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ABSTRACT
        This document provides guidelines Florida schools can use in
designing schools that enhance school safety and security. It examines the
literature available on school safety and security and the principles of
Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design (CPTED), and presents a survey
of Florida's 67 school districts examining incidences of safety and security
problems and steps taken to prevent such incidents. Concluding sections
include a set of design guidelines in which CPTED principles are developed
specifically for schools, and evaluates Chapter 6A-2 of the state's Uniform
Building Code with recommended changes and commentary. Survey data show the
CPTED principles do have broad-based application to the design and/or
re-design of Florida's schools, but these principles must be carefully
assessed, particularly those involving life-safety, educational policy or
intent, costs, and overall educational environment. Appendices provide the
CPTED design guidelines, a sample of the Florida District Questionnaire and
statistical results from the survey, a sample of the National Survey
Questionnaire and statistical results of the survey, and a security
maintenance checklist. (GR)

FLORIDA SAFE SCHOOLS DESIGN GUIDELINES 1993

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Florida
Safe School
Design Guidelines

A Research Report for the
Florida Department of Education
Office of Educational Facilities

by

**The Florida Center for
Community Design + Research**
University of South Florida
Tampa Florida

28 July 1993

Florida Safe School Design Guidelines

A Research Report for the Florida Department of Education,
Office of Educational Facilities

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Abstract

Incidents of criminal activity are on the increase in Florida's school districts, and safety and security are of increasing concern to school administrators, teachers, and parents of school children. Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design (CPTED) princples do address the issues of safety in schools, and a set of design guidelines for including these princples in the design of schools is included in this document. In many areas, Chapter 6A-2 of the Florida Administrative Code does address issues of safety and security, but in some particular instances, Chapter 6A-2 - Uniform Building Code (UBC) requirements are not stringent enough (lighting levels, accessiblity, visibility) and in other instances, concerns for life-safety and/or other educational concerns clearly impact the CPTED recommendations.

This document addresses the perception and reality of increased safety and security concerns in Florida's schools, examines the literature available on school safety and security and the principles of CPTED, and presents a survey of Florida's 67 school districts examining incidences of safety and security problems and steps taken to prevent such incidents. The document includes a set of design guidelines in which CPTED princples are developed specifically for schools, and evaluates

Chapter 6A-2 - Uniform Building Code (UBC), with recommended changes and commentary.

The project concludes that CPTED prinicples do have broad-based application to the design and/or re-design of Florida's schools, but these principles must be carefully assessed in light of other concerns, particulary those of life-safety, educational policy or intent, costs and overall educational environment.

CHAPTER 1: PROJECT DESCRIPTION

Introduction

In October of 1992, the Florida Department of Education (FDOE) published a Request for Applications to *conduct a study and develop a comprehensive guide to planning and designing spaces and facilities which will promote "safe school" concepts and the prevention of crime and violence on school campuses.* As described by the Department, the intent of the Project *is to answer the most complex questions and issues concerning safety, crime, and violence on school campuses, suggest configurations and layouts for typical spaces and facilities, and develop design guidelines which can be used by the Office, educational facility planners, architects, and engineers to plan and design new educational facilities, and assess the safety of existing facilities in Florida's public school districts.*

Project Background

As indicated in the FDOE Request for Applications, *there is concern over the threat of serious disruption of the educational process*

and the attendant possibility of personal harm to students, faculty and staff from the presence and use of drugs and weapons and the incidence of crime and violence on school campuses. The maintenance of a safe, secure, orderly, and peaceful learning environment is essential to the educational process and general welfare of Florida's school population.

Many believe part of the problem lies with a general misunderstanding of the complexities involved and absence of the highly specialized skills needed to design safe schools.

Some have suggested that proper design and effective use of a facility can lead to a reduction in the fear and incidence of crime and violence, and to an improvement in the quality of life for students, faculty, and staff.

Project Statement

The Florida Center for Community Design + Research located on the University of South Florida's Tampa campus was contracted by the Department of Education in January 1993 to conduct the necessary

research *to confirm existing design standards, or establish new standards, and develop safe school guidelines for Florida's public schools.*

Significance of the Project

As evidenced by local and national media exposure, crime and violence in America's schools has become an ever-increasing problem over the last two decades. The rate of such media coverage has escalated during the last several years in apparent proportion to the rising rate of school related crime. For example, during the first week of May 1993, The Tampa Tribune published a series of front page articles titled *Climate of Fear* which addressed the current problem in Florida's public schools. A sample of the reported statistics relating to the one year rise in crime between the 1990/91 and 1991/92 school years is as follows: the total number of criminal offenses increased over 34%; the number of assaults grew almost 54%; robberies rose at a rate of 50%; sexual batteries increased 52%; disorderly conduct advanced almost 75%; weapons possession increased 20%; and the number of drug

incidents soared 91%.

These reports, and others, have justifiably heightened the concern of the Department of Education, district school officials, principals, teachers, students, parents, and the general public.

Scope of Project

As contracted with the Florida Department of Education, the Project consists of four (4) primary components. The first is *to collect, review, and collate existing data and literature dealing with the subject matter* and to compile a bibliography for submission to the Department.

The second *is to analyze the data and literature in order to answer the following specific questions:*

1   *Is there a rationale for mandated standards incorporating safe school concepts?*

2   *Does the data support the need for incorporating additional safe school concepts, particularly during the design phase? If yes, how?*

3   *Is safe school design being hampered because of current standards, or lack of design guidelines? How?*

4   *How will the cost of school construction be impacted if additional safe school design standards are mandated?*

5   *Do different kinds of schools and school facilities need different standards; ie, a sliding scale to accommodate different programs or locations?*

6   *What are the most common or typical types of features of safe facilities and what are good examples of each?*

7   *Are the existing standards too conservative, or traditional from the standpoint of safety, to impact current problems like gangs and school violence. If so, what should the standards be?*

8   *Should the Department of Education mandate, or enforce minimum design standards and safe school design guidelines?*

9   *Does crime data on school related crime from the Florida Department of Law Enforcement, and other sources support the need for design standards? If yes, how?*

The third component is *to reach conclusions, make recommendations, and develop planning and design guidelines which*

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will answer the intent of the Project. These guidelines are to include:

1   *Ways to incorporate natural access control of schools and campus.*

2   *Natural surveillance of school campuses.*

3   *Ways to develop and support territorial behavior in schools and on campuses.*

4   *Text and graphic recommendations and prototypical solutions to common problems.*

5   *Design guidelines which will reasonably promote the prevention of school crime and violence.*

The fourth and final component is *to recommend changes to Chapter 6A-2, Florida Administrative Code (the Uniform Building Code for Public Educational Facilities Construction) which result from the Project and which will promote and encourage safe school design concepts in education facilities.*

Limits of the Study

Relative to the Literature Survey, an early decision was made by the research team to limit the selection of reference materials to items

published since 1970. (This decision was waived in some rare cases).
In most instances these materials could be easily obtained from the
State University libraries or through inter-library loan. Others,
however, were not readily available, but could be ordered from
publishers or government agencies. Some of these materials have not
yet arrived. To date, the Bibliography has approximately 160 entries,
75% of which are annotated.

As a means to augment the review of existing publications, the
research team developed a questionnaire to gather current pertinent
data from Florida's 67 school districts. As of 12 July 1993, 46 Districts
(68%) responded to the survey. The information gathered from this
survey has been tabulated, analyzed, and incorporated into the findings
of this study. However, the statistical results of this survey are subject
to change should the other 21 districts subsequently respond. The
research team also developed a National Survey which was forwarded
to the other 49 states. As of 12 July 1993, 20 State questionnaires have
been received. Again, the statistical results of this national survey is
subject to future changes.

During the course of this study, project team members endeavored

to visit as many existing schools, and to conduct as many personal interviews as possible with local designers, district and school personnel, and law enforcement officials. These visits and interviews proved to be extremely informative and played a significant role in the development of the final work products. Unfortunately, these activities were limited by the confines of the Project schedule and budget.

CHAPTER 2: REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE

As part of the process of responding to the questions presented by the Florida Department of Education, the Florida Center undertook a survey of the available literature in the areas of school safety and security. Using the resources available through the State University System, in particular the LUIS and ERIC electronic databases, the Center was able to retrieve several hundred references in response to a variety of subject and keyword references.

Initial analysis of the database entries enabled the center to whittle down the list of potential items for procurement and review. All items that were not written in English were automatically rejected. In topic areas of broad application such as "crime prevention and environmental design," entries were rejected if they appeared too broad, *Criminal Activity in Urban Areas*; or too esoteric, *The Modification of Problem Behavior and Academic Achievement in a Resource Room*.

From the edited data base, nearly two hundred entries remained, and the research team set about procuring as many of these as could be obtained within the limited time-frame. The initial resources were the State University System libraries, in particular, the main library at the Tampa campus of the University of South Florida. Through this library,

the Center was able to order references that were available at other state universities, and was also able to access the libraries of other universities within the country. Even though universities outside the State were, on occasion, willing to provide texts through a system of inter-library loans, considerable delays were encountered. Texts ordered from non-state universities outside Florida as early as the beginning of March did not begin to arrive at the Florida Center until the beginning of June. It is surmised that these texts had been in use or on loan during the university spring semester, and were not available for shipment until the middle of May.

After initial collection, analysis and editing, over one hundred and sixty different references were identified for inclusion in the bibliography. Of these references, 120 were collected, catalogued and surveyed by the research team. The remainder have been ordered from various sources, but have not yet arrived. About half of these references have been annotated by Center staff; these are included in the Bibliography.

As noted in Chapter 1, almost all of the literature surveyed for this project was written after 1970. A survey of the literature from this

period reveals a number of specific and noteworthy trends:

1   Interest in criminal activity in schools and on school grounds has been steadily increasing. By the early 1970s, a number of studies had been done and essays written describing primarily vandalism as a fundamental (and expensive) problem in America's schools [Nielsen, 1971; American School & University 1971, 1973, 1974; Brenton, 1975; National School Public Relations Association, 1971]. Such studies increased in number after the mid-1970s [Ban & Caminillo, 1977; Bower, 1976; Casserly, 1980; Daniels, 1976; Jackson, 1976; Murillo, 1977; Pablant & Baxter, 1975; Williams & Venturini, 1981]. (Of these references, two deal specifically with schools in Florida: Bower, Vandalism in Selected Florida Schools, and Murillo, Vandalism and School Attitudes.)

Often, under the cover of vandalism, authors would include both intentional and accidental destruction of property. Thus, a person deliberately hurling a rock through a classroom window would be discussed as would a child whose errant baseball also

breaks a window.

While a number of reports attempted to quantify the costs of vandalism and other criminal activities, the estimates varied. Senator Birch Bayh was quoted in a number of texts from a 1977 presentation as stating that school vandalism was costing the United States *almost $600 million each year*. [Strobl] In 1971, Nielsen had rated school vandalism as costing approximately $200 million per year. Others in the 1970s placed the costs around $500 million per annum. Needless to say, all the literature surveyed agreed that vandalism was on the increase throughout the 1970s and 1980s.

In addition, the literature marked an increase in crime in general in and around schools, with an alarming increase in crimes such as violence, burglary, robbery, and weapons and drug possession. The report on the debate in the Committee on Education in the House of Representatives on the *Safe School Act* in 1973 presents a staggering litany of violence, in particularly bombings, occurring in schools across the country in 1971-72. [US House of Representatives, 1973] Nearly all of the literature

agrees that criminal activity in schools has <u>increased</u> over the past twenty years, and that it is a problem both because of the <u>monetary costs</u> it incurs, and because of the <u>danger</u> to human life that it presents.

2   The <u>type</u> of criminal activity within schools has been changing and increasing over the past twenty years, and criminal activity is being found in even the lowest grades of schools, perpetrated both by outsiders and by school children themselves. The above-referenced House Committee hearing from 1973 contains eye-opening references to criminal behavior at all levels of schools. By 1986, the National Institute for Citizen Education in the Law and the National Crime Prevention Council saw fit to produce a textbook --<u>Teens, Crime, and the Community</u>-- intended for use in secondary schools as a means of informing teenagers *about ways that they can make themselves, their families, their friends, and their communities safer.* [National Institute for Citizen Education in the Law, 1986]

3   Attributed causes for this increase in criminal activity vary

widely. Some people in the 1970s stated that they didn't believe

that there was any problem with violence and crime in schools;

the perception of crime had been fabricated by the media, they

felt [American School Board Journal, January 1975]. Others

attributed the increase of crime and safety issues to the

deterioration of the family, the loss of community ties, violence on

television, drugs, access to guns, knives and other weapons, and

the lack of discipline in schools.

Obviously, each of these issues has some role in the overall

increase in criminal activity, but no one factor can clearly be seen

as paramount. Then too, the type of criminal activity will vary

with the location of the schools; inner city schools suffer both

from more criminal activity than do their rural counterparts, and

from crime of a different nature; violent crime is highest in inner

city schools and lowest in rural schools.

4   Recommendations for what to do about increased criminal

activity and issues of safety and security abound, but do not vary

all that widely. Typically, these recommendations fall into a range of approaches: design, equipment, programmatic, personnel.

a   Possibly because safety and security issues typically occur in schools that are already built, design approaches are under-represented in the literature on the general area of school safety and security. Design approaches call for the re-design of particular attributes of schools in order to prevent criminal activity even before it can begin. John Zeisel, who was one of the first to systematically study school architecture and its relation to vandalism isolated five key aspects of school design: access to roofs, entranceways, predictably rough play areas, the damageability of walls, and the damageability of ground materials. [Education Facilities Laboratories, 1974]

Design approaches are fundamental to the CPTED principles (Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design) which were developed in the middle of the 1970s and are now beginning to become reasonably well known

throughout the country (although questionnaires indicate that not all the school districts in the State of Florida are fully aware of CPTED principles. Timothy Crowe is the author who has written most extensively about the application of CPTED principles to the design and/or re-design of school facilities. Crowe attempts to chart the relationship between educational theories and their resulting school designs and the incidence of criminal activity within the schools. He discusses three major movements in school design since the 1950s. Traditional design emphasized the use of classrooms, whereas later school designs evolved around the idea of *departments* organized by discipline. More recently, the "open classroom" concept did away with walls entirely. Crowe describes the effects of each of these educational approaches on safety and security, and elaborates in great detail on some specific problem areas: poorly defined campus borders; undifferentiated campus areas; isolated areas; poorly located bus loading areas; poorly designed

parking lots and landscaping; isolation of lockers and locker rooms; blind spots in corridors; isolated restrooms. [Crowe, School Safety 1990; Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design, 1991; CPTED Broward County School Demonstration.]

Strobl [1978] devotes only a small portion of his book to crime prevention in schools, and his major emphasis is on hardware, but he, too, emphasizes the importance of *facility design* in the effort to prevent crime and reduce property loss. Ironically, while he agrees with Crowe and others on the areas of concern, some of his recommendations are antithetical to those suggested elsewhere. The locating of schools, in particular, is a point of disagreement. Some experts recommend enhancing the integration of a school with its community, in order to increase the sense of community ownership and utility [Williams & Venturini; Pink & Kapel]. Strobl recommends isolating the school from its surroundings, particularly if the *psychological outlook* and *economic status* of the

neighborhood seem to indicate a greater propensity for criminal activity.

Gleason & Wilson [1989] have written a readable, well-illustrated pamphlet on CPTED, intended primarily for a residential audience in Australia, but with ideas which can be directly translated to broader applications.

b   Enhanced safety and security equipment is recommended for some types of criminal and security problems. Such equipment includes alarms, locks and door hardware, screens and bars for windows, security cages for items like vending machines and other appliances stored in public areas, mirrors and one-way mirror glass, and even videotape cameras for particularly high crime areas. Strobl [1978] presents detailed listings of hardware and equipment that he feels must be utilized in schools to help make them crime and vandal proof. Crowe, too, includes lists of equipment and hardware, although his main focus is on the creation of *territoriality* within the school

complexes.

c   Programmatic responses to crime and security include the re-scheduling of events so as to prevent opportunities for criminal activities to occur, and even the prohibition of certain types of activities. Some of the literature [Williams & Venturini; Pink & Kapel] recommends that security could be enhanced if the relationship between schools and their communities was strengthened: schools were set closer into residential neighborhoods and schools were used to host a range of civic activities. Others [Strobl], however, present the opposite advice, advocating that schools be isolated from their environs by a variety of fences and obstacles and that they be closed to non-school activities, especially after the sun goes down.

d   Personnel can be added or hired to help enhance security within the schools. Primary among schools in

Florida is the use of a School Resource Officer, a regulation

policeman or policewoman assigned to the school as their

tour of duty. Other schools are hiring security guards,

night watchmen or other staff members to help prevent

increased incidence of crime.

Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design (CPTED)

A burgeoning field of literature is emerging in the area of Crime

Prevention Through Environmental Design. To date, however, only a

small percentage of the available materials are directed solely, or even

primarily, towards school design. In many instances, elements can be

rather easily translated from one context for use in school design and re-

design.

As described by Gleason and Wilson [1989], environmental crime

prevention emerged in the 1960s with Jane Jacob's The Death and Life

of Great American Cities (1961) and Elizabeth Wood's Social Aspects of

Housing in Urban Development (1967). Jacob's book was the first

influential work to suggest that active streetlife could cut down

opportunities for crime."

The first attempt at codifying the principles of crime prevention through design came in 1971 with C. Ray Jeffery's book <u>Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design</u>, in which the author suggested that *urban design*, including the design of streets and highways, parks and plazas, depots and terminals, could help prevent crime by reducing the *opportunities* for criminal activity.

Oscar Newman's work <u>Defensible Space</u> (1972) went so far as to establish "rules" for environmental crime prevention. Three critical components of his approach included: territoriality, natural surveillance, and image and milieu. The first two of these concepts can find application in the design of schools.

Newman's concept of *territoriality* assumed that the owners or occupants of a particular space will work to *mark* their space as theirs, and will seek ways of dissuading outsiders from entering their realm. Occupants were most happy, he felt, and safest, in an environment where the transitions between public, semi-public, semi-private, and private spaces were well marked and clearly defined.

Natural surveillance allows the owners or occupants of a space to

see what is going on around them without having to go through a great deal of effort. And, Newman stressed, it is not enough to have one or two pairs of *eyes on the street*. The majority of occupants or users of a space should be able to easily survey their surroundings, especially the more public areas.

By the 1980s, faced with increasing crime and security concerns, designers were looking to integrate passive design features with more active forms of crime prevention. This included the addition of specialized personnel to help maintain a safe environment, and the use of specialized programming to ensure safety.

Initial Conclusions

Despite the abundance of literature available on the subject of safe school design, as yet, there appears to be no one seminal text which addresses the subject in a holistic manner. As noted above, many states and jurisdictions have attempted to put together their own preliminary guidelines and standards for insuring school safety. In many instances, these appear as police-department checklists that are used after to

design and construction of the building. To date, no materials have been surveyed in which a clearly stated and clearly illustrated set of architectural design guidelines have been adopted by a jurisdiction for the design of its school facilities. This is clearly an area of need, and one in which the Florida Department of Education may assume a leading role.

CHAPTER 3: METHODOLOGY

Introduction

In January 1993, the Florida Department of Education awarded this Project to the Florida Center for Community Design + Research located at the University of South Florida in Tampa. The Center's research team has been headed by two full-time members of USF's graduate architecture faculty who served as co-principal investigators. The team also included a project manager, administrative assistant, a technical advisor/assistant, and numerous architecture students who served as graduate research assistants in varying capacities.

Definition of Terms

The term *Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design* and the acronym *CPTED* are used to mean a series of site and building design strategies and principles used to prevent or reduce incidents of criminal activity.

The acronyms and terms *FDOE*, *DOE*, *the Department*, and *the Office* are used interchangeably in this document to mean the State of

Florida Department of Education.

The terms *vandalism, burglary, assault & battery, arson, theft, robbery, drug possession & use*, and *alcohol use* are used with their full legal meaning and are further defined in Chapter 4. The additional terms *sexual battery, rape, kidnapping, bomb threats*, and *gang violence*, though not specifically defined in this report, are also intended to bear their full legal interpretations.

The terms *Uniform Building Code* and *the Code*, and the acronym *UBC* are intended to mean the Uniform Building Code for Public Education Facilities Construction as contained in Chapter 6A-2 of the Florida Administrative Code.

Data Collection

Upon contract award, the Florida Center for Community Design + Research began a state-wide bibliographic search for existing information on the subject and scheduled interviews with local school board officials.

Using both LUIS (the State of Florida University System) library

database and ERIC (Educational Resources Information Center) the Florida Center quickly produced a list of several hundred potentially relevant articles, books and other written references.

In some cases, these materials could be easily obtained, usually from one of the State University libraries. In other instances, materials were not readily available, but could be ordered from publishers or from government agencies.

Many of the materials collected contained additional bibliographic references. In each instance, these were copied and analyzed for relevance to the Project. If titles from these secondary sources were deemed of interest, they too were sought out, either through the State University library system, state agencies or publishers.

A decision was made relatively early on to limit the selection of reference materials to items published since 1970. In some instances, this rule was waived, but even the initial literature evaluation seemed to indicate that the early 1970s was when the first signs of problems with school safety and security became widespread. States such as Illinois, California and New York had done studies of school safety and security even prior to 1970, and in the 1970s, other states including

Oregon began doing studies in these areas; Connecticut and Virginia, and the city of Tucson conducted major school safety studies in the 1980s.

Nearly all of the studies conducted after 1980 and the literature written after that date reference the *Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design* or *CPTED* principles. First mentioned as a concept by Jane Jacobs in her 1960 text <u>The Death and Life of Great American Cities</u>, the CPTED principles were developed and codified in the 1970s by C. Ray Jeffery, and presented in his work <u>Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design</u>. Jeffery's work complemented the pioneering work of Oscar Newman who researched the relationship between people and the built environment. In particular, Newman looked at ways that the built environment can add to or detract from the potential for criminal behavior. Newman's early studies (which were published in 1972 as the book <u>Defensible Space</u>) focussed on high-rise housing projects in New York City, but by the end of the decade, his and Jeffery's ideas were being studied and applied to a wide range of environments.

In conjunction with the literature research, the Center began to

maintain an illustration file of pertinent published graphic illustrations. (This file was subsequently augmented by diagrams, sketches, and photographs from visits of existing school sites in the Tampa Bay area).

During the early stage of the literature review, the Center's research team began to devise a questionnaire that would be used to elicit information on safety and security from the 67 school districts within the State of Florida. Working from law texts, and with assistance from members of the Hillsborough County School District, the Center defined and described the various instances of criminal activity that could occur on a school campus. From this, the Center drew up a 16 page, 62 question survey questionnaire. Drafts of this were forwarded to the Florida Department of Education for approval in early March, and the first copies were mailed out to the school districts in mid-April 1993.

A second, more general questionnaire was also developed to be sent to the Departments of Education within each of the other 49 states. While these questions were of a more general nature, it was intended that the answers would provide information as to Florida's position within the nation, and would illustrate specific issues that were more

or less relevant to safety and security within public schools. For instance, did state location (northeastern vs southwestern) have any influence on incidence of crime? Did the over-riding character of the state (rural or urban) influence incidence of criminal activity?

As the earliest literature was being scanned and highlighted by the team, applications and examples for the design guidelines were clipped and filed. In several instances, materials were obtained from other jurisdictions (Virginia, Connecticut, Maryland, the city of Tucson) which presented rudimentary examples of such design guidelines. While all of these guides were relevant, none made the clear, broad-reaching presentation of design standards and guidelines that the Center envisioned as part of it's final product.

In addition to the other activities, the team analyzed the current Florida Administrative Code for possible changes to existing school design regulations as presented in Chapter 6A-2: the Uniform Building Code (UBC) for Public Educational Facilities Construction. This analysis would be used after developing the design guidelines and analyzing the survey results in order to respond directly to the specific questions posed by the Department of Education in their Request for

Applications.

The first of the questionnaires were returned at the end of April, with 32 (or 48%) of the surveys returned, before or around the deadline of 17 May 1993. While one or two questions from the surveys proved to be somewhat ambiguous to different readers, the majority of the respondents took the time and effort to fill out all of the required information and answers. As the questionnaires came back to the Center, the information was entered into a computerized database set up specifically for this Project.

In addition to the literature search and the questionnaires, Center personnel visited a number of Tampa Bay area schools to meet with teachers and administrators and to witness first hand both good and bad points about school security. All three types of schools were visited: elementary, middle and secondary. Schools were selected based on age (newer and older), size (small or large), and the school districts initial reports on the level of safety and security issues (schools that were very well designed and those that had the reputation as security risks).

While at these schools, the team met with and interviewed key personnel, toured the interiors and exteriors of the facilities, took

photographs and made sketches of conditions that were described as either exemplary or negative.

These visits and interviews were complimented by discussions with local design professionals, experienced in the design of education facilities, and law enforcement officials.

By the end of May 1993, several dozen design areas had been isolated, and guidelines were being developed for each area. A variety of systems for categorizing the guidelines were tried before selecting the method that is included in this document. Because it was explained in the contract that the design guidelines would be distributed to architects, facilities planners and school administrators, the section presenting the Guidelines was developed to stand on its own, separate from the rest of the project report.

By 12 July 1993, 46 (68%) of the School Districts had responded to the School District Survey, and 20 (40%) of the States had responded to the nationwide survey. All of these responses are reported in the survey analysis and conclusions.

Data Manipulations

As previously indicated, received survey results from the Florida District Questionnaire and the National Questionnaire were entered into a data base. This information was then analyzed, extracted, and placed into LOTUS 1-2-3 work sheets. This data was then mathematically totaled or averaged depending upon the nature of the information. For example, the reported number of criminal incidents, their locations, the time of day, etc. were totaled, while the percent (%) of change in the number of reported incidents was averaged. The overall statistical results are reported in Chapter 4, and the Florida District and National Survey worksheets are bound in Appendix C and Appendix E.

CHAPTER 4: SURVEY RESULTS

Section 4A: State of Florida District Questionnaire

Introduction

In mid-April 1993, the Florida Center for Community Design + Research sent a questionnaire to the Office of the Superintendent of the 67 public school districts in the state of Florida. (A copy of this questionnaire is contained in Appendix B.) The purpose of this inquiry was to assist the Florida Center in analyzing and reporting to the Florida State Department of Education issues of safety and security as they relate to the design of safe schools.

As of 12 July 1993, completed questionnaires had been received from 46 school districts, or 68% or the survey sample. These districts represent 227 senior high schools, 302 middle/junior high schools, 1055 elementary schools, and 188 other educational facilities. These 1772 facilities accommodate a current overall student population of approximately 1.3 million students.

The questionnaire consists of 62 questions seeking data regarding existing types and sizes educational facilities within each district. The questionnaire also contains a criminal activity survey, and presents

questions relating to crime prevention and the principles of Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design, or CPTED.

The overall findings of the survey are described below; complete detailed results are located in Appendix C.

PART I: Existing Facilities

The objectives of Question Nos. 1-7 were to obtain an overview of the existing educational facilities within each district; to determine existing district preferences, if any, relative to security and safety; and to ascertain the extent of public access to the facilities within each district.

Question No. 1 related to the number of elementary, junior high/middle, and senior high schools represented. The breakdown of the 1772 total facilities from the 46 districts responding has been previously shown.

Question No. 2 asked for the size, expressed in student population, of each school. Of the 1772 total schools represented, **22%** are classified as **small** with 300-500 students, **52%** as **medium** with

500-1,000 students, **18%** as **large** with 1,000-1,500 students, and **8%** as **very large** with 1,500 and more students.

Question No. 3 asked for a general descriptive classification of each facility based upon its location. Of the 1772 facilities, **7%** are listed as **downtown** schools, **42%** as **city**, **40%** as **suburban**, and **11%** as **rural**.

Question No. 4: *Of all the schools in your district, which is the preferred general layout of the building(s) relative to providing optimum security: A single 2 or more story building; multiple 2 or more story buildings; a 1-story centrally organized group of buildings; or a 1-story spread-out "campus plan".* Of the districts responding, **71%** preferred the **1-story centrally organized group** configuration, **16%** the **1-story open-campus plan**; **11%** the **single multi-story building**; and **2%** the **multiple buildings with 2 or more stories.**

As a follow-up to the Question No. 4, Question No. 5 asked: *Which primary circulation system is preferred: interior corridor, exterior corridor, or both?* The survey revealed nearly a **2:1** ratio in preference of the **interior corridor** circulation type (65% favored interior corridor, 35% favored exterior corridor).

Question No. 6: *How many of the schools (within each district) allow for public access of recreational facilities after school hours?* Of the 1772 facilities, the survey revealed that 1042 educational facilities, or **59%** provide some degree of after hour **public access**.

As a point of interest, the response to Question No. 7 revealed that the 46 districts responding currently use **12,819 portable classroom units**.

PART II: Criminal Activity Survey

Question Nos. 8-48 were divided into eight (8) headings: Vandalism, Burglary, Assault and Battery, Arson, Theft, Robbery, Drug Possession & Use, and Alcohol Use. The purpose of these questions was to determine the **number of reported incidents** of each type of offense over the past two (2) years; **where** on the campus the majority of events took place; the **time of day** they predominantly occurred, and whether there had been an increase, decrease, or no significant **change** in the number of incidents over the previous ten (10) years.

Vandalism

Under the category **Vandalism**, defined as *the willful or ignorant destruction of property*, the survey indicated the following:

a   A total of **15,205 incidents of vandalism** were reported within the 46 districts over the past two (2) years.

b   The five (5) most frequently reported locations for vandalism, listed in descending order, were: classrooms, toilet rooms, hallways, locker rooms, and outdoor gathering areas.

c   As indicated in the survey, 82% of the incidents transpired during the evenings, 10% during the school day, and the remaining 8% immediately after school.

d   Of the 46 reporting school districts, 14 districts, or **30% reported a significant increase in vandalism** during the previous ten (10) years, 12 reported a significant decrease, 14 indicated no significant change, and 5 did not provide a response.

Burglary

Under the category **Burglary**, defined as *the entering a building or occupied structure, or separately secured or occupied portion thereof,*

with purpose to commit a crime therein, the survey indicated the following:

a A total of **5,688 incidents of burglary** were reported within the 46 districts over the past two (2) years.

b The five (5) most frequently reported locations for burglary, listed in descending order, were: classrooms, other areas - administrative offices, cafeterias, locker rooms, and parking lots.

c As indicated in the survey, 91% of the incidents transpired during the evening hours.

d Of the 46 reporting school districts, 15 districts, or **33% reported a significant increase in burglary** during the previous ten (10) years, 9 reported a significant decrease, 17 indicated no significant change, and 4 did not provided a response.

Assault & Battery

 Under the category **Assault & Battery**, defined as *the unlawful touching of another which is without justification or excuse*, the survey indicated the following:

a A total of **29,581 incidents of assault & battery** were reported

within the 46 districts over the past two (2) years.

b   The five (5) most frequently reported locations for assault &

battery, listed in descending order, were: hallways, classrooms,

outdoor gathering areas, cafeterias, and playgrounds.

c   The large majority of the incidents transpired during school hours

followed by those immediately after school.

d   Of the 46 reporting school districts, 19 districts, or **41% reported**

a significant increase in assault & battery during the

previous ten (10) years, 4 reported a significant decrease, 9

indicated no significant change, and 13 did not provide a

response.

Arson

Under the category **Arson**, defined as *the act of starting a fire or*

causing an explosion with the intent to destroy a building or occupied

structure, the survey indicated the following:

a   A total of **397 incidents** of arson were reported within the 46

districts over the past two (2) years.

b   The five (5) most frequently reported locations for arson, listed

in descending order, were: toilet rooms, classrooms, laboratories, outdoor gatherings areas, and hallways.

c   The survey indicates that the vast majority of the incidents transpired during school hours followed by evenings.

d   Of the 46 reporting school districts, 6 districts, or **13% reported a significant increase in arson** during the previous ten (10) years, 5 reported a significant decrease, and 34 indicated no significant change.

Theft

Under the category **Theft**, defined as *the taking of property without the owner's consent*, the survey indicated the following:

a   A total of **12,347 incidents of theft** were reported within the 46 districts over the past two (2) years.

b   The five (5) most frequently reported locations for theft, listed in descending order, were: classrooms, locker rooms, gymnasiums, other areas, and hallways.

c   As indicated in the survey, approximately 65% of the incidents transpired during the school day with the remaining during the

evening hours.

d   Of the 46 reporting school districts, 16 districts, or **35% reported a significant increase in theft** during the previous ten (10) years, 3 reported a significant decrease, 11 indicated no significant change, and 17 did not provide a response.

Robbery

Under the category **Robbery**, defined as *the felonious taking of money*, personal property, or any other article of value, in the possession of another, from his person or immediate fear, and against his will and accomplished by means of force or fear, the survey indicated the following:

a   A total of **1,111 incidents of robbery** were reported within the 46 districts over the past two (2) years.

b   The five (5) most frequently reported locations for robbery, listed in descending order, were: hallways, parking lots, playgrounds, classrooms, and toilet rooms.

c   As indicated in the survey, 88% of the incidents transpired during the school day with the remainder transpiring at all other times.

d   Of the 46 reporting school districts, 10 districts, **22% reported a significant increase in robbery** during the previous ten (10) years, 0 or none, reported a significant decrease, and 29 indicated no significant change.

Drug Possession & Use

Under the category **Drug Possession & Use**, the survey indicated the following:

a   A total of **1,855 incidents of drug possession & use** were reported within the 46 districts over the past two (2) years.

b   The five (5) most frequently reported locations for drug possession & use, listed in descending order, were: toilet rooms, parking lots, outdoor gatherings areas, hallways, and locker rooms.

c   The vast majority of the incidents transpired during school hours with some incidents immediately prior to and following the class day.

d   Of the 46 reporting school districts, 13 districts, or **28% reported a significant increase in drug possession & use** during the previous ten (10) years, 8 reported a significant decrease, 7

indicated no significant change, and 18 did not provide a response.

Alcohol Use

Under the category **Alcohol Use**, the survey indicated the following:

a   A total of **922 incidents of alcohol use** were reported within the 46 districts over the past two (2) years.

b   The five (5) most frequently reported locations for alcohol use, listed in descending order, were: parking lots, toilet rooms, outdoor gathering areas, locker rooms, and hallways.

c   According to the survey, approximately 42% of the incidents transpired during the school day with the remaining incidents evenly spread between mornings, late afternoons and evenings.

d   Of the 46 reporting school districts, 15 districts, or **33% reported a significant increase in alcohol use** during the previous ten (10) years, 3 reported a significant decrease, 13 indicated no significant change, and 15 did not provide a response.

Other Criminal Activity

Under the general heading **Other Criminal Activity**, Question Nos. 49-53 sought responses on a variety of safety issues.

Question No. 49: *How many reported incidents of weapons possession have occurred in your school district over the last 2 years?* The 46 respondent districts reported **3,541 incidents of weapons possession**.

Question No. 50: *What are the most common weapons and where are they found?* The survey results from the 46 districts indicated that **knives** were the most common weapon with **38 citations**, followed by **guns** with **16 citations**, and **razors** with **2 citations** and **brass knuckles** with **1 citation**. Weapons were found in bookbags, purses, lockers, and on the person.

Question No. 51: *How many reported bomb threats have occurred in your school district over the past two years?* The 46 respondent school districts reported **279 incidents of bomb threats**.

Question No. 52: *What procedures are implemented in the event of a bomb threat?* All reporting school districts indicated a procedure involving **evacuation** and notification to legal authorities.

Question No. 53 was a general inquiry relative to the problem of trespassing on school grounds. Of the 46 reporting school districts, 24 districts, or **52% reported a significant problem with trespassing** while 15 (48%) indicated that trespassing was not a problem. Of the positive reports, the most often cited offenders, in descending order, were former or suspended students, students from other schools, and non-students.

Question No. 54: *What other criminal activities have you experienced in your school district over the past 2 years?* Of the 46 school districts responding, 21 districts, or **46% reported problems with other criminal activities**. The most common problems, in descending order of the number of citations, were: **group or gang violence, rape, sexual battery,** and **kidnapping** or missing person. The other 19 school districts listed "none" or did not respond.

As a follow up to the previous questions, Question No. 55 asked: *How are the above mentioned criminal acts reported?* Of the 46 surveys received, **20 indicated a reporting procedure to the School Resource Officer or local law enforcement, 6 answered N/A,** and the remaining **18 did not give a response to the question.**

PART III: Crime Prevention and CPTED

Question Nos. 56-62 were a series of general inquiries regarding the overall level of criminal activity within each school district, the district's response to this activity, and its knowledge of, and interest in, Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design (CPTED).

Question No. 56a: *What is the public perception of safety and security within your school district?* Of the 46 responding school districts, 12 districts, or **26% indicated a negative response** with such comments as "unsafe," "concerned," "need more security," and "need more improvement"; 29 districts, **63% indicated a positive response** with such comments as "excellent," "good," "average," and "safe"; and the remaining 5 districts did not know or did not respond to the question.

As a follow-up, Question No. 56b asked: *Has there been an increase in overall "incidents" in your schools over the past 2 years?* Of the 46 respondent school districts, 26 districts, or **57% answered "yes"**; 13 districts, or **28% answered "no"**; and the remaining 15% **did not give an answer**.

As a further follow-up, Question 56c asked: *In descending order*

rank the five most critical safety/security issues within your district from the list provided. As reported by the 46 districts, the 5 most critical issues, in descending order by the number of citations, were: **vandalism**; **drug possession and use**; **assault and battery**; **weapons possession**; and **theft**.

Question No. 57: *Do you have assigned on-site security supervisors or police officers? Do you participate in the School Resource Officer program?* Of the 46 surveys received, 36 school districts, or **78% answered "no"** while 10 districts, or **22** to having assigned on-site security or police officers. Thirty-eight districts or **83% answered "yes"** to having security officers while 7 districts do not.

Question No. 58: *Do you have written regulations regarding access and control after school hours?* Of the 46 respondent districts, 4 districts, or **10% answered "yes"**; 11 districts, or **24% indicated that regulations were subject to individual school administration**; 21 districts, or **46% answered "no"**; and the remaining 9 districts, or **20% did not respond to the question**.

Question No. 59a: *What other specific safety/security measures or programs has your school district implemented?* Of the 46 responding

districts 8 did not indicate an answer. The 5 most common safety/security measures implemented cited in the 38 positive responses, in descending order, are: **alarms systems, resident security, visitor sign-in/badges, fencing**, and **video surveillance**. Other citations included exterior lighting, metal detectors, and searches for weapons and drugs.

As a follow-up to the previous question, Question No. 59b asked: *Who organized them? Runs them? Pays for them?* Of the 28 responses from the 46 districts, 21 indicated that safety and security measures are organized at the district level, 6 at the individual school level, and 1 by local law enforcement/parents. The survey indicates that almost all of the districts assume responsibility for the operation of their respective programs, and that necessary funds are from school board budgets.

As a further follow-up, Question No. 59c asked: *Have these programs been successful?* Of the 28 answers given 27, or **96% answered "yes"** with varying degrees of success while only 1 district, or **4% answered "no"**.

Question No. 60: *What are the most critical areas of school design with respect to safety and security. In descending order, rank the top five*

from the list below. Of the 46 responding districts, 6 did not answer the question. Information received from the other 40 districts indicate the 5 most critical areas of school design, in descending order by number of citations, to be: **enclosure of school property perimeter**; **minimizing niches, alcoves and other residual spaces**; **alarm systems**; **visual surveillance in corridors**; and **exterior lighting**.

Question No. 61a: *Are you familiar with Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design (CPTED) concepts and procedures? If so, where did you learn about them?* Of the 46 respondent school districts, 11 districts, or **24% answered "yes"** while 34 districts, or **76% answered "no."**

As a follow-up to the previous question, Question No. 61b asked: *What is your opinion of them?* Of the **11 school districts** that indicated a familiarity with CPTED 6 districts, or **55% indicated a positive opinion**; 3 districts, or **27% indicated advantages and disadvantages**; 1 district, or **9% indicated a negative opinion** and the two remaining districts did not provide a response.

As a further follow-up, Question No. 61c asked: *Have you initiated policies or measures that incorporate CPTED principles?* Of the

11 school districts that indicated a familiarity with CPTED 6 districts, or **55% answered "yes"** and the other 5 districts, or **45% answered "no."**

As a final follow-up, Question No. 61d asked: *Would you be interested in learning more about CPTED principles?* Of the 46 surveys received, 19 school districts, or **41% answered "yes"** while the remaining 27 districts, or **59% answered "no" or did not respond to the question.**

Question No. 62: *If funding were available, what single policy or procedure would you implement to reduce crime and increase safety and security within your district?* Of the 46 responding districts, 8 did not answer the question. Survey results from the other 36 districts indicate the 6 most needed measures to reduce crime and increase security, in describing order by number of citations, are: **alarm systems; more S.R.O.; fencing; video surveillance; after hours security personnel;** and **exterior lighting**.

The questionnaire concluded with a blank sheet and asked for any **Additional Comments**. No additional comments were provided by any of the 46 responding school districts.

Section 4B: National Survey Questionnaire:

At the same time as the questionnaires were distributed to the 67 Florida School Districts, the Florida Center sent a general questionnaire to the Boards of Education in the 47 other continental United States. The Center designed this survey to provide general information about issues of safety and security in schools in other states, and to find out how widespread was information on CPTED principles and applications.

As of 12 July 1993, 20 of the 47 states had responded to the survey, for a return rate of 40%. One state (Wyoming) responded to the questionnaire with a letter stating that "we do not have this information on file, nor do we have the staff available to do special research for such surveys or questionnaires." The other 19 respondents provided at least partial information for most of the questions.

Question No. 1 simply asked for statistical information on the number and type of schools in each state. Four categories were listed: elementry level; middle/junior high school level; high school level; other (please specify). One state simply indicated that it did, indeed, have all of these types of schools. Another state indicated the response in +/-

terms. The 17 remaining schools accounted for **23,572 elementary schools**, approximately **7,911 middle schools**, approximately **5,745 high schools**, and **1,948 other** types of schools. Primarily, these "other" schools included vocational schools, adult education facilities and various "special schools."

Question No. 2: *Of all the schools in your state, which is the preferred general layout of the building(s) relative to providing optimum security?*

Of the 19 respondents, three indicated no preference. Twelve (12) of the 16 remaining respondents (75%) selected **one-story centrally organized group of buildings**; one respondent selected this category for elementary and middle schools, and a separate category for high schools. Three (3) of the 16 (19%) selected **one two (or more) story building** as their preferred building layout. One state (6%) selected **one-story campus plan** as the preferred building layout for safety and security.

Question No. 3: *Which primary circulation system in preferred?*

One of the 19 respondents indicated no preference. Of the remaining 18 states responding, sevevteen (17) indicated a preference for **interior**

corridor; this comes to 94% of the respondents. One state (Texas) indicated that 95% of the time, interior corridor was preferred; in 5% of the cases, exterior corridor was preferable. Only one state unequivocally stated that **exterior corridor** circulation was the preferred system.

Question No. 4 *What is the public perception of safety and security within your schools?* A wide variety of responses were given. Three states (17%) did not respond. Of the sixteen responding states, ten (10) indicated that the general perception was that **schools are generally safe** places to be (56%). Two states announced, unequivocally, that perceptions were **troubled** or **very concerned** (11%). Three states (3) felt that perceptions **varied across the state**; generally, things were perceived to be worse in **urban** and **metropolitan** areas (17%).

Question No. 5 asked the states to rank the five most critical safety and security issues found within schools. Fourteen states elected to answer. The number of responese for each item is indicated at left.

    13   Vandalism
    11   Drug possession/use
    10   Alcohol use
    07   Burglary
    07   Weapons possession

06   Trespassing
05   Assault
04   Theft
03   Group violence
01   Arson
01   Rape
00   Homicide
00   Kidnapping
00   Other

Question No. 6: *What are the most critical areas of school design with respect to safety and security? In descending order, rank the top five from the list below.* Fourteen states elected to answer. The number of responses for each item is indicated at left.

13   Visual surveillance in interior & exterior corridors
11   Exterior lighting
10   Minimizing niches, alcoves and other residual spaces
08   Interior lighting
07   Alarm systems
05   Miscellaneous openings and out buildings
05   Exterior door design
04   Maintaining visual surveillance from the street
03   Enclosure of school property perimeter
02   Landscaping
01   Control of key cabinet
00   Location of electrical panels
00   Window design

Question No. 7 asked: *Are you familiar with Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design (CPTED) concepts and procedures. If so,*

where did you learn about them? Of the 19 responses, only 2 states, or

10% said yes, while 15 states, or 79% said no. The remaining 2 states

did not answer. Both the states that responded positively, Missouri

and South Carolina, credited their familiarity with CPTED to the

National School Safety Center.

