A reasonable approach to using any new security device would include checking with your legal organization, talking to schools in the area that have already implemented the measure, and inviting local law enforcement to come in to discuss the device's possible use. Although every possible ramification cannot be foreseen, it does help to be aware of issues that might be raised and to be aware of current thinking about ways to address each of these

## **New School Design**

If a district has the luxury of looking forward to a new school in the future, it is important to consider security issues in the design. There are architectural firms specializing in schools that incorporate good security principles; a security conscious design can actually help compensate in the long term for tight security budgets, fewer security personnel, and less sophisticated equipment.

## **The Role of Maintenance**

One additional consideration that cannot be overlooked is the perception of a lack of order on a school campus. Seemingly small incidents or issues such as litter on a school campus can provide the groundwork for (or even just the reputation of) a problem school. Issues of vandalism and theft can be almost as harmful to a school as actual violence because they can create a fertile environment for loss of control and community confidence.

Issues contributing to a school's overall order maintenance must therefore be taken seriously, not unlike any other public facility. Reducing theft, deterring vandalism and graffiti, keeping outsiders off campus, keeping the facility in good repair, improving lighting, maintaining attractive landscaping, and getting rid of trash are all important to school security.

## **Video Cameras**

### **(Why video cameras?)**

The peace of mind of both students and faculty at a school can often be quickly enhanced by the installation of video cameras as part of a closed circuit television (CCTV) system. This change of attitude may result in even further reaching effects on a campus than would be

expected by the use of cameras alone. A sense of safety and authority will directly influence people's opinions and impressions, which will ultimately contribute the overall order maintenance of a facility and how that facility is treated by occupants and outsiders.

To the school's security personnel who must handle day-to-day security issues, the best thing about cameras is the deterrence factor they introduce to outsiders who do not belong on campus and to students and employees who do. Information regarding security measures, such as cameras at the local school, will generally spread through a community. This type of reputation can make outsiders reconsider an unwelcome to the historically easy mark of the neighborhood. It can be assumed that most kids are not going to step way out of bounds if they believe they will likely be caught, which is often possible through the appropriate application of cameras. In a school system, the ideal goal should be to convince kids not to even attempt to do something that is unacceptable. Addressing an incident after it occurs is good, but not as good as if it never happened. Once a perpetrator is caught, there is a chain of events involving confrontation, denial, parental involvement, consequences, and perhaps even the involvement of law enforcement and the legal system. School administrators will be forced to spend a great deal of time on the matter, and all participants will find the process distasteful.

Another strength of cameras is the strong evidence they can preserve on tape. Even if law enforcement is not brought in regarding an incident, the recorded tape can be invaluable to a school administration.

The ultimate usability of a video recording is dependent on many variables. It is possible for a camera system to produce tapes on which individuals are unidentifiable or their actions are indiscernible. Be certain that a camera system provides the kind of information you need before you pay for it. These requirements should be clearly spelled out in the purchase agreement, along with a specified time period, which the school can adequately test it.

Video recordings are also beneficial for use with parents. Although nearly all parents want to believe their children are innocent of wrongdoing, some parents will deny their child's guilt despite the credible testimony of others to the contrary. However, as many school administrators and teachers have discovered, parents quickly accept their child's role in an incident when shown a videotape of the incident. Most parents want to do the right thing, however hard evidence is often required for some to concede over a matter involving their own child.

Finally, the solid documentation that a video recording provides can be invaluable in situations involving liability claims. Although it is possible that this may occasionally work against the school, most schools welcome this concrete evidence so that testimony regarding an incident does not consist solely of hearsay.

### **(Why not video cameras)**

The following is a list of reasons to consider **not** using video cameras:

- 1) CCTV systems are expensive. Installation can also be expensive, as well as logistically difficult
- 2) Choosing the correct camera equipment requires some technical knowledge.
- 3) A single camera can effectively view a smaller area than would be intuitively expected, hence many applications can require more cameras, equipment, and expense than was originally expected.
- 4) Cameras can be stolen or vandalized.
- 5) Ongoing maintenance and operational support are required.
- 6) Some applications or areas do not warrant camera use.
- 7) Some communities or individuals will change the legality of using cameras.
- 8) Insiders with full knowledge of the installed video system's capabilities can possibly circumvent the systems to their advantage.
- 9) If it becomes well known where cameras are being used at a school, students may simply move their misbehaviors to a different part of the campus.

### **(Color versus black & white cameras)**

In a school application, the security objective of recording video scenes would generally be to determine who the perpetrator of an incident was. In this type of after-the-fact assessment, it is most important to identify, not just detect the intruder. Because of this, color cameras are probably more helpful for most school applications than black & white cameras. Color recordings will contain much more information about the scene that was viewed. This can be critical for school applications; the school principal can match the characteristics of the recorded suspect with those of students or outsiders known to frequent the area.

