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ABSTRACT

The papers gathered in this volume were presented at the 1991 meeting of the American Educational Research Association. All the papers were presented as part of the Arts and Learning Special Interest Group (SIG) or were cosponsored by the arts SIG. Following an editorial, papers in this volume are: "Four Types of Women's History and How They Apply to Histories of Women in Art Education" (D. Soucy); "A Propositional View of Environmental Experiencing" (R. W. Neperud); "American Indian Perspectives on Environment and Art" (P. L. Stuhr); "The Inherited Legacy: Art Education in a Postmodern Age (1986)" (J. Jagodzinski); "Technical v. Liberal Content in Art: Schooling and the Reproduction of Divisions in Gender, Class, and Race" (J. Pazienza; P. Amburgy; P. Bolin); "Response to Technical Content in Art: Schooling and Reproduction of Divisions in Gender, Class and Race" (A. N. Johnson); "Historical Sense through the Arts: An Inquiry into Form, Meaning, and Understanding" (M. J. Singer); "Integrating Arts into the Curriculum: Problems and Promises in Critical Perspectives" (P. Salvio); "A Case of Legitimation: Art Education's Movement into the Core Curriculum" (K. A. Hamblen); and "The Development of Invented Music Notations: A Cousin to Invented Spellings" (R. Upitis). (BT)

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Patricia L. Stuhr, Ed.

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
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PREFACE

The papers published in this volume were presented at the 1991 annual meeting of the American Educational Research Association. All of the articles were presented as part of the Arts and Learning Special Interest Group (SIG) or were cosponsored by the arts SIG and other Divisions or SIGs. All of the presentations/articles have the arts as a focus. Each year research is selected for presentation at the AERA conference program. Selection is based on the results of a blind review. Papers presented at AERA can then be submitted for possible publication in Arts and Learning Research. The papers published in the proceedings are often in an abbreviated form. The authors are free to publish the complete papers in another source.

I wish to thank past editors Kerry Freedman-Norberg of the University of Minnesota, Annette Swann of the University of Northern Iowa, Cynthia Colbert of the University of Southern Carolina, and Judith Koroscik of The Ohio State University for their guidance in the publication of this volume. The editorial assistance I received from my Assistant Editor Elizabeth Kowalchuk of Buffalo State College (New York) was invaluable. I am also grateful to my Research Assistant Janet Montgomery here at The Ohio State University, for her cover design and assistance in having computer disks translated. I would especially like to thank Michael Parsons, Chair of the Art Education Department at The Ohio State University, for supporting the project.

Patricia L. Stuhr,
Columbus, Ohio

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The Journal of the Arts and Learning
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ARTS AND LEARNING RESEARCH

Volume 9, Number 1

1991

Editorial

DISCUSSION ON THE CONCERNS AND DIRECTION
OF THE ARTS AND LEARNING SIG

Patricia L. Stuhr

Things are looking up! The Arts and Learning Special Interest Group (SIG) is rallying against some of the major difficulties that it has been encountering in the past few years. Our membership, and therefore our income, has risen this year. The SIG's budget this year is closer to being balanced than it has been in a long time. Next year the Arts & Learning Research proceedings should, for the first time in a long time, be able to be paid for out of the 1992-1993 budget. This is, of course, dependent upon the same continued gain in membership and sales of the proceedings as in the past year.

The 1991 Arts and Learning SIG Program Chair, Dr. Kerry Freedman-Norberg, constructed a SIG program for the conference in Chicago that significantly represented the arts. This issue of the proceedings contains most of the refereed papers presented at the 1991 AERA conference as part of the Arts and Learning SIG Program and features an invited paper presented by Don Soucy, Four types of Women's History and How They Apply to Histories of Women in Art Education. Don's paper was presented in conjunction with the SIG's annual business meeting. The other papers presented at the conference encompassed a variety of timely and provocative topics relative to the arts: feminist concerns; social and cultural environmental issues and propositions in a Postmodern context; relationships to the general and core curriculum; and issues of gender, race, and class and

technical content. All of the papers presented as part of this year's SIG program reflected an interest in the topics that are relevant to general curriculum theorists.

It is obvious that art educators have important perspectives to contribute to the discourse on schooling in general curriculum. However, we have yet to see evidence of much research being done in the area of interdisciplinary curriculum, in which the arts play a significant and leading role. The avenues open to us through our connections with the annual AERA meeting should foster this type of research development. To continue merely to debate and concern ourselves with significant issues germane only to arts would seem to be a lost opportunity. I strongly urge all members to consider this suggestion when you plan your research proposals for next year's AERA program.

FOUR TYPES OF WOMEN'S HISTORY AND HOW THEY APPLY TO HISTORIES OF WOMEN IN ART EDUCATION

Donald Soucy
University of New Brunswick/
University of British Columbia

I thank Jane Gaskell of the University of British Columbia for introducing me to some of the feminist literature discussed in this article. I also thank J. Donald Wilson of UBC and Marjorie Theobald of the University of Melbourne written while on a fellowship from the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada.

Abstract

Four types of women's history are identified and their characteristics discussed. The four are herstory, subjection thesis history, feminized history, and feminist paradigm history. It is argued that histories of women in art education fit within the first three categories.

Four Types of Women's History and How They Apply to Histories of Women in Art Education

In this paper, I describe four types of women's history: herstory, subjection thesis history, feminizing history, and feminist-paradigm history. I argue that, thus far, histories of women in art education fit within the first three categories. These three types of history provide fresh insights into art education's past. A further argument, though, is that feminist-paradigm history raises questions that the other types leave unasked.

Although these four types are not mutually exclusive, each has its own identifying characteristics. Herstory stresses women's historical contributions. It adds "great women" to the existing historical canon (e.g., McKay, 1987; Nochlin, 1971). The criteria for entry into the canon are often

those already established for "great men." The second type, a subjection thesis, exposes barriers faced by women in achieving these criteria. Germaine Greer's The Obstacle Race (1979) is a good example of this type from feminist art history. Like the first two types, a feminizing history also emphasizes women's important contributions. It differs, though, in that it develops new, inclusory criteria, incorporating characteristics and activities identified as feminine. In general, feminizing history accepts what constitutes historical significance, but challenges how we measure it. Feminist paradigm history, on the other hand, challenges not only these measures but also our notion of historical significance itself.

I have adapted these categories from the ideas of various feminist theorists. Gerda Lerner (1979, chap. 10) was the first to identify what she called "levels" of women's history. Since then, others have described different categories of women's history (e.g., Scott, 1987), feminism, and general feminist theory. Some theorists say these different types of feminism develop simultaneously. For example, feminist art educators Georgia C. Collins and Renee Sandell (e.g. 1984, chap. 8) identify three general strains in current feminist theory: integration, separatism, and androgyny. Others describe the categories as sequential stages through which feminism develops. Thalia Gouma-Peterson and Patricia Mathews (1987) take this approach in their overview of feminist art, art criticism, and art history since 1970. They portray methodological debates as always marching forward, with the most recent position always being the most correct. Thus, they present history as stages of naturally-unfolding progress. Unless you accept this notion of progress, it is more useful to talk about types of history, not stages.¹

Herstory

The type found most often in historical research on women in art education is herstory. Collins and Sandell used the title "Matters of Herstory and Heritage" for the history section of their 1984 book on Women, Art, and Education. A chapter in that section was written by Mary Ann Stankiewicz and Enid Zimmerman, the two leading scholars in the history of women art educators (e.g., 1984, 1985; Zimmerman & Stankiewicz, 1982). The section's focus, like most histories of women art educators, is primarily on individuals or small groups, their characteristics and their self-perceptions (e.g., see Erickson, 1979; 1988; Stankiewicz, 1982; 1988; Smith, 1988, 1990). Biography is an obvious format for such studies, and it is no surprise

1990). Biography is an obvious format for such studies, and it is no surprise that it has dominated the field. This emphasis on the individual is one trait that marks these herstories as liberal.²

Robin Morgan (1977) was the first to use the term "herstory" in print in 1970. Since then, according to Lisa Tuttle (1986, p. 142), different feminists have treated the term with seriousness (e.g., Sochen, 1974), jest, or scorn. As a methodology, herstory has raised fresh questions. It has also created new standards for determining what is historically important. It is, however, essentially a separatist strategy, viewing women apart from men.

The implications of such a strategy are not clear cut. Collins and Sandell (1984; Collins, 1977, 1978, 1981), for example, although they employ a separatist herstory, advocate an androgynous feminism that they counterpose to separatist feminism. Their position reflects debates around separatism in the wider feminist arena. On the one hand, Jane Flax (1987, 1990) contends that any feminist discourse that problematizes "woman" ironically privileges the category of "man." On the other hand, Christie Farnham and Joan Hoff-Wilson (1990) say that, regardless of "whether the subject, woman, is problematized, historically there has always been a class of individuals categorized as women. And men as a category have always dominated them." Farnham and Hoff-Wilson are therefore emphatic in their conclusion: "The subject of women's history is women" (p. 8). Standing somewhere in the middle of these two positions, Jean Kelly-Gadol also argues that women should be at the center of feminist history. Nevertheless, she says,

The activity, power, and cultural evaluation of women cannot be assessed except in relational terms: by comparison and contrast with the activity, power, and cultural evaluation of men, and in relation to the institutions and social developments that shape the sexual order. (1984, p. 9)

Art education herstories do not, for the most part, view women in nonseparatist, relational terms as Kelly-Gadol suggests. Whether they should is just one of herstory's methodological issues.³

Another issue arises from herstory's tendency to substitute "great woman" history for the traditional tale of the "great man." In doing so, it

often uses male-defined standards to measure this greatness. In arguing why such criteria should be used in art history, Wendy Slatkin insists, "The great women artists accepted the inequities and struggled to meet the criteria established by male artists. If they recognized and accepted the reality of male-defined standards for excellence, contemporary art historians must as well" (1990, p. 6). The circularity in Slatkin's thinking is, in part, why many feminists early on found this position to be inadequate. Slatkin begins with male standards to measure greatness. Consequently, she unavoidably finds that, by her definition, all great women artists met these standards. And why does she use these male standards in the first place? It is because they are the ones that all great women artists met.

Due to these problems, some feminist critics argue that herstory does not fundamentally change conventional history (e.g., Lewis, 1981; Scott, 1987). Instead, it plugs women into standard historical categories, periods, movements, and interpretations. One critic, Jan Jagodzinski [sic] (1990, pp. 134-136), complains that "achievement roster" herstories in art education are "liberalist" and a decade too late. However, while it is true that art educators are now discovering methodologies that feminist historians have been proposing for years, Jagodzinski is too quick to dismiss the early results of that discovery. Like Jagodzinski, Stankiewicz and Zimmerman (1984, p. 114) acknowledge the limits of current histories of women art educators, and they recognize the need to integrate these histories into wider questions and contexts. However, they also make a point that Jagodzinski seems to dismiss: Having started from scratch, their histories prepare the ground for building more complex arguments. Zimmerman and Stankiewicz present their research as an initial stage that begins to compensate for the androcentric point of view found in art education historiography.

This androcentricism is not easy to shake. One reason for its strength is that history in general has, until recently, been androcentric (e.g., see Lerner, 1988). In educational history, the History of Education Quarterly index for 1961-1970 lists only one article under "Female Education." The journal's 1971-1980 index uses the term "Education of Women and Girls," listing several articles. However, neither index lists "feminism," "gender," or "sex." Of course, the index stops at 1980, and since then growth in feminist theory has spurred advances in women's history. That leads to a second reason for persistent androcentricity in art education historiography: Only a few scholars, such as Collins, Sandell, and, more recently, Elizabeth

Garber (1989, 1990), have thus far been consistently dedicated to bringing feminist theory into the general field of art education.

A third reason for the androcentricity is that men had most of the prominent jobs in art education when its first histories were written, which happened during the latter part of the 19th century and the early part of the 20th. These men concentrated solely on the people, theories, and practices being promoted at their institutions. They did not look closely at how their ideas translated into actual art practice, much of which, if Nova Scotia is typical, was conducted by women. Neither did they pay much attention to art education outside of the public school system, such as in the accomplishments curriculum of the female schools.⁴ Despite their narrow and male-centered view, the power of these historians extended into art education's historical thinking for many decades, and is indeed still with us (Soucy, 1990; Efland & Soucy, 1989, in press).

Herstory, then, serves feminist goals by compensating for this androcentric bias in historical research. It is politically useful research because, as many feminists argue, recovering woman's forgotten past empowers her present (e.g., Gaskell & McLaren, 1987; Pierson, 1987; Pierson & Prentice, 1982). Yet, recognizing the usefulness of liberalistic herstory does not mean that it is a stage through which art education historiography must pass before wider, nonliberalist feminist questions can be addressed. Such questions, however, have generally not been suited to the individualist and equity concerns that are often paramount in art education historiography. Deterministic stage theory can imply that histories of women in art education are currently liberal herstories because they are going through a mandatory first historiographic stage. A better argument, though, is that these histories remain within this first "stage" because they are liberal, and here I would include my own research.

Subjection Thesis

Being liberal, these herstories share a tradition in which a subjection thesis looms large. In fact, the quintessential liberal feminist text is called The Subjection of Women, published in 1869 and written by the utilitarian philosopher John Stuart Mill with the help of Harriet and Helen Taylor. Many feminist historians, however, do not adhere to this tradition. They contend that a subjection thesis or "oppressive model of history" is too narrow. The debate goes back to Mary Beard (1946), whom Gerda Lerner

(1979) credits as having invented women's history for the United States. Beard argued against portraying women as having always been a subject sex that has been progressively liberated. One symptom of this portrayal, she observed, is an overemphasis on female suffrage as an organizing principal of women's recent history. Lerner (1979; Beard), who was one of the first in the United States to articulate clearly the notion of feminist history, agrees in part. Whereas Beard rejects the subjection theory in toto, Lerner rejects only its exclusive use. The two historians fully agree, though, that women have been more than just victims and strugglers against oppression. Other feminist theorists, including art historians Rozsika Parker and Griselda Pollock (1981), make the same point.

Historian Linda Gordon implies a different view. Feminist research, she says, is "an analysis of women's subordination for the purpose of figuring out how to change it" (1979, p. 107). Collins and Sandell share this purpose. Their aim, they say, is to "identify effective sex-equity strategies" (1984, p. 45). Similarly, Stankiewicz and Zimmerman (1984, p. 114) want their histories to challenge "inequities and stereotypes" in order to "provide both grounds and motivation for change." As the work of these four art education scholars reveals, the goal of fighting oppression can be the subtext of research without it being the main topic. We might therefore revise Gordon's description to say that opposing subjection is a project of feminist research, though it need not be its explicit subject.

In art education, a subjection thesis manifests itself more in Collins and Sandell's (1984) description of women's general history than in art education history as such. Still, the latter suffers by not taking a wider view of the former. At times, both have stressed a Germaine Greer-like (1979) obstacle race interpretation that may be seen as an "oppressive model" approach (e.g., Collins & Sandell, 1984; Soucy, 1989; Stankiewicz & Zimmerman, 1984). Collins and Sandell's book, Women, Art and Education, covers a wide range of topics, so it is no surprise that some of them, such as women's general history, do not receive comprehensive treatment. Except for art-related matters, the "women's movement" is the only topic discussed historically. Collins and Sandell's interpretation of this movement is limited, partly because of their sources. For the 19th and early 20th centuries, they, like many before them, depend almost entirely on Eleanor Flexner's 1959 (1972) book on woman suffrage. For later periods they rely primarily on Gayle Graham Yates's 1975 encyclopedic-like book, What Women Want. Collins and Sandell also describe feminism in terms of

two waves, a notion that fits Yates's perspective and has filtered down to them from a 1968 article by Martha Weinman Lear. In this interpretation, the "first wave" of feminism begins in the mid-19th century and ends when women gain the vote. The "second wave" is a contemporary feminism that begins in the 1960s.

Describing feminism in terms of "waves" could suggest "that in social change, as in oceans, calmer patches are followed by new and stronger peaks of activity" (Black 1988, p. 83). Yet, like the historical chauvinism implied by the notion of "Renaissance," the two-wave interpretation also implies a dark age, this one for women from the 1920s to a rebirth of feminism in the 1960s. Such an implication downplays women's role in shaping events during more than a third of this century. In fact, Beard (1946) reminds us, a two-wave subjection thesis also denies women being a force in history for all periods prior to the mid-19th century. The thesis's narrowness does not allow art education history to be adequately situated within a broader, women's history. As Angela Davis (1981) points out, neither does it take into account the history of working class women or people of color. Furthermore, it often anachronistically applies the term "feminism" to the entire "first wave," when for the first few decades of that period the term "woman movement" is historically more appropriate (Lerner, 1979, chap. 4; Rossi, 1973, p. xii; Cott, 1987, pp. 3-10; Offen, 1988; Prentice, et al., 1988, pp. 169-170). Thus, the women's movement that Collins and Sandell describe does not divide so neatly into just two pre- and post-suffrage waves.

The example of art education in Nova Scotia shows how the fight for the vote was not always the sine qua non of women's activism. There the vote was just one of many issues women worked on at any one time. In fact, suffrage's priority was not much different from that given to promoting art education. Both of these issues were more dependent on the enthusiasm of individual women than on the overall commitment of any one women's organization. While both art and the vote were continual concerns, neither was ever the major one. Becoming enfranchised did not mark a major turning point for the city's women activists. Neither did it significantly change their role in art and art education (see Dennis, 1908-1917; Local Council of Women, 1898-1927; N.S. College of Art, 1924-1933; Soucy, 1989).

So, in describing a women's movement that pivots around enfranchisement, Collins and Sandell repeat a useful but limited historical

interpretation. It is useful in part because it breaks away from an androcentric historical periodization and adopts a women-defined one.⁵ It is limited in part because its popularity is not always due to its relevancy to the topic at hand. Furthermore, the fight against women's subordination goes well beyond struggles for the vote. The frequent retelling of the suffrage story is often a result of the subjection thesis legacy and the happenstance of plentiful sources on the topic. Art education history needs a broader scope than this story provides.

Feminizing History and Feminist Paradigm History

Some feminists have moved beyond a subjection thesis by exalting feminine-identified characteristics. They embrace attributes traditionally ascribed to women, such as sensitivity, nurturing, and caring. In contrast, other feminists say this ascription has historically been a strategy to keep women in their place (e.g., Eisenstein, 1983; Segal, 1987). Thus, while some feminist art historians search for a female touch in paintings (e.g., see Garrard, 1976; Broude & Garrard, 1982), other feminists show how misogynists have long used the idea of feminine touch to disparage women's art. While some identify a female sensibility in art, others argue against the notion of universal "woman" implied by such a sensibility. In short, feminizing historians describe traits they say are essentially female, while their critics contend these traits are social constructs that help keep women subordinate (e.g., Gouma-Peterson & Mathews, 1987; Hagaman, 1990; jagodzinski, 1990; Nochlin, 1971, p. 24; Parker & Pollock, 1981, chap. 1). In art education, Collins (1978) has taken a middle position, arguing against a universal female sensibility, but proposing that an individual might define such a sensibility for herself (see also Orenstein, 1975; Sandell, 1979).

Peter Smith (1990) employs a feminizing strategy in art education history. He questions the emphasis art education historians give to salary, rank, research, and publication. Men, after all, were privileged in these areas. Should not historians instead pay attention to the particular ways women contributed to the field? Here Smith is partly echoing earlier arguments by feminist historians such as Lerner (1979, chap. 10), Kelly-Gadol (1977), and Scott (1987). These historians, though, take their case further. For Smith, history's subject is individuals who achieved success, status, and power. For Lerner, Kelly-Gadol, and Scott, history's subject is the power itself, the social relations--especially the gender relations--that shape success and status. Smith's feminizing history makes an important

contribution when it goes beyond questions of who gained status and challenges our assumptions about what criteria we use to measure that status. Feminist-paradigm history goes further still to ask how status and power function and why.

By addressing larger questions of power, gender, and the sexual order, feminist-paradigm history has the best potential of the four types to make fundamental changes in historiography.⁶ Art education has yet to produce a feminist-paradigm history, but art history has. Feminist art historians Rozsika Parker and Griselda Pollock (1981; Pollock, 1988) reject both a male-defined aesthetic canon and a feminized aesthetic canon. In fact, they reject canonical aesthetic interpretations altogether. Aesthetic criteria and style development need not be ignored, they say, but neither should they be the organizing principle of art history and criticism. Instead, historians should analyze "women's historical and ideological position in relation to art, art production, and artistic ideology as a means to question the assumptions that underlie the traditional historical framework" (Gouma-Peterson & Mathews, 1987, p. 328).

The questions in the histories of women in art education are not yet these wide ones of feminist-paradigm histories. They are not expressly about the category of "woman" or the shaping of the sexual order. Rather, they are limited to the position of individual women or specific groups of women within art education itself. Nevertheless, our herstories, subjection thesis histories, and feminized histories challenge androcentric conceptions of the field's past. They are antidotes to histories that view each period solely in terms of one or two supposedly pervasive, male-defined characteristics. Thus, although art education historians have not, to any great degree, explicitly examined the wider questions of gender and power, they have implications for those who do.

Footnotes

- 1 For interpretations in art education literature that parallel Gouma-Peterson and Mathews, see Hagaman (1990) and Jagodzinski (1990). For a critique of Gouma-Peterson and Mathews, see Garber (1991). On three-stage or three-type models for various aspects of feminist theory and the feminist movement, see Eisenstein (1983) and various essays in Farnham (1987). In feminist education see Gaskell & McLaren (1987) and Noddings (1990). In art education, see: Garber (1990) and Collins (1977, 1978, 1981). Collins and Sandell take their three-types-of-feminism model from Yates (1975). Hamblen (1990) repeats this model. Hamblen (e.g., 1987, 1988) has also described a sequential stage model for art education historiography.
- 2 Stankiewicz and Zimmerman (1985a; Stankiewicz, 1985a, 1985b; Zimmerman, 1989) cite Geraldine J. Clifford's (e.g. 1978) ideas on biography. Diana Korzenik used biography in her 1985 book Drawn to Art. She also underscores the importance of the historian's autobiography (Korzenik, 1990). In Britain, Val Walsh (1990) has also incorporated autobiography. For a broader discussion of the advantages of biography in art education history, see Stankiewicz, 1985a.
- 3 For more on viewing women in isolation from men in historical research, see Kelly-Gadol (1979), Lerner (1979, chap. 10), Scott (1987, pp. 39, 41), and Barman (1990). For similar arguments by feminist anthropologists, see Rosaldo & Lamphere (1974; Lamphere, 1987). In general feminist theory, see Virginia Sapiro (1987, p. 169).
- 4 For path-breaking work on ladies' schools and the accomplishments curriculum in Australia, see Theobald (1984, 1988a, 1988b, 1989). In Canadian educational history, see Gidney & Millar (1990). In art education history, see Efland (1985) and Soucy (1987).
- 5 On periodization in women's and feminist history, see Kelly-

Gadol (1976, 1977, 1984), Lerner (1979, chaps. 2, 4, 5, 10), and Schulenberg (1979).

- 6 On the notion of feminism bringing about a Khunian paradigm shift, see Lerner (1979, chap. 12), Spender (1981, 157, 171-72), and chapters by Farnham, Bernard, Christ, and Heilbrun in Farnham (1987).

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A PROPOSITIONAL VIEW OF ENVIRONMENTAL EXPERIENCING

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During the 1970s, a number of art educators were concerned about environment, particularly the quality of the built environment. Some of us assumed that the best way to correct or prevent poorly planned environments was through design and that art educators were in the best position to introduce such study into the school curriculum. This movement reached its height about the time of the St. Louis National Art Education Association Conference during which a lengthy symposium was devoted to the topic and culminated in an environmental design issue of Art Education (April, 1978). Since then there have been many changes that prompts another look at the possibilities of environmental studies in art education.

After the late 70s, it became apparent that interests in art education were shifting from environmental to other concerns and that our efforts didn't seem to have much effect upon what was happening in schools in spite of the work of such committed leaders as June King McFee (1968), (McFee & Degge, 1977). It seemed to me that not much could be done in a methods course to interest art education students in environmental concerns. I experienced greater success in introducing environmental concerns to beginning students in three dimensional design courses.

