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ABSTRACT

This hearing focused on a bill to amend the Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act of 1974 to identify violent and hard core juvenile offenders and treat them as adults. Opening statements by four U.S. senators (the Honorable Fred Thompson, Herbert Kohl, Joseph R. Biden, Jr., and Orrin G. Hatch) present various perspectives on the role of the federal government in dealing with the problem of increasing youth violence. Following that are prepared statements by Senator John Ashcroft; Shay Bilchik, Administrator, Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, U.S. Department of Justice; a panel consisting of Laurie E. Ekstrand, Associate Director, Administration of Justice Issues, General Government Division, U.S. General Accounting Office; Ira Schwartz, Dean, School of Social Work, University of Pennsylvania; and Lavonda Taylor, Chair, Coalition for Juvenile Justice, West Memphis, AR; and a panel consisting of Marvin E. Wolfgang, Professor of Criminology and of Law and Director, Selin Criminology Center, University of Pennsylvania; Delbert S. Elliott, Director, Center for the Study and Prevention of Violence, University of Colorado, Boulder; and Terence P. Thornberry, Professor, School of Criminal Justice, State University of New York at Albany, NY. An appendix presents questions and answers. (SM)

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ED 435 780

YOUTH VIOLENCE: OVERSIGHT OF FEDERAL PROGRAMS

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON YOUTH VIOLENCE

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY

UNITED STATES SENATE

ONE HUNDRED FOURTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

ON

S. 1245

A BILL TO AMEND THE JUVENILE JUSTICE AND DELINQUENCY PREVENTION ACT OF 1974 TO IDENTIFY VIOLENT AND HARDCORE JUVENILE OFFENDERS AND TREAT THEM AS ADULTS, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES

MAY 8, 1996

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YOUTH VIOLENCE: OVERSIGHT OF FEDERAL PROGRAMS

WEDNESDAY, MAY 8, 1996

**U.S. SENATE,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON YOUTH VIOLENCE,
COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY,
*Washington, DC.***

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:22 a.m., in room SD-226, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Fred Thompson (Chairman of the subcommittee), presiding.

Also present: Senators Biden and Kohl.

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. FRED THOMPSON, A U.S. SENATOR FROM THE STATE OF TENNESSEE

Senator THOMPSON. The hearing will come to order, please. I apologize for being late. We had a rollcall vote starting at 10 o'clock. Senator Ashcroft is scheduled to be our first witness and I assume that he will be here shortly, but in order to utilize our time as best we can, I think I will make a couple of comments while he is arriving and hopefully by the time I have finished, he will be here.

Today, the Subcommittee on Youth Violence holds a hearing on oversight of Federal programs designed to prevent youth violence. The basic Federal approach of prevention of youth violence has changed little since the 1970's. The Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act, born out of the conditions of juvenile incarceration and the nature of juvenile violence a quarter century ago, focused State receipt of prevention funds on outcomes unrelated to stopping violent crime.

The act created within the Justice Department the Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention. That office has spent more than \$1 billion over the last 22 years in efforts to prevent youth violence. Yet, youth violence has skyrocketed in that time. Youth violence has become more severe, and shockingly violent offenses are being committed by younger and younger persons. A week cannot pass without another news account of a brutal crime committed by a young person. The savage beating of an infant by 2 young children, aged 6 and 8, is only the most recent shocking example.

Clearly, we must do better. We seem to have little to show for all the prevention money that has been spent, except compliance with the mandates that the act imposed all those years ago. We have a different problem to solve today, and despite all the years and all the money, we seem to know little more about preventing

(1)

youth violence today than we did in 1974. Unless we try some new approaches that we know will make a difference, we are going to be hit in a few years with a youth crime wave that will make today's environment be recalled with nostalgia. That is what the demographers keep telling us.

When people think about preventing youth violence successfully, do they think of the Justice Department's Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention as a leader? If a local government wants to take action to prevent youth violence, does OJJDP have demonstrated programs that can help? When, for instance, it was learned that the Big Brothers/Big Sisters program had been studied and found to dramatically reduce youth violence and drug abuse, the sponsor of the research was a non-profit group in Philadelphia.

How is OJJDP allocating its discretionary funds? Some does go to programs like Big Brothers and Big Sisters, but how much effort and funds are used in ways that are not addressing the serious youth violence that is pervasive in the country today? Are OJJDP funds being targeted effectively? Is OJJDP carefully monitoring their use, and is OJJDP learning whether its funds are being used to successfully prevent youth crime?

These are the questions that will be addressed today, among others. We will hear from Senator Ashcroft about the additional mandates that he would like to see on the States. We will hear from OJJDP Administrator Shay Bilchik, former OJJDP Director Ira Schwartz, and a number of respected academics, including Memphis and Shelby Crime Report coauthor Marvin Wolfgang. I want to welcome all of our witnesses.

Senator Kohl, do you have a statement?

**STATEMENT OF HON. HERBERT KOHL, A U.S. SENATOR FROM
THE STATE OF WISCONSIN**

Senator KOHL. Thank you very much, Senator Thompson. Today, we will hear several very different views on where the Federal Government should be going in its effort to fight juvenile crime. Let us put our cards on the table. Some people want to abolish the Office of Juvenile Justice entirely. In my opinion, that would be a bad idea. I would like to briefly tell you why.

First, OJJDP is the only place in the Department of Justice charged with investing in prevention efforts, and make no mistake about it, prevention is essential because although adult crime has generally continued to decline, we all know that juvenile crime will continue to increase and will soon become a tidal wave. In the words of one criminologist who testified before our subcommittee, this calm before the storm won't last much longer. While punishment is certainly part of the answer, we cannot arrest our way out of this problem. We must reach today's at-risk teenagers before they become tomorrow's hard-core criminals.

Second, in comparison to much of Washington's bloated Federal bureaucracy, the Office of Juvenile Justice is almost a model of efficiency. It spends only 3 percent of its money on administrative costs. Most of the rest of its funding goes directly to States and localities. I am all for reducing Federal agencies, but let us get rid of the bad ones first.

Third, in a very real sense this office actually helps to make sure that at all levels of government our money is going to approaches that work. For example, the Milwaukee community has long supported a program called Summer Stars, which combines recreation, education enrichment, employment counseling and coaching. But what impresses me most about this program is that an evaluation showed that it resulted in a 27-percent decrease in robberies and a 40-percent reduction in auto thefts in targeted areas. So we are getting some bang for our buck.

Unfortunately, the Federal Government has not always supported efforts to monitor the success of prevention programs, so Senator Cohen and I have introduced legislation to address this problem. But at least the Office of Juvenile Justice is trying to figure out what works and what doesn't work, and that is a much needed start.

Fourth, the office collects national information on juvenile crime, fosters new experiments with demonstration projects, and leverages Federal money into better ways to prevent violence. For example, the Title V Challenge Grants have distributed almost \$30 million to State governments to support a broad range of prevention efforts, and the States have responded by contributing over \$17 million themselves to these projects in matching funds. This is exactly the way in which the Federal Government should be working, in a partnership with States and localities on innovative ways to prevent juvenile crime, and most State officials agree on that.

Mr. Chairman, while the Office of Juvenile Justice has never been perfect, we are far better off with it than without it, so we are particularly fortunate to have Shay Bilchik heading up this important office. If there is anyone who can help us see our way through a solid strategy to address juvenile crime, it is a former prosecutor who cares deeply about young people.

So I thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I look forward to this hearing today.

Senator THOMPSON. Thank you, Senator Kohl.

Senator Ashcroft has arrived and, Senator, any statement that you might have for us, welcome.

**STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN ASHCROFT, A U.S. SENATOR FROM
THE STATE OF MISSOURI**

Senator ASHCROFT. Thank you, Senator Thompson. I want to thank the Senator from Wisconsin for his participation in this opportunity for me to talk about one of the most important challenges that I believe America faces.

There is a stunning, startling and alarming dynamic in the statistics about crime. If one reads the news magazines and the newspapers, at least as it relates to statistics we read that the incidence of violent crime has been declining in the 1990's. Yet, if one disaggregates the statistics, one learns that youth crime is not only growing in terms of the numerics, but it is growing in terms of its intensity and in terms of the sort of arrogance and the violence that is related.

Juvenile violence is becoming an epidemic across the United States of America, and so the declining crime rate generally masks a very important thing which we must recognize as a nation, and

that is that young people are committing not only more crimes, but those crimes are more and more aggressive.

In speaking with John DiIulio, the Princeton Professor on Criminology, he indicates that when he talks to individuals who are incarcerated in our penal institutions, they are fearful, and I asked them what they are fearful of and he said young violent juveniles who are now committing crimes about which no sense can be made and for which no reason can be explained, and the random nature of the violence is stunning and startling and inducing fear even in the hearts of those hard-core individuals who are doing long sentences in our institutions.

This past weekend, a 14-year-old Anderson, IN, boy was charged with rape and strangulation of a 69-year-old woman who lived seven homes away. The boy was on probation at the time of the killing. He is charged with murder, rape, robbery, burglary, theft, confinement, and aggravated battery in the case.

On Monday, the Washington Post reported that four members of a teenage militia group were charged with killing a high school band director who had questioned them about a can of gasoline the teenagers had planned to use in burning down their school auditorium. There was additional information that the teenagers had planned to go on a killing spree using costumes from a theme park and targeting ethnic minorities in their plan.

Now, the Federal Government has not ignored the problem of juvenile delinquency. For a long time, we have been substantially committed to trying to do something. GAO issued a report identifying 131 Federal programs administered by 16 different departments and other agencies which serve delinquent and at-risk youth.

In fiscal year 1995, conservative estimates of Federal appropriations used for at-risk and delinquent youth programs was over \$4 billion. In fiscal year 1995, Congress appropriated \$155 million for juvenile justice programs under the Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act of 1974 for programs such as prevention and treatment, more effective education, treatment, rehabilitation, education and social services designed to address the social and development needs of juveniles, to provide health and education, and for juvenile mentoring programs.

I think it is safe to say that the evidence indicates that somehow we have failed to stem the tide. We have a substantially increasing rate of violent crime among juveniles. In spite of these 131 programs, \$4 billion in investments in at-risk youth and 16 different departments and agencies focusing attention and efforts here, the job has not been done. The murder rate for 14- to 17-year-olds grew by 22 percent from 1990 to 1994, and the problem is going to get worse, I am afraid, much worse.

What is interesting is that 7 percent of the juveniles who are committing crimes commit about 70 percent of the violent juvenile crime. There are repeat offenders. These are the individuals for whom the approach of treating them in a special way has provided a shield for their activities. I believe that there is a way to deal with this narrow group of individuals who are not being reached by our efforts and who are, as a matter of fact, frequently using our efforts as a means to further their objectives.

I have held hearings across my State in maybe a dozen different sites. I have heard police officers tell me of youngsters who know that their status as juveniles provides them with protection. I have heard police officers tell me that they are prevented from sharing information about juveniles with school officials. I talked to one police officer assigned to a school because of the dangerous nature of the area and neighborhood, and he cannot communicate his witnessing of a crime committed on the school grounds by a juvenile to the school principal because of rules that restrict the transfer of that kind of information.

I have talked to high school teachers who have seen students come into their classes with electronic shackles or bracelets around their ankles and the students say, well, you know I have committed a crime, a serious one, or I wouldn't have this kind of device, but you can't know what I did because I am a juvenile and I am protected.

Well, I believe that we have to take a different approach and I have filed Senate bill 1245, the Violent and Hard-Core Juvenile Offender Reform Act. I introduced it last September. The measure would strengthen the Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act. This act, which has focused on the 93 percent of those who offend but has not been effective in any significant way against the 7 percent who become hardcore, violent offenders, I believe, needs amendment and adjustment in this respect. These are the offenders who are not amenable to treatment and rehabilitation. I think these are individuals who need to be punished in proportion to the seriousness of the harm that they have inflicted.

The current program prohibits States from incarcerating the least violent juveniles who run afoul of the justice system. There is a requirement that they not incarcerate status offenders, and sometimes I believe that is probably counterproductive. Some of those students would be better off incarcerated.

I just noticed this last week in the St. Louis Post Dispatch, in a series about teens who were in trouble, "When teens exceed limits of tolerance, troubled girl offers up advice to the courts." "Just lock us up," she said. I think sometimes the young people have a sense of knowing that they are so immune from punishment, sometimes an immunity which is required by the Federal law, as it is in this case for some of those offenses, that they themselves know they would be better off.

If the Federal Government can dictate to States that they cannot jail the least problematic of juveniles, I think the Federal Government ought to say that it relates to these most violent that they must treat them as adults. Those who are predatory, hardcore, repeat juvenile offenders that commit murder, rape, armed robbery, armed assault, or major drug offenses ought to be treated as adults.

In order to qualify for continuing participation in the program, Senate bill 1245 provides that States would treat such individuals, 14 years of age or over, as adults for the commission of those crimes. My view is that this would be a life-saving measure. It would save the lives of a number of juveniles who have mistakenly thought as a result of our current position in regard to these issues that they were somehow authorized to commit crimes.

Two years ago in St. Louis, a young person, thinking he was still a juvenile at the age of 17, murdered a woman and threw her off a bridge, bragging that he couldn't be prosecuted. Well, he made two serious mistakes, of course a very serious mistake in murdering the woman, but second he thought that 17 was an age of immunity, when 16 was the last age of juvenile treatment in the State of Missouri. We don't need, though, individuals to be in a position of trying to assess whether or not, because of their age, they will be treated differently.

I believe that we should require that for serious offenses and for third offenses which would, if committed by an adult, be considered as a felony, individuals should be treated as adults by States, and I believe that if they are going to be spending the Federal resources in that respect, they should be required to so treat them.

I noted that the OJJDP program requires States to use funds for projects designed to develop and implement programs stressing advocacy activities aimed at improving services for and protecting the rights of youth affected by the juvenile system. Well, I believe we ought to require States to spend money on advocacy activities to protect the rights of victims, as well, and one of those activities would be to make sure that those individuals are treated as the criminals they are.

The bill could be summed up in three words—responsibility, records and relationships. The bill would provide that States would seek prosecution against 14-year-old and older juveniles who commit murder, attempted murder, forcible rape, serious drug offenses, and certain serious offenses while armed with a deadly or dangerous weapon, namely armed robbery and assault and battery, as adults. It also provides that juveniles who have two prior felony adjudications will be subject to adult criminal prosecution on their third charge for a felony offense. This is a bill that is designed to address the narrow group of individuals who have simply said that they are going to be involved in things that we don't normally consider juvenile offenses.

No. 2, records: The bill requires States to create and maintain records on juveniles. I talked to judges in my State who were sentencing individuals for having committed murder. They thought they were sentencing first offenders, and some time during the proceedings inadvertently the information would come out that these individuals had not lived in our State for a long period of time and they would find out that they were from another area. There is a lot of mobility in the juvenile population these days and there is no way to cross-reference for purposes of sentencing or otherwise addressing the responsibility we have for incarceration when individuals commit heinous crimes.

It looked like this was the person's first murder. It subsequently was revealed, although very difficult to find out because of the nature of juvenile records, that the person had committed several other killings, whether they be defined as murders as not because the individual had been a juvenile at the time, prior to the time of this adult offense. So the bill would encourage and require States to maintain records on juveniles age 14 or over for the offenses that, if committed by an adult, would have been classified as a felony. Those juveniles under age 14 adjudicated delinquent in

any of the enumerated crimes I mentioned earlier would have their conviction records made available to necessary parties.

The last point—I said responsibility; they would have to be responsible. The States would have to be maintaining records. There are certain related parties that I think deserve the records, and primarily this is that I think juvenile records on those kinds of criminal activities should be made available to individuals in schools. To say to a school teacher, I committed a violent crime, you know it because I wear an electronic shackle, but I will not tell you and you cannot find out because it is in another State, even if your State has access to juvenile records, and expect that teacher to turn her back on the student and walk to the blackboard and begin a class and expect the class to have the kind of decorum and serenity necessary to learning, I think, is unreasonable.

This bill would require that juvenile criminal records of juveniles 14 and older adjudicated delinquent for conduct constituting a felony would be available to adult criminal courts, law enforcement agencies, and school officials so those school officials could have some awareness of the nature of the individuals that were in their classes.

I don't believe that this is punitive. I believe that this is constructive. I believe that school officials can do a better job if individuals who are in their charge are individuals about whom they have a complete awareness and an understanding so they can address the needs of those individuals.

I urge this committee to favorably consider Senate bill 1245, the Violent and Hard-Core Juvenile Offender Reform Act, and to implement these very reasonable and measured responses to the problem of the approximately 7 percent of the juvenile offender population which is not responding to the act as it is currently constituted.

Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Senator Ashcroft follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHN ASHCROFT

In America today, violent juvenile predators prowl our businesses, schools, neighborhoods, homes, and parking lots, leaving in their wake maimed bodies, human carnage and desecrated communities. The latest incomprehensible tragedy is only as far away as the nearest newspaper or the latest TV news.

This past weekend, for instance, a 14-year-old Anderson, Indiana boy was charged with the rape and strangulation of a 69-year-old woman who lived just seven houses away, did not know each other. The boy, already on probation at the time of the killing, is now charged with murder, rape, robbery, burglary, theft, confinement and aggravated battery in the case.

On Monday, The Washington Post reported that four members of a teenage "militia" group were charged with killing a high school band director who had questioned two of them about a can of gasoline he saw them with. The teenagers had planned to use the gas to burn down their school auditorium. The group's master plan was to steal costumes at Disney World and go on a shooting spree that would target blacks.

With violent juvenile crime escalating across the country from the east coast to the west coast, from north to south, running rampant to both large, metropolitan areas and in small rural communities, with juvenile violence creating an environment of fear around the nation, our response has been to throw more money at more social programs on delinquency prevention, treatment, or even recreation. Recently, the General Accounting Office issued a report identifying 131 federal programs—administered by 16 different departments and other agencies—which serve delinquent and at-risk youth. In fiscal year 1995, the estimated amount of federal appropriations used for at-risk and delinquent youth was more than \$4 billion. America has

an acute social illness that cannot be cured with money spent solely on social programs.

I need not recite to members of this Subcommittee numerous statistics showing the violent crime rate soaring. You know that our country is facing a serious problem, you know that the murder rate for 14- to 17-year-olds grew by 22 percent from 1990 to 1994, and you know that the problem is going to get worse, much worse.

Last September, I introduced the Violent and Hard-core Juvenile Offender Reform Act (S. 1245) in an attempt to deal with the 7% of juveniles who commit roughly 70% of the violent juvenile crime in America. The measure would strengthen the Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act. That Act has ignored the small percentage of juveniles who are responsible for the vast majority of serious offenses committed by juveniles. These are the offenders who are not amenable to treatment and rehabilitation. They should be punished in proportion to the seriousness of the harm inflicted.

The bill can be summed up in three words: Responsibility; Records; and Relationships. These three words should be the top priorities of the juvenile justice system.

One, Responsibility: The bill would encourage states to seek prosecution against 14-year-olds and older juveniles who commit murder, attempted murder, forcible rape, serious drug offenses (as defined by Federal law), or certain serious offenses while armed with a dangerous or deadly weapon, namely, robbery, assault and battery. It also provides that juveniles, who have two prior felony adjudications, will be subject to transfer to adult criminal court on their third, subsequent charge for a felony offense.

Two, Records: The bill encourages states to create and maintain records on juveniles, age 14 and older, for offenses that if committed by an adult would be classified as a felony. And, those juveniles under age 14 adjudicated delinquent of any of the enumerated crimes I mentioned earlier will have their conviction recorded and made available to necessary parties. It would also encourage states to transmit juvenile criminal records to the Federal Bureau of Investigation for inclusion in the criminal identification database.

Three, Relationships: Under the bill, the juvenile criminal records of juveniles 14 and older adjudicated delinquent for conduct constituting a felony would be made available to adult criminal courts, law enforcement agencies, and school officials. The public will have access to the records of those juveniles who are found guilty of two or more felonies.

Responsibility. Records. Relationships.

Responsibility: Serious, violent, and chronic juvenile offenders must be held responsible for their actions.

Today we are living with a juvenile justice system that was created around the time of the silent film. We are living with a juvenile system that reprimands the crime victim for being at the wrong place at the wrong time, and then turns around and hugs the juvenile terrorist, whispering ever so softly into his ear, "Don't worry, the State will cure you."

The juvenile justice system's primary goal is to treat and rehabilitate the juvenile offender. Such a system can handle runaways, truants, and alcohol offenders; but it is ill-equipped to deal with the small number of offenders who commit serious, violent, and chronic juvenile crime.

The criminal justice system, not the juvenile justice system, can emphasize that adult criminal acts have real consequences. The purpose of the criminal justice system is to punish, that is, to hold defendants accountable.

Responsibility. Records. Relationships.

Records: States need to create and maintain juvenile criminal records.

Typically, state statutes seal juvenile criminal records and expunge these records when the juvenile reaches age 18. The time has come to discard anachronistic ideas that crimes, no matter how heinous, by juveniles must be kept confidential.

Our laws view juveniles through the benevolent prism of kids gone astray. It should view them as young criminals who know that they can commit crimes repeatedly as juveniles because their juvenile records are kept hidden under "the veil of secrecy." These young criminals know that when they reach their eighteenth birthday, they can begin their second career as adult criminals with an unblemished record. In rhetoric we are protecting juveniles from the stigma of a record but in reality we are coddling criminals. We must separate rhetoric from reality by lifting "the veil of secrecy."

Responsibility. Records. Relationships.

Relationships: Criminal courts, law enforcement agencies, and school officials need to build working relationships by sharing juvenile criminal records.

For purposes of adult sentencing, adult courts need to know if a convicted felon has a history of criminal behavior.

According to the 1991 Survey of Inmates in State Correctional Facilities, nearly 40 percent of prison inmates had a prior record as a juvenile. That is approximately 4 in 10 prison inmates. My legislation will not enable criminals to masquerade as neophytes before the criminal justice system.

Law enforcement officers need to know the prior juvenile criminal records of individuals to assist them in criminal investigations and apprehension.

It encourages States to share juvenile record information within their subdivisions and with other States. Under the bill, if a juvenile is arrested, the police will be able to access other state criminal history records. With more information, law enforcement officials will be able to make more intelligent decisions, like whether to detain or release a juvenile arrested for a serious crime.

The sharing of juvenile records would assist law enforcement agencies. While visiting with several law enforcement officers I heard the same recurring problem—when police officers arrest juveniles they have no idea with whom they are handling because the records are kept confidential. This “veil of secrecy” undermines law enforcement efforts.

School officials need access to juvenile criminal records to assist them in providing for the best interests of all students.

The decline in school safety can be attributed to laws that protect dangerous students rather than innocent students. While visiting with school officials in Sikeston, Missouri, a teacher told me that a student came to school wearing an electronic monitoring ankle bracelet. The student told the teacher, “You don’t know if I’m a murderer or a rapist and I ain’t gonna tell you.” That student was brutally honest. No one had any knowledge of what he had done and, more important, no way of finding out.

If schools know the identity of a violent juvenile, they can respond to misbehavior by imposing stricter sanctions, assigning particular teachers, or having the student’s locker near a teacher’s doorway entrance so that the teacher can monitor his conduct during the changing of class periods. In short, this bill would allow school officials to take measures that could prevent violence at schools.

The last proposed change to the Act is a provision that allows State and local governments to use the federal funds to implement the Serious Habitual Offender Comprehensive Action Program (“SHOCAP”). SHOCAP is a multiagency crime analysis and case management process for identifying and targeting the violent and hard-core juvenile offenders in a community.

SHOCAP targets these serious habitual offenders for the most intensive social supervisory interventions, the most intensive accountability in school attendance and discipline, and the most intensive investigation and prosecution when they commit a crime.

The OJJDP conducted five test pilots of SHOCAP. Oxnard, California was one of the selected sites. SHOCAP was implemented in 1983. Oxnard found that less than 2% of all juveniles arrested in that community were responsible for 35% of felonies by juveniles. Four years later, Oxnard’s violent crime dropped 38%. Illinois and Florida both have recently established statewide SHOCAPs. This bill would allow all jurisdictions to use federal funds to implement SHOCAP.

In sum, the bill would send a clear, cogent, and convincing message: serious acts have serious consequences.

Senator THOMPSON. Thank you very much, Senator Ashcroft. I appreciate your testimony. You have been early into this problem and you have certainly identified some of the major problems that we have in this area, and I certainly commend you for your work.

I agree with so much of what you have said. I do want to ask you about an area, though, that troubles me and it is something that we all have to continually confront here. That is taking a problem that clearly is very serious and getting more serious all the time, seeing that it is an area that has been for many years under the domain of the States—and, of course, you have been Governor of the State of Missouri for two terms; you are more familiar with that interplay, the federalism, than probably anybody—and taking that, in a sense, from the States and imposing mandates on the States, replacing some mandates that you and I probably would agree are either outdated, unnecessary, or unwise, and replacing them with our own requirements and our own mandates.

There have been several occasions since I have been here where I have had to say I wish this would happen, I wish this were done, this is a good idea, but I don't think it is a good idea for the Federal Government to get the States in the position where they are required to do it.

Governor Bush, a friend of both of ours, and the speaker of the House of Texas and others have formed a Texas crime bill work group, and they have some of the same problems. They feel that this would impose significant costs on Texas. Texas has already lowered the age of certification to 14 for capital felonies and 15 for other felonies, and the courts have discretion to treat the 14-year-olds as adults if they choose to in a particular case. Texas has adopted a definition of "serious habitual offender" that is really broader than the definition contained in your bill.

So I know you share some of these same general concerns on the issue of federalism that I do. Is it the nature of the problem or the size of it that causes you to think that this is an area where the Federal Government ought to get more involved?

Senator ASHCROFT. Well, I want to say to you that I appreciate not only this question, I appreciate the way in which you have asked it. It is a sensitive question and I struggled with it. I not only spent 8 years as Governor of my State, I spent 8 years as attorney general of my State. Every criminal appeal that was rendered in my State was under my jurisdiction.

There are a couple of things. There is something about the nature of the problem, the mobility of young people now. So many urban centers literally transcend State lines and transcend school district lines, State boundaries, so that the States are not entirely capable of maintaining a capacity to protect themselves.

In one way, you look at this as something that has been reserved to the States for a long time, and in another way you can look at it as something that the States have been involved in a federal system for a long time. If you look at this as a crime problem rather than as a juvenile problem—and I think, frankly, we are going to have to face up to that this is a crime problem. We have had national statistics and national availability of criminal statistics for a long time because we knew that States were not an effective border to criminal activities.

As I indicated, I spend a lot of time talking to prosecutors, juvenile officials, school teachers, and school officials. I talked to a sheriff in Moniteau County, MO. Now, that is pretty rural. I said, what is your biggest problem, and he said, well, we have got some young people in the county coming in to muscle their way in to establish the dope trade in the county. I said, well, what is different about that? He said they are from—I forget whether he said Cleveland or Detroit. He said they can't get information on them.

The so-called segregation of the juvenile problem from the crime problem has been—it is an artifice now. Young people didn't used to travel from one State to another. These people can make tracks faster than Bonnie and Clyde ever thought they could. You have Bloods and Cripps in small towns or in larger cities across the country that come from the more urban areas.

So one point that I make in terms of the character of things—now, everybody knows that the character of the crime is at least

as heinous, if not far more, and random and more violent than we have seen, and less predictable. But it is also far more interstate, and once this is viewed as a crime problem rather than as sort of a unique problem that is a juvenile problem, we get into a category of treating people like we basically have for long periods of time with records. It has been treated nationally. The FBI has been a clearinghouse for national records from time immemorial.

Senator THOMPSON. Well, I appreciate what you are saying. I guess my concern is that we certainly are a more mobile society and technology has brought us all closer together and allowed us to get on the other side of the country within a few hours and all of that. My concern is that if we are going to justify that for beginning to federalize our crime problem, I don't know where we stop.

Senator ASHCROFT. Well, I suppose that is the case, but if we are going to be spending the kinds of resources that we ought to spend, in my judgment, I would like to see us spend it in a way that can be productive, and to tie a hand behind our back by not providing that information be shared, et cetera, and these individuals be treated in a way which is likely to curtail their behavior—this doesn't federalize juvenile crime generally. It federalizes people who have committed three felonies to the extent that information would be maintained about them, or they have committed crimes which are so heinous and so substantial that it is essential that there be a record which is available.

This is not designed to address the 90-or-so percent of young people who shouldn't ever get into this system because these are the folks who have an encounter with our juvenile justice system and it is very successful. They either get the bejabbers scared out of them or they get their act together and they are never back, and this basically wouldn't affect them.

Senator THOMPSON. Well, I appreciate your comments and your testimony.

Senator Biden.

Senator BIDEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would like to ask unanimous consent that my opening statement be placed in the record as if read.

Senator THOMPSON. Without objection. Also I would like to submit the prepared statement of Senator Hatch.

[The prepared statements of Senators Biden and Hatch follow:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR., A U.S. SENATOR FROM THE
STATE OF DELAWARE

This is the third in a series of hearings on the reauthorization of the Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act. Once again, the subcommittee has proceeded in a bipartisan fashion, and I want to thank Chairman Thompson for proceeding in a manner most likely to result in legislative proposals which will strengthen the Juvenile Justice Act.

Today we are focusing on the oversight of Federal programs for prevention, intervention, treatment, and sanctions of at-risk and delinquent youth, as well as the role Federal research, evaluation and technical assistance plays in helping to improve the cost-effective delivery of effective services and programs.

I believe the Federal Government has a crucial role to play in addressing the increasing juvenile crime problem—and that without the Federal Government leadership, States, are left disadvantaged in their struggle to save our children from crime and drugs.

The Federal role is important for two reasons—first the States need the assistance of Federal funding in order to continue to develop effective programs for con-

trolling youth crime—a growing problem that most State juvenile justice systems are woefully ill-prepared to meet.

But, even more importantly, money is not enough. There simply are things that the States cannot do as efficiently nor as comprehensively as the Federal Government. National leadership on the youth crime issue is essential.

Reform of our State juvenile justice systems cannot be done in a timely or cost-effective manner if each State has to invest their own money and learn only from their own successes and failures.

Isolating each State will only mean wasted resources and effort. Information about a program already tried in one State can help other States know what has proven ineffective as well as what viable alternatives have proven successful.

In addition to the role the Federal Government can play in financially supporting efforts and expanding the knowledge base of policy makers and practitioners, national leadership is also important for the role it plays in guiding long-term strategies and leveraging dollars for investment in the future rather than in short-term fixes.

The Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act and the Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention both embody these ideals of Federal, State, and local partnerships.

To cite an example of their partnership in action, the Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention released the comprehensive strategy for serious, violent and chronic juvenile offenders in 1993. This strategy was a compilation of research and program evaluation from prevention, intervention and treatment programs in local communities around the country.

Successful programs from across the spectrum from prevention to punishment are included in this strategy, along with a model for replicating programs at the local and State levels.

No entity other than the Federal Government would have been able to collect, evaluate, and organize this information in a timely and cost effective manner—creating a viable model for State and local policymakers and practitioners to follow.

It is undertakings such as these which I believe are vital to helping curb juvenile crime nationwide. I look forward to hearing from our witnesses today on their views of the Federal role in the Juvenile Justice System.

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. ORRIN G. HATCH, A U.S. SENATOR FROM THE STATE OF UTAH

Currently, there are 131 federal programs being administered by 16 different agencies to combat youth crime and delinquency at a total cost of \$4 billion in FY 1995. Not only are these programs not being monitored effectively, but they are not curbing youth crime.

Let me cite a few statistics from Juvenile Offenders and Victims published by the Office of Juvenile Justice:

In 1994, juveniles accounted for 19 percent of all violent crime arrests, 17 percent of murders, 16 percent of forcible rapes, 16 percent of aggravated assault.

Between 1985 and 1994, the percentage growth in juvenile arrests for murder, robbery, and motor vehicle theft far surpassed the growth in adult arrests.

During the years between 1988 and 1994, the rate of juvenile arrests for violent crimes increased by more than 50 percent.

The Federal Government, however, continues to pour money into programs that are not accountable for the success or failure of the program. The GAO produced a study in March of this year for Senator Kassebaum that attempted to track all federal programs and all Federal resources that go for prevention of delinquency. They concluded that "the current system of Federal programs for at-risk or delinquent youth creates the potential for overlap of services * * * and raises questions about the overall efficiency of Federal efforts to assist at-risk and delinquent youth." [GAO/HEHS-96-34]

In addition to that GAO study, there is the GAO study of OJJDP that Ms. Ekstrand will be discussing today. GAO found that the Office of Juvenile Justice does not conduct adequate monitoring of either formula or discretionary grants. In fact, for the discretionary grants that were reviewed by GAO, they found; "No quarterly program and financial reports were included in 11 of the 78 files for which projects had been ongoing for at least 2 quarters at the time of the review, and 1 or more reports were missing from another 61 files. Only 6 of the 78 files had program and financial reports for all quarters of work completed."

The formula grants were not monitored on an annual basis as required by statute because OJJDP felt that on-site visits were time-consuming and expensive. Without

monitoring programs, there is no way that the Office can know if the grantee is conducting the program efficiently or effectively.

The Office of Juvenile Justice produces a book "What Works: Promising Interventions in Juvenile Justice." If you take a look at the book, however, you may be surprised to learn that there are no program evaluations or outcome measures of one single program. This book should be called What Works? We don't know. Most of the programs in the book do not have evaluation components. If there is an evaluation component, there is not even a hint that the program was successful.

For example: Intensive Probation: targets serious, chronic and violent offenders. Of the 4 programs listed in the book dealing with intensive probation, 3 require no evaluation and the fourth does not provide data on the success or failure of the program.

Deschutes County Secure Intervention Program: targets sex offenders. Evaluation date was February 1993, but there is no mention as to success of participants.

These programs are dealing with our most hard-core violent youths, and we don't even know if they are successful. If the programs are successful in deterring this abhorrent type of behavior, then why aren't the results published in the book? If the programs are not successful, we need to know this as well. We do not want to allow a sex offender to attend a program that has a high failure rate—and then send him back out into society.