Question No. 8 solicited their opinion of CPTED concepts and

procedures. Of the 19 respondent states, 15 did not offer an opinion.

The 4 opinion that were given were: *it is a very important subject that*

needs to be addressed; *in terms of setting positive school climate and*

attitude they are good; concept sounds excellent; and, *they are a requisite*

part of a complete school safety regulation program.

In response to Question No. 9, *Have you instituted policies or*

measures that incorporate CPTED principles?, only the state of South

Carolina has instituted CPTED policies and procedures. The remaining

95% have not.

Question No. 10 asked: *Would you be interested in learning more*

about CPTED principles? Fourteen of the responding states, or **78%**

answered yes. The others did not indicate.

Finally, Question No. 11 asked: *If funding were available, what*

single policy or procedure would you implement to reduce crime and increase safety and security within your schools? Six states elected not to answer the question. Of the thirteen that did, the addition of **alarm systems** was cited four times, additional **security personnel** was mention twice, and one state wanted **24 hour video surveillance**. Other answers included: more **public education**, development of a student jury system with **parental involvement**, more **drug prevention** programs, and **communication** capability between offices and all teaching stations.

CHAPTER 5: SUMMARY & CONCLUSIONS

Section 5A: Summary

The issue of safety and security in Florida's elementary, middle, and secondary schools is of growing importance. Crime and criminal activities have been increasing steadily over the past years, and the nature of these crimes has been getting more violent. In every way possible, aspects of the principles of Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design (CPTED) should be incorporated into the design and management of new schools, and the design evaluation and/or re-design of existing schools. Some principles (the width and organization of corridors, for example) can clearly only be incorporated during the design phase of a new structure. Others, however, can be incorporated into existing facilities without too much difficulty (increasing the illumination along corridors and in stairways).

The CPTED Guidelines included in this document represent a first, comprehensive look at developing crime prevention strategies for Florida's schools. Clearly, over time, these guidelines should be tested,

evaluated and amended as necessary. Some guidelines, undoubtedly, will prove to be less helpful than others. Some, however, will prove to be vital to the design of safer and more secure school environments. These should be preserved and formally accepted into the mandates of Chapter 6A-2 of the Florida Administrative Code.

The Florida Center's analysis of the extant 6A-2 regulations revealed a number of areas where substantive changes can be made to enhance and strengthen the capacity of the Code to ensure school safety and security. These are described in this document. As with the CPTED Guidelines, some of these recommended changes can be implemented with relatively little difficulty or cost, in existing and un-built schools (increased lighting levels, for instance). Other recommendations --hallway widths, for example-- can only be implemented in new structures, and will undoubtedly add to the costs of these buildings. Analysis of the costs and benefits of these decisions was beyond the scope of this project; however, such an analysis clearly needs to be done.

Several areas for further study are indicated. In a number of ways, the CPTED recommendations and/or concerns for security and safety will create additional expense for school design and construction. As mentioned above, a cost/benefit analysis must be done in order to

clearly assess the value of each recommendation.

The recommendations or guidelines presented in these documents do not fully take into account various theories of educational practice. Changing ideals for how and where education should take place will clearly mandate changes in the form and operation of the schools of the future; they are already changing some of the more progressive schools throughout the country. In a very simple example, many school theorists are recommending increased use of windows to admit natural daylight and views into classrooms. Increased glazing, however, is regarded as a liability by many concerned with safety and security. In such instances, a clear conflict has developed between what is considered good educational practice and what is considered necessary for security. This entire topic --the relation between educational concerns and concerns for safety-- is sure to be of greater and greater concern over time, and deserves considerable study in its own right. This document, with its CPTED Guidelines, represents a strong starting point for the development of such a study.

Changes in educational technologies are affecting both the design and use of today's schools, and to a large degree, these changes could

only be addressed indirectly by the recommended CPTED Guidelines. The use of electronic communications equipment is clearly on the increase in today's classrooms, with a corresponding potential for vandalism, theft and destruction. Clearly, the classrooms of the future will be somewhat different than the classrooms of today, in part based on the addition of new technologies, and the impact of these technologies on the recommendations made by the enclosed Guidelines needs to be studied.

In summary, it appears that all three of the factors described above need to be studied as a unity: concerns for safety and security; differing theories of how education should or can best occur; the introduction of new educational technologies. Each of these three factors, alone, has considerable implications for the design, use and cost of tomorrow's schools. To successfully begin to design and build these schools, all three factors must be evaluated together, and analyzed, together, for their potential costs and potential benefits.

Section 5B: Response to Questions

In the October 1992 Request for Applications published by the Department of Education, the Applicant, as part of the study, was to **respond to nine (9) research questions** posed by the Department. They are:

1   *Is there a rationale for mandated standards incorporating safe school concepts?*

The large number of criminal incidents reported by the 46 school districts that responded to the survey indicates that safety is, indeed, a critical issue in Florida's schools. There is definitely a rationale, therefore, for mandating some sort of **positive action** towards countering increased criminal activity.

2   *Does the data support the need for incorporating additional safe school concepts, particularly during the design phase?*

Yes it does. While it is unlikely that any number of design changes will, alone, eradicate one or more areas of criminal

activity, it is likely that poor design of some schools has, and will continue to, foster an environment in which safety and security are compromised. As a counter measure, safe school concepts should be incorporated in the building **design phase** which is a far more cost effective solution than post-occupancy modifications that typically involve additional professional service contracts and construction contracts with higher overhead and profit margins.

3   *Is safe school design being hampered because of current standards or lack of design guidelines? How?*

In all likelihood, school safety and security would be improved if specific design guidelines were incorporated into the design of future schools. It is hard to state, unequivocally, that the current lack of such standards is a **positive cause** of security and safety problems. Clearly, however, in some schools, elements that were included as part of the original design *concept* or *theme* have become negative elements in the fight to provide enhanced security. Such elements include the use of deep recesses at doorways, aesthetically pleasing but ineffective lighting, hallways

that contain *jigs* and *jogs* rather than running straight, fully enclosed group toilet rooms, not closing off the spaces under the final run of stairs in multi-story buildings, and so forth.

4 *How will the cost of school construction be impacted if additional safe school design standards are mandated?*

In our estimation, if school safety standards are incorporated in to the Uniform Building Code there will not be an increase in professional design fees. With regard to the cost of construction, we believe that the majority of the safety and security strategies contained in the proposed Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design (CPTED) Design Guidelines (See Appendix A) will have a minimum impact if incorporated into the design phase, and that some may actually reduce present construction costs. However, as will be noted in the following section (Chapter 6A-2: Recommendations) some of the proposals will undoubtedly impact the cost of school construction. But, it is our opinion that this increase can be partially, or fully, **mitigated by more thoughtful design**.

For example, the design of more compact school plants with simpler building forms can have a very positive effect. Such buildings, with fewer indentations and projections will reduce the number of corner conditions (which are more expensive to construct than flat surfaces) and the overall exterior surface (wall and roof) area. Not only will the cost of the building's enclosure be lessened, but the reduction of the overall exterior surface area will result in a reduction of external heat gain into the building that, in turn, will reduce the size of the cooling equipment, the associated air distribution system, and operating costs.

It should also be noted that the literature survey indicates that such buildings are indeed safer due to the greater visual surveillance achieved by the elimination of areas of concealment associated with exterior undulations. We do not believe that certain building forms should be mandated by the Department of Education, or that others should be prohibited. It is encouraging to note that with regard to safety and security, as indicated in State School District Questionnaire Results (See Chapter 4), **71%** of the responding districts **favor the centrally organized**

group configuration, as opposed to 16% for the open-campus plan; and that there is a **2:1 preference for interior circulation** as opposed to exterior circulation. (These preferences are strongly supported by the results of our National Survey - See previous Chapter 4 - in which 73% of the respondents prefer the centrally organized group configuration and 94% prefer interior circulation). Such preferences must be strongly stated by the district administrators to the design professionals in the pre-design phase of school projects. **The result may very well be safer schools without increases in construction costs.**

We also believe that greater attention must be given by the Department of Education, district administrators, and design professionals to life cycle costs. Construction costs are important. But, consideration must be given to the recapture of increased construction costs, if they occur, by reducing the continual escalating life cycle costs associated with acts of vandalism, arson, burglary, and theft. They should not be left out of the equation. There is, indeed, an economic distinction between capital

improvement funds and operating budgets, but this distinction is not often apparent to student victims, their families, and the taxpayers of Florida.

5   *Do different kinds of schools and school facilities need different standards, ie., a sliding scale to accommodate different programs or locations?*

Since the types of criminal activity vary from pre-kindergarten to senior high school, and the types of buildings and building arrangements vary, it is likely that some differentiation can occur. In terms of protecting school sites and buildings from after hours acts of vandalism, arson, burglary and theft, and in terms of providing exterior safety lighting for persons for legitimate nighttime uses, **all school sites and building exteriors should meet the same minimum standards.** If additional safety and security measures are needed based upon specific location, their implementation should be left as a decision of local administrators.

Inside the buildings however, some of the guidelines for

providing safety to pre-kindergarten, kindergarten and the early elementary school children can be different than those used for middle schools and high schools. Two such **interior sliding scales** are addressed in the next section (Chapter 6A-2: Recommendations) that are based upon the growing physical size of students as they matriculate through the school system. These involve varying minimum widths of corridors and minimum ceiling heights for elementary, middle/junior high, and high schools.

6 *What are the most common or typical types of features of safe facilities and what are good examples of each?*

Based upon the literature review and visits to existing sites, the most common features of safe schools are described and illustrated in the proposed CPTED Design Guidelines contained in Appendix A.

One of the major goals of CPTED is to utilize the passive qualities of the built environment to **enhance visual (and audio) suveillance** as a means of deterrence. In this regard,

some of the better examples visited by our research team were: Hillsborough High School (Hillsborough County), Cardinal Mooney High School (Sarasota County), and Booker Elementary School (Sarasota County). One of the poorer examples was Tampa Bay Technical High School (Hillsborough County).

Hillsborough High School is a traditional inner-neighborhood school built in 1926. The multi-story building is organized around a well landscaped outdoor courtyard that encourages student interaction while providing a non-oppressive sense of containment and security. Visual surveillance is also readily provided in the original building's interior with long, straight corridors that are 14-16 feet wide.

At Cardinal Mooney High School the research team was impressed by the site organization and resultant visual surveillance of its recreation and playing fields. Faculty and staff can readily view all these areas from one central location that is elevated approximately 4-5 feet above the level of the fields.

Booker Elementary School is a new facility that successfully responds to both CPTED principles and Florida's

climate. Like predecessors from the 1920s and 1930s, Booker Elementary is organized around a central courtyard. Large areas of glazing provides direct visual surveillance of the main student gathering area, smaller play spaces, the bus loading/waiting area, and the parent drop-off/pick-up zone. The overall window areas are large and create a positive sense of protective oversight, but the window assemblies are subdivided into small (10") sections that make after hours forced entry difficult. The glazing and exterior walks are given protection from the elements by large cantilevered overhangs above.

Tampa Bay Technical High School is an example of a sprawling campus comprised of two-story buildings without a clearly defined *center*. The site plan organization, coupled with deep, unlighted, exterior door recesses creates numerous exterior spaces for student concealment, loitering and possible criminal behavior. The school administration is concerned with safety and security issues and has implemented a thorough policing policy that necessitates additional personnel and strict control of student access and movement throughout the campus. This

policy has proven to be successful in minimizing undesired behavior, but it may be considered overly oppressive by some, and was made necessary by the design of the school's environment.

7   *Are the existing standards too conservative or traditional from the standpoint of safety, to impact current problems like gangs and school violence? If so, what should the standards be?*

The literature review, case study examination, and personal interviews with designers, district school personnel, and law enforcement officials leads us to conclude that building and site design can prevent some acts of crime; particularly vandalism, arson, burglary, and theft of school property.

On the other hand, it is doubtful that building or site design will prevent one student from *wanting* to strike, steal, or commit some other form of criminal act on another. Rather, one of the underlying principles of Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design (CPTED) is to make such criminal acts as assault & battery, theft, robbery, drug & alcohol use, sexual

assault, rape, and gang violence more observable and detectable. In this manner, faculty, staff and other students are afforded the opportunity to intervene at the first signs of occurrence. Short of such intervention, the increased surveillance provided by CPTED strategies enhances the apprehension of offenders during or immediately following acts of crime. Once apprehended, and if proper discipline is subsequently administered, the research shows that such incidents will decline.

Environmental design, in and of itself, cannot solve the problem of criminal activities in our schools. However, it has been established that it can play a major role when accompanied by administrative safety/security policies and procedures.

As indicated in the following section (Chapter 6A-2: Recommendations) the existing Uniform Building Code (UBC) does not prohibit the implementation of design safety and security strategies, but neither does it encourage them. We believe that the term *safety* must be extended beyond its traditional building code usage. In this regard, we have made several specific recommendations for **changes in the Code**

including the incorporation (by reference) of the proposed **CPTED Design Guidelines** contained in Appendix A and the proposed **Design and Security Maintenance Checklist** contained in Appendix F.

8 *Should the Department of Education mandate, or enforce minimum design standards and safe school design guidelines?*

Yes it should. It is discouraging to note that 21, **or 32%**, of Florida's school districts, for whatever reasons, **did not respond** to our School District Questionnaire, despite follow-up inquiries. Further, of the 46 districts that did respond, **76%** indicated that they were **not familiar with CPTED** concepts and procedures. Based upon this data alone, it appears unlikely that safe school design standards will be voluntarily incorporated on a uniform basis throughout Florida's 67 school districts. Yet, the data received from the respondent districts indicates that incidents of criminal activities are increasing and there is no reason the conclude that conditions are better in the non-

respondent districts. We believe that every child attending Florida's schools should be the beneficiary of safe school design and that Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design **(CPTED) criteria should be mandated** by the Department of Education.

Further, as indicated in the results of our National Survey (See Chapter 4) of the 20 responding states, only one (South Carolina) has instituted CPTED policies and procedures. Thus, Florida is in a position to help lead the nation in reducing crime in our schools.

9   *Does the crime data on school related crime from the Florida Department of Law Enforcement, and other sources support the need for design standards? If yes, how?*

As indicated in the 1989-1992 editions of the <u>Florida Statistical Abstract</u>, FDLE reports an increase in juvenile arrests from 53,754 to 94,988 during this four year period. Unfortunately, as related to us by Department officials, FDLE does not have separate statistical data for which arrests were the

result of crimes committed on school properties. Nevertheless, a significant increase in crime in our schools is supported by our interviews with local school district and law enforcement officials. The large number of reported incidents by the 46 respondent schools districts (See Chapter 4) also establishes the need for some form of **positive action**.

It must be noted that the review of the literature, and our interviews with school and law enforcement personnel, leads us to conclude that the statistics do not reveal a true picture of the problem. This is because **many criminal acts are not reported**. The reasons are many. First, some school administrators, teachers and staff show leniency or bias and **do not report first time offenders** so as not to blemish a student's otherwise *clean record*. Second, many student victims, and many observers of criminal acts (teachers, staff and students alike) do not report crimes because they **do not want to be bothered** or from **fear of retaliation**. Third, some incidents are **undetected** or are considered **too minor to report** to law enforcement. And fourth, some school administrators do not

report what they consider in-house problems and attempt to minimize the extent of criminal activity on their campus' as a means to render a **false public perception of safety**.

In short, we believe that **the problem is greater** than the statistics reveal and unless concerted positive action is taken the **rise in crime** in Florida's schools **will continue**.

Section 5C: Chapter 6A-2: Recommendations

Background

In 1939 the State of Florida enacted its first set of laws regarding

the design and construction of public schools. As indicated in the Laws

of Florida, Chapter 19355, 1939, Section 901 (Chapter IX - The School

Plant):

> *The purpose of this Chapter is to authorize State, county, and district school officials to cooperate in establishing and maintaining school plants that will meet public school needs throughout the State in promoting the health, comfort, and the moral and intellectual development of school children.*

Further, Section 926 of the same enactment, titled *Minimum*

Standards for School Building Construction is the precursor to the

current *State Uniform Building Code for Public Education Facilities*

Construction. Among the original standards were: minimum corridor

widths; minimum ceiling heights; minimum lighting levels; stair and

exit requirements; construction type and building heights; heating and

ventilation; fire protection standards; and others.

In addition, it should be noted that two sections of the original

enactment addressed the issues of arson and vandalism of school property. Section 908 - Burning or Damaging Public School Property established imprisonment in the State Penitentiary and fines for *whoever wilfully sets fire to or burns or causes to be burned or whoever aids, counsels, or procures the burning of any school property.* Similarly, Section 909 -Obscenity on School Buildings called for confinement in County Jail and fines for *whoever wilfully cuts, paints, pastes, marks or defaces by writing or in any other manner, any school,building, furniture, apparatus, appliance, outbuilding, ground, tree, post, or the school property.*

During the past 54 years the State Uniform Building Code (UBC) for Public Education Facilities Construction has evolved into a comprehensive set of rules regarding site conditions, construction type, life safety, maximum net and gross floor area requirements, sanitation, fire protection, and energy consumption. However, the issues of securing school buildings and grounds and the personal safety of those who occupy them from the acts of others have not been adequately addressed. The word *safety* is often used, but in general terms as it relates to hazardous conditions due to building design, construction and

use while the only found reference to *security* is used relative to animals permitted on school grounds. It must be noted that, similar to other codes, the State Uniform Building Code (UBC) sets numerous minimum standards, and while designers and school boards have discretionary authority to supersede them, (except for maximum area requirements) there is little in the Code that encourages or requires the creation of a school environment that deters crime and violence.

Request for Recommendations

In the October 1992 Request for Applications published by the Department of Education, the Applicant, as part of the contract, was to **recommend changes** to Chapter 6A-2, Florida Administrative Code (the Uniform Building Code for Public Educational Facilities Construction), *which result from the Project and which will promote and encourage safe school design concepts in education facilities.* As part of its contract, the Florida Center for Community Design + Research has formulated the following suggested additions to, and modifications of, Chapter 6A-2, Florida Administrative Code, Parts II and III for consideration by the Department of Education.

Chapter 6A-2 - F.A.C. - Part II: Procedures

1   The *CPTED Design Guidelines* bound in Appendix A should be adopted by the State of Florida, Department of Education and incorporated into the Uniform Building Code by reference. (As indicated in the Introduction, it is recommended that the CPTED Design Guidelines remain a stand alone document. In this manner, changes could be made to the Guidelines without modifying the main body of the Code. In addition, the Department of Education CPTED Design Guidelines could be readily distributed and easily adopted by other state, county, local and private agencies for other building types). Adoption of this recommendation would alter 6A-2.045(5) and would include the addition of new paragraph (p). These changes could be worded as follows:

> *6A-2.045(5) Construction of educational facilities shall conform to and comply with the UBC which shall be the prevailing code over all the codes in this paragraph which are hereby incorporated in and made part of the UBC. Ancillary buildings shall comply with the respective classification of buildings by*

occupancy and with the requirements of Rule 6A-2.045(5)(a) through ~~(o)~~ (p), FAC. All or portions of the following codes and requirements are incorporated by this rule and made part of this chapter. In the case of more conflicting requirements, the more or most stringent shall apply, except that a specific requirement in this chapter applicable to the same condition shall prevail.

6A-2.045(5)(p)   S t a t e   o f   F l o r i d a , Department   of   Education,   CPTED   Design Guidelines (insert publication date).

2   To achieve greater Department of Education oversight and design safety/ security uniformity throughout the districts, the minimum project amount for which construction documents must be submitted for review and approval by the office should be reduced from $200,000 to $50,000.   Adoption of this recommendation would alter 6A-2.011(1). Such alteration to the paragraph could be written as follows:

6A-2.011(1) All plans for construction projects, including new construction, remodeling, or renovations, at an educational or ancillary plant, leased or purchased facility with construction contract costs exceeding ~~two hundred thousand dollars ($200,000)~~ fifty thousand dollars ($50,000) shall be approved by the office. For projects with construction

contracts which are less than ~~two hundred thousand dollars ($200,000)~~ fifty thousand dollars ($50,000) which are not submitted to the office, the project architect or engineer shall provide the board with a certificate stating that the building plans comply with the Uniform Building Code and applicable rules and statutes.

3   The *Security Maintenance Checklist* prepared by the State of Florida, Department of Law Enforcement, Florida Criminal Justice Executive Institute as bound in Appendix F should be adopted by the State of Florida Department of Education. This checklist would serve the following two functions:

a)   For new construction, the checklist would be completed by the design professional and submitted with the final design and construction documents for review and approval by the office. In this regard, the document should be retitled *Security Design and Maintenance Checklist*. Adoption of this recommendation would further alter 6A-2.045(5) would include the addition of new paragraph (q). These changes could be worded as follows:

6A-2.045(5) Construction of educational facilities shall conform to and comply with the UBC which shall be the prevailing code over

all the codes in this paragraph which are hereby incorporated in and made part of the UBC. Ancillary buildings shall comply with the respective classification of buildings by occupancy and with the requirements of Rule 6A-2.045(5)(a) through ~~(o)~~ (q), FAC. All or portions of the following codes and requirements are incorporated by this rule and made part of this chapter. In the case of more conflicting requirements, the more or most stringent shall apply, except that a specific requirement in this chapter applicable to the same condition shall prevail.

<u>6A-2.045(5)(q)</u> <u>State of Florida, Department of Law Enforcement, Florida Criminal Justice Executive Institute, Security Design and Maintenance Checklist (insert publication date).</u>

b)   For existing facilities, the checklist would be completed and submitted by school district administrators with the required annual comprehensive safety inspection reports. Adoption of this recommendation add new requirement 6A-2.076(2)(c) which could be worded as follows:

<u>6A-2.076(2)(c)</u> <u>Boards shall submit a completed, signed copy of the State of Florida, Department of Law Enforcement, Florida Criminal Justice Executive Institute,</u> Security Design and Maintenance Checklist for every <u>school plant within the district with each yearly inspection report.</u>

Chapter 6A-2 - F.A.C. - Part IIIA: State Uniform Building Code

4   **Security Alarm Systems.** To discourage vandalism and burglary after school hours, the Code should be expanded to require all schools to be equipped with building security systems. As shown in pervious Chapter 4 - State of Florida Questionnaire, the addition of **alarm systems** is one of the five most critical areas of school design with respect to safety and security cited by district officials in response to Question No. 60. Further, the response to survey Question No. 62 indicates that the addition of **alarm systems** is the first of five crime preventative priorities implemented when district funding is available. Detection devices should be installed to monitor all corridor and stair exit doors, all rooms having exterior windows and doors, all roof access points, and interior spaces housing expensive equipment. Depending upon conditions and needs within each district, these security systems could notify local law enforcement, a 24 hour school district security office, on-site resident personnel, or

contracted private security agencies. Individual building/site systems could also be designed to activate interior lighting, exterior lighting, video equipment, audible alarms, and other devices that may aid in apprehending offenders and discouraging future incidents. Because there is not a current alarm system requirement, this provision would be an addition to the Uniform Building Code. In as much as the development of design or performance criteria necessary for the establishment of a new Code requirement for security alarm systems is beyond the scope of this current study, it is recommended that further research be conducted by the Department of Education involving persons with specific expertise in this field.

It must be acknowledged that a mandatory requirement for security alarms systems could increase construction costs, but, as previously suggested, these costs could be off-set by other aspects of the overall building design. It is also anticipated that this expenditure during construction will be recaptured by life cycle cost savings associated with fewer repairs due to vandalism and lower replacement costs resulting from burglary and theft.

5   **Corridor Widths.** As indicated in previous Chapter 4 - State of Florida Questionnaire, corridors are cited as one of the top five locations for acts of **vandalism, assault & battery, arson, theft, robbery, drug possession & use**, and **alcohol use**. Further, in response to survey Question No. 60, district administrators cite **visual surveillance in corridors** as one of the top five critical areas of school design with respect to safety and security. As a result, it is recommended that the minimum width of corridors be increased. This would reduce congestion, potential conflict, and enhance visual surveillance by faculty and staff. The original 1939 Standards addressed corridor widths as follows:

> *The minimum clear passageway of main corridors of any school building of four class rooms or more shall be not less than eight feet. The minimum clear passageway of secondary corridors shall vary with the length of such corridors and the number of class rooms leading to them, but such secondary corridors shall be not less than six feet in width.*

These requirements have remained essentially the same

despite the steady increase of Florida's student population and size of school buildings over the past five decades. The following is a series of recommendations:

a)   All corridors serving student use spaces should have a minimum clear width of eight (8) feet which should be increased as the occupant load of the corridor increases. This load would be based upon the total number of room occupants that unload into the corridor. For means of egress, the current Uniform Building Code, similar to other codes, uses a 22" exit unit and a ratio of 100 occupants per exit unit. This has proven adequate for the purpose of exiting buildings in emergency situations, however it must be acknowledged that school corridors function as places of social congregation as well as means of circulation. And as previously noted, this congregation of students often leads to congestion, conflict and crime. As a means to alleviate this congestion and to enhance visual surveillance, the ratio used for corridors and horizontal exits should be reduced from 100 to 80 persons/exit unit. (It must be noted that this recommendation of 80 persons/exit unit, as opposed to 75 or 85, is preliminary in

nature and is based upon professional design judgement rather than detailed analysis. It is anticipated that the result would represent a maximum twenty percent (20%) increase in corridors widths. Greater increases appear to be cost prohibitive while lesser increases may not adequately serve the intended purpose).

b)   Student use corridors having fixed lockers on one side only should have a further clear width increase of two (2) feet. This additional floor area is suggested as a reasonable accommodation for students standing at their lockers with the locker doors open. This increase would be in addition to that required for means of egress.

c)   Student use corridors having fixed lockers on both sides should have a further clear width increase of four (4) feet. This increase would be in addition to that required for means of egress.

d)   The term *secondary corridor* should be deleted in its entirety.

Adoption of these recommendations, if accepted as written, would alter 6A-2.051(7)(d) and 6A-2.051(14)(a)2 and would likely

impact the maximum Space for General Circulation established

in 6A-2.032(6). The first two requirements could be written as

follows:

> 6A-2.051(7)(d)   <u>Corridors</u> and Horizontal
> exits - ~~One hundred (100)~~ <u>Eighty (80)</u> persons
> per unit of exit width.

> 6A-2.051(14)(a)2   Minimum clear width of
> all corridors shall be based on required units
> of exit width for occupants served. All ~~main
> exit~~ corridors <u>serving student use rooms and
> spaces</u> shall be a minimum of eight (8) feet
> wide and nine (9) feet high. <u>The minimum
> width of corridors with fixed student lockers
> on one side only shall be increased by two (2)
> feet which shall be in addition to the required
> units of exit width. The minimum width of
> corridors with fixed student lockers on both
> sides shall be increased by four (4) feet which
> shall be in addition to the required units of
> exit width.</u> ~~Secondary corridors which do not
> exit twenty (20) feet in length and do not
> connect primary corridors may be six (6) feet
> wide.~~

> (As a further general point, it is recommended
> that the above cited ceiling height of nine (9)
> feet be eliminated from the above Code
> requirement and relocated to Code Section
> 6A-2.033 - Ceiling Heights, Minimum
> Requirements where it can be more logically
> belongs and where it can be more readily
> found).

It is recommended that further study be conducted by the Department of Education before altering the specific requirements contained in 6A-2.032(6). It is suggested that a random sampling of construction drawings for recently designed schools be analyzed using the 80 persons/exit unit criteria to determine what the average overall increase in building floor area would result. Further, because the physical size of the student varies from elementary to high school, a sliding scale should be investigated. For example, the existing 100 persons/exit unit may be adequate for elementary schools, 90 persons/exit unit in middle/junior high schools, and 80 persons/exit unit in high schools. Undoubtedly any additional floor area could increase construction costs, but, as previously suggested, these costs could be off-set by other aspects of the overall building design. Further, as the number one cited location for student vandalism, the increased visual surveillance provided by the wider corridors should significantly reduce costly life cycle repairs by reducing this vandalism.

6   **Room Doors.** Related to the previous recommendation,

existing CPTED strategies indicate that school corridors should be void of recesses and other *blind spots* which are often used for criminal activities. As shown in previous Chapter 4 - State of Florida Questionnaire, **the minimizing of niches, alcoves, and other residual spaces** and **visual surveillance in corridors** are two of the five most critical areas of school design with respect to safety and security cited by district officials in response to Question No. 60. To eliminate these pockets and to enhance visual surveillance by students, faculty and staff, the current Code requirement for recessing room doors so that they do not swing into a corridor would be deleted in its entirety and all doors that swing into a corridor would be required to swing 180 degrees. However, it must be noted that such recesses have several advantages including protection against accidental injury to those in the corridor when room doors are unexpectedly or suddenly opened. Acknowledging the positive attributes of both sets of conditions, a compromise is proposed. Door recesses should be allowed, but the depth of the recess should not exceed the width of the door leaf it serves and both sides of the recess

should be chamfered out to the corridor at angles not to exceed 45 degrees. Adoption of this recommendation would alter 6A-2.051(14)(a)4 which could be worded as follows:

> *6A-2.051(14)(a)4 Room doors, insofar as practical, shall be recessed so they do not project intò corridors. <u>The depth of the recess shall not exceed the width of the door leaf it serves and both sides of the recess shall chafer out to the corridor at angles not to exceed forty-five (45) degrees.</u> Where a room door does swing into a corridor, it shall be hinged one hundred eighty (180) degrees so as not to reduce required width of corridor.*

In as much as door recesses are recommended in the current Code this revision should not cause an increase in building costs. To the contrary, **construction costs may actually be reduced** by restricting the size of such recesses as indicated above.

7   **General Illumination.** To further enhance visual surveillance by faculty and staff and to increase student safety and comfort, the required general illumination levels in stairways and interior corridors should be increased. In the original 1939

Standards, the minimum lighting level in corridors was 3 *fc* and in 4 *fc* stairways. The 1939 regulations also required 10 *fc* at the desk top in classrooms. Today, the minimum required illumination level in classrooms is 70 *fc* (a seven fold increase) while the current minimum level in corridors and stairways is 10 *fc*. This latter requirement should be increased. The IES Lighting Handbook: Application Volume, 1987 Edition published by the Illuminating Engineering Society of North America, establishes nine (9) Illuminance Categories (A-I) with ranges of illuminance levels for each. According to page 2-9 of this document, Illuminance Category "C" is recommended for *Service Spaces* such as Stairways and Corridors. As indicated on page 2-5 the footcandle range for Category "C" is 10-15-20. For the same reasons cited in previous Recommendations 5 & 6, and because the IES term *service space* does not adequately describe the activities that occur in school corridors and stairs, the minimum lighting level should be increased from the low-end of the range to the high-end of the range; from 10 *fc* to 20 *fc*. Further, this should be cited as the minimum **uniform**

illumination level at the floor. This requirement should also apply to exterior covered corridors and stairs. Adoption of this recommendation would alter 6A-2.065(4). Such alteration could be worded as follows:

> *6A-2.065(4)*   *General illumination in corridors and stairways shall be designed to provide* ~~an average of ten (10) horizontal, initial, raw~~ *a minimum, uniform, horizontal illumination level of twenty (20) footcandles at floor level. Fixtures shall be arranged so that stair treads are not in shadow.*

8   **Ceilings.** Because the plenum area above lay-in acoustical ceilings is too often used to conceal weapons, drugs, and stolen property, and because these relatively fragile ceiling assemblies are too often the subject of vandalism, the existing requirements regarding minimum ceiling heights and the use of lay-in ceiling systems should be changed. For optimum safety the use of acoustical lay-in ceiling systems should be prohibited in student use areas; particularly corridors, locker rooms, shops, and laboratories. Other more durable systems, that also provide access for maintenance are available. (A viable alternative may be the linear or plank ceiling systems manufactured by Chicago

Metallic Corporation, Hunter Douglas, Simplex and others. These systems are readily accessible to school maintenance personnel. However, because the planks or slats are typically only a few inches wide and several feet long, tampering by students would entail more time and would be much more conspicuous). A less stringent approach would be to expand their prohibition beyond the current Group Toilet Room restriction, while at the same time increasing their clear height above floor to render them less accessible to students. (Note that the 1939 Florida Standards established a minimum height of twelve feet in classrooms.) Adoption of these recommendations would alter 6A-2.033 and 6A-2.050(10). Yet a third approach would be to require the installation of motion detectors above all lay-in ceilings in student use spaces. It is acknowledged that all three suggestions have significant construction and operational cost ramifications. In as much as a comparative cost analysis is beyond the scope of this current study, it is recommended that a thorough economic analysis of the three alternatives be conducted by the Department of Education prior to adoption. It should also be noted that the

existing Code does establish lesser ceiling heights for elementary schools and greater heights for other schools. Perhaps this should be expanded. For example, ceiling heights of eight (8) feet may be adequate in elementary schools; ten (10) feet in middle/junior high schools; and twelve (12) feet may be the minimum safe and secure height in high schools.

9   **Student Toilet Rooms.** As indicated in previous Chapter 4 - State of Florida Questionnaire, student toilet rooms are cited as one of the top five locations for acts of **vandalism, arson, robbery, drug possession & use,** and **alcohol use.** To reduce these and other forms of criminal activity, toilet rooms should be so designed to provide acoustic surveillance and easier access by faculty and staff from the adjoining corridors. The large, open vestibule design without doors currently common in passenger terminals, sporting facilities, theaters, and other places of assembly is the prototype suggested. (This would also render these rooms more accessible and in compliance with the recently mandated Americans With Disabilities Act - ADA). In addition,

the currently required air exhaust systems in these rooms should be equipped with *non-tamperable* smoke detectors concealed within the exhaust system ductwork. Adoption of this recommendation would alter 6A-2.068(15)&(16) by prohibiting doors at Group Toilet Rooms and 6A-2.066(2)(b)1 by adding paragraph (c) for the inclusion of smoke detectors. These modifications could be worded as follows:

> *6A-2.068(15)*   *The entry to each group toilet room shall be provided with a <u>vestibule,</u> partition or other shielding device to block from view the occupants in the group toilet rooms. ~~If a door is provided, it shall be provided with a closure and shall swing out.~~ <u>Doors to group toilet rooms are prohibited.</u>*

> *6A-2.068(16)*   *For door swing and hardware requirements <u>in non-group toilet rooms,</u> refer to Rule 6A-2.052(3) and (8), FAC.*

> *<u>6A-2.066(2)(b)1c</u>*   *<u>The exhaust systems in all toilet rooms shall be equipped with a non-tamperable smoke detectors located within the exhaust ductwork.</u>*

Although these revisions will impact construction costs due to an increase in floor area for the vestibules, this added cost can be partially offset by the elimination of expensive doors, frames

and associated hardware as well as the reduction of life cycle costs associated with repairs due to vandalism and arson.

10   **Ground Level Entrances.** To make unauthorized, after-hours entry more difficult it is recommended that corridor exitways include a vestibule. During school hours, the inner doors would be held open, with magnetic hold open devices connected to the fire alarm system, so as not to impede ingress and egress. Or, they could remain active and serve the additional function of an air lock, thus reducing the introduction of Florida's humid outside air into the building. Such air locks, commonly used in colder climates to reduce heat loss, could significantly reduce the building's latent heat gain and the associated air conditioning operating costs. After school hours, the inner doors would be closed and locked, thus providing a second barrier against break-ins at the major points of building entry. If adopted, it is further recommended that these security vestibules be equipped with motion detectors. Adoption of this recommendation would alter 6A-2.051(8)(b) by adding new requirement 1 which could be

worded as follows:

> *6A-2.051(8)(b)1   Vestibules   shall   be provided at all ground level corridor exits. Interior vestibule doors shall swing out in the direction   of   egress,   shall   comply   with   all requirements   of   6A-2.052,   and   shall   be equipped   with   electro-magnetic   hold   open devices connected to the building fire alarm system.*

As previously suggested, the increase in construction costs due to the addition of these vestibules could be readily recaptured in life cycle cost savings associated with the operation of building air conditioning systems as well as reducing other life cycle costs associated with burglary and theft.

11   **Site Illumination.**   Current   Section   6A-2.039   - Educational and Ancillary Facility Sites does not adequately address the matter of site illumination.   The Section does not mention walkways and the vague term *shall be effectively illuminated for night use* is used to describe automobile parking areas.   The IES Lighting Handbook: Application Volume, 1987 Edition, page 9-68 establishes three (3) levels of security lighting:

surveillance lighting *to detect and observe intruders*; protective lighting *to deter attempts at entry, vandalism, etc.*; and lighting for safety *to permit safe movement of guards and authorized persons.* Further, page 9-70, in reference to Figure 2-26 states: *In the event the illuminances for safety are higher than those required for surveillance, the level required for safety should take precedence.* It must also be noted that IES uses three (3) categories in Chapter 14 to describe traffic and pedestrian activity in parking facilities: low, medium and high. The recommended lighting levels by IES increase according to the activity level. IES places Educational Facilities in the Low Category, Residential Complexes in the Medium, and Shopping Centers in the High. In terms of safety and crime prevention, it is recommended that the Department of Education use the High Activity category for its public school sites. This would result in a minimum illumination level 5.0 *fc* as shown in Figure 2-26 - Illuminance Level for Safety. This 5.0 *fc* minimum **uniform** illumination level at the walking surface should be specifically cited in Section 6A-2.039 and should be applied to parking lots, bus zones, vehicular drop-

off/pick-up areas, and all walkways leading to building entrances. By the use of circuitry and switches, lower levels of illumination for *surveillance* and *protection* could be provided on a nightly basis with the higher level for *safety* employed as the schedule of night time events dictates. As shown in previous Chapter 4 - State of Florida Questionnaire, **exterior lighting** is one of the five most critical areas of school design with respect to safety and security cited by district officials is response to Question No. 60. Further, the response to survey Question No. 62 shows that the addition of **exterior lighting** is one of the top five priorities implemented when district funding is available. Adoption of this recommendation would alter 6A-2.039(1) by adding new requirement (i) which could be worded as follows:

> *6A-2.039(1)(i)   Illumination.   On-site vehicular and pedestrian circulation systems including, but not limited to, auto parking areas, bus loading/unloading zones, vehicular drop-off/pick-up areas, bicycle parking areas, and covered/non-covered walkways leading to building entrances shall have minimum, uniform, horizontal illumination level of five (5) footcandles on the walking surface. This shall be the minimum illumination level for the safe use of the site by persons at night for*

authorized, scheduled events. Site illumination systems may be designed to provide lower levels of illumination for the purposes of site security and protection when such events are not scheduled.

Undoubtedly this site lighting requirement will increase construction and operation costs. However, these costs should be at least partially mitigated by reducing the life cycle costs associated with vandalism, burglary, and theft.

12 **Spaces Beneath Stairs and Ramps.** To eliminate places for concealment and criminal activities the space beneath all interior and exterior stairs (required means of egress and others) should be fully enclosed to deny access. Adoption of this recommendation would alter 6A-2.053(7) and add new requirement 6A-2.053(10)(a). Such changes could be worded as follows:

> *6A-2.053(7) All interior stairways in buildings shall be enclosed and shall open directly to either the exterior or into a protected vestibule or corridor that opens to the exterior. Stairway enclosure shall not be required for a stairways serving only one (1) adjacent floor, except a basement, and not*

connected with stairways serving other floors and not connected to corridors. Stairways leading directly to an open mezzanine shall not be required to be enclosed. <u>The space beneath all interior stairways and ramps shall be used as closets or storage areas and shall be fully enclosed to prohibit access.</u>

<u>6A-2.053(10)(a)   The space beneath all exterior stairways and ramps, including required means of egress and non-required means of egress, shall be fully enclosed to prohibit access.</u>

The addition of these recommended walled enclosures would slightly increase construction costs, but they should not be significant.

13   **Ceiling Heights in Gymnasiums.** To deny access to ceilings and spaces above gymnasiums, it is recommended that the same Code requirement 6A-2.033(2)(a) for music ensemble rooms be applied to gymnasiums. Adoption of this recommendation would alter 6A-2.033(4) by the addition of new requirement (a). This change could be worded as follows:

<u>6A-2.033(4)(a)   Gymnasiums equipped with either built-in or movable risers shall maintain a minimum clear height of nine (9)</u>

feet from the floor of the highest riser to the
ceiling. No light fixture, HVAC device, or
structural member shall reduce this height.

It is anticipated that this requirement will not impact construction costs as it is believed that such heights are currently provided by school designers and that the lack of the above requirement is simply an oversight in the existing code. Nevertheless, it should be made a requirement.

14   **Fencing.** As shown in previous Chapter 4 - State of Florida Questionnaire, another critical area of school design with respect to safety and security cited by district officials in response to Question No. 60 is the enclosure of the school property perimeter. Further, the response to survey Question No. 62 shows that the addition of fencing is one of the top five priorities implemented when district funding is available. It is recommended that the Code continue to regulate the type of fencing when it is installed on school property. However, it is not recommended that perimeter fencing be made a mandatory

requirement of the Code.   Rather, the inclusion of perimeter fencing should remain a district level decision and made on a site specific basis.

FAC 6A-2 - PART IIIB: Annual Inspection

As previously indicated in Recommendation 3b, annual evaluations of existing school facilities by the districts should include the use of the State of Florida, Department of Law Enforcement, Florida Criminal Justice Executive Institute, Security Maintenance Checklist as bound in Appendix F.

In addition, the Department of Education should form a state-wide information network for the purpose of exchanging statistical data and crime prevention strategies and policies practiced in the various districts. This study revealed that very little information is being shared, formally or informally, among the district administrators in charge of security matters. This crime prevention network could take on a variety of forms including a data bank, newsletter, annual work shops or conferences, etc. The implementation of a mandatory idea/information interchange could ultimately save the State and the districts considerable revenue as the sharing of both positive and negative results would tend to eliminate costly trial-and-error

duplication among Florida's 67 school districts.

For example, during this study it was learned that at least one district (Pasco) is building some of its new schools without student lockers. As explained, this policy was initiated as a means to save textbook expenditures. Without the lockers each student is given two (2) copies of each text. One is taken home and left there until the end of the school term when it is returned, while the other remains in each student's desk. As reported, cost savings cost have been realized. Undoubtedly there is also considerable construction cost saving potential by eliminating the purchase/installation of the lockers as well as building the floor area to accommodate them. It would also appear that this cost saving measure has positive CPTED implications. Congestion and conflict typically found at locker areas is eliminated as well as a common hiding place for weapons, drugs, alcohol, and stolen articles. Are there other positive results? Have there been any negative results? Regrettably this innovative policy/strategy was not provided to the research team by school district officials, rather by a local design professional. Hopefully, the implementation of the recommended information network will promote the sharing of these and other ideas

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throughout all the districts.

Section 5D: Need for Further Research

As indicated in the previous pages, three (3) recommendations for changes to Chapter 6A-2 - Florida Administrative Code are specific in nature relative to building design and require additional research prior to implementation. They are:

1   The development of performance or descriptive criteria for security alarm systems is needed.   What minimum uniform requirements can be established that will not be cost prohibitive while at the same time be readily expandable by building designers as local conditions warrant?

2   The development of a single standard or a sliding scale relative to corridor widths is needed. Acknowledging that the existing requirement is adequate for building egress in the event of an emergency, to what extent should they be widened to reduce congestion, potential conflict and enhance visual surveillance during peak periods of usage without being cost prohibitive?

3   The development of a series of single standards and/or a sliding scale relative to ceiling heights and materials is needed.

Should ceiling heights be raised to render them less accessible to students and less subject to vandalism? Or should the heights remain the same but be constructed of materials that are less accessible and physically more resistant to vandalism? Or should there be a combination of both? What is the most cost effective means to achieve the desired result?

In addition, in our opinion, the Department of Education should re-issue the State District Board Questionnaire to the twenty-one (21) non-respondent districts to determine whether the current findings from the 46 respondent districts are reinforced or altered. (The non-respondent districts are: Alachua, Baker, Charlotte, Desoto, Dixie, Gilchrist, Glades, Hamilton, Hardee, Hernando, Hillsborough, Jackson, Lafayette, Madison, Manatee (forwarded letter of refusal), Nassau, Palm Beach, Pasco, Polk, Sarasota, and Walton).

Further, what administrative policies and procedures can, or should be, instituted by the Department of Education to implement the proposed state-wide information network and assure active involvement by all 67 school districts?