A couple of views developed out of those earlier interests that provided a foundation for continued environmental interests and developments. These had to do with how we perceive and how we value environment. Fundamentally, I believe now as then that "We need not only to study about environmental design, but we need to practice it from the vantage of a heightened social consciousness. The very notion of expecting that 'someone else' is responsible for our state of affairs is firmly ingrained in our education. It starts very early in our schools. If we do not develop a sense of responsibility for surroundings among the youngest children, environment will always be someone else's problem" (Neperud, 1978, p. 7). It heartens me that another generation of art educators is continuing an environmental interest, particularly from a strong social/cultural perspective

and recognizing the important social/ political commitment necessary to alleviate environmental problems.

It seems to me that the way we perceive and conceptualize environment has a lot to do with how we relate to and treat our surroundings. Sometimes environment has simply meant the physical and natural surroundings, while built environment has referred to what humans have created including architecture and landscapes. The idea of human environment was developed to reflect human interactions with the natural and physical. "The concept of the 'human environment' originates on the one hand in modern philosophy, and on the other in the revolutionary contributions of ecological science. But we must not forget a third source, the literary and artistic description of the 'human environment,' which carried out the delicate operation of transforming a philosophical notion into a fact of sensibility, a scientific construct into a fact of perception" (Maldonado, 1972, p. 5).

If environment is regarded as an object, as separate from us, and as something out there, one can do terrible things to it, with little feeling or sympathy. However, if we regard environment as part of an interactive process between and among humans and surroundings, we have the basis for a different set of environmental concerns. Initially, my interest in how we interact with environment focused on aesthetics and resulted in a propositional view of aesthetic experiencing (Neperud, 1988). It is this view that I am re-examining for implications about how we perceive and value environment.

Essentially, I view human behavior as associated, in part, with the broad cognitive area of information processing; specifically from a propositional format that accommodates both visual and verbal information. It is assumed that this is an interactive process between environment and individual in which propositions (sometimes referred to as hypotheses or schemas) are active in the perception of surroundings. In turn, the environment constantly affects the individual during a processing cycle. Initially, I started to develop this view in an attempt to get at the interrelationships of individuals to their environment. In the course of development I switched to the problem of aesthetic experiencing. Now, the propositional view may be useful in examining human interactions with environment.

Visual information processing is active in that individuals are motivated to make sense of their environment. The process is also interactive in that ways of representing the environment, i.e. visual/verbal propositions, affect what we know and in turn are, altered by our surroundings, through its visual qualities, its responsiveness, and its fit with our existing views. Propositions, then, are a means of encoding both visual and verbal information or assertions about the relationships of information, existing in varying degrees of complexity. There are two additional characteristics of propositions that should be recognized: 1) values and emotional qualities are embedded in propositional processing and are not withheld as the end product of our attempts to make sense of our surroundings, and 2) new informational categories are not dependent upon a priori knowledge, but arise, at least in part, from our particular experiences in specific social and cultural groups. In this way, we are not universalizing propositions, but are recognizing that the information arises from lived experiences. So what does the propositional view hold for human environmental interactions?

The purpose of this paper is to examine the relationship between human behavior and ideas about physical or natural and human environments, all of which are subject to change (Ewald, 1968). I contend that there is a relationship between how humans represent environments through propositional form and human behavior interacting with environments. There is then a relationship between visual/verbal representations of environment and human behavior toward them. By knowing more about behavioral and propositional relationships we will be in a better position to address problems of environment. It would seem that to address human/environmental problems without attending to changing environmental propositions would be an artificial exercise.

First, a framework of human environmental behaviors ranging from intrusive to more harmonious relationships are suggested. These are drawn from various media and literature sources. Next, a range of propositions are developed reflecting various environmental views. Finally, I will speculate about the relationships between behavior and propositions.

Some Types of Human Environmental Behavior

As you can imagine, it is extremely difficult to organize a set of environmental behaviors that are reasonably exclusive categories, yet

represent a range from very active to virtual noninvolvement with surroundings. The categories are quite general and vary in their effects.

Exploited Environment

The most extreme form of negative environmental behavior would be destruction, such as that which takes place in wars. Good examples include recent conflicts in which particular environments were completely destroyed: natural, built, and social as a means of denying supportive use of those surroundings to a culture. Another highly destructive behavior environment is the permanent extraction of natural resources -- coal and ore mining, petro-chemical drilling (on and off shore), clear cutting of forests, etc.

Also included under exploitive environmental use are urban, and suburban development. Historical urban areas may be destroyed, leveled primarily for the sake of immediate development of new moneymaking enterprises. Country areas are developed into residential areas with little or no regard for the effects of new developments on native plants or animal life or waterways.

Benign neglect is not an intentional noncaring relationship, but rather an unthinking neglect or concern for one's surroundings. Examples of this include: the use of natural and human resources with no regard for future consequences (Carr, 1960). Gas and oil are consumed as though there is an unlimited supply. Humans are used in business and industry with little regard for the quality of the workplace and effects upon workers. The focus is upon the present not the future, and capacity production rather than employee content and safety.

Design and Balance. This use of environment recognizes that there are particular constraints on environmental usage. Human uses and the function of a building are calculated into its design, and there is a concern for a building's relationship to its surroundings. Thus theory contends that design is the best fit between human behavior and a physical setting. In the use of natural resources, the constraints of regenerative capacity are considered. The disciplines of city and land use planning also come into play usually with considerations of good for the good of the majority or of political expediency (Halprin, 1972; Greenbie, 1976). The work environment is designed with concern for employee health and comfort: adequate ventilation, safe machinery, breaks to ease fatigue, and congenial

atmosphere free of harassment and discrimination. Essentially, these environmental behaviors are based on a belief that because human controls over the environment are dominant a planning or design element should be used to achieve responsible use of the environment (Banham, 1974). The idea of balance to settle usage arguments is usually rationalized as the will of the majority or as what will be best for everyone. For example, many work places no longer allow cigarette smoking. This denies smoking rights in the workplace, but prevents non-smokers from having to breathe secondary smoke, as well as reducing accidental fire damage.

Design has evolved from formal concerns to more interactive systems. "I think a lot of design in the past has been hollow form-making... The structure and function of ecosystems must pervade all landscape design and all urban design as a very fundamental base, maybe the most fundamental base for all design" (Lyle, 1989, p. 53).

Ecological environment is somewhat similar to designed and planned use, except that greater emphasis is placed upon the interrelated functioning of environmental components, including human functioning within ecological considerations (Charter, 1962; Carr, 1966; Cahn, 1978). Ecology and ecological systems have entered the environmental literature over a considerable period of time and have become institutionalized in land use regulations, farmland and rural preservation versus urban sprawl concerns, the protection of waterway systems, and international habitat concerns (Steiner & Brink, 1989). Usually, the interrelations of natural elements within a particular system are considered. For example, the rain forests of Brazil would be considered an eco-system in which vegetation, precipitation, flora, fauna, and indigenous peoples represent a balanced functioning system in which no one element overpowers or disturbs in a permanent way any other element. Another example might have been the Plains Indian, who until the coming of outsiders lived in comparative harmony with their surroundings.

Even in societies within a particular locale that have evolved very slowly over a considerable span of time, a relative ecological relationship exists until some extraneous element such as new technology (i.e. steam engine, cotton gin, computerized machinery) is introduced and begins to upset the relatively harmonious elements of the long time pre-existing relationships.

Admittedly, these categories representing uses of environment are painted with a broad brush, but hopefully they give some shape to what I am talking about. In effect, there are basically differing ways of intrusion, control, manipulation, planning, and disruption of human interactions with human, natural, and built surroundings or environment.

Environmental Propositions

Propositions about environment come from a variety of sources, represent differing theoretical and philosophical positions, and differ in their degree of specificity and exclusion. They also may be drawn from particular disciplines or fields such as psychology (Sommer, 1969; Prohansky, 1970; Schefflen, 1974); anthropology (Hall, 1969; Geertz, 1976; Macquet, 1979); ethnology (Greenbie, 1976); and sociology (Gans, 1968), as well as economics and political science. Cutting across disciplines are the several theoretical positions within each area. A far ranging survey of environmental problems and a critique of underlying assumptions is contained in The Green Reader (Dobson, 1991). The diversity and complexity in specifying environmental propositions points to a need for examining one's assumptions and propositions of what constitutes environment, if any meaningful dialogue about environment and human behaviors is to be possible.

What I have attempted to suggest in Figure 1 are some environmental propositions ranging from objective, through interactive, to more personal individualized views of environment.

Figure 1

SOME ENVIRONMENTAL PROPOSITIONS

Objective

Environment is physical and spatial in nature.

It exists separate from humans.

It is whatever surrounds humans.

Environment coerces behavior.

Environments are best described and defined through the physical sciences.

Environments are separate from human values.

Behavior in setting is consistent over time thus permitting patterns of behavior to be identified.

Interactive

Environments are socially constructed.

Changes in the physical, social structures of an environment affect behavior.

Changes in one aspect of environment affects all other components in the physical setting, thus changing behavior patterns as a whole.

Environments are by definition open ended and changing.

Environments consist of active and continuing processes defined by the interrelationships at a particular time and place.

Person-Centered

Environments are personal creations.

Individuals are the nucleus of environments.

Environments are defined as the experiences of individuals at a particular time and place.

Cultural and spiritual values are a part of particular environments.

Environments are defined in part by the feelings that individuals have for their surroundings.

It is apparent that environmental propositions as presented here are not necessarily mutually exclusive, but may indicate the range of environmental views. How individuals treat and use environments are related to the views of one's surroundings (Downs & Stea, 1972). Before examining those relationships it may be useful to define some propositions about the human use of environments.

Figure 2

PROPOSITIONS ABOUT HUMAN USES OF ENVIRONMENTS

All environments can be controlled and changed by technology.

The natural resources of environments exist to be developed by humans.

Environmental changes are inevitable, and as a result species will vanish.

Some environments should not be developed.

Undeveloped environments are of value to humans.

In the final analysis, economic values can be attached to all environments.

Design of environments is the best relationship between human behavior and a physical setting.

The use of an environment is best decided by the greatest good for all and defined by consensus.

The best use of an environment should be defined by ecological integrity, not by economic value.

Sources of propositions come from popular media including newspapers, magazines, video, films, as well as the stated positions of various professional organizations with particular commitments to planning, developing, and preserving environments. Some propositions are very explicit with respect to views about particular environments, while others are hidden, embedded, or implied in visual/verbal material such as in some television commercials.

Environmental use propositions could be specified along a stricter typology of views defined from a thorough survey of environmental literature, but what I have suggested serves to give some idea of the propositions applicable in this paper. Conceivably these propositions could be developed into a research instrument assessing individuals' views of environments and their use. Next, some of the relationships of environmental behavior and propositions will be explored.

On The Relationship of Environmental Behavior and Propositions

I speculate that there are clusters of environmental propositions that relate to types of environmental behaviors. Particular propositions allow for attitudes and behavior toward one's surroundings. I will examine the relationship of some environmental propositions and behaviors that seem particularly important today.

Environments for Development. A conflict exists today in the proposed development of The Alaskan Wildlife Refuge which pits an environment for development behavior against a more ecological/preservationist view. What sets of propositions are associated with each set of behavior? Pro-development behavior would seem to be associated with such propositions of environment as: separate from humans, natural resources present for development by humans, able to be overcome and controlled by technology, and an exploitable commodity. Opposing the pro-development view are preservationists whose propositions include: environment is biologically determined; aspects of the environment are interrelated; some environments should not be developed; and environments are part of an ecological system.

It is apparent that the environmental propositions associated with each position are quite contradictory to one another and contain little or no basis for easy resolution of the Alaskan Wildlife problem. An understanding of the environmental propositions underlying each position is crucial to political solutions for contending values and behavior. Without such understanding, political behavior pits power structures against one another, rather than resolve conflict.

Next, benign neglect and the types of propositions associated with it are examined. The manner in which the physical environment is depicted in

television commercials is a good example. All-terrain vehicles or four-wheel drive trucks are pictured dashing through streams or over desolate country hillsides as a test of the durability of vehicles. The message of this commercial employs these propositions about environment: it is something out there separate from humans that can be controlled, it can be controlled and overcome by technology, and it is for using and not for preserving. In effect, an analysis of such scenes using environmental propositions is useful in revealing the hidden messages of commercials.

Other environmental behavior based upon design could be analyzed for the propositions associated with them as a way of understanding the basis for actions towards natural and human environments. For example, city planning would probably indicate that though propositions associated with control, aesthetics of form, and the interrelatedness of environmental characteristics are important, the social dimension of human/environmental reciprocal effects also figure into the analysis.

I have indicated that propositions are essentially interactive between humans and environment, but the range of propositions from objective to person-centered indicates that the type and degree of interaction among them may differ. The nature of the interaction may be dependent upon the aesthetic experience associated with propositional types. In the objective proposition, the locus of attention is the structure of the environment, its formalistic qualities. Individuals with an objective propositional perspective look for a match between pre-existing notions of beauty: sublime landscapes, spectacular mountain vistas, and bubbling mountain streams such as that represented in our major national parks. This environmental view of aesthetics would probably support sympathetic views of environment only when it was of a particular type.

The interactive propositions characterized by the social components; interrelatedness of components; and active, open ended, and changing dynamics of environments would seem to be more closely associated with those views of aesthetics that are applicable to many types of environments, not just a few predetermined types (Lang, 1987). These types of propositions would also seem to recognize the emotional embeddedness throughout the ongoing, changing relationships with particular environments. For these reasons, individuals in favor of interactive propositions would extend their sympathy to a variety of surroundings.

Person centered propositions reflect the feelings, experiences, and background of individuals. This rather self-centered approach has both advantages and disadvantages to environmental experiencing. The advantages are avoidance of the dogma associated with judgments rendered by experts and recognition of the cultural/social nature of each individual, therefore providing a strong rationale for environments such as personal spaces. This view also deems important quality as integral to human interactions with surroundings. The disadvantage of this approach is that allowing the individual to seek out personally pleasing environments and lifestyles may cause one to have a myopic world view that often results in benign neglect of environments which do not immediately impinge on that person's experiences. It allows the individual to have a blind eye to what others do to those spaces, natural and built, that do not affect the immediate self.

It is probably obvious that I find the more interactive types of propositions to be most closely aligned with a view of aesthetics that considers the integrity and quality of all surroundings. (See Lang, 1987, for a discussion of aesthetic theory, particularly symbolic aesthetics and the built environment; pp. 179-213.)

Implications

To the extent that it can be demonstrated that a strong relationship exists between environmental behavior and environmental propositions, there are several implications that can be drawn:

1) Art education curriculum that incorporates a focus on environmental design, including a study of the built and planned environmental behavior, must take into consideration and deal with the propositions that underlie environmental behavior. A study of architecture without a consideration of those propositions that support the planning process is just as much a study solely of formalistic elements as is other discipline based art education which neglects the social/cultural context of art.

2) Recently, I have been examining the content of environmental studies as they exist in a number of states. Often these studies have a purely scientific/biological base and take an objective view of environment, one which is helpful in understanding effects of pollution and ecological

systems, but treats environment as something quite apart from human behavior. They fail to address social and aesthetic concerns and may not develop sympathetic views towards surroundings.

3) I believe that there must be a movement toward understanding interactive propositions about the environment if there are ever to be fundamental changes in the treatment and use of our human and natural environments. This must surely start with the engagement of very young children in understanding how their surroundings affect them and how their actions affect immediate environments. If children come to understand that environments, including their classrooms, are not given by others, but can be affected by themselves, they can develop those environmental propositions that allow for more sympathetic interactions with surroundings. Instructional approaches based on phenomenological (Bachelard, 1964) and experiential (Kaelin, 1970) considerations hold much promise in developing a feeling, sympathetic view toward environment.

4) The meaning of environment and environmental design must be examined so that we do not intentionally or unintentionally advocate or buy into views that may be contradictory to our intentions. The beliefs underlying environment must be uncovered, and one way to do that is to expand our understanding of the ideological basis of environmental propositions. For example, if art educators advocate the "good design" in redeveloping an urban neighborhood, they may unintentionally support commercial development interests at the cost of an existing, functioning neighborhood with its particular history and social system. An unexamined design is not necessarily a good design.

Today, more than ever, there is a need for environmental education based on socially aware and interactive relationships between individuals and their surroundings. An examination of the relationship between environmental behavior and environmental propositions provides a methodology for better understanding the ideas underlying environmental behavior. There is also a need to encourage the realization of environmental propositions that reflect an interactive relationship between humans and environments which is reciprocally advantageous to both. Again, I believe that these new relationships to knowing and understanding environments can best be encouraged among very young children in school situations where they can develop environmental responsibilities.

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AMERICAN INDIAN PERSPECTIVES ON ENVIRONMENT AND ART

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The concept of environment is socially constructed within each culture based in its particular narratives, myths, and legends. Interactions between the social groups which constitute a culture further affect perceptions of environment within a culture.

In this paper an examination of what environment means from specific American Indian groups' (which are located in a particular place and time) points of view is presented. Curriculum theorist Christie Sleeter (1990) discussed the possibilities of student empowerment through the curricular inclusion of the voices and perspectives of ethnic and social cultures that have been historically ignored in American schooling. Employing this concept as a rationale, ethnographic and historic research dealing with the concept of environment as it is understood and affects contemporary Wisconsin Indian artists and their art forms is discussed and applications to curriculum development in art education suggested.

Sociocultural anthropologist, James Clifford (1988), presented a Postmodernist perspective from which to view ethnic and cultural diversity. He recognized the internal and external organic complexities of these socially constructed phenomena. According to Clifford:

Culture is not a static concept, but a transitional process. Cultures remake themselves through specific alliances, negotiations, and struggles. Cultural institutions are relational and political, coming and going in response to governmental policies and the surrounding ideological climate. Societies in culture are always either dying or surviving, assimilating or resisting. (Clifford in Wasson, Stuhr, Petrovich-Mwaniki, 1990, p. 235)

Clifford's perspective on cultural change and maintenance is applied in presenting the analysis of the environment as it relates to Wisconsin Indian art.

Problem

Many art educators, myself included, advocate using sociocultural community resources and their aesthetic values as the basis for curriculum development in schooling (Blandy, Congdon, 1988; McFee, Degge, 1980; Neperud, 1978; Wasson, Stuhr, Petrovich-Mwaniki, 1990). However, sociocultural boundaries are often blurred, and interactions between and within social and cultural groups are constantly changing. This affects concepts of art/environment that we often consider static and relevant to specific groups. Complexity should be dealt with as a sociocultural reality, and the art forms embodied in this conception taught in a way that reflects this.

The environmental aesthetic concepts of the Wisconsin Indian artists were not the primary research concerns of the studies from which the data described below were collected. The data collected on Indians (Stuhr, 1987) was for purposes of cultural description and categorization of artists and products. However, the evidence for the importance of environment (in an aesthetic sense) to the people interviewed and studied was overwhelming. My purpose in writing this article is to make the complicated connections, influences, and interrelationships among the various environmental concepts, held and embodied in the work of Wisconsin Indians artists, understandable to the dominant culture and relevant for use in art education.

Methods

For the past several years I have been documenting, in an anthropological manner, the contemporary Wisconsin Indian artists and the art/aesthetic forms they produce in relation to cultural change within the Indian and dominant culture's communities (Freedman, Stuhr, Weinberg, 1989; Neperud, & Stuhr, 1987; 1990; Stuhr, 1987, 1988, 1990). Ethnographic strategies such as interviewing (both formal and informal), participant observation, photographic documentation, and historical and contemporary review of pertinent documents were methods employed in data collection.

Wisconsin Indian Artists and Environment

There are various forms of Indian art produced in Wisconsin which I classified under the headings of Traditional, Derivative, and Modern (Stuhr, 1987). Many of these forms have interconnections with that of the dominant culture and that of other ethnic and/or socioeconomic groups. Each of the three types or categories of Indian art will be discussed in light of environmental connections, using a specific example from each category.

Traditional

Jessica Suhr (1983) and Murray Wax (1971), a sociologist and an anthropologist respectively, have attributed unity with nature as constituting a traditional spiritual value for Indian people. To understand the art forms contained in the traditional category of Indian art, one must first understand the value and place of environment within the traditional Indian's belief system. The northern Wisconsin Woodland Indian tribes' traditional values, as they relate to environment, can best be explained in the following quote by a Chippewa anthropologist:

There are four orders in creation. First is the physical world; second, the plant world; third, the animal; last, the human world. All four parts are so intertwined that they make up life and one whole existence. With less than the four orders, life and being are incomplete, rather each derives its meaning from and fulfills its function and purpose within the context of the whole creation.

From last to first, each order must abide by the laws that govern the universe and the world. Man is constrained by this law to live by and learn from the animals and the plants which draw their sustenance and existence from the earth and the sun. All of them and existence of each order is predetermined by great physical laws for harmony. It is only by the relationships of the four orders that the world has sense and meaning;.... For the well being of all there must be harmony in the world to be obtained by the observance of this law.

While there is a natural predilection and instinct for

conformity to the great law of balance in the world of plants and animals, mankind is not so endowed by nature. But man possesses understanding by which he can know and abide by the law and so establish his place in the world order. Man must seek guidance outside himself. Before he can abide by the law, mankind must understand the framework of the ordinances. In this way man will honor the order as was intended by *Kitche Manitou* [The Great Mystery/The Creator]. (Johnston, 1976, pp. 21-22)

This view of life, and its relationship to the environment, is in direct opposition to that of the dominant American culture's view based in Judeo-Christian philosophy; man has dominion over all the earth and all living things on it (Deloria, 1973).

Traditional art forms are based in Indian narratives (myths and legends). These forms are based on the original types of artwork and materials employed by Northwoods Indians before the arrival of the Europeans. The traditional art forms are generally utilitarian, sometimes possessing great spiritual powers, and often fashioned in the "old way." The tools used to construct these aesthetic forms have changed, although the processes for making these forms have not (Stuhr, 1987).

These art forms are usually made by and for individuals living on the Indian reservations or in the traditional, ethnic Native American communities. The goal of most of the traditional artists in producing their art forms is to insure the continuance of their indigenous values and the Indian community (Stuhr, 1987).

An excellent example of this type of art is the traditional ceremonial pipe. It initially appears in Northwoods spiritual narratives as a gift from Epingishmook, a spirit. His half-mortal son Nanabush believed that his father had killed his mother, thus depriving him of a mother's love. For this reason, Nanabush sought out his father and physically fought with him. The battle ended in a draw and Epingishmook gave Nanabush a pipe to share with his mother's human people.

My son, you have great powers. You are my equal, not more, not less. For all your powers you cannot vanquish me, nor I you. Let us make peace. I shall remain in my place.

Return to the Land of the Anishnabeg [the People]. Teach them until they are strong. In this way you and your purpose will be fulfilled and you will know love. As a remembrance of our contest and peace, take this pipe, carry it with you always. It is the emblem of peace and goodwill. Give it to the Anishnabeg. (Johnson, 1976, p. 9)

Epingishmook then explained to Nanabush the ritual and gift of pipe smoking.

Louis Washinawotok carves Menominee common and ceremonial pipes. The stems of Louis' pipes are carved out of sumac wood. He carves the stem of the common pipe straight and plain, but the ceremonial pipe is carved in spiral forms. The pipes have traditionally been carved by his people out of sumac. He has little problem finding the material, since a stand of it grows across the road from his home and in the old Indian cemetery close by. However, finding a straight piece of sumac from which to carve a pipe is most difficult. The best one can do is to find a stick with only a slight curve to it; "It rarely grows straight. It's like life itself." The bowl of the common pipe is also carved out of sumac; the bowl of the ceremonial pipe is of catlinite stone, which Louis obtains by trading his pipe stems for the stone bowls with a man from Escanaba, Michigan. Louis explained that carving a pipe is a sacred obligation, especially when making one for "a special person." Once he starts carving a pipe, he never sets it on the ground; "It is sacred like the drum." Louis does not use the pipe or smoke tobacco, but understands its significance and respects those who do use it.