We have all these programs being administered and no results to tell us what works and what doesn't. Throwing money aimlessly at programs has not reduced the crime rate of juveniles. I am eager to hear what justification there could be for continuing to dump the taxpayers' money into projects without seeing evaluations on the success or failure of these programs. I would also like to hear the witnesses opinions on what type of massive overhaul the federal government needs to take on to consolidate and coordinate the programs and evaluations.

I want to thank our witnesses for being here this morning. I look forward to reviewing their testimony.

Senator BIDEN. The chairman has asked the first question I was going to ask, and I guess, having sat in this committee for years and dealt with this subject, it is hard to come up with a principled rationale, any of us—I don't mean you, Senator—as to where Federal jurisdiction should stop. I have been trying for a long time.

It seems to me that one of the principled rationales that at least sets parameters is those things that, in fact, are not able to be contained within a State's borders or handled by a State; that is, the drug trade. That is why we federalized many of the drug offenses because no matter how good Missouri is, no matter what they do, they are not going to stop the drug trade that comes down from Chicago or up from New Orleans or east from New York City.

Senator ASHCROFT. And we do some export, too, I am sorry to say, but you are right.

Senator BIDEN. Right, you do. I wasn't suggesting that your State or any other State is pristine. My point is you can't control it. You can't control organized crime. You can't control terrorism. You can't control certain things, no matter how good you are. You just don't have the resources or the jurisdictional capability of crossing lines. That is why we wrote the Violence Against Women Act, the same rationale.

It is getting kind of down to, you know, one-way mandates. If you like my mandate, I think—let us assume that we had people testifying today, and to the best of my knowledge we don't, that showed there was overwhelming evidence that keeping records sealed had a positive effect on the juvenile justice system. Then the argument for that case would be as compelling because it seems ultimately the principled rationale you have here is that this is a serious problem and either some States are not responding to it or those States

that have responded to it are not able to get cooperation from States that haven't.

So the bottom line is we are going to go in—and I think I agree with you—we are going to go in and tell States who have chosen, their State legislatures, unlike Texas—you mentioned Ohio. I don't know Ohio's case. Let us assume those young men were from Cleveland, OH, or Detroit, MI, Michigan or Ohio. If, in fact, the State of Ohio has a prohibition on making known the backgrounds, the criminal records, of juveniles—your local sheriff picks up the phone and calls Ohio and says, we have got a kid down here named Charlie Jake, he is from Detroit, we know that, we have his license, can you tell me about him, does he have a criminal record?

If Michigan law says you can't do what you are asking us to do, then I think I am inclined to agree with you, that we should overrule the judgment of the governor and the legislature of Ohio.

Senator ASHCROFT. Pardon me, if I may.

Senator BIDEN. Sure.

Senator ASHCROFT. I am asking that if they are going to benefit from a full share of juvenile justice funds, they have to have a fully cooperative—yes.

Senator BIDEN. Well, I mean—

Senator ASHCROFT. There is a 25-percent penalty. You can only get 75 percent of the otherwise available funds if you don't comply.

Senator BIDEN. Right. The second thing I would like to ask you about is—and you may want to answer for the record because of either time constraints or the availability of information at your fingertips right now. As I read the legislation, on page 5, subsection (e), lines 7 through 14, defines a serious drug offense and then you cite what sections of the law in the Criminal Code we are referring to.

Basically, it covers a pretty broad spectrum of drug offenses, and so I guess what I am looking for is can you—or if you could have your staff submit for the record an outline of what each of these drug offenses are because I don't know whether they are major or not major. I expect they are.

For example, I just got out the code and in one section it is pretty clear it is major. It says, "In the case of a violent of subsection (a) of this section involving subsection (i), 1 kilogram or more of a mixture, 5 kilograms, 50 grams," et cetera. It goes down. They are pretty hefty amounts.

Senator ASHCROFT. I would be happy to respond to that on the record. The State definitions were all over the map on this and we felt that the Federal laws about drug trafficking were pretty clear, and so we will respond.

Senator BIDEN. Good. That would be helpful.

[The information referred to was not available at presstime.]

Senator BIDEN. There is other question I would like to ask you, and then I will cease. I substantively agree with what you are attempting to do, which is that you are essentially taking the 7 percent of the offender population that have committed offenses that are of, by anyone's standard, serious who have been tried as adults—you are not suggesting they have to be tried as adults. You are not suggesting—

Senator ASHCROFT. I am. If they commit any of these crimes—murder, rape, armed robbery, armed assaults, or major drug crimes—it would be a requirement that they be tried as adults.

Senator BIDEN. That they be tried in Federal court?

Senator ASHCROFT. Not in Federal court, but be tried as adults in the State court.

Senator BIDEN. In the State court. So you are saying two things, then. One, you are saying—I know you know what you are saying. I just want to make sure I know because I missed the opening statement. I apologize. If you commit these offenses, the State must try you as an adult.

Senator ASHCROFT. That is correct.

Senator BIDEN. Second, if the State has tried you as an adult or a juvenile for any of these offenses—prior to the passage of this law, the record—is this retrospective that the record—for example, a 15-year-old kid tried in a juvenile court in the State of Missouri or Delaware for murder, and convicted—this bill passes, your bill becomes law. The State wants to not have its funds diminished by 25 percent and signs on. Two years later, that same young man tried in juvenile court in Delaware shows up in Missouri for any offense and is now an adult in the court system or a juvenile in the Missouri court system.

Senator ASHCROFT. It is required that he be tried as an adult if he committed one of the five big crimes or if he has two previous felony convictions.

Senator BIDEN. I am not being very articulate and I apologize. It is me, not you. You have got a young man or woman tried for murder in the year 1995 in Delaware. This bill passes in August of 1996.

Senator ASHCROFT. I hope you are a prophet.

Senator BIDEN. The State says, I want to get all the funds, so I am going to abide by the new law. In January 1, 1997, the kid who was tried and convicted in juvenile court in Delaware in 1995 is arrested in Missouri for speeding. Does the State of Delaware have to, if Missouri asked for this kid's record—let us say not speeding, say petty theft, a misdemeanor. Does the court in Delaware have to send, if requested by the attorney general of the State or whoever the prosecuting officer would be in Missouri—send the record that dates back to 1995 to Missouri? That is my question. Are we opening up every single sealed record or not?

Senator ASHCROFT. I don't think this is retrospective.

Senator BIDEN. Well, maybe you can answer it for the record because I think that is kind of an important point.

Senator ASHCROFT. I apologize for not being able to cite line and verse here.

Senator BIDEN. I understand.

Senator ASHCROFT. But this is designed to be prospective, not meant to be retrospective. I don't believe it is retrospective, and obviously the records are only designed to be kept if you violate one of those big five offenses or you have done three felonies.

Senator BIDEN. But if you have violated them beginning from the date of passage of the law?

Senator ASHCROFT. That is correct.

Senator BIDEN. That is all I want to know for the record. I appreciate it. I thank you for your consideration. I think, quite frankly, you and the Chairman and Senator Kohl, who has dealt with this for a long time as well, know this is the most perplexing problem the criminal justice system is facing. Crime is down in every category. Violent crime is down in every category, except among these juveniles, and we have got 39 million children under the age of 10 coming along. So it warrants our attention. I am not sure what the right answer is, but I appreciate your efforts.

Senator ASHCROFT. I would just add that there is not a great deal of comfort that I have in this. It is partly just the urgency of this. We have sought in other areas like with the Gun-Free Schools Act, with the Drug-Free Schools Act, to do things on a Federal basis because of the urgency, and a strict federalism view to this wouldn't either provide the money or provide the mandates.

Senator BIDEN. One of the questions I am going to submit for the record that I didn't want to go into now is the constitutionality and your basis for it. What is the principal rationale for Federal jurisdiction here because the Supreme Court has ruled on the Gun-Free—well, this is the man who wrote the act and he can tell you more about it than anybody. At any rate, I would like to submit that question for the record.

Thank you.

Senator THOMPSON. It will be submitted.

[The information was not available at presstime.]

Senator THOMPSON. Senator Kohl.

Senator KOHL. Thank you, Senator Thompson and Senator Biden. I don't disagree with you, Senator Ashcroft, in your position that we need to be very, very tough with juveniles who are incorrigible or who commit heinous acts and who we determine belong behind bars, regardless of whether they are 14, 16, 18, or 20. I think you are right. I mean, I think we should be very, very tough on people, whether they are younger or not so young, who don't belong on the streets. So without having looked at your bill in any great detail, the theory of what you are suggesting, the philosophy behind the bill, I think, is true. You want stronger attention, much more forceful attention to the problem of crime as it is committed by juveniles and you want the Government to be involved in doing that, and I agree with that, too.

Where we may part company is whether or not we need to be spending at least as much effort in trying to see to it that these young people do not become incorrigible in the first place. Nobody knows who that 7 percent is going to be. If we could target that 7 percent when they were 5 years old and if we knew their names and their addresses, then, you know, we could deal with them, but we know that is not possible.

We also know we are living in a time when young people are growing up in a way which is entirely different—in an atmosphere in neighborhoods, in homes, in schools, on the streets, in a way which is entirely different from the way in which we grew up. So we need, obviously, to understand that and to try and deal with it.

Now, you know, my own position is that we need to deal with it with strong law enforcement efforts, maybe just as strong as what exists in your bill. But if we don't devote time and attention as to

how we are going to prevent to the maximum extent possible these young people from getting involved in the first place—and that is with efforts aimed at, to use the word and the phrase “prevention,” and that the Federal Government has a role to play in deciding what kind of prevention efforts we need to manifest—not the total role by any means, understanding that most of it belongs at the State and local level, but that the Federal Government has a role to play—just as we have a role to play in legislating as you are suggesting, and we have a role to play in trying to pass a Gun-Free School Zones Act or a Drug-Free School Zones Act, we also have a role to play in trying to decide what works and how to encourage State and local governments to work with young people so that they don’t get involved in crime to begin with.

I would like to hope that we don’t part company when it comes to that philosophy. But that is the way I feel about it and I think that is the subject of this hearing this morning, is federal prevention efforts, oversight, and whether or not we need to abolish them or whether we can improve upon their effectiveness. That is, I think, one of the purposes of this hearing and I would be interested in a comment or two from you on that.

Senator ASHCROFT. Well, I want to thank you for that expression of mutual concern, and this whole idea of identifying the 7 percent has not gone unnoticed by some very concerned individuals and there has been developed a program called the SHOCAP program, which is called the Serious Habitual Offender Comprehensive Action Program.

The last provision in the bill is specific authority to spend juvenile justice funds in the SHOCAP program because this has been an effective program in identifying these individuals. At least the data indicates that they are having some success, so this concept of trying to identify the 7 percent who would use the current law as a shield for additional criminal behavior—they are the people that adults go out and enlist and say, hey, you take the money, you do the killing, you can get away with it, and they are the people who say, you can’t touch me, I am a juvenile. Identifying those in advance and trying to work with them is a very important component of this.

SHOCAP is a program which has been—well, I guess it was developed in pilot sites. There were test sites. Oxnard, CA, was one of the selected sites. SHOCAP was implemented in the 1980’s. Oxnard found that less than 2 percent of all juveniles arrested in that community were responsible for 35 percent of the felonies. Four years later, Oxnard’s violent crime rate dropped 38 percent. Illinois and Florida have both recently established statewide SHOCAP programs, and this would be an incentive for people to get into that SHOCAP-type program which has had success in the test sites, although sometimes it is easy to have the first and then the franchises don’t do as well as the rest of the operation.

So I thank the subcommittee for hearing me. I am sensitive to the idea of the problem of federalism. I do know that we mandate conditions like you can’t incarcerate status offenders, the separation of youth offenders from other offenders if you are going to get juvenile justice funds. There are certain things that you have to do

in terms of non-secure custody criteria, disproportionate involvement of minorities, et cetera, that are already in the bill.

None of these is done with great comfort. It is just that the challenge is so significant that I think we ought to be making whatever effort we can, and if it doesn't work, I think we ought to be prepared to do come back and evaluate it and revise it.

I thank the subcommittee.

Senator THOMPSON. Thank you, Senator Ashcroft. We appreciate your testimony.

Our next witness will be Mr. Shay Bilchik, Administrator, Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention. Welcome, Mr. Bilchik.

STATEMENT OF SHAY BILCHIK, ADMINISTRATOR, OFFICE OF JUVENILE JUSTICE AND DELINQUENCY PREVENTION, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, WASHINGTON, DC

Mr. BILCHIK. Good morning. Thank you.

Senator THOMPSON. Do you have a statement you would like to make?

Mr. BILCHIK. Yes, thank you. Mr. Chairman, Senator Kohl, I appreciate the opportunity to appear before you today to discuss the role of the Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, as well as the reauthorization of the JJDP Act.

Over the past several months, you have heard from many witnesses about the significant increases in juvenile delinquency and violence that our Nation has experienced over the past 10 years and the alarming projections for the future. This is perhaps one of the most critical issues facing our country at this time, and I commend you, Mr. Chairman, for the leadership you have shown in holding hearings about this issue.

I came to Washington after spending 16 years as a career prosecutor in Florida, so I am very aware of the impact this rise in crime is having on local communities. I still carry with me the perspective of a local practitioner in viewing the work of OJJDP. My goal as administrator, therefore, is to ensure that OJJDP is doing the best job possible in developing and implementing delinquency prevention and control programs and supporting a strengthened juvenile justice system that protects the public safety, holds juvenile offenders accountable, and provides treatment and rehabilitative services based on the needs of each individual juvenile.

OJJDP supports States and localities through research and studies, evaluation, statistical analysis, development and demonstration of new programs, targeting training and technical assistance, and the gathering and dissemination of information in the juvenile justice field. We support the States with the formula grants, our title V prevention programs, and the State Challenge Grant Programs which gives the States great flexibility in choosing the types of programs they wish to implement.

The Formula Grants Program is truly the heart of the JJDP Act. Through it, we annually award funds to seed innovative programs to address State and local needs. These are the programs that are operating in your jurisdictions, working hard to stop the increases we are seeing in juvenile crime and violence.

As you can see, Mr. Chairman, from the chart I have put on display, in our 1996 appropriations we use about one-third of the total funds allocated to the office for this modeling of programs, evaluating them, and disseminating information on best practices and what works, with the remainder of funding being provided through our 3 formula-based programs. That amounts to \$100 million in direct funding to State and local governments. I think that is the real strength of the JJDP Act, the combining of OJJDP support services with the direct funding of State and local programs that address delinquency and victimization through targeted but flexible programs.

The JJDP Act does provide certain guidelines and requirements that must be met in order to access Federal funds. These requirements establish standards that an effective juvenile justice system should strive to meet. As this subcommittee has heard, however, in prior testimony, juvenile crime has changed both in severity and in extent. In light of these changing circumstances, OJJDP reached out to a range of interested parties to review the operation of the act.

We involved State agencies, State advisory groups, juvenile justice specialists, public interest groups, youth advocates, and both rural and urban practitioners and policymakers. We asked for their comments on the strengths and weaknesses of the act and its implementation by the office. A consensus emerged and that consensus was that the act needs to be simplified and made less prescriptive in terms of both statutory and regulatory requirements.

The vast majority, however, maintained support for the four core requirements, but they asked for flexibility. Input from these sources, combined with the discussions held with you and your staff last month, has resulted in a draft of immediate regulatory changes that we hope to finalize and publish for public comment in the next few weeks. Let me briefly share with you six regulatory changes that will result in more latitude for State and local jurisdictions who are participating in the JJDP Act.

First, eliminate the requirement for a needs-based analysis before a local jurisdiction can establish collocated facilities and vest approval authority for such use of those facilities in the State. Second, clarify the definition of sight and sound contact between juveniles and adults by interpreting the sight and sound separation to allow haphazard or accidental contact in common areas of a facility and permit the time-phased use of those common areas in collocated facilities.

Extend the 6-hour hold exception related to alleged delinquent juveniles in an adult jail or lockup to be applied to juveniles requiring such confinement before or after a court appearance. Next, allow States and localities the flexibility, where required or authorized by State law, to place adjudicated delinquents with incarcerated adults once they reach the State's age of criminal responsibility.

Next, provide State and local jurisdictions with clear regulatory flexibility in handling status offenders by adding language to expressly permit jurisdictions to meet processing, transportation and placement needs by detaining status offenders for up to 24 hours, exclusive of weekends and holidays, prior to and after a court ap-

pearance; last, removal of the requirement that monitoring reports document specific circumstances surrounding each use of the weather, distance and travel exceptions to the jail and lock-up removal requirement which apply to rural jurisdictions.

Mr. Chairman, pursuant to the excellent feedback we received from the field, there are also a number of amendments to the statute that we are reviewing that can increase flexibility and enhance the ability of States and localities to combat juvenile crime and violence, meet public safety needs, and preserve basic protections for juveniles in custody.

I look forward to the continuing dialogue we have already stated, Mr. Chairman, so that a constructive bipartisan approach to continuing an effective Federal role in juvenile justice and delinquency prevention can be maintained and enhanced in the years to come.

Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Bilchik follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF SHAY BILCHIK

Mr. Chairman and members of the Subcommittee. I appreciate the opportunity to appear before you today to discuss the operation of the Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention (OJJDP) and my vision for the future. Over the past several months, you have heard from many witnesses about the significant increases in juvenile delinquency and violence that our Nation has been experiencing over the past 10 years and the alarming projections for the future. This is perhaps one of the most critical issues facing our country at this time. I commend you, Mr. Chairman, and members of this Subcommittee for the leadership you have shown in holding hearings both in the field and in Washington to explore the reasons for these increases and the role of the Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention (JJDP) Act in addressing them.

You have heard the statistics. Continuing the trend that began in the late 1980's, the juvenile violent crime arrest rate in the United States reached its highest level ever in 1994—514 arrests per 100,000 juveniles between the ages of 10–17. In 1994, 8 in 10 juveniles who killed used a gun, compared to 5 in 10 in 1980. We also know, however, that although the juvenile violent crime arrest rate rose 54 percent between 1988 and 1994, less than one half of 1 percent of juveniles (about 1 in every 200) were arrested for a violent crime in 1994 and that a small percentage of offenders account for the vast majority of serious and violent juvenile crime. I believe that the ability to target this group of serious and violent offenders, coupled with our knowledge about what can be successful in preventing and intervening effectively with delinquents, should give us reason for hope in taking on this tremendous challenge.

In our discussion of the problem of youth violence, we should not lose sight of the consequences related to the victimization of juveniles. In 1994, an estimated 2,600 juveniles were murdered—a rate of 7 per day. One in five murdered juveniles was killed by another juvenile. A gun takes the life of a child every 2 hours. New statistics released by Health and Human Services Secretary Shalala also reveal that more than a million children in 48 States were victims of substantiated child abuse and neglect in 1994, an increase of 27 percent since 1990. In 1993, child protective services received more than 2 million reports of child maltreatment and 1,028 children were known to have died as a result of child abuse and neglect. The tragedy of these numbers does not lie solely with the victimization of these children. It is also reflected in the long-term consequences.

Along with other research, OJJDP's 10-year longitudinal study on the causes and correlates of delinquency shows an irrefutable link between being abused and neglected and the increased likelihood of committing subsequent delinquent and violent acts. OJJDP's involvement in juvenile victimization issues seeks to enhance the system's ability, through programs involving law enforcement, judges, and others, to address problems of missing and exploited children, child abuse, and related domestic violence matters.

In preparation for reauthorization, OJJDP has reached out to the field, including police chiefs, judges, and youth-service providers, to examine both the role of the Office and of other Federal agencies in support of State and local efforts to reduce juvenile delinquency, violence, and victimization, and the role of the JJDP Act in

setting basic standards within which a model juvenile justice system can operate effectively. What we have heard leads me to conclude that, while there is cause for great concern in relation to the increase in serious and violent delinquency, there are also reasons to believe that we have the knowledge and tools to address the problem.

I believe the basic standards and framework of the JJDP Act provide both an appropriate and potentially powerful vehicle for reducing delinquency in this country. The key to our success is how we use that framework in attacking this problem.

I joined the Department of Justice after a 16-year career as a prosecutor in Florida. Although I have been in Washington for nearly 3 years, I still maintain a very strong local practitioner orientation. As a result, the mission statement we have adopted at OJJDP—to provide national leadership, coordination, and resources to prevent juvenile victimization and respond appropriately to juvenile delinquency—has special meaning for me. It supports the Office's view that the JJDP Act provides an important opportunity for the Department of Justice to be a partner with States and localities in solving the problem of juvenile delinquency and violence.

My goal is to ensure that OJJDP is doing the best job possible in developing and implementing delinquency prevention and control programs and supporting a strengthened juvenile justice system that protects the public safety, holds juvenile offenders accountable, and provides treatment and rehabilitative services based on the needs of each individual juvenile.

To do this, and as can be seen from an analysis of our 1996 budget and program plan, OJJDP provides support to States and localities through a cycle of activity consisting of research and studies, evaluation, statistical analysis, development and demonstration of new programs, targeted training and technical assistance, and the gathering and dissemination of information relevant to the juvenile justice field. We then feed that support into the direct programmatic assistance we provide through our Formula Grants, Title V (Local Delinquency Prevention Incentive Grants), and State Challenge Grants Programs. The Formula Grants Program, which provides funds to States to plan and implement comprehensive State and local programs to prevent and control delinquency, is the heart of the JJDP Act. Through it, we annually award seed money for innovative programs to address State and local needs.

Since the JJDP Act was enacted in 1974, the States have implemented State plan components to meet the core standards of the JJDP Act, and more generally, strengthen their juvenile justice systems and encourage delinquency prevention efforts. These plan activities have resulted in dramatic changes in the processing of juvenile offenders. By 1980, the States had substantially accomplished the goals of removing status and nonoffender juveniles from secure facilities and separating juveniles from incarcerated adults in secure institutions. However, recognizing that separation was resulting in juveniles being detained in drunk tanks and isolation rooms and that juvenile suicides in jails were eight times the number for juveniles in all forms of secure juvenile facilities, in 1980, Congress amended the JJDP Act to require States to remove juveniles from adult jails and lockups within 5 years. In 1992, a fourth requirement was added—States were required to undertake efforts to reduce disproportionate minority confinement in secure facilities, if overrepresentation was found to exist. Also, in 1992, the Congress tied formula grant funding eligibility to the four core requirements by directing the Administrator to reduce a State's allocation by 25 percent for each core requirement for which the State cannot demonstrate compliance.

Over the nearly 22 years of the JJDP Act, States have made outstanding progress in meeting these standards. The core requirements have provided important protections for juvenile offenders. Setting these standards, proving assistance to the States in meeting these standards, and monitoring compliance has assured better treatment interventions for juvenile offenders nationwide.

As the chart shows (attached) the three formula-based programs providing direct funding to State and local governments account for almost two-thirds (62.5 percent) of OJJDP's total funds for FY 1996, allowing them to use these funds to focus on their areas of greatest need. It is this construct that is the real strength of the JJDP Act—the combination of OJJDP support services that enhance planning and program implementation and the direct funding of State and local programs.

As you can see, Mr. Chairman, with about one-third of the total funds allocated to the Office for program support activities, we accomplish a great deal. Because we work with all of the States, we keep our finger on the pulse of new and emerging approaches to prevent delinquency and control violent crime that are being developed at the community and State level. We support their development, we test their approaches, and evaluate their outcomes. Only from a Federal level can we then take this information and ensure its broadest dissemination throughout the Nation. The training and technical assistance we provide to law enforcement officers, pros-

ecutors, judges, and others who interact with juveniles is of the highest quality—and provides recipients with the latest research and program information that can be adapted to meet the needs of specific communities. And, I might add, OJJDP's overhead is low—about 3 percent of our overall budget.

Let me outline briefly some of the steps we have taken at OJJDP to combat the surge in violent juvenile crime and serve in the role of a supportive partner. The Coordinating Council on Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention (Council) was restructured in 1992 to provide a balance of Federal agency and citizen practitioner membership. Chaired by the Attorney General, the Council responded to her challenge to formulate a national agenda for children by producing *Combating Violence and Delinquency: The National Juvenile Justice Action Plan*. Released in March, the Action Plan describes how communities can mobilize to take concrete steps, using Federal and State resources, to solve their youth violence problem. The eight objectives of the Action Plan call for sanctions and treatment interventions, transfer of appropriate juveniles to criminal court, focus on guns, gangs, and drugs, increased opportunities for youth, addressing the cycle of violence caused by juvenile victimization, abuse and neglect, increased research and evaluation, and public outreach.

State and local formula grant program funding seeks to hold juvenile offenders accountable depending on the severity of the offense. I am pleased to report, Mr. Chairman, the States have implemented a variety of such sanctions, including intermediate sanctions that bridge the gap between secure juvenile corrections settings and nonsecure alternatives such as bootcamps, electronic monitoring, intensive supervision, and community-based programs.

OJJDP funds research and demonstration efforts to encourage juvenile courts to establish a continuum of graduated sanctions, ranging from community-based diversion programs for first-time nonviolent offenders, to intermediate sanctions and secure corrections options for serious and violent offenders. Moreover, OJJDP's Gang Program (Part D) was expanded to include a new focus on intervention, highlighting support for graduated sanctions and innovative correctional responses to juvenile gang crime, including drug trafficking.

OJJDP has developed a comprehensive and coordinated response to America's gang problem. Our gang program is testing and evaluating a gang prevention, intervention, and suppression model in five competitively selected jurisdictions. We are also supporting the National Youth Gang Center to inform the field about the nature and extent of gang activities and effective and innovative programs nationwide. This resource is helping OJJDP coordinate with other Federal agencies, gang program representatives, and local service providers.

In sum, the Act currently gives State and local communities the ability to provide the type of comprehensive response to juvenile delinquency that is needed. Our future success, in my view, is contingent on a continuing and expanded commitment throughout the country to use the knowledge we have about what works and what doesn't work to prevent and reduce juvenile delinquency and violence. I believe OJJDP has made great progress in identifying effective and promising prevention, intervention, and treatment programs and practices.

In 1993, OJJDP published a *Comprehensive Strategy for Serious, Violent, and Chronic Juvenile Offenders* and followed it with an implementation guide. The *Comprehensive Strategy* uses statistics, research, and program evaluations as the basis for a set of sound principles for establishing a continuum of activities to respond to the crisis of serious and violent juvenile crime. It emphasizes the importance of establishing local planning teams to assess and identify the factors that put youth at risk for delinquency, determining gaps in services, and putting in place prevention programs that either reduce the risk factors that cause juveniles to become delinquent or provide buffers to protect juveniles from these risks. The *Comprehensive Strategy* also stresses the importance of immediate interventions for juveniles whose behavior puts them on one or more pathways to delinquency and a full system of graduated sanctions that can ensure appropriate accountability and treatment for each offender.

What we have done through the *Comprehensive Strategy* is to take the lessons learned and wisdom from the experts in the field to put together a model that people can understand, support, and advocate. In essence, OJJDP has served as a conduit for the field, compiling the best programs and practices and the research on what works from across the country. Through our developmental work, we have framed the *Comprehensive Strategy* so that jurisdictions can use these programs and practices to systematically address the problem of serious, violent, and chronic delinquency through a continuum of prevention services and graduated sanctions that is formulated and carried out at the community level.

The *Comprehensive Strategy* also stresses the importance of aftercare for all youth returning to their communities from out-of-home placements. If youth suc-

cessfully complete treatment programs, they should not be abruptly returned to the same high-risk environment without appropriate supervision and transitional support. Consequently, intensive aftercare programs that provide high levels of social control and treatment services are gaining substantial support and represent a significant area of activity for OJJDP.

Intensive aftercare, or "community care," programs that provide high levels of social control and treatment services are an essential part of the graduated sanctions continuum. These programs must monitor the juvenile's reintegration into the community, while providing a range of needed services. Only through this level of sustained community involvement will we maximize our chances of reducing juvenile reoffending. OJJDP is currently supporting the demonstration and evaluation of an intensive aftercare model in four jurisdictions.

The Comprehensive Strategy already has served as a basis for statutory reform efforts in several states, including Connecticut and New Jersey. We are demonstrating the graduated sanctions component of the Comprehensive Strategy in five cities under our Serious, Violent, and Chronic Offender Program and are devoting extensive training and technical assistance resources to assisting local jurisdictions to implement risk-focused prevention under the Formula Grants and Title V Prevention Grants Programs. The full Comprehensive Strategy is being modeled in communities under the SafeFutures Program, and will be implemented statewide in four states over the next two years. We are also making a variety of technical assistance services available to other jurisdictions interested in adopting this approach.

The end product of this work is what truly gives us hope for reducing delinquency and violence. The continuum of activities called for by the Comprehensive Strategy will provide for the short- and long-term protection of our communities while we build a generation of healthier, law-abiding children. To be successful, however, we cannot deviate from the principle of balancing prevention activities and justice system sanctions.

Mr. Chairman, I believe that by examining just a few specific examples of evaluated programs, I can show this subcommittee how OJJDP's support and monitoring of the national scene can lead to the documentation of programmatic success at various stages of the juvenile justice system. I have attached to my statement brief summaries of some of the best programs to intervene with juvenile offenders. As you will note upon reviewing the evaluation data, we can work with the very young, with families and communities, schools, and others to make a real difference.

The programmatic examples, cited in the Appendix, are representative of a larger group of proven, effective graduated sanctions programs within the juvenile justice system. They are included in documents we share with jurisdictions across the country, including the Comprehensive Strategy and Guide, and point the way toward an understanding of the crucial elements of successful programs for juvenile offenders. I can say with great confidence that these programs will be effective if they are carefully conceived, properly implemented, and provided with enough resources to do the job they set out to do.

In addition to graduated sanctions, OJJDP's Comprehensive Strategy calls for a strong prevention component. OJJDP's Prevention Program (Title V), which provides incentive grants for local delinquency prevention programs, is currently funded at \$20 million annually. Through this program, local governments implement delinquency prevention plans based on the community planning team's analysis of community risk factors for delinquency. Funded for the first time in 1994, the Title V Program has enjoyed widespread local support.

To assist communities and stimulate prevention planning, OJJDP has provided training in risk-focused prevention to more than 3,700 key leaders and local community planning board members representing a cross-section of America's communities. Prevention Program funds, which require a 50 percent local match of cash or in-kind services, has already leveraged an additional commitment of financial assistance in many of more than 280 participating communities.

Prevention programs need to be in place as early as preschool and extend into the adolescent years. This conclusion reflects the results of OJJDP's causes and correlates of delinquency research, which demonstrates how we can structure environments to reduce the risks of delinquency. Programs such as the Boys and Girls Clubs of America, which have been instrumental in addressing the needs of at-risk youth and in providing an alternative to drug use, gang involvement, and violent crime, are examples of this positive approach. Boys and Girls Club providing after-school activities in public housing developments across the country have been effective in increasing rates of school attendance and improving academic performance. According to a Columbia University study, Boys and Girls Clubs in public housing reduced the juvenile crime rate by 13 percent. In addition, findings from the OJJDP-funded Boys and Girls Clubs Targeted Gang Outreach Program show out-

reach to 6,000 youth at risk of gang involvement, with 90 percent maintaining regular contact with the club, 48 percent showing improvement in school behavior, and over one-third reporting improved grades.

The examples of school and community-based programs, including child abuse prevention, conflict resolution, gang prevention, pre-school programming, and multi-service programming set forth in the Appendix, are the types of successful prevention programs that communities can successfully use to reduce delinquency and the victimization of juveniles. They give us a sound basis to believe that our efforts to demonstrate effective prevention approaches and spread this information across the country, while also supporting their implementation through our technical assistance, training, and formula funding, will lead to safer communities.

OJJDP's SafeFutures program, started with fiscal year 1995 funds, helps competitively selected communities implement a comprehensive, coordinated delinquency prevention and intervention treatment program for at-risk and delinquent juveniles. SafeFutures focuses on building broad-based community planning and support to provide a continuum of prevention, intervention, and treatment services for juveniles ranging from those at risk of involvement in delinquency to serious and violent juvenile offenders. These services are provided through a customer-oriented approach in which there is broad collaboration between juvenile service agencies at all levels of government and the private sector.

This enhanced, community-based program, designed to further community partnerships to combat juvenile crime and delinquency, combines nine previously separate programs into components of the comprehensive SafeFutures initiative. These programs include both those designed for high-risk youth, such as afterschool programs, job training, mentoring, and family support programs, and graduated sanctions programs designed for juvenile offenders, such as drug treatment, aftercare, and victim restitution. Four urban communities (Boston; Contra Costa County, California; Seattle; and St. Louis), one rural community (Imperial County, California), and one Indian community (Fort Belknap Indian Community in Harlem, Montana) were funded to implement this program.

As can be seen, the JJDP Act provides resources for sound planning at the State and local levels and establishes standard that an effective juvenile justice system should strive to meet. Recognizing that this is the year in which the Congress will reauthorize the Act, OJJDP sought to involve a range of those affected by the Act. We began our part of the process with OJJDP staff and Justice Department officials, who raised a variety of issues. We then wrote to participating State agencies, State Advisory Groups, and juvenile justice specialists asking for their comments on strengths and weaknesses of the Act and its implementation. Nineteen States responded.

We also held two statewide field meetings in March—one in Boise, Idaho and one in Trenton, New Jersey—to obtain both rural and urban perspectives on the JJDP Act. In both cases, representatives of State and local governments, the private sector, program administrators, and system officials (police, judges, court administrators, detention and corrections staff) attended. These meetings provided valuable information on the impact of OJJDP program funding, such as seed money, innovative programming, and increased rural involvement, problems in Act funding and administration, including declining State share, program complexity, and need for more funds, State and local program needs, and the operation of the core requirements.

In April, OJJDP convened two forums in Washington, D.C. Ten public interest groups sent staff representatives and officers or board members to the first forum. The second was attended by representatives of 35 youth advocacy organizations and special interest groups, many of them national membership organizations. A consensus emerged that the Act needs to be simplified and made less prescriptive in terms of both statutory and regulatory requirements. Views diverged concerning the core requirements of the Act, some supporting no change and others arguing that all provisions need a fresh look and that State and local flexibility should be prime considerations, provided the basic protections of the core requirements are preserved.