And finally, what are safe schools? How safe can, or should, they

be made and still maintain **positive** environments for learning and
growing? No doubt there are many interpretations and definitions. One
such definition, as provided by officials of the Department is as follows:

> *Safe schools are orderly and purposeful places where students and staff are free to learn and teach without the threat of physical and psychological harm. They are characterized by sensitivity and respect for all individuals (including those of other cultural and ethnic backgrounds), an environment of nonviolence, clear behavioral expectations, disciplinary policies that are consistently and fairly administered, students' affiliation and bonding to the school, support and recognition for positive behavior, and a sense of community on the school campus. Safe schools also are characterized by proactive security procedures, established emergency response plans, timely maintenance, cleanliness, and a nice appearance of the campus and classrooms.*

The research team of The Florida Center for Community Design
+ Research located on the University of South Florida Tampa campus
trusts that this work product will aid the Department of Education in
creating safer learning environments for all students throughout
Florida, and is eager and able to further assist Department in additional
research of the above cited matters and other related issues.

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American School Board Journal. "Violence in the Schools," in American

School Board Journal, January 1975, pp. 27-37.

This article takes the who? what? where? when? and why?

approach to the problem of school security, and then offers a broad

variety of solutions proposed as part of a survey conducted by the

Journal in November 1974. 52 percent of the responses came from

school board members; 38 percent from superintendents; 10

percent from teachers, principals and others. 28 percent of the

respondents voted to "make discipline stricter; use corporal

punishment; expel trouble-making students." 25 percent felt that

school crime reflected societal issues and that no sweeping changes

would be effective, while 20 percent that schools should be less

restrictive and should give students more autonomy and governing

authority. 17 percent felt that school should not be compulsory;

students with a tendency for criminal activity would select not to

come to school. Finally, five percent of the respondents felt that,

in fact, there was no crime problem, and that perceptions had been

fabricated by the media.

American School and University. "A Counterattack on Vandalism: Four Alternatives for School Security." June 1973, pp. 43-44.

> *"The increasing violence and property losses facing our schools require more than hit or miss reactions." The article indicates that there "are four basic alternatives from which a school administrator can choose to increase the security of the schools in his/her district. The first is to have a cooperative agreement with the local police or sheriff. The second alternative is to make internal security assignments among the school staff. The third is to contract security services from an independent company. The fourth alternative is to solicit the help of students and parents to harden the security of the schools."*

American School and University. "School Designed to Shrug Off Vandalism." November 1974, pp. 28-30.

> *The article features Martin Luther King Elementary School in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania and describes the use of acrylic glazing for windows and skylights as a means of reducing maintenance costs associated with vandalism.*

American School and University. "Vandals Don't Like The Spotlight." January 1971, pp. 26-28.

> *The article reports on the positive effect of outdoor lighting systems on reducing vandalism in the Syracuse (N.Y.) Central School System. "School authorities indicated that the lighting is an indispensable part of the city's anti-vandalism program, and that the public has commented favorably and has increased its night-time use of well-lit buildings."*

American School and University. "Electronic Surveillance Proves Effective." 1974, p. 16.

American School Board Journal. "Violence in the Schools: Now Some Solutions." Vol.162, January 1975, p.31.

Anderson, Mickie. "Suspensions for Drugs, Guns Rise in County Schools. Tampa Tribune, 15 July 1993, pp. 1&5.

> *"As stated by the writer, "the number of Hillsborough County students kicked out of school for having drugs on campus has almost tripled in the past three years while the number of students expelled for using weapons has more than doubled." The article shows that for the 1990/91 school year 84 students were*

suspended for drug use whereas 223 were suspended in 1992/93. Similarly, there were 42 expulsions and 299 suspensions for weapons in 1990/91 and 90 expulsions and 462 suspensions in 1992/93.

Anonymous. "School/Law Enforcement Programs That Work." School Safety, Winter 1987, pp. 15-17.

"Examples of cooperative school/law enforcement programs in seven States are described.

A special school/law enforcement project in Arkansas, which involves junior law enforcement officers recruited from local schools as part of an Anti-Drug Abuse Conditioning Program, gives young students a positive introduction to local police, discourages drug experimentation, and promotes peer pressure to abide by the law. In New York, a Police School Resource Officer program has been initiated to improve student understanding of police objectives and methods, and a Police Anti-Vandalism Education Program is operational in which former vandals counsel perpetrators of vandalism. An important part of the

South San Francisco Police/School Liaison Program is finding out what gang members do away from school Formal school/police links have been established in a Wisconsin municipality, with project elements condensed into a program development manual by the Wisconsin Juvenile Officers' Association. In an Oregon city, the emphasis is on the use of police officers to educate youth in elementary and high school grades on the role of police in society. Police officers in a Florida county view the development of rapport with students as the most important element in establishing respect for the law and combating drug abuse. Finally, police officers serving as counselors and confidants are helping to reduce illegal activities in an Illinois high school district."

Blauvelt, P.D. "School Security: Who You Gonna Call?" <u>School Safety,</u> National Institute of Justice/National Criminal Justice Reference Service, Fall 1990.

"When deciding the proper response to school security issues, it is critical that it be a systemwide decision and not an individual school's choice. The systematic collection of all

"security incident data" in the schools must occur before any decision can be made or any serious discussion can take place. Once collected, the data must be analyzed in a process called incident profiling. Filed by the category of offense, school incidents can be analyzed to determine where and when to deploy resources. A school district is then prepared to begin discussion about how it should best respond to real incidents or the potential threat of violence to the educational system. Five basic options are available to any school district selecting a security response: (1) do nothing; (2) employ local police; (3) contract with a guard service; (4) hire security professionals; and (5) combination of options 2, 3, and 4. Regardless of which option is selected, other than doing nothing, every school needs to establish an office of school security with a competent person as the director or chief."

Boyer, Barbara. "Student Learns School Isn't a Safe Haven These Days." The Tampa Tribune-Times, 2 May 1993, p. 4.

Brenton, Myron. "School Vandalism." Today's Education, March-April 1975, pp. 82-85.

"Some experts estimate the yearly cost of vandalism, arson,

and theft in the nation's public schools at a staggering $500

million." The article describes the widespread growth of school

vandalism and "some of the useful approaches school communities

are (or could be) taking: using security measures, enlisting school

personnel, getting students involved, and involving parents and

neighbors."

Bryant, Salatheia. "Climate of Fear: Students in Trouble on the Increase. Some Who Return to School Try to Achieve, but Others Simply Disrupt." The Tampa Tribune, 3 May 1993, p. 6.

"There are growing numbers of students who have

committed crimes, been arrested, been in juvenile detention

centers, and have probation officers. Some estimates are as high

as almost 1 in 7 students with police records." The article

continues with a brief description of the impact this student

population has on Florida's public school system.

Clements, Mark. "What's Wrong With Our Schools?". Parade Magazine, 16 May 1993, pp. 4-5.

The author reports the findings of a nationwide Parade

survey of 2512 men and women, aged 18 to 75. In addition to

asking what is wrong with America's schools the survey also asked
what would improve them. The results indicate that school safety
is a major national concern and ranked third of the nine factors
cited. The first four were: "More communication with parents" at
76%; "Better qualified teachers" at 75%; "Providing a safer
environment for children" at 74%; and "More discipline" at 73%.

Collins, Lesley and Barbara Boyer. "Climate of Fear: Criminals in
Classrooms Pose Hard Lesson." The Tampa Tribune-Times, 2
May 1993, pp. 1, 4.

As stated in the article, "the number of criminal offenses -
from homicides to assaults and thefts - at Florida schools soared
more that 34% in just one year, from 46,088 incidents in the 1990-
91 school year to 61,842 incidents in 1991-92 according to the
Florida Education Coalition Crime and Violence Survey." In
addition to providing numerous examples of recent crimes in
Florida's schools, many by a small core of repeat offenders, the
report further indicates that the problem is compounded because
"police departments, the state's social service agencies and school
systems don't share information to track criminals in the

classroom."

Collison, Michele N-K. "Law May Push Colleges to Spend More Money on Security and Campus-Police Training," in <u>The Chronicle of Higher Education</u>, 20 January 1993, pages A32-33,43-44.

This article discusses the efforts of selected colleges in Maryland to improve both the perception and the reality of safety on their campuses. Focussing on Johns Hopkins University in Baltimore, the article discusses recent criminal activity, the impact of the new Campus Security Act, and the specific actions taken by the University to increase safety. Such actions include the use of police dogs, increased patrols and alarm systems. Human nature proves to be a major stumbling block. University police "speak in exasperation of countless hours spent training escort drivers, only to see students walking across a campus in the dark; and or sophisticated alarm systems that can be disarmed in minutes."

Criminal Justice Newsletter. "Educators Split On School Violence." <u>Criminal Justice Newsletter</u>, 1975, 6:5.

Cross, Jeannie. "Why So Much Violence In The Schools?" <u>American Vocational Journal</u>, March 1976, pp. 31-32.

"For two days in December (1975) the ramifications of school violence and its solutions were debated by educators and researchers who gathered from across the nation in Washington DC for a conference entitled 'Violence in the Schools: Building and R&D Agenda'." The article highlights the wide range of solutions proposed at the conference.

Crowe, Timothy D. "Designing Safer Schools." School Safety, Fall 1990.

Crowe describes the ways in which the design of schools can adversely or positively affect the perception and reality of safety. He describes the basic principles of Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design (CPTED). The CPTED principle, he notes, is based on the theory that "the proper design and effective use of the built environment can reduce the incidence and fear of crime, and make an improvement in the quality of life." Crowe also describes basic changes in school design theory over the past several decades, and lists areas of concern. Especially important, he feels, are school grounds, parking lots, locker rooms, interior and exterior corridors, restrooms and classrooms.

Crowe, Timothy D. "Safer Schools by Design." School Safety, Fall 1990.

This article, by an expert in the field of Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design (CPTED), describes the use of CPTED principles to control and improve the management of human spaces. Crowe describes three major movements in school design over the past 30 years with respect to CPTED: "traditional, department style, and open classroom." Traditional design emphasized the classroom, whereas "schools built in the 1950s and 1960s evolved around a modern idea of departments" which organized schools around distinct disciplines. Finally, the open-classroom concept did away entirely with separations so that "one massive classroom could contain a number of groups."

Each of these approaches has positive and negative effects on safety and other issues. Some of the more specific safety problems included: poorly defined campus borders; undifferentiated campus areas; isolated areas; poorly located bus loading areas; poorly designed parking lots and landscaping; lockers used by more than one student; isolation of lockers; blind spots in corridors; isolated restrooms and other elements of the school. Crowe includes some discussion of general solutions to the

problems listed.

Dukiet, Kenneth H. "Spotlight On School Security." <u>School Management</u>, November/December 1973, pp. 16-18.

The article reports on the rising crime rates and associated costs in the nation's schools and details six case studies as examples of successful school security programs. Although not identical, certain features common to all six school districts are central alarm systems and high intensity exterior lighting. Two of the districts also employ pen-size personal alarms for teachers.

Edelson, Nora. "Summer Sees Jump in Youth Crimes: Car Thefts Linked to School Vacation." <u>The Tampa Tribune</u>, 21 June 1993, pp. 1,3.

As indicated by representatives of the Hillsborough County Sheriff's Department and the City of Tampa Police Department, "June, July and August are the months when youths are out of school and burglaries and auto thefts peak." Officials estimate that 80% of car thefts are committed by Juveniles and most arrests for burglaries are people from 10 to 20 years old.

Education Facilities Laboratories, "Designing Schools to Minimize

Damage from Vandalism and Normal Rough Play." A Newsletter from Education Facilities Laboratories, March 1974.

Based on a study done by John Zeisel, this report discusses issues that can be addressed during the design of schools. Zeisel's study to determine what designers and owners could do to prevent or diminish damage to schools through more careful planning and design reveals five major design issues pertinent to the problem of property damage. Three relate to the issues of accessibility and proximity: access to roofs, entranceways, and predictable rough play areas. Two others relate to the damagibility of walls and ground materials. This report presents possible design responses for situations involving each of these five major issues.

Edwards, Brian. "Climate of Fear: Students on Drugs Play a Deadly Game." The Tampa Tribune, 5 May 1993, pp. 1,4.

"The number of drug incidents at state public schools soared 91% - from 1,265 in 1991 to 2,418 in 1992 - according to the Florida Education Coalition Crime and Violence Survey". The article also indicates that "where drug use occurs, other crime, some of it violent, is sure to follow" and that "students high on

drugs are more prone to violence because of reduced inhibitions"
and that other violence and crime may be caused by students
engaged in drug dealing. The article gives numerous examples of
the types of drugs encountered in Florida's schools and describes
a drug prevention program being conducted in Sarasota County.

—————————. "Police Officers Get Chance to Help Trouble Before."
The Tampa Tribune, 5 May 1993.

This article briefly describes the positive impact that school
resource officers (SRO) have in schools. According to the reporter,
66 Florida counties use police as school resource officers.

—————————. "Student Troubleshooters Make Schools Safer." The
Tampa Tribune, 6 May 1993.

"Armed with two-way radios, these students are looking for
trouble". The article continues with a brief description of the
Youth Crimewatch Program which originated in Miami 14 years
ago and is now used in 38 Florida Counties. Similar to its
.neighborhood counterpart, students act as eyes and ears of
administrators and report crimes or problems to police officers or
teachers as they patrol the school campus.

Emrich, R. "The Safe School Study Report: Evaluation And Recommendations." Crime and Delinquency, 1978, 24:266-276.

Floyd, N.M. "Terrorism in the Schools." School Safety, Winter 1987, pp. 22-25.

"Victimization by bullies, who act individually and in gangs to commit criminal acts against children and teenagers in schools, is viewed as a terrorist phenomenon.

Aggressive behavior is widespread in schools, but few teenage victims lodge complaints with police officials for fear of retaliation. Psychological research indicates that bullying is not just a phase teenagers go through; rather, aggression is a chronic form of self-expression that starts early in life and persists well into adulthood. According to many studies, bullies most likely come from families where parents prefer physical discipline. Victim effects are experienced not only by those directly targeted for harassment by bullies, but also by those who witness victimization and fear the spread of violence to themselves. Although the problem of bullying is not limited to children, vulnerability is apparently a precondition for victimization by

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school bullies. Many victims of aggression in schools suffer their fate in silence and desolation. Victim responses to bullying can be characterized by self-deprecation, learned helplessness, anger and revenge, and cynicism toward authority. Educators should emphasize rules, rights, and responsibilities in their lesson plans and convey principles of law and order. Parents and the community should be involved with teachers to develop an acceptable intervention program for victims of bullies in schools."

Foley, D. "Danger: School Zone." Teacher Magazine, May 1990, pp. 57-59, 62-63.

"The 1987 National Crime Survey shows that nearly 184,000 people were injured as a result of school crime in one year, including staff, students, and visitors.

No one really knows the number of teachers who are victims of violence nationwide. Many teachers are injured attempting to either break up student fights or halt robberies, however, not all teacher injuries are caused by students. The "psychic violence" against teachers -- the intimidation and verbal abuse -- is unmeasured, but nevertheless present in the classroom. Although

some teachers quit after they have been victimized, most come back to school. Those most likely to give up are teachers who are new to the system and don't have much invested. Support programs, such as the Victim Support Program in New York City, help teachers over the after-shocks of crime, including "blame-the-victim" syndrome. Security measures in the school can carry high price tags; not all schools can afford on-campus police or metal detectors. Long-term remedies include intervention programs aimed at troubled students, stricter discipline policies, and the open sharing of information with classroom teachers about disruptive students."

Futurist. "Child-Friendly Cities," The Futurist, Vol. 25, No. 3: May-June 1991.

This short article discusses the work of RAND Corporation demographer Peter A. Morrison, who notes that "urban childhood is deteriorating. Poverty has declined only among the elderly. Among children, it has gotten worse." The article focusses only briefly on schools, but does note that schools of the future will need to be more integrated into their neighborhoods, and designed and

built so that children will be able to walk to them, and to play and attend activities there after traditional school hours.

Gamble, L. R.; C. P. Sellers, and C. E. Bone. "School Building Intrusions: Prevention Strategies." School Business Affairs, June 1987, pp. 18-21.

"Vandalism resulting from school building intrusions have cost schools in the United States $500 million a year. Property offenses are the most widespread offenses against schools; strategies available to administrators to combat this destruction include educating students and the community, improving student morale, improving community-school relations, and improving the physical appearance of school facilities. In some cases, immediate measures such as installing a security system must be taken. There are two basic protection systems which use alarm devices. The perimeter system provides protection when all entrances, doors, and vents are equipped with a device that signals their opening or movement. Area protection is provided when a specific area is under surveillance so that movement can be detected. Also available are local and silent alarms. Before school

administrators select a protection system, a thorough survey should be made to determine the kinds of equipment available and the kind of surveillance provided and a qualified engineer who has the technical skill to design a security system should be consulted. In the last few years, there has been a return to more traditional methods of combating school intrusions such as use of heavy duty locks, fencing, hall monitors, exterior and interior lighting, and installing door stops in panic exits. Finally, some schools have involved the student body in prevention programs."

Gardner, John C. "Let's Face It: Security Is Up To You." <u>American School and University</u>, pp. 10-11, 14-15.

Written by the Director of Buildings and Grounds at Columbia University, the article distinguishes physical security from employee security and lists some specific suggestions for both from the New York City Police Department and Columbia University.

Gardner, Robert A., "Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design." <u>Security Management</u>, April 1981.

An independent consultant specializing in physical security

planning, Robert Gardner introduces "Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design" (CPTED) and its goal: "the reduction of opportunities for crime to occur. This reduction is achieved by employing physical design features that discourage crime, at the same time they encourage legitimate use of the environment." Central to CPTED is the notion of "defensible space": an "area that has been made a "zone of defense" by the design characteristics that create it." All spaces in an area are designated as public, semi-private, or private; these designations affect the design and acceptable use of each space.

Complementing the notion of "Defensible Space" is the concept of "territoriality" involving the individual's perception of and relationship with his or her environment. "A sense of territoriality is fostered by architecture that allows easy identification of certain areas as the exclusive domain of a particular individual or group." **Surveillance** is the principal weapon in the creation of defensible space and enhancing territoriality; this can be either _formal_ or _informal._ Space _layout,_ _lighting,_ and _landscaping_ all add to the capacity for easy space

surveillance and defensibility. In addition, _physical security_ is a vital aspect of any effective CPTED program.

Gatti, Daniel J. "Violence In The Schools: When Is It Assault And When Is It Battery?" American Vocational Journal, March 1976, pp. 31-32.

After describing the legal distinction between the acts of assault and battery, the author suggests that "the most important thing that must be considered by teachers and administrators is that many times a battery can be foreseen and thus prevented. Many times the assault occurs first and that's the time to discipline the student. Most educators seem to feel that they are not entitled to discipline a student with suspension until the assault becomes successful and thus a battery takes place. This is a major misconception, and as soon as students begin receiving discipline for their assaults and threats, batteries in our schools will begin to decline."

Grealy, J. L. "Safety and Security in the School Environment." School Management, November/December 1973.

Jeffrey, C. R. "Criminal Behavior and the Physical Environment."

American Behavioral Scientist, 1972, 20, 149-174.

Haney, Stan. "School District Reduces Vandalism 65%." American School and University, December 1973, p. 29.

> The author reports on a vandalism deterrent program at the South San Francisco School District that "has overwhelming student support. And no wonder. Money not spent for vandalism is used for student projects. Each of the 22 schools in the district is given a budget allocation of one dollar per student at the beginning of the school year. The funds can be used for any worthwhile project but cannot be spent until the second semester. An accounting of al vandalism costs at each school is kept and the costs of vandalism at each school is subtracted from its original allocation."

Harris, K.B. "Reducing School Violence And Drug Abuse." Security World, 1974, 11:18-19,44-45.

Knowles, E.S. "Boundaries Around Social Space." Environment and Behavior, December 1972, pp. 437-445.

Lane, J.R. "Schools Caught in the Crossfire." School Safety, Spring 1991, p. 31.

"This article reports on the results of a study of gun violence in the Nation's schools ("Caught in the Crossfire: A Report on Gun Violence in Our Nation's Schools"), conducted by the Center to Prevent Handgun Violence.

The study focused on the increasing gun violence that is occurring in and around public and private schools since September 1986. Information for the report was abstracted from more than 2,500 school violence-related news stories recorded in newspapers across the Nation during the past 4 years. A total of 227 incidents were identified. The study found that in addition to the 71 people who have been killed with guns at school, another 201 were severely wounded; and 242 persons had been held hostage at gunpoint. Shootings or hostage situations in schools had occurred in at least 35 States and the District of Columbia. Males were most often the offenders as well as the victims. Teens from the ages of 14 to 17 were most at risk of gun violence at school, and such violence occurred most often in the hallways and the classrooms. Gang or drug disputes were the leading cause of school gun violence. A handgun was most often the firearm used.

One reason why gun violence is increasing in schools is the availability of guns to students. According to the 1987 National Adolescent Health Survey of 11,000 8th-grade and 10th-grade students, 40 percent of the males and almost 25 percent of the females reported that they could obtain a handgun."

Lederman, Douglas, "Colleges Report 7,500 Violent Crimes on Their Campuses in First Annual Statements Required Under Federal Law," <u>The Chronicle of Higher Education</u>, January 20, 1993.

This article presents and discusses the statistics on criminal activities from over 2,400 public and private colleges in the United States for 1991. The survey was in response to the Student Right-to-Know and Campus Security Act of 1990, which requires every postsecondary institution that receives federal aid to provide students and staff with a report about crime statistics and policies.

Policies and statistics vary from institution to institution. The larger and wealthier colleges have done the most; the poorer and smaller ones have done the bare minimum to comply. Similarly, the ratio of crimes committed on college campuses

versus those committed in the surrounding communities varies. In some instances the campuses are significantly safer than the surroundings; in others, the opposite holds true. No discussion is presented to qualify this information.

Lee, Felicia R. "Disrespect Rules." The New York Times - Education Life: A Special Report, 4 April 1993, 4(A), p. 16.

As indicated by the author, "what is happening in Rochester is also happening in San Francisco, Chicago and almost every other city in the nation. Students, educators, parents and people with a finger on the pulse of social trends say there has been a severe erosion of respect among many young people for schools, teachers and each other. While those students may well be in the minority, experts say, there are enough of them to sour everyone's school experience." The report goes on to say that it is "the violence that has everyone most concerned." Citing statistics form the United States Department of Justice and the National Association of School Psychologists, "every day 100,000 children take guns to school. Every day, 6,250 teachers are threatened and 260 are attacked. Every day, 14,000 young people are attacked on

school property. Every day, 160,000 children miss school because of the fear of violence."

Manion, B. C. "Climate of Fear: Battered and Bruised, Teachers Fighting Back." The Tampa Tribune, 6 May 1993, pp. 1, 8.

"Schools are trying a long menu of approaches to cut down campus crime. Some are setting up peace tables where kids can talk out disputes, teaching lessons on tolerance, or installing metal detectors and surveillance cameras. With increasing numbers of crimes on campus and a diminishing level of student respect for authority, schools could be facing chaos if conditions don't improve." The article describes several independent preventative measures being used by schools throughout Florida but also indicates that "school districts need comprehensive security programs."

_____. "Climate of Fear: Violence Puts Teachers at Risk, Under Stress." The Tampa Tribune, 4 May 1993, pp. 1, 5.

"No statewide figures are available on how many teachers are attacked each year. But throughout Florida, there's no doubt youngsters are punching, kicking, pushing and threatening

teachers." The article continues with numerous recent examples from throughout the state and further adds: "some teachers think there is a tendency to downplay school violence or pretend it doesn't exist" and that some have complained "about being discouraged from reporting assaults by administrators who were afraid it would make them or their schools look bad."

Mansnerus, Laura. "Kids of the 90's: A Bolder Breed." <u>The New York Times - Education Life: A Special Report</u>, 4 April 1993, pp. 14-15.

The report focuses upon the breakdown of child-adult relationships in the home and in the school environments as a cause for the increased offensive behavior of the nation's youth. The writer states: "there are also fewer adults whom children see often and who keep track of them. Thus adults in general have lost presence as a deterrent, a positive influence and an intelligence gathering network." The report also indicates that there "are children who learn in school that authority does not protect them." Further, "they learn that adults fear children. They learn that crime does indeed pay, as every day they see other

students who rob, steal, talk back, fight or refuse to do homework -
yet are not punished."

Mawby, R.I. "Defensible Space: A Theoretical and Empirical Appraisal".
Urban Studies, 1977, 14, 169-179.

Menacker, J., W. Weldon, and E. Hurwitz. "Community Influences on
School Crime and Violence." Urban Education, Washington, DC:
United States Department of Justice Office of Juvenile Justice
and Delinquency Prevention, 1990.

"In order to test the validity of the assumption that school
and community order and safety are interrelated, this study
examines data collected by the public school system and the
metropolitan police on a typical inner-city neighborhood in
Chicago.

The school data consists of reports of serious disciplinary
violations at three schools located in high crime areas, the schools'
responses, and results of teacher and student surveys on school
safety and order; the police data includes crimes committed in the
attendance areas of the schools as well as crimes committed on
school property. Between September 1987 and June 1988, the

three schools surveyed recorded 106 violations serious enough to require either police notification or arrest. The teacher and student surveys indicated that many students did not feel safe in school; about a third of the students carried weapons, and many had been assaulted or involved in some kind of violence. The police statistics pointed out that the schools punish violators more severely than the surrounding community does and highlighted the fact that community crime does invade school grounds. The report also notes that, of the 106 reportable offenses, school principals notified the police in only 6.5 percent of them. Once the relationship between school safety and community crime is recognized, prompt legislative and judicial actions should be taken. The authors recommend putting pressure on local police to develop community safety programs, providing adequate correctional facilities to avoid releasing accused felons, strengthening laws on school safety, and making parents bear greater responsibility for their children's behavior."

_____. "Schools Lay Down the Law." School Safety, Winter 1990, pp. 27-29.

"A 3-year study of school safety in schools serving kindergarten through eighth grade in Chicago found that school rules are most effective when teachers, administrators, parents, and students all have major roles in their development.

The research focused on two schools in which committees of teachers and parents developed discipline codes and on two other schools that served as controls. The schools were located in one of the poorest and most crime-ridden areas of Chicago. The committees learned about law regarding order and control, developed a code that required teachers to become educators about discipline, established discipline councils to review important discipline cases, and included rewards for good behavior as well as punishments for bad behavior. The research found that educators and parents often lack understanding of the laws applicable to school order and safety, that effective parent involvement is the greatest need for improving school order and safety, and that patterns of discipline administration at disorderly and unsafe schools are often inconsistent and inefficient."

Moody, Tom et al, "Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design:

A Special Report", <u>Nation's Cities</u>, December, 1977, pp. 15-27.

Based upon a series of research projects in 1969 by the National Institute for Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice, this article is a report of "the relationships between design features of particular environmental settings and citizens' fear of and vulnerability to crime" and is based upon "the proposition that physical design could be used not only to deter crime, but also to encourage citizens to protect their rights and property - in other words, to create a defensible space."

Among the major topical headings are "CPTED in Commercial Settings," "Residential Settings," "Schools" (including Broward County, Florida), "Public Streets," and "Mass Transit."

Muir, E. "Security Now Is Elementary." <u>School Safety,</u> Winter 1987, pp. 14-15.

"Security problems in elementary schools may be different than those in secondary schools, but they need to be addressed just as diligently.

Security problems in elementary schools are not necessarily the students, but rather adult drug abusers, psychopaths, and

irresponsible parents. In many urban areas, the local elementary school is both vulnerable and attractive to criminals or noncustodial parents who want to "kidnap" their children. New York City has implemented procedures to maximize elementary school security. Penalties for trespassing and loitering on or near the city's elementary schools have been increased by the State legislature. In addition, each school must outline a security plan that encompasses visitor screening, exit security, and intruder alert. Specific procedures to reduce the vulnerability of elementary schools are detailed."

Musheno, M. C., J. P. Levine, and D. J. Palumbo. "Television Surveillance and Crime Prevention: Evaluating an Attempt to Create Defensible Space in Public Housing". <u>Social Science Quarterly</u>, 1978.

Nemy, E. "Violence In Schools Now Seen As Norm Across The Nation". <u>The New York Times</u>, 14 June 1975.

Neusner, Noam M. M. "Climate of Fear: Today's Schoolyard Tussle May Cost You Your Life." <u>The Tampa Tribune</u>, 3 May 1993, pp.1, 6.

As reported by the author, "assaults at the state's public

schools increased almost 54% from 1991 to 1992, from 19,907 incidents to 30,574 according to the Florida Education Coalition Crime and Violence Survey". This survey also revealed that in the same two year period robberies rose at a rate of 50%, sexual batteries 52%, and disorderly conduct almost 75%. Further, "a 1991 survey of Florida's students showed that 1 out of 4 had brought a weapon to school within 30 days of taking the survey. The Florida Education Coalition reported there were 3,512 incidents of weapons possession recorded at state schools in 1992, a 20% increase over 1991."

Noles, Pam. "Torment in the Schoolyard." <u>Tampa Tribune</u>, 14 June 1993, pp. 1, 6.

"School districts throughout West Central Florida are developing policies in an effort to examine sexual harassment". As reported in the article, a recent survey of 1,632 8th through 11th graders in 79 schools by the Association of University Women Education Foundation, "four out of five students (81%) report having experienced some form of sexual harassment in school. Of those, 79% say their peers were the perpetrators."

Okaty, G.J. "Kids at School/Kids at Risk." Police Chief, May 1991, pp. 39-41.

> "Crime occurring in educational settings, ranging from elementary schools to universities, poses several dilemmas for law enforcement planners who often view campus problems as being in the purview of school administrators.
>
> Two major issues that need to be confronted are the possible link between school truancy and daytime burglary and the lack of statistics on campus crime gathered either by educational authorities or municipal police departments. The deciding factor for school administrators for establishing campus security forces is often the ability of the city police to respond to campus crimes. An effective campus crime prevention program should include a written police statement which considers victims' rights, protocol for detectives and patrol officers coming to campus on official business, disciplinary measures, employee standards, security regulations, and emergency procedures. Police administrators can help their educational counterparts by encouraging the use of professional law enforcement personnel and by offering advice on

alarm systems, landscaping and architectural designs, and other security measures."

Pablant, P. and J. Baxter. "Environmental Correlates of School Vandalism." Journal of The American Institute of Planners, 1975, pp. 270-279.

Pearson, F. S. and J. Toby. "Fear of School-related Predatory Crime." Sociology and Social Research, April 1991, pp. 117-125.

"Information from the School Crime Supplement (SCS), which was added to the National Crime Survey from January through June 1989, was used to gather information about youths' fear of crime at school or while going to and from school.

SCS was administered only to youths ages 12-19 who had attended school during the past 6 months. The questions gathered information on school-related victimizations, fear of victimization, school characteristics, and efforts to prevent victimization and misconduct in the school. Results showed that fear of being attacked at school was related to reports of street gangs at school and was inversely related to the student's age. In addition, fear of attack going to and from school was substantially related to the

mode of transportation used. Going to school by car was associated with the least fear; going by bus was associated with only slightly more reports of fear. In central cities, those traveling by public transportation reported the greatest fear; outside central cities walking had the highest percentage of youths reporting fear. Results are generally consistent with concepts regarding the role of suitable targets, likely offenders, and the absence of capable guardians in the production of fear of crime. 8 references."

Pindur,W. and D.K. Wells. "For the Record: Chronic Offenders are Bad News." School Safety, Spring 1986, pp. 14-16.

"Research indicates that a small core of youth is responsible for most crime in the school setting, and the key to responding to these chronic offenders is information sharing.

Chronic youth offenders not only intimidate other students and teachers but also impede the learning process. These offenders are predominantly male, usually economically disadvantaged, and likely to have interpersonal and behavioral problems. They are responsible for a disproportionate amount of violence in the schools. An estimated 282,000 students are

attacked at school in a typical 1-month period, and an estimated 5,200 teachers are physically attacked at school each month. Juveniles themselves are often the victims of attack, and violence is also directed at animals and school property. School officials realize that violence does not begin or end with schools. Violence can only be controlled if teachers, school administrators, public transportation safety officers, police officers, and neighborhood residents are involved. It is also important that agencies such as the courts, prosecutors,and community welfare groups be involved in violence prevention. The creation of a system approach to the sharing of information on chronic offenders is essential and can benefit schools in several ways. If chronic offenders are identified, school officials can make the most appropriate classroom and counseling assignments. If schools are aware of chronic offenders, appropriate steps can be taken to insure that other juveniles are protected. Additionally, information sharing will allow schools to enforce probation requirements."

Plaster, Sherry, "Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design." Main Street News, National Trust for Historic Preservation,

Number 83, October 1992, pp.1-6.

Reiss, A.J. "Environmental Determinants of Victimization by Crime and Its Control: Offenders and Victims." Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design Theory Compendium. Arlington, Virginia: Westinghouse National Issues Center, 1978.

Sadler, W.L. "Vandalism in Our Schools A Study Concerning Children Who Destroy Property and What to Do About It." Education, Summer 1988, pp. 556-560.

"Vandalism, arson, and malicious mischief are increasing in the schools.

Some experts estimate the yearly cost of school vandalism at $500 million. Targets of vandalism include buildings, equipment, and furnishings. A survey of 16,000 school administrators in 50 States, to which 48 percent responded, showed that glass breakage was the most frequent form of vandalism. Other types mentioned included painting on ways and property, theft, lavatory damage, driving cars across lawns, and defacing school furniture. Most acts of vandalism are committed by the school's students, and they are as prevalent in affluent

suburban as inner-city schools. Sociologist suggest that school vandalism may be motivated by vindictiveness, maliciousness, ideological concerns, acquisitiveness, boredom, or frustration. The typical vandal is a white male, aged about 15 years. A California study suggests that multiracial schools in low socioeconomic-status neighborhoods have the greatest problem with vandalism. Relatively few vandals are ever caught, and fewer still are prosecuted. In most localities, restitution has been minimal. Useful approaches to preventing vandalism include security measures such as key control, police and watchmen, and electronic protective devices. Such measures must be supplemented by an examination of the school's relationship to the total environment -- social, economic, and educational. 10 references."

School Safety. "Safety Is Priority, Say Urban School Chiefs." School Safety, Spring 1988, pp. 20-21.

"In April 1988, top administrators from the Nation's largest urban school districts met in Detroit to compare strategies for making campuses safe from drug's gangs, and weapons and for improving discipline, leadership skills, and public support.

Many of the strategies emphasized the need for information-sharing and the development of school-community partnerships. A number of school districts have formed citizen advisory groups and task forces with members of local business, religious, and civic organizations. Operation Rescue uses volunteers from the community to tutor and counsel students and help build support systems for them. In Los Angeles, an administrative academy is used to train principals and other school administrators in leadership and management skills that can help reduce school problems. In Baltimore, security personnel monitor a gun hotline and efforts also focus on increasing public awareness of the problem of weapons in the school. Strategies advocated for dealing with drugs at school include a mix of law enforcement, prevention, intervention, education, and counseling, and increased student and public awareness. Increased discipline, including the development of a comprehensive code of student conduct, also was advocated as a strategy for increasing the safety of schools."

Sommer, R. "Developing Proprietary Attitudes Toward the Public Environment." <u>Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design</u>

Theory Compendium. Arlington, Virginia: Westinghouse National Issues Center, 1978.

Tursman, C. "Safeguarding Schools Against Gang Warfare." School Administrator, May 1989, pp. 8-9, 13-15.

"In today's schools, gang activities are often part of a complex web of drugs, abuse, violence, and an attitude that holds criminal and violent behavior in high regard.

For example, Los Angeles gang members who have been in jail point to their jail experience with pride to express gang loyalty. They encourage younger onlookers to follow in their footsteps by making incarceration seem glamorous. While many think that gang activities are limited to inner cities, gang members move to suburban and rural areas when "the heat is on" or to find greener pastures. Also, in mid-size and small towns where factories close or businesses fail, unemployment, poverty, and unrest create conditions conducive to gangs. The increase in gang- and drug-related robberies becomes particularly important when students say they carry weapons to school for safe passage. In areas where gang warfare is extreme, schools must demonstrate that weapons,

violence, extortion, and drug sales will not be tolerated. Teachers

need training in how to spot potential problems, intervene in

crises, defuse potentially volatile situations, and establish

instructional and management routines that limit opportunities

for trouble. In addition, a cooperative working relationship is

needed between school officials and the police. Many security

experts recommend two-way radio systems that link schools to

buses, to other schools, and to local authorities. Some States have

passed legislation that imposes stiff criminal penalties for the sale

and distribution of drugs and weapons within 1,000 feet of school

property. The Chicago Intervention Network, designed to prevent

school gang violence with the support of ex-gang members, is

described."

Walters, Laurel Shaper. "A Nation At Risk: Learning Report Card."
The Christian Science Monitor, 26 April 1993, pp. 12-13.

Written on the 10th anniversary of a report credited with

launching the latest education reform movement in the United

States ("A Nation At Risk: The Imperative for Educational

Reform" released by Secretary of Education Terrell Bell on April

26, 1983) the article outlines certain areas of strength, progress made to date, and areas that need further improvement.

Wilkinson, Joseph F., "Designing Against Malice." <u>Architectural Record</u>, November 1992, pp. 110-113.

As indicated by the author, "the steadily rising incidence of burglary, vandalism, and violent crime has led administrators of schools, private as well as public, to require school architects to underscore security in their designs." The article offers numerous design strategies and specific security measures to protect property, students, and staff.

Books

Albrecht, Peter-Alexis and Otto Backes (eds.). <u>Crime Prevention and Intervention: Legal and Ethical Problems</u>, Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1989.

"The Special Research Unit 227 - Prevention and Intervention in Childhood and Adolescence - held its third international symposium 14-16 October 1967 at the University of Bielfeld in West Germany. The papers in this volume present the scientific discussion on the subject of the symposium: legal and ethical problems of prevention and intervention, with particular reference to adolescence."

Included among the 16 papers that cover a broad range of topics, are "Delinquent Behavior in Adolescence: Potentials and Constraints of Preventative Strategies in School Settings" and "School Delinquency Prevention as Management of Rabble".

Angel, S. <u>Discouraging Crime Through City Planning</u>. Berkeley: University of California, 1969.

Anonymous. <u>Manual of Rules and Procedures for Improving School</u>

Order and Safety: Cather School/Grant School. Chicago, Illinois: September 1988.

"This manual outlines rules for improving school order and safety and consequences for violations, in conformance with the Chicago Uniform Discipline Code.

Rules cover general classroom behavior such as disruptions, clothing, and eating; student movements in and around the school building; reporting of unauthorized persons on school property; cafeteria behavior; grooming; and possession of alcohol, drugs, weapons, or other dangerous materials. Also discussed is the development of individual classroom discipline codes and their contents. Procedures that should be included and avoided in such codes are described. It also is recommended that all teachers include discipline education as a regular part of the curriculum. The legal framework for school order and safety is discussed with reference to student civil rights, legal provisions affecting discipline by teachers, and laws related to parents. A school order and safety agreement is provided that specifies the rights and responsibilities of students, teachers, parents, and administrators.

Finally, procedures are presented for implementing the manual rules, establishing a school discipline council, maintaining disciplinary records, implementing behavioral consequences, and revalidating and amending the manual."

Baker, Keith, and Robert J. Rubel, ed. <u>Violence and Crime in the Schools</u>. Lexington, Massachusetts: Lexington Books, 1980.

Commissioned by the United States Department of Health, Education and Welfare, the text contains a series of papers that explore a wide range of the causes of school crime. As indicated by the editors, "the most striking feature of these papers is their diversity, for this suggests that complete understanding of school crime - and therefore of its solutions - is multifaceted. Moreover, the diversity of these theories of school-based crime will surely challenge the readers' preconceived ideas. The theories also differ considerably in the extent to which they are concerned with the practical matter of immediately reducing crime in schools. Some provide almost a step-by-step course in crime reduction, while the abstract nature of others is far removed from direct application."

The twenty papers containing within the volume are

grouped under four main headings: "Setting the Stage", "Schools as Victims", and "Vandalism - A Special Case".

Ban, John R. , and Lewis M. Ciminillo. Violence and Vandalism in Public Education. Danville, Illinois: The Interstate Printers & Publishers, Inc., 1977.

As indicated by the authors, "This book has several objectives. It was written not only to present an overview of violence and vandalism in the schools but also to encourage continued investigation of those dilemmas along a wide front. It attempts, too, to pull together in one format many of the numerous elements allied with school violence. Furthermore, along with highlighting the entanglement of school crime with other aspects of school and community life, it presents a blueprint for action that schools can follow as they pursue measures of crime prevention and control."

Becker, F. D. Design for Living. Ithaca, New York: Center for Urban Development Research, May 1974.

Block, R. "Community, Environment, and Violent Crime." Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design Panel. Atlanta:

American Society of Criminology, 1977.

Blount, Ernest C. Model Guidelines for Effective Police - Public School Relationships: A Manual for School Security, Springfield, Illinois: Charles C. Thomas Publisher, 1986.

As indicated by the author, "this is a 'how to' manual. No attempt is made herein to offer another sociological dissertation on the causes of crime and violence. Acknowledged is the fact that violent criminal acts are being committed in the halls and on the grounds of our nation's public schools. In the past, efforts on behalf of the concerned parties have not always been productive or effective. In many instances, the search for a solution has been fragmented and incomplete. Therefore, any serious effort to deal with the public school crime problem must involve the police, public school authorities, and parents interfaced with the criminal justice system."

The text is divided into four main parts: An Overview of the Problem, General Planning Considerations, Development of Guidelines, and Examples of Model Guideline Documents.

Bower, Ruth. "Vandalism In Selected Florida Schools." Doctoral

Dissertation, Florida Atlantic University, Boca Raton, Florida, 1976.

"The purpose of this study was to determine if there was a significant relationship between the (cost and incidence) of vandalism and nine characteristics of the average public school. The characteristics selected were: 1) stability of instructional staff, 2) racial balance in the school, 3) number of students transported to the school, 5) income of students' parents, 6) job status of students' parents, 7) geographic location of the school, 8) community school or non-community school, and 9) student withdrawal from school. Ten districts in the State of Florida were selected for the study giving a total of 375 schools. The districts were selected to provide a diversity in geographic location, population size, average family income, percent urban, median education, and number of white collar workers."

Carter, G. M. <u>Designing Safe Environments IV: Sample Size Requirements</u>. Unpublished manuscript, Santa Monica, California: Rand Corporation, June 1978.

Carter, R. L., and K. Q. Hill. "Area Images and Behavior: An

Alternative Perspective for Understanding Crime". in D. E. Georges and K. D. Harries (eds.), <u>Crime A Spatial Perspective</u>. New York: Columbia University Press, 1981.

Casserly, Michael D., Scott A. Bass, and John R. Garrett. <u>School Vandalism: Strategies for Prevention</u>. Lexington, Massachusetts: Lexington Books, 1980.

As indicated by the authors, the text has a twofold goal. "First, we have tried to compile the major theories and research bearing on school vandalism and the most significant strategies for dealing with it. The major themes and patterns are highlighted throughout the text. Second, we have attempted to put vandalism into a strictly educational context. It was our conviction that good schooling was made of more than the absence of chaos. Still needed were security programs that complemented the long-range goals of our educational system: a literate and productive citizenry. Although the book contains a number of practical strategies, it is not a catalog. Nor does it offer any definitive programs or prescriptions. What it does provide is a context for current thinking about the incidence of vandalism and

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its prevention."

Major topics within the text include: an overview of school vandalism, an overview of current research, descriptions of the major kinds of vandalism-prevention currently used, numerous case studies (including one in Florida), strategies that may be implemented at the district level, and summary conclusions.

Clark, Ronald and Patricia Mayhew (eds.). Designing Out Crime. London: Home Office and Research Planning Unit, 1980.

Conklin, J.E. "Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design" in Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design Theory Compendium. Arlington, Virginia: Westinghouse National Issues Center, 1978.

Cooper, J. Environmental Factors Relating to Violence: A Second Report of Mayor Lastman's Committee on Violence. Borough of North York, Toronto, 1974.

Crowe, Timothy D. Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design. Stoneham, Massachusetts: Butterworth-Heinemann, 1991.

As indicated by its author, "the Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design (CPTED) program has rejuvenated an

interest in age-old concepts of environmental psychology. The program has helped to redefine strategies and concepts that had become submerged in a morass of conflicting opinions and beliefs about planning and design. The renewed interest in CPTED has resulted in a wide range of activity that has suffered from a lack of direction. Persons who are actively attempting to implement CPTED concepts have experienced difficulty in obtaining up-to-date materials and guidelines. This book was prepared to provide a fundamental introduction to the history and development of CPTED. It establishes a common basis for the orientation and education of those who are trying to incorporate CPTED concepts into their ongoing planning and development activities."

The text contains numerous tables and simple illustrations to help explain the main concepts.

_____. Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design: A Training Manual. Washington, D.C.: Federal Bureau of Investigation, October 1988.

_____. "Clean, Well-lighted Places: A Natural Approach to

Retail Security". International Security Review, London, England, 1988.