Color cameras usually have a lower resolution than black & white cameras. However, for the school application, the ability to recognize the color of clothing, colors of vehicles, and gang related colors is often more important than a highly detailed image.

When using either black & white or color cameras under low light level conditions (Such as at night with artificial lighting) it is necessary to evaluate the effectiveness of the existing lighting. Generally, security applications of cameras require higher light levels and more evenly distributed lighting than is found in parking lots with typical safety lighting. Also, if school officials plan to use their cameras for nighttime applications, color cameras will require a higher lighting level than black & white cameras.

### **(To monitor or not to monitor that is the question)**

Each year, a great number of camera systems are bought with the objective of assigning a security person to constantly monitor the scenes from the video cameras in real time. The concept of such systems is to have the ability to dispatch or respond immediately to an incident.

This is quite often an unrealistic approach to security, **particularly in school applications.**

## **(Legal aspects of video cameras in schools)**

Laws concerning privacy issues and civil rights may vary widely, so before beginning any electronic surveillance program, be sure to check with your school attorney. However, the following generalities are fairly consistent:

Cameras may not be used in an area where there is a "reasonable expectation of privacy."

Examples of these are bathrooms, gym locker and changing areas and private offices (unless consent by the office owner is given). Examples of where cameras are generally acceptable are in hallways, parking lots, front offices where students, employees, and parents come and go; gymnasiums; cafeterias; supply rooms; and classrooms. The use of cameras in classrooms is often debated by teachers who want cameras for protection and teachers who do not.

Audio recording is often considered to be of greater concern than video recording in most states. The recording of conversations is viewed as more an invasion of privacy, as conversations often take place where the participants do not expect to be overheard

### **(VCRs: the weak link)**

The video cassette recorder (VCR), commonly used in most school surveillance systems, is the weakest link in the video system due to its mechanical nature.

Unfortunately, the most ignored task in most school security departments is the regular servicing and cleaning of VCRs. The heads should be cleaned after every 100 hours of use - about every 4 days of constant recording. The entire VCR unit should be serviced every 2,400 hours, or about every 3 months of constant use.

## **Walk-Through Metal Detectors**

### **(Do metal detectors really work?)**

Metal detectors work very well - they are considered a mature technology and can accurately detect the presence of most types of firearms and knives. However, metal detectors work very poorly if the user is not aware of their limitations before beginning a weapon detection program and is not prepared for the amount of trained and motivated manpower required to operate these devices successfully.

A metal detection device in school security applications is used primarily to locate undesirable objects that are hidden on a person's body. When a questionable item or material is detected by the device, the detector produces an alarm signal; this can be audible, visible (lights) or both. Unfortunately, a metal detector cannot distinguish between a gun and



a large metal belt buckle. This shortcoming is what makes weapon detection programs impractical for many school applications.

Metal detectors are usually not effective when used on purses, book bags, briefcases, or suitcases. There is usually a large number of different objects or materials located in or as part of the composition of these carried items that would cause an alarm.

In many facilities, the misconception exists that someone known by the operator, such as a fellow employee or security person, should be allowed to circumvent the system. It must be clearly established that in order to ensure the integrity of any routine metal detection program, everyone must be subject to the program requirements, including students, parents, teachers, custodial staff, security personnel, school administrators and visitors.

### **(Hand-Held Scanners for Personnel)**

Battery-operated, hand held metal detection devices are a very viable technology for use by schools. By moving the wand of a hand-held metal detector around and close to a scannee's body, the operator can accurately locate sources of metal that may be on or even in, a person's body. When a suspect area is located, the hand-held device will generally give off an annoying squeal. These devices do not have the ability to discriminate between an actual weapon and some piece of benign metal. The responsibility of the operator of the device is to judge whether the squeal is truly suspect, then to investigate and determine the cause. A very common use of hand-held metal detectors is in airports, where these devices allow the security staff to more accurately locate the source of an alarm after the scannee has already walked through a portal system.

It is not recommended that hand-held scanning be done in a private room or private area. To avoid possible misconduct, accusations of misconduct, or a confrontation with a student who does actually have a weapon, all of the weapon detection program functions should be preformed in view of everybody else.

## **Entry-Control Technologies**

Many school administrators contend that the majority of the security problems and incidents at their schools are the result of an unauthorized person being on campus. These trespassers can include a school's own suspended or expelled students, students from rival schools, irate parents seeking revenge against a student or employee, gang members, or even drug dealers.

To best control a school building or campus, the number of entryways must be severely limited. Restricting normal entrance to only one or two locations can greatly reduce the number of security personnel or security devices that must be supported. But limiting entry points can be very difficult for some schools, due to the layout, required emergency egress, property boundaries, the surrounding neighborhood, and adjacent streets. The controlling

of a campus entry may require fencing or other physical barriers. Fencing may be less important for a school that is located in a somewhat remote location. If the majority of students, faculty, and visitors must get to a particular school on buses or in cars, then the act of restricting vehicle entry to one or two driveways and posting a guard at these locations to validate all vehicle occupants may be adequate without the enclosure of fencing.