Input from all these sources, combined with ongoing feedback from within the Department, the Office of Justice Programs, and OJJDP program staff, has resulted in the drafting of immediate regulatory changes that we hope to finalize and publish for public comment in the next few weeks. Mr. Chairman, I will provide you and members of this Subcommittee with these proposed regulatory changes as soon as they are ready. I welcome your comments and look forward to a vigorous dialogue.

OJJDP is considering six major regulatory changes that will result in increased latitude to State and local jurisdictions participating in the JJDP Act. These changes have not yet been formally proposed and are currently under review within the Department. The first change would promote greater flexibility in State and local efforts to detain accused and adjudicated delinquents by eliminating the cur-

rent requirement of a needs-based analysis before a jurisdiction can establish juvenile facilities on the same grounds as an adult facility or within the same building or complex of buildings. Moreover, we would delete the requirement that jurisdictions in States establishing collocated facilities obtain OJJDP's concurrence in addition to that of the State.

A second change would ease overly prescriptive restrictions on contact between juveniles and adults in nonresidential areas of secure facilities. This regulatory change would permit time-phased use of common areas in collocated facilities and interpret the sight and sound provision of the separation requirement to exclude accidental contact in common areas of a facility from being considered a violation of the Act.

The third would be to allow the 6-hour hold exception related to the confinement of juveniles in an adult jail or lockup to be applied to juveniles requiring such confinement before or after court appearances. This change would give jurisdictions greater flexibility in processing and transporting juveniles.

A fourth proposal would allow States and localities the flexibility, where required or authorized by State law, to place adjudicated delinquents with incarcerated adults once they reach the State's age of criminal responsibility.

Fifth, OJJDP believes there is a need to provide State and local jurisdictions with clear regulatory flexibility in handling status offenders. This proposed regulatory change would add language to OJJDP's monitoring requirements to expressly permit jurisdictions to meet processing, transportation, and placement needs by detaining status offenders for up to 24 hours, exclusive of weekends and holidays, prior to an initial court appearance and up to an additional 24 hours, exclusive of weekends and holidays, following an initial court proceeding.

To provide further regulatory relief to rural communities and States, OJJDP would also consider removing the requirement that monitoring reports document specific circumstances surrounding each use of the weather, distance, and travel exceptions to the jail and lockup removal requirement as it applies to rural jurisdictions. We intend to consider additional future modifications to simplify compliance monitoring data reporting requirements in consultation with State agencies and juvenile justice specialists.

Mr. Chairman, you and other members of the Subcommittee have stated that the statute itself needs to be examined. The Department is considering possible changes and looks forward to working with you in this review. Specifically, the Department will examine amendments to the Act that would increase flexibility and enhance the ability of States and localities to combat juvenile crime and violence, meet public safety needs, and preserve basic protections for juveniles in custody.

As I noted earlier, the field has told us those areas in the Act where they are seeking greater flexibility or change. These include program authority under the Gang Program (Part D) to address the issues of guns and drugs. There is also a need to address juvenile corrections programs and facilities to ensure that juveniles can be appropriately detained and confined and receive needed services.

Also, certain amendments to the core requirements would be necessary if OJJDP is to provide States and localities with additional flexibility in administering the Formula Grants Program. Practitioners have expressed concern over the narrowness of the "valid court order" exception and the collocated facility requirements, the sight and sound separation requirement, the need for additional flexibility for rural jurisdictions to hold alleged delinquents in adult jails and lockups, and statutory penalties for State non-compliance with the core requirements. Other areas of concern include the specificity of the State Advisory Group membership requirements and the need for flexibility regarding the award of Title V funds to noncompliant units of local government.

We are excited about our new program areas for fiscal year 1996. We undertook a rigorous process in developing and finalizing our plan, which included public comment. Our three major program areas are: developing one-stop, community-based intake, assessment and case referral centers and programs, supporting the linkage between the community and the law enforcement response to youth gun violence, and improving the dependency and criminal court system's and the community's response to child abuse and neglect. In addition, we will undertake a variety of new research and evaluation projects that will expand our knowledge about juvenile offenders and the effectiveness of prevention, intervention, and treatment programs.

There must be a substantial, sustained investment—both public and private, and both in terms of financial and human resources—in families, communities, and the systems that support and protect them, if they are to work effectively to reduce delinquency and later criminality. To obtain and keep public support for the juvenile justice system, we are going to have to provide both effective, immediate responses

that insure the public safety and long-term preventive solutions to the problem of juvenile delinquency and violence.

I look forward to continuing the dialogue we have already started, Mr. Chairman, so that a constructive bipartisan approach to continuing an effective Federal role in juvenile justice and delinquency prevention can be sustained and enhanced in the years to come. That role must focus on assisting those at the State and local levels to address juvenile delinquency and violence in a coordinated and cost-effective manner that will reverse the statistical projections and stem the tide of youth violence that has engulfed the nation.

APPENDIX

GRADUATED SANCTIONS PROGRAMS

At the front end of the juvenile justice system we must have effective case management. This crucial feature results in greater service coordination and ensures that all service providers are doing their jobs. The innovative assessment team approach to case management integrates risk classification and needs assessment processes, establishes appropriate goals, and maximizes scarce system resources.

An excellent example is the Norfolk, Virginia Interagency Consortium, which represents health and mental health agencies, social services, police, education, juvenile services, agencies, parents, and other private citizens. The Consortium ensures coordinated delivery of comprehensive services, including access to a pool of State funds. Crime has dropped markedly in neighborhoods targeted by this program. According to one 1993 report, crime decreased by 29 percent in the target areas, police reported fewer service calls, and local drug trafficking and gunfire dropped significantly. Participants also believed the program had reduced fear of crime in target neighborhoods.

Based on appropriate assessments, first time and less serious offenders should have the option of community-based programs. The Bethesda Day Treatment Program in West Milton, Pennsylvania, is a model day treatment program, which was started with JJDP Act formula grant funds.

An immediate sanction program, Bethesda Day Treatment Center's services include intensive supervision, counseling, and coordination of a range of services to develop skills that enable youth to function appropriately in the community. Delinquent and dependent youth ages 10 to 17 receive up to 55 hours of services per week. For those youth old enough to work, 75 percent of their paychecks are directed toward payment of fines, court costs, and restitution. This intensive treatment program has shown promising results: a preliminary study revealed recidivism rates far lower than State and national norms.

Intermediate sanction programs designed for serious and repeat offenders are also essential in graduated sanction programming. An effective intermediate sanction program is the Family and Neighborhood Services Program. This South Carolina program employs the principles of "multisystemic" therapy, that is, an individual approach where treatments relating to families, schools, peers, and community are integrated. This program attempts to avoid the institutionalization of target youth.

The Family and Neighborhood Services Program was evaluated using a random-assignment design that compared program participants with youth who received traditional interventions. The evaluation findings were very encouraging. Fifty-nine weeks after the initial referral, there were significant positive differences in incarceration, arrests, and self-reported offenses between the program and control youth. The program participants had slightly more than half as many arrests as the control youth: 68 percent of control youth experienced some incarceration compared with 20 percent of the program group, and 58 percent of program youth had no arrests compared with 38 percent of control youth.

The Choice program is an intensive, home-based monitoring and multiple-service program for high-risk youth at five sites in the Baltimore, Maryland area. The program helps youth address problems with their families, schools, and communities by developing highly structured, individualized 4-6 month treatment plans. Program participants include status offenders and youth arrested for minor delinquent activities. Serious and violent offenders are excluded from the program, as are youth requiring residential substance abuse treatment.

An evaluation of the Choice program showed strong an statistically significant differences between the Choice group and the control group on both number and seriousness of arrests while in the program. Twenty-one percent of Choice youth were arrested during the intervention period, compared with 44 percent of control youth; 9 percent of Choice clients were arrested more than once compared with 15 percent

of control youth. Sixteen percent of the Choice youth were arrested for medium or major offenses compared with 31 percent of control youth.

The North Carolina Court Counselors Intensive Protective Supervision Project, another evaluated program, works intensively with offenders, arranging for multiple intervention services. The program was designed for status offenders at high risk of serious, violent, and chronic delinquency. Based in part on the testimony you have heard describing how status and minor delinquent offenders become serious and violent offenders, I know that this is an area of concern to this Subcommittee.

In the late 1980s, this project operated at four sites in North Carolina and was then evaluated by a team of researchers from Duke University. Youth referred to the program were randomly assigned to either this project or ordinary probation services. In this project, small caseloads allowed counselors to spend more time working intensively with clients and their families. The project evaluation found considerable success in keeping participants from moving from status offenses to delinquency. Participation in the project group reduced the likelihood of a delinquent offense during the course of the program by nearly 60 percent compared with the control group.

Another example of an effective intermediate intervention is the Thomas O'Farrell Youth Center, located in rural Maryland. It is a 38-bed, unlocked, staff-secure residential program for male youth committed to the Maryland Department of Juvenile Services. The typical youth has many prior court referrals, generally for property crimes and drug offenses. On average, youth stay at the center for nine months, followed by six months of aftercare.

Employing a treatment method that recognizes the importance of social rules and expectations in changing behavior, the Youth Center has a strong education program because many of its youth have special education needs. Each youth who completes this residential program has an intensive aftercare plan—including assistance in reentering school, vocational counseling, crisis intervention, family counseling, transportation, and mentoring.

The program evaluation found that the majority (55 percent) of the first 56 Youth Center graduates had no further court referrals in the post-release period (an average of 11.6 months). The study showed a dramatic decline in the number of offenses committed by youth after their stay at the Youth Center. In the 12 months prior to placement in the center, the 56 youth were charged with 219 offenses, an average of almost four court referrals each. In the year after leaving the program, these youngsters were charged with 51 offenses, a decline of 77 percent. The program's recidivism rate compares favorably with that of other successful community-based youth corrections programs across the nation.

There is no question that some offenders pose such a threat to society that they must be placed in locked, secure facilities. The Comprehensive Strategy recognizes the need to transfer those juveniles who are not amenable to treatment, or whose violent crimes demonstrate the need for criminal justice system sanctions, into the criminal justice system. However, there are juvenile correctional programs and facilities available that can provide appropriate punishment, while providing effective rehabilitative opportunities, for many serious and violent juvenile offenders. The Florida Environmental Institute, also known as "The Last Chance Ranch," is an example of such a program. Although not locked, its location in the swamplands of the Everglades is the equivalent of being locked. With a capacity of 40 youth—20 in the residential portion of the program and 20 in the nonresidential aftercare component, it targets Florida's most serious juvenile offenders. Program-referred youth average 18 prior offenses and 11.5 prior felonies. Almost two-thirds (63 percent) are committed for crimes against persons, the rest for chronic property or drug offenses. The average length of participation is 18 months, with a residential stay of at least 9 months, and a very intensive aftercare program. All but a handful of participants return to their communities after they have met strict educational, social, and behavioral objectives. While students live in the community during the aftercare phase, they maintain constant contact with the "Ranch". Aftercare staff, with caseloads of six, contact the students at least four times per week, assisting with job searches, family problems, and other issues. The youth must adhere to a strict curfew. If they break curfew or engage in criminal activity, they are returned to the residential part of the program.

Outcome data on a sample of FEI graduates are promising. This 3-year followup study found that one-third of the sample were convicted of new crimes during this extended period. While no control group was used in this study, comparison studies of training school releasees indicate much higher recidivism rates, ranging from 50 to 70 percent.

PREVENTION PROGRAMS

The demonstrated link between child abuse and neglect and the increased likelihood of committing subsequent violence and delinquency points to the need for effective early intervention with high-risk families. The Elmira Home Visitation Program in New York addresses the population of high-risk newborns, seeking to reduce the incidence of child abuse and neglect. Frequent home visitation by nurses during pregnancy and the first two years of a child's life significantly reduces many health and social problems commonly associated with adolescent, unmarried, and low-income parents. The program results include: a 75 percent reduction in state-verified cases of child abuse and neglect; 32 percent fewer emergency room visits during the second year of life; 80 percent more unmarried women participating in the workforce; and unmarried women bearing 43 percent fewer additional children than their counterparts assigned to comparison services.

An investment in this type of home-visitation program for low-income women and children pays for itself by the time the child is 4 years old. The prenatal and postpartum program costs about \$3,200 for 2½ years of home visitation. Low-income women (those most likely to use government services) used \$3,300 less in other government services during the first 4 years after delivery of their first child than did their low-income counterparts in the comparison group. About 80 percent of the cost savings were from reduced Food Stamp and Aid to Families with Dependent Children payments.

Michigan's Perry Preschool Program fosters social and intellectual development in children ages three to four. The researchers have followed the young people from the time they were 3 until they were 27 years old. Participants in the Perry Preschool program proved far less likely to commit crimes than a matched control group. By age 19, fourteen years after completing this two-year program of developmental preschool and weekly home visits, only 31 percent of participants had ever been arrested—compared to 51 percent of the control group. By the time they turned 27, one-fifth as many Perry participants as control group members had been arrested five or more times (7 percent versus 35 percent).

Children need to be taught in a variety of ways and settings that conflict can be resolved peacefully. The Community Board Program in California has developed and implemented school-based mediation and conflict resolution programs for children, youth, and families. The program is available to students in grades 3 through 12 who participate in communication, problem-solving, and leadership skills-building activities. Students selected as "conflict managers" help to settle disputes among their peers. Evaluation shows the program has resulted in decreases in fights, suspensions, and dropout rates coupled with increase self-esteem and citizenship skills.

The Glendale Community Mobilization Project in Utah has been recognized as a successful gang prevention and community strengthening program. This project includes: mentoring and job shadowing experience offered to over 200 middle school students; a transition program established for 45 high-risk sixth- and seventh-grade students entering Glendale Middle School; community strengthening through the development of a neighborhood organization, with training provided for over 250 potential block leaders; community leader training for individuals to receive specific skills training in gang/drug abuse recognition and effective interventions for at-risk juveniles.

The target area for this project has the highest concentration of gang members in Utah. Since the inception of the project in 1992, crime is down in all major categories by 10 to 30 percent. Gang-related crime, excluding graffiti, is down 38 percent.

Wisconsin's Project Bootstrap, Inc. is a multifaceted program that integrates the best of the current models for educational support, supportive family groups, family mentoring, and alcohol and other drug abuse programs into a single effort. Project Bootstrap's goal is its namesake, to teach children that with personal initiative they can "haul themselves up from trouble by their bootstraps." It addresses the impact of inner city violence on youth through counseling, workshops, positive interaction with the Madison Metropolitan Police Department, family role modeling through a family mentoring program, and a "safe surrogate family" for youth residing in violent families. Coupled with educational support, conflict resolution skill building, and encouraging parental responsibility for the problems of violent and educationally at-risk youth, Project Bootstrap has improved attendance, grades, and results in less violent incidents in the schools involving these children.

Another effective program is Children at Risk (CAR), jointly funded by the Bureau of Justice Assistance, the National Institute of Justice, OJJDP, and a consortium of private sources. This is an intensive 2-year intervention for high-risk youth in high-risk neighborhoods. Communities developed CAR programs by building on the

strengths, cultural background, and history of target neighborhoods. Each program includes eight critical components: case management, family services, education services, afterschool and summer activities, mentoring, incentives, community policing and enhanced enforcement, and criminal/juvenile justice interventions.

The program and its evaluation are ongoing in five cities, with initial findings showing promising results. In the first 12 months after joining the program, CAR youth had fewer contacts with police than youth in a randomly assigned control group (41 percent versus 69 percent). CAR youth also had fewer contacts with juvenile court (34 percent versus 71 percent). A recent finding is that 88 percent of CAR youth were promoted to the next grade, compared to 72 percent of youth in the control group.

The Cities In Schools dropout prevention program, funded by OJJDP in collaboration with the Departments of Health and Human Services, Commerce, and Defense, has 665 sites in 197 communities nationwide. It brings resources to and reaches over 97,000 youth and their families. Recognizing that children and adolescents have a large number of problems due to the breakdown of the family, the physical decline of neighborhoods, and decreased job opportunities, Cities in Schools attempts to offset those circumstances by placing community services providers directly in schools. Evaluations have shown that Cities in Schools students perform at significantly higher levels than other students, stay in school and have lower absenteeism, and achieve higher academic performance. We know that truancy and dropping out of school are common factors in adult inmates' backgrounds. This is the type of program that can address these school-related risk factors.

Senator THOMPSON. Well, thank you, Mr. Bilchik, and you are right. We did have some very good meetings and discussions about this issue and I appreciate you and your staff's forthrightness in discussing some of these programs and what is working and what is not and how we might improve things. I am delighted that you are taking a look at these regulations and I look forward to seeing what you come up with.

These statutory changes, I think, are also important and I would certainly hope that we could work together and see if we can't make some improvements on that. It would be a whole lot easier to get done if we can get together on those things than it is having to fight it out up here in the Halls of Congress.

Mr. BILCHIK. I would look forward to that.

Senator THOMPSON. One of the main concerns, I think, that I have is working through all of this bureaucratic maze. You have a smaller bureaucracy over there, I guess, than most, but you saw the GAO report and you saw the analysis.

Mr. BILCHIK. Yes.

Senator THOMPSON. You have career people and you have presidential appointees and you have reshuffling of the deck every once in a while, and who reports to whom, and who has grant-making authority, and all of the typical stuff that we get into when we pass all this well-meaning and high-filutin legislation, you know, and nobody but us realizes what we are creating here. I guess it is unavoidable.

But the more important question within that is whether or not we are getting a work product. To me that is whether or not we are getting programs that work and whether or not we have a system whereby we can tell what is working and what is not working. We have now 160-something youth programs of some kind throughout our Government, throughout agencies that—I will bet you didn't even know of some of them on the GAO list.

Mr. BILCHIK. I learned about a few.

Senator THOMPSON. GAO came up with a list, and certainly the big majority of them are not under your purview or jurisdiction.

There are scattered out various places here and there. The GAO seemed to conclude that there was not as much going on in terms of monitoring or auditing these programs. Of course, that has to do with whether or not the States are complying with the mandates and whether or not they are complying with the plan that they submit to you and all that, and that is all necessary and well and good, but I am more concerned with the programs themselves.

I know it is very difficult, especially when you are talking about prevention, to maybe determine what works and what doesn't work. But certainly we have got to do a better job and have some feel and, in this scientific age that we live in, be able to create some ways over a period of a few years, anyway, of determining whether we are doing any good in these things or not.

I look at this peer review process and all of that and how they judge these grants, and it has to do with the plan and is it according to certain recognized standards and all that. But nowhere in there is there any follow-up or any looking at whether or not it works or what the results are going to be.

So what can we do better? I know you have your place and your turf, but you work hard and you have been a prosecutor. We are not going to continue any longer just reupping for another \$160 million, or whatever it is. We have really got to start looking and keeping what is good, getting rid of what is not working, and most importantly, have some kind of a system to determine one from the other.

Now, would you not agree with me that we don't have a very good way of doing that right now? I am not blaming you or your department or anybody else. We don't have a very good way of doing that right now, and if that is the case, how do you think we can move in the right direction?

Mr. BILCHIK. Mr. Chairman, I can assure you that I didn't come into this position with any idea of keeping the status quo. I really came into the position with the idea of visiting on what we were doing, how we were doing it, and making sure we improve it.

You focus on a critical issue, the evaluation aspect, what works, how are we judging what we are doing in the States, and we try to do that through two different mechanisms. One is through our own individual review of programs that we fund, and the second is by surveying the field about what other jurisdictions are funding, what is working in those States and territories, and making sure that information gets out to the field as well. So there are really two ways we operate in determining what is happening in the field and what is working.

When we develop a program, we associate a discretionary program, an evaluation with the program. For example—and I can use this going back to the cycle of activity I described in my oral testimony where we do the demonstration evaluation, set up training and technical assistance, and then disseminate information to the field. We did that years ago with the whole approach of restitution where we demonstrated juvenile restitution programs before they were a fad, documented the success of those restitution programs in terms of both collecting restitution and reducing recidivism; pulled together a consortium of individuals from around the country, called RESTA, and then disseminated that information to the

field. Now, we have restitution programs operating in virtually every jurisdiction in the country and we think we get good outcomes out of it. So it is a modeling process.

That is a historical one, but we are also involved in that right now with our after-care program that we funded, our gang program, our interdisciplinary Safe Futures Program. All have evaluations associated with them so we can see what the outcomes are, measure them and, if they are working, get that information out to the field as to why they are working. If they are not working, we need to get that information out as well.

Senator THOMPSON. Well, where, in all this documentation that we have got around here, does it show whether or not these gang programs are working?

Mr. BILCHIK. I think the gang programs are one of the toughest ones because we are really just beginning to develop these multidisciplinary gang efforts that contemplate an entire comprehensive approach of prevention, intervention, as well as suppression in some jurisdictions.

The work we did starting in the late 1980's and continuing into the 1990's on our gang program was to survey the field about some of the better things that were happening in the gang area and pull together a model which we then could demonstrate, and we are in the process of demonstrating that. But that model right now is in operation in Chicago, the little village project, and they are seeing some initial good results with their cohorts that they are analyzing in Chicago with some reduced gang involvement, some reduced levels of violence, as a result of this multipronged effort of prevention, intervention, as well as good law enforcement suppression activity.

Now, that is what I hope we can do when we look at our multiple gang sites, is to do a more indepth review and follow up on that initial little village research and get more information out to the field about what is working.

Senator THOMPSON. You published a report in 1994 that was entitled "What Works: Promising Interventions in Juvenile Justice." Now, some of the programs go back over 20 years. The majority of the programs listed in the book provide no information as to how the programs are evaluated or whether, in fact, the program actually works to prevent violence; there is no basis for knowing what OJJDP says works actually does work.

I mean, you say what works and then you list the program, so therefore it works. It is kind of like that guy that walked into the bar down in Tennessee and wrote names down, and a fellow said, what are you doing. He said, I am writing the names down of all the people in here I can whip. He said, well, you can't whip me, and he said, well, I will take your name off it, then. [Laughter.]

Other than the fact that you have listed it, is there any indication or anything that you can point to to demonstrate that these programs that we have been funding for over 20 years actually do work? Do we have any system of evaluation?

Perhaps the ones that work maybe work because of the people who ran the program and not because of the nature of the program. For example, shouldn't we evaluate these programs in different locations and different staff, and do we really know that the evaluations were done correctly and according to scientific methods, and

so forth? I am trying to get below the surface here a little bit in a very short period of time?

Mr. BILCHIK. It is a very good question, and what we accomplish with that book was an inventory not of the programs necessarily that we were funding. That was a national inventory where we did outreach to jurisdictions across the country asking them to identify their promising programs that could be shared across the country.

What I would point to as a better product in terms of that higher standard of what works is the guide on our comprehensive strategy where we have laid out our strategy on reduction of juvenile delinquency, and within a graduated intervention scheme—immediate intervention programs, intermediate intervention programs and deep-end programs—we have identified programs that have been evaluated and, based on those evaluations, we believe, can be effective in jurisdictions.

But the second part of what you stated, I think, is equally important. How do you—

Senator BIDEN. Would you translate that into English?

Mr. BILCHIK. Absolutely.

Senator BIDEN. I tell you what I would say to that. Excuse me, Mr. Chairman. Look, I support your program. You are not helping your case any. Get very specific. Your testimony right here lays out what you have done with Boys Clubs and Girls Clubs and studies done by Columbia University. The gentlemen is looking for specifics. Respond to specifics. Otherwise, you are not going to be funded.

Mr. BILCHIK. Thank you, Senator Biden. The various programs that we have funded—for example, the Children At Risk Program, which is a multifaceted program dealing with children who are at risk of becoming deeply involved in the juvenile justice system, had a controlled study associated with it and found good results in relation to reduction of delinquency. That is the kind of immediate delinquency reduction program—

Senator BIDEN. What control study? Who did the study? What did the study say? Bingo, bingo, bingo. Put it in the record if you don't know it.

Mr. BILCHIK. I can add the specific study to the record, Senator, but the findings were that the children involved in this program were high-risk children and that their involvement in the program—subsequent contacts with police were 41 percent. Children in the control group were 69 percent. That is approximately a 33-percent reduction in delinquency involvement for those children involved in the program.

The Boys Clubs and Girls Clubs, Senator, you referred to—a 13-percent reduction in delinquency rates for children in public housing involved in Boys Clubs and Girls Clubs. These are the types of programs that we are identifying, getting out to the field so they can understand what can be successful and what can work, and that includes the more deep-end programs. The Florida Environmental Institute Program, secure in the sense that it is in the middle of a swamp, has shown good results in reducing recidivism for some very serious juvenile offenders.

Senator THOMPSON. You say you have got Boys Clubs and Girls Clubs. I personally think that this kind of mentoring and early intervention when these kids are young and having some adult fig-

ure there is very, very important, but again I don't know why I think that. That is just my assumption, and I think what we are looking for is some evidence of that and it sounds like you have some. Are you getting that out?

It looks to me like your role is to, with all these programs that are out there, spend more time—and maybe we hamstring you in the funding; maybe that is part of the problem—but spend more and more time evaluating all of this, finding out what is doing some good. Then tell everybody about it and say, you might want to consider this instead of doing something you have been doing for 20 years as your juvenile crime rate continues to skyrocket. Can we agree that that ought to be your role?

Mr. BILCHIK. Yes, Senator. I think one of our roles is to get that information out and I think we are getting that information out. For example, when the crime bill was passed, we went ahead and produced a document, "Delinquency Prevention Works," dealing with the delinquency part of the crime bill, identifying the types of programs that could be funded with that crime bill money. Boys and Girls Clubs were in that document, describing the operation of the program and the research associated with the program, as were other programs as well along that kind of continuum of intervention that you could see in the juvenile justice system.

Senator THOMPSON. Senator Biden.

Senator BIDEN. I will yield to Senator Kohl, who knows more about these prevention programs than I do, and then I will ask my questions, if I may.

Senator KOHL. Thank you. Mr. Bilchik, I think we need to understand—and I believe that those who are here today do—that your department is under attack and that there are those who think it should be eliminated. Senator Thompson may or may not be one of those, but I am here because I am convinced that while we may and certainly do need to sharpen up your department, sharpen up your programs, be sure that they are more effective, evaluate them carefully, be sure we are not wasting any money—but that does not lead to the conclusion that the Federal Government should be minimally, if at all, involved in trying to prevent juvenile crime from occurring.

That is where I am coming from, and I think you need to express yourself in that respect that there are many areas in which a Federal involvement in trying to prevent young people from getting involved in crime is good and proper and can be and, in fact, is effective, and that it would be counterproductive to try and reduce what is already a minimal role to zero in terms of the Federal Government trying to be a force, a productive force and a useful force, in this area of juvenile crime.

We did not get very much, if anything, in the last go-around just this year, as you know, when we authorized \$1.9 billion for crime-fighting and virtually nothing for prevention, as you know. So we were shut out, and that is where the process is going and some wish to officialize that and make that permanent. I think, you know, we need to hear from you in a very direct, commonsense way about what I believe you believe, that that is the wrong direction in which this Government should go.

Again, nobody is suggesting we can't do better, we can't sharpen up, we can't focus better, but that is not the same thing as saying let us eliminate. How do you feel about that, Mr. Bilchik?

Mr. BILCHIK. I think you make a good point, and we have been working very hard at getting better at what we do. I look at that "Promising Approaches" book that was published in 1994 and I think we have done better with the "Delinquency Prevention Works" publication and the guide on the comprehensive strategy on identifying those practices, those programs, the strategies that local and State jurisdictions can use to be effective.

So it goes beyond what we are going to be funding directly, what we substantively fund in relation to the Federal Government in development of the actual program itself. It goes to the support of the activity that we provide as well.

Senator KOHL. You are familiar with the Weed and Seed Program?

Mr. BILCHIK. Yes, Senator.

Senator KOHL. Will you describe how that has been effective? We have got a Weed and Seed Program in several communities across this country which the Federal Government and your department helped to seed. Just tell us a little bit about what they have done and how they have been effective.

Mr. BILCHIK. The Weed and Seed programs, Senator, have mobilized communities around the country in both attacking the crime problem in relation to a law enforcement approach as well as development of prevention and intervention programs in relation to those individual communities. They develop the strategies themselves and receive the Federal funding, then, to implement those programs. To me, that is an appropriate Federal role and model for how we can do business. We are now in the process of evaluating the Weed and Seed Program on a national evaluation scale and awaiting those results, what kind of outcome measurements we can see and we have obtained in the Weed and Seed Program.

Senator KOHL. Now, we have a community in Wisconsin, in Madison, which got a Weed and Seed grant and has had what they regard as a spectacular Weed and Seed program, first, in moving into crime-ridden and drug-ridden neighborhoods to help root out the crime and the drugs, and then to seed it with programs aimed at young people to get them to move away from crime and drugs into more constructive activity.

The chief of police of Madison, WI, the mayor of Madison, WI, as well as local officials—I have toured this neighborhood—all feel that this is an example of a successful prevention program which was aided by involvement and funding from you all. So I am a person who has seen how prevention money can be used and targeted effectively, and I would like your comment.

Mr. BILCHIK. Senator, what is encouraging to me is that when we look at the information we are getting out to localities and States about the most effective programs that they can use and then we seed that activity—we use our formula funds for them to actually develop them—we see those programs in the sub-grants that the States actually develop.

In your States, you are seeing the Big Brothers/Big Sisters programs, the Boys and Girls Clubs, the intensive supervision, the

after-care programs. Some States that are prioritizing that as a main criterion and agenda item are implementing the Sears Fountain Chronic Offender programs for their more detailed work.

Senator Ashcroft mentioned about the 7-percent factor. Within our sub-grants, we are seeing jurisdictions starting to go to that kind of model, that SHOCAP model, of the 7- or 8-percent solution where they are developing these multidisciplinary programs using our formula funds based upon the information we are getting out to the field.

SHOCAP was actually a program that we developed in OJJDP. Once we demonstrated, we now have converted it into a training and technical assistance program and shared that information around the country. The States that the Senator referred to that are implementing that program are implementing it with our support at this point.

Senator KOHL. Thank you, Senator Thompson.

Senator THOMPSON. Senator Biden.

Senator BIDEN. Boss, you have got a problem and let me tell you what it is. I want a full disclosure here. I was here in 1974 as one of the cosponsors of this act and feel very strongly about the office. The purpose of the office was, first and foremost, at its inception, since I sat here and helped write it, to provide for information to States, along with money. We thought we had a greater resource at the Federal level to go out and find out what worked and what didn't work and, in addition, to comb not only the literature, but the States to find out what worked and didn't work, and then to fund those programs, with mandates, saying, you know, if you want the money, then this is the kind of thing you have to do.

Now, one of the problems is—and I don't mean to be critical; I mean to be hopefully, as someone who has dealt with this area a long, long time—I don't think—as a matter of fact, I am certain there is no one who sits in the U.S. Senate, just because I have been here longer than anybody else up here, who has been more supportive of OJJDP, an acronym I never use because it automatically says bureaucrat, bureaucrat, bureaucrat.

What you are saying today—you are doing all the right things as a professional, but everything you say translates to people watching, other than the pros who are sitting behind you, as bureaucrat, bureaucrat, bureaucrat, and bureaucrat means bad in the minds of the public.

The Senator from Wisconsin is absolutely correct. We are fighting this overall federalism—the new federalism argument. It is a legitimate debate, and that is should we be involved at all? The Senator from Wisconsin and I think we had better darn well be involved not only as much, but more than we have been federally.

So what I respectfully suggest that you do for the record, and quickly for the record, is go back and not in this catalog that you put out, which is just that, a catalog—the only thing that makes it more than a catalog is you put your imprimatur on it by saying it works, but you don't have any sustaining data as to why it works, not a single thing in any one of these programs. What people are looking for is hard data.

This gentleman sitting behind me, Chris Putala, who is as I am often reminded by him, not a lawyer, but he has his graduate de-

gree from Harvard in public policy issues relating to this area, as well as others. He has spent all day yesterday and this morning on the phone for me dealing with a separate issue—this is just to make a point—on the medical or pharmacological difference that can be shown between ice, or methamphetamine, and crack and other drugs, because we have a big debate going on in the country.

Do those drugs warrant greater penalties than other drugs, and is the reason they have greater penalties race based or is it based on medical data available to us? So we have been combing the literature to make sure that we understand the assertion constantly made that ice and violence are synonymous, methamphetamine and violence are synonymous; that you go from a 4- to a 24-hour period of paranoia that lasts, unlike with crack cocaine, and clearly unlike with powdered cocaine. Then policymakers can make informed judgments about whether or not they deserve better or worse, stiffer or less stiff, more attention, less attention.

What is missing in the testimony, not in your knowledge base, but the testimony, is tags on this; you know, stakes in the ground. For example, your testimony lays out—and I realize it must be a pain in the neck to know your agency is under siege and to be called up by a bunch of guys and women who sit on a high bench looking down at you. You get up in the morning and say, assuming you are married, to your wife, so long, honey, have a good day; I am going to have a great day, I am going to go up and speak to those guys; they are all going to be looking down asking me questions. It is hard, it is hard, although everyone, I think, has been very fair with you.

But in your own testimony, when you were asked about gangs, one of the gang prevention programs you have is Boys Clubs and Girls Clubs; not generically youth violence, gangs. So when the Senator asks you a question about what have you done about gangs, you have it right here in your report. It says gangs—let me make sure I get it right here. I will find the page in your report. I have been skipping through it, but at any rate you have a provision in here that points out that the gang prevention program has resulted in a reduction in the number of people engaged in gang activity, the number of arrests, and you cite a Columbia study—I can't find it—Columbia University. I don't know what page of your testimony it is. Maybe your staff can find it quickly for the record so we can speak to it.