_____. "An Ounce of Prevention: A New Role for Law Enforcement". FBI Bulletin. Washington, D.C.: Federal Bureau of Investigation, October 1988.

Crowe, T. D., E. Pesce and A. Reimer. Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design: School Demonstration Plan. Westinghouse Electric Corporation, 1976.

Daniels, Henry W. "Vandalism: A Comparative Study Of Some Of The Effects Of Community Education In Public Schools." Doctoral Dissertation, Florida Atlantic University, Boca Raton, Florida, 1976.

"The purpose of this study was to determine if there is a significant difference between the occurrence of vandalism in community schools as compared with the occurrence of vandalism in non-community schools. A survey instrument was developed and sent to community schools in Dade County, Florida. The stratified sample of community schools was matched with a sample of corresponding non-community schools which also

received the survey instrument containing thirty-seven variables. The completed instruments from thirty matched pairs of schools were coded and forwarded to the Florida Atlantic University Computer Center for processing and analysis."

DeGruchy, G.F. and G.J. Hansford. <u>Crime and Architecture in Brisbane</u>. Vols. 1 & 2, Department of Architecture, University of Queensland, St. Lucia, 1979 & 1980.

Department of Education and Science Building Bulletin No. 69, <u>Crime Prevention in Schools: Specification, Installation and Maintenance of Intruder Alarm Systems</u>. London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, Crown Copyright 1989.

"In recent years there has been a considerable increase in the use of expensive equipment such as micro computers and video recorders in our schools. This has made many schools more susceptible to incidents of break-ins and theft. Intruder alarm systems have an important role to play in preventing crimes of this nature in schools. This building Bulletin offers practical advice on the selection, installation and use of intruder alarm systems."

In addition to the planning, design, operation and

maintenance of alarm systems, the Bulletin contains 4 case studies and numerous illustrations and diagrams.

Dunn, C. S. "The Analysis of Environmental Attribute/Crime Incident Characteristic Interrelationships". Doctoral dissertation, State University of New York. Dissertation Abstracts International, 1977, (University Microfilms).

Edgar, J. M. and R. King. NCJRS Bibliography: Crime and School Security. Washington, DC: National Criminal Justice Reference Service, 1974.

Education U.S.A. Special Report. Vandalism and Violence: Innovative Strategies Reduce Cost to Schools. Arlington, Virginia: National School Public Relations Association, 1971.

This Special Report, a result of a 1970 nationwide survey, reveals the increased rate of vandalism and the emerging trend toward more serious crime. In addition to a descriptive overview, the document examines six primary issues: violence and vandalism; the quest for security; the various roles of security personnel; insurance; working with students; and community involvement as an essential ingredient. An appendix is a physical

plant survey as excerpted from the Los Angeles City School District Manual on Property Protection.

Education U.S.A. Special Report. Violence and Vandalism: Current Trends in School Policies and Programs. Arlington, Virginia: National School Public Relations Association, 1975.

Published shortly after the 1975 release of United States Senate Preliminary Report of the Subcommittee to Investigate Juvenile Delinquency, Sen. Birch Bayh, Chairman, this report examines the facts and figures of violence and vandalism and various programs and practices used throughout the nation to retain safe educational environments. Focused primarily on big-city schools, the report examines the expanding rates of crime and violence, includes case studies from throughout the nation, and discusses the roles of principals, the students, school security, the community, and the police force in combating school crime.

Evans, David J., Nicholas R. Fyfe, and David T. Herbert, Crime Editors. Policing and Place: Essays in Environmental Criminology. London: Routledge, 1992.

"Spiralling crime rates and continuing public concern about police-community relations ensure that crime and policing remain firmly on the social and political agenda. An awareness of crime continues to affect the lives of ordinary people and also to stimulate policy-makers who recognize that crime rates form one of the litmus papers by which their effectiveness is judged. Drawing in case material from Britain, Europe, Canada and America, Crime Policing and Place the significance of spatial patterns and the processes which produce them. The contributors are drawn from a variety of academic disciplines which include criminology, geography and social policy and also from police and government agencies with direct inputs into policy."

Fabin, J. "Crime Prevention Through Physical Planning". Crime Prevention Review, April 1974, pp. 1-7.

Feeney, F. and A. Nair. The Geography of Robbery. Davis, California: University of California, 1974.

Fitch, J.M. American Building: The Environmental Forces That Shape It. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1972.

Fowler, F. and T. W. Mangione. Implications of Map and Fear Data for

Crime Control Design. Boston: Center for Survey Research, The University of Massachusetts/Boston: the Joint Center for Urban Studies of MIT; and Harvard University, 1974.

Fremont/Richmond Police Departments. Crime Prevention/Reduction of Services and Environmental Design. Fremont, California: The Police Foundation, 1972.

Geason, Susan and Paul R. Wilson. Designing Out Crime: Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design. Canberra, Australia: Australian Institute of Criminology, 1989.

As indicated by the authors, "this booklet contains straightforward and sensible advice, directed mainly to Australian home-owners and builders, about ways of avoiding or minimizing the risk of becoming a victim of certain types of crime. It is a booklet which forms part of a series being produced by the Australian Institute of Criminology designed to assist all citizens to make our nation a safer place in which to live."

Although not directed to the design of educational facilities, the text contains numerous strategies and illustrations that can readily be applied to American schools.

Heald, K.A. Designing Safe Environments: III Testing Procedures. Unpublished manuscript, Santa Monica, California: Rand Corporation, July 1978.

Hebert, Elizabeth, and Anne Meek. Children, Learning & School Design. Winnetka, Illinois: Winnetka Public Schools, 1992.

"To build on the growing recognition that collaborative conversation is a necessary ingredient in school reform and to extend the opportunity for conversation between educators and architects as they plan new and remodeled spaces for learning, the first national conference for architects and educators was convened in conjunction with the Crow Island School's 50th anniversary as a national and educational landmark. The conference was held in November 1990 under the sponsorship of the Winnetka Public Schools, the American Institute of Architects, Cranbrook Educational Community, and the American Association of School Administrators."

The five chapters of the text are: "Working Together", "School Design in the 1990s: Outlook and Prospects", "The Connection Between Learning and the Learning Environment",

"Crow Island: A Place Built for Children", and "The Collaboration".

Hope, Tim. <u>Burglary in Schools: The Prospects for Prevention</u>. Home Office Research Studies, London, England: 1982.

As indicated by the author, "burglaries in schools are only a small fraction (about 4%) of the total number of burglaries recorded by the police each year. Probably for this reason the offence has received less attention from policy-makers and criminologists than residential burglary. Schools, however, are actually at considerable risk of burglary: in London, Metropolitan Police figures suggest that a school or college is 38 times more likely to be burgled that a residential dwelling, and a similar picture seems to hold in other parts of the world. Schools are also more likely to be set on fire than all other classes of property."

Included in the text are chapters on the characteristics of school burglary and school design, opportunities for burglary, a review of preventive measures, and an approach to prevention.

Jackson, M. <u>Schools That Change: A Report On Success Strategies For Disruption, Violence, And Vandalism In Public Schools</u>.

Washington, DC: National Institute of Education, 1976.

Jeffery, C. Ray. Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design (2nd edition). Beverly Hills, California: Sage Publications, 1977.

As indicated by the author, "we still persist in reforming the offenders and in reforming the criminal justice system rather than reforming the environment, and providing services rather than research, on the assumption that the causes of crime reside in the individual, not the environment, and on the assumption that we do not need research because we already know how to rehabilitate offenders."

The text contains 18 chapters grouped under 5 main headings: "Introduction - Crime Control"; "The Deterrent Model"; "The Rehabilitation Model"; "A New Model - Crime Control Through Environmental Engineering"; and "Policy for Crime Control".

Klaus, D. and A. Gunn. Serious School Crime: A Review Of The Literature. Washington, DC: American Institutes for Research, 1977.

Laymon, R.S. Architectural Design and Crime Prevention. Washington,

D.C.: National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice, U.S. Department of Justice, 1974.

Lentz, P., R. Sternhall, and C. Lyle. The Limits of Lighting: The New Orleans Experiment in Crime Reduction. The Mayor's Criminal Justice Coordinating Council, April 1977.

Letkemann, P. Crime at Work. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall, 1973.

Lewis, H. An Analysis of Public Safety as Related to the Incidents of Crime in Parks and Public Areas. U.S. Department of Transportation, (NTIS No. PB 220770).

Liechenstein, M. Designing for Security. New York: The Rand Corporation, 1971.

Malt, H.L., Associates. An Analysis of Public Safety as Related to the Incidence of Crimes in Parks and Recreation Areas in Central Cities. Prepared for the Department of Housing and Urban Development. Washington, DC: H.L. Malt Associates, 1972.

Mann, L. and G. Hageirk. "The New Environmentalism: Behaviorism and Design". Journal of the American Institute of Planners, September 1971.

McPartland, James M. and Edward L. McDill, (editors). Violence in

Schools: Perspectives, Programs and Positions. For the Council For Educational Development and Research, Lexington, Massachusetts: Lexington Books, 1977.

As indicated by the editors, "the papers compiled in this book will both disturb and encourage those concerned with the state of public education in America. It is indeed a disturbing notion to contemplate that fear of violence has become a source of deep concern for so many elements of the educational community. At the same time, however, it is a source of encouragement to note that members of this community are deeply engaged in a thoughtful and wide ranging analysis of ways in which we can make our schools a better place to teach and learn. It should be apparent from reading these papers that there are no easy solutions, and approaches that advocate the quick cure will fail because they ignore the complex and diverse causes of violence and vandalism.

This volume is a collection of a wide range of viewpoints, analyses, and suggestions on the topic of school violence. The chapters are organized into four parts: perspectives, programs,

positions, and summaries."

Molumby, T. "Evaluation of the Effect of Physical Design Changes on Criminal Behavior". Doctoral dissertation, St. Ambrose University, 1981.

Morris, T. The Criminal Area: A Study in Social Ecology. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1958.

Motoyama, Tetsuro; Herb Rubenstein, and Peter Hartjens. The Link Between Crime and the Built Environment. Washington, DC: American Institutes for Research, July 1980.

Murillo, Robert B. "Vandalism and School Attitudes." Doctoral Dissertation, The Florida State University, Tallahassee, Florida, 1977.

"This study attempts to accomplish several missions: 1) to test the hypothesis that school vandalism varies with students' school attitudes; 2) to examine the effect of administrative style on the students' school vandalistic behavior; and 3) to conduct a generalized survey of vandalism which is to provide primitive information on the nature and extent of student involvement in vandalism in general, the social, academic and demographic

correlates of vandalism, and the conditions and factors attending

their acts of vandalism."

National Committee for Citizens in Education. <u>Violence In Our Schools:</u>
<u>What To Know About It , What To Do About It,</u> Columbia,
Maryland: National Committee for Citizens in Education, 1975.

National Institute for Citizen Education in the Law, and National
Crime Prevention Council. <u>Teens, Crime, and the Community:</u>
<u>Education and Action for Safer Schools and Neighborhoods</u>. New
York, New York: West Publishing Company, 1988.

> *"The National Institute for Citizen Education in the Law*
> *(NICEL) and the National Crime Prevention Council (NCPC)*
> *joined forces in 1985 to tell secondary school students about ways*
> *they can make themselves, their families, their friends, and their*
> *communities safer. As part of this effort, teens are challenged to*
> *make the places where they live, work, and attend school safer and*
> *more pleasant. (Proposed) community projects, led by students*
> *working with adults, will help build in each young participant a*
> *stronger sense of self as a contributing member of the community*
> *with a stake in its future."*

The eleven chapters include such topics as: "Crime and Crime Prevention", "Violent Crime", "Child Abuse", "Acquaintance Rape", "Substance Abuse", "Drunk Driving", "Property Crime and Vandalism", and "Criminal and Juvenile Justice".

National School Safety Center. <u>School Safety Check Book</u>. Malibu, California: Pepperdine University Press, 1988.

The National School Safety Center, a partnership of Pepperdine University and the United States Departments of Justice and Education, created the Check Book in response to the growing need to "develop strategies that promote safe, secure and peaceful campuses." As described by its authors, the document "is designed to minimize student and staff victimization risks by helping evaluate where a school district stands in terms of effective school safety and school crime-prevention programs. The emphasis is on the process, not the solutions. The solutions will vary with each school, district and state." The text examines four main issues that should be simultaneously addressed: school climate and discipline, school attendance, personal safety, and school security. The text includes charts, sample forms, model

programs, and school design strategies.

_____. School Safety Legal Anthology. Sacramento, California: Pepperdine University Press, 1985.

As indicated in the Introduction, "this legal anthology presents contemporary thoughts covering a broad range of topics in education and school safety from a national perspective. It covers four major areas: (1) an overview of schools in American society from historical and legal perspectives; (2) an exploration of some aspects of school crime; (3) restitution, parental liability, Article I - Section 28c of the California Constitution - the 'safe schools' provision, and law-related education as potential aids in improving school climate; and (4) the legal profession's role in education."

Neill, S. B. Violence and Vandalism: Current Trends In School Policies And Programs. Arlington, Virginia: National School Public Relations Association, 1975.

Newman, O. Defensible Spaces: Crime Prevention Through Urban Design. New York: Macmillan, 1972.

_____. Architectural Design for Crime Prevention. New York:

New York University, March 1973. (U.S. Government Printing Office).

_____. Design Guidelines for Creating Defensible Space. Washington, DC: Law Enforcement Assistance Administration, April 1976.

Olton, Andre L. "Perceptions of School Environment and Locus Control as Determinants of Outcome in Three School-Based Drug Abuse Prevention Projects." University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee, 1992.

"Locus of control and student perceptions of school environment were investigated for their effect on outcome in an Alternatives-based drug abuse prevention project. A total of 103 self-selected students from three urban schools were randomly assigned into experimental and control groups. A pretest-posttest experimental design was utilized. The outcome measures were drug use, student use of drug alternatives to deal with negative moods/states, and self-esteem. A case study on implementation factors was also conducted. The case study results emphasized the importance in all three schools of administrative support and backing for the prevention projects."

Pablant, P. and J. C. Baxter. "Environmental Correlates of School Vandalism". American Institutes of Planning, July 1975, pp. 270-279.

Pesce, E. J., I. R. Kohn, and H. M. Kaplan. Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design: Final Report, Phases II and III, July 1976-1978. Arlington, Virginia: Westinghouse Electric Corporation, July 1978.

Pink, William and David E, Kapel. "Decentralization Reconsidered: School Crime Prevention Through Community Involvement." In School Crime and Disruption, ed. Ernst Wenk and Nora Harlow. Davis, California: Responsible Action, 1978, pp. 146-54.

Poyner, Barry. Design Against Crime: Beyond Defensible Space. London: Butterworths, 1983.

As stated in the Foreword, "From a Police viewpoint, Mr. Poyner's book is useful and timely. It is useful because it lists in the form of readily assimilable 'patterns for design and management' ways in which the environment can be manipulated in order to reduce opportunities for committing crime. It is timely because the police, faced with virtually static resources and ever

increasing crime rates, are turning to crime prevention through environmental design as an approach that promises to be more effective than any traditional Police methods."

In addition to providing a general overview of "Crime Prevention and the Environment", "Protecting Schools From Crime" is one of the 6 chapters that addresses particular environments. The text contains numerous photographs and illustrations to reinforce the major points.

Pyle, G. F. The Spatial Dynamics of Crime. Chicago: Department of Geography, University of Chicago, Research Paper #159, 1974.

Quarles, Chester L. School Violence: A Survival Guide for School Staff, With Emphasis on Robbery, Rape, and Hostage Taking. Washington, D.C.: National Education Association, 1989.

As indicated by the author, "very few textbooks, monographs, and school crime prevention materials provide school staff with direction on personal crisis management and employee safety when confronted with school crime and violence. This monograph addresses these issues. It answers such questions as, how to deal successfully with violent crimes in the school; how to

survive attempts at robbery, rape, and armed assault; how to protect students and school staff when a mentally ill person or terrorist takes an entire class hostage. Finally, this monograph emphasizes crime prevention, school security, and school safety are everyone's responsibility."

Reppetto, T.A. "Crime Prevention and the Displacement Phenomenon". <u>Crime and Delinquency</u>, April 1976, pp. 22-24.

Rubel, R. <u>The Unruly School: Disorders, Disruption, And Crimes</u>. Lexington, Massachusetts: Lexington Books, 1977.

Southern California Association of Governments. <u>Handbook of Crime Prevention Bulletins: Crime Prevention Through Physical Planning</u>. Los Angeles: Southern California Association of Governments, 1971.

Stanley, Paul R. A. <u>Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design: A Review</u>. Ottawa: Office of the Solicitor General of Canada, 1977.

"There is growing interest in the use of environmental design to reduce the incidence of certain types of criminal activity. Crime Prevention approaches based on attempts to identify social,

psychological and economic origins of crime have failed to produce significant practical results. This paper presents an overview of the theory and evidence which gave rise to the environmental design approach. It presents the rise to the environmental design approach. It presents the basic principles and techniques of 'defensible space' - aimed essentially at producing a physical environment supportive of the social control of crime - and looks at the range of options for target hardening; examples of current applications are cited."

Steffy, Gary R. <u>Architectural Lighting Design</u>. New York, New York: Van Nostrand Reinhold, 1990.

Strobl, Walter M. <u>Crime Prevention Through Physical Security</u>. New York State: Marcel Dekker Inc., 1978.

As indicated in the Foreword, the text "is a unique combination of technical information and professional experience that will be valuable to broad range of security interests. The book will be valuable to the security generalist who needs a solid introduction or review of the technical aspects of security hardware and will be a practical guide to the analysis of security

problems and the application of solutions."

Included in the twenty-four chapters are such topics as: defining and analyzing existing hazards, securing the facilities' perimeter, security of open areas, security through electronics and closed circuit television systems, and design to reduce school property loss.

Struder, R.G. "Behavior Technology and the Modification of Criminal Behavior Through Environmental Design and Management". Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design Theory Compendium. Arlington, Virginia: Westinghouse National Issues Center, 1978.

Tien, M. J., T. A. Repetto, and L. F. Hanes. Elements of CPTED. Arlington, Virginia: Westinghouse Electric Corporation, 1975.

Turner, S. "Delinquency and Distance" in M. E. Wolfgang and T. Sellin (eds.), Delinquency: Selected Studies, New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1969.

_____. "The Ecology of Delinquency" in M. E. Wolfgang and T. Sellin (eds.), Delinquency: Selected Studies. New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1969.

Tyska, Louis A. and Lawrence J. Fennelly and Associates, (eds.).

Security in the Year 2000 and Beyond. Palm Springs, California:

ETC Publications, 1987.

This collection of essays written by security professionals

was gathered by the editors in their belief that "it is the

responsibility of the security professional of today to stimulate

thought for those who follow in the future. It is our wish that this

work will serve as a planning aid for the professionals and

managers concerned with crime prevention and asset protection.

It is also a goal that students of Business, Economics, Law,

Humanities and Criminal Justice will gain a futuristic perspective

from the thoughts expressed by contributors."

Included in the twenty-three essays are: "Moral and Social

Implications in the Year 2000", "Crime Prevention Techniques",

"Asset Protection", "College Security", and "Sporting Event

Security". Although not directly related to primary and secondary

education, many of the strategies are applicable to public schools.

United States Senate, Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee to

Investigate Juvenile Delinquency. School Violence and

Vandalism: Models and Strategies For Change, Vol. 2, Washington, DC, 1975.

Vestermark, Seymour D, and Peter D. Blauvelt. Controlling Crime in the School: A Complete Security Handbook for Administrators. West Nyack, New York: Parker Publishing Company, Inc., 1978.

As indicated by the authors, "this book is for those who have to do something about security problems which now trouble our schools. It is especially for the person on the firing line who ends up in the middle - the principal and those other administrators who are in charge of the security of a school." Through intelligence gathering and analysis, as well as providing tested strategies and tactics, the "objective of this book is to help you now" and to "help you do something practical now to make your school a safer and better place to be. There is much you can do."

The fourteen chapters in the text include such topics as: "Choosing a Basic School Security Program", "Designating types of Personnel for the Security Job", "Dealing With the Major Types of School Crime", "Vandalism", "Bomb Threats", "Confronting the Drug Problem", and "What Students Can Do in School Security".

Watson, Lee. Lighting Design Handbook. New York, New York: McGraw-Hill, Inc., 1990.

Weinstein, N. D. "The Statistical Prediction of Environmental Preferences: Problems of Validity and Application". Environment and Behavior, December 1976, pp. 611-627.

Wenk, Ernst and Nora Harlow (eds.). School Crime and Disruption. Davis, California: Responsible Action, 1978.

"The present anthology, sponsored by the National Institute of Education, is part of the national effort to respond to the school crime problem by gathering and disseminating information on its probable causes and potential solution. The focus of this work differs somewhat from that of earlier works. Casual theories and statistical data are considered important, but the primary emphasis in this collection is on practical approaches to school crime prevention and control. It is hoped that this varied selection of papers will contribute to a fuller understanding of the school crime problem. An even more important objective of this volume, however, is to aid school personnel in developing effective responses to crime in their schools, based on the ideas and

experiences of others in this field."

Westinghouse National Issues Center. Crime Prevention Through environmental Design: Final Report on Schools Demonstration, Broward County, Florida. Arlington, Virginia: Westinghouse, May 1978.

_____. CPTED Commercial Demonstration Evaluation Report. Evanston, Illinois: Westinghouse, 1979.

Whitcomb, D. Focus on Robbery: The Hidden Cameras Project - Seattle, Washington. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Abt Associates, 1978.

Williams, Robert Bruce and Joseph L. Venturini. School Vandalism Cause and Cure. Saratoga, California: Century Twenty One Publishing, 1981.

As indicated by the authors, "that the single most important change that ought to occur in many of our schools has to do with the creation of a leaning environment that places student needs and aspirations in proper perspective. Dewey argued long ago for a student-centered classroom. Transposed, we would stress the importance of a person-centered school administration, wherein

the student achieves a worthy self-image, is free to interact with peers, teachers and administrators, and is given a sense of responsibility for over-all pride in one's school and its management. We look upon the learning environment not only in terms of school buildings and their components, but an environment that embraces the greater community, manifested in an on-going team work of school-community cooperation."

The text contains sections on the causes of vandalism, a diagnostic approach to prevention, reports from superintendents, and specific recommendations.

Zeisel, J. <u>Schoolhouse: Designing Schools To Minimize Damage From Vandalism And Normal Rough Play</u>. New York, New York: Educational Facilities Laboratory, 1974.

Zeisel, John. <u>Stopping School Property Damage: Design and Administrative Guidelines to Reduce School Vandalism</u>. Arlington, Virginia: American Association of School Administrators, 1976.

This book "presents schools and school officials an opportunity to implement local strategies which can cut the cost of

both intentional and accidental school property damage. It provides practical guidelines to design future school buildings and to set up administrative programs for existing structures which can be immensely helpful to a district confronted by these problems. Proposals were developed through extensive interviews with experienced educators, architects, and students throughout the country and represent logical, straightforward approaches to the problems of school vandalism."

The text is supplemented by numerous checklists and illustrations to emphasize certain primary issues.

Documents

Boston Commission on Safe Public Schools. Making Our Schools Safer For Learning: The Report of the Boston Commission on Safe Public Schools. Boston, Massachussetts: Safe Schools Commission, 1983.

As indicated in the executive summary the Commission is convinced "that there is too much disruption, violence and fear in the schools, though some schools are much safer than others. It was found that the problems now consist primarily of classroom disruption, theft, vandalism, possession of weapons and drugs, disorder on some buses, and one-on-one physical injuries." Further, "the Commission found that official statistics appear to understate the amount of disorderly behavior in the schools."

Although the document does not address CPTED strategies, it does detail 12 specific policy recommendations to create safer schools. DP

Coleman, Joseph C. "Procedure: School Security." In Crime to Court: Police Officer's Handbook (pp. 17-21), Columbia, South Carolina:

South Carolina Criminal Justice Academy, 1989.

"Communication is the key in the cooperative efforts between school administrators, teachers, law enforcement officers, and the community to make schools safe for children.

Accessibility to campuses, isolated areas within schools, and lack of supervision all contribute to school violence. Recommendations for school security include having police officers and school administrators take a walk around the campus together, instituting visitor regulations, installing sound alarms on doors out of sight of the school office, using convex mirrors to increase visibility in halls, and eliminating faculty restrooms. Weapons use may be reduced through combined efforts of the schools, parents, and law enforcement personnel. The community can help by protecting children traveling to and from school through various neighborhoods. Primary prevention and intervention techniques within the school are often successful in treating habitual juvenile offenders. Child protection services and other community agencies need to network with law enforcement agencies to become more effective. Finally, schools can share

information on successes or even mistakes that have led to violence."

Connecticut State Department of Education. <u>Safe School Guide</u>. Hartford, Connecticut: November 1980.

As described by the book's authors, "this handbook is designed to assist persons who are concerned with preventing or minimizing property damage to schools through vandalism, arson, and theft, and with avoiding bodily injuries in and around school buildings. Many of the suggestions, while directed at the planning of new buildings, can be adapted to lessen the incidence of vandalism and injury in existing buildings. The guide treats six aspects of a total security system: the school site, including grounds, roads, parking lots, and play areas; the exteriors of buildings, including hidden spaces, doors, windows, locks and lights; the interiors of buildings, including community areas, laboratories, shops and classrooms; the location and protection of fire alarms, exits, trash containers, mirrors, and lockers; internal security, including alarm systems; and deterrent programs such as school watches, security officers, and live-in or 24-hour

custodial services."

The text is supplemented by a number of simple line drawings to accentuate specific points.

Crowe, Timothy D. <u>CPTED Broward County School Demonstration</u>. Fort Lauderdale, Florida.

Florida Commission on Education Reform and Accountability. <u>Blueprint 2000</u>. Tallahassee, Florida: 6 October 1992.

"The mission of the Florida Commission on Education Reform and accountability is to guide and oversee the implementation of a system of school improvement and accountability which will result in educational excellence and the highest level of student learning . . . " Within this document, Goal 5 of 7 goals presented describes "School Safety and Environment." This goal has a number of working assumptions including:

1. *Schools provide an environment for students and staff that promotes good health and is free of violence, weapons, hazards, vandalism, and substance abuse.*

Within this standard are two key elements:

1.   *A collaborative agreement exists among the school district and other stakeholders to keep the school campus free of disruptive influences, create a mechanism to enhance the environment in the community at large, and establish specific responsibility for maintaining a safe, healthy, and drug-free environment.*

2.   *Schools collaborate with law enforcement and other stakeholders to ensure a safe school environment that is free of violence, weapons, vandalism, hazards, and substance abuse.*

Florida Department of Education. Educational Facilities "Safe Schools" Self-Assessment Checklist. Tallahassee, Florida: 4 November 1992.

Responding to increased concern within the State of Florida over the "threat of serious disruption of the educational process and the attendant possibility of personal harm to students, faculty and staff from the presence and use of drugs and weapons and the incidence of crime and violence on school campuses," the State Department of Education revised a checklist originally prepared

by Timothy Crowe in the late 1970s. The checklist is intended as "a beginning guide for facility planners and administrators to help determine if their facilities are safe, secure, orderly, and peaceful learning environments," and includes elements developed as part of the CPTED (Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design) Program.

The checklist asks a series of questions about each of the key elements of schools design: parking lots, bike parking areas, bus loading zones, exterior gathering areas, play areas, building perimeters, entrances, windows, roofs, interior gathering areas, interior corridors, assembly areas, stairwells and toilet rooms. In addition, the checklist includes questions about issues of policy and programming for security and safety.

Illinois Office of Education. <u>Toward Safer Schools in Illinois</u>. Springfield, Illinois: Vol. 1, 1978

"This report, one of two related volumes, is the work of an Illinois task force on school violence and vandalism. It presents the task force's findings regarding the nature and extent of the problem, a summary of its major recommendations to local

districts, and recommendations for state-level considerations. The report begins with an analysis of school crime, including costs, victims, and trends. Some local approaches described for dealing with school violence and vandalism include training of administrators, alternative education programs, and parental involvement. One general task force recommendation includes the sponsorship of workshops to provide information on how to handle the problems associated with violence and vandalism."

Kaplan, Howard M., Kenneth C. O'Kane, Paul J. Lavrakas, and Edward Pesce. Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design Final Report on Commercial Demonstration Portland, Oregon. Arlington, Virginia: Westinghouse Electric Corporation, May 1978.

Knox, G. W. and E. Tromanhauser. Findings from the 1991 Safe School Survey. Chicago, Illinois: Chicago State University Department of Criminal Justice, 1991.

"This survey was conducted in 1991 using a sample of approximately 500 students in a Chicago public high school to assess crime victimization in or near the school and the gang

problem.

About one-third of the students reported something worth over $1 had been stolen from them in school or on the way to or from school during the past 2 months. About 1 in 10 reported they had been physically attacked or assaulted, and 12 percent said they had been threatened with violence. About 5 percent indicated they had been robbed. Grade level significantly differentiated self-reported theft victimization but had no significant effect on assault, threats, or robbery. Male students appeared to face a higher risk of assault victimization than female students. Sex had no effect on reports of victimization for theft, threats of violence, or robbery. Most students reported street gangs in their school and indicated they had been asked to contribute money to gang members for "protection" in school. Over half of the students estimated that over 30 percent of their fellow classmates were gang members. Being affiliated with a gang resulted in a higher probability of being assaulted in school or on the way to or from school. Tables."

Modglin, T. "School Crime: Up Close and Personal." School Safety,

Spring 1989, pp. 9-11.

"A curriculum called *Teens, Crime and the Community* *(TC&C)* and developed jointly by the National Crime Prevention Council and the National Institute for Citizen Education in the Law combines education and student action to reduce crime in schools and to develop students' sense of mutual responsibility.

The curriculum has been funded nationally by the Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention (OJJDP) and locally by OJJDP and seven private foundations. It approaches crime prevention and personal safety issues from the teen's viewpoint, not that of a "worried adult." Teenagers examine how crime hurts them and their families, friends and neighbors. It challenges teenagers to learn and serve, to help find solutions, and to develop a stake in the community where they will soon be adults. The curriculum unit and its companion textbook provide a basis for classroom learning. In addition, student-led action projects address real needs of the school and neighborhood. More than 80,000 teenagers, 500 teachers, and large numbers of community resource persons are taking part in the project. Examples of

projects, list of ways students can make their school safer, and discussion of school and community and partnership programs."

Musheno, M. C., J. P. Levine, and D. J. Palumbo. Is "Defensible Space" a Defensible Theory?: An Evaluation of Closed-Circuit Television as a Crime Prevention Strategy. Presented at the National Conference on Criminal Justice sponsored by the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration, Washington, DC, February 1977.

National Institute of Education. Violent Schools - Safe Schools: The Safe School Study Report to Congress - Executive Summary. Washington, DC: U. S. Department of Health, Education and Welfare, 1977.

The Ninety-Third Congress, as part of the Education Amendments of 1974, required the Department of Health, Education and Welfare to conduct a study of the rising crime and violence in schools. "The objectives of that study were to determine the frequency and seriousness of crime in elementary and secondary schools in the United States; the number and location of schools affected by crime; the cost of replacement or repair of

objects damaged by school crime; and how school crime can be prevented."

National Institute of Justice. <u>The Link Between Crime and the Built Environment: The Current State of Knowledge</u>. Vol. 1, Washington, DC: U. S. Department of Justice, 1980.

"The purpose of this study is to assess the state of knowledge on the link between crime and the built environment (C/BE) as of the end of the 1970s. As such, the study is a snapshot of a changing scene. Several new important research projects are under way; more are planned. What follows is an interim report on where matters stand now, on a topic that is still in an exploratory phase. The individual (research) assessments are separately bound, in Volume II. In the Volume I, we synthesize the results".

The text is divided into four sections: "The Domain of the Study"; "The Logic Linking Crime and the Built Environment"; "State of the Evidence"; and "Conclusions and Implications".

National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice. <u>Architectural Design and Crime Prevention</u>. Washington, DC:

U.S. Department of Justice, 1973.

"Residential complexes can be designed to deter robbery, vandalism, and other building crime.   In this illustrated monograph, Professor Oscar Newman, an architect and city planner from New York University, suggests how the grouping of dwelling units, the definition of grounds, the provision of natural surveillance opportunities, the design of public interior areas, and the positioning of routes can significantly discourage criminal action."

Although directed toward residential design, the text includes numerous CPTED principles and strategies than can be applied to the design of educational facilities.

National School Resource Network. Core Curriculum to Assist Schools in Preventing and Reducing Violence, Vandalism, and Disruption: A Trainer's Guide. Washington, DC: Center for Human Services, 1979, 3 Vols. (Microfilm, 1,642 pgs.).

Prepared under a grant from the Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, Law Enforcement Assistance Administration, United States Department of Justice, the trainer's

guide is to be used in conjunction with a 5 day, 7 course, 35 hour
workshop program designed to help administrators, teachers,
students, counselors, security personnel, parents, and community
leaders in making our nation's schools safer and more positive
places to learn. The seven courses, or chapters, are: "Putting It All
Together and Taking It Home", "Discipline", "School Climate",
"Interpersonal Relations", "School Climate", "Security",
"Environment", and "The Community As a Problem Solving
Resource".

The sections dealing with security and environment contain
numerous CPTED strategies and procedures for designing safer
schools.

National School Safety Center. <u>School Crisis Prevention and Response:</u>
<u>NSSC (National School Safety Center) Resource Paper</u>. Encino,
California: National School Safety Center, 1989.

"This paper discusses school security issues, crisis
prevention strategies, crisis response, the aftermath of a crisis and
suicide clusters.

Schools have a legal responsibility to protect students and

staff from such threats as foreseeable criminal activity; identifiable dangerous students; dangerous persons negligently admitted to or placed in the school; and dangerous school staff negligently selected, retained, or trained. Some preventive security measures include a local school security committee that plans safety measures, a comprehensive crisis management plan, volunteers to patrol neighborhoods surrounding the school, limited access points to school grounds, and courses that teach students crime prevention measures and prosocial behaviors. Architectural planning for new schools should take into account crime prevention through environmental design. In planning for response to a crisis, schools should focus on assigning staff roles, communication, transportation, identification badges for emergency personnel, and media relations. The aftermath of a crisis must address post-traumatic stress symptoms, the grief process, counseling centers, and reassurance about school safety. Schools should also be prepared to address a cluster of suicides or suicide attempts. 19-item resource list (organizations and publications), appended relevant media articles."

_____. School Safety Check Book. Westlake Village, California: August 1990.

_____. Weapons in Schools: NSSC (National School Safety Center) Resource Paper. Encino, California: National School Safety Center, 1989.

"After examining the extent of the problem of weapons in schools and its causes, this paper reviews intervention and prevention strategies.

Data from various school districts indicate the widespread problem of students carrying weapons at school, and these statistics only represent those students caught with weapons. Some students carry weapons to show off or impress a friend; others carry them out of fear; and in many cases, weapons are a part of the proliferation of gang and drug activity in the schools. Some intervention strategies are school sweeps with portable metal detectors, hot lines for students to report persons with weapons, a school security force, and the requirement that students use only mesh book bags to make weapons easier to spot. Some schools require that students keep book bags and coats in their lockers

during school to make the concealment of weapons more difficult.

Prevention strategies include the teaching of prosocial skills to

promote a positive campus climate, courses in conflict resolution,

and tough sanctions for students who violate the weapons

prohibition. 27-item bibliography, news reports on weapons

incidents in schools."

Nielsen, Margaret ed. <u>Vandalism in Schools: A $200 Million Dollar</u>

<u>Problem</u>. Eugene, Oregon: University of Oregon, December 1971.

"This report is a compilation of strategies and preventive

devices that have been tested by school administrators and found

to be effective in the prevention of vandalism. The report discusses

which personnel should be responsible for controlling vandalism,

describes construction materials, and outlines policies for

controlling and deterring vandalism."

Passantino, Richard J. <u>Environmental Considerations When Designing</u>

<u>and Maintaining A Child's Day Care Center</u>. Washington, D.C.:

LEA/Passantino + Bavier Architects, Engineers, Planners.

Rubel, R. J., N. L. Ames and Abt Associates, Inc. <u>Reducing School</u>

<u>Crime and Student Misbehavior: A Problem-Solving Strategy</u>.

Washington, DC: United States Department of Justice/National Institute of Justice, 1986.

"Based upon school demonstration programs sponsored by the National Institute of Justice and the U.S. Department of Education, this book instructs school administrators in a program strategy for addressing crime on school grounds and how to obtain technical assistance resources for the implementation of such a program.

The demonstration program, which involves 44 schools in 3 school districts, encourages school personnel and community members to work together to help reduce school crime and student misbehavior. A key element of the program is an information management system designed to track the incidence of misbehavior and crime in school. The information obtained identifies weaknesses in the school disciplinary system so resources may target these districtwide concerns, school-based problems, and the individual classroom environment. This book first presents national statistics on the nature and extent of school-based crime and student misbehavior. It then discusses the etiology and

characteristics of school crime. Another section outlines steps for the diagnosis and action against school crime and misbehavior and delineates the responsibilities of officials at each level in the hierarchy of the educational system. The remainder of the book details the initiatives school administrators can take to achieve a safe and secure learning environment, using the lessons learned from the demonstration projects. Appended resources and program materials."

Rui Olds, Anita. Habitat for Humanity: The Real Client The Child. Orlando, Florida: Architecture for Education Conference, 1993.

Short, James F. "Schools and Communities as Behavior Settings for Juvenile Delinquency." In Delinquency and Society (pp. 84-105), Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1990.

"An adequate understanding of juvenile delinquency must be based on institutional relationships and school-community contexts.

Schools have become social settings in which delinquent behavior occurs, and school performance is a critical element in delinquent and criminal careers. A national study of violence in

schools found that about 10 percent of students are responsible for most vandalism and violence in schools. The study also concluded that the most likely students to be victimized are young, male, and members of racial and ethnic minorities. School crime occurs primarily when supervision is lacking or diminished, for example, in hallways, stairs, toilets, an locker rooms. Of all institutional contexts of delinquent behavior, the greatest amount of attention has focused on the family. Communities vary a great deal in the nature of institutional influence they exert on juvenile delinquency. A study of two small communities revealed that youth are very much involved in the expressive rather than the instrumental side of youth culture. Another study of black and white gang communities found that delinquent behavior in lower-class black communities, is more a part of the total life pattern in which delinquency is not as likely to create disjunctures with other types of behavior. In explaining juvenile delinquency, it is important to recognize that individuals, groups, institutions, and communities experience life in different ways. 29 notes, 2 tables, and 3 figures."

Stephens, Ronald D., <u>School Crisis Prevention and Response, NSSC</u>

Resource Paper. Malibu, California, March 1990.

The Council of Great City Schools, Special Projects: Report on Building Security, Washington, DC, 1977.

Tucson Police Department, Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design: Design Inventory. Tucson, Arizona.

This document contains a checklist of elements critical to school safety and security. The checklist was developed by the Tucson Department of Police for all aspects of community planning and design, and includes a section specifically devoted to schools. This section is broken into a series of sub-sections addressing issues of siting, building structure, parking, grounds, and miscellaneous considerations.

Tucson Police Department, Safe By Design. Tucson, Arizona.

Tucson Police Department, Team Tucson. Tucson, Arizona: 1989.

United States Department of Education, Office of Educational Research and Improvement. Public School Teacher Perspectives on School Discipline. Washington, DC: National Institute of Justice/National Criminal Justice Reference Service, 1987.

"This article summarizes the results of a survey of public

elementary and secondary school teachers on discipline problems in schools.

Data reported in this survey were collected by means of a mail survey with telephone followup. In the nationally representative sample of public school teachers, 44 percent reported there was more disruptive classroom behavior in their schools in 1986-1987 than five years before. Almost one third indicated that they had seriously considered leaving teaching because of student misbehavior. On the average, teachers estimated that about seven percent of the students they taught were habitual behavior problems. Most teachers reported that student behavior interfered with their teaching to a small extent (50 percent) or a moderate extent (26 percent). Almost 20 percent indicated that they had been threatened by a student at some time. While there are indications that teachers viewed their schools' discipline policy more favorable that they did in 1980, 34 percent still regarded it as not comprehensive enough; and 50 percent indicated it was not consistently applied."

United States House of Representatives Ninety-Third Congress. <u>Safe</u>

Schools Act. Hearing Before the General Subcommittee on Education of the Committee on Education and Labor. (First Session on H.R. 2650), Washington, DC: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1973.

"A Bill to amend the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965 to assist school districts to carry out locally approved school security plans to reduce crime against children, employees, and facilities of their schools."

University of Florida Bureau of Economic and Business Research. Florida Statistical Abstract. Gainesville, Florida: The University Presses of Florida, 1989, 1990, 1991 and 1992 Editions.

During the four year period 1989-1992 the number of arrests of persons under 18 years of age in the State of Florida has steadily increased from 53,754 to 94,988. DP

Virginia Crime Prevention Association, Overview of Safe Schools: Mechanics of Conducting Security Assessments of Schools. Richmond, Virginia, undated.

This document is based upon the proposition that "crime and related problems can be managed and prevented through the

application of a process that systematically attempts to reduce, or remove, the opportunity for crime." In addition to providing the procedure for conducting security assessments, a security checklist is included that breaks the school environment into 5 major zones: immediate neighborhood, property boundaries, open space, building exterior, and building interior.

Virginia Department of Criminal Justice Services, School Safety and Security Initiatives. Richmond, Virginia: October 1992.

Virginia Department of Criminal Justices Services, Virginia Crime Prevention Resource Directory. Richmond, Virginia.

Virginia Department of Criminal Justice Services, Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design: An Introductory Handbook. Richmond, Virginia: November 1984.

Virginia State Council of Higher Education & The Task Force on Campus Rape, Sexual Assault on Virginia's Campuses. Richmond, Virginia: Senate Document No. 17, 1992.

Virginia State Council of Higher Education & The Task Force on Campus Rape, Sexual Assault on Virginia's Campuses. Richmond, Virginia: Senate Document No. 30, 1992.

Virginia State Crime Commission, <u>Building Code Security Needs</u>. Richmond, Virginia: House Document No. 12, 1989.

Whitaker, Catherine J. and Lisa D. Bastian, BJS Statisticians. <u>Teenage Victims: A National Crime Survey Report</u>. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Justice, 1991.

As indicated in the Introduction, "from 1985 to 1988, persons age 12 to 19 were victims of 1.9 million violent crimes and 3.3 million crimes of theft annually. Teenagers were much more likely than adults to be victims of crimes of violence. On average, every 1,000 teenagers experienced 67 violent crimes each year, compared to 26 for every 1,000 adults."

Among the 23 Tables of statistics for the 1985-88 study period, Table No. 14 shows that 37% of all violent crimes and 81% of all thefts directed at the 12-15 year old age group occurred at school (17% and 39% respectively for the 16-19 age group).

White, Anthony G. <u>Architectural Design and Crime Prevention: A Revised Bibliography</u>. Monticello, Illinois: Vance Bibliographies, 1983.

Although directed to the topics of housing and

neighborhoods, many of the 120+ entries bear titles that are applicable to other building types and settings. DP

Letters

Florida Department of Education, Professional Services, by Suzanne A. Marshall. Tallahassee, Florida: November 30, 1990.

Florida Department of Education, Inspection of Gymnasium and Stadium Bleacher Seats, by Bobby L. Johnson. Tallahassee, Florida: June 24, 1991.

Florida Department of Education, Fire Alarm Systems Bleacher Seats, by Bobby L. Johnson. Tallahassee, Florida: December 10, 1991.

Florida Department of Education, Safety Reports - Approval of Board, by Bobby L. Johnson. Tallahassee, Florida: March 5, 1992.

Florida Department of Education, Changes to State Board of Education Rule 6A-2.0207, FAC (Supp. 92-3) (OEF Supplement No. 92-2), by Suzanne A. Marshall. Tallahassee, Florida, July 31: 1992.

Florida Department of Education, Changes to State Board of Education Rule 6A-2, FAC (Supp. 92-4) (OEF Supplement No. 92-3), by Suzanne A. Marshall. Tallahassee, Florida: August 31, 1992.

Florida Department of Education, Handicap Accessibility Guidelines, by Suzanne A. Marshall. Tallahassee, Florida: February 11, 1992.

Florida Department of Education, Statutory Changes in Facilities Requirements, by Suzanne A. Marshall. Tallahassee, Florida: September 26, 1992.

Florida Department of Education, Handicapped Accessibility, Chapter 89-97, Laws of Florida, by H. James Schroeer. Tallahassee, Florida: December 15, 1989.

Florida Department of Education, Changes to State Board of Education Rules 6A-2.032 and 6A-2.045, FAC OEF Supplement No. 92-1, by Suzanne A. Marshall. Tallahassee, Florida: August 31, 1992.