Once entrances to a facility are limited in number, the process of allowing or denying access is generally accomplished through one of four approaches:

- 1) A security guard controls entry; ID cards or other means of identification may be checked.
- 2) A special ID card/badge with automatic readers.
- 3) A PIN number for entering on a keypad.
- 4) A biometric device for feature recognition.

## **Duress Alarm Devices**

Modern duress alarms are generally electronic devices that vary widely in capabilities and price. There are three general overlapping categories of duress alarms that can send one or more levels of distress signals to a particular location:

- 1) A panic-button alarm. This is a pushbutton mounted in a fixed location.
- 2) An identification alarm. This is a portable device that identifies the owner of the device
- 3) An identification / location alarm. This alarm is a portable device that identifies, locates, and tracks the person who activates the alarm.

One additional category could include cellular telephones. While this approach is neither discrete or automatic, it is recommended equipment for every principal and the primary security person.

The panic button is by far the most common type of duress alarm presently found in schools. There are several weaknesses to a panic-button system. In a classroom situation, it is possible that the panic-button would not be readily available in a duress situation. Also, this configuration lends itself to nuisance alarms triggered by mischievous students.

A second type of system incorporates a pager- like device that has a panic button built in and is either worn by school personnel or may be installed within a foot switch located under the desk. When the panic button is pushed, a wireless alarm signal is sent to the closest wireless sensing unit (a type of repeater) which then is sent to the alarm console. The personnel at the console receive a coded signal, which corresponds to the teacher. This system does not usually give specific locations other than to the general preprogrammed zone of the repeater.

A major limiting factor of this system is that the pager-like device must have a clear line of sight to the nearest sensing unit for an accurate transmission.

A third system, a smarter version of the previous system, can identify, locate, and track the person who activated the duress alarm of his or her pager. An extensive wireless infrastructure tracks the device within school property. This type of system can operate in an area of about 40 acres. The major concern is the cost. (Aprox. \$100,000.00)

## **A Spectrum of Physical Security Approaches**

A wide array of security measures involving people, campus modifications, and technologies can be considered for most concerns, keeping in mind the unique characteristics of each school. The following is a partial list of possible security measures to address various security issues:

### *Outsiders on campus.*

- 1) Posted signs regarding penalties for trespassing
- 2) enclosed campus (fencing)
- 3) Guard at main gate to campus
- 4) Greeters in strategic locations
- 5) Student I.D.s or badges
- 6) Vehicle parking permits
- 7) Uniform or dress codes
- 8) Exterior doors locked from the outside
- 9) A challenge procedure for anyone out of class
- 10) Cameras in remote locations
- 11) School laid out so all visitors must pass through front office
- 12) Temporary "fading" badges issued to all visitors

### *Fights on campus*

- 1) Cameras
- 2) Duress alarms
- 3) Whistles

### *Vandalism*

- 1) Graffiti-resistant sealers
- 2) Glass-breaking sensors
- 3) Law enforcement officers living on campus
- 4) Fencing
- 5) Well-lit campus at night

### *Theft*

- 1) Interior intrusion detection sensors
- 2) Property marking (including microdots) to deter theft
- 3) Bars on windows

- 4) Reinforced doors
- 5) Cameras
- 6) Locating high value assets in interior rooms
- 7) Key control
- 8) Doors with hinge pins on the secure side

#### *Drugs*

- 1) Drug detection swipes
- 2) Drug dogs
- 3) Removal of lockers
- 4) Random searches
- 5) Vapor detection of drugs

#### *Alcohol*

- 1) No open campus for lunch
- 2) Breathalyzer test equipment
- 3) No access to vehicles
- 4) No lockers
- 5) Clear or open mesh backpacks

#### *Weapons*

- 1) Walk-through metal detectors
- 2) Hand-held metal detectors
- 3) Crime-stopper hotline with rewards for information
- 4) Random locker, backpack, and vehicle searches
- 5) X-ray inspection of book bags and purses

#### *Parking lot problems*

- 1) Cameras
- 2) Parking permits
- 3) Fencing
- 4) Parking lots sectioned off for different student schedules
- 5) Roving guards
- 6) Bike patrol

#### *Bomb threats*

- 1) Caller ID on the phone system
- 2) Crime-stopper program with big rewards
- 3) Recording all phone calls, with a message regarding this at the beginning of each incoming call.
- 4) Phone company support
- 5) No pay phones on campus
- 6) Policy to extend the school year when plagued with bomb threats and subsequent evacuations

*Bus problems*

- 1) Video cameras and recorders on the bus
- 2) I.P.S. required to get on a bus
- 3) Security aids on the bus
- 4) Duress alarm system or radios for bus drivers

*Teacher safety*

- 1) Duress alarms
- 2) Roving patrols
- 3) Classroom doors left open during class
- 4) Cameras
- 5) Controlled access to classroom areas

Most schools are safe institutions, with disciplinary issues creating most disruptions. However, because of the campus violence involving firearms, student deaths, and multiple victims, schools and school programs are working harder to reach out to students. Meanwhile, security incidents are occurring in schools. Perpetrators must be caught and consequences must be administered.