The point is you do have data, you do have data, where you had Columbia University, based on your testimony, come in and take—page 12; my staff tells me it is page 12. Let us find it. Here you go. It says,

Programs such as Boys Clubs and Girls Club of America, which have been instrumental in addressing needs of at-risk youth and providing alternatives to drug use, gang involvement, and violent crime, are examples of positive approaches. Boys and Girls Clubs providing after-school activities in public housing developments across the country have been effective in increasing the rates of school attendance and improving academic performance. According to a Columbia University study, Boys and Girls Clubs in public housing reduced the juvenile crime rate by 13 percent. In addition, findings from the OJJDP-funded Boys and Girls Clubs targeted outreach program show outreach to 6,000 youths at risk for gang involvement, with 90 percent maintaining regular contact with a club, 48 percent showing improvement in school behavior, and over one-third reporting improved grades.

That is the kind of data the Senator is looking for. Now, he may be looking for a lot more, but I really think you have got to go back, and I would ask unanimous consent that you are able to submit amended testimony laying out just illustratively four or five or six programs that you have, in fact, funded along with the States where you have had oversight where you are able to show that there are results.

Now, I don't suggest you have to show results for every program you have funded because some of the purpose of funding it is you have to take a flyer to see whether or not they are going to work. But I really think the bottom line of all of this is there is a growing element in the debate about the role of federalism.

This is an honest guy, an intellectually rigorous guy. You heard him ask questions of the Senator from Missouri. I doubt whether there was a single thing he disagreed with with the Senator from Missouri, but federalism, mandates, and results are things that everybody is focusing on now and all I am respectfully suggesting is we try to drop the bureaucratise and talk about what evidence we have to think that something that we funded works and what are the programs that we at OJJDP have promoted that we think work, and why, and to what extent do they work.

I will conclude—I am over my time, I know, Mr. Chairman—by pointing out that I think you got a pretty good report from the GAO. As I read the GAO report, you only spend 3 percent of your entire budget on administrative costs. All the rest of that goes back to the States. So the one argument that is often used is that, you know, we absorb the vast majority of this stuff federally with regard to administrative costs and overhead. That doesn't seem to be the case with your agency.

There is an awful lot of local control out there. Much of what you send back there is initiatives from the States that you are willing to go with. Lastly, you are working on trying to streamline the process. You are making some strides there.

I really believe that we are going to be in, all of us—and I am not suggesting anyone has drawn a final judgment on this, but I think in the tightened times, the debate on federalism and mandates, we are going to have to be able to show to a greater degree than we have felt necessary in the past why there is utility in spending the dollar the way we are spending it and the means by which we are distributing it.

I happen to think you are doing a good job. I am not being solicitous. I believe you are doing a good job. I believe we have got to make the case, though—it is a different environment we are in than we were before. That is all I am saying. It is more than I should have said, and I yield back to the chairman.

Senator THOMPSON. Well, thank you. I appreciate all your comments, Senator Biden. You and Senator Kohl both have been laboring in this vineyard for a long, long time. You know, I think this is kind of an example that the system is working. I came to this without much knowledge and still may be pretty close to where I came in. But I have just kind of a basic attitude not that we want to put this under siege or not that I have made my mind up about anything. That is overblown, I think. I have kind of a novel approach to these things. When we have hearings, I like to have the

hearings and then sit down and see what you have got and then come to conclusions.

Senator BIDEN. It is novel, but welcome.

Senator THOMPSON. Every once in a while, especially in regard to an area where we are not interested in just tearing down—we are interested in doing something positive for the future—what we have been doing has got to be looked at. That is what the Senator here is saying. I mean, he is one of the architects and he is acknowledging that we have got to look at these things and justify these things.

It is not from my standpoint that there are not any things out there that are working. It is just that when we have to spend so much time digging out from those of you who are supposed to be telling us what is working, it makes you question as to how many other people know about it and focusing on what works and disseminating the information.

We use what works, I guess, very loosely around here because I am not sure it is that easy. I mean, in some of these areas we are going to have to come to the conclusion, I think, that we just don't know and never can know. The fact that the crime rate goes up or down is just the beginning of it. There are all kinds of variables that play into all of that, especially when you are dealing with prevention programs. I understand all of that, but we get so caught up in all of these people and reports and, justifying our own existence and all that I think it is easy in any kind of a program to lose track of the basic purpose that it started with.

I will just ask you one specific thing in terms of administration and it has to do with the National Council on Juvenile and Family Court Judges, which I am sure is a wonderful institution, but I would like to know a little bit more about it. You have about \$20 million of discretionary funds to provide for direct programs that you feel work, and over the last 20 years this National Council on Juvenile and Family Court Judges has received \$40 million, roughly 10 percent of OJJDP discretionary spending, ostensibly, I would assume, to help train juvenile court judges, which is a laudable purpose, but, again, you know, we are in some of these communities that are being just overrun with violence.

We had testimony from a juvenile court judge from Chicago talking about the revolving door court system and young people with numerous gun offenses just going in and out and all that kind of stuff. I am sure these conferences where you get into the nuances of what these court judges ought to be doing are nice and important, and so forth, but we could be fiddling while Rome is really burning.

So tell me about this national council and what they have done to deserve \$40 million of the rather limited budget that you have.

Mr. BILCHIK. I think that the judges serve, of course, a critical role in the juvenile justice system, and the support of the judges that Congress has indicated from year to year that it wishes that we give the judges, I think, serves an appropriate purpose.

Senator THOMPSON. Have we earmarked that?

Mr. BILCHIK. Yes.

Senator THOMPSON. You know, I don't know if I am stepping on any toes around here or what, or how that came about, but has

Congress earmarked and said that you must give that much money to this particular outfit?

Mr. BILCHIK. Yes. We have been advised by Congress that this should be a priority for our funding for the judges, and they serve an important purpose. They network between the judges. They do training programs across the country throughout the year to support the judges. They are running some demonstration programs in terms of some model court practices which they are evaluating and getting some outcome measurements on.

But, predominantly, it is a training and technical assistance program to build capacity in the bench around the country. When we look at the problem of juvenile violence, one of the main problems that we are seeing is that we don't have a strong juvenile justice system in place, and building capacity in the bench and making sure that judges can advocate for what needs to be in place in their jurisdictions—to have that kind of strong juvenile justice system, I think, is critical.

Senator THOMPSON. What do you mean, building capacity in the bench, getting more judges?

Mr. BILCHIK. I think in some jurisdictions it does require more judges. The judges are overwhelmed with caseloads that are too high for them to effectively deal with—

Senator THOMPSON. So you get together and have a meeting and effectively try to teach these judges how to go back home and tell people that they are being overwhelmed and they need more judges?

Mr. BILCHIK. The building capacity predominately is about the model practices that are used in different jurisdictions, programs and types of interventions they can take back to their jurisdictions, share with their practitioners, and try to implement in those jurisdictions. Judges can be leaders in their cities and their counties in trying to implement juvenile justice reform and improvement of the system. That is part of what is done in there, as well as training of the judges on some of the tools that they can use on the bench.

Senator THOMPSON. Well, they charge tuition for their training and the judges have to pay, as I understand it, all their expenses when they go to these. Where does the \$40 million over the last 20 years go? Ten percent of your discretionary spending goes to this one group of people. What do they do with that money?

Mr. BILCHIK. They are sponsoring those training programs and conferences. It does take money to put the conferences on to begin with, bringing in the trainers and the experts from the field to work with the judges, as well as—

Senator THOMPSON. The National Council on Juvenile and Family Court Judges is based in Reno, NV, as I understand it.

Mr. BILCHIK. Yes.

Senator THOMPSON. They don't have in-house, that expertise? They go out and hire lecturers and people to come in and train?

Mr. BILCHIK. They have a core staff which they use, in part, but they also go out across the country. But some of the best things that you see happening in the country, as you have noted, are going into Tennessee or going into Delaware and saying what do you have going on in this jurisdiction you can share as far as the

best practice with the other judges across the country, and then facilitate that training opportunity.

Senator THOMPSON. Has OJJDP ever audited this group?

Mr. BILCHIK. We have monitored them throughout the years as far as their activities.

Senator THOMPSON. Have you ever audited this group?

Mr. BILCHIK. I will have to check, Mr. Chairman, as to whether there has been a complete audit of NCJFCJ.

Senator THOMPSON. The last meeting they had in Honolulu, as I understand. This year's conference is in Vail, CO.

Senator BIDEN. In the summer or winter?

Senator THOMPSON. It is in summer.

Senator BIDEN. Well, that is some relief.

Senator THOMPSON. We will have the GAO representative here.

Senator BIDEN. May I ask a question on that because I think you are raising a very valid point?

Senator THOMPSON. Yes.

Senator BIDEN. Again, sir, if you could submit for the record specifics, not about capacity. I may be mistaken. I don't know the chairman as well as I would like to get to know him, but my guess is your answer confirmed his concern that they don't do much at those conferences.

For example, my understanding is that the conference—there are a lot of family court systems that don't know how to manage their docket, so people actually come in and sit down and train them and they say, here is what we do to manage the docket. That very judge who came from Chicago who was referenced earlier said she was overwhelmed with the number of cases. My recollection is that these conferences are the same as the judicial conference in what they do. They sit down and they decide how they are going to teach jurisdictions that seek the help—how to bring in masters to work with them, literally how to physically set the court room up. That is the kind of answer we are looking for. What do they do?

If we leave here now, the impression is, and it may be a correct one, that what we spend money to do is teach them how to go back and lobby their legislatures to hire more judges, because when you were asked the question, what do they do in terms of increasing capacity—I would not ask the reporter to read back the section, but my recollection of what the chairman said was, does this mean they teach them how to go back and, in effect, lobby better at home, and you answered—instead of saying, no, that is not what they do, you gave an answer about increasing capacity and inter-jurisdictional blah-blah, you know.

I want specifics. What do you teach these judges? What does this outfit out in Reno, NV, that goes off to Vail, CO, do, what concrete thing? Has the State of Arkansas or Delaware changed the way in which they set up their family courts as a consequence of what they have learned about how you can more effectively control case-loads? My recollection is they do, but say so; put it in the record. You are making it really hard for me.

Mr. BILCHIK. I welcome the opportunity to supplement the record.

Senator BIDEN. Not only welcome; you don't have to be polite. This is not the State Department; you are not in the State Depart-

ment. I am sorry to be so blunt, but I hope I get the message to you and your staff. No more bureaucratic answers. What do they do, specifically? Next time you come, on the record tick off boom, boom, boom, boom. They show some courts how to set up metal detectors outside of their courtrooms. They have shown that it works in other places. They have shown that when you have someone, you need two bailiffs, not one bailiff. They have shown you need a master and not just one judge. They have shown you have to have a ratio of x to y.

Senator THOMPSON. And why it costs \$40 million.

Senator BIDEN. And why it costs \$40 million over 20 years, which is—anyway—

Senator THOMPSON. Mr. Bilchik, I appreciate your being here and I have no further questions or comments. Obviously, we have got a lot of work to do and we will get to it together. I appreciate it.

Mr. BILCHIK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator THOMPSON. Thank you.

The next panel is Dr. Laurie Ekstrand, Associate Director, Administration of Justice Issues, U.S. General Accounting Office; Dr. Ira Schwartz, dean, School of Social Work, University of Pennsylvania; and Ms. Lavonda Taylor, National Chair, Coalition for Juvenile Justice. You didn't know you were going to get to spend lunch with us, I will bet, did you?

Ms. Ekstrand, we will start with you, if we may, for any opening statement you have.

PANEL CONSISTING OF LAURIE E. EKSTRAND, ASSOCIATE DIRECTOR, ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE ISSUES, GENERAL GOVERNMENT DIVISION, U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, WASHINGTON, DC; IRA SCHWARTZ, DEAN, SCHOOL OF SOCIAL WORK, UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA, PHILADELPHIA, PA; AND LAVONDA TAYLOR, CHAIR, COALITION FOR JUVENILE JUSTICE, WEST MEMPHIS, AR

STATEMENT OF LAURIE E. EKSTRAND

Ms. EKSTRAND. Thank you, sir. Thank you for inviting me to testify about our review of the Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention.

With fiscal year 1995 and 1996 appropriations of about \$162 million, this has been the high point of a somewhat unstable pattern of funding over the last 20 years, and the chart over there shows the pattern of funding. The additional funds in these last 2 years were for new formula grants to States and territories to fund local delinquency prevention programs and for State challenge grants.

To participate in the Formula Grant Program, States and territories apply for funding annually and are required to submit 3-year comprehensive plans on how the money is to be used to meet their juvenile justice and delinquency prevention needs. According to the Office of Justice Programs [OJP] policy, formula grants are to be monitored through annual visits to determine whether States are following the plans they submitted.

Our review found that monitoring visits were not done on an annual basis. From January 1993 to December 1995, a total of 29 on-

site monitoring visits were made. If each participating State and territory had been monitored annually during this period, 171 monitoring visits would have been made.

OJJDP guidance also requires audits of each formula grant program every 5 years. The audits are to determine whether States' reporting systems are providing complete and accurate information on compliance with the four key mandated eligibility requirements. These are that juvenile offenders are not detained in secure detention or correction facilities and the other three that we talked about earlier this morning.

In relation to discretionary grants, we found that OJJDP awarded 162 new grants for fiscal years 1993 to 1995. These grants funded juvenile justice research, demonstration projects testing new approaches to delinquency prevention, treatment or intervention, training and technical assistance, or a mix of these activities. We have provided the subcommittee with a summary of the information on all 162 new grants in a separate correspondence dated May 7, 1996, and we have included some examples of the different kinds of grants in the appendix to this testimony.

Our review of OJJDP's grant award process showed that the funds were awarded to grantees as a result of a peer review process that is generally similar to that used by the National Institutes of Health and the National Science Foundation.

According to OJP policy, information on discretionary grant monitoring and related activities is to be maintained in an official grant file. However, our review of the files for 132 new discretionary grants awarded in fiscal years 1993 through 1995 showed little evidence of monitoring activities, although plans for monitoring activities were included. Some required financial reports were also missing from some files. OJJDP's deputy administrator told us that he thought that some of the missing reports had been submitted, but that they had just not been properly filed.

Finally, in relation to OJJDP's efforts to communicate the results of discretionary grant work, we reviewed how research results are communicated for five grants that were completed in fiscal year 1995. Overall, we found that these grants resulted in a variety of types of products, including research summaries, fact sheets, technical reports, reference manuals, training curricula, reports and executive summaries, and more. These products were made available through the Internet and through other electronic media, as well as through a library maintained by a private contractor for OJJDP.

In summary, we found that auditing of formula grants, the awarding of discretionary grants, and the communication of results of discretionary grant projects seem to be operating reasonably well. However, monitoring of the formula grants does not seem to be on a schedule that conforms to OJP criteria, and monitoring of discretionary grants does not seem to be documented in the grant files as they are prescribed.

This concludes my oral statement and I would be happy to answer any questions you may have.

Senator THOMPSON. Thank you very much.

[The prepared statement of Ms. Ekstrand follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF LAURIE E. EKSTRAND

The goal of the Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention [OJJDP] is to provide national leadership in addressing the issues of juvenile delinquency and in improving juvenile justice. OJJDP operated on a \$162 million appropriation in fiscal year 1995 with 71 authorized staff positions. The Office addresses juvenile justice issues primarily by administering a range of grants to states, territories, and public and private organizations. About 62 percent on OJJDP's fiscal year 1995 appropriation funded formula grants to states and territories. The 57 states and territories participating in the formula grant program can use the funds to meet juvenile justice and delinquency prevention needs that they identified in 3-year plans submitted to OJJDP. OJJDP is to do annual monitoring visits to each participating state and territory to determine whether they are doing the activities specified in their plans.

About 35 percent of OJJDP's fiscal year 1995 appropriation funded discretionary grants, the office's primary mechanism for providing federal assistance directly to public and private juvenile justice organizations. The grants are to be awarded to applicants determined by OJJDP to be the most qualified to do work advertised in grant solicitations. Projects funded have been for research, demonstration projects, and/or training and technical assistance. OJJDP made 162 new discretionary grant awards for fiscal years 1993 through 1995.

GAO found that OJJDP had procedures in place for planning, soliciting, and awarding grants, as well as for auditing and monitoring activities on grant projects and communicating the results of the work to interested practitioners and policy-makers. OJJDP is generally following these procedures. However, GAO found that some monitoring procedures were not followed.

GAO's review of formula grant data between January 1993 and December 1995 showed that on-site program monitoring visits were generally not done annually, as required by procedures. The Deputy Administrator said that the visits did not occur because they are expensive and time consuming. He said that OJJDP might need to revise some procedures, noting that a visit once every 2 years and some interim telephone monitoring may be more appropriate than annual visits. In addition, GAO's review of official discretionary grant files showed that, while almost all had plans for monitoring the work, there was little evidence in the files that monitoring had occurred. The Deputy Administrator said that OJJDP would take the necessary steps to improve its monitoring records.

ABBREVIATIONS

IG—Inspector General.
 JJDP—Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention.
 JMD—Justice Management Division.
 LEAA—Law Enforcement Assistance Administration.
 LRE—Law-Related Education.
 NIH—National Institutes of Health.
 NSF—National Science Foundation.
 OJARS—Office of Justice Assistance, Research and Statistics.
 OJJDP—Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention.
 OJP—Office of Justice Programs.

Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee: I am pleased to be here today to discuss the results of our review of the Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention [OJJDP]. OJJDP is one of five¹ components of the Department of Justice's Office of Justice Programs [OJP]. In requesting this work, Senator Hatch and Senator Thompson asked us to cover several management and grant administration issues to assist you in your deliberations on OJJDP's reauthorization.

In accordance with their requests, my testimony covers the following topics:

How communication and coordination have evolved between OJP and its component offices, including OJJDP. We will discuss these issues within the historic perspective of an organization that has experienced frequent change and has diffused decisionmaking authority.

How OJJDP monitors and audits the use of juvenile justice formula grants² by states and territories.

¹The other four components are the National Institute of Justice, the Bureau of Justice Statistics, the Bureau of Justice Assistance, and the Office for Victims of Crime.

²OJJDP formula grants are funds available to states and territories to assist them in developing programs to improve their juvenile justice systems and to prevent and control delinquency. To be eligible for formula grants funds, states must apply for the program each year and meet

Continued

What new discretionary grant projects³ OJJDP has awarded over the last 3 fiscal years (fiscal years 1993 through 1995).

How OJJDP manages its discretionary grants, including processes for planning, announcing, and awarding its discretionary grants, and how those projects are monitored. We will also discuss how the OJJDP process for outside peer review of discretionary grant applications compares to the processes of the National Institutes of Health [NIH] and the National Science Foundation [NSF].

How OJJDP communicates the results of the work it sponsors, and how those communication processes worked for five judgmentally selected discretionary grant projects.

We did not work primarily at OJP and OJJDP in Washington, DC. We also visited OJJDP contractor facilities in Rockville and Annapolis Junction, MD, and a discretionary grantee in Albany, NY. We observed an audit of the state monitoring system for formula grant use in Pennsylvania. We did our work in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Appendix I explains our objectives, scope, and methodology in greater detail.

BACKGROUND


The goal of OJJDP is to provide national leadership in addressing the issues of juvenile delinquency and in improving juvenile justice. Formula grant funding makes up the largest portion of OJJDP's budget. In fiscal year 1995 total OJJDP appropriations were \$162 million. As shown in figure 1, \$100 million of this amount (about 62 percent) was for formula grants, and \$57 million (about 35 percent) was for discretionary grants. The remaining \$5 million (about 3 percent) covered administrative and other expenses. According to OJJDP's Administrative Officer, this included salaries for 71 authorized full-time equivalent staff positions and funds for travel and other administrative expenses.

certain requirements in treating juveniles who are detained in their facilities. In February 1996, 57 states and territories were participating in the formula grant program.

³OJJDP discretionary grants are the Office's primary funding mechanism for providing federal assistance directly to public and private juvenile justice organizations. The grants are to be awarded to applicants determined by OJJDP to be the most qualified to do work advertised in grant solicitations. Though small compared to other programs, the discretionary grant programs of OJJDP and other OJP offices collectively provide the largest block of discretionary funds available to Justice for underwriting research and demonstration projects.

Figure 1: OJJDP's Budget Appropriation for FY 1995

GAO OJJDP's Budget Appropriation for
FY 1995



Source: GAO analysis of OJJDP data.

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HISTORIC PERSPECTIVE—OJJDP HAS UNDERGONE FREQUENT CHANGE

OJJDP has been a component of three umbrella offices since it was established by the Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act of 1974 (JJDP Act).⁴ It was originally part of the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration (LEAA) with responsibility to administer new juvenile justice grant programs. In 1979, LEAA was restructured into the Office of Justice Assistance, Research and Statistics (OJARS), and, in 1984, into OJP—with OJJDP being a component of each office. OJJDP's 22-year history can be characterized by fluctuating executive branch support and funding levels.

EXECUTIVE SUPPORT FLUCTUATED

Executive branch support for OJJDP has fluctuated over the years, while Congress continued to fund OJJDP. For example, in 1980, the administration did not seek funding for OJJDP's umbrella organization—LEAA—while retaining OJJDP. Both the 1977 reauthorization and the 1980 amendments to the JJDP Act reflected overall executive and congressional support for the law and its implementation.

Beginning in 1982, OJJDP was targeted for elimination by the executive branch. For about 10 years, the administration requested no funding for OJJDP's juvenile justice programs, but Congress restored appropriations each year.

APPROPRIATIONS LEVELS WERE UNSTABLE

As shown in figure 2, OJJDP's funding levels dropped from about \$100 million between fiscal years 1978 and 1981 to about \$70 million in 1982. Then, between fiscal years 1982 and 1993, appropriations remained relatively flat, ranging between \$70 million and \$88 million. Appropriations levels increased rather dramatically in fiscal years 1994 and 1995. The increases were primarily for funding new initiatives authorized by 1992 amendments to the JJDP Act.


The initiatives included new formula grants for states to fund local delinquency prevention programs and state challenge grants to address priority programs identified by Congress (e.g., gender-specific services and aftercare programs for youths released from confinement). They also included new discretionary grant programs for missing and abused children, mentoring of at-risk youths to improve school performance and prevent delinquent behavior, and several programs addressing juvenile gang issues.⁵

⁴ Public Law 93-415, 42 U.S.C. 5601, et seq.

⁵ Three programs authorized by the 1992 amendments—juvenile boot camps, programs for juvenile offenders who are victims of child abuse or neglect, and a White House conference on juvenile justice—had not been funded as of April 1996.

Figure 2: OJJDP's Budget Appropriations, FYs 1975-1995

GAO OJJDP's Budget Appropriations, FYs 1975-1995



Source: GAO analysis of OJJDP data.

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COMMUNICATION AND COORDINATION BETWEEN OJP AND ITS COMPONENTS, INCLUDING OJJDP, APPEARED TO HAVE IMPROVED SINCE THE EARLY 1990'S

OJJDP's history has also included conflicts over lines of authority with OJP. Justice studies and congressional hearings have attributed some of that conflict to OJP's organizational structure, as established by statute. The organizational structure gives each OJP component office, headed by a presidential appointee, independent authority to make grants and formulate budgets.

Studies by the Justice Management Division [JMD] and Justice's Office of Inspector General [IG] in 1990 and 1991 documented several conflicts over authority between OJP and its components, including OJJDP. For example, JMD found that OJP's attempts to implement agencywide comprehensive planning and budget management processes for fiscal year 1990 generated considerable controversy and objections within the components. Also, the IG documented difficulties over preparation of the fiscal year 1992 budget request. In preparing a consolidated budget request, OJP made significant changes to the funding of certain initiatives that were contained in budget submissions prepared by the components. Despite strenuous disagreement from some component heads, OJP's consolidated budget presentation was the version accepted by Justice.

Prompted in part by these reports on management problems, the Attorney General issued an order in February 1991, which assigned the Assistant Attorney General for OJP broad policymaking authority. Specifically, it gave the Assistant Attorney General authority over the contract and grant programs of the OJP components. The House Subcommittee on Government Information, Justice and Agriculture asked us to review the legality of the order.⁶

We found the Attorney General order to be contrary to statutory authority. We concluded that by assigning the Assistant Attorney General policy-setting authority and countermand authority over the OJP programs, the order exceeded the Attorney General's "general authority" over the agency heads; was contrary to components' statutory "final authority" over grant and contract matters; and conflicted with the overall statutory scheme.

According to the current Assistant Attorney General for Justice Programs, two difficulties arose from the organizational structure of OJP and its components, including OJJDP:

First, there are 6 presidential appointees positions in an organization of about 530 employees. She said that the number of top-level appointees can in itself become cumbersome and duplicative. Cooperation becomes overly dependent on interpersonal relationships among the heads of the components.

Second, since each component has its own budget and grant-making authority and funds are often obligated to multiyear projects, components sometimes cannot work together on joint projects because one or another of them is not able to commit the money at any given time.

According to interviews with top OJP and OJJDP managers, communication and coordination between OJP and its component had improved since the early 1990s. The managers thought that the improvements had been the result of the current management team's interpersonal skills and commitment to cooperation.

The Assistant Attorney General for Justice Programs said that her highest priority when she took office was to achieve substantive coordination among OJP components. She said that the 1991 Attorney General order delegating broad policymaking authority to her was technically in effect, but that it was not followed. In practice, she said that OJJDP and other components exercised final control over grant awards. She also noted that components prepared their own publications without OJP review.

According to OJP's Budget Director, components, including OJJDP, developed their own annual budget requests on the basis of departmental guidance, their budget bases from the prior fiscal year, and Attorney General priorities. She said that the Assistant Attorney General would not change an item in a component's budget request unless the component concurred. However, OJP budget officials would let component officials know if they believed an item would not withstand Department review.

The Assistant Attorney General and the OJJDP Administrator said that they believed communication and coordination between OJP and its component offices had improved. They cited several examples of progress made on these issues:

⁶ Opinion of the Comptroller General of the United States (B-243175, Aug. 2, 1991).

In fiscal year 1995, OJP published a consolidated volume of the program plans for OJJDP and three other components.⁷ It was the first time since fiscal year 1990 that a consolidated program plan had been issued.

The OJP management team held a series of retreats in 1995 to establish goals, priorities, and strategies, and the team planned to have similar retreats for longer-term strategic planning during 1996.

More joint projects and working groups were established to deal with issues that cross-cut more than one component.

The Assistant Attorney General said that progress made in interagency coordination should be institutionalized. However, in the absence of statutory changes in OJP's organizational structure, she was uncertain as to whether the relationships and progress achieved would be institutionalized, or whether they were the result of solid working relationships built by one management team that might not be transferable to another team.

OJJDP'S MONITORING OF FORMULA GRANTS WAS NOT AS FREQUENT AS PROCEDURES REQUIRED, BUT AUDITS WERE GENERALLY DONE ON TIME

To participate in the formula grant program, states and territories apply for funding annually and are required to submit 3-year comprehensive plans on how the formula funds are to be used to meet their juvenile justice and delinquency prevention needs. According to the Handbook of Policies and Procedures for the Administration of OJP Grants, formula grants made to states and territories are to be monitored through annual visits to determine whether states are following the plans they submitted for use of their formula grant funds.

OJJDP guidance also requires audits of each formula grant program every 5 years. The audits are to determine whether states' monitoring systems were reporting complete and accurate information on compliance with requirements that they must meet to be eligible for formula grants. Four key requirements for continued eligibility are that states develop and adhere to policies, practices, and laws which ensure that (1) juvenile status offenders (e.g., run-aways and truants) are not detained in secure detention or correctional facilities; (2) juveniles are not detained or confined in any institution where they have contact with adult detainees; (3) juveniles are not detained or confined in adult jails or lockups; and (4) efforts are made to reduce the disproportionate confinement of minority youth where it exists.

Our review of OJJDP data showed that on-site program monitoring visits were generally not done on an annual basis, as required by OJP procedures. The data showed that audits had generally been done for each participating state and territory within the 5-year period specified by OJJDP guidance.

MONITORING VISITS

Monitoring visits are to determine whether states were doing activities that they specified in their state plans with the formula grant funds that they received. According to OJJDP officials, monitoring visits are generally no longer than 3 days in duration, they follow a format prescribed in a monitoring handbook, and written reports of visits are generally prepared.

Our review of OJJDP monitoring data showed that on-site program monitoring visits were generally not done on an annual basis, as required by OJP procedures. From January 1993 through December 1995, a total of 29 on-site visits were made. If each participating state and territory had been monitored annually during that period, 171 monitoring visits should have been completed. Officials noted that they also met with state formula grant program managers at conferences, state advisory group meetings, and OJJDP-sponsored workshops and discussed their programs. We do not think meetings with state officials at other functions should be considered as monitoring visits, where checks are to be made of the states' adherence to their plans.

The OJJDP Deputy Administrator said that monitoring visits did not occur on an annual basis because they are expensive, particularly in territories, and they are time consuming to do. In response to our review, he said that OJJDP officials would consider possible revisions of monitoring procedures, noting that a visit once every 2 years and some interim monitoring by telephone may be more appropriate than annual visits to 57 states and territories. He also said that follow-up to ensure compliance with any new procedures implemented would occur.

⁷ The Bureau of Justice Statistics' plan was not included.

AUDITS

According to officials, audits typically involved about a week of fieldwork culminating in an exit conference and written report and are to follow a plan detailed in OJP guidelines. The audits are to include reviews of written monitoring procedures that state officials are to follow, interviews with staff responsible for monitoring, and inspections to determine whether adequate steps had been taken to separate juveniles from adults housed in the same facilities. In addition, audits are to include verification of compliance data and checks of facilities' admission and release records to ensure that the states reported accurate information to OJJDP.

On the basis of our review of OJJDP data, we found that audits had been done for most participating states and territories within the 5-year period specified by procedures. Of 57 states and territories participating in the program as of February 1996, 44 (77 percent) had either been audited between January 1991 and March 1996, or audits were not required because the state had a period of nonparticipation in the program. Arrangements were being made to complete at least three additional audits in 1996. According to the Deputy Administrator, efforts will continue to achieve full compliance with the 5-year audit requirements.

OJJDP AWARDED 162 NEW DISCRETIONARY GRANTS FOR FISCAL YEARS 1993 THROUGH
1995

For fiscal years 1993 through 1995, OJJDP data showed that it awarded 162 new discretionary grants. Funded projects covered a variety of program areas. They were for (1) research on juvenile justice issues; (2) demonstration projects testing new approaches to delinquency prevention, treatment, and intervention; (3) training and technical assistance to juvenile justice practitioners; or (4) a mix of these activities.

Forty-one of the 162 awards provide funds to grantees at demonstration sites nationwide to develop juvenile mentoring programs. The program was designed to match adults in one-to-one relationships with young people who were having difficulty in school. The goals were to improve student participants' academic performance, reduce school drop-out rates, and prevent delinquent behavior. Grantees included hospitals, Boys and Girls Club chapters, and Big Brother and Big Sister chapters. Funding was for July 1995 through June 1998, with 4,000 young people in 25 states expected to participate.

Other discretionary grant awards went to colleges and universities; state and local government offices, including public school systems and courts; and nonprofit organizations. All regions of the nation were represented.

Project periods for the 162 awards made in the 3-year period ranged from about 1 year to about 9 years, with the average period running about 2 years. The highest individual award amount was about \$3.1 million for a 3-year project providing services at a national center for missing and exploited children in Arlington, VA. The services included a toll-free hotline, case management and analysis, publication development, and photo distribution and age progression for missing children. The smallest award amount was \$31,448 for an 18-month project to research, publish, and disseminate a law enforcement manual containing federal and state laws relating to missing children. The grant was also to fund the development of a training program and 13 training sessions to provide information on the basis of the research. We did not calculate an average award amount because some of the new grants awarded during the period of our review were incomplete and were scheduled to have other funds awarded in future fiscal years.

In a May 1996 correspondence,⁸ we provide the Subcommittee with a list of all of the discretionary grants awarded during the 3 fiscal years by program category, including descriptions of each grant and information on the grantee, project period, and funds awarded as of March 1996. In instances where more than one grant was awarded for the same project over the period of our review, we combined award amounts and project descriptions. Appendix II provides examples of discretionary grants for research, demonstration projects, and training and technical assistance.

OJJDP'S PROCESS FOR IMPLEMENTING ITS DISCRETIONARY GRANT PROGRAM


OJJDP manages its discretionary grants by setting goals and priorities for the programs and publicizing available grant programs. It then obtains assistance from peer review panels to evaluate grant applications, makes final grant award decisions, and monitors the work of the grantees. According to OJJDP officials, appropriations delays slowed the process of soliciting applications for discretionary grants this fiscal year.

⁸ OJJDP Discretionary Grant Programs (GAO/GGD-96111R, May 7, 1996).

As shown in figure 3, the key parts of OJJDP's process for planning and announcing discretionary grants are issuance of a program plan; issuance of discretionary program announcements; and distribution of application kits. As shown in figure 4, the key parts of the grant application and review process include initial screening of applications by the OJJDP program manager, peer review of applications, and final selection of applications for funding by the OJJDP administrator.

Figure 3: OJJDP's Process for Planning and Announcing Grant Programs


GAO OJJDP's Process for Planning and Announcing Grant Programs



Source: GAO analysis of OJJDP documents and interviews with OJJDP staff.

Figure 4: Overview of OJJDP Grant Application and Review Process

GAO Overview of OJJDP Grant Application and Review Process



Source: GAO analysis of OJJDP documents and interviews with OJJDP staff.

PROGRAM PLAN IS TO DESCRIBE GOALS AND PRIORITIES

The program plan is to describe OJJDP's goals and priorities for the fiscal year and its discretionary grant programs. OJJDP is required by law to publish a proposed program plan in the Federal Register. After a 45-day comment period and before December 31 of each fiscal year, OJJDP is to publish a final plan.

According to an official, the OJJDP program plan was generally drafted by the administrator and senior managers and was based on congressional and departmental priorities, their knowledge and experience, and input during the course of the year from a variety of sources. As described in the Federal Register, these sources of input included program reviews by OJJDP staff and comments from practitioners in the field, officials from Justice and OJP components, and other federal agencies. The final program plans are also to take into consideration comments received during the 45-day public comment period on the proposed plan.