Florida Department of Education, Chapter 6A-2. Tallahassee, Florida: 1986.

Florida Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services, Chapter 10D-13, Florida Administrative Code: Food Service. Tallahassee, Florida: February 21, 1991.

Unpublished

Virginia Department of Criminal Justice Services, <u>Information Needs</u>.

Virginia Department of Criminal Justice Services, <u>Safe Schools Security Check List</u>.

Virginia Department of Criminal Justice Services, <u>Resources.</u> Richmond, Virginia: January 1993.

Appendix A

SAFE SCHOOLS DESIGN GUIDELINES

Recommendations for a Safe & Secure Environment
in
Florida's Public Schools
project number: 4950-33-10-056-LO

Available at Web site:
www.fccdr.usf.edu

BEST COPY AVAILABLE

prepared by: The Florida Center for Community Design + Research
for: The Florida Department of Education
date: July 28, 1993

acknowledgements

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The following Guidelines illustrate recommendations that are founded on principles and strategies of Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design (CPTED). These principles focus on safety and security issues with respect to the prevention of criminal activity on school campuses.

CPTED authors suggest that the design of the physical environment can affect the incident rate of crime. The Florida Center has found this to be an accurate statement, but realize that a large percentage of criminal activity can be reduced based on actions taken by individual school administrations. This could involve the development and implementation of security programs that integrate high-tech surveillance systems with School Resource Officers (SRO).

Not all CPTED recommendations are executed the same. In our research, we have read cases where schools address a safety/security issue the same conceptually, but manifest them differently. For instance the State of Connecticut Department of Education produced a Safe School

Guide in 1980 that advises to avoid planting trees and shrubs along sidewalks because they provide places for people to hide. In Florida, trees provide welcomed shade, and if properly maintained, visibility around planted areas can be accomplished. The Connecticut Safe School Guide also recommends to design main entrances and student "hangout" areas with minimal glazing to reduce potential vandalism. This is in conflict with the concept of creating "a sense of being watched" in these areas as indicated by the literature research, case study examinations, and interviews with school and law enforcement officials.

These Guidelines are presented to address issues in a general manner in order to respond to a variety of building types and siting conditions. These Guidelines do not differentiate between new construction and old construction, or between high schools, junior high schools, and elementary schools. However, these concepts for increasing safety and security levels are applicable at all grade levels, with specific adjustments

made for each individual school design.

In some cases, the recommendations will conform with the current requirements of Chapter 6A-2 - Florida Administrative Code - UBC.

Where recommendations are in conflict with the current UBC Requirements, a footnote will cross reference an explanation given in Chapter 5, Section 5C: Chapter 6A-2 - Florida Administrative Code, in the section titled Request for Recommendations.

LOCATION

The location of a school and its relationship to its immediate surroundings is critical in evaluating safety and security concerns. The differences in suburban, urban, and rural environments, both actual and perceived, has shaped the organization and design of Florida's schools.

Schools within a suburban neighborhood play a different role than the urban inner-city school or the rural school. Suburban schools are often embraced as an integral part of the community, and because of their proximity to residential areas they are readily accessible to their neighbors.

Schools located in urban surroundings are shaped by a greater perception of crime. Their organization and design is of an insular nature and discourages contact with the nearby population. Safety design criteria is greatly influenced by the protective face of the urban school.

Rural schools tend to be located in areas of dispersed population. Unlike schools located in subur-

ban and inner-city areas, rural schools do not have the benefit of a nearby residential population to provide visual surveillance. The availability of lower cost land allows the typical rural school campus to sprawl over a larger area and can make their perimeter more difficult to monitor and secure.

EDGE CONDITIONS

The edge, that is the part of the school grounds that contacts the street and adjacent property, defines the initial impression of a school. How a school's site design responds to its immediate surroundings is evident in its treatment of its edges. These edges communicate to the public messages of accessibility or total privacy.

For example, a school located in an industrial area could define its boundary by open fencing, but soften this hard edge by integrating trees and landscaping along it. This would provide an aesthetically pleasing screen to adjacent industries as well as discouraging unwanted visitors. Careful design can accommodate ample sight lines for visual surveillance.

Astute planning and design of site edges help define a school's property lines without continuous fencing or signs. Schools in rural districts with expansive tracts of land need only to create a visual line to define boundaries. For instance, this can be

accomplished with landscaping
arranged in a coherent pattern.
Rows of trees with canopies main-
tained above 8' accompanied with
low hedges work well to create an
edge while allowing visual
access.

CONNECTION

In suburban and inner-city areas careful site design can strengthen the connection between a school and its adjacent neighborhood. This connection is dependent upon school site location, orientation, and alignment on or to existing streets.

A school in an inner city area should screen nearby incompatible uses (warehouses, factories, railroad yards, etc.). Urban neighborhoods tend to be located close to the school yard, hence connections to adjoining residential blocks should be emphasized. In addition, neighborhood access to certain school facilities, such as a running tracks, courts, and play areas may be encouraged before and after school hours to provide increased passive surveillance.

The planting of a row of trees leading up to the main entrance of a school is a traditional pattern of urban schools in the early part of the 20th century, and can be adapted for today's suburban schools. Besides creating a clear view corridor, it establishes a cer-

emonial sequence between the school and the neighborhood. A coordinated street treatment, incorporating continuous sidewalks, landscaping, and a trimmed tree canopy should continue up to and wrap around the school property. It also helps define the public path from the street and private residential property.

LANDSCAPING

Careful consideration should be given when planning landscape arrangements and plant selections on school campuses. In Florida's climate, landscaping becomes an essential ingredient in the design of outdoor spaces.

Shade, protection from the wind, and the ability to act as noise and visual buffers are just a few of the benefits provided by thoughtful landscape design leading to a less stressful, hence safer, school environment.

Landscaping can provide protection from the wind. A large tree canopy has an enormous capacity to absorb high speed wind energy from storms and hurricanes. A wind break protects not only people but school structures as well. Care must be taken to use tree species that will resist winds and avoid certain softwoods which could split and create an additional hazard in a storm.

Trees can also provide shade, often far more economically than a built structure, and can provide

comfort and relief from the heat of Florida's subtropical sun. If tree canopies are trimmed to maintain an eight-foot clearance and are located with care, places people can hide are minimized.

Effective landscape design can create noise and visual buffer that help insulate outside play areas from nearby busy streets. Absorption of high decibel levels of noise before it reaches school grounds make verbal communication and surveillance easier.

Landscaping can also be used as a method of access control. Like walls and fencing, a tightly spaced row of trees incorporated with low level plants, can define an edge that leads to an opening or entrance. Larger trees, such as oaks and sable palms, lining sidewalks and driveways will deter potential motorists from driving onto property and damaging lawns and recreation fields.

The following pages illustrate recommendations for landscaping applications that facilitate both aesthetic and environmental needs while addressing issues of security and safety.

site design

EXTERIOR PEDESTRIAN ROUTES

Exterior pedestrian routes should be well defined with smooth walking surfaces, adequate lighting[1], and landscaping that allows visual access while providing shade.

Paths from drop off areas need to be wide enough to accommodate peak periods of use, thus preventing congestion, pushing, and accidents. Paving material should be non-skid, well marked, non-glare, and without sudden or dramatic changes of elevation. Canopies, either built or of trees, should be used to provide shaded areas for students to wait to board buses. This can help reduce conflicts caused by the psychological irritation of standing in the hot sun.

Covered walkways between buildings could be bordered with low shrubs and hedges planted at grade. Heights for border plants should not exceed 18". Taller hedges should be maintained in such a way so that one can see someone hiding behind them.

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[1]See Chapter 5, Section 5C, Recommendation 11, for minimum site illumination which, if adopted, would alter 6A-2.039

site design

Planters along exterior routes should be designed to allow easy maintenance and prevent vandalism. They typically become containers for stray refuse, or an option for seating, which in turn can damage the plants. Properly designed, these planters can integrate seating, lighting, and garbage containers.

VEHICULAR ROUTES & PARKING AREAS

These areas are the primary entry drive, parking lots, bus loading zones, and parent drop-off/pick-up areas. Vehicular routes and parking lots must be designed to handle the rush of people and vehicles at the peak unloading and loading times at the beginning and end of each day. Other times, these areas may be completely empty and unsupervised.

In general the safety and security of all of these areas benefit from the following design considerations. First, they should not be isolated from the school, but should be in close proximity to facilitate visual surveillance from classroom and administration areas. Second, these areas, especially classrooms should be provided with windows that overlook vehicular routes and parking areas. Third, external access to parking areas should be restricted to a limited number of controlled entrances. And finally, parking and vehicular routes should be adequately lit[2] with vandal-proof lighting.

[2]See Chapter 5, Section 5C, Recommendation 11 for minimum site illumination which, if adopted would alter 6A-2.039.

The entry drive should provide ample space for lanes coming in and out, and if possible, should be separated by a landscaped median. Wide sidewalks located on either side of the drive separates student pedestrian traffic from vehicular traffic. A landscaped safety buffer of trees and streetlamps between the sidewalk and entry lane will provide a physical barrier from errant cars. In this way safety and clear lines of sight can be provided in an aesthetically pleasing manner.

In small schools this entry drive will connect with the main entry of the school. This entry area and drive should be visible from the administration office. Because this office is always occupied during school hours, a constant watch can be kept on the primary door to the school.

The main drop-off area should be where visitors enter the school and parents pick up their children. Also, it is important to provide for emergency vehicles, especially if the infirmary is located near the administration area.

In some schools, especially larger high schools, the main entry drive may not be able to accommodate the large number of buses arriving at peak loading/unloading times. In this case it is better to segregate the bus loading area from other pedestrian and vehicular traffic. However, the waiting area should still be visible from the administration area, and the path from the bus area into the school should pass through the main entrance.

Parking lots should be located close to classroom and administration areas. Classrooms should be provided with sufficient windows to allow views of the parking lot, since each classroom represents 20 or 30 sets of eyes. Anyone intent on stealing or vandalizing a car in the lot must worry that he or she may be being watched. Special provision may have to be made for overflow lots for special and sporting events.

Issues of security and safety will affect the design and configuration of parking lots. Avoid the use of loose gravel or crushed rock for surfacing; spinning tires will toss

projectiles damaging other ve-
hicles and potentially injuring
pedestrians.

To maintain control over vehicles
entering and leaving, one entry
is ideal, especially for afterschool
events that may restrict parking
to certain people. If two entries
are needed they should be close
enough so that one person can
monitor both. Otherwise, two
people would be needed.

The layout of lots, particularly
those to be used by high school
students, should avoid long
straight layouts that allow cars
to speed through the lot endan-
gering pedestrians. Traffic calm-
ing devices such as speed humps
will greatly reduce the potential
for high speed activity. A traffic
signal located at the entry inter-
section can control the exiting
rush onto main thoroughfares.

Landscaping, providing it does
not obstruct lines of sight, is a
useful psychological influence to
slow drivers down.

RECREATIONAL AREAS

Supervision of recreational areas can be provided in new construction by organizing play areas along one axis to facilitate immediate visual surveillance of the entire area. School buildings placed on a higher elevation than the recreation area provide better opportunities for outlooks. Ramping down to the play area allows the physical education director to command a broad visual sweep of all activities from the high ground.

On flat sites, vantage points should be identified and provided to allow as unobstructed a visual surveillance as reasonable.

Multiple enclosures around individual tennis and basketball courts can provide greater control and frustrate would-be thieves. Additional envelopes of fencing make it more difficult to both penetrate into an area, and remove school property.

Interior fences can be a functional chain link material, while the outer public fence can have a more aesthetically pleasing appearance.

Inadvertent vandalism and damage to buildings and property can be reduced by locating hard court play areas away from buildings. When courts are too close to buildings, errant balls can mar walls and shatter windows. In situations were courts must be placed close to buildings, window openings should be protected with mesh covers that permit light and ventilation as well as emergency ingress and egress.

Nighttime visual access to recreational areas requires not only adequate illumination[3], but attention to the design of the edge conditions as well. Where play areas are adjacent to neighborhoods, streetedge plantings should have sufficient openings to allow visual sightlines to fields beyond. This allows the local community and passing patrol cars to monitor after-school recreational use.

[3]If by administrative policy recreation areas are accessible to the public for nighttime use, they should be provided with the same minimum level of illumination as indicated in Chapter 5, Section 5C, Recommendation 11.

SIGNAGE

It is important that signs not provide places for persons to hide behind. Signs need to be well lit in front with care taken to eliminate unnecessary side shadows. The ground behind the sign can be bermed up to prevent people from standing behind it. An alternative is to raise the sign high enough off the ground that a person's feet would be visible if they were hiding behind it. Another solution for preexisting signs is to plant thick hedges around the sign's base.

Signs can be instrumental in cutting down on lost and wandering visitors. Signs should have large lettering, bold graphics, simple directions, and be well lit.

site design

STORMWATER

Stormwater retention areas, necessary in Florida to control flooding and to filter pollution from rainwater runoff, can be simple grassy pits or fully landscaped ponds. Either must be safely enclosed to prevent accidental drowning.

The common pit surrounded by chain link fencing suffers from several problems. Because it is empty during the dry season it can be traversed and provide a place to hide at night in its low spots. People may circumvent the fence to ride bicycles and motorbikes up and down its slopes.

Maintaining it can be hazardous to groundskeepers mowing its steep slopes. Often located near the edge of the school grounds, they attract illegal dumping and their depressions collect trash.

Retention pits are also not as effective in filtering pollution as ponds. Finally their unattractive appearance creates a hostile barrier between the school and the nearby community.

The retention pond, while requiring more room, has many advantages. Designed to hold water even during the dry season, they can be used to form a physical barrier or moat to prevent trespassing to certain parts of the school. They can help segregate play and pedestrian areas from areas of heavy vehicular traffic.

The water in a retention pond allows it to support indigenous water plants that are effective in filtering heavy metal pollution washed from school parking areas by rainwater. Plants absorb excess nitrogen from fertilizer runoff. Shade trees planted along the banks of the pond help regulate a cool water temperature allowing the native flora and fauna to flourish. In this way it is possible to have a natural self regulating system that lowers maintenance costs.

An attractive landscaped retention pond can become an asset that serves to link the school and the local community. An alternative to utilitarian fencing can include landscaped low walls and wrought iron fencing. This facilitates the need for a protective barrier while permitting clear views to the pond.

BUILDING ORGANIZATION

The overall organization of a school can enhance the ability of school and public safety authorities in keeping it secure and discouraging burglaries.

The contemporary campus plan evolved from the availability of inexpensive land and the lower cost of constructing single story buildings. The haphazard arrangement of many campus schools contributes to the difficulty in maintaining safety and security.

Traditional school plan organizations were relatively compact. This was a reaction to the environmental concerns of natural daylighting and providing natural ventilation. Compact plans have the benefit of efficient interior circulation and minimal exterior surface area to maintain.

The narrow wings of traditional school organization lend themselves to common "alphabet" configurations- "U", "O", and "H" shaped buildings result in courtyards protected on three or four sides.

This allows ease of monitoring activity in the courtyard and helps provide shade and shelter. They also are easier to lock up and secure.

The distance from the street to the schools' open areas is critical to preventing burglaries.

Buildings that are set back from the street by long entry roads or vast parking lots are less likely to be patrolled by local authorities than buildings close to the street.

EXTERIOR COVERED CORRIDORS

Covered corridors provide protection from the rain and sun for primary exterior circulation paths. These structures should be designed to eliminate opportunities for persons to gain access to windows, roofs, or other upper level areas. Their design should also promote adequate visual surveillance and illumination as a deterrence against criminal activity during normal use[4].

Columns supporting covered corridors should be of a smooth finish, difficult-to-climb, building material. Plant trees away from walkways and buildings to prevent persons from climbing to gain access to upper levels.

Provide a "T" connection to entries to avoid using niches. This will allow a clear site line and circulation path unobstructed by doors or loitering students.

[4]See Chapter 5, Section 5C, Recommendations 5, 6, and 7, for minimum widths, room doors, and illumination, which, if adopted, would alter 6A-2.051(7)d, 6A-2.051(14)a2, 6A-2.051(14)a4, and 6A-2.065(4).

POINTS OF ENTRY

Ideally, the main point of entry should be at the front of the school and provide a safe, well lit[5], protected shelter for people entering the school. This area should be easily visible from the administration area, and so sufficient windows and glazed doors should be provided. An overhang should be large enough to shelter a large number of people from the sun and rain. This can prevent heatstroke during the summer, and wet and slippery surfaces during storms. The overhang should drain to the sides away from where people might enter it or where it meets the school building.

The main entry area should have a paved, non-slip surface and be sloped to connecting drives and sidewalks for handicap accessibility. Seating areas should be provided on either side especially if the front entry is the prime bus loading zone. The walkway must be wide enough to accommodate seating areas without obstructing normal pedestrian movement. Vandal proof lighting should be provided.

[5]See Chapter 5, Section 5C, Recommendation 11, for minimum site illumination, which, if adopted, would alter 6A-2.039.

Secondary entries require careful design to prevent them from becoming dark alcoves that someone can hide in. Completely hidden alcoves may shield door and stairs from inclement weather, but also can serve as concealed areas for criminal activity.

While secondary exterior entries should remain recessed for weather protection their alcoves can have improved visibility by the use of chamfered corners. These recesses should be limited by the same constraints applicable to interior room doors[6].

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
[6]See Chapter 5, Section 5C, Recommendation 6, which, if adopted, would alter 6A-2.051(14)a4.

ENCLOSED EXTERIOR SPACES

The overall organization of the school can create a beneficial enclosure of exterior space. The traditional form of the courtyard school allows for uncomplicated supervision and control. An outdoor circulation arcade around the courtyard allows one person to oversee activities during class changes. The arcade helps shade and cool the air, aiding in natural cross ventilation. Operable windows with visual access to the courtyard below can discourage mischievous pupils from leaving class unobserved. Areas that are mechanical and functional in nature can be placed in the corners of each floor allowing occupied areas to front on the courtyard.

The courtyard itself can be used for limited hard surface play activities, or be an entirely passive area for sitting. It can also be used for school assembly providing it meets 6A-2 requirements for exiting[7].

[7]See 6A-2.054.

ANCILLARY BUILDINGS

Ancillary buildings and structures include relocatable classrooms, dumpster enclosures, and bike lock up areas. Just like the main school building these areas need to reduce hiding places, maximize visibility, and be capable of being secured.

Relocatable classrooms shall be sufficiently separated for fire prevention and control (as per 6A-2.064(1)h) as well as to provide visual surveillance. They should be well lit with tamper resistant lights. Clearly marked paths, preferably paved, should be provided. A potential problem with relocatables is people hiding under them, therefore, the space underneath should be enclosed with chain link fencing and similar materials that will simultaneously prohibit access and maintain visibility.

Dumpsters should be secured and enclosed to prevent children from climbing into them. They should be surrounded on three sides by an eight foot screen wall. The base of the wall should be sur-

rounded by a hedge to discourage climbing. The gate should be capable of being locked and should be transparent so one can see into the enclosure.

Bicycle racks should be located in a highly visible area near the main entry or parking, maintaining a separation between bicycle and vehicular traffic (as per 6A-2.039(6)) with landscaping and bike paths. A low hedge or wall around the racks would visibly screen bicycles, but not persons attempting to steal or vandalize them.

WALLS

Wall form, texture, and use influence safety concerns. Where there are walls undulate or project into small wings, dark niches are created for people to hide. The use of these spaces for hiding can be reduced by planting hedges, or providing recessed exterior lighting or windows.

Walls in graffitti prone areas should be made of a durable material that can handle repeated cleaning.

Screen walls of metal or decorative concrete block are often used to provide separation without compromising ventilation. However they can become informal ladders allowing unauthorized access to the roof. This can be prevented by making sure that the screen wall provides no footholds and that the top three or four feet near the roof is smooth and unclimbable.

Walls near recreation areas are often defaced by spray paint by youths making markings for games such as handball and street hockey. Provide markings and game lines before hand so that children will not be tempted to make their own.

WINDOWS

Windows not only let in light and air but can also let in thieves if their design and placement is not carefully considered.

Clerestory windows allow for ventilation and privacy while minimizing wall penetrations, but also allow only a minimum of natural daylight.

A combination of glass block and clerestory windows can provide ventilation and greater daylighting than clerestories, without compromising security.

Larger window assemblies divided into small (10"-12") panes allow natural daylighting and ventilation and make it difficult for after hours forced entry, and the subsequent removal of school property. These windows must be designed to accommodate a second means of egress as required by 6A-2.051(1).

Narrow windows around doors, or sidelites, increase safety by allowing a person to see what is on the other side of the door and allow teachers to keep an eye on

activity in adjacent circulation spaces. However, sidelites made of (tempered) glass should only be used when the door hardware would prevent someone reaching through a broken side window to open the door. Where fire safety requirements limit the choice of hardware, wire glass in steel frames shall be used for sidelites as per 6A-2.050(6).

If operable transoms windows are used over exterior doors, they should be lockable to prevent break-ins.

DOORS

Doors and hardware must conform to use and location requirements. The use of hinges with non-removable pins and strike plate covers reduce the potential for forced break-ins. Wireglass openings should be used for visibility in fire rated doors along main egress routes. Kickplates should be provided for classroom, assembly, and circulation doors.

It is important that when the door is being opened it does not obstruct the circulation path. It should be in a recess that is chamfered and top lit so that there are no dark corners, or it should swing a full 180 degrees[8].

The use of multiple sets of doors to create vestibules can help reduce heated and air conditioned air loss, as well as increase security. Lighting the vestibule at night illuminates someone trying to break through the second set of doors.

[8]See Chapter 5, Section 5C, Recommendations 5, 6, and 7, for minimum widths, room doors, and illumination, which, if adopted, would alter 6A-2.051(7)d, 6A-2.051(14)a2, 6A-2.051(14)a4, and 6A-2.065(4).

ROOFS

A key concept for safe school roof design is to minimize accessibility both to the roof and in the school from entry points on the roof. Avoid the use of permanent mounted roof access ladders, short walls adjacent to low canopy roofs, screen walls and columns using decorative block or wrought iron (open) framing that make climbing up to roofs easy.

Skylights are often used to gain entry to the interior of school buildings. While it is difficult to prevent them from being vandalized, access can be minimized by the use of multiple mullions. Solid or fixed diffusers within the light well can prevent further ingress into the building.

Equipment enclosures should protect roof equipment, such as HVAC cooling towers, from vandalism. They should have lockable louvered doors, and spaced sufficiently from the equipment to allow proper ventilation.

Parapets should allow for surveillance from the ground by restricting their heights or by integrating openings.

LIGHTING

The use of artificial illumination can help both deter criminal activity as well as reduce accidents. Key issues are the accessibility of the fixtures, the level of illumination, the reduction of shadows, and the lighting of horizontal surfaces. Areas for careful consideration of lighting include lobbies, stairwells, corridors[9].

Light fixtures are a frequent target of vandalism. The damage and theft of a fixture can leave an area vulnerable to thieves and dangerous to walk through. Therefore, the proper selection and installation of fixtures is critical. They should be mounted as high as possible and still provide the illumination required. Fixtures should not be hanging or projecting to provide footholds for scaling a wall. They should be flush mounted or recessed whenever possible and covered with an impact resistant material.

It is important to be aware of the line of sight between the light fixtures location and objects that may cast a shadow. Careful placement will avoid dark corners be-

[9]See Chapter 5, Section 5C, Recommendation 7, which, if adopted, would alter 6A-2.065(4).

hind doors, trashcans, etc.

Fixtures should be installed to cast a light pattern over a broad horizontal area rather than a tall vertical area. Light colored surfaces reflect light more efficiently than dark colored surfaces.

LOBBIES & RECEPTION AREAS

The combination of a main entry with a carefully located, constantly manned administration area provides floor plans that can aid visual supervision of school entries, stairs, and hallways.

The first drawing shows an interior administration desk across from the main entrance. It allows visual access to the lobby doors, stairwells, and perpendicular hallways.

The second drawing shows an administration area located on an outside wall. The administration area can see activities in the lobby, stairs, and hallways almost as effectively as the first scheme, but in addition the administration office commands a supervisory view of outside areas.

The third drawing shows the location of a manned visitors desk in the front lobby. Since it is not part of an adjacent administration area it requires an assigned monitor. The monitor used (school administrator, teacher, parent, student, or school resource officer) is a factor in the effectiveness of any surveillance.

CORRIDORS

Much of the design of school corridors is dictated by the life safety requirements which ensure that hallways are wide enough to allow students to evacuate the building quickly[10]. Regardless, as a general rule hallways should be broad, well lit, and void of projections. Designs which lead to sudden 90 degree turns and narrow hallways should be avoided. The corners allow people to hide and cause others to run into each other. Chamfered corners allow better visibility as well as smoother pedestrian traffic flow.

Windows near classroom doors allow instructors to monitor corridors. If door niches are provided they should be chamfered and wide enough to allow a clear line of sight down the hall[11].

To reduce hiding places and possible injury, water coolers, vending machines, trash containers, and lockers should be either low profile or flush with the wall. Avoid creating alcoves, nooks and other small spaces along corridors that promote criminal activity. Any freestanding objects such as stand alone lockers or vending machines should be mounted to the wall to avoid injury if they should fall over.

[10]See Chapter 5, Section 5C, Recommendation 5, for corridor widths, which, if adopted, would alter 6A-2.051(7)d and 6A-2.051(14)a2.

[11]See Chapter 5, Section 5C, Recommendation 6, regarding room doors which, if adopted, would alter 6A-2.051(14)a4.

TOILET ROOMS

Toilet rooms are frequently cited by Florida educators as a site for criminal activity, injury, and vandalism. Therefore, every opportunity to make them more secure and safe should be taken.

To begin with, locate toilet rooms directly adjacent to main corridors to maximize visibility and surveillance.

Toilet rooms void of entry doors and screened by a partition allow for acoustic surveillance from adjoining corridors[12]. Care should be taken to preserve privacy by paying attention to sightlines from a hallway. To avoid the threat of assault by someone from behind this partition it could be raised above the floor to expose someone's feet. It could be constructed of translucent material as may be permitted by fire resistant requirements.

The enclosed nature of the toilet room allows vandals the privacy and opportunity to steal and damage fixtures. Therefore shelves, hand dryers, sanitary-napkin dispensers, and trash containers

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
[12]See Chapter 5, Section 5C, Recommendation 9, regarding student toilet rooms which, if adopted, would alter 6A-2.068 (14) and (15).

should be heavy duty, recessed, fire resistant, and have separate locks.

Toilet room walls and floors should have a durable finish to withstand repeated cleaning of graffitti. Toilet stall partitions should be structurally sound and anchored to the walls and floors. Maintain partition heights at five feet, with a twelve-inch clearance above the floor to allow visual surveillance.

STAIRS AND STAIRWELLS

Main stairs should be designed to accommodate occupant loads as per 6A-2.051. Widths dictated by the Codes are only a minimum, therefore, a main stair may need to be wider for overall safety and security. Stairs should also be well lit with adequate foot-candles of illumination[13].

Solid hand-rails create hiding places on stairs and landing areas. Open hand-rails allow visual access to immediate areas on both sides of the stairwells. Hand-rails should be designed to discourage people from sliding on them which can result in inadvertent damage or possible injury.

Risers must be enclosed as per 6A-2.053(6), and to prevent people from grabbing the ankles of those on the stair. The entire area under all stairs should be enclosed, and made inaccessible for any use[14].

Consideration should be given to enlarging stair landings beyond minimum code requirements to

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
[13]See Chapter 5, Section 5C, Recommendation 7, regarding stair illumination which, if adopted, would alter 6A-2.065(4).

[14]See Chapter 5, Section 5C, Recommendation 12, regarding spaces beneath stairs which, if adopted, would alter 6A-2.053(9).

prevent overcrowding and unsafe conditions.

All enclosed stairwells should have surveillance equipment to provide motion detection at main access points. This will allow schools to minimize security system requirements on upper levels[15].

[15]See Chapter 5, Section 5C, Recommendation 4, regarding security alarm systems which, if adopted, would add to the Code.

interior spaces

CAFETERIAS

Cafeterias that are overly cramped and crowded in layout suffer from the same security problems as any place of general assembly. It is important to avoid overcrowding by providing sufficient space between tables to allow ample circulation. This also gives cafeteria monitors room to freely move between tables during meal time. Care must be taken to maintain continuous, easy flow from the serving line into the dining area.

A designated control point near the main entrance and exit can allow a clear line of sight of the whole cafeteria.

Because of the presence of cash, both at the cashier and with the students in line, the serving line should be visible from the dining area. This can be accomplished by an impact resistant window or an opening protected by a roll down screen that can be lowered and locked at night. It is important to be able to properly secure the serving and kitchen area since food is a frequent target of theft in schools.

interior spaces

AUDITORIUMS

Like any large school assembly area auditoriums should provide clear sight lines and easy traffic flow. Niches along walls should be eliminated, and if the auditorium is subdivided by for dual use as classrooms, the partitions should fully recess into the wall. Partitions that do not recess can form a barrier for people to hide behind when the auditorium is empty, as well as giving cover to those intent on disrupting a general assembly.

The stage curtain can be left open to allow visual surveillance of back stage area (per 6A-2.055(5)(c)5). Electrical and lighting controls, stage equipment, props, and tools should be placed in locked storage rooms to reduce theft.

Auditoriums often require scaffolding, platforms, and catwalks for the installation and maintenance of lighting and sound equipment. Care must be taken not to locate roof openings close to these structures as it is possible to gain entry into an auditorium by prying open a roof hatch or smoke vent and travelling via a scaffold down to floor level.

GYMNASIUMS

Like the auditorium, the gym is another large span structure in which care must be taken to avoid opportunities for students to enter via skylights and climbing down structural elements such as trusses.

Clerestory windows can be used instead of skylights. If skylights are used they should be installed well clear of any means of climbing down to the gym floor. In addition, structural members should not be accessible from either the floor or from adjacent bleachers as per 6A-2.033(2)a.

Retractable bleachers should be capable of being locked in place when not in use to prevent vandalism and persons using the space underneath to hide.

Locked equipment rooms should be visible from the exterior of the gymnasium. Glass block walls or impact resistant windows along a common corridor would allow monitoring of the interior of the equipment room.

LIBRARIES & MEDIA CENTERS

Library design should minimize opportunities for theft of materials and equipment as well as minimize possible hiding places. Both goals can be met through the use of control points and the maintenance of clear sight lines.

The reception area or circulation librarian should be placed in a central location near the main entry to police student traffic.

Low stacks, well spaced, and placed parallel to the circulation librarian's line of sight will aid in visual control as well as reduce hiding places for storing stolen goods. Serious consideration should be given to installing a magnetic book alarm system. Detection devices that use a turn-style or gate element shall not impede or be placed in designated means of egress.

Access to audio-visual (A.V.) equipment can be controlled by creating a lockable delivery/pick-up area separate from general equipment storage.

CLASSROOMS

Classrooms should be organized for easy monitoring. Visual access to the hallway, and in some cases the exterior, is desirable.

Classrooms that include retractable partitions must provide an opening in the partition for egress and visual access as per 6A-2.052(7). Niches should be provided for housing partitions when they are in a retracted position.

A lockable built-in storage cabinet should be provided in each classroom to store A.V. and multimedia equipment in a secure place. This storage area should be visible from the hallway. An alternative to the storage cabinet would be to permanently mount television and video-recorder at levels beyond reach.

LOCKER ROOMS

Locker rooms should be organized for easy surveillance; they should have a clear circulation pattern with no dead-end spaces to avoid entrapment. Gym instructors' offices should be located near the main entry and exit and provided with windows to monitor the locker area.

Interior lockers should not exceed four feet in height to allow visual surveillance and should be adequately spaced to avoid crowding. Lockers can also be mounted flush to the wall to minimize opportunities to hide on top of them or gain access to ceiling areas.

Light fixture covers, windows and mirrors should be impact resistant to prevent damage from inadvertent vandalism. Acoustical ceiling tiles should not be used in any area of the locker room [16]. Exposed concrete or plaster finished ceilings eliminate the opportunity to use the space above as a hiding place for persons and stolen property.

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
[16]See Chapter 5, Section 5C, Recommendation 8, regarding ceiling materials and heights.

LABS SHOPS & COMPUTER ROOMS

Clear orgainzation of workspaces is essential in the design of rooms where special equipment is being used.

Faculty offices should be located to allow direct visual access to work room and entry. Valuable equipment and supplics should be protected by providing storage in a lockable closet within the office.

Entry vestibules to workspaces equipped with an alarm system makes breaking and entering difficult from interior hallways.

Equipment in workspaces should be secured to tables or counters with concealed through-bolts or one-way screws/ It is important that the locking or mounting hardware not have any sharp edges or projections.

To maximize secuirty and minimize theft, rooms with computers and other costly equipment could be located in interior zones away from exterior walls with windows or doors.

MUSIC ROOMS

Music rooms or band practice areas have similar programmatic considerations as auditoriums. It is important to facilitate visual supervision by one person over a large assembly of students.

Acoustical demands typically require a space with limited window area and sound separation from adjacent spaces such as hallways, classrooms, and faculty offices. Isolation of music rooms (on campus) can be avoided by integrating intermediate/support spaces to absorb sound or greatly reduce sound transmission. Storage areas placed along the perimeter of the main room and entry vestibules accessed from hallways help attenuate sound.

Storage for equipment and supplies should be locked at all times. Both sets of doors in entry vestibule should have locking hardware and access detection alarms.

ADMINISTRATION AREAS

The visitors' information counter, faculty offices, student records, and first aid stations need to have a high degree of security while maintaining a "sense of accessibility" to students. Administration areas should be adjacent to main entry areas and be visibly accessible through windows to provide a connection between administrators and students or visitors.

Faculty offices and student records should be separated from reception area, accessible through locked hall doors. Student records shall be stored in a fire resistant vault within a locked room.

Key boxes shall be located in a locked cabinet that contains school floor plans, evacuation maps, and computer passwords. This cabinet should be made accessible to police and fire department personnel. Distribution of master keys should be strictly regulated by plant administrators.

Clinic rooms should keep supplies and surgical equipment locked in a storage closet located in the nurse's office.

ALARM & SURVEILLANCE SYSTEMS

The use of alarm and surveillance systems can greatly reduce the amount of property loss[17]. Reports have shown that while actual breaking and entering incidents have increased recently, the amount of stolen property has decreased. This is due in part to the effective use of alarms and intrusion detection systems.

Once the building envelope has been penetrated, the assailant has limited time to achieve his or her goal. Coordination with local police can help reduce response time to alarms, increasing the chances of apprehending persons while still on school grounds with property in hand.

Installation of alarm systems should be handled by expert contractors. They will strategically locate detection devices at critical entry points and in rooms that contain valuable electronics or shop equipment.

Fixed metal detectors can greatly reduce the influx of weapons. A modest, inconspicuous, metal detector should be used to avoid bringing attention to a threatening problem.

[17]See Chapter 5, Section 5C, Recommendation 4, regarding security alarm systems which, if adopted, would add to the Code.

FIRE CONTROL

Fire control equipment includes such items as fire extinguishers, standpipe cabinets, and sprinklers.

Fire extinguisher and standpipe cabinets located in main circulation paths should be flush mounted in walls adjacent to classrooms. Isolated equipment is more susceptible to damage.

Fire sprinklers should be also be flush mounted in ceilings to avoid damage. A sprinkler that has recessed valves is available, but still allows distribution head to hang below the ceiling.

HVAC\MECHANICAL EQUIPMENT

The location for HVAC equipment should be accessible only to authorized personnel, but should also allow for proper ventilation. Mechanical equipment storage should have flush mounted vents located out of reach. Spacing of vent slats should not allow persons to reach in or to pass objects through them, potentially causing damage to equipment or exhaust fans.

Exterior condensing unit enclosures should be designed using materials that are difficult to climb and that provide (side) protection from thrown projectiles. Access doors should be solid with concealed hinges and locked with deadbolt hardware.

Locating these structures in areas where general site lighting is used will make nighttime surveillance easier without having to install direct lighting.

VENDING MACHINES

Protecting vending machines from vandalism and theft is a major problem in many schools today. Provide a niche or alcove designed specifically for the placement of vending machines so as not to obstruct general circulation areas. A roll down screen can be installed, giving students limited access to machines, allowing them only to reach in and make purchases.

Avoid locating vending machines in isolated areas. Locate them adjacent to or within the cafeteria or other well monitored spaces.

WATER FOUNTAINS

Locate water fountains near restrooms and areas where students gather that are typically monitored.

Like vending machines, water fountains need to be protected from vandalism. Flush mounted water fountains provide protection for the cooling system, but do not provide access for handicapped persons. Floor mounted fountains are completely exposed, providing protection only to the side facing the wall. Wall-hung fountains that have in-wall cooling systems should have heavy-duty mounts to prevent vandalism by sitting or standing on them, while maintaining wheelchair access.

ELEVATORS

Elevators should be centrally located adjacent to main circulation spaces, i.e. entry lobbies and primary corridors. A five-foot deep landing area should be provided without obstructing student traffic.

General access to elevators should be controlled with limited access to authorized individuals. The use of elevators for criminal activities could be significantly deterred by faculty/staff surveillance of lobbies and corridors coupled with video monitoring within the cars.

Appendix B

Available at Web site:
www.fccdr.usf.edu

FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION
OFFICE OF EDUCATIONAL FACILITIES

SAFE SCHOOLS DESIGN GUIDELINES QUESTIONNAIRE

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Instructions

The Florida Center for Community Design + Research, located at the University of South Florida, has been selected by the Florida Department of Education, Office of Educational Facilities, to conduct a study to evaluate issues of safety and security in Florida's public schools.

The answers to the questions that follow are of great importance in order for the staff of the Center to analyze and report to the Department of Education the issues of safety and security as they relate to safe school design guidelines. Please answer all of the questions.

If you have questions please feel free to contact Christopher J. Joiner, of the University of South Florida at 813-974-2106, or John A. Watson of the Department of Education, Office of Educational Facilities, at 904-488-1750.
==
Questionnaire

District Name:_____ Date:_____

Person Completing Questionnaire:_____

Title/Position:_____

Phone # (SunCom if Available):_____

1. How many of the listed schools do you have in your district?

   _____ elementary levels
   _____ middle/jr. high school levels
   _____ high school level
   _____ other (please specify)

2. Write in the number of schools in each size category in your school district.

	small 300-500	medium 500-1000	large 1000-1500	very large 1500-above
elementary				
jr. high				
high school				

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State of Florida
Department of Education
Tallahassee, Florida
Affirmative action/equal opportunity employer

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3. Where are these schools located?

	downtown/inner-city	city/town	suburban area	rural area
elementary				
jr. high				
high school				

4. Of all the schools in your district, which is the preferred general layout of the building(s) relative to providing optimum security?

_____ one 2 (or more)-story building
_____ multiple 2 (or more)-story buildings
_____ 1-story centrally organized group of buildings
_____ 1-story "campus plan" (spread-out)

5. Which primary circulation system is preferred?

_____ interior corridor
_____ exterior corridor
_____ both (please estimate %)

6. How many of the schools allow for public access of recreational facilities after school hours?

_____

7. How many portable classrooms are being used throughout your school district?

_____

CRIMINAL ACTIVITY SURVEY

Vandalism: willful or ignorant destruction of property.

8. How many reported incidents of vandalism have occurred in your school district over the last two years?

_____

9. Where do the majority of these incidents take place? Rank in descending numerical order the top five.

_____ classrooms
_____ hallways
_____ toilet rooms
_____ laboratories
_____ auditoriums
_____ cafeteria
_____ gymnasium
_____ locker rooms
_____ playgrounds
_____ outdoor athletic areas
_____ outdoor gathering areas: covered walkways, patios, terraces, courtyards
_____ parking lots
_____ bicycle racks
_____ bus loading areas
_____ other (please describe)_____

10. What time of day do these incidents predominantly occur?

_____ immediately before school
_____ during school
_____ immediately after school
_____ evening hours

11. Does vandalism occur at other times? If so, when?

_____

_____

12. What types of vandalism has your school district experienced over the past two years?

_____

_____

13. Has there been a significant increase or decrease in vandalism in your school district over the past 10 years? (% if known).

_____

CRIMINAL ACTIVITY SURVEY

Burglary: entering a building or occupied structure, or separately secured or occupied portion thereof, with purpose to commit a crime therein, unless the premises are at the time, open to the public, or the actor is licensed or privileged to enter.

14. How many reported incidents of burglary have occurred in your school district over the last two years?

_____

15. Where do the majority of these incidents take place? Rank in descending numerical order the top five.

_____ classrooms
_____ hallways
_____ toilet rooms
_____ laboratories
_____ auditoriums
_____ cafeteria
_____ gymnasium
_____ locker rooms
_____ playgrounds
_____ outdoor athletic areas
_____ outdoor gathering areas: covered walkways, patios, terraces, courtyards
_____ parking lots
_____ bicycle racks
_____ bus loading areas
_____ other (please describe)_____

16. What time of day do these incidents predominantly occur?

_____ immediately before school
_____ during school
_____ immediately after school
_____ evening hours

17. Does burglary occur at other times? If so, when?

_____

_____

18. What types of burglary has your school district experienced over the past two years?

_____

_____

19. Has there been a significant increase or decrease in burglary in your school district over the past 10 years? *(% if known)*_____

CRIMINAL ACTIVITY SURVEY

Assault and Battery: any unlawful touching of another which is without justification or excuse. **Battery** requires physical contact, whereas simple **assault** is committed without physical contact.

20. How many reported incidents of assault and battery have occurred in your school district over the last two years?

_____

21. Where do the majority of these incidents take place? Rank in descending numerical the top five.

_____ *classrooms*
_____ *hallways*
_____ *toilet rooms*
_____ *laboratories*
_____ *auditoriums*
_____ *cafeteria*
_____ *gymnasium*
_____ *locker rooms*
_____ *playgrounds*
_____ *outdoor athletic areas*
_____ *outdoor gathering areas: covered walkways, patios, terraces, courtyards*
_____ *parking lots*
_____ *bicycle racks*
_____ *bus loading areas*
_____ *other (please describe)_____*

22. What time of day do these incidents predominantly occur?
_____ *immediately before school*
_____ *during school*
_____ *immediately after school*
_____ *evening hours*

23. Has there been a significant increase or decrease in assault and battery in your school district over the past 10 years? *(% if known)*

_____

CRIMINAL ACTIVITY SURVEY

Arson: the act of starting a fire or causing an explosion with the intent to destroy a building or occupied structure of another.

24. How many reported incidents of arson have occurred in your school district over the past two years?

_____

25. Where do the majority of these incidents take place? Rank in descending numerical order the top five.

_____ *classrooms*
_____ *hallways*
_____ *toilet rooms*
_____ *laboratories*
_____ *auditoriums*
_____ *cafeteria*
_____ *gymnasium*
_____ *locker rooms*
_____ *playgrounds*
_____ *outdoor athletic areas*
_____ *outdoor gathering areas: covered walkways, patios, terraces, courtyards*
_____ *parking lots*
_____ *bicycle racks*
_____ *bus loading areas*
_____ *other (please describe)_____*

26. What time of day do these incidents predominantly occur?

_____ *immediately before school*
_____ *during school*
_____ *immediately after school*
_____ *evening hours*

27. Does arson occur at other times? If so, when?

_____

_____

_____

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28. Has there been a significant increase or decrease in arson in your school district over the past 10 years? (% *if known*)_____

CRIMINAL ACTIVITY SURVEY

Theft: the taking of property without the owner's consent.

29. How many reported incidents of theft have occurred in your school district over the past two years?

_____

30. Where do the majority of these incidents take place? Rank in descending numerical order the top five.
    _____ *classrooms*
    _____ *hallways*
    _____ *toilet rooms*
    _____ *laboratories*
    _____ *auditoriums*
    _____ *cafeteria*
    _____ *gymnasium*
    _____ *locker rooms*
    _____ *playgrounds*
    _____ *outdoor athletic areas*
    _____ *outdoor gathering areas: covered walkways, patios, terraces, courtyards*
    _____ *parking lots*
    _____ *bicycle racks*
    _____ *bus loading areas*
    _____ *other (please describe)*_____

31. What time of day do these incidents predominantly occur?
    _____ *immediately before school*
    _____ *during school*
    _____ *immediately after school*
    _____ *evening hours*

32. What types of theft has your school district experienced over the past two years?

_____

_____

_____

33. Has there been a significant increase or decrease in theft in your school district over the past 10 years? (% *if known*) _____

CRIMINAL ACTIVITY SURVEY

Robbery: the felonious taking of money, personal property, or any other article of value, in the possession of another, from his person or immediate presence, and against his will, accomplished by means of force or fear.