# Bomb Threats & Physical Security Planning

# BOMB THREATS AND PHYSICAL SECURITY PLANNING

## Forward

Bombing and the threat of being bombed are harsh realities in today's world. The public is becoming more aware of those incidents of violence that are perpetrated by vicious, nefarious segments of our society through the illegal use of explosives. **Law enforcement agencies are charged with providing protection for life and property, but law enforcement alone cannot be held responsible. Every citizen must do his or her part to ensure a safe environment.**

This document is designed to help both the public and private sectors prepare for the potential threat of explosives-related violence. **While the ideas set forth herein are applicable in most cases, they are intended only as a guide.** The information provided is compiled from a wide range of sources, including the actual experiences of special agents of the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms (ATF).

If there is one point that cannot be overemphasized, it is the value of being prepared. Do not allow a bomb incident to catch you by surprise. By developing a bomb incident plan and considering possible bomb incidents in your physical security plan, you can reduce the potential for personal injury and property damage.

The purpose of this document is to help you better prepare to deal with bomb threats and the illegal use of explosives.

## **Bombs**

Bombs can be constructed to look like almost anything and can be placed or delivered in any number of ways. The probability of finding a bomb that looks like the stereotypical bomb is almost nonexistent. The only common denominator that exists among bombs is that they are designed or intended to explode.

Most bombs are homemade and are limited in their design only by the imagination of, and resources available to, the bomber. Remember, when searching for a bomb, suspect anything that looks unusual. Let the trained bomb technician determine what is or is not a bomb.

## **Bomb Threats**

Bomb threats are delivered in a variety of ways. The majority of threats are called in at the target. Occasionally these calls are through a third party. Sometimes a threat is communicated in writing or by a recording.

Two logical explanations for reporting a bomb threat are:

1. The caller has definite knowledge or believes that an explosive or incendiary bomb has been or will be placed and he/she wants to minimize personal injury or property damage. The caller may be the person who placed the device or someone who has become aware of such information.
2. The caller wants to create an atmosphere of anxiety and panic which will, in turn, result in a disruption of the normal activities at the facility where the device is purportedly placed.

Whatever the reason for the report, there will certainly be a reaction to it. Through proper planning, the wide variety of potentially uncontrollable reactions can be greatly reduced.

## **Why Prepare?**

If you accept the two aforementioned explanations for reporting that a bomb is about to go off, you can better prepare to foil the bomber or threat maker.

Through proper preparation, you can reduce the accessibility of your business or building and identify those areas that can be "hardened" against the potential bomber. This will limit the amount of time lost to searching, if you determine a search is necessary. If a bomb incident occurs, proper planning will instill confidence in the leadership, reinforce the notion that those in charge do care, and reduce the potential for personal injury and property loss.



Proper planning can also reduce the threat of panic, the most contagious of all human emotions. Panic is sudden, excessive, unreasoning, infectious terror. Once a state of panic has been reached, the potential for fatal injury and property damage is greatly increased. In the context of a bomb threat, panic is the ultimate achievement of the caller.

Be prepared! There is no excuse for not taking every step necessary to meet the threat

### **How to Prepare**

In preparing to cope with a bomb incident, it is necessary to develop two separate but interdependent plans, namely a physical security plan and a bomb incident plan.

Physical security provides for the protection of property, personnel, facilities, and material against unauthorized entry, trespass, damage, sabotage, or other illegal or criminal acts. The physical security may already be in existence, although not necessarily intended to prevent a bomb attack. The bomb incident plan provides detailed procedures to be implemented when a bombing attack is executed or threatened. In planning for the bomb incident, a definite chain of command or line of authority must be established. Only by using an established organization and procedures can the bomb incident be handled with the least risk to all concerned. A clearly defined line of authority will instill confidence and avoid panic

Establishing a chain of command is easy if there is a simple office structure, one business, one building. However, if a complex situation exists, a multi-occupant building for example, a representative from each occupant entity should attend the planning conference. A leader should be appointed and a clear line of succession delineated. This chain of command should be printed and circulated to all concerned parties.