The Pipe Ceremony is one of the most important of all Indian ceremonies. It is an absolutely essential ritual in traditional life. The Pipe Ceremony is replete with meaning and represents all relationships: "man to Manitou, man to cosmos, man to plant world, man to animal world, man to man, man to his state, and quality of life and being and existence" (Johnson, 1976, p. 134). The Pipe is considered prior in substance, nature, mood, and tone to all other ceremonies. It is considered antecedent to time and to possess a universality of meaning that gives all other ceremonies and rituals their place in life (Johnston, 1976).

In the Pipe of Peace smoking ceremony were represented the four orders of life and being: earth, plant,

animal, and man the celebrant. The earth, whose elemental substance was rock, make up the pipe. The plant, tobacco was the sacrificial victim. The animal was symbolized by feathers and tegument [fur, shell, claws] appended to the pipe and the stem (Johnston, 1976, p. 135).

The smoking of the pipe is considered representative of men's and women's relationship to the environment and all that exists in it, a petition to the Creator, and a thanksgiving.

A pipe ceremony can be conducted alone, but generally is not. A spiritual leader, elder, or social leader often waits until all of the participants have assembled in a circle. At his nod, the outer circle which is made up of the men, women, and children becomes silent, signalling the Keeper of the Pipe to come forth and present the pipe to the celebrant. The celebrant lights the pipe and offers the first whiff of smoke to the sun, or actually *Kitche Manitou*, through the sun; "all being and all life has its origin in and ultimately comes from *Kitche Manitou*; and, that the sun is the physical agency through which the Master of Life confers his goodness and generosity" (Johnston, 1976, p. 135). The second whiff of smoke is offered to the earth as homage, but also to womanhood; "The earth was woman; woman, earth. Both gave birth and life, both sustained being, growth, existence; both enhanced life; finally, both were primal" (Johnson, 1976, p. 136). Next, a breath of smoke is offered to the east, the dawn and rebirth of all life. Thanksgiving for the gift of life is implied in this offering. Then a breath of incense is offered to the west, the setting of sun, the loss of light and all life as is the natural order of things. A puff of smoke is now offered to the north, the place of winter and the perilous way. Life was, and still is, an ordeal. For leaders, the whiff of smoke to the north serves as a reminder that decisions made in their councils are to be based on the principle "that the well-being of people takes precedence over form, custom, and even tradition" (Johnson, 1976, p. 139). The final breath of smoke is offered to the south, an act that expresses thanksgiving for all temporal gifts and goodness received (Johnston, 1976). The south represents birth, growth, and fulfillment with its colors of yellow and green. The pipe is passed to all participants in the circle who offer it to the sky, earth, and four points of the world. According to Johnson (1976), at times and in certain ceremonies, the pipe is "danced." "The dance motion of the pipe represented the motion of the world and the pace of time" (p. 141).

The relationship between traditional art forms and environment is historic, absolute, and strong. All of the traditional aesthetic/art forms provide actual visual, functional, and conceptual metaphors and symbols for the perceived philosophical and harmonious relationship between the Indians and their environment. Not all members of the Indian communities are aware of this relationship between the traditional art forms and philosophy of Indian life. All of the artists producing these forms, however, were intimately aware of the metaphors and symbols embodied in their products and their products' functions. For the most part, these artists are the elder male members of the Indian communities (Stuhr, 1987).

Derivative

Derivative artists also produce art forms based on the original types of art work made by the Woodland Indians before the arrival of the Europeans. Their art forms are modified from the traditional, in that they employ, either partially or totally, materials in the production of their forms that were acculturated after they were introduced to them by the Europeans or dominant culture Americans. These forms still generally embody the values of the traditional ethnic Wisconsin Indian communities. They are often produced by and for individuals living on reservations or in Native American communities. The use and goals of the derivative artists in producing their art work are basically the same as those of the traditionalist.

Beadwork is an example of a derivative art form. Prehistorically (before written history), beadwork would have been done laboriously with seashell or copper beads, porcupine quills, or moose hair embroidery. After trade with the Europeans commenced, the trade beads which they brought along to exchange with the Indians for their furs, took the place of these labor intensive materials.

As with the pipe, beads have an origin in the narratives and legends of the Indian people. One such legend is about how the loon got its necklace.

Gail Ellis, whose Indian name is Yako/sta Lokwini, meaning "beads around the neck or beads hanging down," has been doing beading for about twenty years (Stuhr, 1987). She is aware of the legend of the loon and its necklace and often chooses colors and designs to represent certain aspects of nature, for example floral patterns, sky, and sun. She feels spiritually connected with beading and the teaching of beading to others. Gail usually

beads belts, earrings, and necklaces, but sometimes produces pieces for use in the Oneida Long House Ceremonies. These ceremonies are usually based on seasonal changes and products, such as Strawberry Festival, or Corn Celebration.

All derivative art forms have some symbolic connection to the narratives and philosophical views of life (which environment is a part) of the Indian peoples, even if the connection is minor. Younger Indian people (ages 12-24) recognize and appreciate derivative art forms more easily than the older members of the ethnic community (Neperud, Stuhr, 1990). Derivative art forms lack the tremendous metaphoric impact and association with nature and environment that the traditional forms possess, however most members of the Indian communities, including the young people, are aware of the narrative symbolic origin of derivative art forms like beading.

Modern

The Modern artists produce art forms and use materials in a very idiosyncratic fashion based on or influenced primarily by the twentieth century Euro-American culture. These forms vary widely, but generally have lost the emphasis on utilitarian purpose that the traditional and derivative forms possessed, though they retain aesthetic values. The Modern artists may reflect their cultural background in their work. However, the materials they use are often novel and are not used in accordance with the more traditional forms, which are often more easily understood by other Native Americans. The modern artists' concern for nature, if expressed, is often very personal.

Truman Lowe is an example of a modern Indian artist. He is a sculpture professor at the University of Wisconsin-Madison. Truman's art work is influenced by the past cultural art forms and artifacts of the Winnebago tribe. He says that he has spent time studying in museums and historical centers to gain deeper insights into the tribe's past, and to gain inspiration for his work. His sculptural and two dimensional forms are based on recycled images and materials from past tribal artifacts, and not the narratives and legends that were primarily responsible for the production of traditional and derivative art production.

An example of this is his sculptural construction of an abstracted lodge-like form. Historically, the lodge was a dome shaped dwelling made

out of curved wooden poles covered with bark often constructed by the Winnebago people. Truman's lodge-like sculpture was constructed out of woven fir strips. Truman explained this particular sculptural form as having been influenced by the crafts done by his extended family. In his form he feels there is evidence of the basket weaving and ribbon applique which he was familiar with as a child.

Truman often uses the feather as a symbol of great spiritual, tribal, and personal significance. His colors are usually natural or earth toned. This coloration he feels is in keeping with the way he feels that the earth is meant to be seen. He says anyone can relate to his colors, if they can relate to the land. Understanding the narratives of the Winnebago people is not necessary to fully appreciate his work.

Most modern artists interviewed revealed their only, if any, connections with the culture and environment were in reference to recycled images or natural materials. These images and materials are not always perceived by the artists to be connected with traditional narratives or philosophy of life. Instead, these images and materials are used in a very idiosyncratic fashion, which rarely, is understood by the more traditional Indian communities' members. However, these forms might be appreciated by some of these community members at a certain level, because the images depicted, or the materials employed, act as referents to objects, which are inexplicably connected for these individuals through myth or philosophy to "Indianness." The modern artists are not trying to maintain the cultural traditions of their past with regard to the environment or in establishing tribal unity. They are involved with expressing themselves within the parameters of Western Euro-American traditions and philosophy. These artists have acculturated their own tribal/ancestral images and materials for use within the dominant American art world in accordance with its established canons.

Conclusions

Artists who produce traditional art forms are usually aware of the narratives and traditional Indian life philosophy with its emphasis on living in harmony with the environment. They know that their forms are metaphors for Indian narratives and philosophy. Derivative artists, likewise, are almost always aware of the symbolic connections to the traditional narratives that their production represents. The modern artists may, or may not, have a reference to environment in their work. When a reference is

present, it is usually in the form of a recycled image or in the selection of natural materials.

Most Indian people, even those who live in Indian communities, are unaware of the fact that the traditional art forms are symbolic metaphors for an environmentally relevant way of life. The traditional artists, however, are often keenly aware of this fact. Derivative art forms are more akin to popular art in the dominant culture, and are better understood and appreciated than the traditional forms by the Indian people, especially on the reservations. The symbolic relationship between the Indian narratives concerning environment and the art objects is generally common knowledge to both the artist and the Indian appreciator of the art forms. The modern artists are very idiosyncratic, and if a reference is made to the environment in their art forms it is usually not understood in the context of Indian philosophy of man's relationship to nature by the people in the Indian communities. Only in relationship to the dominant western Euro-American academic canons of art are their recycled images and materials fully appreciated. These artists have actually been assimilated into the Western world of art and use their ancestral or tribal influences as materials to be acculturated and employed in art production within that system.

Suggestions for Art Education Curriculum Design

When incorporating the connection between environment and Indian art into the curriculum, it is necessary to include the multiple perspectives that exist. An analysis of the value systems that underpin the relationships of the environment embodied in various types of Indian art should be conducted cooperatively with teacher and students. The differences and complexity of these perspectives ought to be discussed in relation to cultural change and maintenance.

This type of curricular instruction should open up difficult questions that may or may not have an answer or answers available for them. Examples of this type of questions are: When is Indian art no longer Indian art? Are some cultures' traditional value systems more in tune and respectful of the environment than others because of their world/political/religious views? If Indians can acculturate the dominant culture's canons of art, can the dominant culture acculturate their traditional views on environment and living in harmony with nature, and make applications to their art and design education/products? Students may come to appreciate and understand,

through this type of critical questioning, that the concept of and its relationship to Indian art involves an ongoing and complex social process involving maintenance of cultural traditions and allowance for cultural change.

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**The Inherited Legacy: Art Education
in a Postmodern Age (1986)¹**

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The whole secret lies in arbitrariness. People usually think it easy to be arbitrary, but it requires much study to succeed in being arbitrary so as not to lose oneself in it, but so as to derive satisfaction from it. One does not enjoy the immediate but something quite different which he arbitrarily imports into it. You go to see the middle of the play, you read the part of a book. By this means you insure yourself a very different kind of enjoyment from that which the author has been so kind as to plan for you (Kierkegaard, 1944, p. 295).

Preface: Education in a Postmodern Age

A great deal of schooling is mundane. It is mundane not because of daily classroom routine, for as Phillip Jackson (1968) describes school it is a place where something always happens. Rather, it is because what happens is not always relevant learning; behavioral modification of ten takes precedence over intellectual stimulation. The number of decisions a teacher must make concerning discipline each day, and the speed with which these decisions must be made, is exhausting. Thus, by and large, learning consists of repetition and rational thought, because many educators believe this is the best way to insure the transference of material, given the burden of maintaining classroom control. In fact, as has been well-documented, the primary task of schooling has always been to socialize students into the accepted dominant values of the established social order (Katz, 1968, 1971; Spring, 1986; Bowles and Gintis; 1976). Discipline with its multiplicity of meanings (i.e. a well defined body of knowledge, abeyance to an external authority, ability to delay gratification, and self-control of the body) has always influenced discourse on education (Foucault, 1975/1977), despite the recognition among educators that a trauma is required before a change of

consciousness can occur.² However, it appears that the antithesis of a rational approach to the world is required, as my introductory quote from Kierkegaard suggests, if creativity and change are to occur and a deeper understanding of the curriculum is to take place. The serendipitous nature of the play of forces between chaos and order seems to be implied.³ A great deal of confusion and questioning must take place before an existential crisis takes place and a new equilibrium is sought. Understanding how mistakes can create innovation is required. In this essay, I argue that the aesthetic dimension needs to be given its due if a more creative curriculum is to unfold.

The achievement of the Enlightenment permeates the modern mind. It affects our curriculum and educational thought like some nebulous transparent cloud and has become part of our vision; a persistent cataract, which has paradoxically become accepted as providing us with a clearer vision. Just how unclear that vision is has been the thrust of critical and feminist thought in our postmodernist period. Public education cannot avoid this debate, because its practice has been shaped by the belief in the rational mind. It was through reason, Hegel argued, that man's teleology could be revealed, the workings of the Absolute Spirit unveiled. When, for Hegel, the Prussian State became the apotheosis of that telos, a bourgeois evolutionary progressivism based on technological rationality replaced the spiritualist vision through the new guiding light of pragmatism. Material progress became the new measure. As the feminist critique has shown (Merchant, 1980) Nature became despiritualized. By the end of the nineteenth century a hardened materialism, both in its positivistic and "vulgar" Marxist forms virtually penetrated all institutions including education.

Technological knowledge coupled to a male discourse became the business of education. The body, demeaned by emphasis on its sensuality and sexuality, became perverse. The mind, elevated and separated from the body began to be treated as a pure organ of cognition. Streaming in schools appeared to be the logical course of events. The salient dichotomy repeated itself along discipline and gender lines. Subjects of the body, like home economics, industrial arts, and physical education, were perceived as less important. They usually housed a homogeneous student-body -- girls took cooking, boys took shop. As for the arts, there was a tone of effeminacy and emascularity about them. Like the worker, the body had to toil, although in a much more refined and skillful way. Children with so-called talent found their expression only outside of school hours.

The bifurcation between body and mind within the arts is an eighteenth century phenomenon. The clearest expression of the fine arts separating from the mechanical arts occurred during the absolutism of Louis XIV (Gimpel, 1969). The artist, replacing the artisan, emerged under the slogan of *l'art pour l'art*. Aesthetics became an exclusive term of the philosophy of art. Sensuous knowledge (what a layman might call feeling and what an educator calls the affective domain) was whisked away from the body and relegated to the art object for display in a museum cum gallery. There, ripped from the soil of its birth, art could be studied, categorized and examined at a distance. Today, as educational critics, we yearn to restore the fusion between feeling (body), mind (cognition) and soul (spiritualism), which were separated during the growth of modernism and the rise of the bourgeois mentality.

The Rule of Sight and Objectivity

The Western intellectual tradition in its quest to overthrow the kerygmatic tradition of Church theology claimed a new vision. The search for a new naturalism led eventually to the institutionalization of bourgeois science in the nineteenth century. The discovery of God's laws that animated the universe were claimed to be nomothetic and invariant. This plea for a "hidden God," as Lucien Goldmann (1976) described it, was eventually replaced by Nietzsche's dead God. Scientism replaced science as the dominating ideology in the twentieth century. The dialectic of the Enlightenment gradually became framed by sight. The visual modality, through optics and the development of perspective by Dürer, Viator, da Vinci, and a whole host of lesser artist-engineers, helped shape that illusion of objectivity. It normalized the sense of sight for modern man. Knowledge became embedded in the text. Hearing and touching receded in importance. Eventually, reading was to be done in silence. Libraries became very still places. Today, in an electronic age the constructed illusion remains preserved through photography, television, cinema, and holography (Lowe, 1982). Significantly, with the "disappearance" of the body, the mind was extended primarily through optics. At the micro level the progression has moved from the microscope to the electron microscope to the microchip revolution with greater and greater precision and control at this invisible (to the human eye) level through optical instrumentation. At the macro level the progression has been from the telescope to the radio telescope which now listens to the universe through binary (and hence dichotomized) mathemat-

ical language. For those who wish to reinstate the body, an entirely different perspective is maintained. Here the realms of extrasensory perception and cosmic consciousness hold the promise of a newly emerging consciousness (White, 1985; Wilber, 1981). The "musicalization" of the universe is listened to rather than the mathematization of the universe.

For the nonreflective mind, the mind of Husserl's "natural attitude," the sensuous tangibility of things, be they rendered in oil paint, by acrylic air brush, by the exposure of silver nitrate crystals to light, or perhaps through the technical manipulation of laser light, appear to be real and desirable through sight alone. Certainty, and above all the sense of possession squelches the desire to know some "thing," to own something. The possession of the thing identifies the ego as to what it is. Its sign-value is appropriated and assimilated. All is simulacrum, as Baudrillard (1983) has elaborated. The illusion that you can "be" or own an original. The simulacrum is but a "copy." There is no original, only a commodity in a potential infinite series. For the reflective mind, once this illusion of objectivity is shattered, the ground upon which one ought to stand becomes soft, yet harder, if not impossible to find. Attached to the possession of any "text" has been the recognition that what is signified shapes our reality. The commodity becoming an exchange of sign-values in the market place of late capitalism (Jameson, 1984). Perception, as humane experience, becomes an intermediary link between the content of thought and the structure of society shaped by the hierarchy of senses, the communications media, and the epistemic order (Lowe, 1982). Since the mid 70s, educators, who have awakened to this changing ontology, have had to turn towards contemporary continental philosophers for insights to challenge this creative image, which the bourgeoisie had projected from themselves.

Marx's early Hegelianism captured this insight. "By thus acting on the external world and changing it, [man] at the same time changes his own nature" (Capital, Vol.I, p. 177). In one stroke Hegel's Geist was replaced by the collective will of a rising class generating a counter-hegemonic myth of being and reality. Once that vision was materialized, and power was consolidated, the embourgeoisification of all institutions began. The problem was and is, that vision of emancipation excluded women and Hegel's Geist was a patriarchal God. HE was replaced by MAN, whose vision of the body was instrumental, a body touched by a hand of death.

The Reduction of the Aesthetic Impulse in Bourgeois Society

The reclamation (Abbs, 1979) of various dimensions of aesthetic humaneness would appear as a necessary corrective to the technological rationality that grips our western educational tradition. Unfortunately, aesthetics, as it has been shaped by bourgeois ideology, has become a powerless dimension of humane experience. Hearn (1978), for example, has outlined how play, the embodiment of the humane creative spirit, was curbed during the transition of early capitalism. Since then, aesthetics has been reified as the external appearance of things as outlined above. Sartre's (1954) reflections of the "look" in everyday life is suggestive of this normalization of consciousness. Dichotomies abound: male versus female, affective versus cognitive, mind versus body, right brain versus left brain. We judge character by what it is not. The semiological messages of our bodies and clothes define the boundaries of our being. If we push such overdeterminism to its strongest case, class consciousness is reduced to the structures of class, age, gender, ethnicity, and color as in the writings of Althusser (1977) and Poulantzas (1975). The look transforms what is seen into an object. Objects, the simulacra, rather than social relationships, become the overriding apriori categories of the subject. The woman, seen as an object of desire by man, or man seen as an object of desire by woman, requires that the sensuousness of the body be an exemplar of the manufactured and therefore artificial vision of taste-makers. Such polarizations promote the anxiety of the age, and advertising feeds on the desire to ease that anxiety, to make the person conform to the sanctioned role. Such instrumental logic in aesthetics leads to the social relationships of competition and opposition between men and women and between themselves. Dominance and power are manifested through torture, violence, and a management mentality, for the person has become another manipulative thing.

The antecedents for this pathological sense of the sexual body evolved out of bourgeois rationality and Enlightenment thinking. Prior to its emergence, however, the differentiations among peasant, Church, and court society became most visible with the development of refined taste. Sensuousness of material, the lure of jewels, and the conscious shaping of the body with clothes became more and more prominent as the monarchy pulled away from church dominance during the 16th and 17th century. Class differentiations in clothing, hair, and dance began to be established. By the fifteenth century, courtly love and courtly dancing had become a tradition during tournaments and festivals. Norbert Elias' *The Civilizing Process*

(1939/1978) documents how table manners and correct etiquette became internalized as self-checks by the nobility and the rising middle class. The body became more and more a thing to be dressed and examined for its grace as it exhibited its social class. Childhood, an emerging social reality during this time, began to differentiate the sexes through the institutionalization of a new code of dress (Aries, 1962).

The bourgeois rise to power during the 18th and 19th centuries reworked the category of taste. The Protestant ethic introduced a new found asceticism, first made visible with the Burger Calvinist class in Holland where the men began to wear Burgundy black, and the women took on household duties (Alpers, 1983). The industrial mentality eventually spread to the wearing of the habit noir, the forerunner of today's business suit. Taste as fashion finds its full support in Hume's essay "On the Standard of Taste" (1739/1969). Taste in the tradition of the Enlightenment was based on the experiences shaped by the managers of a rising culture industry. Judgment of worth (of a product, of an artwork, or of a person) was based upon the measure of its predetermined ideal being. The judgment of a good worker was therefore based on the execution of a predetermined task. Likewise, the ability to follow an intricate dance step, to dress in "correct" fashionable clothes, to possess pedigreed stock indicated that there was a correct way of being and acting. As in Moliere's play, *La Bohème*, the gentilhomme had to know all the noble graces. Such a Pygmalion theme has been repeated many times since. An objective standard could and should be achieved.

In a courtly society, standards of taste were first displayed in "mummery," disguise or masquerade parties in the 14th and 15th centuries. Later parlour games and courtly festivals continued to preserve correct behavior. With the rise of the haute bourgeoisie in the 18th century, salons once again reassured correct judgment. Eventually dolls and doll houses, which could be easily transported from house to house, normalized the fashion of dress and interior design. With the growth of capital cities like London, Paris, Oslo, Vienna, and Berlin the bourgeoisie popularized the promenade as the display of taste in public. The Sunday stroll displayed the finery of the bourgeois life. Today current gala openings, fashion shows, and the perpetuation of artificial taste through advertising machinery provides the constructed illusion of appearance. Art education by and large promotes the consumption of the commodification of art. Aesthetics in this context is still trapped by Enlightenment rationality.

The critique of the Enlightenment by Frankfurt theorists is by now well-known (Horkheimer and Adorno, 1944/1969). Compté's dream to know the world objectively has led to the emancipation of "man" from Nature, but at the expense of reducing "her" to a collection of mere facts. Pragmatically, science worked, but it did so at the expense of any moral guiding light. If technical rationality was to be applied to humane beings, they like Nature herself, were not to be inviolate but subject to the will of a power. If God was indeed dead, on what grounds could man claim divinity? In our nuclear age the paring away of the metaphysical question has led to the irony of the poststructuralist position: there is no ground, only constructed dialogue and power play. Yet, it is precisely in our negotiations with nature that the aesthetic finds its greatest expression for our humaneness. There is the need to restore our pagan past, which has been suppressed by patriarchal religions (Whitmont, 1982). The shaping of material through our labour power makes our ideas visible. It is our negotiations, deliberations between our biological being and our cultural being, which determine the course of our negotiated history. Thus, it is in the included middle, that area that lies between opposites, where one finds paradox, ambiguity, and surprise. It is that area of lived-experience, of temporal-spatial choreography of our bodies through the established boundaries of our culture that gives us life. To the extent that we are allowed to shape these boundaries, the will becomes exercised. To the extent that our will is informed by practical life (*phronesis*), our humaneness becomes vindicated. It will be argued later that such boundaries are informed by a male/female binary opposition, which plays itself out in each of the six layers of aesthetic experience.

The Question of Nature and a Male God

Kant had adumbrated the dilemma of volition in the 18th century. His Critique of Judgment stands as a reconciliation between temporal and atemporal man, the man of finitude and the man of infinite potential. Struggling against the reduction of the judgment of taste to that of sensuousness, as in the empiricist haute bourgeois tradition, where free play of the imagination ended in hedonism, Kant attempted to reconcile aesthetic experience as the free play of mind between understanding and the imagination. This was the realm of freedom and the indeterminacy of the will. If the sublimity of nature could be experienced, then this was indeed proof that God did exist inside the system, inside nature as life. The beauty of nature was free beauty, and it was the moral man who could appreciate this beauty because it was a sign of God's moral order. Man could only

complement God's work of Nature through art. But, this was not just any art. It was to be the art of genius, because only the original could give the new rule to art. The artist had to be a moral man for what was created was to be God-like. Only moral men could see the beauty of nature, whose purpose was paradoxically unknown, but nature had to be perceived as if its telos was knowable. Kant was still well within the Enlightenment tradition.