34. How many reported incidents of robbery have occurred in your school district over the past two years?

_____

35. Where do the majority of these incidents take place? Rank in descending numerical order the top five.
_____ *classrooms*
_____ *hallways*
_____ *toilet rooms*
_____ *laboratories*
_____ *auditoriums*
_____ *cafeteria*
_____ *gymnasium*
_____ *locker rooms*
_____ *playgrounds*
_____ *outdoor athletic areas*
_____ *outdoor gathering areas: covered walkways, patios, terraces, courtyards*
_____ *parking lots*
_____ *bicycle racks*
_____ *bus loading areas*
_____ *other (please describe)*_____

36. What time of day do these incidents predominantly occur?
_____ *immediately before school*
_____ *during school*
_____ *immediately after school*
_____ *evening hours*

37. What types of robbery has your school district experienced over the past two years?

_____

_____

38. Has there been a significant increase or decrease in robbery in your school district over the past 10 years? (% *if known*)

_____

CRIMINAL ACTIVITY SURVEY

Drug Possession/Use

39. How many reported incidents of drug possession/use have occurred in your school district over the last two years?

_____

40. Where do the majority of these incidents take place? Rank in descending numerical order the top five.
    _____ *classrooms*
    _____ *hallways*
    _____ *toilet rooms*
    _____ *laboratories*
    _____ *auditoriums*
    _____ *cafeteria*
    _____ *gymnasium*
    _____ *locker rooms*
    _____ *playgrounds*
    _____ *outdoor athletic areas*
    _____ *outdoor gathering areas: covered walkways, patios, terraces, courtyards*
    _____ *parking lots*
    _____ *bicycle racks*
    _____ *bus loading areas*
    _____ *other (please describe)*_____

41. What time of day do these incidents predominantly occur?
    _____ *immediately before school*
    _____ *during school*
    _____ *immediately after school*
    _____ *evening hours*

42. Do you have problems with drug related activity on property immediately off-school campuses? If so, please explain.

_____

_____

_____

43. Has there been a significant increase or decrease in drug related activity over the past 10 years? *(% if known)*_____

CRIMINAL ACTIVITY SURVEY

Alcohol Use

44. How many reported incidents of alcohol use have occurred in your school district over the last two years?

_____

45. Where do the majority of these incidents take place? Rank in descending numerical order the top five.
  _____ *classrooms*
  _____ *hallways*
  _____ *toilet rooms*
  _____ *laboratories*
  _____ *auditoriums*
  _____ *cafeteria*
  _____ *gymnasium*
  _____ *locker rooms*
  _____ *playgrounds*
  _____ *outdoor athletic areas*
  _____ *outdoor gathering areas: covered walkways, patios, terraces, courtyards*
  _____ *parking lots*
  _____ *bicycle racks*
  _____ *bus loading areas*
  _____ *other (please describe)*_____

46. What time of day do these incidents predominantly occur?
  _____ *immediately before school*
  _____ *during school*
  _____ *immediately after school*
  _____ *evening hours*

47. Do you have problems with alcohol related activity on property immediately off school campuses? If so, please explain.

_____

_____

_____

48. Has there been a significant increase or decrease in alcohol related activity over the past 10 years in your school district? (% *if known*)

_____

CRIMINAL ACTIVITY

Other Criminal Activity

49. How many reported incidents of weapons possession have occurred in your school district over the last two years?

_____

50. What are the most common weapons and where are they found?

_____

_____

51. How many reported bomb threats have occurred in your school district over the past two years? Five years?

_____

_____

52. What procedures are implemented in the event of a bomb threat? Please describe.

_____

_____

_____

_____

53. Have you had any problems with trespassing? If so, please describe.

_____

_____

_____

CRIMINAL ACTIVITY SURVEY

54.   What other criminal activities have you experienced in your school district over the past two years?

_____ group violence
_____ kidnapping
_____ rape
_____ homicide
_____ other (please explain)

_____

_____

_____

_____

55.   How are the above mentioned criminal acts reported?

_____

_____

_____

_____

_____

CRIME PREVENTION ISSUES

56.   What is the public perception of safety and security within your school district?

_____

_____

_____

Has there been an increase in overall "incidents" in your schools over the past 2 years? 5 years? 10 years?

_____

_____

In descending numerical order rank the five most critical safety/security issue within your district?

_____ *trespassing*
_____ *vandalism*
_____ *burglary*
_____ *theft*
_____ *assault*
_____ *arson*
_____ *drug possession / use*
_____ *alcohol use*
_____ *weapons possession*
_____ *group violence*
_____ *kidnapping*
_____ *rape*
_____ *homicide*
_____ *other (please describe)_____*

57. Do you have assigned on-site security supervisors or police officers? Do you participate in the School Resource Officer program? If so, for how long?

_____

_____

58. Do you have written regulations regarding access and control of school personnel after school hours? If so, please explain.

_____

_____

_____

59. What other specific safety/security measures or programs has your school district implemented?

_____

_____

Who organized them? Runs them? Pays for them?

_____

_____

_____

_____

_____

Have these programs been successful? Please describe.

_____

_____

_____

_____

_____

60. What are the most critical areas of school design with respect to safety and security? In descending numerical, rank the top five from the list below.
    _____ *maintaining visual surveillance from the street*
    _____ *maintaining visual surveillance in corridors (interior and exterior)*
    _____ *minimizing niches, alcoves and other residual spaces that provide places for hiding*
    _____ *window design*
    _____ *exterior door design*
    _____ *interior lighting*
    _____ *exterior lighting*
    _____ *location of electrical panels*
    _____ *enclosure of school property perimeter (fencing, walls)*
    _____ *landscaping*
    _____ *control of key cabinet*
    _____ *alarm systems*
    _____ *miscellaneous openings and outbuildings*

61. Are you familiar with Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design (CPTED) concepts and procedures?
If so,
Where did you learn about them?

_____

_____

What is your opinion of them?

_____

_____

Have you instituted policies or measures that incorporate CPTED principles?

_____

_____

Would you be interested in learning more about CPTED principles?

_____

_____

62. If funding were available, what single policy or procedure would you implement to reduce crime and increase safety and security within your school district?

_____

_____

_____

_____

_____

Additional Comments

_____

_____

_____

_____

_____

_____

_____

Appendix C

SCHOOL DESIGN GUIDELINES
...T INFORMATION

DISTRICT	TOTAL SCHOOLS ELEM	JR	SR	OTH	PREFERRED LAYOUT	PREFERRED CIRCULATION	REC FACIL. AVAILABLE AFTER HOURS	PORTABLE CLASSROOMS
BAY	18	6	4	3	1 STORY CENTRAL	BOTH 50/50	24	146
BRADFORD	5	1	1	2	1 STORY CAMPUS	EXTERIOR CORRIDOR	7	30
BREVARD	46	13	10	4	1 STORY CENTRAL	BOTH 60/40	73	527
BROWARD	113	31	22	24	ONE 2 STORY	EXTERIOR CORRIDOR	0	2175
CALHOUN	3	3	2	1	1 STORY CENTRAL	EXTERIOR CORRIDOR	3	8
CITRUS	9	3	3	1	1 STORY CENTRAL	BOTH	3	21
CLAY	17	4	4	2	1 STORY CENTRAL	INTERIOR CORRIDOR	26	714
COLLIER	16	6	4	1	1 STORY CENTRAL	INTERIOR CORRIDOR	27	174
COLUMBIA	6	2	1	0	1 STORY CAMPUS	BOTH 25/75	9	0
DADE	189	48	28	14	MULTI 2+ STORY	INTERIOR	265	2146
DUVAL	100	22	17	10	1 STORY CENTRAL	INTERIOR CORRIDOR	0	550
ESCAMBIA	28	10	8	12	1 STORY CENTRAL	---	58	0
FLAGLER	3	1	1	1	1 STORY CENTRAL	INTERIOR CORRIDOR	3	34
FRANKLIN	2	0	1	1	1 STORY CENTRAL	BOTH 75/25	4	7
GADSDEN	7	2	4	2	1 STORY CENTRAL	INTERIOR CORRIDOR	5	87
GULF	3	1	1	0	1 STORY CENTRAL	BOTH 50/50	3	7
HENDRY	8	3	2	0	---	BOTH 40/60	7	39
HIGHLANDS	8	3	3	2	1 STORY CENTRAL	BOTH 30/70	8	41
HOLMES	2	1	2	2	1 STORY CENTRAL	INTERIOR	7	14
INDIAN RIVER	12	3	1	1	1 STORY CAMPUS	EXTERIOR CORRIDOR	16	71
JEFFERSON	1	1	1	0	1 STORY CENTRAL	INTERIOR CORRIDOR	3	9
LAKE	19	8	8	6	1 STORY CENTRAL	BOTH 20/80	43	245
LEE	35	12	7	4	1 STORY CENTRAL	EXTERIOR CORRIDOR	54	400
LEON	22	7	4	13	1 STORY CENTRAL	EXTERIOR CORRIDOR	4	100
LEVY	4	3	1	0	1 STORY CAMPUS	INTERIOR CORRIDOR	11	80
LIBERTY	1	1	0	2	1 STORY CENTRAL	BOTH 50/50	3	5
MARION	26	7	6	3	1 STORY CENTRAL	BOTH 25/75	42	350
MARTIN	8	4	3	3	1 STORY CENTRAL	BOTH 50/50	9	86
MONROE	6	1	3	3	ONE 2 STORY	INTERIOR	13	41
OKALOOSA	21	6	6	3	1 STORY CENTRAL	INTERIOR CORRIDOR	33	154
OKEECHOBEE	5	1	1	1	1 STORY CENTRAL	BOTH 60/40	8	38
ORANGE	85	21	12	4	ONE 2+ STORY	INTERIOR CORRIDOR	122	2397
OSCEOLA	14	5	4	1	1 STORY CENTRAL	INTERIOR CORRIDOR	4	149
PINELLAS	79	21	15	41	ONE 2+ STORY	INTERIOR CORRIDOR	0	362
PUTNAM	10	3	3	1	1 STORY CENTRAL	BOTH 30/70	6	83
SANTA ROSA	13	5	5	1	ONE 2+ STORY	INTERIOR CORRIDOR	24	165
SEMINOLE	28	10	6	2	1 STORY CENTRAL	INTERIOR CORRIDOR	10	265
ST JOHNS	12	4	2	2	1 STORY CENTRAL	INTERIOR CORRIDOR	20	80
ST LUCIE	18	4	4	3	ONE STORY CAMPUS	INTERIOR CORRIDOR	29	202
SUMTER	5	2	2	1	1 STORY CAMPUS	INTERIOR CORRIDOR	10	50
SUWANNEE	2	1	2	3	1 STORY CAMPUS	INTERIOR CORRIDOR	6	22
TAYLOR	1	1	1	1	1 STORY CENTRAL	BOTH 40/60	1	36
UNION	1	1	1	1	1 STORY CENTRAL	INTERIOR CORRIDOR	2	6
VOLUSIA	39	10	6	4	1 STORY CENTRAL	BOTH 80/20	29	633
WAKULLA	2	1	1	1	1 STORY CENTRAL	INTERIOR CORRIDOR	6	35
WASHINGTON	2	2	2	1	1 STORY CENTRAL	BOTH 30/70	7	15
TOTALS	1055	302	227	188			1042	12819

School Size and School Location column totals:

	SCHOOL SIZE ELEMENTARY SM	MED	LG	V LG	JR HIGH SM	MED	LG	V LG	SR HIGH SM	MED	LG	V LG	SCHOOL LOCATION ELEMENTARY DTWN CITY	SUB RURAL	JR HIGH DTWN CITY	SUB RURAL	SR HIGH DTWN CITY	SUB RURAL
TOTALS	163	672	142	5	19	115	123	28	26	31	47	114	62 / 376	407 / 103	21 / 128	96 / 23	13 / 98	74 / 24

SCHOOL DESIGN GUIDELINES
VANDALISM

LEGEND

	RESPONSE NOT GIVEN
CR	CLASSROOMS
HH	HALLWAYS
TR	TOILET ROOMS
LAB	LABORATORIES
AD	AUDITORIUMS
CF	CAFETERIA
GYM	GYMNASIUM
LR	LOCKER ROOMS
PG	PLAYGROUNDS
OAA	OUTDOOR ATHLETIC AREAS
OGA	OUTDOOR GATHERING AREAS
PL	PARKING LOTS
BR	BICYCLE RACKS
BLA	BUS LOADING AREAS
OTH	OTHER
BEFORE	IMMEDIATELY BEFORE SCHOOL
DURING	DURING SCHOOL
AFTER	IMMEDIATELY AFTER SCHOOL
EVENING	EVENING HOURS

DISTRICT	INCIDENTS (2 YEARS)	*1	*2	*3	*4	*5	TIME OF DAY	OTHER TIMES INCIDENTS OCCUR	TYPE OF VANDALISM			CHANGE OVER 10 YEARS	PERCENT CHANGE
BAY	199	PG	OGA	OAA	TR	CR	EVENING	WEEKEND	GRAFFITI			DECREASE	10
BRADFORD		CR	OAA	OGA	PL	LR	EVENING	WEEKENDS/HOLIDAYS	DESTROY PROPERTY	GRAFFITI		--	--
BREVARD	527	OTH	OTH	CF	LR	BLA	EVENING	WEEKENDS	DESTROY PROPERTY	DAMAGE DOORS/WALLS		INCREASE	--
BROWARD	1262	OAA	OGA	OAA	PG	TR	DURING	WEEKENDS/HOLIDAYS/SUMMER	BROKEN WINDOWS	BROKEN WINDOWS		INCREASE	13
CALHOUN	2	HH	OGA	LR	LR	TR	EVENING		SPRAY PAINT			NONE	0
CITRUS	30	CR	TR	CR	OGA	PG	AFTER		RESTROOM DOORS	EXPEL FIRE EXTIN		NONE	0
CLAY	88	CR	HH	HH	OGA	PG	EVENING	12 MIDNIGHT TO 4 AM	DESTROY PROPERTY	GRAFFITI		INCREASE	50
COLLIER	41	OTH	CF	OGA	OGA	LAB	EVENING	MIDDLE OF NIGHT	GRAFFITI	BROKEN WINDOWS		DECREASE	61
COLUMBIA	0												
DADE	5398	HH	OTH	PL	CF	CR	EVENING		GRAFFITI	VEHICLE DAMAGE	EQUIPMENT DAMAGE	DECREASE	62
DUVAL	1774	OTH	CR	OGA	OGA		EVENING	DURING	BROKEN WINDOWS	DESTROY PROPERTY		NONE	0
ESCAMBIA	94	TR	HH	OGA	HH	OTH	EVENING	WEEKENDS/HOLIDAYS	DESTROY PROPERTY	GRAFFITI	CUTTING PHONE LINES	NONE	0
FLAGLER	5	TR	TR	TR	LR	GYM	AFTER	EVENING	GRAFFITI	DOOR KICKING		DECREASE	25
FRANKLIN	0								BREAKING & ENTERING	BROKEN WINDOWS		NONE	0
GADSDEN	94	OGA	LR	TR	BLA	CR	EVENING	EARLY AM	BREAK INS	BROKEN WINDOWS		INCREASE	--
GULF	54	TR	LR	HH	LR	OAA	EVENING		ARSON	DESTRUCTION		INCREASE	--
HENDRY	5	CR	OTH	PG	CR		EVENING	NORMALLY EVENING HOURS	TRASHING	MINOR THEFT		UNKNOWN	--
HIGHLANDS	125	CR	OGA	TR	GYM	GYM	EVENING	IMMEDIATELY AFTER	TRASHING	GRAFFITI	GLASS BREAKAGE	NONE	0
HOLMES	50	LAB	TR	TR	LR	GYM	EVENING	DURING SCHOOL	DESTROY PROPERTY	GRAFFITI		NONE	0
INDIAN RIVER	50	OGA	HH	HH	BLA	LR	DURING	NONE	BREAK INS	GRAFFITI		NONE	0
JEFFERSON	0	CF	OTH	TR	PL	PG	EVENING	DURING SCHOOL	GRAFFITI	BROKEN WINDOWS		DECREASE	--
LAKE	6	CF	CR	TR	CR	GYM	DURING	HOLIDAYS	BREAKAGE			NONE	0
LEE	27	CR	PG	OGA	PL	LR	EVENING	WEEKENDS/HOLIDAYS	DESTROY PROPERTY	VEHICLES		DECREASE	--
LEON	49	CR	OGA	OGA	OTH	HH	AFTER	WEEKENDS/HOLIDAYS/SUMMER	BROKEN WINDOWS	DESTROY PROPERTY	EXPEL FIRE EXTIN	DECREASE	--
LEVY	39	HH	TR	HH	TR	OTH	EVENING	WEEKENDS/HOLIDAYS	GRAFFITI	BROKEN WINDOWS	BROKEN LOCKS	NONE	0
LIBERTY	18	TR	OTH	HH	TR	CF	EVENING	BREAK TIME AND LUNCH	BROKEN WINDOWS	GRAFFITI	RESTROOMS DAMAGED	NONE	--
MARION	0												
MARTIN	6	GYM	TR	LR	PG	PG	EVENING		GRAFFITI	BREAKING GLASS	BREAKING PLAYGROUND	DECREASE	0
MONROE	20	TR	OTH	PL	PG	LR	EVENING	WEEKENDS	GRAFFITI	BROKEN WINDOWS	EXPEL FIRE EXTIN	DECREASE	--
OKALOOSA	5	OGA	PL	TR	HH	HH	EVENING	DURING/AFTER/WEEKENDS	EXTERIOR LIGHTING	LOCKERS	ROOF TOPS BLDGS/BUS	NONE	0
OKEECHOBEE	83	OTH	OGA	CR	TR	TR	EVENING	WEEKENDS/HOLIDAYS	DESTROY PROPERTY	GRAFFITI	VENDING MACHINES	NONE	0
ORANGE	297	CR	OGA	HH	TR	PL	EVENING	WEEKENDS/HOLIDAYS	BROKEN WINDOWS	GRAFFITI	DISPERSED MATERIALS	DECREASE	5
OSCEOLA	1	HH	HH	OGA	OTH		EVENING	LATE NIGHT/EARLY MORNING	EXPEL FIRE EXTIN	VANH		--	--
PINELLAS	3478	TR	OTH	CR	PG	LR	EVENING	DURING SCHOOL	BROKEN WINDOWS	BATH ROOMS		INCREASE	--
PUTNAM	47	HH	HH	HH	PG	OGA	DURING	WEEKENDS	BROKEN WINDOWS	GRAFFITI		INCREASE	--
SANTA ROSA	800	HH	PG	LR	LR	CR	EVENING	ALL HOURS	STOPPING UP TOILETS ETC	DESTROY PROPERTY		DECREASE	50
SEMINOLE	0								DEFACE BUILDINGS	DAMAGE EQUIPMENT		INCREASE	--
ST JOHNS	164	PL	LR	PG	HH	HH	EVENING	WEEKENDS/HOLIDAYS/SUMMER	HOLES IN WALLS	FLAT TIRES		DECREASE	0
ST LUCIE	20	CR	LAB	HH	TR	TR	EVENING		BROKEN WINDOWS	DESTROY PROPERTY		NONE	--
SUMTER	25	CR	OGA	HH	TR	PL	EVENING	BEFORE/AFTER SCHOOL WKND	GRAFFITI	DESTROY PROPERTY		DECREASE	0
SUWANNEE	4	HH	CR	CR	OAA	GYM	EVENING	WEEK ENDS	GLASS BREAKAGE	FURNITURE		NONE	--
TAYLOR	10	LR	CF	CR	CR	OGA	EVENING	NO	BURGLARY	DESTROY PROPERTY		DECREASE	25
UNION	10	CF	LR	HH	PG	PG	EVENING		BROKEN WINDOWS	GRAFFITI	EXPEL FIRE EXTIN	DECREASE	--
VOLUSIA	309	PG	OGA	OGA	PC	CR	DURING		BROKEN WINDOWS	BROKEN GLASS	DAMAGING VEHICLES	DECREASE	74
WAKULLA	41	OGA	PL	PG	HH	OGA	EVENING		DEFACING BUILDINGS			INCREASE	--
WASHINGTON	3	OTH	LR	OGA	BLA	PC	EVENING			BROKEN GLASS		DECREASE	--

TOTALS AND AVERAGES	15205												15.63
		CR 27	HH 22	TR 26	LAB 3	AD 1	BEFORE 0					INCREASE 14	
		CF 15					DURING 4					DECREASE 12	
		LR 8					AFTER 3					NONE 14	
		PG 20	OAA 14	OGA 7			EVENING 34						
		PL 20	BR 10	BLA 0	OTH 2		ALL TIMES 0						
		OTH 15											

BEST COPY AVAILABLE

SCHOOL DESIGN GUIDELINES
CHART

DISTRICT	INCIDENTS (2 YEARS)	TOP 5 PLACES INCIDENTS OCCUR (1=MOST OFTEN) 1	2	3	4	5	TIME OF DAY INCIDENTS OCCUR	OTHER TIMES INCIDENTS OCCUR	TYPE OF BURGLARY		CHANGE OVER 10 YEARS	PERCENT CHANGE
BAY	96	EM	PL	CF	GTM	CR	EVENING	WEEKENDS/HOLIDAYS	EQUIPMENT	CARS	NONE	0
BRADFORD	0	CR	CF	GTM	LAB	LR	EVENING	WEEKENDS/HOLIDAYS	PETTY THEFT		INCREASE	---
BREVARD	39	LAB	CF	PL	OAA	LR	EVENING	WEEKENDS/VACATION	EQUIPMENT	KEYS	INCREASE	---
BROWARD	460	CR	CF	PL	BR	OCA	EVENING	WEEKENDS/HOLIDAYS/SUMMER	COMPUTER LAB	CAFETERIA	INCREASE	---
CALHOUN	4	CR	CF	LAB	OTH	OCA	EVENING		BREAKING & ENTERING		NONE	0
CITRUS	8	CR	LAB	LR	BLA	OCA	EVENING		BREAKING & ENTERING		NONE	0
CLAY	86	CF	OTH	OTH	CR	CF	EVENING	12 MIDNIGHT TO 4 AM	FORCED ENTRY	WINDOW	INCREASE	50
COLLIER	50	EM	EM	CR	CF	OTH	EVENING	MIDDLE OF NIGHT	MONEY	EQUIPMENT	DECREASE	57
COLUMBIA	0	OAA	OTH	OTH	CF	OTH	EVENING		GENERAL BURGLARY	MUSICAL INSTRUMENTS	NONE	0
DADE	3317	OTH	OTH	CR	CF	OTH	EVENING		UNOCCUPIED STRUCTURE		INCREASE	18
DUVAL	740	CR	OTH	LR	CF	OCA	EVENING	NO	GENERAL	JANITORIAL EQUIP	NONE	0
ESCAMBIA	93	CR	OTH	OTH	CF	OAA	EVENING	WEEKENDS/HOLIDAYS	COMPUTERS/AV EQUIP	MONEY	NONE	0
FLAGLER	1	CR					EVENING	NO	BREAKING & ENTERING		NONE	0
FRANKLIN	0						EVENING					
GADSDEN	60	CR	CF	LR	GTM	LR	EVENING		BREAKING & ENTERING	CAR THEFT	INCREASE	---
GULF	2	LR	GTM	OTH	OCA	CR	DURING		LOCKER BREAKINS	CLASSROOM	UNKNOWN	---
HENDRY	2	CR	OTH	LR	EM	PL	EVENING	NO	MISSING PROPERTY	BREAKING & ENTERING	INCREASE	---
HIGHLANDS	100	OTH	EM	EM	LAB	GTM	EVENING	DURING SCHOOL	COMPUTER EQUIPMENT	CASH	NONE	0
HOLMES	8	CF	CR	CR	CF	CF	EVENING	NO	EQUIPMENT	FOOD	NONE	0
INDIAN RIVER	3	CR	OTH	OTH	OTH	GTM	EVENING	NONE	MONEY		NONE	0
JEFFERSON	4	CF	CR	CR	AD	LAB	EVENING	HOLIDAYS	COMPUTER EQUIPMENT	AV EQUIPMENT	NONE	0
LAKE	0	CR	OTH	LR	CF		EVENING	WEEKENDS/HOLIDAYS/SUMMER	EQUIPMENT	MONEY	DECREASE	---
LEE	16	CR	OTH	CF			DURING	WEEKENDS/HOLIDAYS/SUMMER	EQUIPMENT	FOOD	DECREASE	---
LEON	57	CR	OTH	GTM	LR	CF	EVENING	WEEKENDS/LATE AFTERNOON	AV/OFFICE EQUIPMENT	MONEY	NONE	0
LEVY	47	CR	OTH				EVENING		MONEY	MUSICAL INSTRUMENTS		
LIBERTY	4	LAB	GTM	OAA	CR	CR	EVENING		EQUIPMENT	FOOD	DECREASE	---
MARION	0	OTH	OTH	EM	TR	PL	ALL TIMES	WEEKENDS	CORK MACHINES	STUDENT LOCKERS	DECREASE	---
MARTIN	1	OTH	OTH	EM	LR	EM	EVENING		STOLEN EQUIPMENT		INCREASE	---
MONROE	8	LR	CF	LR	OAA	LAB	EVENING	WEEKENDS/HOLIDAYS	EQUIPMENT	MONEY	INCREASE	5
OKALOOSA	7	AD	CF	CF	GR	LR	EVENING	LATE NIGHT/EARLY MORNING	ILLEGAL ENTRY		DECREASE	---
OKEECHOBEE	19	CR	LAB	LR	BR	PL	EVENING	DURING SCHOOL	CRIMINAL INTENT	FOOD STORAGE FREEZER	DECREASE	---
ORANGE	254	EM	OTH	CF	PL	LR	EVENING	WEEKENDS	COMPUTER/AV EQUIP	LAB MATERIALS	DECREASE	50
OSCEOLA	8	CR	OTH	GTM	OTH	AD	---	EARLY MORNING HOURS	EQUIPMENT	MONEY	UNKNOWN	---
PINELLAS	115	FL	CR	OAA	LAB	GR	EVENING	WEEKENDS/HOLIDAYS/SUMMER	EQUIPMENT	PERSONAL PROPERTY	INCREASE	---
PUTNAM	32	LAB	OTH	EM	TR	LR	EVENING	WEEKENDS	COMPUTER/BAND EQUIP	MONEY	NONE	0
SANTA ROSA	5	CR	OTH	OTH	LR	EM	EVENING	WEEKENDS	PERSONAL ITEMS		NONE	0
SEMINOLE	0	CF	LR	OAA	GR	PL	EVENING		VENDING MACHINES	CANDY/SNACKS	NONE	0
ST JOHNS	0	EM	OAA	CR	GR	CTH	EVENING		CAFETERIA	COMPUTER/SOUND EQUIP	INCREASE	10
ST LUCIE	42	FL	OTH	GTM	GR	PL	EVENING		VEHICLES	CLASSROOMS	DECREASE	5
SUMTER	6	FL	BR				ALL TIMES		EQUIPMENT		INCREASE	---
SUWANNEE	27	BLA					EVENING				DECREASE	---
TAYLOR	3	OTH					EVENING					

TOTALS AND AVERAGES: 5688

	INCREASE	15
	DECREASE	9
	NONE	17
Percent	8.13	

Time of day counts:
BEFORE	0
DURING	2
AFTER	0
EVENING	39
ALL TIMES	2

LEGEND

	RESPONSE NOT GIVEN
CR	CLASSROOMS
EH	HALLWAYS
TR	TOILET ROOMS
LAB	LABORATORIES
AD	AUDITORIUMS
CF	CAFETERIA
GTM	GYMNASIUM
LR	LOCKER ROOMS
PG	PLAYGROUNDS
OAA	OUTDOOR ATHLETIC AREAS
OGA	OUTDOOR GATHERING AREAS
PL	PARKING LOTS
BR	BICYCLE RACKS
BLA	BUS LOADING AREAS
OTH	OTHER
BEFORE	IMMEDIATELY BEFORE SCHOOL
DURING	DURING SCHOOL
AFTER	IMMEDIATELY AFTER SCHOOL
EVENING	EVENING HOURS
ALL TIMES	BEFORE/DURING/AFTER

FL SCHOOL DESIGN GUIDELINES
RAPE AND BATTERY

DISTRICT	INCIDENTS (2 YEARS)	1	2	3	4	5	TIME OF DAY INCIDENTS OCCUR	CHANGE OVER 10 YEARS	PERCENT CHANGE
BAY	749	TR	GYM	PL	CR	HW	DURING	INCREASE	---
BRADFORD	0						---	---	---
BREVARD	127	OTH	CR	LR	OGA		DURING	INCREASE	---
BROWARD	1636	OGA	PL	HW	OGA		DURING	INCREASE	---
CALHOUN	20	PG	HW	OGA	CR	TR	DURING	NONE	0
CITRUS	708	CR	LAB	LR	BLA	OGA	DURING	INCREASE	---
CLAY	1	OTH					AFTER	INCREASE	100
COLLIER	6000	HW	CF	PG	OAA		ALL TIMES	---	---
COLUMBIA	0	HW	CF	LR	OGA	PL	ALL TIMES	INCREASE	---
DADE	4124	CF	BLA	OGA	HW	CR	DURING	INCREASE	117
DUVAL	1472	CR	HW	OGA			DURING	NONE	0
ESCAMBIA	79	HW	CR	TR	BLA	LR	DURING	---	---
FLAGLER	0						---	---	---
FRANKLIN	0						---	---	---
GADSDEN	494	OGA	BLA	PL	CF	PG	DURING	INCREASE	---
GULF	410	HW	CR	LR	CF	AD	DURING	INCREASE	---
HENDRY	2	HW	OTH				DURING	UNKNOWN	---
HIGHLANDS	50	OGA	PG	HW	CF	BLA	DURING	INCREASE	---
HOLMES	12	CF	PL	TR	HW	GYM	DURING	NONE	0
INDIAN RIVER	104	PG	PL	CR	TR	HW	DURING	NONE	0
JEFFERSON	10	OGA	OAA	BLA	PG	LR	ALL TIMES	INCREASED	50
LAKE	0	GYM	PG	TR	OGA	OTH	ALL TIMES	DECREASE	---
LEE	21	HW	PG	LR	OAA	OGA	AFTER	DECREASE	---
LEON	1556	HW	BLA				DURING	INCREASE	---
LEVY	36	CR	HW	PG	OTH	OGA	DURING	NONE	0
LIBERTY	2	HW	BLA	GYM			AFTER	INCREASE	---
MARION	0						---	---	---
MARTIN	0	NONE					ALL TIMES	NONE	0
MONROE	38	HW	PL	GYM	CF	OGA	DURING	DECREASE	---
OKALOOSA	32	HW	CR	GYM	PL	CF	DURING	DECREASE	---
OKEECHOBEE	85	HW	PG	CR	CF	GYM	DURING	INCREASE	25
ORANGE	9491	HW	OGA	OAA	CF	HW	DURING	INCREASE	---
OSCEOLA	110	OGA	PG	CF	HW	CR	DURING	DECREASE	---
PINELLAS	791	CR	HW	CF	TR	OGA	DURING	DECREASE	---
PUTNAM	873	HW	CR	CF	BLA	PG	DURING	INCREASE	---
SANTA ROSA	1	OTH					AFTER	---	---
SEMINOLE	0						---	---	---
ST JOHNS	0						---	---	---
ST LUCIE	268	LR	GYM	HW	CR	CF	ALL TIMES	INCREASE	---
SUMTER	5	HW	PL	CR	GYM	LR	DURING	NONE	0
SUWANNEE	6	HW	PG	CR	GYM	CF	DURING	INCREASE	---
TAYLOR	0	HW	OGA	CR	BLA	TR	DURING	NONE	0
UNION	2	GYM	LR	PG	CR	HW	DURING	NONE	0
VOLUSIA	107	OAA	PG	LR	HW	OGA	DURING	DECREASE	14
WAKULLA	156	TR	HW	OGA	PG	LR	ALL TIMES	INCREASE	---
WASHINGTON	3	PL	BLA	CR	-		ALL TIMES	---	---

TOTALS AND AVERAGES: 29581

CR 22		BEFORE 0	INCREASE 19
HW 29		DURING 26	DECREASE 4
TR 10		AFTER 4	NONE 9
LAB 1		EVENING 0	21.86
AD 1		ALL TIMES 8	
CF 17			
GYM 11			
LR 11			
PG 15			
OAA 6			
OGA 21			
PL 10			
BR 0			
BLA 10			
OTH 6			

LEGEND

---	RESPONSE NOT GIVEN
CR	CLASSROOMS
HW	HALLWAYS
TR	TOILET ROOMS
LAB	LABORATORIES
AD	AUDITORIUMS
CF	CAFETERIA
GYM	GYMNASIUM
LR	LOCKER ROOMS
PG	PLAYGROUNDS
OAA	OUTDOOR ATHLETIC AREAS
OGA	OUTDOOR GATHERING AREAS
PL	PARKING LOTS
BR	BICYCLE RACKS
BLA	BUS LOADING AREAS
OTH	OTHER
BEFORE	IMMEDIATELY BEFORE SCHOOL
DURING	DURING SCHOOL
AFTER	IMMEDIATELY AFTER SCHOOL
EVENING	EVENING HOURS
ALL TIMES	BEFORE/DURING/AFTER

FL SCHOOL DESIGN GUIDELINES
BOE

| DISTRICT | INCIDENTS (2 YEARS) | TOP 5 PLACES INCIDENTS OCCUR (1=MOST OFTEN) | | | | | TIME OF DAY INCIDENTS OCCUR | OTHER TIMES | CHANGE OVER 10 YEARS | PERCENT CHANGE |
		1	2	3	4	5				
BAY	7	LAB	PL	OGA	TR	CR	EVENING	——	NONE	0
BRADFORD	0									
BREVARD	7	TR	OAA	OGA	LAB	CR	DURING	WEEKENDS	NONE	0
BROWARD	47	TR					DURING	WEEKENDS/HOLIDYAS	DECREASE	
CALHOUN	1	HW					DURING	NONE	NONE	0
CITRUS	4	TR	CR	LAB	LR	BLA	EVENING	——	INCREASE	
CLAY	0	NONE								
COLLIER	0	NONE								
COLUMBIA	1	CR					AFTER	——	NONE	0
DADE	34	CF	HW	TR	CR	OTH	EVENING	NO	DECREASE	25
DUVAL	37	TR	LR				DURING	——	NONE	0
ESCAMBIA	1									
FLAGLER	0									
FRANKLIN	0	NONE								
GADSDEN	2	CR	OTH	HW	LAB	AD	EVENING	EARLY AM	INCREASE	
GULF	0									
HENDRY	0	NONE								
HIGHLANDS	10	TR					DURING	NONE	NONE	0
HOLMES	0	NONE								
INDIAN RIVER	0	NONE								
JEFFERSON	0	NONE								
LAKE	0	NONE								
LEE	0	N/A								
LEON	3	NONE							INCREASE	
LEVY	1	GYM					DURING	——	NONE	0
LIBERTY	0	NONE								
MARION	0	NONE								
MARTIN	0	NONE								
MONROE	0	NONE								
OKALOOSA	0									
OKEECHOBEE	2	TR					DURING	AFTER SCHOOL	INCREASE	
ORANGE	13	PG	CR	OGA	OAA	LR	EVENING	WEEKENS/HOLIDAYS	INCREASE	48
OSCEOLA	0									
PINELLAS	201	HW	LAB				EVENING	AFTER SCHOOL	DECREASE	
PUTNAM	3	TR	OGA				DURING	NO	NONE	0
SANTA ROSA	1	CR					EVENING	——		
SEMINOLE	0									
ST JOHNS	0									
ST LUCIE	7	HW	LR	LAB	TR	CR	BEFORE	——	INCREASE	
SUMTER	0	NONE								
SUWANNEE	0								N/A	
TAYLOR	0								NONE	
UNION	0									0
VOLUSIA	11	OGA	LAB	CR	LR	TR	DURING	——	DECREASE	94
WAKULLA	3	TR					DURING	——	INCREASE	
WASHINGTON	1	CR					EVENING	——	DECREASE	

| TOTALS AND AVERAGES | 397 | | | | | | | | | 13.92 |

Legend frequency counts:

CR	11
HW	5
TR	12
LAB	7
AD	1
CF	1
GYM	1
LR	5
PG	1
OAA	2
OGA	5
PL	1
BR	0
BLA	1
OTH	2

TIME OF DAY:
BEFORE	1
DURING	10
AFTER	1
EVENING	8
ALL TIMES	0

CHANGE OVER 10 YEARS:
INCREASE	6
DECREASE	5
NONE	9

LEGEND
——	RESPONSE NOT GIVEN
CR	CLASSROOMS
HW	HALLWAYS
TR	TOILET ROOMS
LAB	LABORATORIES
AD	AUDITORIUMS
CF	CAFETERIA
GYM	GYMNASIUM
LR	LOCKER ROOMS
PG	PLAYGROUNDS
OAA	OUTDOOR ATHLETIC AREAS
OGA	OUTDOOR GATHERING AREAS
PL	PARKING LOTS
BR	BICYCLE RACKS
BLA	BUS LOADING AREAS
OTH	OTHER
BEFORE	IMMEDIATELY BEFORE SCHOOL
DURING	DURING SCHOOL
AFTER	IMMEDIATELY AFTER SCHOOL
EVENING	EVENING HOURS

FL SCHOOL DESIGN GUIDELINES

DISTRICT	INCIDENTS (2 YEARS)	TOP 5 PLACES INCIDENTS OCCUR (1=MOST OFTEN) 1	2	3	4	5	TIME OF DAY INCIDENTS OCCUR	TYPE OF THEFT			CHANGE OVER 10 YEARS	PERCENT CHANGE
BAY	622	BR	CF	LR	GYM	CR	DURING	BICYCLES	EQUIPMENT	MONEY	INCREASE	25
BRADFORD	0	—					—	—			—	—
BREVARD	311	CF	BR	PG	CR	EW	DURING	COMPUTER EQUIPMENT	CARS		INCREASE	—
BROWARD	1310	CR	BR	LR	LAB	PL	DURING	COMPUTER EQUIPMENT	MUSICAL INSTRUMENTS		INCREASE	—
CALHOUN	20	EW	EW	LR	GYM	PG	DURING	PETTY THEFT			NONE	0
CITRUS	100	CR	LR	GYM	CF	OGA	DURING	PETTY THEFT	EQUIPMENT		INCREASE	—
CLAY	97	OTH	CR	CF	LR	GYM	EVENING	GROUNDS EQUIPMENT	EQUIPMENT		INCREASE	25
COLLIER	650	CR	CR	GYM	LR	PG	ALL TIMES	EQUIPMENT			INCREASE	—
COLUMBIA	0	—					ALL TIMES	—			INCREASE	—
DADE	4303	EW	CF	OTH	LR	CR	DURING	SCHOOL	PERSONAL	AUTO	INCREASE	5
DUVAL	1489	LR	LR	BR		CR	DURING	JEWELRY	GYM CLOTHING	VCR	NONE	0
ESCAMBIA	47	CR	OGA	OTH	EW	AD		EQUIPMENT	PERSONAL PROPERTY	FIRE EXTINGUISHERS	NONE	—
FLAGLER	15	LR	CR	PL	AD	EW	DURING	PETTY THEFT	COATS/JACKETS	PERSONAL RADIOS	NONE	0
FRANKLIN	0	—					—	—			—	—
GADSDEN	9	OTH	CR	LAB	LR	PL	DURING	CARS	EQUIPMENT	PURSES	INCREASE	—
GULF	0	—					—	—			—	—
HENDRY	6	CR	OTH	PL			EVENING	VALUABLES IN LOCKER			UNKNOWN	—
HIGHLANDS	100	LR	EW	CF	BR		DURING	VALUABLES IN LOCKER	BICYCLES		NONE	0
HOLMES	11	LR	LR				DURING	SHOES	PERSONAL ITEMS		NONE	0
INDIAN RIVER	3	—					DURING	VEHICLE			NONE	0
JEFFERSON	0	CR	LR	GYM	OTH	EW	DURING	COMPUTER EQUIPMENT	PERSONAL ITEMS	AV EQUIPMENT	DECREASE	100
LAKE	17	CR	OTH	GYM			EVENING			MONEY	—	—
LEE	0	N/A					—	—			—	—
LEON	4	CR	LR	GYM	OGA	CF	DURING	CLOTHING/JEWELRY	BOOK BAGS	MONEY/WALLETS	INCREASE	0
LEVY	102	OGA	GYM	OAA	EW	OTH	DURING	CLOTHING ITEMS	JEWELRY	MONEY/WALLETS	NONE	0
LIBERTY	23						DURING	MONEY	FOOD	CLOTHING/JEWELRY		—
MARION	0	—					—	—			—	—
MARTIN	11	LAB	GYM	CR	CF	CR		PERSONAL ITEMS	CLASSROOMS		—	—
MONROE	58	OTH	LR	OTH	PL		ALL TIMES	STUDENT LOCKERS	TWO WAY RADIOS	CARS	DECREASE	0
OKALOOSA	5	CR	OTH	AD	OGA	EW	EVENING	COMPUTER EQUIPMENT	EQUIPMENT	MONEY	NONE	0
OKEECHOBEE	95	CR	CF	LR	OTH	BR	DURING	EQUIPMENT	BICYCLES	SUPPLIES	DECREASE	—
ORANGE	84	AD	CF	LR	OTH		AFTER	AV/SPORTS EQUIPMENT	AV/SOUND EQUIPMENT	PURSES	INCREASE	5
OSCEOLA	8	CR	BR	CR	OTH		EVENING	MONEY	AV/SOUND EQUIPMENT	COMPUTERS	DECREASE	—
PINELLAS	2353	CR	EW	TR	LR	PL	DURING	PORTABLE EQUIPMENT	COMPUTERS	TOOLS	INCREASE	—
PUTNAM	304	LAB	LR	OTH	GYM	CR	EVENING	MONEY	PERSONAL PROPERTY	BICYCLES	INCREASE	—
SANTA ROSA	31						EVENING	PETTY THEFT				—
SEMINOLE	0	—					—	—			—	—
ST JOHNS	0	—					—	—			—	—
ST LUCIE	159	LAB	CR	LR	CR	CR	ALL TIMES	EQUIPMENT	PERSONAL PROPERTY		INCREASE	—
SUMTER	169	CR	LR	EW	PG	PL	DURING	PURSES	PERSONAL PROPERTY		DECREASE	10
SUWANNEE	23	CR	LR	GYM	OGA	PL	DURING	VENDING MACHINES	CD TAPES	AUDIO VISUAL EQUIPMENT	NONE	—
TAYLOR	3	CF	LR	CR	CR	TR	EVENING	COMPUTER EQUIPMENT	COMPUTER EQUIPMENT		NONE	0
UNION	12	AD	LR	LAB	LR	CR	DURING	PETTY			NONE	0
VOLUSIA	155	OGA	LAB	GYM	LR	OGA	DURING	VEHICLES	AUTOS	LOCKERS	INCREASE	1
WAKULLA	46	CR	GYM	LR	GYM		DURING	COMPUTERS	COMPUTERS	EQUIPMENT	INCREASE	—
WASHINGTON	0	—					—	—			—	—

| TOTALS AND AVERAGES | 12,347 | | | | | | | | | | | 10.06 |

Place	Count		Time of Day	Count		Change Over 10 Years	Count
CR	32		BEFORE	0		INCREASE	16
EW	12		DURING	23		DECREASE	3
TR	2		AFTER	1		NONE	10
LAB	6		EVENING	7			
AD	5		ALL TIMES	4			
CF	13						
GYM	15						
LR	27						
PG	5						
OAA	2						
OGA	8						
PL	8						
BR	7						
BLA	0						
OTH	14						

LEGEND

—	RESPONSE NOT GIVEN
CR	CLASSROOMS
EW	HALLWAYS
TR	TOILET ROOMS
LAB	LABORATORIES
AD	AUDITORIUMS
CF	CAFETERIA
GYM	GYMNASIUM
LR	LOCKER ROOMS
PG	PLAYGROUNDS
OAA	OUTDOOR ATHLETIC AREAS
OGA	OUTDOOR GATHERING AREAS
PL	PARKING LOTS
BR	BICYCLE RACKS
BLA	BUS LOADING AREAS
OTH	OTHER
BEFORE	IMMEDIATELY BEFORE SCHOOL
DURING	DURING SCHOOL
AFTER	IMMEDIATELY AFTER SCHOOL
EVENING	EVENING HOURS
ALL TIMES	BEFORE/DURING/AFTER