In planning, you should designate a command center to be located in the switchboard room or other focal point of telephone or radio communications. The management personnel assigned to operate the center should have the authority to decide whatever action should be taken during the threat. Only those with assigned duties should be permitted in the center. Make some provision for alternates in the event someone is absent when a threat is received. Obtain an updated blueprint or floor plan of your building and maintain it in the command center.

Contact the police department, fire department, or local government agencies to determine if any assistance is available to you for developing your physical security plan or bomb incident plan. If possible, have police and/or fire department representatives and member of your staff inspect the building for areas where explosives are likely to be concealed. (Make a checklist of these

areas for inclusion in command center material.) Determine whether there is a bomb disposal unit available how to contact the unit, and under what conditions it is activated. In developing your bomb incident plan, you must also ascertain whether the bomb disposal unit, in addition to disarming and removing the explosives, will assist in searching the building in the event of a threat.

Training is essential to deal properly with a bomb threat incident. Instruct all personnel, especially those at the telephone switchboard, in what to do if a bomb threat is received. Be absolutely certain that all personnel assigned to the command center are aware of their duties. The positive aspects of planning will be lost if the leadership is not apparent. It is also very important to organize and train an evacuation unit which will be responsive to the command center and has a clear understanding of the importance of its role.

We have suggested that the command center be located near the switchboard or focal point of communications. It is critical that lines of communication be established between the command center and the search or evacuation teams. The center must have the flexibility to keep up with the search team progress. In a large facility, if the teams go beyond the communications network, the command center must have the mobility to maintain contact and track searches or evacuation efforts

### **Security Against Bomb Incidents**

We mentioned earlier that, in dealing with bomb incidents or potential bomb incidents, two interrelated plans must be developed; the bomb incident plan and the physical security plan. Heretofore, we have primarily addressed the bomb incident plan. Now, before continuing with that plan, we will discuss security measures as they apply to "hardening" against the bomb attack.

Most commercial structures and individual residences already have some security in place, planned or unplanned, realized or not. Locks on windows and doors, outside lights, etc., are all designed and installed to contribute toward the security of a facility and the protection of its occupants.

In considering measures to increase security for your building or office, it is highly recommended that you contact your local police department for guidance regarding a specific plan for your facility. There is no single security plan that is adaptable to all situations. The following recommendations are offered because they may contribute to reducing your vulnerability to bomb attacks.

The exterior configuration of a building or facility is very important. Unfortunately, in most instances, the architect has given little or no consideration to security, particularly toward thwarting or discouraging a bomb attack. However, by the addition of fencing and lighting, and by controlling access, the vulnerability of a facility to a bomb attack can be reduced significantly.

Bombs being delivered by car or left in a car are a grave reality. Parking should be restricted, if possible, to 300 feet from your building or any building in a complex. If restricted parking is not feasible, properly identified employee vehicles should be parked closest to your facility and visitor vehicles parked at a distance.

Heavy shrubs and vines should be kept close to the ground to reduce their potential to conceal criminals or bombs. Window boxes and planters are perfect receptacles for the bomber. Unless there is an absolute requirement for such ornamentation, window boxes and planters are better removed. If they must remain, a security patrol should be employed to check them regularly.

A highly visible security patrol can be a significant deterrent. Even if this "patrol" is only one security guard/night guard, he/she is optimally utilized outside the building. If an interior guard is utilized, consider the installation of closed-circuit television cameras that cover exterior building perimeters.

Have an adequate burglar alarm system installed by a reputable company that can service and properly maintain the equipment. Post signs indicating that such a system is in place.

Entrance/exit doors with hinges and hinge pins on the inside to prevent removal should be installed. Solid wood or sheet metal-faced doors provide extra integrity that a hollow-core wooden door cannot provide. A steel door frame that properly fits the door is as important as the construction of the door.

The ideal security situation is a building with no windows. However, bars, grates, heavy mesh screens, or steel shutters over windows offer good protection from otherwise unwanted entry. It is important that the openings in the protective coverings are not too large. Otherwise, a bomb may be introduced into the building while the bomber remains outside. Floors vents, transoms, and skylights should also be covered. Please note that fire safety considerations preclude the use of certain window coverings. Municipal ordinances should be researched and safety considered before any of these renovations are undertaken.

Controls should be established for positively identifying personnel who are authorized access to critical areas and for denying access to unauthorized personnel. These controls should extend to the inspection of all packages and materials being taken into critical areas.

Security and maintenance personnel should be alert for people who act in a suspicious manner, as well as objects, items, or parcels which look out of place or suspicious. Surveillance should be established to include potential hiding places (e.g., stairwells, rest rooms, and any vacant office space) for unwanted individuals.

Doors or access ways to such areas as boiler rooms, mailrooms, computer areas, switchboards, and elevator control rooms should remain locked when not in use.

It is important to establish a procedure for the accountability of keys. If keys cannot be accounted for, locks should be changed.