God, in Kant's system was certainly a male God, but Kant's organismic theory claimed a harmony with nature. Such a system opens the door to an ecological frame of mind, which while not being pagan in its spirituality, might still be used to justify a feminist position for an aesthetic which re-enchants nature and the role hu(woman)ity must play with her (jagodzinski, 1987). Kant's concept of nature had a prescriptive force for humane and political consciousness. Pre-Darwinian in his thought, and hence prior to the time that teleology became reduced to a biological positivism, Kant's metaphysics grappled with the concept and movement of life by claiming a categorical imperative. God became an asymptote, towards which all men strove, but failed to achieve. In this sense, such a vision was patriarchal in its intent.

The journey from Kant's insight, to Hegel's claim of a genius of culture -- the unfolding of Geist's work through the self-reflected aspirations of men -- to Marx's critique of Hegel's teleology as the materialization and succession of self-generated collective myths through the concrete social and political control of institutions by alienated and oppressed groups, provides one of the most powerful starting points for recovering a directionality in our postmodern era provided that this one-sided male discourse is gender balanced. If Kant and Husserl's quest for a transcendental subject is situated in the light of a critical anthropology, then it may be possible to show that the aesthetic dimension might be the place from where a renewed mythology may be conceived and from where a recovery of the body might begin. If the collective dream is generated by peoples in alienated positions, then it is precisely at the level of feeling that such a vision must begin, both for the oppressor and the oppressed. And this vision requires a new theophany (Whitmont, 1982), the need to reawaken, reinstate and re-enchant the body and life through our aesthetic link to nature.

Is it possible to demonstrate a universal aesthetic which binds both men and women to nature (biology), but at the same time makes us divine (culture bound) because it provides the creative desire to generate a new

mythological vision of how we might live? Currently, as Ortner's (1974) well known essay indicates: Nature is equated with women, whereas culture is equated with men. Virtually in all cultures, this seems to be the case (French, 1985). The private realm is equated with nurture, childbirth, nourishment, and care, whereas the public realm is where "culture" is displayed, where state decisions are made.

Can the private/public realms be transcended? Elsie Boulding (1978) has outlined ecumenical shifts in vision which have been generated to create renewed hope. Without the generation of such desires, the solutions to understanding social reality have led to structuralist and poststructuralist currents of thought which now grip our academies. Meaning becomes neither a private experience nor a divinely ordained occurrence, but a product of certain shared systems of signification, codes uninformed by an ethic. Not only is the individual decentered and texts deconstructed, but also first principles are found to be empty and bottomless. The anti-hero emerges as faceless (Eagleton: 1983, p. 107). The aesthetic dimension has the advantage of restoring the gendered individual to a renewed center. Although a methodological idealism will be claimed for an aesthetic consciousness, that is, a universal dimension inherent in the mind/body, such an aesthetic does not follow Kierkegaard's description of it in his "Diary of a Seducer" (1948:20f.). Here, we find the aesthetic to be the lowest stage of life, lived only for the moment in some hedonistic fashion. Such a description is still framed by the discourse of a male God and the elevation of an ascetic life, a de-sexualization of the body. On the contrary, aesthetic experience, it will be argued, is the fundamental grounding for our perceptions. Although there is no such thing as pure perception, nor pure "being," there is, I will argue, the shaping of existence through six aesthetic forms within the brackets of a historicized consciousness.

The Death of Nature

Aesthetic experience of nature as developed by Kant, hinted at wo(man)'s deep anthropological attachment to the web of life, which today, one strand of feminism is attempting to recover. The death of nature as Carol Merchant (1980) so brilliantly demonstrated, went hand in hand with the development of the male world view based on laws of mechanization. Modern medicine was shaped by a male discourse, which promoted instrumentation and chemical solutions to illness. Midwifery and herbal preventative medicine, the woman's discourse, was replaced by medical

obscurantist language (Illich, 1976). It is precisely the death of nature and our amnesia with our link to the biocenose that has framed Western thought since the 16th century. Above all, the concept of artificiality has assured the West's break with nature (Dawkins, 1976).

At the turn of the 20th century, artificiality and human control with their resultant benefits and problems could be found in all aspects of life: artificial lighting, manmade materials, artificial elements (snow for ski slopes), the development of self-contained environment buildings (skyscrapers, which sealed off nature, and indoor ice skating rinks and astrodomes, which imitated natural environments, but were comfortable and maintainable year round), packaging that prevented touch, preservatives that increased shelf life of food, hybrid food crops, synthetic drugs (i.e. Valium), the construction of powerful artificial environments that allow us to live and travel underwater and in space, artificial insemination, and birth control. Even our wars became depersonalized with the advent of chemical and air warfare and "smart" bombs. Artificial presence was achieved through the inventions such as the telephone, radio, and television. Artificial intelligence that is to say computers, is given responsibilities from remembering valuable information and running industrial machinery to turning on the coffee machine so one can wake up to a fresh brewed pot of coffee in the morning. All these developments have pulled us away from our biological roots; our bodies have been split in two.

These achievements have elevated the power of the mind at the expense of the social body but it is precisely the body, so ably described by Merleau-Ponty (1962), which needs to be put back in its rightful place. Furthermore, the above notion of technological progress is decidedly a male concept. When the sun gods replaced the earth and moon gods (Stone, 1978) the vertical striving by the male pointed upwards to the mountains and to heaven and today to the stars for eventual exploitation. The religion of the goddess always pointed down to earth, to the cave, to birth. The horizon(tal) was her domain. Today, however, the cross, a symbol of balance between vertical and the horizontal, between the feminine and the masculine, has been replaced by the erect phallus -- the nuclear missile and the space shuttle strut their stuff.

The Deconstructivist Challenge to the Current Parabolic Illusion

There is a story of a young man who wished to know the truth of things. So great was his thirst for such knowledge that he travelled to seek the council of many wise prophets. After many years of travel, he was still dissatisfied. All their answers seemed partial and circular. Finally, he was told to go to the Oracle at Euphesus. There he would see and find what he was searching for. Arriving in great haste, he came to the priest who guarded the entrance to the cave which housed the oracle.

"Is this where I will find the TRUTH," asked the young man.

"Enter," said the priest, "and listen to the voice."

The young man entered the cave and waited. Darkness enveloped him, but nothing happened. All became silent.

"I have come to know the truth," the young man shouted, but only his echo was heard. He waited for the oracle to speak, but nothing happened. The young man waited a long time, but only silence and darkness engulfed him. Left with his own thoughts, he finally walked out of the cave and greeted the priest.

"Did you hear the truth," asked the priest.

"I heard only my voice," replied the young man disappointedly.

"Then you've heard the truth," answered the priest.

The young man was astonished. He had come to have someone tell him the truth when all along the truth was within himself! The truth is not found in the "presence" of the voice. Truth is found in the absences echoing in the cave -- in its intertextualities.

This story, purposefully riddled with male bias, satirically illustrates the postmodernist dilemma: the naivety that through speech alone, which makes us "present" to ourselves, the truth of our consciousness may be determined. Even when our conversations are transcribed, examined, and analyzed, the issues surrounding politics and ethics remain wanting. Research grounded in everyday life: ethnomethodology, ethnography, existential phenomenology, symbolic interaction, and "thick" description, as adapted by the educational community certainly became contenders to the established positivistic epistemologies; however, they reconfirmed and fine-tuned the malaise of educational practice: the certainty of truth and authority could no longer be manufactured by men. Knowledge was not a pale reflection on the cave wall, which must then be seen whole and with clarity by a Cartesian frame of mind. The metaphor of Plato's cave was stood on its head. The astrological symbol of male power, the sun, which gave light,

warmth, and clarity of vision found outside the cave, was challenged by the feminine symbol of the cave, a womb, and a place of birth, where the constructed reality had taken on a linguistic turn. The moon, the dark, and the shadows began to regain their allegorical power. Like the oracle, which was originally a feminine voice, the modality of listening and speaking challenged the modality of sight. Dialogical pedagogical theories emerged and held their own.

It was the experience of lived life, of perception, that had been the crowning achievement of the human sciences (*Geisteswissenschaften*). However the grounded theories that have emerged from the original insights of Dilthey, Husserl, Heidegger, the so-called "discourse theories" of everyday life, were embedded in language games. There has been a tendency for structuralist theories to squeeze the life out of such ordinary discourse by applying semiological analysis, reducing lived experience to binary oppositions, which merely recapitulate the dichotomous thinking of bourgeois liberal thought. For example, the new critics as predecessors of this movement, merely continued to update the formalism of previous positivist thought. The deconstructivist impulse by Derrida and his followers reconfirm that language and its interpretation when reduced to structure, can be shown to have a bottomless foundation.⁴ Not only can meaning be deferred *ad infinitum*, but all discourse can be subject to defamiliarization. This turn directs us towards rhetoric, irony, and polemics as the upcoming persuasive and performative discourses in everyday life, which as Sloterdijk (1984) has argued, leads to a cynical world view. Cynicism then becomes the opposite response to objective domination and violence. Power and social status, which shape the time and space of exchange, are genuinely scoffed at. But such a stance against the world, although psychically gratifying, is ineffectual for instituting change. The way of perception and linguistic discourse, however, are impregnated with the potential emancipatory force of the aesthetic dimension. This, for any emancipatory curriculum has been overlooked.

At first the euphoria of the idiographic sciences introduced the concerns of hermeneutical exegesis, particularly with educational issues of justice, and goodness. The curriculum, as lived, led to many insights concerning classroom life, but a new sobriety concerning language kept emerging. The critique of deconstruction⁵ kept reconfirming that the language of communication is representational and riddled with a rhetoric of persuasion. Storytelling and the oral tradition were capable of transmitting an ideology in the most seductive of fashion (Zipes, 1985). Visual

representation is socially constructed as well, and through writing we are doubly cursed with both insight and blindness (de Man, 1971). The Western metaphysical tradition continues to be fraught by a phonocentric bias. Within the structure of language itself rests a dominant view of the world, which we unwittingly reproduce despite our best efforts of self-examination. Despite the conscious will of the author, meanings are disseminated that are not consciously intended. These grounded theories, whose practice was sanctioned as educational research and practice, took as their premise a very safe tradition of hermeneutic theorizing. They were steeped in the tenets of humanism, which claimed the belief in a unified bourgeois ego transparent to itself. Over the past two decades, poststructuralist examinations have shown the folly of such a position (Jameson, 1972). Derrida (1976) has consistently shown the need to question authority -- the centering of Western thought. He has demonstrated that consciousness, rather than being a pure origin of meaning and truth is a text, a weaving of many strands, which are not of the nature of presence or meaning, but shaped from behind by an arch-writing, which exists prior to speech and writing (Ryan, 1982). Psychoanalytic theories, especially those generated by Lacan (1977), become crucial for understanding these antihumanistic impulses. Educational theorizing is only beginning to appropriate these postmodern, poststructuralist debates (Gauthier, 1986). The six dimensions of the aesthetic may enable us to comprehend more fully that level alluded to prior to speech and writing, an arch-writing on the body.

Art in the Postmodern Period

This logocentric world view (Derrida, 1976), which has its roots in Periclean Greece has always used the sense of sight for its metaphorical base (Derrida, 1978, p. 84-92; Jay, 1986). Vision, unlike the immediacy of voice, provides us with an objective illusion. It is the most distancing of the senses. Rendering a visual model of how the world operates allows for a centering, a symbolic logo of how reality is structured. Mechanistic, organic, and currently dissipative structures (Prigogine, 1980) have been the visual metaphors which have given us a heuristic tool for rendering reality manageable. Computer programs thrive on such visual metaphors, the microchip being an exquisite circuitry diagram. However, the writings of postmodern fiction (McHale, 1987) and the shift in postmodern art have begun to reorder the hierarchy of senses.⁶

In the postmodernist period, drama as performance begins to emerge as the new expressive artform. The interdisciplinary nature of performance art can best serve the issues raised by post-structuralist thought (Barry, 1980). Just as literature by way of the novel, the visual arts by way of three dimensional perspective, and music by way of a classicist structure embodied the objective vision of the rising bourgeoisie, displacing the pre-Renaissance forms of poetry, church chants, and mystical visual space, the new art of performance in the 80s has come to embody the voices of alienated minorities to the point of screaming out their personal alienated biographies. German neo-Expressionist painting (Neue Wilden), punk rock, heavy metal in its Christian and Satanic forms, and high performance art are the manifestations of this screaming self which finds meaning only through the extreme act. In philosophy the names of Nietzsche, Heidegger, Foucault, and Derrida (Megill, 1985) echo that same cry. What is one to make of a performance piece where a man and woman are chained to each other for a year without speaking, or a performance artist who suspends himself above the ground by having large fish-hooks skewered through his skin? By 1970 minimalist art had levelled the great-man tradition of art. It seemed that all traces of the humane self, the ego, had vanished from the mainstream of visual arts. Authenticity is now in question. Artists borrow their images from the past rather than the present. In Baudrillard's (1981) view, all is simulacra of signs -- illusions of meaning. The artwork becomes a text to be read semiotically, a quotation rather than an original. The Inuit Eskimo artists, for instance, merely repeat the images of their past to preserve the illusion of their own ethnicity for the marketplace. Some Inuit artists have never used a dogsled in their lives, nor hunted whale or seal with harpoon. Sadly, the images they carve have lost their magic. The goddess Nuliajuk, once the patroness of the hunt, has become a paperweight mermaid. Today, in a world of standardization, in order to be heard, art has become torture, violence, anger, and cynicism. No more masterpieces screamed Artaud!

How is the school curricula able to make sense of this postmodernist trend? How should it respond? Should it turn a blind eye to such pain? Recognizably, these events are staged by artists who are led to the edge in their attempt to make their statements. For the majority of the public, seeing and listening are monological activities. The public illusion of an objective reality is shaped through the information media of television, newspapers, and the radio. Yet there is a deep embedded cynicism (Sloterdijk, 1984). Perhaps there is enough skepticism today to make Orsen Well's staging of *The War of the Worlds* an impossibility? For adults, even the most

realistically contrived movies about the nuclear threat, like *The Day After*, *Testament*, and *Threads* seem to occupy just one more moment in a long list of entertainment possibilities. For our children, a different reality persists. Nuclear war is foremost in their minds. The drama of their lives claims a self-renewing dialogue, but this dialogue for many has become meaningless. Nihilism and suicide stalk our youth. When one thinks of the school curriculum against this background, education becomes like some surrealist landscape, where the perspective on things has become absurd. When "all that is solid melts into air," to quote the title of Berman's book (1982), we are left with a metaphorical universe of labyrinthine complexity; but that labyrinth is an ancient symbol of the Goddess. It offers us a clue.

Schooling and The Discourse on Everyday Life

One need not recapitulate the critique of schooling which has eliminated the body and elevated the mind. A meritocratic system continually updates its scientism to the state of the art possibilities. Examinations by Katz (1968), Spring (1972), Bowles and Gintis (1976), Apple (1979), Giroux (1981) and of course many, many ethnographic studies of classroom life have brought a sobering mood to the educational community. So much so that once the critique is taken to heart, it becomes difficult to overcome the overwhelming despair and pessimism which accompany the change of perception. The speed of decision-making that must take place within the classroom cannot help but reduce the teacher to using an either/or logic. The constructed reality cannot but promote better and better ways to manipulate the student-body. It is no wonder that the computer is becoming more and more popular as a tool to increase the monitoring potential of our students' progress.

Given that our curriculum continues to be framed by the legacy of the Enlightenment, a male dominated vision, it is my claim that the aesthetic dimension, a fundamental humane condition, can become the source of knowledge that might provide an anthropological apriori to transcend the current patriarchal dominated knowledge. In the history of civilization, it is only with Western capitalism that there has been a radical break with the past, with a strenuous attempt to abolish all "naturalistic" modes of thought and behavior and to set for itself the primary task of developing productive forces for the satisfaction of humane wants. Scientism has been thin on spirituality, philosophy, and the aesthetic dimension. These are discourses, con-

versations concerning the practical wisdom of (wo)mankind, that have been lost.

The source of the sacred has also been lost during the age of mechanical reproduction as Benjamin (1969) had so clearly shown. Art, too, continues the illusion of commodity and in our schools is reduced to a set of skills and identifying those who have "true" talent. The game continues in fine art departments at universities that perceive the portfolio as the necessary precondition for entry. The arts have been stripped of their aura. The spatial-temporal dimension for their viewing has been displaced from lived experience to the gallery cum mausoleum. Permanent collections merely gather dust; their truth claims (Gadamer, 1975) lost, buried in underground vaults. Time and space have been so well-choreographed that we fail to experience the journey of our minds and bodies long enough to be held under the spell of artistic insight. The irony is furthered when we realize "that nature, which art once imitated, has become secondary to art; any given piece of coastline, any single craggy peak cannot measure up to the standards set by nature photographers and the Sierra Club Calendars" (Berman, 1984-85, p. 48). The magic of nature has been laid to rest. Can the aesthetic dimension be recovered?

Footnotes

1. A version of this essay was presented at AERA, 1991, Chicago. The essay was written in 1986. No new references have been added. This essay stands as a bench mark for my thoughts at that time.
2. This was William James (1982) insight in his psychological study of religious conversion. Dewey's (1932) latter writings on aesthetics came to a similar conclusion, when he argued that education should be an experience.
3. This is especially true with the writings on the history of science by Feyerabend (1970) and Kuhn (1970), as well as on the history of poetry (Bloom, 1973) and literature (Derrida, 1978).
4. Derrida is not without falling into metaphysical speculation himself when he posits the notion of arch-writing. Arch-writing is that realm which exists prior to the emergence of speech and writing. The notion of "writing" is somewhat delusionary here.
5. Deconstruction now has had a history of twenty-five years, if we take 1960 to be the beginning of Derrida's systematic attempt to put into question the Western metaphysical tradition, with its reliance on a transcendental signifier, that is, a final arbitrator for truth such as God, or the inherent structure of mind -- a Logos.
6. Documenta 8, 1987 in Kassel will present current artistic trends from the past four to five years, which will be representative of this trend. The Sixth Biennale of Sydney (1986) entitled *Origins, Originality + Beyond* was devoted to questioning the issues raised by deconstructivist thought. The more speculative computer programmers and scientists are also questioning the limits to visual thinking (Hofstadter, 1979).

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**TECHNICAL v. LIBERAL CONTENT IN ART:
SCHOOLING AND THE REPRODUCTION OF DIVISIONS
IN GENDER, CLASS, AND RACE**

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Abstract

To the extent we can distinguish between liberal and technical content in art, general education should focus on liberal content. An emphasis on technical content may be appropriate for the vocational education of artists, art historians, art critics, and aestheticians, but it is not appropriate for general education in art. When we choose to teach technical content in public schools, we tacitly help to perpetuate inequalities of class, race, gender, and ethnicity in contemporary society.

General Education in Art

Is there life after death? What is love? Does God exist? What is the purpose of human life? These are the kinds of questions almost everyone asks in life, whether young or old, rich or poor, a professional philosopher, a professional educator, or a professional anything else. They are what we might call "big questions" in life (Amburgy, 1991). Can art help answer such questions? We believe so.

The definition we suggest for general education is based on conventional distinctions, but it is a working definition in the sense that it

serves as a criterion for selecting content in art education. In contrast to other kinds of schooling, the purpose of general education is to develop knowledge that goes beyond preparation for work or immediate personal interests. The purpose of general education in art, like the purpose of general education in any other subject, is to help answer big questions in human life.

General education is usually described in several ways. In contrast to schooling, general education is said to be broad in scope; it entails the acquisition of knowledge in more than one area of study or specialization. The purpose of general education is not vocational training. Rather than being directed toward the preparation of doctors, lawyers, mechanics, hairdressers, artists, or aestheticians, general education is directed toward what is common in human life. We should notice that what is common in human life also differs from immediate, distinctively personal interests. As we usually describe it, the purpose of general education is not only different from vocational training, but also from that of so-called "personal service courses" in school curricula such as driver's education, bachelor living, or consumer awareness.

In art, as in other fields of knowledge, there are both liberal and technical kinds of content. To the extent that we can distinguish between liberal and technical content in various fields of knowledge, the arts and humanities as well as the sciences, the focus of general education should be liberal content. Although it may not be possible or even desirable to completely separate liberal and technical content in school curricula, general education should emphasize ends rather than means, big questions in life rather than technical content and skills. An emphasis on technical content may be appropriate for vocational education, but not for general education.

Perhaps the most obvious example of technical content in art is an emphasis on elements and principles of design in school curricula, rather than exploring meanings in works of art. Elements and principles of design are an obvious example of technical content, partly because formalism has been widely criticized by contemporary artists, art historians, art critics, aestheticians, and some art educators. There are, however, other examples of technical content that may not be as obvious to us because they are rooted in formalist conceptions of education as well as in formalist conceptions of art. As it applies to education, a "formalist" perspective refers to an emphasis on teaching students how to do something, how to think critically,

or how to solve problems rather than focusing on what is problematic or what it is that students are supposed to think critically about. An example of this type of formalism in art education is an emphasis on teaching methods of inquiry in art history, art criticism, and aesthetics. What educators usually conceive as methods of inquiry is not, in fact, what professionals do in their work. Understood from a formalist perspective, methods refers to procedures or, at best, to a set of generic skills. What professionals do in their work, however, involves more than mere procedures, and what they produce is not generic history, generic criticism, or generic philosophy. What they produce may be feminist history or Marxist criticism or analytic philosophy. But whatever it is, the nature of their inquiry has as much to do with what they inquire into as it does with how they inquire into things. When emphasis is placed upon how to do historical research, how to criticize art, or how to analyze philosophical issues, the what or the substantive content of art education becomes a secondary consideration. Most importantly, there is no reason for choosing ideas, interpretations, or issues that are taught in reference to various objects. From the perspective of teaching generic methods of inquiry, the evolution of style in teacups is as important as the religious content of twelfth-century art. The arrangement of lines, shapes, and colors on record albums is as important as the depiction of women in modern painting. The aesthetic value of seashell lamps and rubber alligators is as important as the issue of censorship in contemporary art.

Certainly there is a wide range of content in art, both substantive and methodological, that we might choose to teach in public schools. The possibilities include all of the objects that have been or could be described as art, all of the art from the past and the present, both in western and in other cultures, and all of the ideas and issues that inform our understanding of the creation and interpretation of works of art.

If the kind of schooling we have in mind is supposed to be general education in art, we would suggest choosing content that helps answer big questions in life. This is a criterion, not a categorical rule. It does not automatically rule out objects that are categorized as everyday art, commercial art, or tourist art, for example. Nor does it rule out histories of style, formal criticism, or modernist aesthetics.

In Search of Significant Content and Methods for a General Education in Art

One way to provide students with a general education in art is to place artworks at the center of instruction. In other words, students ought to learn to interpret big questions in artworks, questions, for example, that relate to gender, class, and race. Teachers, therefore, need to choose artworks that have the capacity to challenge and engage students in lively debate over multiple meanings of the same work or works of art. Teachers also need to choose interpretive accounts of these works that answer as well as pose big questions.

The way many art historians and art critics approach the study of art has changed in the last twenty years (Bolin, 1991, Garber, 1991; Paziienza, 1989). Formal, stylistic, and internally referential questions are being replaced with questions that ask: What social and cultural factors influence the artistic canon? How does art have meaning in today's world? Who is the audience? How does an artwork reflect the experience of being black/ white/ Native American/ Arab American/ Latin American/ Caribbean/ Asian American/ woman/ poor/ well-off/ middle-class/ handicapped/ able-bodied/ etc. in today's world? How does it raise our awareness of living? ...Of differences between us? These issues are embedded in the social context of our lives. They find representation in artworks and works of art critical and art historical analysis. Understood in this way, art is a signifier of the context of living (Pollock, 1987). In art history, formal analysis becomes a means to greater end, rather than an end in itself. For example, discussion of the effects of line, tone, and color, his frequent use of pastels or the oblique angles of his compositions becomes integrated into explanations of Degas' art. Formal qualities are now seen as representative of the disintegration of Parisian social tradition and the anxiety produced by such disintegration (Lipton, 1987). Many contemporary art critics are especially concerned with issues of gender, race, and class. Because of this concern, they often write about artists who have heretofore received little attention from high art circles.

When teachers need to learn about artworks they often turn to H.W. Janson's History of Art. Now in its fourth edition, how effective a resource is this text? Does History of Art deal with significant content? Can the kind of information in Janson's History of Art contribute to the general education of students?