PROGRAM ANNOUNCEMENTS AND APPLICATION KITS ARE TO SOLICIT APPLICANTS FOR PROGRAMS

Following publication of the final program plan, OJJDP is to publish in the Federal Register a notice of competitive discretionary grant programs and to announce the availability of an application kit. The notice is to include the availability of funds, criteria for selection of applicants, procedures applicable to the submission and review of applications for assistance, and information how to obtain an application kit.

Subsequent to issuance of final program announcements, an OJJDP official said that application kits are to be mailed to interested parties through its contractor-operated Juvenile Justice Clearinghouse. According to the official, about 10,000 copies of the application kit were printed for fiscal year 1995, and about the same number are expected to be printed in fiscal year 1996.

PEER REVIEW PANELS ARE TO HELP DETERMINE WHICH APPLICATIONS ARE FUNDED

Upon receipt of discretionary grant applications, the OJJDP program manager is to perform an initial review on each of them, using an application review checklist. The objective of this initial review is to determine whether applications are complete and eligible for federal funding.

By statute, OJJDP is to have a formal peer review process for its discretionary grant programs. The statute also required that, in establishing its peer review process, OJJDP consult with the directors of the National Institute of Mental Health, a part of NIH, and NSF and submit their final peer review plan to those officials for formal comment.

OJJDP's peer review process is to be advisory—to supplement and assist the consideration of applications by OJJDP. However, an official noted that, in practice, results of the peer review panels' consideration of applications were almost always accepted by OJJDP.

OJJDP contracted out the administrative arrangements (e.g., arranging panels and notifying reviewers) for the peer review of its discretionary grant applications. The contractor maintained a list of qualified consultants from which peer reviewers were selected by OJJDP. In December 1995, the list contained more than 600 names. Peer reviewers were recommended for projects by the OJJDP grant program manager overseeing the project. The OJJDP administrator also had the option of selecting reviewers or asking the grant manager for additional names. Once the selection was made by OJJDP, the contractor was to make arrangements with individuals selected to do the reviews of the projects. According to an OJJDP official, consultants performing peer reviews were reimbursed at a flat rate of \$150 a day, as established by the Administrator.

OJJDP guidance required that the program manager use the following criteria to help achieve balance on the peer review panel:

Each reviewer should have expertise in or complementary to the subject area under review.

Where possible, the peer review panel should be composed of a mix of researchers, practitioners, and academicians.

Panel members should be drawn from as wide a geographic area as practical.

Special attention should be paid to obtaining qualified representation from women and minority groups.

COMPETITION, PEER REVIEW OCCURRED FOR ALMOST ALL DISCRETIONARY GRANTS
AWARDED THAT WE REVIEWED IN FISCAL YEARS 1993 THROUGH 1995

We reviewed files for 81 of 162 new discretionary grants awarded in fiscal years 1993 through 1995. All but two of the grants we reviewed were awarded competitively.⁹ In 75 of the 81 instances, 3 or more proposals were peer reviewed.

Peer reviewers reviewed and scored proposals in six categories: (1) conceptualization of the problem; (2) goals and objectives (i.e., are they program specific, clearly defined, and easily measurable); (3) project design; (4) implementation; (5) organizational capability; and (6) budget.

Peer review panels were composed of three panelists in all of the cases we reviewed. In instances in which a large number of proposals were submitted, peer review followed a two-step process. First, reviewers did evaluations by mail. Second, reviewers convened as a panel for discussions and scoring of proposals.

Biographical data for 60 peer reviewers on panels for the grants that we reviewed showed that they were professionals in the criminal justice field representing geographic regions nationwide. They include academicians; a judge; researchers; and practitioners, such as juvenile justice project directors and program administrators. Twenty-eight percent of the peer reviewers in our sample were minorities, and 47 percent were women.

FINAL DECISIONS TO AWARD DISCRETIONARY GRANTS

After completion of the peer review panels, OJJDP is to do a second internal review of the applications. It is to consider review comments from peer reviewers and other program offices. The OJJDP manager of the discretionary grant program is to make formal recommendations concerning applications to receive funding in a memorandum to the administrator, and the administrator is to make tentative grants selections. The OJP Comptroller is to do a financial review of these applications to determine whether the applicant has the necessary resources and integrity to account for and administer federal funds properly, and whether budget and cost data in the application were allowable, effective, and reasonable. Final awards are to be made by the OJJDP administrator.

APPROPRIATIONS DELAYS HAVE SLOWED DISCRETIONARY GRANT SOLICITATIONS AND
PROJECT FUNDING IN FISCAL YEAR 1996

According to an OJJDP official, delays in enactment of annual appropriations measures have resulted in difficulties in publishing a program plan according to established time frames. If significant delays occur, it becomes difficult to complete the steps in the grant application, review, and award process before the end of the fiscal year. OJJDP's program plan for fiscal year 1996 was published in the Federal Register on February 20, several months later than the official said is the normal time frame for publication. Because OJJDP was operating under a continuing resolution, which is a short-term spending measure, funding amounts were not included in the plan. In comparison, the proposed comprehensive plan for fiscal year 1995 was published on December 30, 1994, with preliminary funding amounts for each program included.

According to an OJJDP official, appropriations delays also slowed funding for some multiyear discretionary grant projects during the first 5 months of fiscal year 1996. When appropriations are authorized in the beginning of a fiscal year, continuation funds are awarded once for the full fiscal year. In the first 5 months of fiscal year 1996, some partial awards were made for ongoing projects that had exhausted funds needed to continue operating. The official noted that funding grants in this manner results in additional paperwork. The fiscal year 1996 appropriation was enacted on April 26, 1996. The appropriation level, \$162 million, was about the same as the fiscal year 1995 level.

COMPARISON OF OJJDP PEER REVIEW TO PEER REVIEWS BY NIH AND NSF

We compared the peer review processes of NIH and NSF to those of OJJDP to note similarities and differences among these agencies. We found the following similarities among peer review processes at OJJDP, NIH, and NSF:

The decisions of the peer reviewers were advisory;

⁹In one of the instances in which a grant was awarded noncompetitively, the record stated that expertise to do the project was available from only one source. In the other instance, a grantee was awarded a noncompetitive continuation grant.

Written criteria for selecting reviewers promoted balanced review selection in terms of race, gender, and region; and

Reviewers evaluated and scored applications on the basis of written criteria.

Key differences we found among peer review processes at the three agencies were in the size and structure of peer review panels and in the methods of appointing peer reviewers. NIH peer reviewers served on panels for up to 4 years. Officials said that this approach allowed for the selection of top experts as panelists. In contrast, NSF and OJJDP registered large numbers of peer reviewers and called upon each infrequently to serve as reviewers. According to an OJJDP official and a researcher, this approach allowed for a broad base of opinions and limited the possibility of reviewers developing biases toward particular potential grantees.

NIH used a dual peer review system. The initial level of review was to evaluate the scientific and technical merit of applications. It involved panels of experts selected according to scientific disciplines or research areas. Initial review groups were composed of about 16 members appointed for 4-year terms. The second level of review was to evaluate application again on scientific merit and on relevance to the program and priorities. Second-tier reviewers were also appointed for 4-year terms and included scientific and government policy personnel. These panels generally met about three times a year. A typical second-tier panel at NIH included 12 to 15 panelists.

According to officials, NSF used three methods of external peer reviews: review by mail; review by panel; and a combination of mail and panel review. In all types of panel reviews, reviewers were asked to address the merits of ideas, the capacity of the research leaders and teams to do the work, and the likelihood of wide use of potential research results. About 50,000 reviewers were used annually. They were selected from a list of about 216,000 potential reviewers. Panels were typically composed of 8 to 12 members. Mail reviews involved about 10 reviewers.

OFFICIAL GRANT FILES REVIEWED GENERALLY CONTAINED MONITORING PLANS BUT LITTLE EVIDENCE THAT MONITORING OCCURRED

According to OJP policy, information on discretionary grant monitoring and related activities is to be maintained in official grant files. Of the 131 new discretionary grants awarded for fiscal years 1993 through 1995 that we reviewed, files for 129 grants contained plans by program managers for monitoring the work. Monitoring plans included such activities by the grant manager as making quarterly telephone calls or on-site visits to grantees and reviewing interim and final products. In addition, grantees were usually expected to submit quarterly program and financial progress reports for review by program managers.

We found little evidence in the files we reviewed that monitoring had occurred as planned. None of the files had documentation of telephone contacts, site visits, or product reviews. No quarterly program and financial reports were included in 11 of the 78 files for which projects had been ongoing for at least 2 quarters at the time of our review, and 1 or more reports were missing from another 61 files. Only 6 of the 78 files had program and financial reports for all quarters of work completed.

The OJJDP Deputy Administrator said that quarterly program and financial reports were to be submitted by grantees to remain eligible for funding, and he thought that the missing reports had been submitted but had not been filed in official grant files as they should have been. He also noted that reports of monitoring visits should have been placed in grant files. He said that written records of routine monitoring by telephone were not required. The Deputy Administrator noted that OJJDP discretionary grant program managers are responsible for overall program management, not just monitoring, and that the large workload may result in the lack of monitoring records. As a result of our review of monitoring data, he said that OJJDP would take the necessary steps to improve monitoring records.

HOW OJJDP COMMUNICATED DISCRETIONARY GRANT RESULTS

OJJDP and other OJP components participate in a contract negotiated by the National Institute of Justice with Aspen Systems, Inc., to handle several aspects of communicating the results of the work that it sponsors. According to the Contract Coordinator, Aspen Systems has done this work for about 18 years under a competitive procurement contract that is rebid every 3 to 4 years. Each OJP component participating in the contract funds a share of the annual contract award amount of about \$7 million.

Tasks performed by the contractor for OJJDP include providing publications support (e.g., editing services), acquiring documents, and operating information booths at conferences. In addition, the contractor operates a toll-free telephone line and an

Internet mailbox to assist with information requests; manages mailing lists; and assembles, collates, distributes, and stores documents.

In our review to determine how research results were communicated, we reviewed the following five grants, which were completed in fiscal year 1995: (1) Program of Research on the Causes and Correlates of Juvenile Delinquency—a longitudinal research study conducted in three states; (2) Funding Support for Specific Program Development for a State Clearinghouse for Missing Children—a training and technical assistance grant; (3) County-wide Youth Gang Prevention Project—Malheur County—a demonstration project; (4) National Juvenile Hate Crime Study—a research grant; and (5) American Bar Association Symposium on International Child Abduction—a training and technical assistance grant.

Overall, we found that these OJJDP grants resulted in a variety of types of final products, including research summaries, fact sheets, technical reports and technical appendixes, reference manuals, training curricula, reports and executive summaries, comprehensive resource manuals, and symposiums. These products are available to interested parties through the Electronic Bulletin Board System, the Internet, DIA-LOG, CD-ROM, and the contractor document database and library collection.

According to contractor data, requesters for these grant final products were affiliated with a wide range of organizations including: OJJDP, the Office for Victims of Crime, OJP, other Department of Justice agencies, Congress, other federal agencies, state and local planners, police departments, youth services organizations, corrections offices, courts, criminal justice and juvenile justice commissions and professional associations, other professional associations, legislatures, U.S. military departments, international users, researcher organizations, faculties/students, community organizations, medias/publishers, foundations, public interest groups, the general public, corporations, and consultants. Appendix III shows detailed communication information for each OJJDP grant included in our sample.

This concludes my statement. I would be happy to answer any questions you may have.

APPENDIX I

OBJECTIVES, SCOPE, AND METHODOLOGY

As agreed with the Committee and Subcommittee, our objective was to provide the Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on Youth Violence with descriptive information on the operations of OJJDP. We addressed the following issues:

What communication and coordination takes place between OJP and its component offices, including OJJDP, within the historic perspective of an organization that has experienced frequent change and has diffused decisionmaking authority?

How does OJJDP monitor and audit the use of juvenile justice formula grant funds by states and territories?

What new discretionary grants did OJJDP award during fiscal years 1993 through 1995? What were the program categories, titles of grants, grantees, project descriptions, proposed project periods, and dollars awarded for these grants as of March 1996?

How does OJJDP manage its discretionary grants, including processes for planning, announcing, and awarding the grants and for monitoring grantees' performance?

How does OJJDP communicate the results of the work it sponsors?

We also compared OJJDP's processes for peer review of grant applications with the processes used by NIH and NSF.

To determine the level of communication and coordination that exists between OJP and component offices, including OJJDP, we interviewed the Assistant Attorney General for OJP and the OJJDP Administrator. We also reviewed documentation of management retreats, consolidated program plans, and other examples of efforts by OJP and its components, including OJJDP, to communicate and coordinate. We relied on prior reports issued by GAO and Justice's Offices of Inspector General and Justice Management Division for an historic perspective on this issue.

To determine how OJJDP monitors and audits the use of juvenile justice formula grant funds by participating states and territories, we reviewed written procedures for monitoring visits and audits, and we interviewed OJJDP officials and program managers. To determine whether monitoring visits and audits were occurring within established time periods, we examined documentation of the dates these actions were last completed in each participating state and territory. We also observed a 4-day audit of Pennsylvania's monitoring system for formula grant use during the week of March 4, 1996. We did not evaluate the quality or completeness of the monitoring visits and audits that were done.

To determine what new discretionary grants OJJDP had awarded during fiscal years 1993 through 1995, we obtained a list of the grants from OJJDP. Using a data collection instrument, we then collected information from official grant files for 131 of the 162 discretionary grants awarded during this period. Forty-one awards were made for juvenile mentoring demonstration programs at various locations nationwide. We reviewed a random sample of 10 of them. We reviewed all 121 of the other discretionary awards made over the 3-year period. This information is summarized in the testimony. A complete list of the awards made, including program and project descriptions, grant titles, grantees, proposed project periods, and dollars awarded as of March 1996, was provided to the Subcommittee in a May correspondence.¹⁰ In instances where more than one grant was awarded for the same project over the period of our review, we combined award amounts and project descriptions.

To determine how OJJDP managed its discretionary grants program, we interviewed program officials and reviewed procedural manuals, Federal Register announcements, and grant application kits. We also reviewed contractor files at Aspen System, Inc., in Rockville, MD, which documented peer reviews of selected grant applications. We reviewed documentation on 81 of the 162 new grants awarded during fiscal years 1993 through 1995. The 81 files we reviewed were judgmentally selected on the basis of their availability. They included a mix of grants awarded in each of the 3 years. We also reviewed biographical data on 60 peer reviewers who served on the panels that made these grant awards. To compare OJJDP's peer review process with processes used by NIH and NSF, we interviewed officials of these organizations and reviewed their written procedures. We did not verify the processes used at NIH and NSF.

For the portion of OJJDP's management of discretionary grants covering the monitoring of projects selected for award, we reviewed its written procedures. As part of our review of 131 new grants awarded during fiscal years 1993 through 1995, we also documented monitoring plans and records of monitoring that had occurred. We did not evaluate the quality of monitoring done. We observed a monitoring visit to grantees at the State University of New York at Albany, NY, in February 1996 to discuss progress on a longitudinal study of the causes and correlates of delinquency.

To determine how OJJDP communicated the results of discretionary grant projects, we interviewed program officials. We visited contractor facilities at Aspen Systems, Inc., in Rockville and Annapolis Junction, MD. These facilities handled communications functions for OJJDP, including compiling mailing lists; answering telephone requests for information; and distributing and storing publications.

We also reviewed a judgmental sample of four completed discretionary projects and one ongoing longitudinal study to determine what products had resulted from the work, how the results were communicated, and to how many and what types of requesters (i.e., policymakers, practitioners, students, etc.) they were distributed. These projects were selected to obtain a variety of types of grants and grant amounts and a diversity of geographic regions.

Our work was done between November 1995 and April 1996 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.

On April 19, 1996, we obtained oral comments from the Deputy Administrator and Administrative Officer of OJJDP on this testimony. These agency officials generally agreed with the information presented in this testimony and provided comments that we incorporated as appropriate.

APPENDIX II

EXAMPLES OF VARIOUS TYPES OF OJJDP DISCRETIONARY GRANTS

The following are examples of various types of OJJDP discretionary grants. For summary information on all 162 discretionary grants awarded during fiscal years 1993 through 1995, see our May correspondence (GAO/GGD-96-111R, May 7, 1996).

The following is an example of a research grant:

A program of research on the causes of delinquency. This program has been ongoing at three universities since 1986 with funding from OJJDP, the National Institute on Drug Abuse, and the NSF. The studies have tracked at-risk youths and their parents through interviews and analysis of data, including school and police records. The young people, who lived in Rochester, NY; Denver, CO; and Pittsburgh, PA, were 7 to 15 years old when they began participating in the project. In the 1995-96 time period, they were about 17 to 25 years old. According to a researcher involved with the project since its inception, it is the most extensive research done

¹GAO/GGD-97-111R.

on at-risk youths. The project is currently incorporating the experiences of three generations of participating families because some of the youths had become parents.

The research assisted in development of a comprehensive strategy by OJJDP for prevention and intervention in the careers of serious, violent, and chronic offenders. The strategy included prevention services for at-risk youths and their families and graduated sanctions for offenders.

An example of a grant for a demonstration project follows: Grants demonstrating law-related education (LRE) programs. LRE is a curriculum for elementary and secondary school students that teaches commitment to good citizenship and skills such as alternative dispute resolution, peer mediation, and conflict resolution. In 1990, OJJDP began funding LRE programs for at-risk youths. Demonstration projects funded in the review period included those for a bilingual program; a course for youths leaving correctional facilities to return to high-risk environments; and 1-week LRE summer camp sessions for at-risk middle school youths.

The following is an example of a grant to provide training and technical assistance: An award to the California Department of Justice to provide training to users of an on-line missing and unidentified persons system. In addition to giving 13 training sessions, project results were to include the research, publication, and dissemination of a law enforcement manual containing federal and state laws relating to missing children.

APPENDIX III

COMMUNICATION OF RESEARCH RESULTS FOR FOUR PROJECTS

Grant title	Product type	Requestor type	Total number of products requested
Program of Research on the Causes and Correlates of Juvenile Delinquency.	Research summary	State and local legislators, policymakers, youth service providers, and juvenile justice researchers.	21,410
	Fact sheet	State and local legislators, policymakers, youth service providers, and juvenile justice researchers.	4,170
	Technical report	State and local legislators, policymakers, youth service providers, and juvenile justice researchers.	112
Funding Support for Specific Program Development for State Clearinghouse for Missing Children.	Reference manual and training curriculum.	Unknown ¹	Unknown ¹
National Juvenile Hate Crime Study	Fact sheet	State and local legislators, policymakers, law enforcement officials, and victim service providers.	388
	Executive summary and full report.	Planned distribution, spring 1996	N/A
American Bar Association Symposium on International Child Abduction.	Compendium	State and local organizations, professional associations, educators, and students.	427
	Promotional flyer	Variety of related interest groups	28,568

¹ The reports have been borrowed from the National Criminal Justice Reference Service library and copied; therefore, the number cannot be quantified.

Note: N/A = Not applicable.

Source: GAO analysis of OJJDP data.

APPENDIX IV

MAJOR CONTRIBUTORS TO THIS TESTIMONY

GENERAL GOVERNMENT DIVISION, WASHINGTON, DC

Weldon McPhail, Assistant Director, Administration of Justice Issues.

Deborah A. Knorr, Project Manager.

Patricia J. Scanlon, Deputy Project Manager.

Dennise R. Stickley, Staff Evaluator.

Anna T. LittleJohn, Secretary.
 David P. Alexander, Senior Social Science Analyst.
 Katherine M. Wheeler, Publishing Advisor.
 Pamela V. Williams, Communications Analyst.

OFFICE OF THE GENERAL COUNSEL, WASHINGTON, DC

Ann H. Finley, Senior Attorney.

Senator THOMPSON. Mr. Schwartz, any statement you might have?

STATEMENT OF IRA SCHWARTZ

Mr. SCHWARTZ. Thank you very much, Senator and members of the committee. I will be submitting a written report as part of the record.

I want to thank you very much for inviting me to be here. I want to say that looking back at the history of the Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act and program that in many respects it is a rather remarkable success story. I am sure that Senator Biden will recall from the early days when this legislation was passed that the mandates calling for the removal of status offenders, and also dependent neglected children from secure institutions and subsequently the removal of juveniles from adult jails, were really developed because of some horrendous conditions at those times.

I don't want to take time to remind the committee of what those conditions were, and I think if we look at the results, there have been significant reductions in the numbers of those young people who are confined in those facilities and, frankly, for a relatively modest amount of money. So I really think that that investment has been a wise investment.

Now, the question is how to utilize the office's resources more efficiently and more effectively, and I know there are legitimate concerns about the impact of possibly eliminating the mandates, but I think we ought to declare victory at least on those two major portions of the legislation and really look to the State advisory committees to continue their work on these issues. I think enough time has been demonstrated to show the merits of those two particular mandates.

But I also want to point out that there has been, in my judgment, a gradual and steady decline of the stature and the impact of the office, particularly in the States. For the past 10 years, I have been involved in a project that has been funded by a private foundation to assist States in reexamining their youth detention and correction systems. Tennessee, Delaware, as well as 15 other States have been involved in various aspects of this project, and frankly the office has really not played any significant role in any of those efforts.

I also think that the office is not playing nearly the visible leadership role that it should be or could be playing in focusing public attention on key national juvenile justice issues, and also in focusing research and development and advancing knowledge in some key, critical areas. I think it is particularly unfortunate that we are about to step into the 21st century and we really know very little about how to prevent chronic and violent delinquent behavior.

I would like to make a few recommendations for this committee to consider. Although I know that the office has a relatively small amount of resources going into administrative costs, there are over 70 staff and I think there could be some significant reductions in staff and some of those resources reprogrammed into programmatic efforts.

I also think the discretionary funds, particularly, and the set-asides even more specifically, ought to be freed up and we ought to focus those funds on research and development in some key, critical priorities of national attention that transcend State boundaries. I mentioned the chronic and violent offender issue. Another question is how can we get guns out of the hands of young people. We also need to learn a lot more about what interventions work and under what circumstances and with kinds of offenders.

We also need to learn more about the impact of trying and sentencing juveniles as adults. Although this issue is gaining in popularity, there is some data suggesting that this strategy may be counterproductive. Given the legislation that has been enacted that is resulting in more juveniles being tried as adults, there are serious questions being raised about whether we should continue to have a juvenile court in this country, and I think this is a serious issue that we ought to have an informed dialogue about.

We also need, frankly, some honest, straightforward facts and data about the nature and scope of the juvenile crime problem. I have heard a number of academics on all sides of this issue, some predicting Armageddon, some not, and I think that the office has a very important role to play in helping to make sure that policy-makers have the critical information they need.

Finally, I want to say that the office needs to play a more aggressive role in providing policy-relevant information to State policy-makers so that they can, in turn, use their crime control fighting dollars more efficiently and more effectively.

Thank you very much.

Senator THOMPSON. Thank you, Mr. Schwartz.

Ms. Taylor.

STATEMENT OF LAVONDA TAYLOR

Ms. TAYLOR. Good morning, Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee. My name is Lavonda Taylor. I am the national chair of the Coalition for Juvenile Justice [CJJ]. The CJJ is the only national organization that focuses directly on the whole juvenile justice system. As citizen volunteers appointed by our Governors, we are the local link between Federal, State, and local governments, and citizens. I thank you for this opportunity to testify.

I would like to focus my testimony on the role played by the act and the Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention in dealing with the growing problem of youth violence and in efforts aimed at prevention and intervention.

In the early years of the Act, formula grant funding was primarily directed at achieving system reform goals. In recent years, as most States came into compliance with the mandates, formula grant funds began to be available for delinquency prevention efforts. If we are going to judge the success of the act in relation to its delinquency prevention focus, we must recognize two things.

First, funds for delinquency prevention have become fully available to many States only in recent years. Second, these funds are very limited and the problem of delinquency and youth violence is enormous. It is far beyond the capacity of the JJDP Act alone to handle, but the act is one weapon that can be used to aid in the fight.

In the mid-1980's, the first rise in youth crime began since the early 1970's. One of the influences in that rise is the availability of weapons. There has been substantial research into other factors that contribute to juvenile crime. There is much agreement on what some of these factors are. The list is long, but includes availability of drugs; family conflict, including physical, emotional and sexual abuse; poverty; community attitudes that favor drug use, gun use, and criminal activity; lack of job opportunities; academic failure; and betrayal of violence in the media.

These factors involve every aspect of a young person's life. They are too many, too pervasive and too complex to be solved by one Federal law with the limited reach and funding of the JJDP Act. Yet, the act cannot be discarded as being of little or not value in the right against juvenile crime. It is, in fact, of real value. It is the one act which has juvenile crime and delinquency prevention as its total focus. It is the one act which provides, through the State advisory group structure, an ideal mechanism for funding community-based delinquency prevention and youth violence prevention initiatives.

Appointed by their Governors, State advisory groups are made of people with a wide range of experience and philosophy, both professional and volunteer, who analyze statewide needs and develop and implement plans to meet those needs. They are local people developing local solutions to local problems.

There is another component of the act which plays a critical role in combatting juvenile crime. That component is the Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention. Although the States, territories, and local communities play the most immediate role in prevention and intervention, there is no question that the Federal Government can and should provide resources to support these efforts. OJJDP is a vital link in a combined Federal, State, and local effort to combat delinquency and reduce youth violence.

OJJDP has received its share of criticism. However, it does provide effective help to States and communities. It has funded and published critical research in youth violence, prevention and intervention. Examples of this research include the "Guide for Implementing the Comprehensive Strategy for Serious, Violent, and Chronic Juvenile Offenders," "Juvenile Offenders and Victims: A National Report," and "Juvenile Offenders and Victims: 1996 Update on Violence." These reports are important resources and serve as fine examples of what a Federal office can do in support of State and local efforts.

OJJDP also provides training and technical assistance to the States. Just last week at the coalition's national conference, State advisory group members received valuable training from Dr. Howard Snyder, the author of the "Juvenile Offenders and Victims" reports. My State advisory group has received assistance in the development and refining of our 3-year plan and in training in the basics of the act, gender bias and cultural awareness, among other

things. This type of assistance is critical in helping States to meet the goals of the act.

OJJDP has been given important work to do under the act and it should be supported in its efforts. When the act became law in 1974, it had a two-fold focus—delinquency prevention and juvenile justice system reform. These two goals are clearly related. In mandating the institutionalization of status offenders, the site and sound separation of juveniles from adults in jails and lock-ups, and the removal of juveniles from adult jails, it recognized that flaws in the juvenile justice system which allowed secure detention of status offenders and incarceration of juveniles with adults could lead to increased juvenile crime.

By directing States to address disproportionate minority confinement where it was found to exist, the act recognizes that conscious or unconscious bias has no place in the juvenile justice system. In enacting these mandates and providing the funds to meet them, the act was structured to promote public safety by mitigating some of the factors that led to delinquent behavior.

The Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act is a rather large topic to cover in a very short period of time. I have been able to touch on only a few of the many roles it plays in focusing efforts to address the growing problem of youth violence. I do want to re-emphasize that the act must be seen in perspective. As currently funded, it is a small weapon involved in a very big war, but it is an important weapon and with continued existence and increase support, it can be a very effective weapon. Please recognize this and support its reauthorization.

Thank you for this opportunity to talk to you about something that is very important to me. I would be happy to answer your questions.

[The prepared statement of Ms. Taylor follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF LAVONDA TAYLOR

Good morning, Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee. My name is Lavonda Taylor and I am submitting this testimony on behalf of the Coalition for Juvenile Justice. I am the past Chair of the Arkansas State Advisory Group and currently I serve as the Chair of the Coalition for Juvenile Justice. The Coalition is comprised of members of the State Advisory Groups (SAGs) of the 56 states and territories participating in the Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act. The Coalition for Juvenile Justice is the only national organization that focuses directly on the whole juvenile justice system. As citizen volunteers appointed by our governors, we are the local link between federal, state and local governments and citizens—a partnership working toward improvements in the juvenile justice system and focusing of delinquency prevention efforts designed to protect public safety and keep at-risk children from becoming involved in juvenile crime. I thank you for this opportunity to testify.

While I cannot tell you a story about me or my family being victimized by violent juvenile crime, we have been directly and deeply affected by four incidences of very violent juvenile crime. Briefly, I will mention two of those incidences. Two elderly sisters and their young nephew were butchered by a fifteen year old—the sisters cared for my son Bryan for several years while I worked. Bryan thought of Audrey and Lois as two extra grandmothers. Then there was Michael, one of three eight year old boys brutally murdered by three teens in West Memphis, Arkansas. My last words to Michael are words I shall never forget. He sat in front of me at church on the Sunday before his death. "God's peace be with you, Michael!" were the last words I said to him. Certainly I have been affected by juvenile crime.

The incidents I have just described were among the things that made me what I would call a "hardliner" when I first began to do volunteer work related to juvenile justice. I was certainly a "hardliner" when I was appointed to the Youth Services

Board in Arkansas. Then I began to visit the campuses of the state training schools. I met the youth who were there and heard their stories. It became apparent to me that I should be thinking about more than just punishing youth who violated the law. I began to see that there was a totality of circumstances involved in why any girl or boy was in the training school—circumstances including poverty, family dysfunction and lack of community resources and support. I began to recognize that I should be thinking about why these young men and women got into trouble, and about whether or not something could have been done to keep them out of trouble. In other words, I began to see that blame and punishment should not be the only consideration in dealing with issues of delinquency and violence, but also concern and compassion.

I wanted to give you this bit of personal background as an introduction to my testimony on behalf of the Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act so that you know I don't view youth violence from some ivory tower. It is very real to me. I do not discount the grave nature of the problem. Nonetheless, I want to take the balance of my time to talk about the realities of youth violence and the role of the JJDP Act and the Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention in helping to meet and deal with this very real problem.

As you know, the JJDP Act first became law in 1974. It was enacted with strong bipartisan support and signed into law by President Gerald Ford. As clearly indicated by its name, the Act had a two fold focus delinquency prevention and juvenile justice system reform. Congress recognized that both prevention and system reform are essential to solving the problem of juvenile crime.

In the early years of the Act, formula grant funding was primarily directed at achieving system reform goals. For much of the life of the Act this remained the case. In recent years, as most states came into compliance with the mandates, formula grant funds began to be available for delinquency prevention efforts. If we are going to judge the success of the JJDP Act in relation to its delinquency prevention focus we must recognize two things. First, funds for delinquency prevention have only become fully available to many states in recent years. Second, these funds are very limited and the problem of delinquency and youth violence is enormous. The public concern about juvenile crime has resulted in much finger pointing in an attempt to fix blame for the increase in violent juvenile crime. There may well be many places at which we can point fingers but the Act is not to blame for a failure to control such crime. The problem is far beyond the capacity of the JJDP Act alone to handle. But the JJDP Act is one weapon that can be used to aid in the fight.

In the mid-80s, the first rise in youth crime since the 1970s began. As the problems faced by today's youth increased dramatically, funding for the JJDP Act declined during the period from 1980 to 1992. Delinquency and violent juvenile crime is the result of enormous and complex factors that no reasonable person could expect to be solved by the truly small sums of money that have been provided in the Act.

During the mid-1980s, another influence began to figure prominently in juvenile crime. That factor is the availability and use of guns. In a period from 1976 to 1991, firearms were used by 65% of juvenile homicide offenders. Arrest rates for juveniles for weapons-related offenses increased by 103% between 1985 and 1994. In 1976, 59% of juvenile homicide offenders used a gun and that figure increased to 78% by 1991. Coupled with this increase in the use of guns is the fact that, at the end of 1993, only 16 states had laws prohibiting the possession of handguns by juveniles. Clearly, the availability of guns has had a marked impact on the increasingly violent nature of juvenile crime. Yet, this too is not a problem that can reasonably be expected to be solved by the JJDP Act alone. It is a problem massive in scope and one which requires action at the local, state and federal level both in terms of legislation prohibiting possession of handguns and other non-sporting type weapons by juveniles and in resources to enforce such laws and to control access to guns by juveniles. As long as juveniles have guns we cannot expect violence involving gun use by juveniles to decrease!

In addition to data and research linking guns to the increase in violent crime, there has been extensive research into other factors that contribute to juvenile crime. There is much agreement on what some of these factors are—the list is extensive but includes: availability of drugs; family conflict including physical, emotional and sexual abuse; poverty; community attitudes that favor drug use, gun use and criminal activity; lack of job opportunities; academic failure; and portrayals of violence in the media. These factors involve every aspect of a young person's life. They are too many, too pervasive, and too complex to be solved by one federal law with the limited reach and funding of the JJDP Act.

Yet, the JJDP Act cannot be discarded as being of little or no value in the fight against juvenile crime. It is, in fact, of real value. It is the one Act which has juve-

nile crime and delinquency prevention as its total focus. It is the one Act which provides, through the State Advisory Group (SAG) structure, an ideal mechanism for funding community-based delinquency prevention and youth violence prevention initiatives. Appointed by their governors, SAGs are made up of people with a wide-range of experience and philosophy, both professional and volunteers, who analyze state-wide needs and who develop and implement plans to meet those needs. They are local people, developing local solutions to local problems!!! With resources that can be directly focused on community-based prevention and intervention, states and communities can have much needed support for their efforts to control juvenile crime.

There is another component of the Act which plays, and should continue to play, a critical role in combating juvenile violence. That component is the Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention (OJJDP). Although the states, territories and local communities play the most immediate role in prevention and intervention, there is no question that the Federal government can, and should, provide resources to support these efforts. The Federal government plays an appropriate and necessary role in providing leadership, direction and support. The Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention is a vital link in a combined federal, state, and local effort to combat delinquency and reduce youth violence.