Good housekeeping is also vital. Trash or dumpster areas should remain free of debris. A bomb or device can easily be concealed in the trash. Combustible material should be properly disposed of, or protected if further use is anticipated.

Install detection devices at all entrances and closed-circuit television in those areas previously identified as likely places where a bomb may be placed. This, coupled with the posting of signs indicating such measures are in place, is a good deterrent.

Our society recognizes the necessity for businesses to maintain good public relations. Corporate responsibility, however, also encompasses the safety and protection of the public. The threatened use of explosives necessitates that in the interest of safety and security, some inconvenience may have to be imposed on visitors to public buildings. The public is becoming more accustomed to routine security checks and will readily accept these minor inconveniences.

Perhaps entrances and exits can be modified with a minimal expenditure to channel all visitors through someone at a reception desk. Individuals entering the building would be required to sign a register indicating the name and room number of the person whom they wish to visit. Employees at these reception desks could contact the person to be visited and advise him/her that a visitor, by name, is in the lobby. The person to be visited may decide to come to the lobby to ascertain that the purpose of the visit is valid. A system for signing out when the individual departs could be integrated into this procedure.

Such a procedure may result in complaints from the public. If the reception desk clerk explains to the visitor that these procedures were implemented in his/her best interest and safety, the complaints would be reduced. The placement of a sign at the reception desk informing visitors of the need for safety is another option.

### **Responding To Bomb Threats**

Instruct all personnel, especially those at the telephone switchboard, in what to do if a bomb threat call is received.

It is always desirable that more than one person listen in on the call. To do this, a covert signaling system should be implemented, perhaps by using a coded buzzer signal to a second reception point.

A calm response to the bomb threat caller could result in obtaining additional information. This is especially true if the caller wishes to avoid injuries or deaths. If told that the building is occupied or cannot be evacuated in time, the bomber may be willing to give more specific information on the bomb's location, components, or method of initiation.

The bomb threat caller is the best source of information about the bomb. When a bomb threat is called in:

- Keep the caller on the line as long as possible. Ask him/her to repeat the message. Record every word spoken by the person.
- If the caller does not indicate the location of the bomb or the time of possible detonation, ask him/her for this information.
- Inform the caller that the building is occupied and the detonation of a bomb could result in death or serious injury to many innocent people.
- Pay particular attention to background noises, such as motors running, music playing, and any other noise which may give a clue as to the location of the caller.
- Listen closely to the voice (male, female) voice quality (calm, excited), accents, and speech impediments. Immediately after the caller hangs up, report the threat to the person designated by management to receive such information.
- Report the information immediately to the police department, fire department, ATF, FBI, and other appropriate agencies. The sequence of notification should be established in the bomb incident plan.
- Remain available, as law enforcement personnel will want to interview you

When a written threat is received, save all materials, including any envelope or container. Once the message is recognized as a bomb threat, further unnecessary handling should be avoided. Every possible effort must be made to retain evidence such as fingerprints, handwriting or typewriting, paper, and postal marks. These will prove essential in tracing the threat and identifying the writer.

While written messages are usually associated with generalized threats and extortion attempts, a written warning of a specific device may occasionally be received. It should never be ignored.

### **Decision Time**

The most serious of all decisions to be made by management in the event of a bomb threat is whether to evacuate the building. In many cases, this decision may have already been made during the development of the bomb incident plan. Management may pronounce a carte blanche policy that, in the event of a bomb threat, total evacuation will be effective immediately. This decision circumvents the calculated risk and demonstrates a deep concern for the safety of personnel in the building. However, such a decision can result in costly loss of time.

Essentially, there are three alternatives when faced with a bomb threat:

1. Ignore the threat.
2. Evacuate immediately.
3. Search and evacuate if warranted.

Ignoring the threat completely can result in some problems. While a statistical argument can be made that very few bomb threats are real, it cannot be overlooked that bombs have been located in connection with threats. If employees learn that bomb threats have been received and ignored, it could result in morale problems and have a long-term adverse effect on your business. Also, there is the possibility that if the bomb threat caller feels that he/she is being ignored, he/she may go beyond the threat and actually plant a bomb.

Evacuating immediately on every bomb threat is an alternative that on face value appears to be the preferred approach. However, the negative factors inherent in this approach must be considered. The obvious result of immediate evacuation is the disruptive effect on your business. If the bomb threat caller knows that your policy is to evacuate each time a call is made, he/she can continually call and force your business to a standstill. An employee, knowing that the policy is to evacuate immediately, may make a threat in order to get out of work. A student may use a bomb threat to avoid a class or miss a test. Also, a bomber wishing to cause personal injuries could place a bomb near an exit normally used to evacuate and then call in the threat.

Initiating a search after a threat is received and evacuating a building after a suspicious package or device is found is the third, and perhaps most desired, approach. It is certainly not as disruptive as an immediate evacuation and will satisfy the requirement to do something when a threat is received. If a device is found, the evacuation can be accomplished expeditiously while at the same time avoiding the potential danger areas of the bomb.