318

319

BEST COPY AVAILABLE

FLORIDA SCHOOL DESIGN GUIDELINES
ENTRY

DISTRICT	INCIDENTS (2 YEARS)	TOP 5 PLACES INCIDENTS OCCUR (1=MOST OFTEN) 1	2	3	4	5	TIME OF DAY INCIDENTS OCCUR	TYPE OF ROBBERY		CHANGE OVER 10 YEARS	PERCENT CHANGE
BAY	0	AD	TR	GTM	EM	CR	DURING	EXTORTION	---	---	---
BRADFORD	0								---	---	---
BREVARD	70	CR	CR	PG	PL	EM	DURING	MONEY	---	INCREASE	---
BROWARD	52	TR	PG	OGA	OGA	PL	BEFORE	SNATCH & gRAB / SHOES	---	INCREASE	90
CALHOUN	0	NONE							---	---	---
CITRUS	0								---	---	---
CLAY	0	NONE							---	---	---
COLLIER	0								---	---	---
COLUMBIA	0	NONE							---	---	---
DADE	799	ELA	EM	PL	PG	OGA	DURING	JEWELRY / MONEY	---	INCREASE	21
DUVAL	59	EM	PL				DURING	STRONG ARM	---	NONE	---
ESCAMBIA	0								---	---	---
FLAGLER	0								---	---	---
FRANKLIN	0	NONE							---	---	---
GADSDEN	3	OGA	PG	LR	PL	CF	DURING	MONEY / JEWELRY / CLOTHING	---	INCREASE	---
GULF	0								---	---	---
HENDRY	0	NONE							---	---	---
HIGHLANDS	10	PG	EM	LR	PL		DURING	LUNCH MONEY	---	NONE	---
HOLMES	0	NONE							---	NONE	---
INDIAN RIVER	3	PG					DURING		---	NONE	---
JEFFERSON	0	NONE							---	---	---
LAKE	0	NONE							---	---	---
LEE	4	NONE						JEWELRY / MONEY / FOOD	---	INCREASE	---
LEON	0	NONE							---	---	---
LIBERTY	0								---	---	---
MARION	0	NONE							---	---	---
MARTIN	0	NONE							---	---	---
MONROE	0								---	---	---
OKALOOSA	0	NONE							---	---	---
OKEECHOBEE	33	EM	CR	OGA	TR	CF	DURING	STRONG ARMED	---	INCREASE	10
ORANGE	0								---	---	---
OSCEOLA	35	CR	GTM	PL	EM	LR	EVENING		---	NO	---
PINELLAS	11	CF	CR	PL	EM	LR	DURING	EXTORTION	---	INCREASE	---
PUTNAM	0								---	---	---
SANTA ROSA	0								---	---	---
SEMINOLE	12	PG	OAA	LR	EM	PL	DURING	MONEY	---	INCREASE	---
ST JOHNS	0	NONE							---	---	---
ST LUCIE	16	PG	CF	OAA	TR	EM	DURING	MONEY	---	NONE	---
SUMTER	0								---	---	---
SUWANNEE	0								---	NONE	---
TAYLOR	2	ELA	OAA	PL	OGA	EM	DURING	STRONG ARM ROBBERY	---	INCREASE	50
UNION	2	TR					DURING	ARMED ROBBERY	---	INCREASE	---
VOLUSIA	0								---	---	---
WAKULLA											
WASHINGTON											

TOTALS AND AVERAGES	1111				BEFORE 1					INCREASE 10	42.75
		CR 5			DURING 13					DECREASE 0	
		EM 10			AFTER 0					NONE 5	
		TR 5			EVENING 1						
		LAB 0			ALL TIMES 0						
		AD 1									
		CF 5									
		GTM 2									
		LR 4									
		PG 8									
		OAA 4									
		OGA 5									
		PL 10									
		BR 0									
		ELA 2									
		OTH 0									

LEGEND

--	RESPONSE NOT GIVEN
CR	CLASSROOMS
EM	HALLWAYS
TR	TOILET ROOMS
LAB	LABORATORIES
AD	AUDITORIUMS
CF	CAFETERIA
GTM	GYMNASIUM
LR	LOCKER ROOMS
PG	PLAYGROUNDS
OAA	OUTDOOR ATHLETIC AREAS
OGA	OUTDOOR GATHERING AREAS
PL	PARKING LOTS
BR	BICYCLE RACKS
ELA	BUS LOADING AREAS
OTH	OTHER
BEFORE	IMMEDIATELY BEFORE SCHOOL
DURING	DURING SCHOOL
AFTER	IMMEDIATELY AFTER SCHOOL
EVENING	EVENING HOURS
ALL TIMES	BEFORE/DURING/AFTER

78 SCHOOL DESIGN GUIDELINES
K12 POSSESSION AND USE

DISTRICT	INCIDENTS (2 YEARS)	TOP 5 PLACES INCIDENTS OCCUR (1=MOST OFTEN) 1	2	3	4	5	TIME OF DAY INCIDENTS OCCUR	CHANGE OVER 10 YEARS	PERCENT CHANGE
BAY	77	PL	GYM	LR	HW	TR	DURING	DECREASE	—
BRADFORD	0								—
BREVARD	89	CR	HW	PL	LR	CF	DURING	INCREASE	—
BROWARD	149	PL	TR	PG	OAA	HW	ALL TIMES	NONE	—
CALHOUN	4	PL	OGA	TR			AFTER	NONE	0
CITRUS	28	PL	OGA	TR	PG	OAA	ALL TIMES	INCREASE	15
CLAY	71	OTH					UNKNOWN	INCREASE	—
COLLIER	160	HW	LAB	LR	PL		ALL TIMES		—
COLUMBIA	0						DURING	INCREASE	—
DADE	204	OAA	TR	HW	CR	OGA	DURING	DECREASE	50
DUVAL	174	HW					DURING	NONE	0
ESCAMBIA	27	CR	BLA	LR	TR	OGA	DURING		—
FLAGLER	2	PL						DECREASE	—
FRANKLIN	2	CR	OAA				DURING		—
GADSDEN	11	OGA	OAA	PG	TR	PL	DURING		—
GULF	1	CR					DURING	UNKOWN	—
HENDRY	3	OGA							—
HIGHLANDS	17	OGA	HW	TR	PL	LR	DURING	INCREASE	—
HOLMES	0	NONE							—
INDIAN RIVER	17	OGA	TR	OTH	CR	PL	BEFORE	NONE	0
JEFFERSON	6	OGA	TR	BLA	OAA	PL	ALL TIMES	DECREASE	—
LAKE	0								—
LEE	16	LR	PL	OGA	OAA	CF		INCREASE	—
LEON	59						DURING	NONE	0
LEVY	10	TR	PG	OAA	OGA		BEFORE		—
LIBERTY	3	OGA	PL	HW					—
MARION	0								—
MARTIN	67	LR	CR	TR	PL	HW	DURING	INCREASE	0
MONROE	46	PL	TR	HW	OGA	OTH	ALL TIMES	NONE	—
OKALOOSA	9							DECREASE	—
OKEECHOBEE	12	OGA	HW	TR	OAA	PL	DURING	DECREASE	—
ORANGE	270	TR	OAA	OGA	PL	HW	ALL TIMES	INCREASE	10
OSCEOLA	50	PL	OGA	OAA	TR	HW	ALL TIMES	DECREASE	50
PINELLAS	99	CR	OGA	TR	BR	OGA	DURING	DECREASE	—
PUTNAM	52	HW	TR	LR	CR	OGA	DURING	INCREASE	—
SANTA ROSA	0								—
SEMINOLE	0								
ST JOHNS	0								
ST LUCIE	43	LR	CR	TR	PL	OGA	ALL TIMES	INCREASE	0
SUMTER	10	TR	HW	CR	PL	CF	DURING	NONE	—
SUWANNEE	5	PL	OGA	TR	CR	GYM	DURING	NONE	—
TAYLOR	7	PL	OGA	TR	BLA		DURING	NONE	0
UNION	5	TR	PG	OAA	OGA	PL	DURINGS	DECREASE	—
VOLUSIA	39	CF	PL	OGA	LR	TR	DURING	INCREASE	27
WAKULLA	11	TR	LR				ALL TIMES	INCREASE	—
WASHINGTON	2						DURING		—
AVERAGES	**1855**								**12.67**

CR	11
HW	16
TR	25
LAB	1
AD	0
CF	4
GYM	2
LR	11
PG	5
OAA	13
OGA	23
PL	24
BR	1
BLA	3
OTH	3

BEFORE	2	INCREASE	13
DURING	19	DECREASE	8
AFTER	1	NONE	7
EVENING	0		
ALL TIMES	8		

LEGEND

—	RESPONSE NOT GIVEN
CR	CLASSROOMS
HW	HALLWAYS
TR	TOILET ROOMS
LAB	LABORATORIES
AD	AUDITORIUMS
CF	CAFETERIA
GYM	GYMNASIUM
LR	LOCKER ROOMS
PG	PLAYGROUNDS
OAA	OUTDOOR ATHLETIC AREAS
OGA	OUTDOOR GATHERING AREAS
PL	PARKING LOTS
BR	BICYCLE RACKS
BLA	BUS LOADING AREAS
OTH	OTHER
BEFORE	IMMEDIATELY BEFORE SCHOOL
DURING	DURING SCHOOL
AFTER	IMMEDIATELY AFTER SCHOOL
EVENING	EVENING HOURS
ALL TIMES	BEFORE/DURING/AFTER SCHOOL

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FE SCHOOL DESIGN GUIDELINES
SCHOOL

DISTRICT	INCIDENTS (2 YEARS)	TOP 5 PLACES INCIDENTS OCCUR (1=MOST OFTEN) 1	2	3	4	5	TIME OF DAY INCIDENTS OCCUR	CHANGE OVER 10 YEARS	PERCENT CHANGE
BAY	69	HW	CR	TR	LR	PL	DURING		
BRADFORD	0								
BREVARD	34	PL	LR	OAA	TR	PG	DURING	INCREASE	
BROWARD	0	IN DRUG STATS							
CALHOUN	3	PL	OGA	OAA				NONE	0
CITRUS	18	PL	OGA	TR	PG	OAA	EVENING	INCREASE	
CLAY	26	OTH	LR	PL	OGA	TR	DURING	INCREASE	30
COLLIER	0	IN DRUG STATS							
COLUMBIA	0						BEFORE	NONE	0
DADE	16	CR	OGA	TR	LR	CR	DURING	NONE	0
DUVAL	146	CR	PL				ALL TIMES	NONE	0
ESCAMBIA	3	PL					BEFORE	NONE	0
FLAGLER	1								
FRANKLIN	1	HW					DURING		
GADSDEN	53	OGA	PL	CR	LR	TR	DURING	INCREASE	
GULF	13	HW	TR	OTH	PL	CR	DURING		
HENDRY	0	NONE							
HIGHLANDS	43	OGA	PL	BLA	TR	HW	DURING	INCREASE	0
HOLMES	3	PL	LR				DURING	NONE	0
INDIAN RIVER	1	OTH					AFTER	NONE	
JEFFERSON	8	OTH	TR	LR	OGA	PL	ALL TIMES	INCREASE	100
LAKE	0								
LEE	0								
LEON	6	NONE							
LEVY	7	PG	TR	CR			DURING	NONE	0
LIBERTY	4	OGA	PL				BEFORE	DECREASE	
MARION	0								
MARTIN	14	PG	GYM	OGA	OAA	PL	EVENING	INCREASE	
MONROE	14	OTH	BR	OGA			ALL TIMES	INCREASE	
OKALOOSA	41						ALL TIMES	DECREASE	
OKEECHOBEE	21	PL	CF	HW	OAA	CR	DURING	DECREASE	10
ORANGE	282	PL	OTH	OGA	OAA	TR	ALL TIMES	INCREASE	0
OSCEOLA	5	PL	OGA	OAA	TR	HW	AFTER	NONE	
PINELLAS	0	PL					EVENING	INCREASE	0
PUTNAM	24	TR	OAA	PL	OTH	HW	ALL TIMES	NONE	
SANTA ROSA	0								
SEMINOLE	0								
ST JOHNS	0								
ST LUCIE	15	HW	CR	TR	LR	PL	ALL TIMES	INCREASE	0
SUMTER	5	PL	HW	LR	TR	CR	DURING	NONE	
SUWANNEE	20	OGA	PL	TR	LR	OGA	ALL TIMES	NONE	0
TAYLOR	12	PL	BLA	HW	HW	OGA	ALL TIMES	NONE	0
UNION	2	TR	LR	PG	OAA	OGA	DURING	NONE	0
VOLUSIA	7	HW	TR	PL	OAA	OGA	DURING	DECREASE	75
WAKULLA	6	TR	OTH	LR	OGA	OAA	ALL TIMES	INCREASE	
WASHINGTON	0								

LEGEND

RESPONSE NOT GIVEN
CR — CLASSROOMS
HW — HALLWAYS
TR — TOILET ROOMS
LAB — LABORATORIES
AD — AUDITORIUMS
CF — CAFETERIA
GYM — GYMNASIUM
LR — LOCKER ROOMS
PG — PLAYGROUNDS
OAA — OUTDOOR ATHLETIC AREAS
OGA — OUTDOOR GATHERING AREAS
PL — PARKING LOTS
BR — BICYCLE RACKS
BLA — BUS LOADING AREAS
OTH — OTHER
BEFORE — IMMEDIATELY BEFORE SCHOOL
DURING — DURING SCHOOL
AFTER — IMMEDIATELY AFTER SCHOOL
EVENING — EVENING HOURS
CMB — INFORMATION COMBINED WITH DRUGS
ALL TIMES — BEFORE/DURING AFTER

TOTALS AND AVERAGES: 922

Place	Count		Time of Day	Count
CR	11		BEFORE	3
HW	11		DURING	14
TR	20		AFTER	2
LAB	0		EVENING	3
AD	0		ALL TIMES	11
CF	1			
GYM	1		INCREASE	15
LR	12		DECREASE	3
PG	5		NONE	13
OAA	10			
OGA	17			
PL	25			
BR	1			
BLA	2			
OTH	8			

FL SCHOOL DESIGN GUIDELINES
HER CRIMINAL ACTIVITIES

DISTRICT	WEAPONS INCIDENTS (2 YEARS)	TYPE OF WEAPONS 1	2	3	BOMB TREATS 2 YRS	5 YRS	PROCEDURS IMPLEMENTED DURING BOMB THREAT
BAY	20	KNIVES	---	---	1	3	EVACUATE/NOTIFIY SUPERINTENDENT, LAW ENFORCEMENT
BRADFORD	0	---	---	---	0	0	---
BREVARD	57	KNIVES	GUNS	RAZORS	27	0	EVACUATE/LAW ENFORCEMENT/TRACE CALL/TRY ID VOICE/GET SPECIFIC LOC
BROWARD	367	KNIVES	---	---	0	0	---
CALHOUN	0	KNIVES	---	---	0	0	EVACUATIONTHEN SEARCH BY AUTHORITIES
CITRUS	22	GUNS	KNIVES	---	30	0	TRAP AND TRACE THROUGH PHONE COMPANY
CLAY	112	KNIVES	---	---	3	0	NOTIFY PRINCIPAL, SAFETY MGMT, LAW ENFORCE/EVACUATE/SEARCH
COLLIER	160	KNIVES	---	---	1	2	EVACUATE/NOTIFE FIRE AND POLICE
COLUMBIA	0	GUNS	KNIVES	---	0	0	---
DADE	1026	KNIVES	GUNS	---	55	0	COMMONS AREAS SEARCHED/POLICE CALLED/EVACUATION
DUVAL	490	KNIVES	GUNS	---	24	70	NOTIFY SCHOOL SECURITY & POLICE PRINCIPAL DESCRETION TO EVACUATE
ESCAMBIA	52	KNIVES	---	---	3	0	---
FLAGLER	4	KNIVES	---	---	0	0	EMERGENCY PLAN
FRANKLIN	0	KNIVES	---	---	1	0	EVACUATE/NOTIFY LAW ENFORCEMENT/NOTIFY DISTRICT
GADSDEN	117	KNIVES	RAZORS	CLUBS	4	16	EVACUATE/CALL LAW ENFORCEMENT
GULF	41	KNIVES	---	---	0	0	EVACUATE CALL SHERIFF
HENDRY	3	GUNS	KNIVES	---	0	0	SITE ADMINISTRATORS FOLLOW BOMB THREAT EMERGENCIES
HIGHLANDS	7	GUNS	---	---	7	20	CALL 911 EVACUATE SEARCH RETURN TO CLASS
HOLMES	2	KNIVES	---	---	0	0	EVACUATION
INDIAN RIVER	11	KNIVES	---	---	0	2	FIRE DRILL
JEFFERSON	10	KNIVES	GUNS	---	0	0	EVACUATE
LAKE	0	---	---	---	0	0	CALL IN BY PHONE
LEE	19	KNIVES	---	---	39	0	EVACUATE
LEON	0	KNIVES	GUNS	---	3	0	EVACUATE/TEACHERS SCAN ROOM/LEAVE WINDOWS, DOORS OPEN/SEARCH
LEVY	8	KNIVES	---	---	0	0	EVACUATED AUTHORITIES CALLED
LIBERTY	2	KNIVES	---	---	0	0	EVACUATE/NOTIFY LAW ENFORCEMENT
MARION	0	---	---	---	0	0	NOTIFY PRINCIPAL AND SUPERINTENDENTAS OFFICE
MARTIN	55	KNIVES	GUNS	---	11	27	EVACUATE/NOTIFY LAW ENFORCEMENT/FIRE DEPARTMENT/SUPERINTENDENT
MONROE	21	KNIVES	GUNS	---	0	5	EVACUATE NOTIFY DISTRICT CALL POLICE CALL PHONE COMPANY
OKALOOSA	6	KNIVES	---	---	1	2	EVACUATE/NOTIFY LAW ENFORCEMENT
OKEECHOBEE	35	KNIVES	---	---	19	0	EVACUATE/NOTIFIY AUTHORITIES/SEARCH
ORANGE	379	KNIVES	---	---	7	0	CALL 911/EVACUATE
OSCEOLA	30	KNIVES	---	---	15	21	---
PINELLAS	156	KNIVES	---	---	8	13	EVACUATE/NOTIFY BOMB SEARCH TEAM/NOTIFY LAW ENFORCEMENT/DISTRICT
PUTNAM	120	KNIVES	---	---	1	2	EVACUATION/CALL LAW ENFORCEMENT&CIVIL DEFENSE/INSPECT BUILDING
SANTA ROSA	5	GUNS	---	---	0	0	EVACUATE/CALL FIRE DEPARTMENT
SEMINOLE	7	GUNS	---	---	0	0	---
ST JOHNS	0	---	---	---	2	5	EVACUATE/CALL 911/TRACE CALL/LEO INVESTIGATION
ST LUCIE	35	KNIVES	GUNS	---	1	0	TAPE, TRACE CALL/EVACUATE/SEARCH
SUMTER	48	KNIVES	---	---	0	1	EVACUATE BUILDING CALL DISTRICT OFFICE AND SHERIFF
SUWANNEE	40	KNIVES	---	---	2	6	EVACUATE CALL POLICE/FIRE SEARCH
TAYLOR	10	KNIVES	---	---	0	1	LOCAL POLICE
UNION	3	KNIVES	GUNS	---	0	0	EVACUATE/NOTIFY LAW ENFORCEMENT&SECURITY/SEARCH
VOLUSIA	30	KNIVES	B KNUCKL---	---	14	63	FIRE EVACUATION/CALL SHERIFF/SEARCH
WAKULLA	30	KNIVES	---	---	0	0	EVACUATE BUILDIG/CALL SHERIFF
WASHINGTON	1	GUNS	---	---	0	1	
TOTALS AND AVERAGES	3541	KNIVES 38, GUNS 16, RAZORS 2			279	260	

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TE SCHOOL DESIGN GUIDELINES
HER CRIMINAL ACTIVITIES

DISTRICT	PROBLEMS W/TRESPASS	DESCRIBE PROBLEM	OTHER CRIMINAL ACTIVITIES	METHODS USED TO REPORT CRIMINAL ACTS
BAY	YES	AFTER HOURS	RAPE	LAW ENFORCEMENT RISK MANAGEMENT SUPERINTENDENT
BRADFORD	---	---	---	---
BREVARD	YES	STUDENTS ON SUSPENSION	RAPE / MISSING PERSON	SECURITY SERVICES/POLICE/HRS/AREA SUPERINTENDENT'S OFFICE
BROWARD	YES	NON STUDENTS	GROUP VIOLENCE	LOCAL POLICE AND SCHOOL BOARD SPECIAL INVESTIGATION UNIT
CALHOUN	NO	---	---	---
CITRUS	YES	SUSPENEDE STUDENTS	N/A	N/A
CLAY	NO	---	RAPE	VICTIM REPORTED TO PRINCIPAL /PRINCIPAL NOTIFY LAW ENFORCEMENT
COLLIER	NO	---	NONE	N/A
COLUMBIA	YES	DROPOUTS	NONE	N/A
DADE	YES	PREVIOUS STUDENTS-DROP OUTS AND UNEMPLOYED	GANG ACTIVITY	CLASSIFIED TO TYPE, ID AS GANG RELATED
DUVAL	YES	300 IN PAST 2 YEARS	GROUP VIOLENCE RAPE	---
ESCAMBIA	---	---	HOMICIDE	LAW ENFORCEMENT
FLAGLER	NO	---	---	---
FRANKLIN	YES	---	---	---
GADSDEN	YES	NON-STUDENTS VISITING STUDENTS	GROUP VIOLENCE	PRINCIPAL REPORTS TO APPROPRIATE HRS AND LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICIAL
GULF	NO	N/A	LARCENY	SRO ACTIVITY REPORT
HENDRY	---	N/A	N/A	SITE ADMINIATRATOR NOTIFY PROPER AUTHORITIES
HIGHLANDS	NO	---	GROUP VIOLENCE RACIAL CONFLICT	SCHOOL RESOURCE OFFICERS
HOLMES	NO	---	---	---
INDIAN RIVER	YES	EX-STUDENTS OR EXPELLED STUDENTS	GROUP VIOLENCE	DEAN'S OFFICE SRO
JEFFERSON	YES	PUBLICE USING PLAYGORUNDS AFTER HOURS	GROUP VIOLENCE RAPE	RESOURCE OFFICER
LAKE	YES	---	---	---
LEE	NO	OPEN SCHOOL CONCEPT	NONE	---
LEON	YES	---	GROUP VIOLENCE	LOCAL AUTHORITIES
LEVY	NO	---	---	---
LIBERTY	YES	DURING LUNCH STUDENTS FROM OTHER SCHOOLS	GROUP VIOLENCE	REPORTED TO RISK MANAGEMENT
MARION	---	---	NONE	---
MARTIN	NO	---	NONE	N/A
MONROE	NO	---	NONE	POLICE ARE CALLED
OKALOOSA	YES	OUTSIDERS COMING ON CAMPUS	GROUP VIOLENCE	---
OKEECHOBEE	YES	FORMER STUDENTS AFTER HOURS	GROUP VIOLENCE	---
ORANGE	YES	OPEN CAMPUS AREAS INVITE UNWANTED VISITORS	GROUP VIOLENCE	SRO AND SCHOOL ADMINISTRATORS
OSCEOLA	YES	VANDALISM	GROUP VIOLENCE RAPE	THROUGH THE PRINCIPALS OFFICE
PINELLAS	NO	NOT SINCE GROUNDS WERE POSTED	GROUP VIOLENCE RAPE	REPORTED TO SRO AND HANDLED BY LOCAL AGENCY
PUTNAM	YES	NON STUDENTS ENTERING CAMPUS	NONE	N/A
SANTA ROSA	YES	UNAUTHORIZED PEOPLE ON CAMPUS	NONE	N/A
SEMINOLE	---	---	---	---
ST JOHNS	---	---	---	---
ST LUCIE	YES	48 ARREST IN 2 YEARS	GROUP VIOLENCE RAPE	SRO OR LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCY OR SCHOOL SAFETY-SECURITY OFFICERS
SUMTER	NO	---	---	REPORTED TO LAW ENFORCEMENT
SUWANNEE	YES	FORMER STUDENTS WEEKENDS BASKETBALL COURTS ABUSED	GROUP VIOLENCE SEXUAL BATTERY	INFORM DISTRICT OFFICE NOTIFY SHERIFF FILE CHARGES
TAYLOR	NO	---	---	INVOLVE POLICE
UNION	NO	---	GROUP VIOLENCE	---
VOLUSIA	YES	SUSPENDED OR EXPELLED STUDENTS COLLEGE STUDENTS	GROUP VIOLENCE	---
WAKULLA	YES	STUDENTS FROM OTHER SCHOOLS	NONE	---
WASHINGTON	---	---	---	---

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SAFE SCHOOL DESIGN GUIDELINES
Question 56

DISTRICT	PUBLICE PERCEPTION OF SAFETY WITHIN DISTRICT
BAY	PERCEPTION IS CHILDREN ARE SAFE IN SCHOOL
BRADFORD	---
BREVARD	UNKNOWN
BROWARD	GOOD PUBLIC AWARENESS OF BOARD INVOLEMENT WITH LAS ENFORCEMENT
CALHOUN	GOOD
Citrus	EXCELLENT SAFE SCHOOL PLAN HAS BEEN DEVELOPED BY EACH SCHOOL
CLAY	POSITIVE
COLLIER	GENERALLY VERY SAFE
COLUMBIA	NEED MORE FUNDING AND STAFF FOR THESE AREAS
DADE	THERE IS A NEED FOR IMPROVEMENT AND RE-ENFORCEMENT OF DISCIPLINE
DUVAL	---
ESCAMBIA	NEEDS IMPROVEMENT
FLAGLER	GOOD
FRANKLIN	---
GADSDEN	APPREHENSIVE
GULF	NOT AS SAFE AS IN THE PAST HAVE PLACE SRO IN HIGH SCHOOLS
HENDRY	SAFE AND SECURE
HIGHLANDS	FAIRLY GOOD
HOLMES	VERY GOOD
INDIAN RIVER	SOME CONCERN
JEFFERSON	CONCERNED
LAKE	SCHOOLS ARE A SAFE ENVIRONMENT
LEE	GOOD
LEON	---
LEVY	SCHOOLS ARE SAFE
LIBERTY	SAFE
MARION	FAIR
MARTIN	VERY GOOD
MONROE	PARENTS PREFER STRICTER DISCIPLINARY PROCED. AND ENFORCEMENT
OKALOOSA	NEED MORE SECURITY
OKEECHOBEE	EXCELLENT PARENTS SEND CHILDRENT TO PLAY ON GROUNDS AFTER HOURS
ORANGE	DEPENDS UPON MEDIA COVERAGE
OSCEOLA	GOOD
PINELLAS	COULD B IN TROUBLE BECAUSE OF LACK SECURITY/FEW STAFF
PUTNAM	SAFE
SANTA ROSA	GOOD
SEMINOLE	HANDLED BY PRINCIPALS AND DIVISION DIRECTORS
ST JOHNS	---
ST LUCIE	COULD USE IMPROVEMENT AT MIDDLE AND HIGH SCHOOLS
SUMTER	GENERALLY SAFE
SUWANNEE	UNSAFE
TAYLOR	GOOD
UNION	AVERAGE
VOLUSIA	ADEQUATE & APPRECIATIVE OF THE PROGRAM IMPLEMENTED TO PROTECT
WAKULLA	GOOD
WASHINGTON	SATISFACTORY AT MOST

SCHOOL DESIGN GUIDELINES
Question 57

DISTRICT	ON-SITE SECURITY	SRO PROGRAM	YEARS	MONTHS
BAY	NO	YES	9	0
BRADFORD	--	--	0	0
BREVARD	NO	YES	3	0
BROWARD	NO	YES	5	0
CALHOUN	NO	NO	0	0
CITRUS	NO	YES	8	0
CLAY	YES	YES	13	0
COLLIER	NO	YES	10	0
COLUMBIA	YES	YES	0	0
DADE	--	YES	6	0
DUVAL	YES	YES	3	0
ESCAMBIA	NO	YES	8	0
FLAGLER	NO	YES	7	0
FRANKLIN	--	--	0	0
GADSDEN	NO	YES	0	0
GULF	NO	YES	2	0
HENDRY	NO	YES	5	0
HIGHLANDS	NO	YES	5	0
HOLMES	NO	NO	0	0
INDIAN RIVER	NO	YES	0	0
JEFFERSON	NO	YES	2	0
LAKE	NO	NO	0	0
LEE	YES	YES	13	0
LEON	NO	YES	12	0
LEVY	NO	YES	5	0
LIBERTY	NO	NO	0	0
MARION	NO	YES	0	0
MARTIN	YES	YES	5	0
MONROE	NO	YES	4	0
OKALOOSA	NO	YES	0	8
OKEECHOBEE	NO	NO	0	0
ORANGE	YES	YES	13	0
OSCEOLA	YES	YES	5	0
PINELLAS	NO	YES	10	0
PUTNAM	NO	YES	13	0
SANTA ROSA	NO	YES	4	0
SEMINOLE	NO	YES	0	0
ST JOHNS	YES	YES	0	0
ST LUCIE	NO	YES	8	0
SUMTER	NO	YES	9	0
SUWANNEE	YES	YES	0	0
TAYLOR	NO	YES	7	0
UNION	--	YES	0	0
VOLUSIA	NO	YES	7	0
WAKULLA	YES	YES	7	0
WASHINGTON	NO	YES	0	0

SAFE SCHOOL DESIGN GUIDELINES
Question 58

DISTRICT	WRITTEN REGULATIONS REGARDING ACCESS AND CONTROL
BAY	HANDLED BY EACH FACILITY MANAGER
BRADFORD	---
BREVARD	---
BROWARD	CONTROLLED BY SCHOOL PRINCIPAL
CALHOUN	NO
Citrus	SAFE SCHOOL PLAN
CLAY	NONE
COLLIER	---
COLUMBIA	NONE
DADE	MUST CALL CENTRAL ALARM STATION BEFORE ENTERING BUILDING
DUVAL	SONITROL SECURITY SYSTEM
ESCAMBIA	NONE
FLAGLER	YES BD POLICY AND SCHOOL RULES
FRANKLIN	---
GADSDEN	YES PRINCIPAL RESPONSIBLE FOR ADMIN OF GUIDELINES
GULF	NO
HENDRY	NO
HIGHLANDS	NO
HOLMES	NO
INDIAN RIVER	NO
JEFFERSON	NO TRESPASSING SIGNS
LAKE	NONE
LEE	BOARD POLICY
LEON	NONE
LEVY	NO
LIBERTY	NO
MARION	NONE
MARTIN	---
MONROE	NO
OKALOOSA	NO
OKEECHOBEE	---
ORANGE	EACH SCHOOL HAS THEIR OWN
OSCEOLA	---
PINELLAS	SCHOOL BASED DECISION
PUTNAM	NONE
SANTA ROSA	NO
SEMINOLE	---
ST JOHNS	YES
ST LUCIE	SCHOOLS PROTECTED BY ALARM SYSTEMS
SUMTER	NONE
SUWANNEE	YES EMPLOYEES NOT ALLOWED IN ALONE LOCKED DOWN AFTER HOURS
TAYLOR	NO
UNION	NO
VOLUSIA	MUST NOTIFY SECURITY DEPT TO HAVE ALARM TURNED OFF
WAKULLA	STATE BOARD RULES/BOARD POLICY/PERSONNEL HANDBOOK
WASHINGTON	---

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FL SCHOOL DESIGN GUIDELINES
QUESTION 59

DISTRICT	PROGRAM SUCCESSFUL	PLEASE DESCRIBE
BAY	Y	ALARM SYSTEMS DETERED CRIME
BRADFORD	---	---
BREVARD	Y	---
BROWARD	N	PROGRAMS SERVE AS GOOD STANDING POINT
CALHOUN	---	---
Citrus	Y	ALL PROGRAMS JOINTLY RUN BY DISTRICT AND SHERIFF'S DEPARTMENT
CLAY	Y	---
COLLIER	Y	---
COLUMBIA	Y	DETERANT TO CRIME AND VIOLENCE
DADE	Y	STUDENT/STAFF INCREASED AWARENESS INCREASED REPORTING INCIDENTS
DUVAL	Y	NO SIGNIFICANT INCREASE IN DRUGS/WEAPONS
ESCAMBIA	Y	INTERCOM/ALARM WIRED TO RESIDENT TRAILER/PATROLS/SRO
FLAGLER	---	---
FRANKLIN	---	---
GADSDEN	Y	PROVID INSTRUCTION AND LEADERSHIP SKILLS
GULF	---	STILL GATHERING DATA
HENDRY	Y	STOPPED TRESPASSING AND DETERS VANDALISM
HIGHLANDS	---	N/A
HOLMES	---	---
INDIAN RIVER	Y	RELATIVELY
JEFFERSON	Y	SOMEWHAT
LAKE	Y	DETERS VANDALS
LEE	Y	VANDALISM, BURGLARY REDUCE OVER A 3 YEAR PERIOD
LEON	Y	INCREASED SAFETY AWARENESS
LEVY	Y	---
LIBERTY	---	---
MARION	Y	DRAMATIC DECREASE IN VANDALISM BY KIDS BREAK INS BURGLARY
MARTIN	---	---
MONROE	Y	---
OKALOOSA	Y	---
OKEECHOBEE	Y	SRO VERY SUCCESSFUL/MORE ARREST/LIGHT & FENCE INHIBITS VISITS
ORANGE	Y	---
OSCEOLA	---	---
PINELLAS	Y	ALARMS REDUCED FREQUENCY/ID BADGES OFFER SECUIRTY
PUTNAM	---	TOO SOON TO JUDGE
SANTA ROSA	Y	---
SEMINOLE	---	---
ST JOHNS	---	SOME PROGRAMS DISCONTIUED NO FUNDS JUVENILE CRIME HAS INCREASED
ST LUCIE	Y	---
SUMTER	---	EASY ID OF UNAUTH PERSONS NO AFTER HOURS W/O PRIOR PERMISSION
SUWANNEE	Y	---
TAYLOR	---	---
UNION	---	DRAMATICE DROP VANDALISM & BURGLARY
VOLUSIA	Y	---
WAKULLA	Y	---
WASHINGTON	---	---

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X SCHOOL DESIGN GUIDELINES
SECTION 59

DISTRICT	SAFETY/SECURITY MEASURES AND PROGRAMS	ORGANIZED BY	RUN BY	PAID BY
BAY	SECURITY ALARMS	—	—	INDIVIDUAL SCHOOL
BRADFORD	—	—	—	—
BREVARD	RESIDENT SECURITY	SECURITY SERVICES	FACILITIES DEPARTMENT	SCHOOL BOARD
BROWARD	YOUTH CRIME WATCH / GANG AWARENESS/INTERVENT.	SCHOOL BOARD	SCHOOL BOARD	SCHOOL BOARD
CALHOUN	—	—	—	—
CITRUS	SAFE SCHOOL PLAN	—	—	—
CLAY	RESIDENT SECURITY / SECURITY ALARMS	SCHOOL DISTRICT	SHERIFF'S DEPARTMENT / DISTRICT/SHERIFF/POLICE	SCHOOL DISTRICT
COLLIER	SECURITY ALARMS / PRIVATE SECURITY	SCHOOL DISTRICT	DISTRICT	DISTRICT
COLUMBIA	NONE / YOUTH RELATIONS PROGRAM	DISTRICT	SCHOOL DISTRICT	SCHOOL DISTRICT
DADE	YOUTH CRIME WATCH / GANG AWARENESS	SCHOOL BOARD	CITIZENS CRIME WATCH/SCHOOL BOARD	SCHOOL BOARD
DUVAL	DRUG/WEAPON SEARCHES	SCHOOL SECURITY	SCHOOL SECURITY	SCHOOL SECURITY
ESCAMBIA	RESIDENT SECURITY/HIGH SCH / HIRED SECURITY/HIGH SCH	SCHOOL DISTRICT	SCHOOL DISTRICT	SCHOOL DISTRICT
FLAGLER	NONE	—	—	—
FRANKLIN	—	—	—	—
GADSDEN	ADULT CROSSING GUARDS / YOUTH CRIME WATCH / D.A.R.E. / G.R.E.A.T.	PRINCIPAL/SCHOOL/SHERIFF	PRINCIPAL/SCHOOL/SHERIFF	PRINCIPAL/SCHOOL/SHERIFF
GULF	HAND HELD RADIOS AT HS / FM RADIOS ON BUSES / VIDEO CAMERAS ON BUSES	GULF COUNTY SCHOOLS	GULF COUNTY SCHOOLS	GULF COUNTY SCHOOLS
HENDRY	FENCING / LIGHTING / NEIGHBORHOOD WATCHES / RESIDENT SECURITY	PRINCIPALS	PRINCIPALS	SCHOOL DISTRICT
HIGHLANDS	FENCING	N/A	—	—
HOLMES	—	—	—	—
INDIAN RIVER	ONSITE SECURITY / ALARM SYSTEM / VIDEO SECURITY	FACILITIES DEPT	MAINTENANCE DEPT	GENERAL FUND BUDGET
JEFFERSON	FENCING	SCHOOL BOARD	SCHOOL BOARD	SCHOOL BOARD
LAKE	RESIDENT SECURITY	SCHOOL	SCHOOL	SCHOOL
LEE	ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE	DEPT OF RISK MGMT	DEPT OF RISK MGMT	DEPT OF RISK MGMT
LEON	DISTRICT SAFETY OFFICER	SCHOOL DISTRICT	DISTRICT/VOLUNTEERS	SHERIFF DEPARTMENT
LEVY	VISITOR SIGN IN / DESIGNATED WAITING AREAS	—	—	—
LIBERTY	VISITOR SIGN IN	—	—	—
MARION	SAFETY REVIEW COMMITTEE	MANAGER OF SCHOOL PLANT OPERATIONS & FACILITIES	—	PART OF UTILITIES BY SCHOOL
MARTIN	ALARM SYSTEM	ADMINISTRATION	—	—
MONROE	SECURITY RESIDENTS	—	—	—
OKALOOSA	STAFF SECURITY PLAN	SCHOOL DISTRICT	SCHOOL PRINCIPAL	SCHOOL DISTRICT
OKEECHOBEE	SAFETY COMM / D.A.R.E. / BUS EVACUATION DRILLS	GTR SECURITY/LAW ENFORCEMENT/SCHOOL	—	—
ORANGE	ELECTRONIC SECURITY / FENCING / SHERIFF AFTER HOURS ACT/ALARM SYSTEMS	—	SCHOOL DISTRICT	—
OSCEOLA	ALARM SYSTEM / INCREASED LIGHTING / FACILITY AWARENESS PROGRAM	—	—	—
PINELLAS	SIGN IN/OUT / ID BADGES	CAMPUS POLICE	—	—
PUTNAM	ALARM/MOTION DETECTORS / HAND HELD METAL DETECTORS / EXTERIOR LIGHTING	—	—	—
SANTA ROSA	SPECIAL EVENT SECURITY / CRIME WATCH	INDIVIDUAL SCHOOLS	INDIVIDUAL SCHOOLS	INDIVIDUAL SCHOOLS
SEMINOLE	RESIDENT SECURITY	—	—	—
ST JOHNS	—	—	—	—
ST LUCIE	D.A.R.E. / S.A.D.D.	L.E.O./PARENTS	L.E.O./PARENTS	LAW ENFORCEMENT/SCHOOL
SUMTER	N/A	—	—	—
SUWANNEE	FIRST AID/CPR / VISITOR BADGES / CRISIS PLANS	ADMINISTRATORS	COMMUNITY EDUCATION	—
TAYLOR	NONE / LOCK OUT ALERT	—	—	—
UNION	—	—	—	—
VOLUSIA	ID BADGES FOR OUTSIDERS / RESIDENT SECURITY / ALARM SYSTEM	BOARD SECURITY DEPT	BOARD SECURITY DEPT	BOARD SECURITY DEPT
WAKULLA	FENCING / ALARM SYSTEM / EVENING CUSTODIAL CREWS	DISTRICT ADMIN	DISTRICT ADMIN	DISTRICT ADMIN
WASHINGTON	—	—	—	—

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DISTRICT	SAFETY/SECURITY MEASURES AND PROGRAMS			ORGANIZED BY	RUN BY	PAID BY
BAY	SECURITY ALARMS					INDIVIDUAL SCHOOL
BRADFORD						
BREVARD	RESIDENT SECURITY			SECURITY SERVICES	FACILITIES DEPARTMENT	SCHOOL BOARD
BROWARD	YOUTH CRIME WATCH	GANG AWARENESS/INTERVENT.		SCHOOL BOARD	SCHOOL BOARD	SCHOOL BOARD
CALHOUN						
CITRUS	SAFE SCHOOL PLAN			SCHOOL DISTRICT	SHERIFF'S DEPARTMENT	SCHOOL DISTRICT
CLAY	RESIDENT SECURITY	PRIVATE SECURITY	SECURITY ALARMS	SCHOOL DISTRICT	DISTRICT/SHERIFF/POLICE	SCHOOL DISTRICT
COLLIER	SECURITY ALARMS	YOUTH RELATIONS PROGRAM		DISTRICT	DISTRICT	DISTRICT
COLUMBIA	NONE	GANG AWARENESS	GDF AWARENESS	SCHOOL DISTRICT	SCHOOL DISTRICT	SCHOOL DISTRICT
DADE	YOUTH CRIME WATCH			SCHOOL BOARD	CITIZENS CRIME WATCH/SCHOOL BOARD	SCHOOL BOARD
DUVAL	DRUG/WEAPON SEARCHES			SCHOOL SECURITY	SCHOOL SECURITY	SCHOOL BOARD
ESCAMBIA	RESIDENT SECURITY/HIGH SCH	HIRED SECURITY/HIGH SCH		SCHOOL DISTRICT	SCHOOL DISTRICT	SCHOOL DISTRICT
FLAGLER	NONE					
FRANKLIN						
GADSDEN	ADULT CROSSING GUARDS	YOUTH CRIME WATCH	D.A.R.E.	PRINCIPAL/SCHOOL/SHERIFF	PRINCIPAL/SCHOOL/SHERIFF	PRINCIPAL/SCHOOL/SHERIFF
GULF	HAND HELD RADIOS AT HS	FM RADIOS ON BUSES	VIDEO CAMERAS ON BUSES	GULF COUNTY SCHOOLS	GULF COUNTY SCHOOLS	GULF COUNTY SCHOOLS
HENDRY	FENCING	LIGHTING	NEIGHBORHOOD WATCHES	PRINCIPALS	PRINCIPALS	SCHOOL DISTRICT
HIGHLANDS	FENCING		RESIDENT SECURITY	N/A		
HOLMES						
INDIAN RIVER	ONSITE SECURITY	ALARM SYSTEM	VIDEO SECURITY	FACILITIES DEPT	MAINTENANCE DEPT	GENERAL FUND BUDGET
JEFFERSON	FENCING			SCHOOL BOARD	SCHOOL BOARD	SCHOOL BOARD
LAKE	RESIDENT SECURITY			SCHOOL	SCHOOL	SCHOOL
LEE	ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE			DEPT OF RISK MGMT	DEPT OF RISK MGMT	DEPT OF RISK MGMT
LEON	DISTRICT SAFETY OFFICER			SCHOOL DISTRICT	DISTRICT/VOLUNTEERS	SCHOOL DISTRICT
LEVY	VISITOR SIGN IN	DESIGNATED WAITING AREAS				SHERIFF DEPARTMENT
LIBERTY	VISITOR SIGN IN					
MARION	SAFETY REVIEW COMMITTEE			MANAGER OF SCHOOL PLANT		
MARTIN	ALARM SYSTEM			OPERATIONS & FACILITIES	SCHOOL PRINCIPAL	PART OF UTILITIES BY SCHOOL
MONROE	SECURITY RESIDENTS			ADMINISTRATION		
OKALOOSA	STAFF SECURITY PLAN			SCHOOL DISTRICT	SCHOOL DISTRICT	SCHOOL DISTRICT
OKEECHOBEE	SAFETY COMM		BUS EVACUATION DRILLS			
ORANGE	ELECTRONIC SECURITY	D.A.R.E.	SHERIFF AFTER HOURS ACTV/ALARM SYSTEMS	4TH SECURITY/LAW ENFORCEMENT/SCH	4TH SECURITY/LAW ENFORCEMENT/SCH	SCHOOL DISTRICT
OSCEOLA	RESIDENT SECURITY	FENCING	INCREASED LIGHTING	FACILITY AWARENESS PROGRAM	SECURITY/LAW ENFORCEMENT/SCHOOL DISTRICT	RISK SCHOOL ACTRISK
PINELLAS	ALARM SYSTEM	SIGN IN/OUT	ID BADGES	CAMPUS POLICE		
PUTNAM	ALARM/MOTION DETECTORS	HAND HELD METAL DETECTORS	EXTERIOR LIGHTING			
SANTA ROSA	SPECIAL EVENT SECURITY		CRIME WATCH	INDIVIDUAL SCHOOLS	INDIVIDUAL SCHOOLS	INDIVIDUAL SCHOOLS
SEMINOLE	RESIDENT SECURITY					
ST JOHNS						
ST LUCIE	D.A.R.E.	S.A.D.D.		L.E.O./PARENTS	L.E.O./PARENTS	LAW ENFORCEMENT/SCHOOL
SUMTER	N/A					
SUWANNEE	FIRST AID/CPR	VISITOR BADGES	CRISIS PLANS	ADMINISTRATORS	COMMUNITY EDUCATION	
TAYLOR	NONE		LOCK OUT ALERT			
UNION						
VOLUSIA	ID BADGES FOR OUTSIDERS	RESIDENT SECURITY	ALARM SYSTEM	BOARD SECURITY DEPT	BOARD SECURITY DEPT	BOARD SECURITY DEPT
WAKULLA	FENCING	ALARM SYSTEM	EVENING CUSTODIAL CREWS	DISTRICT ADMIN	DISTRICT ADMIN	DISTRICT ADMIN
WASHINGTON						