OJJDP has certainly receive its share criticism. I can be candid and say that the Coalition for Juvenile Justice has not hesitated to voice its own criticisms when it felt them warranted. The OJJDP isn't at a perfect organization—quite frankly, I don't know of any that are—but it is one which has provided, and continues to provide, effective help to states and communities in their prevention and intervention efforts. It has done and continues to do very important work. As examples, I have brought with me today copies of the "Guide for Implementing the Comprehensive Strategy for Serious, Violent, and Chronic Juvenile Offenders," "Juvenile Offenders and Victims: A National Report," and "Juvenile Offenders and Victims: 1996 Update on Violence," works funded, coordinated and published by OJJDP. The "Guide" describes critical research into the causes of juvenile crime and the protective factors that help buffer the effects of exposure to the risks. It sets out strategies for communities to follow in dealing with serious, violent, and chronic juvenile offenders. The "Juvenile Offenders and Victims" reports represent the most current and reliable information available on juvenile offending and victimization. They provide critical information that will enable the juvenile justice system to protect the community and hold youth accountable. These reports are important resources and serve as particularly fine examples of what a federal office can do in support of state and local efforts. I can not imagine a more effective and cost-effective way to share information than through this sort of research assistance provide by OJJDP which allows easy and immediate access to information from all the other states and territories.

In addition to support for program development and research efforts, the Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention provides training and technical assistance to the State in their efforts to support juvenile justice system reform and delinquency prevention efforts required by the Act. Recently SAG members from most of the states have training by Dr. Howard Snyder which updated findings in his afore-mentioned document. In my home state we have, in recent years, requested training in the following areas; the basics of the Act and the SAG role related to the Act; Gender Bias; and Cultural Awareness. We have received technical assistance in the development and refining of our 3-year plan. These requests are examples of what OJJDP could expect from any of the states. All this, and more, is done without cost to the states.

One of the most critical components of any organization is its staff. The states and territories are fortunate in the support provided to them by OJJDP staff. There are three staff members with whom members of the Coalition have worked who have been of particular help. They are Administrator Shay Bilchik, Deputy Administrator John Wilson, and Roberta Dorn, Director of the State Relations and Assistance Division. Mr. Bilchik came to OJJDP in 1995. While he is rather new to the Office, he comes with years of experience in the juvenile justice system and, perhaps more importantly, with an open-minded, even-handed approach to working for prevention and intervention while being mindful of the need to deal swiftly and appropriately with the serious, chronic, violent juvenile offenders. Mr. Wilson and Ms. Dorn have worked with JJDP Act many years. They have an invaluable depth of knowledge about the Act and its regulation—knowledge they make readily available in a very user friendly fashion. These three people have been notable for their openness with and support for those of us who are working every day to make the Act meaningful and effective on the state and local level.

OJJDP is essential to the success we have had in meeting the goals of the Act. It has been given important work to do under the Act. It should be encouraged and supported in its efforts.

I would like to turn briefly to the system reform goals of the Act. In mandating deinstitutionalization of status offenders, the sight and sound separation of juveniles from adults in jails and lock-ups and the removal of juveniles from adult jails, the Act recognized the flaws in juvenile justice system which allowed secure detention of status offenders and incarceration of juveniles with adults could lead to increased juvenile crime. In enacting these mandates and providing the funds to meet them, the Act was structured to promote public safety by mitigating some of the factors that lead to delinquent behavior. Children in adult institutions were victims of abuse. Research clearly indicates a strong correlation between child abuse and delinquent behavior. Removing status offenders from the negative influences of being incarcerated with delinquent children and requiring that delinquent youth be separated from adult offenders by whom they were often abused and from whom they got an "education" in criminal activity does positively affect public safety. In promoting these system reforms and providing dollars to states to help them achieve the reforms, the Act plays a part in delinquency prevention.

In addition to the system reform mandates relating to status offenders, separation, and jail removal there is a fourth mandate dealing with disproportionate minority confinement. It provides that the States must determine whether the proportion of minority youth held in secure confinement exceeds the proportion of minority youth in the general population. If a state finds that there is overrepresentation of minority youth in secure confinement, the Act provides that a state must, and I quote, "address efforts to reduce" the overrepresentation.

Data from a vast majority of the states does show that minority youth receive progressively more severe treatment as they penetrate into the juvenile justice system. The requirement to "address efforts to reduce" the problem is a very flexible one. It does not dictate the steps the States must take to "address" the problem and allows each state complete latitude to determine its own course of action.

The Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act is rather large topic to cover in a short period of time. I have only been able to touch on a few of many vital roles it plays in focusing efforts to address the growing problem of youth violence. I do what to re-emphasize that the Act must be seen in perspective. As currently funded it is a small weapon involved in a very big war. But it is an important weapon and with continued existence and increased support it can be a very effective weapon. Please recognize this and support its reauthorization.

Thank you for this opportunity to talk to you about something that is so important to me. I would be happy to answer any questions.

Senator BIDEN. Mr. Chairman, before you begin your questioning, I would like to make a point that Ms. Taylor just laid to rest the assertion that Southerners talk slowly. [Laughter.]

Ms. TAYLOR. Thank you, sir.

Senator BIDEN. You did a phenomenal job.

Ms. TAYLOR. Thank you. I appreciate that.

Senator BIDEN. I am amazed you got all that in, and I understood every word you said. [Laughter.]

Senator THOMPSON. Plus the fact she is about as close to being a Tennessean as you can get to be without actually being one.

Ms. TAYLOR. That is also true, sir.

Senator THOMPSON. Right across the river.

Senator BIDEN. We don't consider you the South; we consider you a border State.

Senator THOMPSON. We thank you for being here.

Ms. TAYLOR. Thank you.

Senator THOMPSON. Ms. Ekstrand, the work that you did here basically was not to really get in and answer some of these questions we have been posing as to what works and what does not work in terms of preventing juvenile violence. What you were doing was basically seeing whether or not compliance was being met with regard to the statutes and the regulations that they were supposed

to meet, without particularly evaluating whether or not what they were doing was what they ought to be doing.

To generalize, I take it that you felt like they were in general compliance, but they were not doing some monitoring. As I understand, on the formula grants, they are supposed to monitor some method once a year.

Ms. EKSTRAND. That is correct.

Senator THOMPSON. And with regard to the formula, have an audit about every 5 years, I think.

Ms. EKSTRAND. Yes, an audit every 5 years. Now, that, they were doing.

Senator THOMPSON. They were doing that?

Ms. EKSTRAND. Yes.

Senator THOMPSON. But not the monitoring. On the discretionary grants, the files were incomplete to indicate that they were doing the monitoring there that they were supposed to be doing?

Ms. EKSTRAND. The records did not seem to indicate that there had been monitoring visits. Although there were plans for the monitoring and the administrator felt that some monitoring was probably done, it is just a matter of keeping the papers in the right place.

Senator THOMPSON. But you sure couldn't prove it from the files?

Ms. EKSTRAND. We couldn't find them.

Senator THOMPSON. As I understand it, on the formula grants that go to the States, the monitoring is for the purposes of seeing whether or not the States comply with the plan that they laid out that justified their money.

Ms. EKSTRAND. That is correct.

Senator THOMPSON. And the audits were to basically determine whether or not they were complying with the Federal mandates. Is that correct?

Ms. EKSTRAND. That is right.

Senator THOMPSON. So the monitoring and auditing is not designed to determine whether or not the programs are working?

Ms. EKSTRAND. That is right. That would be some type of impact evaluation.

Senator THOMPSON. Yes. You didn't run across any of that while you were over there, did you?

Ms. EKSTRAND. Well, we did find discretionary grants that were for the express purpose of evaluating demonstration projects and things of that nature.

Senator THOMPSON. Right, and as I recall, there were 162 discretionary grants awarded from 1993 to 1995.

Ms. EKSTRAND. 162 new ones.

Senator THOMPSON. New ones.

Ms. EKSTRAND. Yes.

Senator THOMPSON. How are those discretionary grants awarded? What is the process? I know you compared the process with other agencies, but who gets to make that determination?

Ms. EKSTRAND. It is basically a peer review process that is very similar to NIH and the National Science Foundation. There is a list maintained of experts in the field and a solicitation goes out for grant proposals and when they come in, as long as they have met the minimum requirements of what needs to be there in order to

be reviewed, they would be assigned to a peer review panel that would go over each one of the proposals, looking at a certain set of criteria.

Senator THOMPSON. If I can interrupt you just a minute, peer reviewers reviewed and scored proposals in six categories—this is on page 24 of your statement—one, conceptualization of the problem; two, goals and objectives—i.e., are they program-specific, clearly defined and easily measurable; three, project design, whatever that means; four, implementation; five, organizational capability; and, six, budget.

Ms. EKSTRAND. Correct.

Senator THOMPSON. Now, that is the way these applications are evaluated, and again there is no reference to any prior indication of whether or not such an approach has had good or bad results in the past, is there, in terms of this peer review?

Ms. EKSTRAND. Well, a lot of times, or at least sometimes these are research projects themselves to look at other demonstration projects. So in that case, you would be interested in whether—

Senator THOMPSON. Research projects to research other research projects?

Ms. EKSTRAND. Well, the demonstration projects are basically a trial to look and see whether something actually works, both a trial in terms of how they have put this together and a trial in terms of whether they are having appropriate outcomes. But in order to determine whether they are having appropriate outcomes, many times there is a need for another discretionary grant to look at that because it is a really very different kind of expertise needed to evaluate a program than it is to run a program.

Senator THOMPSON. Also, on the discretionary grants the entity receiving the grant is supposed to make a quarterly report, aren't they, to see how they are doing?

Ms. EKSTRAND. They are.

Senator THOMPSON. In many cases, that was not done, was it?

Ms. EKSTRAND. We didn't find them in the files in many cases.

Senator THOMPSON. And what were those quarterly reports supposed to contain, or their purpose?

Ms. EKSTRAND. Well, the quarterly reports are probably very much akin to the monitoring of the formula grants, in that it deals with process issues. You know, we said that we would have certain things in place by a certain time and here is where we are in relation to having those things in place. Basically, it is keeping them on the plan that they had initially set up to do the work.

Senator THOMPSON. All right. Mr. Schwartz, you were the head of this agency back during the Carter years, is that correct?

Mr. SCHWARTZ. Yes.

Senator THOMPSON. How long were you there?

Mr. SCHWARTZ. Two years.

Senator THOMPSON. Two years, and you have been quoted recently somewhere as believing that OJJDP should maybe be abolished, that it may have served its purpose. Is that correct? Do you feel that way, and if so, why?

Mr. SCHWARTZ. Let me explain the context. The last time that we went through the reauthorization process, I basically gave very similar testimony that I really thought that the discretionary

grants should be freed up, that there should be a few key issues of national significance prioritized for research and development to really advance knowledge in the field, and that we needed to move on and address some emerging and very critical issues confronting the country.

You know, this did not happen in the last reauthorization. In fact, it hasn't happened in any of the reauthorizations. It usually just sort of gets kind of reauthorized as it is with just a little bit of touchup here, you know, so my statement—

Senator THOMPSON. In the last couple of years, the money has gone up a couple of times.

Mr. SCHWARTZ. Right, but I mean, you know, in terms of the substance of the legislation.

Senator THOMPSON. Yes.

Mr. SCHWARTZ. What I said was that if we can't really restructure this legislation that, you know, then I think the office may well have outlived its usefulness. I mean, there are 162 discretionary grants.

Senator THOMPSON. New ones.

Mr. SCHWARTZ. Yes, new ones, right. That is a scatter-gun approach. I mean, I think, you know, it is a small amount of money that the office really has and I think those dollars need to be carefully targeted to some critical issues to advance knowledge in this field, and we need to have some careful demonstrations with some credible research that will really advance knowledge and help policymakers in the States.

You know, if just \$20 million of the \$40 million that went to the National Council on Juvenile and Family Court Judges might have been targeted for critical research trying to address the prevention issue for chronic delinquents or preventing serious violent behavior, we might not be in this position that we are in today. You can make a very good argument that judicial training ought to be a State and local responsibility, and we have State court offices. There is a National Center for State Courts.

I mean, we are at a point now where we have to make critical priority issues. Is judges' training the most important, high-priority item on the issue? I mean, there is law enforcement training; there is a whole range of things. You know, I think it is time that we really, I think, moved beyond that and I think training really ought to be a State and local responsibility.

If there certain things that are of national significance that judges or law enforcement officials ought to know about, I think then the office has a responsibility to make that knowledge available and to do it in as an efficient and effective way as possible, and also using the existing professional associations and organizations that are out there, particularly the State organizations. But we have got to really advance some knowledge in this area.

The juvenile court frankly is in danger of going out of business in some States. If you look at the legislation that is being enacted in many States that is designed to try more juveniles as adults, that erosion that is taking place—in fact, there is one State that has a bill to eliminate their juvenile court. I don't know if it will pass or not, but I think that is a serious issue that we have got to have an informed dialog on in this country. I think it would be

a mistake if we eliminated our juvenile courts in this country, but this is the kind of issue we need to look at.

At the same time, there are a lot of juveniles being propelled into the adult courts and into adult prisons. We don't really know about the impact of those policies. I have seen some data that suggests that juveniles who go to adult prisons, compared to match groups who do not, do worse when they get out. I think Governors and legislators need to know about that, and I think the office is in a unique position to help find the answers to those critical kinds of questions before we move down this path of essentially eliminating our juvenile justice system.

So this is my frustration, and we only have a limited amount of resources and we need to use them wisely. I think that we ought to consider removing those mandates on the status offender and jail removal, on the condition that the States agree not to return to the good old days, not to have young people who are status offenders locked up in those secure facilities longer than delinquent youth, and also that we not have the horrendous conditions of juveniles incarcerated in adult jails.

The office can certainly provide you—and I know that Senator Biden is well aware of why those mandates were passed. They were passed for some very good reasons. In Washington State where I came from before I took over as administrator, we had just finished getting status offenders who were largely young women out of our State training schools and they were spending a lot of time in those institutions than first-time felon commitments to the State prison system. Those were the conditions that existed and I think that is what we need to prevent.

Senator THOMPSON. Thank you very much. Just one more question. You have heard the testimony here today with regard to the programs, Ms. Taylor, but still with Mr. Schwartz. With regard to some of these programs, is it your feeling that some of these programs that are being funded are doing some good, are working, or do you feel that we really don't have any system for determining that? Or do you feel that it is a matter of prioritization that, if we had all the money in the world, why not, but we don't and we really need to focus on what the Federal Government maybe does best, which may be research and development and focus and leadership, or all of the above?

What is your view with regard to those elements in terms of programs that we are doing or should be doing?

Mr. SCHWARTZ. Well, I think the research and development and the leadership is critical and that is an important part of the Federal role. There are programs that the office has funded and evaluated that clearly have worked, and that information we need to get out to policymakers. In some instances, there are programs that have been evaluated that the office has not funded, but, you know, have been funded through other sources that have worked.

It was mentioned earlier about the Big Brothers/Big Sisters Program, the mentoring program. It did, as I understand, have a fairly careful evaluation. The results, I understand, are quite positive, and I think the office then has a responsibility to help make sure that those results get into the hands of other policymakers who need to have access to them.

There are some examples of programs working with the serious delinquent cases in their own homes that have been carefully evaluated and funded through the National Institute of Mental Health, Scott Engler's, in particular, that have been carefully evaluated using good, solid research designs. That kind of information, the office, I think, has the responsibility to get into the hands of people who need to have access to it.

But more critically, I think we have to decide on what those few critical priorities are and target the office's resources in terms of research and demonstration and advancing knowledge. I could give you some specific suggestions as to what they might be. I mean, I mentioned the chronic repeaters and serious, violent delinquents as one critical issue. Another is how to get handguns out of the hands of young people. The problem of juvenile homicide which, you know, is a critical issue, is one thing we have got to address and figure out a way how to handle that problem and tackle it in a responsible way.

The issue of substance abuse and its relationship to delinquency is another. We have made some advances, but not nearly the advances that—

Senator THOMPSON. It sounds like you are talking an awful lot about non-prevention-type things. Of course, the focus of OJJDP in many respects and the focus of the Federal Government, you might say, has been on the prevention side. Is it your feeling that we just don't know enough to be able to handle that, or what?

Mr. SCHWARTZ. Well, there are some things about the prevention area that we know, but unfortunately what we don't know is how to prevent the chronic, repeat and the serious, violent behavior, and I think that is the issue we need to target because, frankly, that is the issue that is driving a lot of these policy changes in the States.

Senator BIDEN. Exactly.

Mr. SCHWARTZ. If you look at the legislation that is enacted in the States to either lower the age at which juveniles can be waived to adult courts or eliminating certain offenses, it is not just targeted toward the murderers. It generally opens up a lot of other categories and what you see in the States, or at least what I see, and I can give you some specific examples, is a lot of erosion in the jurisdiction of the juvenile court in this country to the point where there is at least one State that has a bill to eliminate it. I know of two other States where it is actively being discussed in the legislatures.

Frankly, you know, if we are going to eliminate the "serious cases" and then we are going to get rid of the sort of less serious cases, what are you left with? It is a burglary court. I mean, how could you justify having a separate court for children? I mean, I think there are some critical issues. Are children different than adults? In what ways? I mean, in what way should the legal system respond to it, as well as the youth corrections system?

Senator THOMPSON. You say we don't know enough about the repeat offender. That is for sure. My concern has been that there may be nothing we could do about it. By the time a person gets to be a certain age and you classify him as a repeat offender, we may be able to do absolutely nothing about it. Perhaps we ought

to concentrate on locking them up as early and often and as long as possible on the one end, and then concentrating on those children who are not yet in trouble and getting them out of those impossible homes, looking at foster homes, and lots of other things we could discuss.

But my concern about what you are talking about is this. Your point is well made. But in some of these areas we are going to have to maybe admit that we are so far removed. We are trying to man the fort here now and we have been surrounded. We are so far removed from the luxury of figuring out what to do with repeat offenders that we may just have to acknowledge that we don't have any clue as to what to do about them right now and in the meantime maybe we ought to concentrate on these other two areas. Does that make any sense to you?

Mr. SCHWARTZ. It does, but let me give you an example that I was confronted with when I assumed responsibility of managing the office. There had been something in the neighborhood of \$5 or \$6 million that had been given out for prevention programs through a number of agencies, and the program was evaluated and essentially what the evaluation showed—now, prevention means a lot of things to a lot of different people, and essentially what evaluation showed was that, first of all, there really wasn't a definition as to what prevention really was and a lot of the money ended up being targeted programs that, in the evaluator's perspective, were designed to prevent a lot of normal adolescent behavior.

That was \$5 million that was sort of thrown out there and really not spent very well, and I don't think that we can afford to do that. I think we need to take advantage of the knowledge that we have in the prevention area and build on that and design and demonstrate some efforts to really advance knowledge in this field because where we are headed now, I am afraid we are going to see some States move out of the whole juvenile justice business altogether and I think that would be unfortunate.

Senator THOMPSON. And continuing pressures for us to take it over up here because we have got all the answers to these problems.

Mr. SCHWARTZ. Well, the adult criminal justice system, also, in the States is not exactly a model. As I said, the initial data that I have seen suggests that juveniles who go to adult prisons who look like juveniles who do not do a lot worse.

Senator THOMPSON. Let me cut myself off here.

Senator Biden.

Senator BIDEN. I think this is a very good discussion.

Dean, it is an honor to have you here. I guess what those of us who have battled around in this field for a long time know, but many don't know is that the University of Pennsylvania, and your school in particular, is one of the oldest and probably one of the most prestigious in the Nation, and your work in this area and your leadership is well recognized.

The problem is, I find, in dealing so much of my professional career with the criminal justice system—the Senator talked about that Texan—I mean, that Tennessean who walked into the bar.

Senator THOMPSON. The Tennessean.

Senator BIDEN. Well, I want to tell you about the Texan. Crime and criminal justice issues are the only place where no one needs a knowledge base to have an opinion. Everyone is sure they know, and they don't know a damn thing about it most of the time when they talk about it. They are like that Texan, that joke about the Texan who says, I don't know much about art, but I know what I like. Well, that is what most people up here and in the communities—it is the only place—if we were talking about nuclear proliferation, if we were talking about the Fed, if we were talking about the CPI, everyone would acknowledge we would have to have some knowledge base to have an opinion because we would be embarrassed if we couldn't defend it.

But nobody needs a knowledge base to have opinions about this system and they don't know what the heck they are talking about half the time. I am not referring to the chairman or anyone here; I am talking generically. That is part of the problem. What has happened since we wrote the act—Ms. Taylor was right. The act initially was to focus on research and reform. The reform part worked, the reform part worked, and I might add for all those who talk about the brilliance of the States, the reason we did it is the States weren't doing it. The States were not reforming. That is why we did it.

Now, the alternative to this programmatic approach that is most often projected out there is block grants, which seems to me to take the idea you have and stand it on its head. Am I wrong? I mean, if we were to say tomorrow, okay, we are going to take \$169 million and turn it into block grants, that is the antithesis of what it seems to me we should be doing, but it is not working the way it is now.

Just to speak to that one issue. If the only alternative that you had—you are sitting there and you are a Senator and you have one vote to cast. You take the program and you reform it along the lines that we are suggesting to refocus on what its initial charge was, which was research and reform, or turn it into a block grant program. Does a block grant reform exacerbate the concerns you have or does it alleviate them?

Mr. SCHWARTZ. Well, I think it would probably exacerbate the problems.

Senator BIDEN. By the way, since I have a little time, you can elaborate on further questions as we go along, but the point is it clearly would. It absolutely clearly would because what we say when we turn it into a block program, the one thing you are calling for and that I believe we should do will be gone. Part of the problem is this is caught up in the politics of the day; I mean the politics of the last 10 years, I don't mean Democrat-Republican politics.

As the States have struggled and not gotten help from their State legislatures on juvenile justice issues, they have come to us and OJJDP to get direct grants to do what they want to do that the States won't fund. That is the truth of the matter. That is the truth of the matter. The reason Ms. Taylor is so involved is she needs the Federal Government because her State isn't helping her much, I will bet, and I don't mean to pile onto Arkansas or Tennessee or Delaware or anywhere else. So the politics here are kind

of perverse. I don't mean partisan politics; I mean the generic politics of this debate.

What we should be doing is making what we intended when we wrote the act a priority. The reason we reformed is because guys like you and women like Ms. Taylor in the academic institutions of the Nation had written reams of reports saying incarcerating status offenders was a bad idea. So the irony is we took the research to make the reform. Now, all the research that was done that we had any real hard data on has been implemented by and large. What is left is now we need research for new problems.

So the bizarre turnaround here has been the thing that started the act that got guys like me and Birch Bayh, as you recall, as the authors of this to get going is we were the guys that went to your predecessors at the University of Pennsylvania and said, tell us. We did not go to the politicians or the Texans, figuratively speaking, and say, tell me your opinion. We went and got hard data and we concluded from the hard data that we needed an outfit like this under our Federal system to cajole, because we have no Federal jurisdiction to coerce States into making informed decisions about juveniles.

But what happens is we have run out of information, in effect, and now this has turned into a program that does a little bit of research and a whole lot of distribution and evaluation. We have never had much faith—and I don't mean to beat up on the States, but they have never found it in their interest or capability—when was the last time the Pennsylvania Legislature commissioned the most prestigious university in the State and one of the most prestigious schools in the country to say, by the way, do a study for us? When was the last time that happened? If we wait for the States to do that, it is going to be a long time.

So it seems to me that you are dead-on that we should be sitting here and the Office of Juvenile Justice should be saying to us, you know, we are going to focus on three problems or one problem. After having surveyed the academic and professional community, like the National Science Foundation, what are the things we should be focusing on that we, the Federal Government, can assemble the leaders in the Nation, if not the world, by the way, because other countries are going through, as you know from your research, the exact same thing—before I had the luxury of losing the chairmanship of this committee, I will show you how presumptuous I was—I thought we were going to win, so I had my staff put together an entire series of prospective hearings on the phenomenon that no one talks about.

There is no difference in what is happening in Western European countries in terms of juveniles than the United States. Did you hear what I just said? No difference. Why is that? If it is just that we have lost our moral bearings and it is just that we have not followed the Christian Coalition's agenda, how is it so coincidental that every other major nation in the world that I am aware of has close to precisely the same thing happening within their systems as we have with regard to juveniles? Violent crime, younger age, drug consumption, shattered homes, violence in the home—why is that?

So we should be saying, for example, it seems to me, with the input of people like you, the deans and the professors of the finest schools in the country, hey, look, we should focus on two, three, four, or one thing. We should continue to fund programs that we think work, but the bulk of our funding should go, in my view, to research.

Just to get it straight, this is not the only place where we have decided to provide funding for States to help with their juvenile justice systems. In the crime bill, we put in \$6.1 billion for what—we have everything from the Ounce of Prevention, Community Schools, Faces, the Local Partnership Act, Model Intensive Grants, the Crime Prevention Block Grant Program, anti-gang programs, sports leagues, Boys and Girls Clubs, police partnerships, the YES program, gangs and youth violence, gang crimes, using kids to sell drugs, recruiting and encouraging kids to commit crimes, drug-free school zones, public housing projects, adult prevention in juvenile justice, et cetera—\$6 billion.

My view—and I have gone over my time, as well, and it is not my prerogative. The chairman has that; I don't, and that is as it should be because some day I would like to be chairman again.

One of the things that is clear to me is that we have turned OJJDP into essentially a miniature version of what we used to call revenue-sharing. It is a vehicle by which the States get money. With all due respect, those who suggest we turn it into a block grant program just complicate that. It makes it even worse. What we should be doing is pulling back, in my view.

If we want to fund those issues, those programs, we should fund them through the appropriating process and in crime bills or other ways, but we should not decide to turn this into a block grant. But we also should, in my opinion, not decide to keep this as it is. So I would ask you to do me a favor. If you would be willing to submit an addendum to your testimony that, if you had your druthers, in priority order, what are the two or three things that you think we should focus our research efforts on in the juvenile justice area, and, number two, how would you undertake that research.

There are 70 staff members, roughly. One of my problems is do we, if we cut that staff, just contract out all this work, or is there any need, as there is, in my view, on the drug director's office, to have some in-house expertise that is academic and research in nature, or should this all be contracted out, for lack of a better phrase. I don't have a prejudiced view on which way that should go in this area.

Last, how would you change, if you would change, the—I'll use the phrase that is not in the act now in this context—the peer review group to determine what should be the focus? Other than Senators like me and the distinguished Senator from Tennessee sitting up here and asking people we respect like you what you personally think, what methodology should we use to determine what we focus on, and when we do determine that, how should we, in fact, distribute funds to do that research? Lastly, what piece of OJJDP's budget in a percentage sense, roughly, should be devoted to the research piece?

To conclude, I agree with you that we are being moved, understandably, by a legitimate fear on the part of the public about irra-

tional behavior that is very violent in nature as a consequence of younger and younger people, thought to be less moved by potential sanctions against them, because the younger they are, the less likely they believe they will ever be caught, who are wreaking havoc on the psyche, if not on the persons of, the community at large.

What do we have? We have people who don't know much about the issue concluding, which is acceptable—I mean, it is understandable; their answer is lock them up, treat them as adults, hang them, or whatever the devil it is. It is understandable, but it drives us in a direction that I, with all due respect, do not think many State legislative bodies are going to stand up and say, you know, before we do this, maybe we should get some facts. That does not lend itself to the present political dialogue among Democrats or Republicans these days because it is very popular, as you point out—in my State, we actually have a senate made up of 21 people. Last year, a majority voted to bring back the whipping post.

We used to have a whipping post, literally, when I was a young lawyer—it still existed my first year—where you latched someone to a post in the yard. The last person to be whipped—I will correct this for the record—my recollection is 1952, and the law was abolished in 1972. Now, I am convinced that that call for bringing back the whipping post is for the same reason as the call for the legalization of drugs, which is based on very little substantive data to suggest it would make anything better. It is because people are frightened, people are concerned, people are angry.

The only thing I think we can do that makes sense at this point is to focus our attention on several of these items to try to gather the best data we can to determine whether or not the policy prescriptions we are proposing comport with what we think the end will be.

Let me say I have only one disagreement with anything you have said today, and that is the idea of lifting the mandates on States regarding status offenders. I respectfully suggest to you that if we do that in this environment, it won't be but a matter of months that we are back in the tank again because the very sort of virus that is infecting our thinking these days about youth offenders is one that is not going to draw a principled distinction, in my humble opinion, between status offenders, and since States already are complying, what is the big deal about keeping it where it is? I feel a little safer in this environment leaving that prohibition where it is.

I realize I spoke more than I asked, but I know of your work. I remember when you were here and I look forward to you and your colleagues across the country trying to inform this debate a little more by us maybe making changes in the priorities within OJJDP and go through the crime bill or subsequent crime bills to distribute money to State courts.

For example, all the people that didn't want to have us interfere with the local courts and all this stuff—in the crime bill, they wanted to federalize every gun offense. Senator Dole had a proposal that if you are in a gang, you must be tried in Federal court. Al D'Amato has a proposal that if, in fact, you commit a crime with a gun, you are tried in Federal court, and we are trying to make sure we don't step on the toes of the—so we are, myself included—

I will include my own muddled thinking in this so I am not singling out too many people. We need more information and I think this is the place in terms of juveniles, which is the place where everybody is focusing, to find out whether the things we are saying are right.

I read all the time, and I am going to ask you in another context, not today—I would ask if I can come and see you because we are near neighbors. I would like to come up and sit down with your folks and deal with the one issue of ice, methamphetamine. Every piece of literature you pick up says it induces violence more acutely than anything else, but I have yet to find any data other than anecdotal that makes the case, other than a cop saying that.

Yet, we are beginning to train our police in how to deal with someone who has recently consumed methamphetamine to get them to be aware that that person may, in fact, turn around and shoot them. So a cop walking in and told this is a meth raid is going to walk in with his shotgun under his arm and a bullet-proof vest and a helmet on, as opposed to a cop walking in to break up a powder cocaine ring. Is that what we should be training them to do, and what is the basis for it? We need that kind of information with our kids and we need the help.

I appreciate your testimony, and I appreciate your indulgence, Mr. Chairman. Ms. Taylor, again, I compliment you on the work you have done. I mean that sincerely, but we have got to get the States into the mix here a little bit with the funding.

Ms. TAYLOR. Thank you, Senator.

Senator THOMPSON. Well, thank you, Senator, and I want to thank this panel. It has been very, very helpful and we appreciate your indulgence.

We will call our final panel now, if we may—Dr. Marvin Wolfgang, Dr. Delbert Elliott, and Dr. Terence Thornberry.

Dr. Wolfgang, we will start with you, if we may.

PANEL CONSISTING OF MARVIN E. WOLFGANG, PROFESSOR OF CRIMINOLOGY AND OF LAW, AND DIRECTOR, SELLIN CRIMINOLOGY CENTER, UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA, PHILADELPHIA, PA; DELBERT S. ELLIOTT, DIRECTOR, CENTER FOR THE STUDY AND PREVENTION OF VIOLENCE, UNIVERSITY OF COLORADO, BOULDER, CO; AND TERENCE P. THORNBERRY, PROFESSOR, SCHOOL OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE, STATE UNIVERSITY OF NEW YORK AT ALBANY, ALBANY, NY

STATEMENT OF MARVIN E. WOLFGANG

Mr. WOLFGANG. Thank you very much for inviting me. Having heard the testimony—

Senator THOMPSON. We could just almost ask you fellows by now, what do you think? [Laughter.]

Mr. WOLFGANG. That is about what I am going to respond to.

Senator THOMPSON. OK.

Mr. WOLFGANG. I am going to amend even my prepared oral remarks somewhat. I have been around long enough to remember May 8, 1945, and today we should all recall that this is V-E Day, which was the end of the European campaign. I mention this be-

cause of the intensive collaborative, coordinated enterprise that produced victory in Europe.

I think it was John Dewey who used the phrase "we need a moral equivalent of war," and I bring that up because to study, to evaluate, to advance knowledge in the field of juvenile delinquency is a moral equivalent, and I think we need to mobilize our coordination and collaboration and we need increased funding.

The other thing that I am going to mention that I hadn't thought of mentioning until Senator Ashcroft mentioned it—he mentioned the 7 percent of chronic offenders. Now, it is an immodest statement for me to say that the University of Pennsylvania was the first to produce a longitudinal birth cohort research in the field of criminology. Medical research has long been doing this.

In our delinquency and birth cohort that was published in 1972, we referred to the chronic offenders. We examined 10,000 boys born in 1940–45 and we found that only 6 percent—627, to be exact—were the chronic offenders. We defined chronicity as having been arrested or had contact with the police at least 5 times before reaching age 18. It is true that 6 percent were responsible for 70, 75 percent of the homicides and the rapes and aggravated assaults and robberies. We repeated that with OJJDP money for a 1958 birth cohort in which we had not only males, but this time we had females, a total of around 24,000, 25,000 subjects that we researched, and we found there it was a little over 6 percent, 7 percent.

The reason that I mention these few remarks about the longitudinal studies, which I still consider extremely important, is that my mentor who just died a year ago, Thorson Celine, and I submitted a proposal not as any kind of utilitarian, applied research. It was simply what has to be called basic research. We only had intellectual curiosity because there hasn't been any longitudinal studies before. So, Senator Biden, I was very glad to hear your call for more research, and I would like to add the adjective "basic" research and development.

Now, my written testimony is an adaptation of essentially the section on prevention in the Memphis and Shelby County Report, Senator, that you mentioned. We used as examples prevention programs that worked toward reducing delinquency in that report, and some of them have been or are in a positive process of evaluation. My written testimony provides the names and locations of some of these exemplary programs. I don't have time to go over them.

I was going to pick out three in the oral presentation, but my time is already shortened. The three had to do with Head Start; the Perry County Preschool Report in Ypsilanti, MI, which showed all the kinds of statistical findings that you call for, Senator. Another one, and one that is relatively new and not too much elaborated upon—it is called the Quantum Opportunities Program, and I don't know if anybody has heard about it here. Rev. Leon Sullivan in Philadelphia was responsible for this.

This is a 4-year youth development program funded by not OJJDP, but by the Ford Foundation. They targeted black teenagers living in poverty. The program was initiated in 1989 and 1990. High school students in 5 sites were included—Philadelphia, Oklahoma City, Saginaw, Milwaukee, and San Antonio. They were ran-

domly selected to enter the program. The program eligibility included students who were entering 9th grade, who were attending public high school in a high-poverty-rate area, who were members of a minority group, and who were from a family receiving public assistance. Now, that concatenation of characteristics suggests we are dealing with relatively high-risk youth.