### **Evacuation**

An evacuation unit consisting of management personnel should be organized and trained. The organization and training of this unit should be coordinated with the development of the bomb incident plan, as well as with all tenants of a building.

The evacuation unit should be trained in how to evacuate the building during a bomb threat. You should consider priority of evacuation, e.g., evacuation by floor level. Evacuate the floor levels above and below the danger area in order to remove those persons from danger as quickly as possible. Training in this type of evacuation is usually available from police, fire or other units within the community.

You may also train the evacuation unit in search techniques, or you may prefer a separate search unit. Volunteer personnel should be solicited for this function. Assignment of search wardens, team leaders, etc., can be employed. To be proficient in searching the building, search personnel must be thoroughly familiar with all hallways, rest rooms, false ceiling areas, and every location in the building where an explosive or incendiary device may be concealed. When police officers or firefighters arrive at the building, the contents and the floor plan will be unfamiliar to them if they have not previously reconnoitered the facility. Thus, it is extremely important that the evacuation or search unit be thoroughly trained and familiar with the floor plan of the building and immediate outside areas. When a room or particular area is searched, it should be marked or sealed with a piece of tape and reported to the supervisor of that area.

The evacuation or search unit should be trained only in evacuation and search techniques and not in the techniques of neutralizing, removing or otherwise having contact with the device. If a device is located, it should not be disturbed. However, its location should be well marked and a route back to the device noted.

### **Search Teams**

It is advisable to use more than one individual to search any area or room, no matter how small. Searches can be conducted by supervisory personnel, area occupants or trained explosive search teams. There are advantages and disadvantages to each method of staffing the search teams.

Using supervisory personnel to search is a rapid approach and causes little disturbance. There will be little loss of employee working time, but a morale problem may develop if it is discovered that a bomb threat has been received and workers were left unaware. Using a supervisor to search will usually not be as thorough because of his/her unfamiliarity with many areas and his/her desire to get on with business.

Using area occupants to search their own areas is the best method for a rapid search. The occupants' concern for their own safety will contribute toward a more thorough search. Furthermore, the personnel conducting the search are familiar with what does or does not belong in a particular area. Using occupants to search will result in a shorter loss of work time than if all were evacuated prior to search by trained teams. Using the occupants to search can have a positive effect on morale, given a good training program to develop confidence. Of course, this would require the training of an entire work force, and ideally the performance of several practical training exercises. One drawback of this search method is the increased danger to unevacuated workers.

The search conducted by a trained team is the best for safety, morale and thoroughness, though it does take the most time. Using a trained team will result in a significant loss of production time. It is a slow operation that requires comprehensive training and practice.

The decision as to who should conduct searches lies with management, and should be considered and incorporated into the bomb incident plan.

### **Search Technique**

The following room search technique is based on the use of a two-person searching team. There are many minor variations possible in searching a room. The following contains only the basic techniques.

When the two-person search team enters the room to be searched, they should first move to various parts of the room and stand quietly with their eyes closed and listen for a clockwork device. Frequently, a clockwork mechanism can be quickly detected without use of special equipment. Even if no clockwork mechanism is detected, the team is now aware of the background noise level within the room itself.

Background noise or transferred sound is always disturbing during a building search. If a ticking sound is heard but cannot be located, one might become unnerved. The ticking sound may come from an unbalanced air-conditioner fan several floors away or from a dripping sink down the hall. Sound will transfer through air-conditioning ducts, along water pipes and through walls. One of the most difficult buildings to search is one that has steam or hot water heat. This type of building will constantly thump, crack, chatter, and tick due to the movement of the steam or hot water through the pipes and the expansion and contraction of the pipes. Background noise may also include outside traffic sounds, rain, and wind.

The individual in charge of the room searching team should look around the room and determine how the room is to be divided for searching and to what height the first searching sweep should extend. The first searching sweep will cover all items resting on the floor up to the selected height.

You should divide the room into two virtually equal parts. This equal division should be based on the number and type of objects in the room; e.g., the edge of the window on the north wall to the floor lamp on the south wall.

### **First Room-Searching Sweep**

Look at the furniture or objects in the room and determine the average height of the majority of items resting on the floor. In an average room, this height usually includes table or desktops and chair backs. The first searching height usually covers the items in the room up to hip height.

After the room has been divided and a searching height has been selected, both individuals go to the one end of the room division line and start from a back-to-back position. This is the starting point, and the same point will be used on each



successive searching sweep. Each person now starts searching his/her way around the room, working toward the other person, checking all items resting on the floor. When the two individuals meet, they will have completed a "wall sweep." They should then work together and check all items in the middle of the room up to the selected hip height, including the floor under the rugs. This first searching sweep should also include those items which may be mounted on or in the walls, such as air-conditioning ducts, baseboard heaters, and built-in wall cupboards, if these fixtures are below hip height.