FL SCHOOL DESIGN GUIDELINES
CRITICAL ISSUES
sections 56C and 60

DISTRICT	DECREASE IN OVERALL INCIDENTS 2 YRS	5 YRS	10 YRS	5 MOST CRITICAL SAFETY/SECURITY ISSUES (1=MOST CRITICAL) 1	2	3	4	5	5 MOST CRITICAL AREAS OF DESIGN (1=MOST CRITICAL) 1	2	3	4	5
BAY	--	--	--	ASSAULT	BURGLARY	VANDALISM	TRESPASSING	THEFT	ALARM SYSTEMS	EXTERIOR LTG	MIN NICHES	VISUAL IN CORR	ENCLOSE
BRADFORD	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
BREVARD	Y	Y	Y	WEAPONS	ASSAULT	DRUGS	THEFT	VANDALISM	ENCLOSE	WINDOW DESIGN	KEY CABINET	MISC OPN BLDS	EXTERIOR LTG
BROWARD	Y	Y	Y	THEFT	VANDALISM	GRP VIOLENCE	WEAPONS	ASSAULT	VISUAL FROM ST	MIN NICHES	VISUAL IN CORR	EXTERIOR LTG	KEY CABINET
CALHOUN	N	N	N						EXTERIOR LTG	ENCLOSE	ALARM SYSTEMS	EXT DOOR DESIGN	WINDOW DESIGN
Citrus	Y	Y	Y	DRUGS	ALCOHOL	WEAPONS	THEFT	VANDALISM	VISUAL IN CORR	MISC OPN BLDS	EXTERIOR LTG	MIN NICHES	ENCLOSE
CLAY	Y	Y	Y	VANDALISM	BURGLARY	THEFT	DUGS	WEAPONS	EXTERIOR LTG	WINDOW DESIGN	MIN NICHES	VISUAL FROM ST	EXT DOOR DESIGN
COLLIER	Y	N	N	ASSAULT	THEFT	VANDALISM	ALCOHOL	DRUGS	WINDOW DESIGN	EXT DOOR DESIGN	ENCLOSE	MIN NICHES	ALARM SYSTEM
COLUMBIA	Y	N	N	WEAPONS	DRUGS	ASSAULT	THEFT	TRESPASSING	ENCLOSE	ALARM SYSTEM	MISC OPN BLDS	VISUAL FROM ST	VISUAL IN CORR
DADE	Y	Y	Y	THEFT	VANDALISM	BURGLARY	ASSAULT	WEAPONS	EXTERIOR LTG	VISUAL FROM ST	ENCLOSE	MIN NICHES	VISUAL IN CORR
DUVAL	Y	Y	Y	WEAPONS	ASSAULT	GRP VIOLENCE	DRUGS	BURGLARY	VISUAL IN CORR	MIN NICHES	EXT DOOR DESIGN	WINDOW DESIGN	ENCLOSE
ESCAMBIA	N	N	N	WEAPONS	BURGLARY	VANDALISM	ASSAULT	DRUGS	VISUAL IN CORR	MIN NICHES	ENCLOSE	KEY CABINET	ALARM SYSTEMS
FLAGLER	N	N	N										
FRANKLIN	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
GADSDEN	Y	Y	Y	ARSON	ASSAULT	WEAPONS	ALCOHOL	GRP VIOLENCE	ENCLOSE	MIN NICHES	MISC OPN BLDS	VISUAL FROM ST	ALARM SYSTEMS
GULF	Y	Y	Y	ASSAULT	VANDALISM	WEAPONS	ALCOHOL	DRUGS	VISUAL IN CORR	MIN NICHES	VISUAL FROM ST	ENCLOSE	KEY CABINET
HENDRY	N	N	N	THEFT	ASSAULT	WEAPONS	VANDALISM	TRESPASSING	ENCLOSE	ALARM SYSTEMS	MIN NICHES	VISUAL FROM ST	EXTERIOR LTG
HIGHLANDS	N	N	N	ALCOHOL	DRUGS	THEFT	VANDALISM	ASSAULT	ALARM SYSTEMS	ENCLOSE	EXT DOOR DESIGN	VISUAL FROM ST	KEY CABINET
HOLMES	N	N	N	DRUGS	ALCOHOL	ASSAULT	BURGLARY	VANDALISM	MISC OPN BLDS	INTERIOR LTG	EXT DOOR DESIGN	EXTERIOR LTG	ALARM SYSTEMS
INDIAN RIVER	Y	Y	Y	VANDALISM	TRESPASSING	ASSAULT	DRUGS/USE	THEFT	ALARM SYSTEMS	MIN NICHES	INTERIOR LTG	VISUAL IN CORR	VISUAL FROM ST
JEFFERSON	Y	Y	Y	WEAPONS	THEFT	ALCOHOL	DRUGS	ASSAULT	ENCLOSE	ALARM SYSTEM	EXTERIOR LTG	KEY CABINET	ENCLOSE
LAKE	N	N	N	VANDALISM	TRESPASSING	THEFT	DRUGS		ALARM SYSTEMS	MIN NICHES	VISUAL IN CORR	EXTERIOR LTG	EXTERIOR LTG
LEE	N	N	N						VISUAL FROM ST	ALARM SYSTEM	LANDSCAPING	ENCLOSE	MIN NICHES
LEON	Y	Y	Y	ALCOHOL	DRUGS	BURGLARY	THEFT	VANDALISM	ALARM SYSTEMS	MISC OPN BLDS	INTERIOR LTG	VISUAL IN CORR	MIN NICHES
LEVY	N	N	N	VANDALISM	THEFT	TRESPASSING	BURGLARY	DRUGS	EXTERIOR LTG	ENCLOSE	MIN NICHES	ALARM SYSTEMS	VISUAL FROM ST
LIBERTY	N	N	N	VANDALISM	TRESPASSING	THEFT	BURGLARY	ALCOHOL	VISUAL FROM ST	INTERIOR LGT	EXTERIOR LTG	ENCLOSE	VISUAL FROM ST
MARION	N	N	N	ASSAULT	DRUGS	ALCOHOL	VANDALISM	BURGLARY	ALARM SYSTEMS	ENCLOSE	EXTERIOR LTG	MIN NICHES	VISUAL FROM ST
MARTIN	Y	Y	Y	THEFT	VANDALISM	THEFT	WEAPONS	DRUGS	WINDOW DESIGN	MISC OPN BLDS	INTERIOR LTG	MIN NICHES	INTERIOR LTG
MONROE	Y	Y	Y	ALCOHOL	VANDALISM	THEFT	WEAPONS	BURGLARY	ENCLOSE	ALARM SYSTEM	VISUAL IN CORR	MIN NICHES	INTERIOR LTG
OKALOOSA	Y	Y	Y	ASSAULT	GRP VIOLENCE	TRESPASSING	ALCOHOL	DRUGS/USE	ENCLOSE	VISUAL IN CORR	EXTERIOR LTG	MIN NICHES	EXT DOOR DESIGN
OKEECHOBEE	--	--	--	VANDALISM	THEFT	TRESPASSING	ALCOHOL	TRESPASSING	VISUAL IN CORR	VISUAL IN CORR	VISUAL FROM ST	ALARM SYSTEM	MISC OPN BLDS
ORANGE	Y	Y	Y	WEAPONS	ASSAULT	VANDALISM	DRUGS	TRESPASSING	MIN NICHES	EXTERIOR LTG	VISUAL FROM ST	ENCLOSE	ALARM SYSTEMS
OSCEOLA	Y	Y	Y	GRP VIOLENCE	WEAPONS	ASSAULT	DRUGS	VANDALISM	ALARM SYSTEM	EXTERIOR LTG	VISUAL FROM ST	ENCLOSE	ALARM SYSTEMS
PINELLAS	Y	Y	Y	ASSAULT	WEAPONS	GRP VIOLENCE	BURGLARY	DRUGS	WINDOW DESIGN	WINDOW DESIGN	EXT DOOR DESIGN	ENCLOSE	MIN NICHES
POTNAM	Y	Y	Y	ASSAULT	VANDALISM	THEFT	BURGLARY	TRESPASSING	ALARM SYSTEM	ALARM SYSTEM	EXT DOOR DESIGN	ENCLOSE	MN NICHES ALCOVES
SANTA ROSA	N	N	N	WEAPONS	DRUGS	TRESPASSING	ARSON	VANDALISM	MIN NICHES	EXT DOOR DESIGN	EXTERIOR LTG	WINDOW DESIGN	ENCLOSE
SEMINOLE	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
ST JOHNS	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
ST LUCIE	Y	Y	Y	DRUGS	WEAPONS	KIDNAPPING	RAPE	HOMICIDE	EXTERIOR LTG	MIN NICHES	ALARM SYSTEMS	VISUAL FROM ST	VISUAL IN CORR
SUMTER	N	N	N	ALCOHOL	DRUGS	THEFT	WEAPONS	BURGLARY	VISUAL IN CORR	MIN NICHES	ENCLOSE	ALARM SYSTEMS	MISC OPN BLDS
SUWANNEE	N	N	N	TRESPASSING	WEAPONS	WEAPONS	THEFT	BURGLARY	VISUAL IN CORR	EXTERIOR LTG	MIN NICHES	ENCLOSE	INTERIOR LTG
TAYLOR	N	N	N	DRUGS	ALCOHOL	WEAPONS	ASSAULT	BURGLARY	VISUAL IN CORR	MIN NICHES	INTERIOR LTG	EXTERIOR LTG	ENCLOSE
UNION	Y	Y	Y	VANDALISM	THEFT	BURGLARY			ENCLOSE	ALARM SYSTEM	WINDOW DESIGN	INTERIOR LTG	EXTERIOR LTG
VOLUSIA	N	N	N	ASSAULT	KIDNAPPING	WEAPONS	DRUGS	GRP VIOLENCE	WINDOW DESIGN	EXT DOOR DESIGN	ENCLOSE	VISUAL IN CORR	ALARM SYSTEMS
WAKULLA	Y	Y	Y	ASSAULT	WEAPONS	THEFT	TRESPASSING	VANDALISM	VISUAL IN CORR	MIN NICHES	EXTERIOR LTG	ENCLOSE	ENCLOSED HALLWAYS
WASHINGTON	--	--	--	BURGLARY	VANDALISM	ARSON			ALARM SYSTEMS	ENCLOSE	EXTERIOR LTG	--	--

LEGEND:

GRP VIOLENCE - GROUP VIOLENCE
VISUAL FROM ST - MAINTAIN VISUAL SURVEILLANCE FROM THE STREET
VISUAL IN CORR - MAINTAIN VISUAL SURVEILLANCE IN CORRIDORS (INTERIOR/EXTERIOR)
MIN NICHES - MINIMIZING NICHES, ALCOVES, & OTHER RESIDUAL SPACES
EXT DOOR DESIGN - EXTERIOR DOOR DESIGN
INTERIOR LTG - INTERIOR LIGHTING
EXTERIOR LTG - EXTERIOR LIGHTING
ENCLOSE - ENCLOSURE OF SCHOOL PROPERTY PERIMETER (FENCING)
KEY CABINET - CONTROL OF KEY CABINET
MISC OPN BLDS - MISCELLANEOUS OPENINGS AND OUTBUILDINGS
-- - NO RESPONSE GIVEN

BEST COPY AVAILABLE

FL SCHOOL DESIGN GUIDELINES
KNOWLEDGE OF CPTED
Question 61

DISTRICT	FAMILIAR WITH CPTED	WHERE DID YOU LEARN ABOUT CPTED?	YOUR OPION OF CPTED	DO YOU HAVE POLICES INSTUTUING CPTED?	INTERESTED IN LEARNING MORE ABOUT CPTED
L	NO	N/A	N/A	N/A	—
BRADFORD	—	—	—	—	—
BREVARD	NO	N/A	—	N/A	—
BROWARD	YES	FLORIDA STATE ATTORNEY GENERAL TRAINING SESSION	EXCELLENT	YES	YES
CALHOUN	NO	N/A	N/A	N/A	YES
CITRUS	YES	ARCHITECT, SHERIFF'S DEPARTMENT	AREA TO BE CONSIDERED IN SCHOOL PLAN REVIEW	NO PROGRAM DESIGN AT COUNTY LEVEL	YES
CLAY	NO	N/A	N/A	N/A	YES
COLLIER	NO	N/A	N/A	N/A	YES
COLUMBIA	NO	N/A	N/A	N/A	YES
DADE	YES	ATTENDING WORKSHOPS	EFFECT CONCEPTS NEED TO TARGET SCHOOLS IN HIGH CRIME AREAS	OPEN COURTYARDS INCREASED LIGHTING OPEN DESIGN	NO
DUVAL	YES	JACKSONVILLE SHERIFF'S OFFICE	PROGRESSIVE AND INNOVATIVE CONCEPT	NO	YES
ESCAMBIA	YES	BY A CONSULTANT	NOT IMPRESSED WITH CONSULANT INTERESTED IN COMM. COMMITTEE	NO	YES
FLAGLER	NO	N/A	N/A	N/A	—
FRANKLIN	—	—	—	—	—
GADSDEN	YES	FDOE	GOOD, PROVIDES SAFER MORE ORGANIZED ENVIRONMENT	YES WHEN APPROPRIATE AND WITH ALL NEW BUILDING	YES
GULF	NO	N/A	N/A	N/A	—
HENDRY	NO	N/A	N/A	N/A	YES
HIGHLANDS	NO	N/A	N/A	N/A	—
HOLMES	NO	N/A	N/A	N/A	NO
INDIAN RIVER	NO	N/A	N/A	N/A	NO
JEFFERSON	YES	TELEVISION	SOME GOOD IDEAS	YES	YES
LAKE	NO	N/A	N/A	N/A	YES
LEE	YES	PERNA CONFERENCE	NO PROBLEMS WITH CONCEPTS	YES	—
LEON	YES	TALLAHASSEE POLICE DEPARTMENT	N/A	YES - TPD OFFICER REVIEWS PLANS	NO
LEVY	NO	N/A	N/A	N/A	YES
LIBERTY	NO	N/A	N/A	N/A	—
MARION	NO	N/A	N/A	N/A	—
MARTIN	NO	N/A	N/A	N/A	YES
MONROE	NO	N/A	N/A	N/A	—
OKALOOSA	NO	N/A	N/A	N/A	YES
OKEECHOBEE	NO	N/A	N/A	N/A	—
ORANGE	NO	N/A	N/A	N/A	YES
OSCEOLA	NO	N/A	N/A	N/A	YES
PINELLAS	NO	N/A	N/A	N/A	—
PUTNAM	NO	N/A	N/A	N/A	YES
SANTA ROSA	NO	N/A	N/A	N/A	—
SEMINOLE	NO	N/A	N/A	N/A	—
ST JOHNS	—	—	—	—	—
ST LUCIE	YES	N/A	HAS ADVANTAGES/DISADVANTAGES IN SCHOOL ENVIROMENT	TO SOME EXTENT	YES
SUMTER	NO	N/A	—	—	—
SUWANNEE	YES	FSU SCHOOL OF CRIMINOLOGY	—	—	YES
TAYLOR	NO	N/A	N/A	N/A	YES
UNION	NO	N/A	N/A	N/A	NO
VOLUSIA	NO	N/A	N/A	N/A	YES
WAKULLA	NO	N/A	N/A	N/A	—
WASHINGTON	NO	N/A	N/A	N/A	—

AFR SCHOOL DESIGN GUIDELINES
Question 62

DISTRICT	IF FUNDING WERE AVAILABLE, WHAT SINGLE POLICY OR PROCEDURE WOULD YOU IMPLEMENT TO REDUCE CRIME AND INCREASE SAFETY AND SECURITY WITHIN YOUR SCHOOL DISTRICT?
BAY	SRO EACH SCHOOL/FENCING/SECURITY ALARMS
BRADFORD	---
BREVARD	SECUTIY PERSONNEL BETWEEN 9OM AND 6 AM
BROWARD	MORE AWARENESS PROGRAMS THRU SRO AT ELEMENTARY SCHOOLS
CALHOUN	---
Citrus	OPPROTUNITY TO REVIEW PROGRAMS OF LIKE SIZED DISTRICTS
CLAY	SECURITY ALARMS
COLLIER	ON-SITE HOUSING FOR 24 HOUR OBSERVATION
COLUMBIA	STUDENT ARRESTS FOR VIOLATIONS
DADE	SRO-SECONDARY SCHOOLS/CONFLICT RESOLUTION PROGRAM/NIGHT PARTROL
DUVAL	SRO IN EVERY SECONDARY SCHOOL
ESCAMBIA	VIDEO SURVEILLANCE SHOOLS & BUSES/CENTRAL CONTAL ALARM SYSTEM
FLAGLER	ADULT MONITORS ON SECONDARY CAMPUS
FRANKLIN	---
GADSDEN	FENCING WITH SECURITY AT MAIN ENTRANCE
GULF	SRO EFFICIENT MONITORING EFFICIENT COMMINICATIONS VIDEIO SURVEIL
HENDRY	EXTERIOR LIGHTING/FENCING/ALARM SYSTEMS
HIGHLANDS	ALARM SYSTEMS
HOLMES	NOT SURE
INDIAN RIVER	FUND ALTERNATIVE PROGRAMS
JEFFERSON	FENCING
LAKE	VISUAL MONITORING/FENCING
LEE	PARKING LOT - OUTSIDE AREA SECURITY
LEON	RESOLVE DRUG PROBLEM
LEVY	---
LIBERTY	AFTER HOURS SECURITY/SRO/MORE EXTERIOR LIGHTING
MARION	---
MARTIN	SECURITY SYSTEMS TO CENTRAL LOCATION FOR QUICK RESPONSES
MONROE	ALARM SYSTEMS/SECURITY CAMERAS/EXPAND D.A.R.E. PROGRAM
OKALOOSA	SRO
OKEECHOBEE	FENCING
ORANGE	ELECTRONIC SECURITY/KEYLESS ENTRY/STAFF&STUDENT ID BADGES
OSCEOLA	BETTER TRAINING OF STAFF AND STUDENTS
PINELLAS	---
PUTNAM	SRO ALL CAMPUS/VIDEO SURVEILLANCE/FENCING/SECURITY PERSON
SANTA ROSA	FULL TIME SECURITY PERSONNEL/SECUIRTY ALARMS
SEMINOLE	SECURITY ALARMS
ST JOHNS	---
ST LUCIE	PHOTO IDs/ALARMS/COMPUTER CONTROL ENTRY/MORE SRO
SUMTER	SRO
SUWANNEE	CONFLICT RESOLUTION TRAINGIN ALARM SYS SRO SELF LOCK DOORS
TAYLOR	FENCE ALL SCHOOLS AND RESOURCES OFFICERS FOR ALL SCHOOLS
UNION	INSTALL ALARM SYSTEM
VOLUSIA	TOTAL SECURITY ALARM SYSTEMS ALL FACILITIES AND ROOMS
WAKULLA	STUDENT/PARENT RESPONSIBLE FOR ACTIONS/ELIMINATE VIOLENCE ON TV
WASHINGTON	---

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State	School Types				Prefered Layout	Primary Circulation	Public Perception of Safety
	Elementary	Middle/Jr	High School	Other			
ALABAMA	1012	539	453		1 Story Central	Interior Corridor	Generally Safe
ALASKA							
ARIZONA							
ARKANSAS	615	114	336		1 Story Central	Interior Corridor	Good, but there are districts with gang, drug & Violence problems
CALIFORNIA	4867	989	802	827	1 Story Central	Exterior Corridor	Worried but not enought to vote bonds to secure schools
COLORADO							
CONNECTICUT							
DELWARE	91	27	30	15	1 Story Central	Interior Corridor	Good. Recent incidents of weapons possession have caused concern
FLORIDA							
GEORGIA	1104	285	320	27	1 Story Central	Interior Corridor	Mixed across the state
HAWII							
IDAHO							
ILLINOIS							
INDIANA							
IOWA							
KANSAS							
KENTUCKY							
LOUISIANA							
MAINE	543	97	119	82	1 Two+ Story Bldg	Interior Corridor	Safe and Secure, greatest threat is from drug trafficking and use
MARYLAND	784	189	203	68	1 Story Central	Interior Corridor	---
MASSACHUSETTS							
MICHIGAN							
MINNESOTA							
MISSISSIPPI							
MISSOURI	1550	800	650	40	1 Story Central	Interior Corridor	Great awareness in metropolitan areas
MONTANA							
NEBRASKA	442	74	189	132	1 Story Central	Interior Corridor	Generally secure, Drug/Alcohol safety a big concern
NEVADA							
NEW HAMPSHIRE	324	52	62	12	1 Two+ Story Bldg	Interior Corridor	Safe
NEW JERSEY							
NEW MEXICO							
NEW YORK	3000	1600			None	Interior Corridor	
NORTH CAROLINA	1484		297	165	1 Story Central	Interior Corridor	Violence and weapons possession result of worsening environment for schools
NORTH DAKOTA							
OHIO	2321	571	715	77	1 Story Central	Interior Corridor	Very Concerned
OKLAHOMA							
OREGON							
PENNSYLVANIA	3681	958			N/A		
RHODE ISLAND							
SOUTH CAROLINA					1 Story Campus	Interior Corridor	Acceptable but could be improved
SOUTH DAKOTA							
TENNESSEE							
TEXAS		1123	1103	443	1 Story Central	Both 95/5	Troubled
UATH	441	114	117	44	1 Two+ Story Bldg	Interior Corridor	Good, gang related incidents/violence is very small
VERMONT	228	93	59	16	None	Interior Corridor	Safe, security not a problem during normal school hours
VIRGINIA							
WASHINGTON	1085	286	290		1 Story Central	Interior Corridor	
WEST VIRGINA							
WISCONSIN							
WYOMING	No Information Available						
	23572	7911	5745	1948			

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SAFE SCHOOL DESIGN GUIDELINES
Questionnaire
April 1993

State of _____

Name: _____

May we call You? _____

Phone No. _____

1. How many of the listed schools do you have in your state?

    _____ elementary level
    _____ middles/jr. high school level
    _____ high school level
    _____ other (please specify)

2. Of all the schools in your state, which is the preferred general layout of the building(s) relative to providing optimum security?

    _____ one 2 (or more) story building
    _____ multiple 2 (or more) story building
    _____ 1-story centrally organized group of buildings
    _____ 1-story "campus plan" (spread-out)

3. Which primary circulation system is preferred?

    _____ interior corridor
    _____ exterior corridor
    _____ both (please estimate %)

4. What is the public perception of safety and security within your schools?

    _____

    _____

    _____

5. In descending numerical order rank the five most critical safety/security issues within your state?

    _____ trespassing   _____ alcohol use
    _____ vandalism   _____ weapons possession
    _____ burglary   _____ group violence
    _____ theft   _____ kidnapping
    _____ assault   _____ rape
    _____ arson   _____ homicide
    _____ drug possession/use   _____ other (please describe)

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6. What are the most critical areas of school design with respect to safety and security? In descending numerical order, rank the top five from the list below.

_____ maintaining visual surveillance from the street
_____ maintaining visual surveillance in corridors (interior and)exterior
_____ minimizing niches, alcoves and other residual spaces that provide places for hiding
_____ window design
_____ exterior door design
_____ interior lighting
_____ exterior lighting
_____ location of electrical panels
_____ enclosure of school property perimeter (fencing, walls)
_____ landscaping
_____ control of key cabinet
_____ alarm systems
_____ miscellaneous opening and out buildings.

7. Are you familiar with Crime Prevention through Environmental Design (CPTED) concepts and procedures? If so, where did you learn about them?_____

_____

8. What is your opinion of CPTED concepts and procedures?

_____

_____

_____

9. Have you instituted policies or measures that incorporate CPTED principles?

_____

_____

_____

10. Would you be interested in learning more about CPTED principles? _____

11. If funding were available, what single policy or procedure would you implement to reduce crime and increase safety and security within your schools ? _____

_____

_____

_____

Appendix E

State	Familiar w/CPTED	Opinion of CPTED	Instituted CPTED Policies	Interested in Learning More CPTED	What policy would you implement to reduce crime?
ALABAMA	NO		NO	YES	Video surveillance and direct alarm to police
ALASKA					
ARIZONA					
ARKANSAS	NO				
CALIFORNIA	NO	Sounds Excellent	NO	YES	More security and educational staff, including aids
COLORADO					
CONNECTICUT					
DELAWARE	NO	N/A	N/A	YES	Alternate programs to cure disruptive behavior
FLORIDA					
GEORGIA	NO	N/A	N/A	YES	
HAWAII					
IDAHO					
ILLINOIS					
INDIANA					
IOWA					
KANSAS					
KENTUCKY					
LOUISIANA					
MAINE	NO	N/A	NO	YES	Uncertain
MARYLAND					
MASSACHUSETTS					
MICHIGAN					
MINNESOTA					
MISSISSIPPI	YES	Good at setting positive climate & attitude	NO	YES	Design safest most secure facility and then install alarm system
MISSOURI					
MONTANA	NO	N/A	N/A	YES	Public Education to the concerns and needs of schools for safety
NEBRASKA					
NEVADA					
NEW HAMPSHIRE	NO	N/A	N/A	YES	Provide an acceptable and challengin environment for each person
NEW JERSEY					
NEW MEXICO					
NEW YORK	NO				
NORTH CAROLINA	NO	N/A	N/A	YES	Security Personnel during day and motion sensors at night
NORTH DAKOTA	NO		NO	YES	Drug Prevention
OHIO					
OKLAHOMA					
OREGON					
PENNSYLVANIA	NO	Important/needs to be addressed	NO	YES	Alarm Systems
RHODE ISLAND					
SOUTH CAROLINA	YES	Require part of school safety program	YES	YES	Communicationcapability between offices and all teaching stations
SOUTH DAKOTA					
TENNESSEE					
TEXAS	NO	None	NO	YES	Hold parents responsible for children/use student jury system
UTAH	NO	N/A	NO	YES	Improve School Climate
VERMONT	NO				
VIRGINIA					
WASHINGTON					
WEST VIRGINIA					
WISCONSIN					
WYOMING					

ional Survey Responses

Top 5 critical Safety/Security Issues

State	1	2	3	4	5
ALABAMA	Weapons	Vandalism	Burglary	Drugs	Assault
ALASKA					
ARIZONA					
ARKANSAS	Vandalism	Burglary	Trespassing	Vandalism	Burglary
CALIFORNIA	Weapons	Group Violence	Assault		
COLORADO					
CONNECTICUT					
DELAWARE	Assault	Drugs	Alcohol	Weapons	Vandalism
FLORIDA					
GEORGIA					
HAWAII					
IDAHO					
ILLINOIS					
INDIANA					
IOWA					
KANSAS					
KENTUCKY					
LOUISIANA					
MAINE	Theft	Trespassing	Vandalism	Alcohol Use	Drug Possession
MARYLAND					
MASSACHUSETTS					
MICHIGAN					
MINNESOTA					
MISSISSIPPI					
MISSOURI	Burglary	Vandalism	Durgs	Alcohol	Trespassing
MONTANA	Alcohol	Vandalism	Drug	Trespassing	Burglary
NEBRASKA					
NEVADA	Rape	Burglary	Drugs	Alcohol	Vandalism
NEW HAMPSHIRE					
NEW JERSEY					
NEW MEXICO					
NEW YORK					
NORTH CAROLINA	Alcohol	Trespassing	Group Violence	Drugs	Weapons
NORTH DAKOTA	Weapons	Drugs	Alcohol	Vandalism	Assault
OHIO					
OKLAHOMA					
OREGON					
PENNSYLVANIA					
RHODE ISLAND					
SOUTH CAROLINA	Vandalism	Weapons	Arson	Alcohol	Theft
SOUTH DAKOTA					
TENNESSEE					
TEXAS	Assault	Vandalism	Drugs	Alcohol	Weapons
UTAH	Vandalism	Burglary	Theft	Drugs	Group Violence
VERMONT	Alcohol	Drugs	Theft	Vandalism	Trespassing
VIRGINIA					
WASHINGTON					
WEST VIRGINIA					
WISCONSIN					
WYOMING					

Top 5 critical areas of School Design

State	1	2	3	4	5
ALABAMA	Visual in Corriodrs	Min Niches Alcoves	Exterior Door Design	Misc Openings Bldgs	Exterior Lighting
ARKANSAS	Visual in Corridors	Min Niches Alcoves	Alarm Systems	Exterior Lighting	Interior Lighting
CALIFORNIA	Visual from Street	Visual in Corridors	Min Niches Alcoves	Enclose Perimeter	Misc Openings Bldgs
DELAWARE	Visual in Corr	Interior Ltg	Exterior Ltg	Alarm System	Ext Door Design
MAINE	Min Niches Alcoves	Enclose Perimeter	Exterior Lighting	Visual in Corridors	
MISSOURI	Interior Lighting	Exterior Lighting	Key Cabinet	Min Niches Alcoves	Visual in Corridors
NEBRASKA	Visual in Corridors	Min Niches Alcoves	Exterior Door Design	Interior Lighting	Landscaping
NEW HAMPSHIRE	Exterior Door Design	Alarm System	Interior Lighting	Visual in Corridors	Exterior Lighting
NORTH CAROLINA	Visual from Street	Alarm Systems	Min Niches Alcoves	Misc Openings Bldgs	Visual in Corridors
NORTH DAKOTA	Visual in Corridor	Interior Lighting	Exterior Lighting	Min Niches Alcoves	Alarm Systems
SOUTH CAROLINA	Alarm System	Enclose Perimeter	Exterior Lighting	Visual from Street	Visual in Corridors
TEXAS	Exterior Lighting	Alarm Systems	Visual from Street	Visual in Corridors	Min Niches Alcoves
UTAH	Visual in Corridors	Min Niches Alcoves	Interior Lighting	Exterior Lighting	Misc Openings Bldgs
VERMONT	Interior Lighting	Exterior Door Design	Landscaping	Misc Openings Bldgs	Exterior Lighting

Vandalism	13
Drugs	11
Alcohol	10
Burglary	7
Weapons	7
Trespassing	6
Assault	5
Theft	4
Group Violence	3
Arson	1
Rape	1

Maintain Visual in Corridors	13
Exterior Lighting	11
Minimize Niches/Alcoves	10
Interior Lighting	8
Alarm Systems	7
Exterior Door Design	5
Miscellaneous Openings & Buildings	5
Maintain Visual from Street	4
Enclose Perimeter (Fencing)	3
Landscaping	2
Control of Key Cabinet	1

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Appendix F

Security Maintenance Checklist

How often are doors checked to be certain they are secure?
    DAILY   WEEKLY   MONTHLY   6 MONTHS   ANNUALLY

How often are windows checked to be certain they are secure?
    DAILY   WEEKLY   MONTHLY   6 MONTHS   ANNUALLY

How often are outbuildings, storage sheds, portable classrooms and other school facilities checked to be certain they are secure?
    DAILY   WEEKLY   MONTHLY   6 MONTHS   ANNUALLY

How often are fences and gates checked to be certain they are secure?
    DAILY   WEEKLY   MONTHLY   6 MONTHS   ANNUALLY

How often are lights checked to be certain they are working properly?
    DAILY   WEEKLY   MONTHLY   6 MONTHS   ANNUALLY

How often are floors and fixtures checked to be certain they are working properly?
    DAILY   WEEKLY   MONTHLY   6 MONTHS   ANNUALLY

How often are playgrounds checked to be certain that equipment is in working order?
    DAILY   WEEKLY   MONTHLY   6 MONTHS   ANNUALLY

Doors

All exterior doors must meet the following criteria. Where security is required, some interior doors must also meet the same criteria.

a. Locking hardware is in proper working order
b. Framework is strong and door fits snugly
c. Strike plate is strong and securely affixed
d. No breakable glass (in door or sidelights) within 40 inches of panic bar and button
e. Door cannot be bypassed, e.g., through transom or decorative paneling above door
f. Panic bat (or button) operates properly
g. Exposed hinge pins on outswing doors cannot be easily removed
h. The inactive (stationary) leaf on double doors is secured at both top and bottom
i. Overhead door is secured with auxiliary locking device
j. Portals and hatches are secured with heavy-duty hasp and padlock
k. Key numbers have been removed from all padlocks
l. Exterior doors equipped with panic bar are secured with heavy-duty chain and padlock at night and on weekends
m. Outside handles are removed from doors used only as exits

(NOTE: Safety requirements never allow the use of chain and padlock with building is occupied)

For the questions below, if "NO" is checked, please explain in the space provided.

Are all outside entrances secure? . . . . YES/NO

Are all inside doors secure? . . . . YES/NO

Are all overhead doors secure? . . . . YES/NO

Are all portals and hatches secure? . . . . YES/NO

Windows

All ground floor windows must meet the following criteria; depending on their accessibility to an intruder, some windows above the ground floor must also meet the criteria.

a. Locking hardware is in proper working order
b. Opening is protected with burglar resistant glazing or decorative grill; or broken windows are normally replaced with burglar resistant glazing
c. Additional security is provided for window openings with air conditioning units
d. Basement windows are protected with security grill or well cover

(NOTE: Life Safety Code requires that each room have at least on window which can be used for emergency rescue)

For the questions below, if a "NO" is checked, please explain in the space provided.

Are all ground floor and other accessible windows secure? . . YES/NO

Miscellaneous Openings and Outbuildings

All openings and exterior barriers must be checked for adequate security. Particular attention must be given to roof hatches, cornices above protective porches, and sheds containing combustibles or expensive maintenance or athletic equipment.

For the questions below, if a "NO" is checked, please explain in the space provided.

Are all openings accessible to the intruder secure? . . . . YES/NO

Are all outbuildings, storage sheds and portable classrooms secure? . . . . YES/NO

Are walls and fixtures in unsupervised hang-out areas durable and well protected? . . . . YES/NO

Key Control

Optimum security is contingent upon a proper control system for keys. Minimum criteria to be met are:

a.   The responsibility for lock and key control is assigned to a single individual
b.   All file keys and duplicates are kept in a steel key cabinet, under lock and key
c.   All keys are maintained and issued with strict supervision, including the requirement that each key issued must be signed for (using key receipt tags)
d.   Master keys are kept to a minimum and are retained by top administrative personnel only (principal, assistant principal, and maintenance supervisor)
e.   Appropriate fines or penalties are enforced when an employee loses a key
f.   Employees are never permitted to have a duplicate key made on their own
g.   Keys are always collected from employees who terminate or transfer
h.   All keys are collected and logged at the conclusion of the school year; the key control system is re-evaluated, inadequacies corrected, before keys are reissued
i.   Tumblers in vital locks are changed if keys are permanently lost of stolen

For the questions below, if a "NO" is checked, please explain in the space provided.

If the key control system adequate? . . . . YES/NO

The key cabinet is maintained with sufficient number of hooks tags and
supervision. . . . . YES/NO

Lighting and Electrical Boxes

For the questions below, if a "NO" is checked , please explain.

Is the perimeter of the school building protected by adequate
lighting? . . . . YES/NO

Are repairs to lights and replacement of inoperative lamps made
immediately? . . . . YES/NO

Is there sufficient light to provide marginal coverage in case a bulb
burns out? . . . . YES/NO

Are photo electric cells located out of reach of
spotlights? . . . . YES/NO

Are all accessible lenses protected by some unbreakable
material? . . . . YES/NO

Is additional lighting provided at entrances and other points of possible intrusion? .... YES/NO

Is the wiring for protective lighting properly mounted? .... YES/NO

Are switches and controls properly located and protected? .. YES/NO

Is the lighting system designed and location of fixtures recorded so that repairs could be made rapidly? .... YES/NO

Are materials and equipment in storage areas properly arranged to provide adequate lighting? .... YES/NO

Has the possibility of lower energy consumption and high lighting levels with more efficient light sources been explored? .... YES/NO

Are corridors and stairwells properly lighted for safety? . . . YES/NO

Are directional lights aimed at the building rather that away
from it? . . . . YES/NO

Is access to electrical panels restricted? . . . . YES/NO

Are mechanical rooms and other hazardous storage areas kept
locked? . . . . YES/NO

Perimeter and Grounds

For the questions below, if a "NO" is checked, please explain in the space provided.

Fencing: If the school grounds are fenced, is the fencing high enough?

Are trees and telephone poles far enough away? . . . . YES/NO

Are the gates as well Constructed as the fence itself? . . . . . YES/NO

Are gates secured by good padlocks or chains? . . . . YES/NO

Visibility and Access:
Are all areas of the school buildings and grounds accessible to cruising police vehicles? . . . . YES/NO

Are buildings visible to passing patrol cars? . . . . YES/NO

Has Access to bus loading areas been restricted to other
vehicles? . . . . YES/NO

Have school personnel been assigned to bus loading/drop-off
areas? . . . . YES/NO

Have school personnel been assigned to student parking areas during
arrival and dismissal times? . . . . YES/NO

Vandalism and Theft Prevention:
School grounds should meet the following criteria:

a.   Grounds are mowed and free from debris
b.   Exterior and Interior walls are free from graffiti
c.   Floors are kept clean and damaged floor covering is replaced
        promptly
d.   Broken glass is replaced promptly with plexiglass or other break
        resistant material

Are school facilities generally kept neat and in good
repair? . . . . YES/NO

Are sections of the building locked when not in use for specific after-
hours activities? . . . . YES/NO

have protective screens or window guards been installed in areas where glass is frequently broken? .... YES/NO

Are school files and records maintained in locked, vandal proof, fireproof containers or vaults? .... YES/NO

Does the school maintain a record of all maintenance on doors, windows, lockers, or other areas of the school? .... YES/NO

Is graffiti photographed (to record possible gang identification) and removed promptly? .... YES/NO

Have all items that could be used to break into the building been removed from school grounds? .... YES/NO

Are driver education vehicles secure? .... YES/NO

<u>Playground Safety:</u>
Is vehicle access to play areas restricted? . . . . YES/NO

Are all play areas fenced? . . . . YES/NO

Are bicycle racks provided in a location which allows for good visual surveillance? . . . . YES/NO

Is playground equipment located so as to permit good visual surveillance by school staff? . . . . YES/NO

Does playground equipment have tamper-proof fasteners? . . YES/NO

Access Control Procedures

For the question below, if a "NO" is checked, please explain in the space provided.

<u>Visitors:</u>
Are there written regulations regarding the access and control of visitors to the school? . . . . YES/NO

Are signs concerning visitor policy and trespassing properly displayed at all entrances to the campus and buildings? . . . . YES/NO

Is clearly marked visitor parking provided as close to the main office as possible and/or in a high visibility location? . . . . YES/NO

Are school personnel assigned to duty stations on the school grounds when school is in session? . . . . YES/NO

Do personnel assigned to duty stations have two-way communication with the main office? . . . . YES/NO

Are all visitors greeted upon entering the school? . . . . YES/NO

Is on entrance designated for visitors? . . . . YES/NO

Are there signs on other entrances requesting visitors to use only the designated entrance? . . . . YES/NO

Is the school office area locked near the main entrance? . . . YES/NO

Are visitors required to sign in? . . . . YES/NO

Are visitors issued identification cards or badges? . . . . YES/NO

Is proper identification required of vendors, salespersons and repairmen? . . . . YES/NO

If a vendor offers a product (e.g., class rings) to the student body, is the vendor assigned to a sales "station"? . . . . YES/NO

Are all deliveries made at one entrance designated for this purpose? . . . . YES/NO

Are delivery men always accompanied by a staff person when carrying supplies into the kitchen, storeroom, or other areas? . . . . . . YES/NO

Is there a policy for intercepting/responding to suspicious persons observed on school grounds? . . . . YES/NO

Students:
Are there written regulations restricting student access to school grounds and buildings? . . . . YES/NO

Are students issued I.D. cards or other identification? . . . . . YES/NO

Are students issued parking stickers for assigned parking
areas? . . . . YES/NO

Is student access to parking areas restricted to arrival and dismissal
times? . . . . YES/NO

Has a parking area been designated for students who must leave school
during regular hours to begin work? . . . . YES/NO

Are "restricted" areas properly identified? . . . . YES/NO

Are students required to carry a pass when exempted from attendance
of classes? . . . . YES/NO

Are students restricted from loitering in corridors, hallways, and
restrooms? . . . . YES/NO

If a classroom is vacant, are students restricted from entering the room alone? . . . . YES/NO

Are friends, relatives or non-custodial parents required to have written permission to pick up a student from school? . . . . YES/NO

Ares students required to have written permission to leave school during school hours? . . . . YES/NO

Has a high visibility area been designated as the pickup/drop-off point for students? . . . . YES/NO

Are student parking areas located to permit easy surveillance by school staff? . . . . YES/NO

Staff:
Are full and part-time staff, including bus drivers, issued I.D. card or other identification? . . . . YES/NO

Are there written regulations regarding access and control of school personnel after school hours? . . . . YES/NO

Are staff members who remain after school hours required to sign out? . . . . YES/NO

Are faculty members required to lock classrooms upon leaving? . . . . YES/NO

Is on person designated to perform the following security checks ate the end of the day? . . . . YES/NO

> Check that all classrooms and offices are locked
> Check all restrooms, locker rooms to assure that no on is hiding
> Check all exterior entrances to assure that they are locked
> Check all night lights to assure that they have been turned on
> Check the alarm system to assure that it is functioning properly

Is the telephone number of the principal provided to the police department so the police can make contact in the event of a suspicious or emergency situation? . . . . YES/NO

Is there a means for two-way communication between the office and all classrooms, including portable units? . . . . YES/NO

Is a school resource officer assigned to the school? . . . . YES/NO

Do law enforcement personnel or community residents monitor school grounds after school hours? . . . . YES/NO

Property Identification and Inventory Control

For the questions below, if a "NO" is checked, please explain in the space provided.

Has all school equipment been permanently marked with Operation Identification Number? . . . . YES/NO

Is an up-to-date inventory maintained for all expendable school supplies? . . . . YES/NO

Is secure storage available during and after school for valuable items? . . . . YES/NO

Have special security measures been taken for high target items? . . . . YES/NO

Is cash deposited in the bank daily? . . . . YES/NO

Alarms

For the questions below, if "NO" is checked, please explain in the space provided.

Is the school protected by an alarm system? . . . . YES/NO

<u>If yes:</u>
Is there regular maintenance and/or testing of the entire system at least every six months? . . . . YES/NO

Is the number of false alarms kept below two for any six-month period? . . . . YES/NO

Upon alarm activation, is there a trained, armed person on the site within 20 minutes? . . . . YES/NO

Have responsible members of the community living near the school been requested to call the police if the alarm bell is heard? . . . . . YES/NO

Is there always someone available with keys to the school and alarm when the alarm is activated? . . . . YES/NO

Are suitable procedures established for turning the system on and off? . . . . YES/NO

Are high risk areas protected (e.g., Office, Cafeteria, Shops. Laboratories, Music Rooms etc.)? . . . . YES/NO

Can selected areas of the school be used while the remaining areas of the school are protected? . . . . YES/NO

If public utility power fails, is there back-up power to keep the system operating without generating an alarm signal? . . . . YES/NO

Are staff members trained on the capabilities and limitations of the

alarm system? . . . . YES/NO

Are staff trained regarding their responsibilities when responding to an
alarm? . . . . YES/NO

<u>If no:</u>
Is an alarm system necessary? . . . . YES/NO
(Describe system recommended)

      Recommended Types   Recommended Locations

      Sensors (Detectors)

      Contact Switches

      Photo Electric

      Passive Infrared

      Sound Monitoring

         Digital Dialer
         Voice Dialer

      Signal Transmission
         Leased Lines
         Digital Dialer
         Voice Dialer

Comments and Recommendations:

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