Each group of 25 students at the 5 sites was matched with a paid mentor who stayed with the group for the 4 years of high school, including summers. The program required students to participate in academic activities outside of school hours; community service projects, which included tutoring younger students; clean-up work in the communities; and cultural enrichment and personal development activities, namely college and job planning, attending plays and concerts.

There were financial incentives that were offered to encourage participation and to encourage completion in the project. The average cost per participant was approximately \$2,500 per year, or a little over \$10,000 over the 4-year period.

Senator BIDEN. Did that include the paid mentor?

Mr. WOLFGANG. Yes.

Senator BIDEN. Thank you.

Mr. WOLFGANG. The reduced criminal costs were estimated to be \$38,650 per participant. Sustained group and one-on-one interaction, high-tech education, social enrichment experiences, plus needed financial support resulted in increased high school graduation, post-secondary enrollment, as well as reduced child-bearing and reduced criminal involvement.

I will finish this very quickly now. Specifically, compared to the control group, the participants were more likely to have earned a high school diploma; that is, 88 percent, compared to the control group, 54 percent. They were more likely to be enrolled in college, 57 percent compared to 25. They were less likely to be out of work at school, 14 percent compared to 48, and the participants had fewer children; that is, 24 percent of the participants had children, 38 percent of the controls. Finally, the participants had only half the number of arrests and arrest records than the control group, namely only 7 percent of the participants were ever arrested, whereas 14 percent of the non-participants were.

I will conclude by saying that what we need very much in examining and evaluating these programs—there are programs that do work, and in my written testimony I have about a dozen. They have been properly evaluated using the canons of science. We need to have an experimental group, or a quasi-experimental group, and a control or comparison group. I don't pay any attention to people who have said in their various programs throughout the country, oh, we have been very successful, and they give some anecdotal information.

Senator THOMPSON. Have you ever heard anybody who has said otherwise? [Laughter.]

Mr. WOLFGANG. Sometimes, a quasi-experimental program in behavioral research can be a before-and-after instead of an experimental group and a control group. That is my major emphasis in evaluation of research programs, and I am a little less cynical and less pessimistic than some of my colleagues about the future. I

think that with concerted and coordinated efforts, we can reduce or prevent this horrible projection of enormous increases in delinquency over the next 10 years.

Thank you.

Senator THOMPSON. Thank you very much.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Wolfgang follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF MARVIN E. WOLFGANG

"Controlling crime before it happens" is an idea that has not received much attention in the juvenile justice system until recent years. Traditionally implemented crime control programs emphasize deterrence, treatment or rehabilitation which intervene only after youth have gotten into trouble and have been processed by the juvenile justice system. Fewer efforts have been placed on crime or violence prevention by reducing the risks of its occurrence.

Beginning from the late 1980s, two major sources have contributed to the development of ideas which take crime prevention, in general, and violence prevention, in particular, to a new direction. One of the earliest efforts was initiated by the Centers for Disease Control (CDC) and the Minority Health Professions Foundation. In a 1990 forum designed to prevent injuries and deaths from violence among youth in their communities, a policy approach was introduced to treat violence as a health problem. Adopted from medical science and epidemiological studies, this approach suggests directing crime prevention efforts as the most promising way to prevent different types of violence, just as medical science attacks one type of disease or one cause of death at a time. The concept was later widely adopted by other disciplines. By 1993, criminologists started using the concept of "health-compromising and health-enhancing behaviors" to discuss delinquency and violent crime.

Another major influence on crime prevention consists of longitudinal studies of serious, violent and chronic offenders. These studies identified causes or correlates of delinquency, and how various factors in different developmental stages are related to initiation of adolescent problem behaviors, and, eventually, progression to violent or criminal careers. The Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention (OJJDP) of the U.S. Department of Justice conducted an extensive review of delinquency-control programs and evaluations and identified promising and effective prevention programs. This information, published as *A Sourcebook: Serious, Violent & Chronic Juvenile Offenders*, serves as the most comprehensive reference for identifying useful delinquency and crime prevention programs.

The next section provides a summary of exemplary delinquency intervention programs that have been evaluated as effective or potentially promising. They may be grouped into four categories: (1) Prenatal and early childhood interventions; (2) family interventions; (3) school-based interventions; and (4) community interventions. Each type of program is briefly described, followed by the demographic and social background descriptions of the target group(s).

1. PRENATAL AND EARLY CHILDHOOD INTERVENTIONS

The earlier the onset of problem behavior, the greater the consequences as the child ages. It has been suggested by the Panel on the Understanding and Control of Violent Behavior of the National Academy of Sciences that biological and psychosocial developmental factors, such as brain damage, low birth weight, childhood head trauma, lack of cognitive-behavioral techniques for preventing aggressive behavior and inculcating pro-social behavior, all be addressed in planning a violence prevention strategy. Programs covering child development from conception to age six are mostly centered on reducing these immediate risk factors and enhancing protective factors such as good intellectual development and pro-social behavior.

a. Pre- and Perinatal Programs

Mainly targeting children born to unmarried mothers living in poverty, pre- and perinatal (before and around the period of birth) interventions are conducted under two types of programming. The first type is designed to reduce known risk factors such as perinatal difficulties, minor physical abnormalities and brain damage which are found to be related to later aggressive and violent behavior. Long-term effects such as reducing child abuse and neglect are also included. Program implementations are composed of nurse home visits, intensive health and parenting education, job and education counseling, emotional and social support and parent-child interaction training. The second set of programs usually includes pre- and perinatal care in multiple-component teenage pregnancy prevention programs. These programs also take into consideration teenage parents' protective factors such as increased

school attendance, graduation, and reduced repeat pregnancy. Programs with these extra components usually provide mentoring, tutoring, school-based child care and parent support groups.

Evidence from evaluations indicate that when properly implemented, these programs are effective in reducing the risks of perinatal difficulties, and in decreasing child abuse or neglect. Also, program participants have increased school attendance and graduation rates and lowered repeat pregnancies compared to control groups.¹

Exemplary Program: Plainfield Teen Parent Program, New Jersey.—The Plainfield Teen Parent Program was developed as part of the Plainfield School-Based Youth Service Program. By collaborating with various public and private sectors, including national and community organizations (e.g., National Committee for Prevention of Child Abuse, Plainfield Health Center) and corporations (e.g., AT&T), this program was designed to provide comprehensive services in response to the increased incidence of teenage parenthood. Services provided to mothers and their babies included school-based child care, parent education classes, mentoring, tutoring, parent support groups for both pregnant and parenting teens, life skills training, job skills training, health care, including prenatal, well-baby, and adolescent health care, and information and referral to other social service agencies. Services are also provided to young fathers, grandparents, and guardians.

All student who had children in the school's Infant Toddler Center were required to enroll in a parenting class that taught them activities to enhance their child's development and to strengthen the parent-child relationship. Parent support groups provided opportunities to share experiences and help problem-solving.

Evidence from project evaluation found that higher percentage of program mothers graduated from high school than mothers in the control group. Two years following the first birth, the repeat pregnancy/child birth percentage was 11 percent for program mothers and 33 percent for the comparison group. Program mothers were more likely to report having a regular source of medical care for their children and less stress related to parenting. In general, this program was supported by students, faculty at school and the community as a whole.

b. Early Childhood Enrichment Programs

Early Childhood refers to the stage from newly born to age six. Given the fact that the total environment of children in this development stage is within their family, this group of programs addresses issues related to child rearing, parenting, and early social behavior learning. The identified risk factors for this target group include family history of alcoholism, poor family management practices, family conflict, parental attitude toward and involvement in drug abuse and early antisocial behavior. The protective factors which these programs are designed to enhance include positive social orientation in children, warm and supportive relationships with family members and family norms supportive of educational success and health development.

Targeting disadvantaged pre-schoolers and their low-income parents, the Head Start program should be considered as the best example of comprehensive programming to address the many risk and protective factors listed above. Program components include health-related services (medical, dental, nutrition and mental health), education (language development, advance cognitive and social development) and home visitations (parent training, family counseling and enhancement of parent-child interaction). Depending on local program designs, individual Head Start programs provide services for varying degrees of duration. Among the nationwide implementations of Head Start programs, several have been proven to have impact on the short-term measures, such as improved hyperactive or aggressive behaviors. One specific program, the Perry Preschool Program, has demonstrated its long-term effects on reducing violence and delinquency for participants in their juvenile years.

With the goal of enhancing optimal development in children, particularly disadvantage children, a majority of early childhood enrichment programs are designed to provide intensive educational interventions. Emphasizing children's intellectual, cognitive, emotional and behavior skills development, these program components are designed to address the children directly and to teach their mothers how to provide good developmental stimulation and instructions. An example of the child-directed approach, the Carolina Abecedarian Project was conducted in a learning center where special curricula were developed for children shortly after birth and continued until children entered kindergarten. An example of the parent-oriented approach, the Health Start program in Hawaii involves home-based interventions which include parent training/education, family counseling, enhancement of parent-

¹Carnegie Council on Adolescent Development (1995). *Great transitions: Preparing adolescents for a new century*. New York: Carnegie Corporation of New York, pp. 51-52.

child interaction, and child development activities. Depending on the specific needs of their targeted population, early education intervention programs adopt one or both of the above components.

A successful program that employed both components has been the Houston Parent-Child Development Center. After receiving home visitation services during the first year of the child's life and center-based parent-training and educational nursery school when the child was age two, program participants were found to display less impulsive, disruptive and restless behavior and to be involved in less fighting than the control group children five to eight years later. In addition to the early education training, early enrichment intervention programs also provide health-related services to both parent and child.

*Exemplary Program: Perry Preschool Program, Michigan.*²—Including both early childhood education and home visitation, the Perry Preschool Program targeted 3-4 year-old disadvantaged Black children, with below average IQ, from Ypsilanti, Michigan. Classroom programs adopted the High/Scope Cognitively Oriented curriculum to foster social and intellectual development. In addition, weekly home visits by teachers encouraged mothers to help the children engage in activities consistent with the classroom curriculum.

Both short-term and long-term effects have been demonstrated by the Perry Preschool Program. Compared to those in a control group, participants attached greater importance to school, had higher academic achievement, and exhibited less mental retardation. By the time program participants reached 19, they were more likely to have finished high school, be employed, have a higher literacy level and less likely to be on welfare. Long term effects on delinquent and violent behavior included significantly fewer arrests for participants (31 percent) than among nonparticipants (51 percent). Moreover, participants had only half of the self-reported violent behaviors compared to those reported by nonparticipants.

2. SCHOOL-BASED INTERVENTIONS

A safe school climate and effective school organization are important not only in providing quality education, but in contributing to prevention of disruptive behavior. A comprehensive review of 400 experimentally designed studies of delinquency treatment programs, found that the best intervention programs, which produced 20 to 30 percent reduction in recidivism rates, focused on "changing overt behavior through structured training or behavior modification interventions designed to improve interpersonal relations, self-control, school achievement, and specific job skills." Most of the school-based intervention programs summarized in this section adopt components to address these considerations.

a. Behavior Intervention Programs

Designed to address the risk factors of aggressive behavior, rebelliousness, academic failure and low commitment to school, and to enhance protective factors of bonding to school and positive behavior, school-based behavior interventions include four kinds of programs: structured playground activities, behavioral consultation, behavioral monitoring and special educational placements, including alternative schools.

Covering students from kindergarten to junior high school, structured playground activities and behavioral consultation programs are usually effective in reducing vandalism and disruptive incidents. In a well implemented behavioral consultation program, vandalism costs decreased in participating schools by an average of 79 percent. A significant decrease in disruptive or situation-specific aggressive behavior was also reported.

The targeted population for behavioral monitoring and special educational placement programs are mostly truant or disruptive students. The behavioral intervention programs were found to be effective in improving school attendance, school behavior and academic achievement for students in both elementary and secondary schools. Long-term program effects in reducing school and community delinquency are also demonstrated in one of the studies involving students in Monmouth County, New Jersey.

The major component of special educational placements is to provide separate, self-paced individual instruction, tutoring and intensive counseling to disruptive or low-achieving students who are placed in a special classroom section or resource room for behavior modification. These programs have been found ineffective for disruptive, disturbed, learning-disabled students in elementary schools, but might en-

²Berrueta-Clement, J.R., Schweinhart, L.J., Barnett, W.S., Epstein, A.S., & Weikart, D.P. (1984). *Changed Lives: The effects of the Perry Preschool program on youths through age 19.* Ypsilanti, MI: High/Scope Press.

hance academic achievement, attendance and school behavior among disruptive secondary school students. The same mixed results also characterized alternative school programs. Targeting high-risk, disruptive students, alternative education interventions usually include peer counseling, leadership training, teen-parent involvement and vocational education. While greater safety, less delinquency and disruptive behavior were found in some schools, various evaluations of these programs have not demonstrated similar successful effects in the community.

*Exemplary Program: Monmouth County (NJ) Study of School-Based Prevention.*³—Initiated in the late 1970s, 66 seventh-grade students from one suburban system and one urban school system were chosen for this program, based on three characteristics: low academic motivation; a feeling of distance from the family; and discipline referral. Through the process of pairing and random assignment, half were assigned to an intervention group and the other half to a control group. For two years, interventions included: weekly teacher consultations, weekly group meetings where the relationship between the subjects' behavior and what happened to them in school was examined, and periodic contacts with parents through letters, telephone calls, and home visits to inform them about their child's progress. After the two-year interventions period, six-month booster sessions were offered to the students. Even though fewer than 50 percent of the subjects attended the sessions, evaluations on short-term program effects indicated that the intervention prevented deterioration in school grades and attendance. In the one- and five-year follow-up studies, significant impacts on problematic behaviors were also demonstrated.

During the year-and-a-half following the two years, intervention subjects in both school systems showed fewer school-based problems than those in the control group. Only 20 percent of the intervention group reported never being employed as opposed to 45 percent in the control group. Three percent of the intervention group compared to 16 percent of the control group reported frequent or multiple substance use. A significant difference also existed in self-reported criminal behaviors: 37 percent of the intervention subjects reported 19 instances of delinquency whereas 55 percent of the control subjects reported 45 incidents. Five years after the interventions, a search of official data indicated no intervention effects on drug-related arrests, but long-term intervention effects on total delinquency were significant: Compared to 30 percent of the control group who had official delinquency records, only 10 percent of the intervention group were so recorded. This program showed that high-risk adolescents receiving behavioral intervention reduced both short-term problem behavior and long-term incidence of delinquency.

b. Classroom Management and Instructional Strategies

School-based programs involving classroom management and instructional strategies have a two-fold goal of improving achievement and classroom behavior. The identified risk factors include academic failure, low commitment to school and persistent antisocial behavior. The protective factors which programs are designed to enhance include greater student bonding to school, active participation in learning, and pro-social behavior. Ranging between one semester to two years, these programs target students at various school levels and with diverse demographic backgrounds.

An extensive review of instructional programs shows that strategies for improving student learning and academic achievement include: (1) class size reduction for kindergarten and first-grade; (2) within-class and between-grade ability grouping in elementary schools; (3) nongraded elementary schools; (4) continuous progress instruction, in which students proceed through a defined hierarchy of skills and are tested at each level to assess their readiness to advance to the next skills; (5) cooperative learning, in which students work in 4–5 member learning teams to help each other learn and to assess one another's progress in preparing for tests and teacher assessments; (6) tutoring; (7) computer-assisted instruction. To promote positive classroom behavior and to decrease aggressive behavior, it appears that applying behavioral techniques by teachers for classroom management, along with interactive teaching and cooperative learning are effective approaches.

*Exemplary Project: Seattle Social Development Project, Washington.*⁴—A six-year school-based program that was explicitly designed to prevent delinquency and other problem behaviors, the Seattle Social Development Project used two cohorts: (1) students who entered multi-ethnic public elementary schools (first-grade students), and

³ Bry, B.H. (1982). Reducing the incidence of adolescent problems through preventive intervention: One- and five-year follow-up. *American Journal of Community Psychology*, 10, 265–276.

⁴ O'Donnell, J., Hawkins, J.D., Catalano, R.F., Abbott, R.D., & Day, L.E. (1995). Preventing school failure, drug use and delinquency among low-income-children: Long-term prevention in elementary schools. *American Journal of Orthopsychiatry*, 65, 87–100.

(2) middle schools (seventh-grade students). Among the general sample population, a high-risk, low-income sub-sample was identified. Project components related to classroom management and instruction included cooperative learning, and proactive classroom management. Parent training and child social skills training were also provided. For the elementary school group, the program was implemented from the first grade to the sixth grade, and for the middle school group, the program was implemented only during the seventh grade.

A program evaluation revealed mixed results. For elementary school cohort, evaluations conducted by the end of the second year showed that participants exhibited less problem behavior than those in the control group, as rated by teachers. By the beginning of the fifth grade, significantly higher levels of improved family management and family and school bonding were reported by the experimental students. The enhancement of protective factors, such as bonding to conventional society and more opportunities for conventional involvement, was also reported by low-income experimental students when the program was evaluated at the end of sixth grade. Both short-term measures of greater academic achievement, better teacher-rated behavior and long-term measures of lower rates of delinquency were reported for various subgroups of experimental students when compared to their counterparts in the control groups.

The bonding effect of the program remained in the middle school program participants who had received only one year of intervention. Other than this desirable program effect, evaluation of the middle school cohort showed negative program effects in areas such as school suspensions, expulsions, academic achievement, delinquency and violent behavior. Before adoption of multi-component programs such as this one, evidence from other simple-component programs should be examined to ensure positive effects.

c. School Organization

Structural characteristics of school have been associated with high rates of delinquency. Factors such as large school size, inconsistent treatment by teachers and administrators, and lack of structure have been identified as contributing to child misbehavior. Programs related to school organization tend to be comprehensive and system-oriented and usually involve a wide variety of interventions. In addition to addressing risk and protective factors mentioned in the above school-based programs, school organization programs also pay attention to factors such as clear standards for behavior and norms regarding delinquency and violence.

One of the better known school organization programs is the Comer School Development Plan. Professor J. Comer and his colleagues at Yale University developed a form of school-based management in which parents, teachers, support staff and school administrators formed a school governing team that established the school's curriculum, activities, attitudes and values. Within this governance framework, a multidisciplinary mental health team was formed to provide consultation in managing student behavior problems, and a parent program was established to allow parents' involvement in classroom and other school activities. Academic curricula were left flexible to meet the special needs of students as judged by the team. Preliminary results of evaluations indicated this program effectively addresses academic achievement and bonding to school.

Another program in South Carolina, designed specifically for similar problems in secondary schools, Project PATHE (Positive Action through Holistic Education) also instituted organizational changes to address the needs of targeted students who were predominantly low-income Blacks. The major program components were: (1) "participatory decision making in which staff, parents, and student groups were involved in decision making concerning management issues, which included discipline policies"; (2) student cooperative learning "in which heterogeneous students were put together to work on an academic task"; (3) "school wide climate" innovations by providing extra services and activities, including a school pride campaign and (4) career-oriented programs and training. By comparing experimental group students with those in control groups, varying degrees of program effects were found related to the risk/preventive factors of academic achievement, alienation, commitment to school and self concept. The most significant result indicated that seniors in the program group were more likely to graduate (76 percent) than those in the control group (42 percent). Long-term program effects on delinquency and drug involvement were not conclusive.

*Exemplary Program: School Transitional Environment Project (STEP).*⁵—Based on a "transactional-ecological" model of preventive intervention, STEP was aimed at

⁵ Felner, R.D., Brand, S., Adan, A.M., Mulhall, P.F., Flowers, N., & Sartain, B. (1993). Restructuring the ecology of the school as an approach to prevention during school transitions: lon-

helping low-income, minority and other disadvantaged students experiencing normative transitions into secondary schools. By providing an increased level of social support, this program was designed to address preventive factors such as bonding to school and academic achievement. At the early stage of the program, incoming ninth-grade students were randomly assigned to units of fewer than 100, "schools within the so-called school". Homerooms and classes in primary academic subjects were composed only of students in the same unit. The project's two major components were restructuring of the role of homeroom teachers so that they acted more as counselors and liaisons, and reorganizing class schedules so that project students had more classes together and more teachers in common. After a year in STEP, participants returned to the general student population.

By the end of the ninth grade, experimental students showed significantly better attendance records and grades, as well as more stable self-concepts than students in the control group. At the end of program, project students also reported significantly more positive perceptions of school, higher levels of teacher support and involvement. Results from long-term follow-up of these STEP students revealed a significantly lower drop-out rate for experimental students (24 percent) than for comparison students (43 percent). STEP students also had significantly higher performance and attendance patterns in the first two years of high school. Replication of STEP in other junior high schools showed similar effects.

d. Drug Prevention Programs

Although drug prevention programs, independently or combined with other components, have been created by various institutions to prevent drug use among youth, a substantial number which have proved to be effective are located in schools. In general, school-based drug prevention includes one of four components: (1) curricula, designed to teach students the harmful effects related to drug use; (2) support services and counseling, which include group and individual counseling and involve students' family and community; (3) school-based clinics, which provide a substance abuse program, mental health and other pro-social counseling and (4) a school-team approach, in which school-specific intervention programs are developed and implemented by a team consisting of parents, school staff, students and community residents.

Except for selective programs with special curricula, most school-based interventions programs were not evaluated by using control groups. Preliminary findings from the assessments of these programs, however, show positive impact of some curricula and support service and counseling programs. For example, the Student Assistance Program (SAP) which provides professional alcohol and drug abuse counseling service in many junior and senior high schools reported increased academic performance and reductions in alcohol and marijuana use.

Life Skills Training Program (LST), a school-based curriculum intervention specifically designed to address substance use, adopted the approach of treating drug use as a socially learned, functional behavior. Program components were included to address the underlying determinants of substance use and to encourage behavioral change. This 20-session program was designed to target junior high students who were led by a classroom teacher or extensively-trained older peer. Evaluations indicated reductions in cigarette, marijuana and alcohol users. The reduction rates ranged from 30-75 percent.

Another school-based drug program widely implemented is Drug Abuse Resistance Education (DARE). Initiated by the Los Angeles Police Department and the Los Angeles School District, DARE is offered in over half the elementary schools in the United States. The first generation of DARE had a uniformed police officer lecture in school once a week. The emphasis was on information dissemination and alternative activities to drug use. Found to be unsuccessful in lowering adolescent drug use, the original DARE program was modified. The second-generation program focused on improving skills in problem-solving, resisting peer pressure and mastering difficult social situations. One primary goal of this program has been to delay the onset of experimentation with alcohol, tobacco and other drugs, which reflects the program's targeting of pre-adolescents with an anti-drug message that gives them resistance skills before they enter middle school or junior high school.

Over 20 evaluations of DARE have been conducted. A recent review has shown DARE to be moderately effective in presenting knowledge and in building social skills, but less effective in the areas of drug attitudes and drug use.

itudinal follow-ups and extensions of the School Transitional Environment Project (STEP). *Prevention in Human Services*, 10, 103-136.

3. FAMILY AND OTHER NON-SCHOOL-BASED INTERVENTIONS

a. Parent Training and Intensive Family Preservation Programs

Focusing on preventing child abuse and neglect, these programs address the risk factors of family management, family conflict and early and persistent antisocial behavior as well as protective factors of active family involvement, recognition of positive behavior and bonding to the family.

Parent training involves teaching parents techniques, meant to monitor and change their children's behavior. Programs typically provide home-based training, which includes monitoring child behavior and positive reinforcing pro-social behavior as well as effective and nonabusive punishment and problem solving skills. Various studies of parent training programs indicate that most of the interventions are effective both in the short-term by improving child school performance and in the long-term by reducing delinquency. In a recent study, kindergarten boys who received 19 skills training combined with their parents' receiving 17 parent skills training during a two-year period were found to be 50 percent less likely to commit delinquency by age 12.

Intensive family preservation services are short-term crisis interventions for families whose children are at risk for out-of-home placement. By providing clinical and material services to the family in crisis within a short period of time (commonly within 24 hours), case workers from the intensive family preservation service programs help to stabilize the family. Although current reviews of the existing intensive family preservation services show selected effects of enhanced home environment and decreased child maltreatment, no clear evidence is available to prove their long-term effects in reducing delinquency and violence.

b. Marital and Family Therapy

Marital and family therapy programs typically involve a trained therapist working with multiple family members to change maladaptive patterns of family interaction and communication. The risk and protective factors addressed by this type of intervention are consistent with other family-based programs. In two experimental and quasi-experimental evaluations of marital and family therapy, program effects have been found, ranging from moderate to significant in areas of family functioning, family interaction and child behavior. Taking into consideration long-term effects, evaluations of two different family therapy programs singled out the significant effect of preventing delinquency: siblings of identified delinquents whose families received behavioral therapy were less likely to have court records (20 percent) than the siblings of delinquents whose families either received some other form of therapy or not therapy at all (40–63 percent). Given the variety of therapeutic approaches and lack of client-and-therapy-specific type assessments, substantial care and effort are required to ensure a well-designed therapy program.

c. Mentoring Programs

Mentoring of youth in the form of prevention usually involves non-professional adults serving as guides and role models. Almost all individual- and school-related risk and preventive factors, such as alienation and association with violent peers, are addressed by existing mentoring programs. Based on a review of 10 major program evaluations, however, the majority of these mentoring programs do not work. The exception was one Hawaiian program where mentors combined behavioral management techniques with a group of youth aged 11 to 17. The six-week combined mentoring intervention was effective in reducing truancy.

*Exemplary Program: The Quantum Opportunities Program (QOP).*⁶—The Quantum Opportunities Program (QOP) is a four-year youth development program funded by The Ford Foundation. Targeting Black teenagers living in poverty, this program was initiated during the 1989–90 school year. High school students in five sites (Philadelphia, Oklahoma City, Saginaw, Milwaukee, and San Antonio) were randomly selected to enter the program. Program eligibility included students who were entering ninth grade, were attending a public high school in a high poverty-rate area, were members of a minority group and were from a family receiving public assistance. Each group of 25 students at the five sites was matched with a paid mentor who stayed with the group for the four years of high school, including summers.

⁶Hahn, A., Leavitt, T., & Aaron, P. (1994). Evaluation of the quantum opportunities program (QOP). Did the program work? Waltham, MA: Brandeis University; and Taggart, R., (1995). The Quantum Opportunity Program: Second post-program year impacts. Philadelphia, PA: OIC of America.

The program required students to participate in academic activities outside school hours, community service projects including tutoring younger students, clean-up work in the communities, and in cultural enrichment and personal development activities including life skills training, college and job planning, attending plays and concerts. Financial incentives were offered to encourage participation, completion, and long-range planning. The average cost per participant was approximately \$2,500 per year or a little over \$10,000 for the four years. The reduced criminal costs were estimated to be \$389,650 per participant. Sustained group and one-on-one interaction, "high-tech" education, social enrichment experiences, plus needed financial support resulted in increased high school graduation and post-secondary enrollment, as well as reduced child-bearing and criminal involvement. Specifically, compared to a control group, the QOP participants were more likely to have earned a high school diploma or GED equivalent (88 percent vs. 54 percent), were more likely to be enrolled in college (57 percent vs. 48 percent), had parented fewer children on average (0.54 vs. 0.75), were less likely to be receiving welfare (20 percent vs. 42 percent), and had fewer arrests on average (0.28 vs. 0.56).

d. After-School Programs

Research has shown that about 40 percent of delinquency occurs between 3 p.m. and 8 p.m. when juveniles are out of school, are bored, restless, and unsupervised. Meant to provide at-risk youth with the opportunities for involvement with pro-social youth and adults, learning skills for leisure activities, and bonding to pro-social others, after-school recreation programs are made of components covering a wide variety of activities. Among the better known and widely-established after-school programs are the Boys & Girls Clubs. Open to all young people, ages six to eighteen, clubs are often operated in low-income neighborhoods and provide youth with adult guidance during a time-period when juveniles are at high risk of committing delinquency. Designed to address the risk/preventive factors of alienation, association with violent peers, healthy beliefs and positive social orientation, the program components include health and physical education, personal and educational development, citizenship and leadership development, cultural enrichment, recreation and outdoor environmental education. Beginning in 1987, special efforts have been made to expand the clubs to public housing projects. Preliminary outcomes from research of 15 public housing project clubs and one Boy's Club have shown an impact on parental involvement and school performance. Decreasing drug use and other juvenile crime have also been reported.

Many innovative programs have been developed out of available community resources. Though not yet thoroughly evaluated, the Philadelphia Free Library after-school program was created a few years ago and serves as an inspiration for developing similar programs.

From the support of corporations and foundations, the Free Library of Philadelphia created a pilot after-school program—Learn, Enjoy, and Play (LEAP)—to address children whose parents needed to work during their after-school hours but were not capable of paying for after-school programs. Three times a week, 32 of the library's 52 branches offered book-related programs and homework assistance, with no fee for attending. Helped by a computer containing encyclopedia, typing and math tutors, and geography games, the librarians often provided the children with guidance and encouragement unavailable to many children at home. According to a local survey at a time when people are losing faith in institutions such as public schools, Philadelphians rated their libraries higher than any other city service. With the perceived effectiveness of the dual functions of implementing book-related programs and providing adult role models for the children, LEAP is in the process of fund-raising to set up pre-school learning centers and to maintain and expand the LEAP after-school program.

Results from current after-school programs indicate that these opportunities reduced youths' involvement in delinquent behavior. Programs that aggressively recruit youth and maintain high participation rates appear promising for preventing delinquency and violence.

e. Gang Prevention Program

Gang prevention efforts can be divided into two types based on the stage of prevention each program is targeting. The first type emphasizes preventing youth from joining or forming gangs. These interventions generally target young or pre-adolescent children and are implemented both inside and outside of school. Emphasizing gang education and information dissemination, program components include classroom sessions and after-school programs which provide alternative activities for participants. Risk and protective factors addressed in these programs are alienation, association with delinquent peers, skills for pro-social involvement and bonding to pro-

social youths. A second type of gang prevention programs focuses on working with existing gang members. In addition to the education and alternative activity components, this type of intervention also utilizes approaches such as counseling, crisis intervention and mediation, and other community-based social activities designed to "deisolate" gang members.

Evaluations of existing gang prevention programs do not show encouraging results. Although the "anti-gang forming" approach has demonstrated a limited impact on changing participants' attitudes toward gangs, on enhancing resistance skills, and on preventing them from getting into trouble or even joining gangs, most of the observed differences were not significant. Most prevention programs that involved working with current gang members were also found to be not effective in decreasing gang membership or gang-related crime. In certain instances, negative effects such as increased delinquency were observed.

One gang prevention program which warrants special discussion is the Gang Resistance Education and Training (GREAT) program that was developed under a grant from the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms. Similar in concept to the drug prevention program DARE, this program originated in Phoenix, Arizona, and has been adopted by many states. Even though it is school-based, GREAT involves collaboration with law enforcement by having specially trained police officers come to elementary schools to teach sixth or seventh graders information and skills on how to resist the attraction of joining a gang. Goals also include changes in students' violent behavior, attitudes, and self-esteem.

In a recent evaluation of GREAT conducted at the end of its third year of implementation in selected sites, similar program effects associated with DARE evaluations were shown: Even though there were positive program effects on participants' attitudes related to drugs, the before-after program differences were small and non-significant. Measures on student gang membership also revealed that the program had virtually zero impact. The conclusions suggested that police involvement in the GREAT program, just like that of DARE, served a more symbolic than a crime control purpose.

4. COMMUNITY LEVEL INTERVENTION

a. Neighborhood-Based Organization

Developed to address the risk factor of weakened social controls and the preventive factor of strengthening bonds between family, school, peers, and the community, neighborhood-based crime prevention programs organize and coordinate neighborhood residents and various agencies to address local problems and to meet the needs of families and the community.

Two common neighborhood programs are block watch and citizen patrols. These programs strive to enhance the safety of neighborhood and individual residents. Block watch starts with mobilizing neighborhood residents, followed by organizing meetings in which information is disseminated and neighborhood problems are identified. Program services usually include identification of suspicious persons and home security inspection. Citizen patrol programs involve patrolling guards who are not sworn law enforcement officers. While many tasks performed are similar to block watch programs, citizen patrols are more likely to confront force or personal injury. Evaluations of neighborhood organization experiences from six communities showed mixed results. Although these programs have not up until now produced significant effects, they were judged promising by a recent review of intervention programs, because of their impact on reducing the fear of crime.

One well-implemented neighborhood effort, co-founded by an ex-felon, is the Delancy Street Program in San Francisco which consists of a residential center targeting ex-offenders. Program participants, ranging in age from 12-68, are required to stay at Delancy Street for at least two years, during which time behavioral skills, educational and vocational training are provided. In addition to learning programs, all Delancy residents are put in charge of some aspect of the organization, and all are employed to help support the extended family. Residents must become involved in volunteer community or social work before leaving. The projects vary from helping the elderly to working with young people in impoverished neighborhoods. Central to Delancy rules is its prohibition of alcohol or drugs. Violence is forbidden. In over two decades of operation, there has never been an arrest for a violent incident at Delancy Street. This model has been replicated by other ex-felon populations around the world.

b. Gun-Related Programs, Legislation and Regulation

One of the most serious changes in the landscape of crime in Memphis is the increasing involvement of juveniles in gun-related offenses. In 1994, for example, 39

youngsters under age 18 were referred to juvenile court on charges of homicide (almost always with a firearm), but nearly 800 more were referred to the court for illegally possessing or carrying a weapon. Half of these cases stemmed from an incident in school property.

Prevention efforts related to gun injuries and crime address the problems from two levels. At the policy level, legislation and regulation efforts are enacted with the goal to control firearm violence. These regulations restrict the sale and transfer of guns and specify the place and manner of carrying firearms. At the local level, gun-related intervention involves firearms training programs and school metal detector practices.

Various laws and regulations aimed at restricting firearms appear to prevent crime and violence. For example, evaluations of laws in Pennsylvania, New Jersey, Michigan and Florida consistently showed that their enactments, along with enhanced information campaigns, significantly decreased homicides with guns and other gun-related crimes. Studies of regulations on the place and manner of carrying guns, on the other hand, showed mixed outcomes, partially because the significant enforcement of these regulations was lacking. Metal detector programs on weapon availability were found to decrease the lethality of interpersonal conflicts.