Paul Bolin (1991) conducted a study designed to determine whether the variety of art history content found in Feminism and Art History: Questioning the Litany (1982), edited by Norma Broude and M.D. Garrard, had been addressed and included in the fourth and most recent edition of Janson's History of Art (1991). He chose the book because: a) it has been widely recognized and often referred to by authors who have written about women and art history; b) it presented topics that dealt directly with issues surrounding women and art history; c) the book has been available for a number of years, thereby giving ample time for the essays to be recognized by the Janson's editor; d) the essays were written in a clear manner without an abundance of technical language; and finally, e) the essays seemed appropriate and important to be presented and discussed in a textbook such as Janson's History of Art. The examination of Janson's History of Art (1991) revealed no instances where content from the essays in Feminism and Art History: Questioning the Litany (1982) was included.

When we consider much of the ongoing debates addressing the art of women and women in art history, it is perhaps not surprising that these issues are omitted from Janson's (1991) latest History of Art. Bolin (1991) suggests that it may be that the art historical content found in Feminism and Art History (Broude & Garrard, 1982) does not fit into this particular text format that is within the long-standing traditional structures used to document and promote achievements of male artists from the past.

In addition to textbooks, teachers can also use resource guides. For example, Instructional Resources is a reoccurring section in the National Art Education Association's magazine, Art Education, that is mailed monthly to the NAEA's 15,000 members. Although better than most, Instructional Resources is still inadequate for addressing the big questions in art that may affect students' lives. For example, Art Education magazine's resource writer Bay Hollowell (1991) suggests that we ask children the following questions about Cindy Sherman's photograph Untitled No. 147:

Is this picture a painting or a photograph? How can you tell?
 ...What is behind the person? Is this a close-up, a long shot,
 or somewhere in the middle? ...How does this picture make
 you feel? Why does Cindy Sherman let us see parts of her
 disguise? Do photographs always show what is real? (p. 30)

Untitled No. 147 is a large color photograph of a woman (the artist) made ugly by a false nose, sand over her face and skin, dishevelled and chopped hair, rounded shoulders, and yellow light. Critics writing on Sherman raise questions about the role of women in society, the association of women with beauty, and the ways in which Sherman, through her changing costumes, undermines fixing women in any particular role (Owens, 1983). They also discuss the photographs in terms of the ways in which they challenge traditional criteria for what constitutes high art (Gundberg, 1981), and as critiques of the fashion industry's use of sex and desire in advertising (Gambrell, 1984). Does Halliwell address any of these issues in the guide? Clearly, no.

In the "Profile" section of the resource guide, Halliwell (1991) gives background information for teachers. She explains the source of inspiration for this series of photographs an assignment Sherman had from Vanity Fair magazine to illustrate fairy tales. She tells us that these photographs are weird, strange, and ambiguous, and provides other sources for the artist's inspiration from art history and commercial films. In the Activities section of the resource guide, Halliwell suggests that students outline different values in the photograph and experiment with different colors to see how colors and tones change the different roles; and that juxtapose drawings of their head with scary and monstrous body parts and images. In this guide, Halliwell focuses on understanding reality and make-believe. This is a concern for young children, one that is traditional fare in early childhood education. While we do not dispute it, we argue that there are other issues relevant to children that are avoided. This resource guide is characteristic of teacher materials and attitudes that skirt around big questions, particularly those that involve issues of gender, class, or race.

Another problem teachers face when choosing content and supporting material is that of finding appropriate methods for teaching students how to increase their knowledge and understanding of art and the world.

Elizabeth Garber (1991) explains that a dozen or more strategies for engaging students in art criticism acts exist in the art education literature. These emphasize the technical knowledge and skills discussed by Patricia Amburgy (1991) rather than the liberal content that empowers people to live informed and meaningful lives. Most art criticism methods are based on getting students to systematically describe what is physically present in the artwork. These descriptions center on formal aspects of the artwork,

composition, and naming objects represented. From this inventory, students are expected to formulate an interpretation and a judgment of the artwork. Feldman's (1970), Smith's (1973), and Mittler's (1976) sequencing of description, analysis, interpretation, and judgment rely on this foundation of observations accumulated in the descriptive stage. The correspondent to this type of criticism in literature, new criticism, is sometimes referred to as "empirical" because emphasis is placed on what can be observed without due regard for theoretical perspective. Although Feldman, the author of the most popularly used method of art criticism in the schools, does not preclude introduction of social, historical, and theoretical issues, in practice few teachers expand beyond describing, formally analyzing, interpreting, and judging characteristics readily observable in an artwork.

Other methods of art criticism, such as those developed by Lankford (1984) and Johansen (1982), are based on a phenomenological premise. Both begin with a base of the viewer's impressions or reactions to the artwork, making them experientially founded. Contextual elements that bring historical, cultural, and political understandings to the artwork are minimized. The phenomenological methods, while guided by an explicit theory of art, are a second type of empirical criticism that does not engage students in the theoretical big questions we are discussing here. In practice, students who follow either of these empirical routes often engage in a process that is skill-oriented and yields "data," either a collection of impressions or an interpretation/judgment that coheres facts. Neither empirical approach makes the next step, that of linking these impressions, interpretations, and judgments to questions that are relevant to the philosophical issues that should guide the study of art in general education. What Garber has explained about art criticism can be applied to existing theories of art history (Pazienza, 1989). Erickson (1983) emphasizes art history as process, where art historical inquiry is seen as content. Mittler (1976) applies the Feldman (1970) model to historical interpretation; Hurwitz and Madeja (1977) stress the use of "art historical information" to an appreciation of technical content, and Clark, Day and Greer (1987) treat Panofsky's (1939) hermeneutical method of art historical interpretation hierarchically.

Traditional art history survey texts, instructional resource guides, and empirical methods of art critical and art historical inquiry are inadequate models for the implementation of a general education in art. Art critical and art historical accounts about artists and issues, as we have discussed them

here, are available and accessible to teachers through art journals with national circulation and through exhibition catalogs, thereby making it possible for teachers to find the resources necessary to base instruction on big questions in art.

Alternate Models: Re-creative Art History and Art Criticism, A Basis for a General Education in Art

We have argued that students ought to be the recipients of a general education in art. We have assumed that art instruction based on big questions in art is appropriate for all students, even those in elementary school. We believe that children can learn to interpret and apply big questions in art to a greater understanding of art, the world, and themselves. The work of Jennifer Pazienza (1991) in re-creative art history and art criticism indicates that fifth grade students with some background on Puerto Rico and especially in Puerto Rican-US relations can understand the issues of race, class, and gender embedded in contemporary artist Juan Sanchez's art. She also contends that they are able to make connections between the struggles of Puerto Ricans in New York and the struggles of French and Native Canadians in Canada.

Pazienza took a reproduction of Juan Sanchez's Cultural, Racial, Genocidal Policy into a fifth grade class at Assiniboine Elementary School in Oromocto, New Brunswick, Canada. She learned from critic Coco Fusco (1990), in an article from Art in America, that Sanchez's investigation of difference and cultural identity in his art is imbued with social consciousness. Although Sanchez confronts the destruction and marginalization of his culture, he takes on the role of healer. With diverse fragments in media and imagery "he lovingly weaves" a "new fabric that is both spiritually restorative and politically radical" (Lippard, 1990, p. 135). Intermixed on his canvases are diverse symbols -- the Puerto Rican flag, the rose, the cross, people (painted, drawn or photographed), and Boriquen (the indigenous name for the island of Puerto Rico) mythology and history. In Cultural, Racial, Genocidal Policy (1983), superimposed over the Puerto Rican flag is the head of Caguana, the most primal sign of origin, renewal of the oppressed, and of Puerto Rico itself. Fragments of a picture of Jesus, roses and a photograph of a young girl dressed in her Sunday best are other elements in the painting. Etched into the paint in graffiti-like fashion is text about a US backed program that encouraged and resulted in the sterilization of one-third of the women of Puerto Rico.

Sanchez's attention in his art to political issues such as racial and cultural genocide reflects a synthesis of concerns that deal with women, ethnicity, and class. To what extent were the students at Assiniboine Elementary School able to interpret the issues embedded in Sanchez's art? Robert C., ten years old, writes:

I think Juan Sanchez made this painting to show the differences between the US and Puerto Rico. But I don't think he had to call it Cultural, Racial, Genocidal Policy, maybe Difference. I think he put the girl in a jail. Maybe he did this to show how she is different than other people. There are two masks on each side of the picture. I think they are masks from some tribe. I also think the flag represents the US and Puerto Rico and that the US has taken over Puerto Rico and kept them from their own heritage and their own way of life or to show the differences between different races and how people deal with people unlike themselves. I'm glad Juan Sanchez made this painting to show people about different cultures. I like the collage for the meaning it's trying to tell people.

Nicole K., 11 years old, writes:

This painting is sort of confusing because the flag is different from the Puerto Rican flag and the American flag. I don't understand it. People say that Puerto Ricans live in poverty, but the girl in the collage doesn't look like she lives in poverty. I don't understand what the objects on the left and right side of the collage are. People in our class say that they are sofas or fruit bowls. I think they are Indian heads symbolizing the cultures in Puerto Rico. I think that the artist wrote on the flag because they are mad at the Americans. I think that the collage represents the problems Puerto Ricans are having. The Puerto Ricans and the French sort of have the same problems, so do the Indians in Canada. Because in all three cultures they feel that they are losing their culture, their religion, and their ways of doing things.

Each of these students' writings stand as evidence of their ability to interpret and apply the social and cultural issues embedded in Sanchez's work. Their ability to make connections between the worlds depicted in Sanchez's art to their own worlds is revealed when they accurately equate the problems facing Puerto Ricans to current problems confronting French and Native Canadians.

Teachers need to understand that within the context of re-creative art history and art criticism, art historical and art critical worlds are made, not discovered. According to Nelson Goodman (1978), worldmaking always starts from worlds at hand, so that the making is actually a remaking. As it applies to art history and art criticism, art historians and art critics engage in worldmaking when they, using different theoretical perspectives (Feminist, Marxist, Social/ Historical) and other scholars' accounts about the same artwork, interpret and construct written re-creations of the many possible meanings artworks contain. In other words, art historians and art critics re-create artistic worlds that provide us with knowledge about art, ourselves and worlds past, present, and to come.

Synonymous with the idea of re-creative art history and art criticism is the post-structuralist or postmodern conception of originality (Krauss, 1985). Unlike the 19th century romanticist view of originality as that which springs solely from within the individual, here originality is seen as re-invention or re-interpretation, or the interpretation, re-combination, adaptation, modification, and reconstruction of ideas already at hand. In short, originality occurs through the re-creation of existing ideas. This does not mean that students simply imitate the ideas and interpretive methodologies scholars discuss and use. It means that students should assume and apply a critical as well as interpretive attitude toward the ideas they are asked to think about.

Although there may be some knowledge gained from typical art history survey courses, prospective and practicing teachers need courses in art historical and art critical discourse. They need a working philosophy of art that reaches beyond the late modern emphasis on formalism to a view that permits art to educate about life's big questions. Teachers need to understand that in works of art, ideas such as those surrounding Sanchez's work are not self-evident. It is through the mediation (Carrier, 1988 & Gadamer, 1976) and re-creation of exemplary art critical and art historical

models in dialogue with the artwork that we come to learn about these greater ideas.

Finally, teachers need to understand that when we choose to teach technical content instead of significant ideas that answer big questions in human life what we do, in effect, is to withhold the kind of knowledge that promotes social change. Withholding such knowledge is an act of omission, rather than a case of teaching overtly prejudicial content in public schools. Omission of such knowledge is an extremely effective way to perpetuate present divisions of class, race, gender, and ethnicity in American society. Without answers to big questions or without the knowledge to ask big questions, there are no answers to the question: If you could change one thing in the world, what would it be?

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RESPONSE TO TECHNICAL CONTENT IN ART: SCHOOLING AND REPRODUCTION OF DIVISIONS IN GENDER, CLASS AND RACE

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The comments in this paper are made in response to the four papers originally presented as the roundtable session entitled "Technical Content in Art: Schooling and Reproduction of Divisions in Gender, Class and Race." These papers formed the basis for the paper submitted to *The Journal of Arts and Learning Research* by Pazienza, Amburgy, and Bolin (1991). Their paper also includes views originally stated in the paper submitted by Elizabeth Garber. I offer this paper as a statement of my response to the views expressed by all of the authors.

Purpose and Focus of Art Education

Pazienza, Amburgy, and Bolin begin their argument by supporting the view that general education should be the focus of art in the schools. The term "general education", is used by the authors to infer curricular content that is relevant for all students regardless of their educational objectives; content that is not specialized, but rather addresses fundamental questions, those encountered in the life of a human being. These questions raise issues related to choices that the students face and encourage discussion of values. The authors describe the "big questions in life" as those which focus on how a person chooses to live, what a person thinks is right and wrong, and how a person might wish to change the world (Pazienza, Amburgy, and Bolin, 1991).

Support for the emphasis on general education is not new. Foshay spoke specifically about the role of the arts in general education. He described general education "as domains of knowledge and experience which deal with what it is to be a human being" (Foshay, 1973, p. 4). Foshay also stated, "If the arts are to be understood by most of us for what they really are, a special way of viewing the universe and man's activity in it, then the arts have to be seen as a part of the general education of students" (Foshay, 1973, p. 3). Pazienza, Amburgy, and Bolin (1991) also support this purpose and advocate discussion about the expressive or interpretive nature of art as a means for making content relevant for students.

Selection and Delivery of Content

Pazienza, Amburgy, and Bolin (1991) contend that teachers must make choices to determine both what content is taught and how they will teach it. They recommend that teachers choose artworks and methods of discourse that challenge students to think critically about the social and political realities of life and encourage students to understand their own place and role in the larger scheme of history and culture. In this context, artworks would serve as a point of departure for dialogue and debate; artworks would be chosen on the basis of their relevance and usefulness in raising awareness of social issues.

The authors propose that art educators also raise questions about the reliance on the traditional methods of teaching art history and criticism, which emphasize the transfer of techniques and skills, or on the use of formalist approaches, which emphasize the method of inquiry rather than on the underlying message or significance of the artwork. The authors are critical of the traditional art history texts which are commonly used as resources in the art classroom. They criticize the traditional content of these texts, as being Eurocentric and state that the apparent biases of such material serves to perpetuate the current state of societal injustices and cultural biases. Although the authors recognize that there is something to be gained by studying historical categories of style, formal criticism, and modernist aesthetics, they feel that these approaches are limited and that teachers need to broaden their curriculum and include forms of art that have social or cultural significance for students. These artworks may be selected from the works of contemporary female and male artists from a broad range of cultural backgrounds, and from folk and decorative arts.

The authors contend that using the works of contemporary artists is helpful for raising questions related to issues of gender, race, and class. They feel that many of these artists represent the voices of persons throughout our society and our world. They warn against limiting attention to artists who represent only the traditionally accepted schools and periods of art and that the omission of artworks created by women, minorities, and others outside of the traditional boundaries or power structure unwittingly helps to perpetuate the status quo (Pazienza, Amburgy & Bolin, 1991). It is, therefore, important for teachers to examine the traditional images of artworks introduced into the classroom for art historical content in terms of

the values, assumptions, and hidden messages which may be reflected in them.

Updating Methods and Resources

The teacher in today's art classroom must recognize that the students they teach must not know only about the history of art, but also know how to understand and appreciate the art of contemporary times. The authors are critical of traditional approaches in art education that emphasizes technical knowledge, which is delivered through traditional methods of teaching, and that focus on discussion of the elements and principles of design. As the authors suggest, the traditional methods of art criticism first adopted in art education in the 1970s and early 1980s reflect a formalist approach, which was prevalent in the field of art criticism in the 1950s, 60s and 70s. Much of the art produced during pop, op and minimalist periods easily lent itself to the use of the formalist techniques based on description and analysis.

Risatti (1990) implies that this emphasis on technical content had its origins during an even earlier period of time. Risatti describes the origins of formalist criticism in 18th Century aesthetics and the writings of Immanuel Kant. He states that "Formalist Criticism is based upon an aesthetic theory that gives priority to such formal elements as line, shape, and color, rather than to representational elements involved in narrative, iconography, and iconology" (Risatti, 1990, p.1). The emphasis on the nature of aesthetic quality of form, which is characteristic of this approach, is reflected in the art critical writings of Kant and Greenberg, and provides the basis for the formalist methods, which are commonly found in sequential strategies for talking about artworks. These strategies are widely used in current art education curricula and constitute the major approach in classroom discussions about artworks. This approach, though useful for discussing the physical qualities of the artwork, severely limits any discussion of the context in which the artwork was created. Unfortunately, teachers often adopt a procedurally based method for talking about an artwork without clearly understanding the historical context of that artwork.

I feel, as the authors do, that much of the artwork created today requires a different approach for discussion; one that incorporates an emphasis on understanding the cultural context in which the artwork was created. Understanding the art of the 80s and 90s, or the postmodern era requires methods of discussion that reflect the artist's intention and center on

interpretation of the artist's representation of our postmodern times. Whereas the art of the modern era was characterized by several dominant styles, the art of the 80s and early 90s includes a wide diversity of styles and orientations (Risatti, 1990). This work is pluralistic; it does not reflect only one theme or style.

There are qualities of the work that call for an emphasis on interpretation of the meaning of the artwork in terms of its sociological or political contexts. The works of artists such as Barbara Kruger, Judy Chicago, Cindy Sherman, and other feminist artists can help students explore and question the traditional ways women have been portrayed in art. The artworks of Steinbach and Koons can be examined in relation to ideas about the commodification of art and objects in a consumer society (Risatti, 1990). These contemporary artists make statements about the world in which they live and about the conditions and current state of our society. Pazienza, Amburgy, and Bolin (1991) provide excellent examples of artists who examine social issues through their art. Although these works of art can also be discussed in terms of their technical and aesthetic qualities, their real value may be in providing an understanding of the artist's statement about the culture in which the work was created.

The authors also rightfully suggest that teachers draw from a broad range of sources written about art in order to understand artworks by both female and male artists, as well as artworks created by artists from many sociocultural backgrounds. Teachers may find that the traditional sources provide only one viewpoint, or do not approach the tough questions, which are inherent in many of the artworks that focus on the representation of stereotypes, cultural biases, or traditional male attitudes. Pazienza, Amburgy, and Bolin (1991) call for a new era of consciousness in which the status quo, in terms of gender, class, and race, is questioned and debated throughout the curricula of art education. I support the need for open discussion about the serious political and sociological issues confronting our society; discussion which will enable the students to understand our rapidly changing world.

Recommendations

If one agrees with the ideas stated above, one must certainly recognize the need for changes in teacher training. If we are to expect art teachers to lead students in discussions related to the "big questions," their preparation

for the classroom must include greater exposure to ideas from history, sociology, and psychology to ensure that they have the background needed to talk about the issues. Even with exposure to a broader range of ideas there are questions that must be posed, if the recommendations of the authors are to be implemented for example: Considering the different political orientations and value systems of teachers, can we expect that all of them will teach fairly and responsibly about other cultures? How can teacher preparation programs ensure that an accurate and unbiased viewpoint is encouraged?

One must recognize that teachers represent a wide range of political and cultural backgrounds and may not all treat the issues inherent in this content with a liberal mindset. If teachers are asked to teach the type of curriculum content that the authors are proposing, there is a need for the education of teachers to address values, to foster development of sensitivity to the problems of minority cultures, to develop understanding of traditional cultures and their symbols, and to challenge the problems of prejudice and discrimination existing today.

Alternative Approaches

Teacher preparation programs must expose future teachers to ideas which reflect an approach which has, as its focus, attention to the aforementioned perspectives and ideas. The central focus of the social reconstructivist approach is the "belief that teaching and teacher education can make contributions along with other educational and political projects, to the creation of a more just and compassionate society" (Liston & Zeichner, 1991, p. 180). It will be necessary to broaden the training of art educators to prepare them to lead students toward an understanding of the world, which they will face in the future.

The field of teacher education is currently being challenged by the question of how to most effectively prepare teachers to enable them to provide a relevant education for all students. It seems reasonable to assume that art education must also look to other models, both within and outside of the field of art education, to develop curricula and teaching approaches that will help students understand and interpret their world. There is a need for new art education models, which draw from a variety of orientations. The structure of such an education must be based on alternative organizational principles, such as bioregional curriculum models (Bowers, 1974), cultural

literacy education (Johnson, 1989), multicultural models, and human rights education (Dufour, 1990).

There is a great need for the development of educational materials, which help teachers to understand artworks within the social context of the artist's time. It is imperative that teachers become exposed to the ideas of contemporary artists, art historians, and art critics in order to understand the artwork of the 1980s and 90s. The authors (Pazienza, Amburgy, & Bolin, 1991) point out that the traditional texts, which have been used to train art teachers, have been generally one-sided, have retained the focus on historical and descriptive information, and have supported a narrow definition of art.

It is true that traditional coursework for teachers has reflected a limited knowledge-centered approach in the past. Teachers will need to learn how to use a multitude of methods and approaches for talking about art with students. Recreative art history may provide one possible approach, which will serve students in the process of interpretation and help them to find meaning in the artwork that they are learning about. Discussion related to the social and cultural context, the audience, the artist's background and its affect on the interpretation of the artwork may also provide avenues for understanding contemporary artwork.

Teacher preparation programs must help teachers to learn how to use alternative resources such as written materials by and about artists, and to consider knowledge of the social environment at the time the artwork was produced, rather than rely merely on the traditional texts for art history and art criticism content. It is imperative that instructors in art teacher preparation programs help students to make the transition from college level art history courses to the development of relevant and timely content for art education in the schools.

There is a need for courses in teacher preparation, which expose students to a wider range of art critical orientations and that enable them to make comparisons between ideas that characterize feminist criticism, psychoanalytic criticism, and a broad range of other theories within that field. Understanding the ideas and influences of writers such as Jean Baudrillard, Jurgen Habermas, Donald Kuspit, Craig Owens, Lucy Lippard, Kate Linker, and their contemporaries will be important in helping art teachers to interpret and discuss the art created by artists today.

Pazienza, Amburgy, and Bolin (1991) support the need for examination of how artists have depicted the role of both women and minorities, and how this has perpetuated the ways that those persons were traditionally viewed. I share their concern and their recommendation that teachers carefully consider the assumptions and values that are implicit in the selection of certain content and methods for teaching. Our teacher preparation programs must provide a forum for discussion of these issues. With the increasingly multicultural nature of our society and school population, it is important for teachers to understand art, which is representative of many cultures, in order for them to help students appreciate the contributions of people from differing ethnic origins. Influences related to the diversity of cultures, gender, and class in contemporary society will need to be understood clearly, as they will certainly affect the students and artists of this decade and beyond.

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HISTORICAL SENSE THROUGH THE ARTS: AN INQUIRY INTO FORM, MEANING, AND UNDERSTANDING

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Introduction

Asked about the mood of a passage in her history textbook, Sunny replies: "History. ... But what kind of mood do I feel? It's a story, I mean, like you're learning, that kind of mood. Like, 'Pay attention!' kind of mood." In five years of secondary school social studies, this high school junior has learned that the textbook is history. The textbook means "you're learning." The textbook carries the voice of authority: "Pay attention!" Sunny is not alone. According to the most comprehensive review of social studies education, in the eyes of students, "knowing ... is largely a matter of having information, and the demonstration of the knowledge frequently involves being able to reproduce the language of the text in class discussions or on tests" (Shaver, Davis and Helburn, 1979, p. 6). Such a conception is based upon hundreds of hours of social studies instruction dominated by "teacher talk" or lecture, recitation, and reliance on the textbook as both the backbone of the curriculum, and as the source of most information (Cuban, 1991; Ravitch and Finn, 1987; Shaver, Davis and Helbrun, 1979). Yet, the sources for understanding history exist in a variety of forms: in historical documents and narratives, and also in the paintings, sculpture, music and literature that artists have created throughout time. All of these forms are means by which human beings have rendered their experiences of the world. Outside of history classrooms, each of these sources contributes to efforts of those attempting to make sense of the past.