The first searching sweep usually consumes the most time and effort. During all the searching sweeps, use the electronic or medical stethoscope on walls, furniture items, and floors.

### **Second Room-Searching Sweep**

The individual in charge again looks at the furniture or objects in the room and determines the height of the second searching sweep. This height is usually from the hip to the chin or top of the head. The two persons return to the starting point and repeat the searching technique at the second selected searching height. This sweep usually covers pictures hanging on the walls, built-in bookcases, and tall table lamps.

### **Third Room-Searching Sweep**

When the second searching sweep is completed, the person in charge again determines the next searching height, usually from the chin or the top of the head up to the ceiling. The third sweep is then made. This sweep usually covers high mounted air-conditioning ducts and hanging light fixtures.

### **Fourth Room-Searching Sweep**

If the room has a false or suspended ceiling, the fourth sweep involves investigation of this area. Check flush or ceiling-mounted light fixtures, air conditioning or ventilation ducts, sound or speaker systems, electrical wiring, and structural frame members.

Have a sign or marker indicating "Search Completed" conspicuously posted in the area. Place a piece of colored Scotch tape across the door and door-jamb approximately 2 feet above floor level if the use of signs is not practical.

The room searching technique can be expanded. The same basic technique can be applied to search any enclosed area. Encourage the use of common sense would indicate searching the speaker's platform and microphones first, but always return to the searching technique. Do not rely on random or spot checking of only logical target areas. The bomber may not be a logical person.

In conclusion, the following steps should be taken in order to search a room:

1. Divide the area and select a search height.
2. Start from the bottom and work up.
3. Start back-to-back and work toward each other.
4. Go around the walls and proceed toward the center of the room.

### **Suspicious Object Located**

It is imperative that personnel involved in a search be instructed that their only mission is to search for and report suspicious objects. Under no circumstances should anyone move, jar or touch a suspicious object or anything attached to it. The removal or disarming of a bomb must be left to the professionals in explosive ordinance disposal. When a suspicious object is discovered, the following procedures are recommended:

1. Report the location and an accurate description of the object to the appropriate warden. This information should be relayed immediately to the command center, which will notify the police and fire departments, and rescue squad. These officers should be met and escorted to the scene.
2. If absolutely necessary, place sandbags or mattresses, never metal shields, around the suspicious object. Do not attempt to cover the object.
3. Identify the danger area, and block it off with a clear zone of at least 300 feet, including floors below and above the object.
4. Check to see that all doors and windows are open to minimize primary damage from blast and secondary damage from fragmentation.
5. Evacuate the building.
6. Do not permit re-entry into the building until the device has been removed/disarmed, and the building declared safe for re-entry.

### **Handling of the News Media**

It is of paramount importance that all inquiries from the news media be directed to one individual appointed as spokesperson. All other persons should be instructed not to discuss the situation with outsiders, especially the news media.

The purpose of this provision is to furnish the news media with accurate information and to see that additional bomb threat calls are not precipitated by irresponsible statements from uninformed sources.

## **Summary**

This document serves only as a guide and is not intended to be anything more. The ultimate determination of how to handle a bomb threat must be made by the individual responsible for the threatened facility.

Develop a bomb incident plan. Draw upon any expertise that is available to you from police departments, government agencies, and security specialists. Don't leave anything to chance. Be prepared!

## **Bomb Incident Plan**

1. Designate a chain of command.
2. Establish a command center.
3. Decide what primary and alternate communications will be used.
4. Establish clearly how and by whom a bomb threat will be evaluated.
5. Decide what procedures will be followed when a bomb threat is received or device discovered.
6. Determine to what extent the available bomb squad will assist and at what point the squad will respond.
7. Provide an evacuation plan with enough flexibility to avoid a suspected danger area
8. Designate search teams.
9. Designate areas to be searched
10. Establish techniques to be utilized during search.
11. Establish a procedure to report and track progress of the search and a method to lead qualified bomb technicians to a suspicious package.
12. Have a contingency plan available 8. if a bomb should go off.
13. Establish a simple-to-follow procedure for the person receiving the bomb threat.
14. Review your physical security plan in conjunction with the development of your bomb incident plan.

## **Command Center**

1. Designate a primary location and an alternate location.
2. Assign personnel and designate decision-making authority.
3. Establish a method for tracking search teams.
4. Maintain a list of likely target areas.
5. Maintain a blueprint of floor diagrams in the center.
6. Establish primary and secondary methods of communication. (Caution-the use of two-way radios during a search can cause premature detonation of an electric blasting cap.)
7. Formulate a plan for establishing a command center, if a threat is received after normal work hours.
8. Maintain a roster of all necessary telephone numbers.



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