In this paper, I propose not only that such forms as painting, music, poetry, and film are different ways of rendering human events and concerns, but also that they offer unique senses of history. By making these forms essential to the curriculum, we provide students access to a broader domain of historical phenomena, and so enable them to construct more complex historical understandings. My remarks are based on a year-long study of a public school 11th grade U.S. history class in which the teacher, Jayne,¹ has made painting, photography, music, poetry, and film integral to her

instruction.² Driving the inquiry was the question: What are the epistemological contributions of different forms of representation? That is, in what ways do forms like photography, or film, or music, extend the ways in which students are able to reason about the subject matter of history? What unique kinds of knowing do each of these forms enable? Implicit was the goal of finding ways to perceive, conceptualize, and describe the nature of our representations of experience, and the means by which we construct understandings from these representations.

In the following pages, I present three conceptual lenses, or ways of examining students' understandings of various representational forms. The first has to do with the ways students locate meaning within different forms of representation; the second with the conceptions of historical time different representational forms enable; and the third with the ways different forms contribute to students' sense of empathy for historical actors. These lenses were defined through analysis of over 300 hours of classroom instruction and taped interviews with seven students.

Locating Meaning

Perhaps the most obvious difference among forms of representation lies in the sensory modalities they emphasize, and so the sort of information they convey. Painting makes palpable relationships in space and color. With music, our attention is drawn to patterns of sound: dissonance, consonance, duration, and abruptness. Film offers us motion and development. Whereas stature is central in photography, gesture is the essence of dance. Exceptionally good narrative can describe and depict contrasts in space, light, tone, and movement. However, because the text stands for, or points to the qualities it emphasizes, it cannot provide direct or visceral understanding.³ Visual arts, music, and film offer these relationships directly to our apprehension, and in so doing, let us know differently.

In philosophical aesthetics, Susanne Langer (1953) suggests that the critical difference lies in the nature of the materials comprising these forms, and the resulting challenges for presenting experience.⁴ For example in the visual arts, Langer argues, the artist's central problem is to create the semblance of space in purely visual terms. Space is a concept which we know through the combination of vision, audition, and movement. With painting or sculpture, however, we are given only the visual. The artist's

task is to create "visual substitutes" for "non-visible" elements of spatial experience (Langer, 1953).

Although the processes of production and perception are quite distinct, the problem of locating meaning within the formal parameters of a particular medium exists for the viewer/listener as well as the creator of a representational form. As you read this page, you are building an understanding of my ideas. But upon what do you develop your understanding? How do the printed words, phrases, or paragraphs shape your impressions? Now consider a painting, or a lecture. Clearly, the elements which contribute to your understanding are very different in kind. The meanings generated in written forms hinge on the stock of images acquired throughout our experiences. These images are recalled and shaped by an author's choice and ordering of discursive symbols, i.e. words. If we are particularly attuned to linguistic nuance, we may respond to the cadence, rhythm, and rhyme effected by a particular selection and sequencing of words. If words are spoken their speaker's voice, facial and bodily gestures, and even relationship to us all influence the sense or meanings we make of those words. Our understandings of painting also are influenced by the experiences we bring to it. However, painting offers us not words or bodily presence, but hue, shading, brush stroke, and proportion.

In my work with Jayne's students, the unique problems for meaning-making posed by different representational forms emerged most clearly in the relative significance students assigned to formal qualities as conveyors of meaning. As they reflected on painting and music, formal qualities were central in students' regard. However, when students focused on film, photography, or writing, formal elements were fairly peripheral. Let me illustrate this contrast. Asked "What strikes you?" or "Can you describe this passage?" as they worked with written forms, students immediately summarized the events to which the writing referred. In so doing, they paid virtually no attention to the formal features of the writing itself. Consider students' comments about poetry:

Evan: It's about Woodstock. It's about saving the nation. No more war, you've got to find your soul and set it free. Live a good life.⁵

Lynn: My dominant impression is like, I don't know, whenever I think of this, I think about meat because it says rotten meat in it, and probably like syrupy rotten meat.

or about a passage from their textbook.

Rebecca: [What stands out is] like how he passed the Voting Rights Act. You know, anyone going anywhere ... It's talking about the good and the bad times.

Sunny: OK, Johnson said that he can get backing for the march in Mississippi, and then how eventually they did get to march.

Only in one instance during the study did a student make note of the formal idiosyncrasies of different kinds of text, and then only marginally.

Lynn: Is this a song or just a poem?

MJS: Why did you ask?

Lynn: Because it looks like a song, that's why, it doesn't look like a poem...they repeat it and they have different verses after.

Sensitive to the repetitions that exist in lyrics (e.g. the chorus), but usually do not occur in poetry, Lynn wondered whether the piece might be a song.⁶ However, beyond this kind of observation, even Lynn seemed unconcerned with the ways that the distinctive phrasing might affect the meaning of the writing. As the quotes about written forms above demonstrate, Lynn and her classmates directed their interest beyond the words and line structure, to the ideas and images referred to or generated: the Woodstock concert, "syrupy rotten meat," Johnson's politics, etc.

In film and photography, only two students discussed formal features. The quality to which they attended is light. They noticed the black-and-whiteness of Charlie Chaplin's film *Modern Times* and Margaret Bourke-White's Depression era photographs, and suggested that the lack of color contributed to the dreariness projected by these representations of the 1930s. However, a perusal of interview protocols revealed that the primary concern for students was not light or shading; what was lit or shaded would have been considered essentially the same regardless of how much light fell upon it.

In contrast, students' descriptions of painting showed a greater sense of equivalence between what the artist represents and how she or he does so. Consider three students' comments on Roy Lichtenstein's *Crying Girl*:

Rebecca: Looks like a girl out of a cartoon strip for one, and then its simple. I mean if the other ones looked to be more complex, this one is simple.

Sunny: A woman, she looks like she was painted by, her face looks like it was painted with dots, but you can't see the dots unless you look really hard.

Robby: The painting, it look like there's dots. It doesn't look like the artist, not one of these weird artists painted it, someone like a cartoonist.

Rebecca, Sunny, and Robby attended to pattern and style as well as the representational subject or image. They were surprised by Lichtenstein's technique, for it challenged their conception of "real" paintings. Significantly, they incorporated this challenge into their analyses:

Rebecca: Maybe the artist thought that the times were simple, like and everyone was kind of the same. Everyone was simple, and did things one way.

Robby's perception that Lichtenstein is not an artist, but a cartoonist is paralleled by his sense that the painting itself is deceptive:

Robby: There's a pattern. It's stable, calm she's not, but the painting is. She's crying, and she's upset, but she looks like a normal person...she's crying right? But her eyes don't show, it's like she doesn't mean it. ...They're more like devious eyes [than sad eyes].

Hence subject and form blended in the student's understandings. Unlike with photographs or text, students recognized the formal features of representation (in this case Lichtenstein's use of dots), and thus were able to locate meaning in these features.

My intent in identifying what kinds of formal features students attend to, and how salient these features are in students' interpretations, is not to replay what might be obvious. It is to begin to understand the relationships between the qualities which distinguish forms, and the kinds of understandings students achieve. If form shapes and constrains meaning-

making, then forms of representation will be differentially suited for highlighting the myriad qualities of historical experience.

The clearest instance of this notion comes from music. Music does not literally describe historical events. However, in Jayne's class, music served as an ideal means of depicting relationships in time. By recognizing how qualities like tempo, rhythm, or flow give shape to music, students were able to sense directly such abstract ideas as the flow of history, and the tempo or rhythm of change. Moreover from the experience of music, students are able to move beyond the interpretations presented in class and in readings, to generate their own interpretations of historical themes. One student compared the mechanical nature of ragtime to the machines which were finding an ever larger place in society during the late 19th and early 20th centuries. Another likened the syncopation and "busyness" in ragtime and jazz to being on the brink, to the unrealized expectations and instability characteristic of the 1920s and 1930s. Because of its unique formal features, music thus offers students a specific and immediate understanding, qualitatively different from that provided by Margaret Bourke-White's photographs of the American dust bowl, or John Steinbeck's *Grapes of Wrath*.

Conceptions of Historical Time

A second difference in the meanings communicated by different forms has to do with the temporal relationships different forms express. Perhaps the most common conception of history is as a timeline of events stretching from a distant past to some point before the present. Although we learn to section off chunks within the timeline, to recognize characteristic themes or attitudes which unify the succession of single years, decades, centuries, or even millennia (as in the case of geology or technology), we also learn that these larger eras or ages are part of an evolutionary chain: each grows out of the preceding, from each proceeds the next. This linear conception of time organizes most historical narratives, especially textbooks.

Interestingly, this kind of linear understanding permeated students' discussions of the textbook and documentary films. Asked to describe the textbook reading on Sacco and Vanzetti, Rebecca said:

There were two men who were arrested after a burglary, after two people had been killed. And basically, most of America thought they were innocent. I don't know, they went to a committee to see if the trial was fair, but it really wasn't. And one of the guys was a white supremacist, or whatever. And they were executed. And everybody thought it was wrong.

Asked the same question about a segment of the documentary film *Eyes on the Prize* Robby recounted:

They were talking about how Oakland Police were beating up on Black people and stuff and arresting them just to pick them up. So they organized and called themselves the Black Panthers, they got a newsletter out, they got young people to join. They had shotguns, and they looked just like Rambo walking on the street, so it kind of scared a lot of people. Then the police tried to take away their guns, so they had to go to Sacramento to fight that because it's a constitutional right to bear arms, and that right was taken away, so they needed to fight for that.

Note the linear logic of these accounts: first this happened, then that happened, and so that happened.

But there is another conception of time, one which pervades science fiction and much feminist work (Kristeva, 1981; Forman, 1989). According to this second conception, time is cyclical, recursive; historical moments are not merely points in linear progression, but events which are complex and multidimensional. One way to imagine this expansive, yet immediate and instantaneous sense of time is to reflect on one's experience of the present.

Painting, photography, music, and poetry contributed to the students' sense of this second conception of history. In their comments about these forms, students describe not a chain of causes and consequences, but a rich, contextual whole. For example, after listening to Bessie Smith's "Lost Your Head Blues," Sunny remarked:

This is what my mother listens to. what my family back home listens to... When I go back home, it's like my cousin is

singing on the porch. This is like they'll be in the kitchen, cooking, and singing...it's like walking into the kitchen and listening to that.

Describing a photograph by Dorothea Lange, Lynn said:

She looks like she's stressed out about a lot of stuff. She looks determined to give something to her children food, clothes, and stuff. ...The determination? It's in her eyes.

Similarly, reflecting on Thomas Hart Benton's *City Activities with Dance Hall*, Robby asserted:

This could happen again... People just going crazy, counter to nature. They don't care about anyone else. Like now, it's the same thing. People just thinking about money, like with the Stock Market, not thinking about other people. The difference between the rich and the poor. Nobody's happy, and they're just going wild.

Robby shifted between the instant in the painting in which "people [are] just going crazy," and the instant of his perception of lunch period, February 28, 1990 when "people [are] just thinking about money...not thinking about other people." His experience of the painting was not as a unique event from the 1930s rendered by Thomas Hart Benton, but as an image which recurred before him, and which linked his present to the present of the artist.

Historical accounts typically are ordered by chronology; when they are not, we call them "artistic." However, historical experience is not linear. In hindsight we can see cycles as well as the power of coincidence; in the moment we may sense an evanescent instant, or *deja vu*. Moreover, because experience is complex, our perceptions of it shift. The nonlinear logic expressed in students' reflections on photography, painting, and music suggests that these forms can render past experience differently, capturing these complexities. Forms which enable students to identify the recursive nature of historical time provide opportunities for students to draw relationships between their studies of the past and their experiences of the present. By including in her curriculum works which sustain a sense of present, Jayne made it possible for students to recall and reflect on their

experiences in relation to the experiences of historical actors, to engage in an eternal present of history.

Understanding the Historical Other

If there is any generalization to make about the advantages of employing a wide array of sources in the curriculum, it is that the diverse ways in which Jayne invited students to know the era enhanced students' ability to develop a sense of empathy toward historical actors. Drawing on Nel Noddings (1984), I define empathy as a profound form of understanding based on receptivity to, and identification with another. It is through empathy that we understand human experience and so participate in social relationships. In Jayne's class, there were two broad ways in which different forms of representation enabled empathy.

The first is in the identification with another as an agent acting purposively toward social or moral ends. For example, as they discussed Langston Hughes' "Dream Deferred," students showed an intimate sense of the poet's situation, identifying with the desires and frustration depicted.

Sunny: Okay, what strikes me? You know, when you're a little kid, and you're dreaming and you say, "oh, I want to be a doctor," and then all your life you can't be a doctor, you gotta be a housewife or you can't be a doctor, you're not smart enough. And finally, you know, if you really want something so bad that you just go crazy, explode.

Robby: I guess they knew they weren't going to win. Well, the odds were against them for what they wanted, it was like going against something where you know the other side will win. You can maybe make a dent but they knew they weren't going to get I mean in ten or 20 years, or a lot longer than that.

The varying levels at which students construed agency in different written forms corresponded to differences in levels of voice and graphic detail. John Steinbeck's *Grapes of Wrath* and Langston Hughes' "Dream Deferred" have strong narrative voice, and rich visual and visceral imagery. In contrast, textbooks are written in objective voice, i.e., the authors attempt to minimize the use of words which display subjectivity. Moreover, little of the detail of which Steinbeck and Hughes are masters is provided. While students developed an intimate sense of the conditions faced by historical actors

through both Steinbeck's and Hughes' works, they gleaned little such understanding from the textbook.

Perhaps the clearest sense agency students achieved came through film. Extending the reasoning above, film not only provides clear images and subjective voices, but also makes visible its subjects' actions. In all of their comments about these films, students described moral or immoral social actors, who have emotions and motives, and also have the power to affect their own and others' lives. Film thus evoked students' empathy for its characters, and in so doing, engaged students in problems of social injustice.

Another explanation for film's power is that it also provided for a second form of empathic understanding. This second sort of connection is rooted not in identification with condition, motive, or choice, but in an inchoate yet piercing perception of human feeling. It is the compassion we feel for the wide-eyed, distended-bellied child whose plaintive countenance, artfully captured on film, accompanies requests for our dollars; it is the joyous surge we feel with the chorus in the last movement of Beethoven's Ninth Symphony, or Louis Armstrong's voice rising in scat.

The expressive meanings projected by the formal qualities of representation seem essential to this second form of empathy. By mixing just the right combination of pigments, creating a particular vocal timber, or choreographing just the right sequence of movements or lines, artists capture and render psychic qualities which elude verbalization, but which powerfully inform our social lives. With art forms like music or photography, the logical check between motivated action and personal experience is unavailable to us. Yet, clearly images and sounds inspire our passions.

Consider students' responses to music, painting, and photography. A striking feature of students' reflections on music was the abstract, yet visceral nature of their ideas. They spoke not of concrete images, but of being transported back into a time, and of being presented with a context of feeling as they listened. They believed they knew how the singer or performer felt, and how their audiences heard them.

Rebecca: You get a feeling, 'cause it's actually people from that time, singing about. And ragtime, it was upbeat and everything. But then the blues, you just get into it. It's just, "Yeahhhhh." Just sit there and rock back and forth. That's the Depression right there.

Sabrina: Makes me feel sort of sad. She is not singing very happily. She sort of makes you feel sorry for her.

With painting and photography, students' sense of empathy was similarly based upon their receptivity to expressive meanings.

Lynn: Looks kind of wild. And all different kinds of people because of the whole bunch of different colors, and it looks like the city because it's crowded, busy.

When paintings depicted human subjects, students connected expressive meanings to both the works' formal qualities and the humans represented: painted subjects are visible beings whose feelings are projected through facial or bodily expressions, as well as through the artist's use of color or brushstroke.

Sunny: He looks sad ... like the type of guy who lost something in life. ... His face looks strong ... [but] he's colored it dark, he's not all one color. On this side he's dark, on this side he's light, and ... on this side he looks sad. And he looks kinda blue, like he should be dead!

With photography, students' statements of empathy related emotional tone more directly to the individuals photographed.

Sunny: The lynching. There was a whole bunch of white people laughing and just having a gay old time like they were at the carnival, like that ragtime was playing in the background. And you know kids was there and grandmas was there. And right in the middle is this black man and he is just hanging there all bloody like. It was really bad.

Although students lacked contextual details (e.g. motive and circumstance) surrounding the paintings and photographs, visual elements evoked strong feeling.

Because it relies on the direct presentation of sound or image, this sort of intuitive understanding may well be unavailable through written text. Because written text usually is the primary medium of secondary school history classes, the opportunities for such understanding often are unavailable to students. Yet, the intuitive apprehension of visual and

auditory data is an essential part of cognition. Rudolph Arnheim (1986) writes:

Genetically, then, all knowledge of the environment and all orientation within the environment begin with the intuitive exploration of the perceptually given. ... Cognition comes about biologically as the means by which the organism pursues its goals. Cognition distinguishes desirable from hostile targets and focuses on what is vitally relevant. It singles out what is important and thereby restructures the image in the service of the perceiver's needs. A hunter's world looks different from that of a botanist or poet. The input of these various determining forces, cognitive as well as motivational, is forged into a unified perceptual image by the mental power we call intuition. Thus intuition is the basis of it all; and it therefore deserves all the respect we can offer (p. 82).

Opportunities for intuitive understanding also deserve a place in the curriculum. Extending Arnheim's argument, we rely upon nonverbal visual and auditory cues as we maneuver through human relationships. In providing these cues, painting, photography, and music literally gave sense to afforded students immediate apprehension of the human events and conditions outlined in the textbook and Jayne's "minilectures."

Further Steps

In the foregoing pages, I have outlined themes from a study spurred by the conviction that the sources for understanding history exist in a far broader array of forms than typically made available to students in history classrooms. Implicit in this work is the belief that part of knowing a discipline is doing it. If students have the opportunity to draw meaning from a variety of representational forms beyond the textbook, they can learn not simply about historical ideas, but also what it means to engage in historical inquiry. This second sort of understanding is not secondary in import. The separation of historical facts from the inquiry which generates and sustains them offers students a distorted view of the discipline and no doubt contributes to students' belief that history is boring (Cuban, 1991). We can not divorce the knowing from the doing.

Absent from this analysis is attention to the contextual factors which both shape the kinds of meanings the arts make available and impede a wider array of forms from becoming a regular part of the curriculum in the first place. Meaning is not simply a product of formal qualities and students' processes of perception, but a web spun of cultural and institutional context, individual beliefs and interests, and representational form.⁷ In fact, part of understanding the epistemological contributions of the arts to students' understanding of history, may well be the examination of why these forms traditionally have been marginalized. Returning to Cuban (1991), simply focusing on how best to design and implement a particular curriculum is inadequate. A far more fruitful mode of inquiry will explore the interaction of curricular forms, teacher beliefs, and situational and cultural constraints.

Such inquiry is critical. If our goal is to help students see history as more than a chronological narrative of events and names, we must provide the curricular and instructional forms which make it otherwise. The artistic achievements which linger into our history from the past tell us of the lives, sensibilities, and experiences of those who created them. They compel us to seek more about the past, and also provide a new way of looking at our present and future. This is historical sense.

Footnotes

- 1 All names are pseudonyms.
- 2 My role in her classroom was that of a participant observer. Throughout the 1989-1990 academic year, I contributed to curriculum development, and during the first semester, team A taught the class. During the second semester, I shifted into the role of researcher/guest teacher observing, conducting intensive interviews with a small group of students, and occasionally teaching.
- 3 The exception here, of course, is the artistic treatment of text which blurs the boundaries between the discursive and presentational. Consider for example, the work of e.e. cummings, or even corporate logos.
- 4 Research in physiological psychology has found fundamental differences in how various types of sensory information are perceived and processed, and indicates that each sensory modality is associated with a unique portion of the brain (Rozenzweig and Leiman, 1982). Studies of auditory and visual perception report that our mental representations of forms are closely connected to the sensory modality by which we apprehend them: visual and auditory processes are distinct; visual imagery involves the same processing mechanism as does visual perception; and acoustic imagery involves the same processing mechanism as does auditory perception (Segal & Fusella, 1970). How differences in medium and modality relate to meaning, however, remains a question unaddressed in empirical research.
- 5 All student comments reported in this paper are direct quotes from audio-taped interviews.
- 6 This poem, written by Joni Mitchell, actually became lyrics for the song, "Woodstock," performed by Mitchell, and then by Crosby, Stills, Nash and Young.

- 7 I explore these issues more fully in the dissertation from which this paper is abstracted (Singer, 1991).

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KNOWLEDGE, DISCIPLINE AND THE BODY: A FEMINIST PERSPECTIVE ON ARTS EDUCATION

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Introduction

This paper explores the relationship between the academic disciplines, art education, and the body. My intention is to more fully understand the epistemological limits of art education programs that identify with the academic disciplines. Disciplined-Based Arts Education, for example, has sought to give art education intellectual efficacy by building "content areas," (i.e. production, criticism, history, and aesthetics) into their program. The separation of art into art history, art criticism, and aesthetics is rooted in the tradition of the humanities. This tradition, I will argue, has systematically functioned to create an economy of enclosure, efficiency, and monotony that makes students' bodies docile. I will further argue that artistic experience is contingent upon emotional life, and that our emotional lives are a constituent part of the way we know the world. Our bodies are the sites for affective, kinesthetic, and sensory power. Arts curricula that identify with the academic disciplines limit these modes of perception, and thus are potentially complicit in recasting the body as an object to be controlled.

The Art of Discipline

In Discipline and Punish, (1977) Foucault renders a chilling and timely history about the essential methods used to discipline the body in the early seventeenth century. "The modern practice of discipline no longer considers political allegiance to the state sufficient, rather it invades the body, and seeks to regulate its power of perception and the efficiency of its every gesture, attitude, rapidity and movements" (Lee-Bartky, 1990, p. 63).

The historical moment of the disciplines was the moment when an art of the human body was born, which was directed not only at the growth of its skills, nor at the intensification of its subjection, but at the formation of a relation that in the mechanism itself makes it more obedient as it becomes more useful, and conversely. What was then being formed was a policy of

coercions that act upon the body, a calculated manipulation of its elements, its gestures, its behaviour. The human body was entering a machinery of power that explores it, breaks it down and rearranges it. A "political anatomy," which was also a "mechanics of power," was being born; it defined how one may have a hold over others' bodies, not only so that they may do what one wishes, but so that they may operate as one wishes, with the techniques, the speed and the efficiency that one determines. Thus discipline produces subjected and practised bodies, 'docile' bodies (Foucault, 1977, pp. 137-138). Here, the art of discipline is used to constrain the body, to coerce it, and make it docile. In *The Handmaid's Tale*, (1985) Margaret Atwood confronts us boldly with the logical extension of the seventeenth century practised body. Told from the point of view of a woman who is forced to endure policies of coercions that make her docile, this tale compels the reader to confront the implications these practices will have for women in the post apocalyptic future. Offred, the handmaid who furtively roams the land of Gilead, is forced to wear a red cloak and white winged hat and veil that keep her from seeing and being seen. She testifies that her methods for resistance to Gilead's regiments of discipline lie in steeling herself. Offred learned this method of survival from her mother. "Steel yourself, my mother used to say, before examinations I didn't want to take or swims in cold water. I never thought much at the time about what the phrase meant, but it had something to do with metal, with armor, and that's what I would do, I would steel myself. I would pretend not to be present, not in the flesh" (Atwood, 1985, p. 206).

This state of absence, of denying bodily sensation, desire and pain, is an accomplishment in the land of Gilead; it is what Offred strives to master. Here, fertile bodies are merely for breeding purposes. D.W. Winnicott believes that this mind-body split, the act of steeling oneself, is a response to an unpredictable, painful, or dangerous environment. The mind, according to Winnicott, does not exist in itself, but rather it is an integral part of the psyche-soma, the psyche being the "imaginative elaboration of somatic parts, feelings, and functions" (Goldenberg, 1990, p. 90). For Winnicott, the psyche is not a transcendental entity, rather it is our physical and emotional being. The psyche-soma develops and compensates for the imperfections of reality (Goldenberg, 1990). The daily routines and rituals Offred is forced to take part in are designed to make her body a thing of use, a thing owned, like everyone else's. "We must look good from a distance." Offred further explains: "Picturesque, like Dutch milkmaids on a wallpaper frieze, like a shelf full of period-costume salt and pepper shakers, like a

flotilla of swans or anything that repeats itself with at least minimum grace and without variation. Soothing to the eye, the eyes, the Eyes, for that's who this show is for. We're off to the Prayvaganza, to demonstrate how obedient and pious we are " (Atwood, 1985, p. 275).

Obedience, piety, and uniformity, all staged to satisfy the one who "looks," is part of an historic regime of discipline Anthony Grafton and Lisa Jardine (1986) trace to the Liberal Arts tradition of fifteenth century Italy. Their portraits of art education disclose the economy of docility and utility inherent in a humanities training. If Margaret Atwood (1985) offers us a haunting fictional rendition of discipline in the future, and Foucault (1977) documents a chilling history of disciplinary practices in the 17th century, the work of Grafton and Jardine (1986) provides a third perspective, one which depicts the origins of Liberal Arts disciplinary practices. They present us with the details of actual 15th century classroom life as seen through the eyes of students. Through a careful study of textbooks, student notes and compositions, and tutors' diaries and letters, Grafton and Jardine conclude that the actual practice of the humanities was more concerned with training in grammar, syntax, and etymology than the humanists' theoretical pronouncements about moral and civic education. This training, argues Grafton and Jardine, fostered in all its initiates a properly docile attitude towards authority. While "it stamped the more prominent members of the new elite with an indelible cultural seal of superiority, it equipped lesser members with fluency and the learned habit of attention to textual detail and if offered everyone a model of true culture as something given, absolute, to be mastered, not questioned " (Grafton and Jardine, 1986, p. xiv). The following excerpt, taken from a student's notes on a lecture given by Guarino Guarini, a prominent and charismatic teacher of the humanities from 15th century Italy, exemplifies the quality of erudition students were expected to acquire. This lecture was given on Virgil's Georgics. What follows is Guarino's general note on line 43:

Vera nova: the word annus comes from ananeun (renew, recover), because when the sun returns to the same degree then a year has passed. Romulus began the year from March; hence he called the first [month of the year] by his name, since he is called the son of Mars. The second month he named after Aeneas, from whom the Roman nation is descended. He is said to have been the son of Venus; Venus is called Aphrodite. Hence Aprilis, with the aspiration

removed. And because the Roman people were divided into two parts that is into the elders and the seniores ...and the younger, he named May from the elders (maioribus) and June from the younger (junioribus) (Grafton and Jardine, 1986, p. 15).

Grafton and Jardine emphasize "that it was not a deep knowledge of any one subject or subjects, but as comprehensive a catalogue as possible of disconnected 'facts' necessary for informed reading and writing in the classical tradition: etymological, geographical and mythological points have equal value for this purpose, and demand equal attention" (Grafton and Jardine, 1986, p. 15). If we consider the body rather than literary texts or artifacts as the significant giver of culture, then we can more clearly understand the humanist motive for disciplining the body through a process of disconnecting bodies of knowledge. We are in the habit of thinking about culture in terms of power, authority, and the public life of the intellect. What we have forgotten is that the word culture has a sensual, domestic history. It is closely tied to the Indo-European root *kwel*, meaning to dwell or inhabit. To inhabit a place is to be bodily present, it is a physical act. We rummage around the places we inhabit, looking for a pen, stirring up dinner and trouble, answering the phone, or letting it ring while we change the baby. Religious beliefs, art scientific practices, and social policy, what we ordinarily consider to be aspects of our culture, are generated, passed on, contradicted, resisted, and transformed through the physical practices people engage in. These practices are contingent upon embodied human life, for discourse and theory emerges from our physical, social bodies.

The humanities curriculum of the 15th century considered aesthetics, history, and literature as a means to discipline the body and teach morality. Textual analysis was taught so students would learn to identify the aesthetic qualities which characterized a superior moral sense on the part of the author. This is the *sutext* of education, the cornerstone of humanism which creates a newly born man, an eloquent, virtuous man, educated for the good life through the emulation of the distant ideals of distant figures -- Homer, Virgil, Ennius. Although the Greek program of education had as its core the Greek poetry and drama that provided the focus for ritual and community life, the program bought by the Romans from the Greeks was profoundly altered (Grafton and Jardine, 1986). The Romans accepted and followed a carefully graded program of literature and rhetoric that did not emerge from the specificity of their lives. Rather students learned to commemorate the

literature of an alien culture not in their first, but in a second language -- Greek. The current debates about the legitimacy of an anglo canon which allegedly generates intellectual solidarity are logical extensions of a curriculum which literally and symbolically depreciated the dwelling places of its students. Humanistic education continues to foster ideal identifications with western fathers through a method of disciplined reading which instructs students on how to operate on, dissect, and, cut a text.

Just as humanism inherited the Greek curriculum, so it inherited a suspicion of emotion and the life of the body. Inherent in education's promise to turn men from a woman-thing into a man-thing, was a desire to tame the passions and the spastic hysteria that flows from the undisciplined body, the mother's body, the body of woman. Clearly, the idea that the best things about the world are not part of the world extends from the world of Plato to our present time. One need only turn to the criticisms of Allan Bloom (1987) and Lynne Cheney (1990) to hear resounding echoes of longings to transcend the inconsistencies of our present, material, and physical existence. In each of the academic disciplines lurks the notion of an abstract presence that created and controls the world. Like the humanists of the 15th century, we too often forget the physical contingency of all thought and all creation (Goldenberg, 1990). If, as D.W. Winnicott (Winnicott, 1979) argues, culture, art, and religion are elaborations of transitional objects -- those objects which, like mother, are felt to be both part of the external world and part of the child -- then the basis of all human experience, whether we are theorizing or working in the garden, is motivated by a desire to elaborate a union of matter, with mother (Goldenberg, 1990). The work of Mary O'Brien (1981, 1989) and Naomi Goldenberg (1990) has shown that western intellectual thought has systematically denied that women and matter are at the origins of all reflection.

Given the historical constitution of the humanities, residues of education inevitably seep into art education programs that define integration in terms of an identification with the academic disciplines. These residues erode bodily life by turning students further and further away from their corporality. It is not a question of whose art is studied, rather it is a question of how it is studied, what methods are used to engage students in the life of art. The disciplines confine us to a repertoire of theories and concepts that lack a living presence. Drawing upon the work of Melanie Klein, Goldenberg (1990) argues that we begin a lifelong process of sensing the relationship among the parts of our bodies when we recognize that our

mother is a whole entity. Images and sensations of wholeness and cohesion in art, religion, and music provide us with a maternal equivalent of wholeness and counter the universal tendency to "go to pieces." Goldenberg emphasizes that integration requires that we sense relationships among the parts of our bodies, our sensations, our emotions and our thoughts, that we do not simply live in our heads. The performing arts are acts of interpretation appropriated through the body, and consequently, as I will argue, offer art educators aesthetic forms they can draw upon to both literally and symbolically integrate art education into students' lives.

Errand Into Form

I would like to suggest a framework for reading a work of art that places two unlike practices, writing and the gestural life of the body in dialogue. How does the quality of our understanding transform when our bodies are drawn upon to physically articulate our experiences with a work of art? Let us imagine such an act of interpretation as a duet between the speaking body and the dancing body, between loquacity and muteness. In the world of school, both of these voices are to a great degree suppressed, a suppression that is symptomatic of a disorder between the body and speech. Our movements, like speech, are social acts, produced by and within social discourses. They are not "pure" forms of expression. What they bring to our understanding is a knowledge of our origins, traditions, customs, and desires. Bodies, like words, are not only legible, they are comprehensible (Dempster, 1988). I comprehend my child's desire to be held, her arms outstretched, her face looking up toward me, her arched back and balance just a bit off, in the way I would read a presentational, rather than a discursive form. I understand her desire in a moment through the totality of her gestures. I do not read her facial expressions first, and then her arched back as in discursive reasoning where we work through one idea at a time and the total intuition of relatedness comes to us at the conclusion (Langer, 1955). The presentational form captures feelings, intuition, and desire. This form, like the total structure of relations which constitute our lives, is understood only through the meaning of the whole, through our relations within the total structure. It is within the context of community that multiple interactions are encoded as presentational symbols. In art, as in the spaces where we live, the look, the touch and the distance we keep from one another and the objects framing our lives are meaningful; this meaning is grasped through the corporeal processes of perception and intention (Salvio, 1990).

The moment I encounter Georges Seurat's Sunday Afternoon on the Island of La Grande Jatte, I too straighten my back and look toward the lake. For some reason, my breath deepens and I am conscious of the sound of my voice. My initial response to this work of art is perceptual; I seize its initial meaning via my bodily responses to it. Through my inclination to gesturally mime the configuration of objects and orient my body in the virtual space of the painting, I locate my entry into the world of La Grande Jatte. This moment of gestural mimesis discloses a level of my consciousness that joins my corporality, that field of sensibility which enables me to apprehend myself and others with my intentionality. Although I alone may feel the sensible confinement of Seurat's painting, the painful breathlessness and the cultural constraints of bodily life, the signification of this constraint can be communicated to other people and felt by other people. My intentions are expressed through my somatic response; discursive language is one form used to elaborate on or refine responses.

Gestural mimesis is by no means akin to the doctrine of mimesis. The doctrine of mimesis holds that a description of representation, in other words, what a viewer might say about a work of art, is a process of perceptual correspondence where the image is said to match, with varying degrees, a fully established reality. This doctrine, writes Norman Bryson, (Bryson, 1983) "is untroubled by the question of whether that prior material is constituted from unequivocally empirical sensory data or from a nonempirical 'vision' without counterpart in the objective world: for as long as the original vision, of whatever nature, is imparted, the conditions of mimesis have been fulfilled (Bryson, 1983, p. 38). Also known as the doctrine of perceptualism, the doctrine of mimesis holds that problems of art are subsumed by the psychology of the perceiving subject, as if the subtext existed outside of history. Bryson argues that this doctrine overlooks the social character of the image. According to the concept of perceptualism, perception is a cognitive rather than a corporeal event.

A detailed discussion of the doctrine of mimesis is beyond the scope of this paper, however what is crucial to understanding the concept of gestural mimesis is that it departs from the doctrine of perceptualism in that it literally embodies the viewer's corporeal, kinesthetic response to a work of art. This initial response, however, like a child's imitative acts, requires a playful space in which it can be explored. A child makes the passage from an imitation of acts to an imitation of persons who possess complex

emotional lives through a process of play. Through play the child is able to change perspectives, to play for example, at being a parent. A child can reproduce a parent's tone of voice and gait to perfection. In play, children bring to form the stylized body of authority. Play creates a context for children to explore the emotional meaning embodied in the gestures and tones they perform. As these gestures are adopted to fit their experiences in the world, imitation is superseded (Merleau-Ponty, 1966).

In the context of responding to a work of art, gestural mimesis acquires epistemic potential when we interrupt its flow, when we frame it so to speak, so we can explore its emotional import. This interpretive process requires that we create a "playing space." In the theatre of Bertolt Brecht, a method called *Verfremdung*, or v-effect is used to distance spectators from the assumptions they bring with them to the spectacle. *Verfremdung* is an artistic device used to develop an attitude of inquiry and criticism on the part of the audience. Like Brecht, art educators can use the v-effect to gain access to the ways in which students experience a work of art. Brecht's concept of the social geste, mediates our perceptual response to a work of art and the historical, political, aesthetic, or epistemological meaning it embodies. Students might create a social geste which represents selected social relations depicted in Seurat's painting. Another possibility might be to create a social geste from students' performed gestural mimesis. In the theatre of Brecht, the social geste acts as an intervening agent which stops the movement of the action and enables the audience to comment on what might have been acted on stage. In the context of the visual arts, the social geste might act as an intervening agent that interrupts the use of space, color, perspective, and density so the emotional import of these elements can be explored.

Like theatre, perception is an event which is mediated through the body. The modern theatre provides us with a repertoire of methods that give shape to our responses to a work of art. The word shape comes to us from the Late Latin, *capulare*, which means to cut. In Old English it is associated with the word *gesceap*, which means form or creation. The act of giving shape to something implies a breaking away from, a cut, or transgression, and then an investment, a making of something new. The process of forging separation is wrought with contradictions and ambiguities. When students give physical shape to their perceptions of a work of art, they both transgress the limits of tradition, while at the same time making physical their identification with it. I have found that lodged in our gestures are

contradictions between spoken language -- what we might say about a work of art -- and what our kinesthetic movements suggest we actually felt about it. Our experiences are inscribed in our gestures. They are an index to what the philosopher Susanne Langer (Langer, 1967) calls the "inside story of our own history, the way living in the world feels to us." When we elaborate on the kinesthetic responses we have to a work of art, we are, in effect locating ourselves in the fictive, virtual world, which although inanimate, animates our bodily sensations. The domain in which these bodily sensations occurs is that of society: they are fully material and observable actions. Gestural mimesis returns perception to its corporeal domain. When used as an interpretive strategy, it also makes physical the social codes which the image activates (Bryson, 1983). Just as the Liberal Arts privileged speech, so the visual arts privileges sight. They inculcate a way of looking at something, a method of surveillance that locates power, (and hence the right to designate what is beautiful and not so,) in the eyes of the beholder. I would like to suggest that if art educators come together with teachers of drama, they might create methods of exploring a work of art that are truly integrative in that they provide students with opportunities to sense and trust the relationships among situation, sensation, and thought.

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**A CASE OF LEGITIMATION:
ART EDUCATION'S MOVEMENT INTO THE CORE
CURRICULUM**

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Abstract

The changing character of art education at this time provides a unique opportunity to observe and understand how a field of study begins to take on the traditional, institutionalized characteristics of general education. To examine the characteristics and processes of art education's movement into the core curriculum, the following will be discussed: (1) current trends in art education and art policy, (2) characteristics of general education, (3) relationships between current trends in art education and characteristics of general education, and (4) the testing of art learning as illustrative of the movement toward general education characteristics.

**A Case of Legitimation:
Art Education's Movement into the Core Curriculum**

Art instruction for purposes of creativity and personal development which has, for many years, been well-established in art education is now in the process of changing. Statements in current guidelines and proposals in art education suggest that instruction should deal with art as a discipline with its own unique knowledge base, that instrumental (extra-art) benefits of art study should be eschewed, and that art learning outcomes can be and should be evaluated through standardized or criterion-referenced tests (Beyond Creating, 1985; Davis, in press; Greer & Hoepfner, 1986; Toward Civilization, 1988). Although many of these assumptions and characteristics are common fare in other subject areas (usually denoted as "academic" subjects), they represent radical changes for art education.

The purpose of this paper will be to discuss the developing and evolving rationales and practices of art education as these relate to institutionalized characteristics of academic subject areas within general education. To examine the process of legitimation as art education moves toward core curriculum status,¹ the following will be discussed: (1) current trends in art education and art policy, (2) characteristics of general education, (3) relationships between current trends in art education and characteristics of general education, and (4) the testing of art learning as illustrative of the movement toward general education characteristics. Testing will be discussed in relationship to how major education and art education organizations have promoted and supported testing, how rationalizations have been presented for standardized testing,² how the case for testing has sometimes been exaggerated, and how testing institutes changes that ripple throughout the art curriculum. The manner in which it was proposed that art learning be tested will serve as a specific example of how quantification, accountability, and predictability of learning art outcomes are being used to legitimate art study as a discrete discipline with core curriculum status.

A Brief on the Background for Change

The current movement toward core curriculum status can be traced to, roughly, the early and mid-1960s when art education researchers and theorists such as Barkan (1962; also see Mattil, 1966) suggested that art education should consist of the study of its parent disciplines and their professional role models, i.e. art criticism and art critics, art history and art historians, studio work and artists; this discipline-centered approach was designated as aesthetic education. Although a great deal of discussion and research resulted in the following years, aesthetic education remained essentially theoretical in nature.

In 1982, the J. Paul Getty Trust formed the Getty Center for Education in the Arts and began the search for a theory of art instruction that would eliminate perceived inadequacies of studio-based instruction, place art on par with other subjects, and have the support of major art education academicians (*Beyond Creating*, 1985). The Center selected characteristics of aesthetic education to form the criteria for initial surveys of the field conducted by the Rand Corporation and later for proposals for curriculum implementation. Subsequently, the Getty Center for Education in the Arts began a programmatic thrust to implement instruction based on art's defined

disciplinary nature; this was designated as discipline-based art education or DBAE (Greer, 1984), wherein it was believed that art learning outcomes not only could be evaluated but that they should be evaluated.

The crucial and perhaps determining factors for DBAE's possible widespread and even national implementation are its relationship to the characteristics of general education and the way in which those characteristics have been adopted in the promotional, programmatic actions of many discipline-based proponents. Discipline-based proponents have found support from the long-standing and highly regarded aesthetic education theory of the 1960s, as well as from reform proposals and movements current throughout the rest of education. In addition, there is a certain amount of dissatisfaction with the status quo by art education decision-makers (read: "academics") based on the perceived ineffectualness of traditional art classroom practices. These characteristics, coupled with the support of the philanthropic, governmental, and professional organizations, have set the stage for art education, through its formal organizations, to develop policies and practices that support the disciplinary status of art instruction and its movement into the core curriculum.

Characteristics and Processes for Core Curriculum Status

In this paper, an examination of how art education is beginning to copy traditional education practices proceeds from a social theory perspective on education via the work of Apple (1982), Bowers (1984), Callahan (1962), Gouldner (1979), and Popkewitz (1977), among others. These researchers have examined and discussed the characteristics of general education in terms of modernist values, bureaucratic efficiency, economic decision-making, business and industry models, the replication of social structures, and often the reproduction of social inequities. Institutionalized modal characteristics of modern educational practices encompass the use of textbooks, standardized testing, denotative learning, expert-originated materials, and Euro-American subject content. Such curriculum content and practices support a consensual model of education based on accountability, simplification, abstract and expert-defined knowledge, prespecified outcomes, and predictability.

Entrance into an existing institution is made possible, or at the very least facilitated, if the assumed characteristics and processes of change are compatible with the institution, in this case, general education and its core

curriculum of academic subjects. It is also highly helpful if the characteristics of the existing institution are themselves relatively precise and definable, provide authority to designated experts (individuals can become self-defined experts merely by being involved in the process of change), and are capable of being replicated in a variety of contexts, i.e. are relatively context-free and capable of being nationalized.

Testing as a Key to Core Curriculum Status

In past decades in the United States, it was often believed that children's learning in art classes eluded traditional forms of evaluation. This situation is changing. Day (1985) believes "that the use of educational evaluation is perhaps the aspect that distinguishes most dramatically between what is traditional and what is contemporary in art education" (p. 232).

"If it is tested, it will be taught" is the rallying battle cry for those who see testing as an expedient for gaining educational legitimation. Standardized testing has been described as a focal influence from which other educational practices develop, i.e. teacher-proof curricula, standardized curricula, lecture methods of instruction, teaching for minimum competencies, and so on (Haladyna, Nolen & Haas, 1991; Hamblen, 1987; Paris, Lawton, Turner & Roth, 1991; Smith, 1991). In this paper it is suggested that standardized testing provides a key to core curriculum status in that it encompasses the means, the rationales, and the rewards for compliance to the characteristics of the existing educational institution (see Apple, 1982; Bowers, 1984; Callahan, 1962; Gouldner, 1979; Popkewitz, 1977).

To examine how art education's movement toward core curriculum status is being accomplished, the following processes and characteristics will be discussed in relationship to proposals for standardized testing in art: (a) proponents for change select key or essential aspects for implementation from which other aspects of change will follow; (b) change is proposed to eliminate perceived, current inadequacies; (c) the appearance of consensus and inevitability is given to the proposed change; (d) success of implementation is exaggerated; (e) the negative aspects of change are not made explicit, and criticisms of change are dismissed through indifference or intimidation; (f) a noncritical stance is taken toward key aspects of change; (g) the proposed program for change replicates the most established and

conservative aspects of the existing institution, noncritical stances are taken toward the existing institution and its problematic aspects; (h) controversial issues are simplified; (i) strict adherence to the characteristics of the existing institution result in overcompensation and distortions; and (j) support solicited from major educational organizations and agencies legitimates the change.

Core Curriculum Membership Promises to Eliminate Inadequacies

Although Day (1985) cited a range of ways in which art learning can be evaluated, in many instances, evaluation has come to be equated with standardized or criterion referenced testing that conforms to the usual objective, pencil-and-paper forms of testing (Greer & Hoepfner, 1986). The apparent appeal for standardized testing and all it entails is that it appears "right." Such art testing would allow art education to fit in with the rest of education.

Change is Presented as Inevitable

To give the movement toward core curriculum status the patina of inevitability, art testing has been presented as supported by a broad-base of important and powerful agencies, and as nearing implementation. Endorsements for formalized assessments are found throughout the literature (Davis, in press). In 1985, the Council of Chief State School Officers stated that there is "a definite trend toward standardized testing in the arts" (Olson, 1986, p. 11). According to a state education survey conducted by this council, "Ten states currently employ standardized testing to assess achievement in the arts on a statewide basis" (p. 5). In the December 1986 issue of the NAEA (National Art Education Association) News, it was reported that 12 states have some form of art assessment. Proposals from major governmental, professional, and philanthropic organizations create the belief that testing is an accomplished fact -- or imminent. In either event, a climate has been created that is receptive to standardized testing implementation.

Success is Exaggerated

From the rhetoric, one would not suspect that at this point standardized testing in art is still primarily promotional or in its planning stages (Davis, in press). In 1988, Finlayson found that of the 10 to 12 states

supposedly employing standardized testing, only 3 states (Connecticut, Minnesota, and Utah) actually use such tests, and only 1 of those (Minnesota) had repeated its statewide testing assessment. Finlayson (1988) found, however, that various states are considering standardized testing, are designing tests at this time, or are compiling test item data banks; Davis' (in press) more recent survey and analysis confirms this trend.

A Noncritical Stance is Taken: Dissent is Minimized

Published, promotional statements on testing minimize or more often ignore the downsides and controversial aspects of standardized testing (Greer & Hoepfner, 1986). Conflict, debate, controversy, and the selective value base of a discipline-based program are not part of promotional literature or programmatic actions. Formalized criticism of core curriculum status has been cited and dismissed as merely instances of wrong thinking, nay-saying, or professional jealousies (Eisner, 1988; Feinstein, 1989; Hamblen, 1989). The result has been a general failure to examine the many implications of testing and a failure to examine the value system from which testing proponents are proceeding.

Negative Aspects of Testing are Ignored

The well-developed critiques of testing that are very much part of general education theory and research are not part of art education promotional materials (Bullough & Goldstein, 1984; Davis in press; Paris et al., 1991; Smith, 1991; Sternberg & Baron, 1985; Stiggins, 1985). Since most art teachers lack a background in testing and measurement, they will have to rely on experts for test design and the interpretation of results. In such instances, testing experts become, in effect, the designers of curriculum content. To this extent, when art education moves into the core curriculum, teachers must buy into a system that has predefined rules that have to be learned and followed (Paris et al., 1991; Smith, 1991).

Conservative Aspects are Adopted

The general education reform movement of the 1980s was itself an impetus for changes in art education; however, it is not the reform or, in Kuhn's (1970) terminology, the revolutionary aspects of general education reform that are promoted by testing proponents. A desire to be part of the core curriculum is dovetailing with the salient characteristics of traditional

practices in general education, i.e. standardization of instruction and learning, predictability of student outcomes, primacy of denotative learning, and a reliance on curriculum and testing experts and on teacher-proof curriculum materials.

Simplification and Distortion of Content

Standardized testing promises to eliminate the messiness of qualitative evaluation procedures. Not surprisingly, testing in art, to date, has focused primarily on factual information, formal qualities, basic design principles, and on the identification and formal analysis of Western fine arts that are considered exemplars (*Art Inventory*, 1985; Finlayson, 1988). These constitute knowledge and skills that can be quantified and are amenable to standardization. A tautology has developed in that what can be tested in an objective manner becomes what is considered to be fundamental art knowledge and skills (McReynolds, 1990).

The Ironies of Overcompensation

Although many art educators see standardized testing as a way of legitimating art's inclusion in the core curriculum, reformers in general education often view this type of assessment as a major cause and symptom of failures in the total educational system (Bob, 1986; Paris et al., 1991; Smith, 1991; Stiggins, 1985). In opting for standardized testing as the way to evaluate art learning, art educators are entering thoroughly charted territory that many educators have found to be devoid of value beyond what it offers in the way of accountability and efficiency. Most standardized testing requires lower cognitive responses, presents information nonproblematically, and does not allow for the negotiation of meanings (Bullough & Goldstein, 1984; Finlayson, 1988; Paris et al., 1991).

Broad-based Support is Solicited From Established Institutions

Not surprisingly, standardized testing in art is not a grassroots idea. Rather, standardization assessments have endorsements from almost every major private and public art and educational organization in the United States (*Beyond Creating*, 1985; Davis, in press; *Toward Civilization*, 1988). Essentially all major education and art education professional organizations have been contacted through conferences and meetings, with critics excluded or given minor attention.

Conclusion

While art educators are seriously contemplating standardized testing, many educators in core curriculum disciplines are highly critical of such types of testing and standardized curricula (Haertel, 1986). Some educators even suggest that true educational reform is contingent upon the elimination of standardized testing (Bob, 1986; Stiggins, 1985; Twiggs, 1986). Moreover, although some art educators are seeing traditional general education practices as a means of legitimating art instruction, other educators are seeing the traditional studio-based art classroom as offering instructional methods and forms of evaluation that could benefit the rest of education (Gitomer, Grosh & Price, 1991; Hamblen, 1987; Twiggs, 1986).

Characteristics of art education which are now being promoted, if not embraced, by major art educators, philanthropic organizations, and professional organizations were only five to ten years ago considered anathema to the purposes of art instruction. Considering the magnitude of current changes in art education and how drastically they differ from previous ideas on art curriculum and instruction, it is essential that aspects of these changes -- such as are revealed by trends toward standardized testing -- continue to be documented and analyzed.

Footnotes

1. This paper deals with the movement toward core curriculum membership. For a discussion of the extent to which discipline-based programs might actually be implemented and successful in the 1990s and beyond see Arnstine (1990) and Hamblen (1990).
2. Distinctions between traditional pencil-and-paper standardized testing and other forms of standardized assessments are not explored in this paper, e.g. Arts PROPEL in the Pittsburgh schools and national art testing in the Netherlands encompass standardized qualitative assessments of student learning through portfolios and journals (see Gitomer, et al., 1991). Also, Davis (in press) discusses a range of forms standardized accountability can take in assessing student learning and teacher performance.

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THE DEVELOPMENT OF INVENTED MUSIC NOTATIONS: A COUSIN TO INVENTED SPELLINGS

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Over the past decade, a strong and influential movement called "whole language" has resulted in the restructuring of many teachers' approaches to the teaching of reading and writing. Based on the work of several researchers, culminating in a number of well-known books (e.g., Atwell, 1987; Calkins, 1983, 1986; Graves, 1983), this movement has helped teachers recognize and encourage original work by children. The acknowledgment of the importance of original and creative writing by children, complete with "invented" spellings and unconventional uses of language, has sparked a renewed interest in the development of the writing and reading by children. The research reported here is based on the premise that if children learn to read and write more readily through actively engaging in the writing process, then they would similarly learn to read and write music more readily through writing music. If this is the case, researchers need to identify patterns of development of invented notations as children's invented notations come to approximate conventional music notations, just as researchers have done in the related field of invented spellings.

The present study describes how children's invented notations of music develop in ways that are parallel to the development of invented spellings, as documented by Gentry (1981, 1982) and others (e.g., Dyson, 1984). The research indicates that when children are exposed to a "whole music" approach, either during private music lessons or in a classroom setting, their music notations change in predictable ways as they learn to standardize their use of symbols.

Theoretical Framework

Many studies on children's invented notations have focused on describing the development of notational systems for rhythm sequences in controlled settings (e.g., Bamberger, 1980, 1982; Davidson & Scripp, 1988; Davidson, Scripp, & Welsh, 1988; Hildebrandt, 1985; Smith, 1989; Upitis, 1985, 1987a). In these studies, attention was given to the features of the

rhythms children were asked to notate, the musical skills of the children, the types of notations generated by the children, and in some cases, children's development of rhythm notations as related to their general cognitive development. As Davidson and Colley (1987) pointed out, studies such as these provide a fragmented picture of children's ability to remember, notate, and reproduce rhythm patterns, since most researchers concentrated on one or two of the issues, and in so doing, failed to link the various aspects. Davidson and Colley suggest that one way of reducing the fragmentation in the research on notations is to concentrate less on delineating the features of the rhythms and more on the abilities of children, using more "child-centered measures." One way of developing more child-centered measures is to use tasks and melodies which occur naturally within children's musical contexts (e.g., Davidson & Scripp, 1988, used "Row, Row, Row Your Boat" as a melody; Davidson, Scripp, & Welsh, 1988, used "Happy Birthday"). Another way is to examine the children's own compositions. Both approaches were used to gather the notations discussed in the present study.

A few studies have described notations for melodies children themselves have composed, on both traditional and nontraditional instruments (Borstad, 1989; Uptis, 1987b, 1990b). However, these studies do little more than show the breadth and variety of symbols used by children when they are inventing notations for their own compositions. There is yet to be a systematic, longitudinal examination of invented notations for invented pieces. The research reported in the present study provides a framework for establishing such a longitudinal study on a large scale.

In the meantime, just as the early work on rhythm understanding was aided by an examination of children's notations of other people's rhythm sequences, the work on children's understanding of melody can be enhanced by looking at children's notations of other people's melodies. In fact, some researchers argue that there is a parallel development in children's ability to produce spontaneous and familiar songs (McKernon, 1979). Therefore, one might expect there to be parallels in the notation systems for invented and familiar melodies as well. Evidence for this assumption was found in the present study.

Much of the research, I will refer to in this paper, on young children's notations of melodies, familiar and unfamiliar to them, was conducted by members of Harvard's Project Zero. Those researchers have found that children use a variety of symbols to notate familiar melodies (Gardner, 1983;

Davidson & Scripp, 1988; Davidson, Scripp, & Welsh, 1988). Davidson and Scripp (1988) reported that 5-year-old children at the beginning of a three-year study developed considerably in their abilities to encode melodic information over the three-year period. At the beginning of the study, the 5-year-old children were primarily using pictures and abstract symbols, by age 6 language and melodic contour were often incorporated in the notations, and by age 7, children were able to combine language and abstract symbols in such a way that several features of the melody were notated. The typology proposed by Davidson & Scripp at that time suggests that children move from using no units (Level 0), to units of some kind (Level 1), to the description of melodic contour or intervallic boundaries (Level 2), to the description of regulated pitches (Level 3). In a later study, with untrained 10-year-olds and untrained adults, where subjects were asked to notate a familiar melody, it was found that the notations of older untrained subjects were comparable to those made by the 7-year-olds in the earlier study (Davidson, Scripp, & Welsh, 1988). Evidence supporting both studies is described by Uptis (1990c).

Related literature on the development of invented spellings can be found in the work of Gentry (1981, 1982). Gentry (1982) proposed that children progress through five levels of spelling: (1) the precommunicative stage where alphabetic symbols are used to represent words, (2) the semiphonetic stage where there is a letter-sound correspondence, (3) the phonetic stage where the mapping of letter-sound correspondence is mastered, (4) the transitional stage where a move is made toward standard English orthography, and (5) the correct stage where further growth is an extension of strategies previously developed. The present research was undertaken to examine the possible parallels in these five stages to the development of invented music notations.

Method

The notations analyzed in the present study were collected in a variety of settings, from over a thousand children, over a number of years. The children ranged from 3 to 15 years of age, and were mixed in terms of gender, socio-economic status, and race. Most of the children studied lived in Ontario or Massachusetts, although a small number lived in England and Africa. The settings from in which notations were generated included private music lessons, classrooms, camps, and homes of friends and colleagues. As well, unsolicited offerings of notations made to the

researcher by children are included. Sometimes the notations were discussed with the children, sometimes they were not. Anecdotal recordings were made of some conversations. No attempt was made to standardize the collection of these notations. As Graves (1983) found, records of all types of children's writings (collections of papers, books, diaries, anecdotal recordings) added to his growing understanding of the writing process. Further, he argued that the simplest collections, those that are gathered almost informally over a long period of time, are the ones that last, and are the kind that teachers themselves can manage. Thus, the analysis presented in the following section is based on the same kind of data used by researchers representing the field of whole language, literally thousands of notations collected over the past decade.

Analysis and Results

Two ways of analyzing the notations governed the classification of the children's work. First, the typologies of Davidson and Scripp (1988) and Gentry (1982) were used and compared. Second, the notations were considered in terms of whether the child was notating his or her own melody, or a melody of someone else's creation. The ways in which the notations were collected were not used as a way of classifying the children's work, since the patterns that emerged appeared to be found in each of the settings (private lessons, research settings, classrooms, personal contacts). Also, no attempt has been made in the present study to establish quantitative measures depicting either the relative proportions of different kinds of notations or the ages at which given notational types are most likely to emerge. There are two reasons for this. The first is that a comparative typology, the main function of the present paper, needs to be established so that quantitative studies might successfully be launched. The second is that, while the order of notational development appears to be fixed, children exhibit representations of a given type at a wide variety of ages, presumably because music instruction is much less uniform than instruction in reading, writing, and spelling, and therefore, more variance occurs. Thus, while Davidson and Scripp (1988) found that 7-year-olds could notate melodic contour or intervallic boundaries, other researchers have found this kind of notation emerging at a much later age (e.g., at 9 years; Linton, 1991). In the collection of notations used in the present study, the depiction of melodic contour was found in the notations of children as young as 5 years, particularly if they were involved in composition, and as late as 10 years of age if they were not.

It was noted earlier that the typology proposed by Davidson and Scripp (1988), based on the notations made by children of other people's melodies, suggests that children move from no units or pictures (Level 0), to units of some kind (Level 1), to the description of melodic contour and/or intervallic boundaries in the case of pitch, and pulse or grouping in the case of rhythm (Level 2), and finally, to the description of regulated pitches and integrated pulse and grouping (Level 3). The latter three of these stages roughly parallel the semiphonetic, phonetic, and transitional stages of invented spellings identified by Gentry (1982). When children's notations of their own compositions are included, as in the present study, music notations that parallel the first spelling stage (precommunicative) and last stage (correct) are evidenced as well. Some of the notations produced by children for their own compositions, particularly for the middle stages, are indistinguishable from the notations collected by Davidson and his colleagues. This is to be expected. The developmental level of spelling is reflected both in spelling tests and in children's original writing. Similarly, the tasks set by Davidson and others might be regarded as "spelling tests", while the notations produced by children in the composition process might be seen as corresponding to spellings made in original writing. Thus, just as different information comes from examining children's original writing than from examining spelling tests alone, so too new information can be gleaned by looking at what children produce to record their own compositions and not only what they produce to notate a given melody.

Stages of Spelling and Notation

Precommunicative Spelling and Early Communicative and Iconic Notation

Examples of precommunicative spelling and what can be seen as a parallel stage in music notation for children who have been exposed to music symbols appear in Figure 1. Just as the child in the precommunicative stage who makes strings of letters that don't form words, the child who plays with music symbols creates combinations that don't make melodies. Gentry (1982) argues that at this very earliest level of spelling development, children often use single letters of the alphabet to represent entire words. In so doing, the children demonstrate that they have some knowledge of the alphabet, nevertheless they have no knowledge of letter-sound correspondence. Further, children at this stage may or may not understand that the text of our culture is read from left to right. Gentry has observed

that often, when children at this precommunicative stage of spelling, numbers are mixed in, upper and lowercase letters are mixed indiscriminately, and a preference is shown for uppercase letters. The use of music symbols shown in Figure 1 can be described in similar terms. (See Figure 1: Precommunicative spelling and early communicative and iconic notation.) The child demonstrates some knowledge of standard music symbols and understands that they have meaning, but the child may not understand how a given symbol represents pitch or duration. As with the precommunicative stage of spelling where a child may use a single letter to represent an entire word, a child may well use a music symbol to represent an entire piece of music. In some cases the symbols may mean nothing, the child is merely playing with symbols, or, as one child put it, "drawing music for fun." Further, the child may or may not understand that music also has left-right directionality. A child at this stage of notational development may make drawings, letters, and numbers to accompany the symbols of music. In the same way that a precommunicative speller may mix upper and lowercase letters, a child playing with the symbols of music may mix symbols of various types of meaning (e.g., different durations, clefs).

Because Davidson and his colleagues (1988) did not include settings where children were learning about music symbols, their first stage of invented notation differs substantially from the other invented music notation pictured in Figure 1. The stage they identify as the no units stage (Level 0) essentially represents children's attempts at writing something down, an icon or a picture, presumably in part because this is the expectation of the researcher. Other researchers have called this stage the iconic stage (Upitis, 1990c; Linton, 1991). Arguably, however, the music notation in Figure 1 is qualitatively different from the iconic stage. Like the precommunicative speller who is somewhat aware of the alphabet, the child making the notation with music symbols in Figure 1 is somewhat aware of a "musical alphabet", or the symbols of standard music notation. For this reason, it is perhaps better to think of this stage of development of music notation as an early communicative rather than a precommunicative stage, differentiating these notations from the no units or iconic stage described by researchers looking at children's invented notations of a given melody (Davidson & Scripp, 1988; Linton, 1991).

Semiphonetic Spelling and Units Notation

At the next stage of development there is a much closer link among the Davidson and Scripp (1988) typology, the Gentry (1982) typology, and the notations made by children for their own compositions. This is the case regardless of whether the child is using standard music notation symbols or nonstandard symbols for notating music sequences.

At the semiphonetic stage of spelling development, Gentry (1982) has found that children first begin to understand the principle of an alphabet, and that letters are related to sounds. At this stage, children may use letters to represent entire words. The representation of the words may be phonetic, but in an abbreviated form (see Figure 2). For instance, semiphonetic spellers may use one letter for an entire word, particularly if the word sounds like the letter such as R for are. These children understand that text is read from left to right, but may or may not segment words. (See Figure 2: Semiphonetic spelling and units music notation.)

At the level of units (Level 1) identified by Davidson and Scripp (1988), the child begins to represent discrete notes with separate symbols. Like a child at the semiphonetic stage of spelling who may use one or more letters to represent an entire word, the child may use only one or more symbol for an entire musical phrase, but not one symbol for each note. Children who are using standard notation symbols, but only capturing unit information make similar notations to those recorded by Davidson and Scripp (1988) (see Figure 2).

Children at this stage of notating usually make representations that are to be read from left to right. In music, however, when more than one note is being played at the same time, there is also a vertical dimension. When children are creating their own compositions, and not responding to a target phrase of unaccompanied notes, they often have difficulty representing the vertical dimension at this stage (e.g., showing which notes are to be played at the same time by different instruments).

Phonetic Spelling and Contour, Intervals, and Grouping or Pulse Notation

At the phonetic stage, children systematically represent the sounds of the words through their spelling. (See Figure 3: Phonetic spelling and

melodic contour, intervallic boundaries, and pulse or grouping notation.) They also develop consistent ways of dealing with recurring details, e.g., -ed endings. Further, at this stage, children are usually well aware of word segmentation, although they may segment words at inappropriate junctures. At the phonetic stage, however, letters are assigned only on the basis of the sound they make, without regard for conventions of letter sequence or orthography (Gentry, 1982).

The next stage of invented music notation development is undoubtedly the most difficult to describe, since so many features of music are now considered by the child. Predictably, the parallels between invented spellings and invented notations are also more obscure at this stage. Perhaps this is because the inherent differences between notating music and spelling words are made most apparent, as children grapple with the complexities of notating pitch and rhythm, and when composing their own pieces, texture, mood, repetitions, and dynamics as well (Upitis, 1987b, 1990a, 1990b).

There is also the most diversity in music notations at this level (see Figure 3 for various examples). Thus, one child may notate rhythmic groupings consistently, but be unable to describe those groupings in terms of pulse. Conversely, another child may notate the pulse without showing the figural groups. In the case of melody, there is some indication that the child understands the shape of the melody at this stage, and even the relationship of one note to the next in terms of pitch. He or she may nevertheless still be unable to consistently notate both rhythm and pitch in such a way as to allow a reader to reproduce the melody from the notation. Again, as with spelling, much of the music grammar is in place; children realize that in notating rhythm, pulse and groupings are important, and that in notating pitch, intervals and contour are salient. Similarly in spelling, children have developed rules for dealing with certain kinds of word endings, but not necessarily in conventional ways.

Transitional Spelling and Regulated Notation

When children reach the transitional stage of spelling, many conventions of English orthography are consistently represented (Gentry, 1982). Vowels are used in every syllable, and children begin using such conventions as the silent e to make a long vowel sound (e.g., TIP [for type] becomes TIPE). Many of the spellings that children use at this stage are visual (e.g., YOUNITED [for united]), as children begin using familiar

visual combinations in the words they spell. Sometimes all letters are included, but not necessarily in the right order (e.g., HUOSE [for house]). At this stage, of course, some simple words are consistently spelled correctly (e.g., HAT), but as Gentry (1982) points out, developmental cues are easier to discern from mistakes than from correct spellings.

A child who has reached what Davidson and Scripp (1988) identify as the stage of recording regulated pitches along with both pulse and grouping in a rhythm notation may also be seen as reaching a transitional stage of invented notations (see Figure 4). In some ways, these notations are already "correct", in that they capture the essence of pitch and rhythm. Thus, just like the child who spells some words correctly and consistently, a child at this stage may notate some elements of a melody correctly and consistently, such as pulse and grouping. However, at this transitional stage, pitch, while regulated, is not absolute. (See Figure 4: Transitional spelling and regulated pitches or pulse and grouping notation.) In other words, while one can tell both the contour of the melody, and the relative pitch levels, one cannot reconstruct absolute pitches. Thus, one cannot tell, for instance, whether to start singing on a D or a G, although once the right starting position is found, the other pitches fall into place.

Correct Spelling and Standard Notation

It was stated earlier that when children's notations of their own compositions in the context of music teaching were included, evidence was also found for the correct stage, where children learned to use standard notational symbols in a standard and regulated way. Unlike spelling development, however, researchers interested in music notation are prepared to accept more than one correct form of music notation. For instance, what Davidson and Scripp (1988) term regulated (Level 3) notation may well be seen as a form of correct notation, if it is successful in capturing the rhythmic and melodic elements of the melody, so that the original composition can be performed from the notation. However, not all regulated forms of notation are successful in this way, and would more appropriately fall under the transitional category described previously.

At the correct stage of spelling development, which of course can exist at many different levels, as can regulated notations, children have a large body of words that they spell correctly, reflecting their knowledge of English orthography and the basic rules thereof (Gentry, 1982). Another

feature of correct spelling is that silent consonants are used correctly, and the child can think of alternate spellings for a given word when attempting to come up with the correct or standard spelling. The correct forms of music notation, whether with standard notation symbols or other symbols, are most notable for two features: the child understands the concept of absolute pitch and is successful at notating rhythm in a metered way. An example of a correct notation, using standard music notation symbols, is given in Figure 5. This notation was of the child's own composition and was produced, four years later, by the same child whose music notation was shown in Figure 1. (See Figure 5: Correct spelling and regulated or standard notation.)

Research and Educational Implications

While the parallels between invented notations and invented spellings are in some sense crude, it is interesting that similar patterns were found, both for notations of familiar melodies and original compositions. Clearly, one of the factors that limits what might be a closer correspondence is that children receive less instruction in music notation. Thus, while typical ages and ranges of ability for spelling and notating were not formally considered in the present study, it is not surprising, as one soon notices when examining the data, that children learn to spell sooner than they learn to regulate their music notations. There are, nevertheless, remarkable similarities in the development of these two types of symbol systems. Perhaps even more important, the presence of such similarities may help teachers of music engaged in teaching standard notation to their students enhance their techniques by adopting some of those used when teaching reading and writing through a whole language approach.

Further longitudinal study is needed to verify and elaborate on the patterns described in the present research and from the related work by Davidson and his colleagues. Thus, it is important that children are studied over several years, in different contexts, performing different notational tasks, and with differing musical experiences in terms of exposure and instruction. This kind of information would be invaluable to teachers interested in teaching standard notation from a child-centered viewpoint. Just as teachers have learned ways of enhancing children's invented spellings in a manner that is congruent with the development of spelling, so too can teachers learn to enhance children's invented notations. For instance, while teaching word segmentation would make sense during the phonetic stage, it would make no sense to introduce such a concept when the child spells

semiphonetically (Gentry, 1981). Likewise, teaching ways of notating regulated pitches would make little sense if the child is primarily interested in describing melodic contour. On the other hand, as with any stage theory, some children appear to pass through some stages almost invisibly, depending on the kinds of interventions that have been made and on the individual strengths of the child. In the same way that Bissex's son only touched the semiphonetic stage of spelling (Gentry, 1982), some children, such as the child described in a previous paper (Upitis, 1987b), appear to move directly from icons or early communicative music symbols to regulated pulse and groupings.


Perhaps most important of all, teachers who pay attention to spontaneous invented notations, particularly in the context of their own compositions, give children the message that they are honoring the children's work. If children's compositions were thus honored in a whole music approach, as their text is within a whole language framework, would they not come to see themselves as composers, as they now have opportunities to see themselves as writers? This in turn might make it possible for children to become musicians in the fullest sense.

Figure 1: Precommunicative spelling and early communicative and iconic notation


Precommunicative spelling (Bissex, 1980, p. 4)



Early communicative notation (Upitis, present study)



Iconic notation (Upitis, 1985)



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Figure 2: Semiphonetic spelling and units music notation

Semiphonetic spelling (Bissex, 1980, p.3)

RUDF

[Are you deaf?]

Units notation and melody (Davidson & Scripp, 1988)

⌋ ⌋ ⌋ ⌋



Life is but a dream.

Figure 3: Phonetic spelling and melodic contour, intervallic boundaries, and pulse or grouping notation

Phonetic spelling (Bisex, 1980, p. 12)

I WIL TECH YOU TO RIT AD THESE EZ HAOW U RIT KAT BAT MAT
DOG RAKET ROWBOW T LOLEPOP MOP DODO DUMDUM
BOOBEE RESAS MUPS BLAKS DOEN WEPRWEL

[I will teach you to write and this is how you write cat, bat, mat, dog, racket, rowboat, lollipop, mop, dodo, dum dum, booby, recess, mumps, blocks, doing, whipporwill.]

Grouping notation and melody (Davidson & Scripp, 1988)

Lalala



Life is but a dream.

Pulse notation and melody (Davidson & Scripp, 1988)

/// V



Life is but a dream.

Melodic contour and dynamics notation (Upitis, 1987b)
[in this notation, low means softly]





Figure 4: Transitional spelling and regulated pitches or pulse and grouping notation

Transitional spelling (Bissex, 1980, p. 61)



Regulated pitches notation and melody (Davidson & Scripp, 1988)




Life is but a dream.

Pulse and grouping notation and rhythm pattern (Upitis, 1985)



Pulse and grouping and nonregulated notation and melody (Upitis, present study)



"and then you keep going up"

Figure 5: Correct spelling and regulated or standard notation



Correct spelling (Bissex, 1980, p. 76)

I saw a man and when he
saw me he said "put him down
put him down magic carpet to
the ground. The carpet stopped
(lying) and landed. I said who are
you? I am the owner of the
carpet you are sitting on.
was what he said. I didn't
know what to say. Then
he said I could teach you
the magic words. Would you like
to take that? Yes I would
he taught me all the
magic words for up a-

♩ 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

Regulated music notation with nonstandard symbols, and melody in standard notation
(Upitis, present study)

[The numbers indicate which fingers are to be used to play the recorder, the instrument for which this song was composed. The length of the bar gives the duration of the note.]



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
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