*Exemplary Program: The Kansas City Gun Experiment.*⁷—As part of the Weed and Seed program supported by the Bureau of Justice Assistance, the Kansas City Police Department initiated a police patrol project in 1991 and 1993 aimed at reducing gun violence, drive-by shootings and homicides in a patrol beat where the homicide rate was high. By using computer analysis to identify gun crime "hot-spot" areas, extra proactive patrolling was provided in rotation in the areas. While on duty, the special patrol focused exclusively on gun detection and did not respond to calls for service.

Evaluation of this program reported an impressive impact on crime prevention. For example, gun seizures by police in the target area increased by more than 65 percent. Fewer incidents of gun crimes in the target beat (86) were found compared to those of the comparative beat (192). Drive-by shootings dropped from seven to one in the target area, but doubled from six to 12 in the comparison area, and showed no displacement to adjoining beats. Assessment of operating funding indicated that the increased number of guns seized in high crime-rate areas could be done at relatively modest cost.

Senator THOMPSON. Mr. Elliott.

STATEMENT OF DELBERT ELLIOTT

Mr. ELLIOTT. Sitting here and listening to the questions that are raised, for me, heightens the need for information, just as Senator Biden said. One of the things that strikes me about all of this is that we have serious, frustrating issues to address and the fact is we don't know what various options and alternatives are likely to produce. So my pitch is a single pitch, and that is a pitch for basic research and evaluation which will allow us to answer those questions.

The problem I have, much like my colleague, is that a lot of what people talk about when they talk about evaluation and evaluation outcome is not something that will stand up against a test. I am in agreement with him. We have got to have very careful, rigorous evaluation work done, and we know that there are lots of ways that you can run a study and get a control group and claim all kinds of success that is due to skimming, that is due to a whole lot of processes. I evaluated a program that was delivering counseling that claimed such great results, and we discovered they counted counseling service as their phone calls to make the appointments. So there are real problems.

I am a little bit disturbed. Even though I came in pretty much the same way saying we know that there are some things that

⁷ Sherman, L. W., Shaw, J.W., & Rogan, D.P. (1995). The Kansas City gun experiment. National Institute of Justice Research in Brief. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Justice.

work—and the reason we know that there are things that work is because we have mounted some very good, basic research studies which have essentially told us how to focus those kinds of programs, and we are doing some good evaluations so we know that some things do work.

It costs a lot of money. A good longitudinal study like this study or like the one that Terry is involved in costs a lot of money, and we have to have Federal assistance in order to mount those kinds of research efforts. States cannot do that. We have to have Federal assistance to do quality evaluations because the evaluations we are talking about here cost as much as the annual budget for most of these programs.

So given that, OJJDP has to focus its attention upon basic research and doing evaluation studies, and I have to say to you, unfortunately, a lot of what they say in the way of evaluations and what is available is not good, quality evaluation. It is not that we don't know how to do it, but a lot of what is being done is not, in fact, quality evaluation.

I would like to ask that you consider OJJDP focusing itself upon that mission; that is, upon mounting basic research and providing evaluation studies, and I am talking about the high-end evaluation part, not the process evaluation people talk about. That is a statement as to whether a program says it is doing what it said it would do, whether it is delivering the services it said it would deliver, and whether it had any effect upon kids' reading ability or whatever it was. That, States can do. As a matter of fact, I want to come back and talk about Senator Biden's issue about what States are able to do and not able to do.

The fact of the matter is that kind of evaluation can be done at the State level when they are working with programs that are demonstration programs. I would like to ask, as a matter of fact, that OJJDP not mount demonstration programs at all. The fact of the matter is what OJJDP is doing in the way of demonstration programs is a drop in the bucket with respect to what is actually happening. The States and private foundations are mounting far more demonstration programs.

In the State of Colorado, we are mounting more demonstration programs than OJJDP did in the last budget year. We have a private foundation that probably has mounted half as many. As a matter of fact, title V program that is called communities that care—that program was mounted in the State of Colorado before it was ever mounted as a demonstration here, paid for by State funds. So I think that the demonstration part of this can be done at the State level and they can do that preliminary work, which has to be that performance evaluation, because if you can't implement the program well, then there is no point in mounting a high-cost evaluation. That is a precondition for doing an evaluation.

So I think we could, one, really focus the efforts of this agency on evaluation and basic research. I also think that there is an important role to play having to do with data collection systems and reporting, so I think that is a necessary need. We need to have a centralizing training and technical assistance center run out of this office to disseminate the information that we learn from the evaluations, and we probably have to have a national standards center.

But when I look at what is funded in OJJDP, we have eight different grants all designed to deal with data collection around issues of juvenile violence and juvenile delinquency. We don't need eight; we need one integrated, coordinated data collection system, not eight.

Second, there are 24 agencies that are being funded to provide technical assistance and training. There are five different agencies funded to deliver technical assistance and training to correctional officers, one for staff, one for line staff, one for detention. That is an unnecessary duplication, it seems to me. I think we need that function, but it ought to be housed in a single center that provides an integrated, coordinated delivery of technical assistance and training. Finally, we do need a standards center. We have two right now that are proposing to do that that certainly could be put together in one.

So we could free up moneys from those kinds of activities to really develop the focus upon evaluation and basic research that would inform us and tell us what works, and I am optimistic that we can do that.

Senator THOMPSON. Thank you very much.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Elliott follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF DELBERT S. ELLIOTT, PH.D.

Introduction: I would like to address three questions in my testimony to the Subcommittee on Youth Violence as you consider the reauthorization of the Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act. First, what do we know about the causes of violence and crime that can inform our efforts to prevent and control these types of behavior? Second, what kinds of violence prevention programs work? Third, how effective had OJJDP been in developing and promoting effective violence prevention strategies, programs and initiatives. Finally, I will make some recommendations for changes in the structure and functioning of OJJDP to facilitate its violence prevention effort.

I. WHAT DO WE KNOW ABOUT THE CAUSES OF VIOLENCE THAT CAN HELP US DEVELOP EFFECTIVE PREVENTION PROGRAMS?

The last 10 years of research has produced a dramatic improvement in our knowledge about the causes of crime and violence. This new knowledge base is primarily the result of a series of longitudinal studies of general population samples that followed children and their families as these children grew up, passed through adolescence and became adults. These were expensive studies, but they have paid off with a much improved understanding of how youth come to be involved in criminal behavior; how an initial involvement in minor offenses escalates into serious forms of violent and predatory crime; and the individual traits and circumstances which determine whether youth will continue or terminate their involvement in criminal activity as they enter their adult years.

I am not saying we have all of the answers, for there remains much that we do not know or understand. Further, identifying the causes does not mean that we know how to eliminate, neutralize or reverse their effects. But today we have a good scientific knowledge base upon which to build violence prevention programs and treatment interventions for those who are caught up in this destructive behavior. There are several key findings from this body of research that have direct implications for violence prevention programming.

There are multiple causes of crime; multiple causal paths that lead to involvement in criminal behavior. For some, these causal factors or conditions are found in early childhood and the most effective point of intervention is in the family and the socialization processes that are occurring there. Children who are abused and neglected by their parents, are exposed to unconventional, dysfunctional lifestyles, and whose activities are unsupervised or beyond the control of their parents, develop no effective self-controls and live in an environment in which there are no real external controls on their behavior. These conditions put children at high risk for violence, crime and substance abuse during adolescence.

For others, the causal conditions that lead to criminal behavior are encountered primarily during adolescence, and involve difficulties associated with the performance demands at school, being accepted by peers, exposure to negative influences and role models in the peer group or neighborhood, and a failure to internalize conventional values and develop a capacity for moral reasoning and behavior. A good upbringing in the home reduces the risks for these problems in adolescence, but does not guarantee success, since different abilities and resources are required in adolescent settings. Getting along with one's parents does not guarantee academic success or getting along with teachers at school. Nor does it insure acceptance or popularity with one's peers, support from neighbors, or the development of skills which are valued in the labor market. During the adolescent years, the most appropriate contexts for interventions involve the school, peer group and neighborhood, as well as the family. The risk and protective factors to be addressed by these interventions are those found in each of these settings.

For yet others, criminal behavior is a response to problems associated with the transition into adulthood. At this stage of the life course, it is the failure to have developed the levels of personal competence required to find and hold a job, limited opportunities or racial/ethnic discrimination in the labor market, and difficulties in developing and maintaining stable intimate relationships that precipitate violent behavior. Having a job and a stable intimate relationship are both protective factors and substantially reduce the risk of involvement in serious forms of violence and crime.

Initiation into crime and violence thus occurs at different points in the life course. For many, its roots are to be found in early family life. But for others it is a response to difficulties encountered at school, work or with peers; and there is no evidence of poor parenting in their background. Individuals are capable of deciding to use violence to get what they want, without this having been modeled or encouraged by their parents. Falling in with the wrong kinds of friends can lead to behavior which is inconsistent with everything parents have taught and encouraged. The family is clearly a critical social context for developing the potential for violence and crime, but it is not always implicated in the causal path.

CHARACTERISTICS OF EFFECTIVE INTERVENTIONS

Effective interventions must be early, comprehensive, developmentally appropriate and self-sustaining. Given the variety of causes in different social settings, it follows that no intervention or treatment that targets a single risk factor in a single social context will be very effective. Yet historically, this is precisely what most interventions have been designed to do. There is evidence that early interventions are particularly cost effective. For one thing, they typically involve a single context, the family. For young children, failure and dysfunctional behavior patterns have not yet become established. And parents are more open to change and willing to do what they can to help their children. Finally, if successful, these interventions tend to have effects which carry over into adolescence, increasing the odds of a responsible, health adaption to that stage of development as well.

During the adolescent years, interventions become more complex. They must address potential problems in each of the social contexts in which youth live, the family, school, neighborhood and peer groups. They also must be developmentally appropriate. The relative influence of family, school and peers changes over time, and this must be taken into account in designing our interventions. For example, we know that parent effectiveness training, when it is implemented well, reduces the risk of delinquent behavior for children and those in early adolescence. We also know that it is not effective for older adolescents, who have already achieved a measure of independence from their parents and look more to their peers for approval. If parents have not established effective monitoring and supervision prior to age 14-15, the attempt to introduce these controls after that age often introduces more conflict and actually weakens parental control and influence. It is too late for this type of intervention. The peer group is the dominant context at this point, and an effective intervention must address what is going on in the peer culture.

Finally, interventions which have the potential for becoming self-sustaining, are much more cost effective. Neighborhood-level interventions in poor, disadvantaged neighborhoods that bring residents together, build consensus around conventional values and norms, help establish informal support networks and empower residents to secure and make effective use of community resources, are going to have crime prevention effects over many generations of parents and children living in this neighborhood. Building a sense of "community" generates the most effective social controls on behavior, and once established, these controls become self-sustaining. Too often, prevention and control programs are not designed to become self-sustain-

ing, and once the money designated for the program runs out, the intervention is ended, and the family, neighborhood, school, or gang returns to its "normal" mode of functioning because no permanent change has occurred.

II. WHAT KINDS OF VIOLENCE PREVENTION PROGRAMS WORK?

Not too many years ago, evaluation researchers claimed that nothing worked; no delinquency or crime prevention programs could be demonstrated to prevent or deter this behavior. Today, we can demonstrate the effectiveness of some specific programs. As suggested above, these tend to be interventions that focus on both the individual and the social context. These tend to be more comprehensive interventions that simultaneously build personal competencies and provide opportunities for participation in conventional activities and roles; that promote a personal commitment to conventional values and norms; and that provide a clear and consistent system of rewards and sanctions for behavior in each social context in which the individual lives.

Examples of successful individual programs include: prenatal/early infancy home visitation programs, head-start type programs, family training programs, school-parent involvement programs, cognitive/behavioral programs, adult/youth mentoring programs, and education/work programs. There are of course individual programs of these types that have not proved effective in deterring criminal behavior. The quality of implementation varies considerably across programs and they are sometimes employed with the wrong age group or at-risk populations. It must also be noted that the deterrent effects of these individual programs are relatively modest, with 10-20 percent reductions in criminal behavior.

There are no "silver bullets". More comprehensive initiatives which utilize multiple combinations of these programs may well generate stronger deterrent effects, but these truly comprehensive initiatives are relatively recent and few of them have been carefully evaluated to date. Finally, the evidence suggests that the treatment intervention programs are equally effective when located in the community or in correctional settings as long as they are well implemented with appropriate at-risk groups.

We also have examples of programs that have proved to be ineffective and in some cases these programs may even have negative effects, that is, they may increase the rates of crime within the treated group. Doing something is not always better than doing nothing. Examples of such programs include psychotherapy, intensive case-work, guided group interaction and positive peer culture programs, and "scare" type programs like Scared Straight and boot camps. Once again, there may be individual exceptions, but as a rule, these type of programs have been shown to be ineffective.

In general, intervention strategies that are based on the threat of increased punitive sanctions, have small deterrent effects. Most likely this is because the risk of apprehension is so low. If only two out of every 100 aggravated assaults results in an arrest, as some studies report, doubling the length of the sentence if convicted will have little deterrent effect. The research evidence does suggest that increasing the risk of apprehension will have a stronger deterrent effect than increasing the severity of the sanction until the risk is relatively high. Once this risk is relatively high, increasing the sanction should have a stronger effect. How many of us would change our present speeding habits if the fine were doubled. Not many. On the other hand, if the chance of getting caught speeding were increased to one-in-five, we would see a major change in driving habits. And if the fine were then doubled, it would have some additional effect.

I know of no careful evaluations of the deterrent effect of hate crime legislation, or of waiving juveniles into the adult criminal court. I will be very surprised if either is shown to have any significant general deterrent effect, i.e., an effect on other juveniles in the population who are at risk of committing such an offense. The risks of apprehension and conviction are simply too low. There are, of course, deterrent effects that result from incapacitation, but again they are quite small. For example, a recent national study demonstrated that less than 10% of men who committed serious violent offenses between the ages of 11 and 30 were ever arrested for a serious violent offense. If each of those had been incapacitated at the point of their first arrest and kept in prison to age 30, the reduction in the total number of serious violent offenses in the sample would have been less than 15 percent. Given current conviction and sentencing rates, the actual reductions in crime resulting from incarcerating offenders is much smaller. Taking into account the cost of incarceration, the relative cost-benefit of this strategy for reducing crime is low.

I should also note that there is no evidence that confinement in an adult prison has greater deterrent effects than confinement in a juvenile facility. In fact, when

age effects are taken into account, juvenile institutions probably have a greater deterrent effect than do adult prisons.

While I have argued that we have a strong scientific knowledge base that can inform our violence prevention initiatives, there are two serious limitations in our efforts to develop and implement effective prevention and control programs. First, relatively few programs have been carefully evaluated. In fact, most violence prevention programs currently being implemented have not been evaluated. For example, the nations schools are spending millions of dollars on conflict resolution curriculum and millions of instruction hours in an effort to prevent and control violence, but there is no scientific evidence that these programs reduce the rates of violence in these schools or among students who have taken these classes. Given the guidelines outlined above, there is little reason to expect such a narrow, limited intervention to be effective. The few evaluations completed are not encouraging, but the evidence is still inconclusive. By any reasonable standard, this is a high risk venture. How many private businesses would make this type of expenditure without some minimum R&D.

The same may be said of many other violence prevention programs widely being adopted in this country: gun control legislation, juvenile waivers to criminal courts, longer sentences for gun involved violent crimes, school peer mediation programs, Community Development Corporations, family service centers, grass-roots neighborhood organizational initiatives, social skills training, graduation incentive programs, to name just a few that have been proposed as violence prevention programs. If we are to make intelligent, cost-effective decisions in our efforts to prevent violence and crime, we must do a better job of evaluating these initiatives.

The second limitation is that many programs being implemented are essentially uninformed by the existing knowledge base about the causes of violence. Programs often have little reasonable expectation that they will be effective. In some cases, they involve approaches which are already known to be ineffective. Those responsible for making funding decisions must be better informed about what works and what doesn't. We are wasting too much money and time on programs that have already been tried and demonstrated to be ineffective. For example, we have completed careful, systematic evaluations of the DARE program. There may well be other positive benefits from participation in this program, but there is no evidence that this program is effective in preventing drug use. Given what we know about youth development and the appropriate timing of interventions, there is reason to question whether it is being used for the most appropriate age group. But it continues to be a very popular program. The same conclusion applies to the use of boot camps, to the extent they are seen as violence prevention programs.

A COMPREHENSIVE, BALANCED STRATEGY OF CONTROL

In an effort to create an overall violence prevention strategy for the country, it is important to achieve some reasonable balance between primary prevention and crime control initiatives. Crime control programs involve strengthening the justice system so as to maintain or increase the pressure of threatened sanctions against those who would violate the law. Prevention programs are those that attempt to strengthen the informal personal and social controls that support the legitimacy of the legal system and reinforce social values/norms and the self-regulation of conduct.

Both are critical to an effective set of controls of behavior; we need prisons to maintain an effective system of controls on behavior. But prisons are not our first line of defense against violence and crime. That role belongs to the strengthening of informal controls- a strong personal commitment to law-abiding behavior and involvement in informal social networks of friends and family where violence and crime are strongly disapproved. As noted above, evaluations generally reveal smaller and less cost-efficient effects for control approaches. We need a balanced approach which places at least as much, and preferably more, emphasis on prevention than control.

There must always be sanctions for violating the law. This applies to those arrested for the first-time. These offenders are rarely first-time offenders and to do nothing undermines both the informal control system and the perceived legitimacy of the formal system. We need a system of graduated sanctions that begins with routine fines and restitution orders and ends with incarceration in a secure facility.

But we must resist the tendency to over-invest in the control side because these interventions can be implemented more quickly and are easier to sell to the general public. Their effects may be more immediate, but they are less effective in the long run. The "war on drugs" was not as effective in reducing illicit drug use as was a

concerted educational campaign about the negative effects of drug use which changed the norms in the adolescent population.

III. OJJDP'S ROLE IN DEVELOPING AND PROMOTING PREVENTION AND CONTROL PROGRAMS

The National Institute for Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention has played an important role in developing and evaluating crime prevention and control programs. Grants from NIJJDP have had a major impact on our understanding of the causes of crime and violence, primarily through the Research Program on the Causes and Correlates of Delinquency which involves three of the most sophisticated longitudinal studies available in the U.S. In the past several years, NIJJDP has also funded a number of prevention demonstration projects with rigorous evaluation which will add significantly to our knowledge of what works. One of the best available summaries of promising approaches to prevention and control of delinquency was recently published by NIJJDP and the OJJDP Comprehensive Strategy for Violence Prevention is a well conceived, balanced approach including both primary prevention and justice system control initiatives.

It is my impression that NIJJDP has become much more effective in recent years. It was not always an effective agency. They have taken some bold steps, like investing in long-term panel studies and imposing higher standards of scientific review, which represented a significant departure from earlier procedures. Some of the best basic research and evaluation studies now come out of NIJJDP. Unfortunately, the agency is still vulnerable to political interest groups and radical shifts in political priorities and has struggled to maintain a coherent research and evaluation agenda.

Unfortunately, we have learned little from the States Formula Grant Program and the Discretionary Grant Program about designing and implementing effective prevention and control programs. Many of these grants have little to do with prevention. Occasionally, prevention programs funded by these grants have been evaluated, but this effort has been neither systematic nor sophisticated. There are some exceptions, for examples diversion and deinstitutionalization programs, both of which were evaluated by NIJJDP grants.

I am not fundamentally opposed to either formula grants or block grants to the states, if these grants produce genuine violence prevention and control programs and they are evaluated so we can learn from their successes and failures. But the available evidence suggest that these funds are often used to fund programs that are only tangentially related to violence prevention or control or to fund programs we already know are ineffective and a waste of resources. And there is little control over the quality of implementation when programs known to be effective or new creative programs are funded.

IV. WHAT SHOULD THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT BE DOING THROUGH OJJDP TO PREVENT AND CONTROL JUVENILE CRIME?: RECOMMENDATIONS

1. Double the NIJJDP budget. The major contributions to our national effort to prevent and control crime have come out of NIJJDP. These contributions are in the form of basic research, demonstration and evaluation grants, and dissemination of information on comprehensive prevention and control strategies and the effectiveness of individual programs. This is exactly what a federal program should do to assist state and local governments and private foundations in mounting effective crime prevention programs. The cost of a sophisticated evaluation are high, and often beyond the ability of state and local governments to fund. The federal government should take the lead role in evaluating promising programs, with the cooperation of the states and agencies implementing them.

2. Whether the existing formula grants and discretionary grants are continued or block grants are instituted:

a. There should be a 5-8% set aside for each grant to fund independent evaluations of promising programs. These funds should be administered by NIJJDP.

b. States should be required to invest two dollars in primary prevention programs for every dollar they invest in crime control programs.

c. NIJJDP should provide training for all grant recipients on what is known about effective and ineffective programs.

Senator THOMPSON. Mr. Thornberry.

STATEMENT OF TERENCE P. THORNBERRY

Mr. THORNBERRY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Senator Biden. Earlier, Mr. Chairman, you asked Mr. Bilchik if OJJDP was identi-

fyng programs that work and getting the word out far and wide, I think was your term, to everyone about those, and I would like to try to respond to that question because part of my written testimony is directed at that. But more directly, I will try to give you some information, in part because I think in the past 3 or 4 years, under Mr. Bilchik's guidance, I think the office actually has been doing a good job at that and far better than it has done in the past.

We all know that youth violence has reached unacceptable levels in American society and we all realize that it is imperative that we take immediate and effective steps to stem the rising tide of delinquency and violence and the projections that it is going to get worse in the future.

For a variety of reasons, I think that a general policy strategy that is based on prevention is the most effective way of accomplishing this goal, but to emphasize prevention as our basic strategy implies we know something about effective prevention programs. Do we, and specifically what has OJJ contributed to that knowledge base? I think, Mr. Chairman, that is the heart of the question that you were asking earlier.

There are two ways of answering that, I think. One is at the level of specific programs and the second is at the general level of information about effective prevention. At the level of specific programs, I think research supported by the office has made significant contributions to our knowledge base. For example, the Communities That Care Program that Dr. Elliott mentioned a second ago was initiated by research from the office many years ago and is now a key part of their effort to reduce delinquency. I think that is a scientifically valid way of going about identifying risk factors, identifying the services that communities actually have, and targeting our efforts at prevention efficiently rather than a shotgun or scattered approach.

The office has also made successful contributions, I think, in schools in its current Comprehensive Gang Program and others. I think that in response to Senator Biden's urging before, I think the office can provide a lot more detailed information about specific programs, how they were evaluated, and what they learned, because I think there is a contribution they made.

Now, is the office's track record in research and evaluation perfect? Probably not, and I think, for example, I would concur with my colleagues in urging that a much larger portion of their budget be allocated to basic research and to evaluation research. I think Del Elliott is quite right that it is the high-end evaluation research, and only that, that can answer the questions that you were posing earlier, what works and for whom, and they certainly can do a better job there.

I think we need to put that in proper perspective, though, in evaluating the record of the office in the past. Evaluation research is not an exact science. It is often buffeted about by political, policy, and social forces that interfere with scientific designs. Thus, I think it is not fair to compare the office's record with perfection because we must expect some failures in this research area. But compared to the state of the art, I think OJJDP is doing very well, indeed. The office's record, I think, compares favorably with those of

other agencies working in this area and they have indeed made important contributions.

At the second or more general level that your question raises, I think the office has actually done better than at the specific program level. There is a large literature on the evaluation of delinquency prevention programs that has developed over the past half century. Most of it, as Dr. Elliott said a moment ago, is pretty shoddy, but there is within that literature a core of scientifically valid and acceptable programs, and I think in the past 2 or 3 years the office has done a masterful job in trying to cull through that material that is out there, identify the effect of programs, the ones that meet Professor Wolfgang's comments about the canons of scientific research, and then to use that information to suggest program and prevention strategies.

That comes out most clearly, I think in the "Comprehensive Strategy for Serious, Chronic and Violent Juvenile Offenders" that the office has prepared. That comprehensive strategy systematically assesses the results of prior evaluation studies to identify programs that work and, in my opinion, most importantly perhaps, programs that do not work. Although not politically popular often, identifying ineffective programs is just as important as identifying effective programs. A general prevention policy can only be successful if we know which programs we should implement, and also which programs we should avoid because they are either ineffective or actually harmful.

In my view, OJJ has been a leader in the Federal Government in trying to gain information about both types of programs and in disseminating that information widely to policymakers and practitioners. As a result of the office's work conducted over the past 3 or 4 years, we now have more detailed information on effective prevention programs, ranging across the full developmental course from childhood to late adolescence. The benefits of this approach can be enormous.

Rather than simply throwing more money at the delinquency problem or the violence problem, we can now target our limited resources far more effectively than before. The efficient use of resources is certainly a requirement that the Congress should impose upon the prevention community and I think we have more detailed information than ever before about how to meet that requirement.

I concur with my colleagues on this panel that we could on a somewhat optimistic note that while the task is a difficult one, we certainly have the scientific ability to evaluate these programs effectively, and I think that we can actually begin to make a dent in the problem of delinquency and youth violence.

Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Thornberry follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF TERENCE P. THORNBERRY

Mr. Chairman, Senator Biden, members of the Committee: I am honored to testify before the Subcommittee on Youth Violence of the Committee on the Judiciary concerning the reauthorization of the Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act. This is a most important matter and I hope I will be able to contribute to your deliberations.

I have been associated with OJJDP since its inception, and for the past ten years I have directed one of the three projects of the Office's Program of Research on the Causes and Correlates of Delinquency. These projects—in Denver, Pittsburgh, and

Rochester—represent the largest, most comprehensive assessment of the causes and correlates of delinquency ever undertaken. Begun by OJJDP in 1986, they have followed about 4,500 families over the past 10 years to study the social and psychological forces that create serious, chronic, and violent delinquents. It is difficult to summarize the voluminous findings of these studies, but let me point quickly to a few that have implications for prevention programs. First, it is abundantly clear from our research that the vast majority of violent offenses are committed by a relatively small group of offenders. Second, these chronic violent offenders begin their careers early and are heavily involved in many other forms of delinquency and crime, including drug use and drug sales. Third, there is no single risk factor that leads to these outcomes; chronic offenders have serious deficits in many areas such as family, school, peers, and neighborhoods. I will return to the implications of these findings for prevention policies in a moment.

Because of this research effort I have watched the Office through good times and bad, and let me say at the outset that I think these are very good times for OJJDP. In the past few years, under Shay Bilchik's guidance, the Office has made immense contributions to the development and dissemination of information about effective delinquency prevention programs.

Youth crime, particularly violent crime, has reached unacceptable levels in American society. It is imperative that we take immediate and effective steps to stem the rising tide of delinquency, violence, and drug-related offenses before the situation becomes completely out of control. For a variety of reasons I think that a general policy strategy based on prevention is the most effective way of accomplishing this goal. I am appending to my testimony an editorial I just wrote for the Criminal Law Bulletin outlining my reasons for this assertion.

But to emphasize prevention as a basic strategy implies that we know something about effective prevention programs. Do we? And what has OJJDP contributed to that knowledge? This question can be answered at two levels—first, the evaluation of specific programs and second, the evaluation of general information about prevention.

At the level of specific programs, research supported OJJDP has made significant contributions to our knowledge about prevention programs. For example, the social development model created by David Hawkins and his colleagues was initiated by OJJDP and has led directly to the Communities that Care strategy, perhaps the most important general approach to delinquency prevention available today. Communities that Care is based on a scientifically valid assessment of 20 risk factors in five areas such as family and schools. These risk factors are drawn directly from the results of longitudinal research such as that conducted in OJJDP's Program of Research on the Causes and Correlates of Delinquency. Based on the assessment of risk factors and of services available in the community, a carefully crafted prevention program is established, efficiently targeted at the particular needs of the community.

Other examples of the Office's contribution to program evaluation can be seen in its assessment of Cities in Schools which is concerned with school dropout and delinquency, and in its evaluation of the Comprehensive Gang Program which has a substantial component on prevention efforts. I am sure the Office can provide additional examples of the evaluation of specific programs.

Is OJJDP's track record on research and evaluation perfect? Perhaps not. I would prefer that a larger portion of their budget be allocated to evaluation research. Also, it must be noted that some programs they did fund were not properly implemented or evaluated. But evaluation research, especially on such a politically volatile issue as youth violence, is not an exact science; it is buffeted about by political, policy, and social forces that interfere with scientific designs. Thus, it is not fair to compare the Office's record with perfection—we must expect some failures in this research area. Compared to the state of the art, however, I think OJJDP is doing very well indeed. The Office's record compares favorably to those of other agencies working on this topic and, as indicated by the earlier illustrations, many of their programs have contributed to our knowledge base about prevention.

There is a second, more general level, on which the Office's record in this area can be assessed. There is a large literature on the evaluation of delinquency prevention programs that far exceeds the information based on the Office's specific research agenda. This literature, developed over the past half century by both federal agencies and private foundations, has a core of useful and scientifically valid information within it. In the past few years the Office has done a masterful job of culling through this material to identify effective delinquency prevention programs.

OJJDP's approach can be seen most clearly in its Comprehensive Strategy for Serious, Chronic and Violent Juvenile Offenders. That strategy makes compelling use of findings on the causes and development of violent careers from longitudinal re-

search projects, such as those conducted by my colleagues here today, Drs. Wolfgang and Elliott, as well as the projects of the Program of Research on the Causes and Correlates of Delinquency. The strategy also systematically assesses the results of prior evaluation studies to identify programs that work and, importantly, programs that do not work. Although not politically popular, identifying ineffective programs is just as important as identifying effective programs. A general prevention policy can only be successful if we know which programs we should implement and which programs we should avoid because they are either ineffective or actually harmful. In my view, OJJDP has been a leader in systematically gaining information about these issues and disseminating it widely to policymakers and practitioners.

As a result of the Office's work conducted over the past three or four years we now have detailed information on effective prevention programs ranging across the full developmental spectrum from childhood to late adolescence. We also have detailed information about treatment programs ranging across all levels of the juvenile justice system. The benefits of this approach can be enormous. Rather than simply throwing more money at the "delinquency problem," we can now target our limited resources far more effectively than ever before. The efficient use of resources is certainly a requirement that should be imposed on the prevention community, and the landmark work of the Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention makes it possible for all of us to comply more easily with this requirement.

The Office is currently disseminating its Comprehensive Strategy widely and working with communities across the country to implement it. I hope this effort will go forward and that the Office will carefully and rigorously evaluate each step of the implementation process. The Office's work, as exemplified in its Comprehensive Strategy, holds great promise for the future and deserves the Committee's support.

CRIME POLICY IN AMERICA TODAY

In an earlier editorial in this journal Fred Cohen wrote:

"We do not think grandly about crime anymore. We do, of course, think about it, debate it, lament it, and watch it on TV. We also do something about it, don't we? "Three strikes"; other mandatory prison terms; expansion of the death penalty; sex-offender notification; stripping prisoners of amenities; chain gangs in Alabama, Arizona and Florida; and the highest incarceration rate in the world: 426 prisoners per 100,000 population (South Africa has 333).

"When I state that we do not think grandly about crime I certainly do not mean that there are no grand thoughts about crime. I do not mean that there are no criminologists or other social scientists with something important to say about crime. I mean that their voices are not heard above the din of insipid legislators, frenzied talk show hosts, and vapid lawyers."

I agree with Professor Cohen's assessment of our current situation. Moreover, I think it is particularly deplorable since we know a great deal more about criminal behavior than every before—politicians and policymakers simply refuse to use that knowledge to inform policy.

I do not know that what follows can be considered "thinking grandly" about crime in any sense of the term, but it is, at least, an effort to think seriously about crime and what should be done about it. Hopefully, these comments will help raise the level of discourse on this topic so that we can once again begin to think grandly about this serious and persistent American social problem.

To discuss the problem of crime in American society, or to discuss a general policy for crime in America today, is a daunting task. The topic is far too broad to yield to easy resolution. Because of that I would like to focus on one issue that I think is central to our general concern about crime in America today. Namely, it is the problem of criminal violence and drug related crimes committed by young males, roughly from ages 15 to 24.

When citizens, legislators, politicians say they are concerned with or worried about crime I think that they are really referring to youth violence. I do not think they are particularly concerned about such crimes as environmental crime or white collar crime, despite the great harm created by these forms of criminality. They are concerned about street violence and drug markets. As a result, youth violence and drug related crimes are, in large part, driving our current crime policy and need to be at the center of any discussion of that policy.

So let's start with a few basic facts about these forms of crime. First, compared to virtually any other industrialized country in the world the rates of youth violence in this country are extraordinarily high. For example, our rates of homicide are 5 to 10 times as high as those observed in most European countries. Rates of homicide for American teenagers is about 10 times that observed for Canadian teenagers.

Second, youth violence has been increasing rather dramatically in the past ten years. From the mid 80's to the early 1990's youth homicide increased by about 50 percent while the comparable rate of increase for adult homicide was only about 10 percent. Property and other forms of criminality did not increase as markedly either. Thus, the recent increase in crime is rather specific—driven by increases in youth violence.

Third, almost all of the increase in violent crime, and almost all of the cross national differences in violent crime, are attributable to firearms, especially handguns. For example, almost the entire increase in youth homicide is attributable to increases in gun homicides; trends and in all other forms of homicide are flat over the past 15 to 20 years.

Fourth, violent youth appear to be getting younger and younger each year. In the past homicide rates were driven by 17 to 24 year olds. Now homicide has crept down to 12 to 17 year olds and, in recent years, the largest increases are seen at the youngest ages.

Finally, demographic projections suggest that youth violence will increase even more during the next 10 to 15 years. There are more young children in our population today than there are teenagers, and as those youngsters mature and reach the crime-prone years our rates of youth violence are likely to increase over those that we are observing today.

These and related observations suggest to me that the situation with respect to youth violence and related forms of crime has indeed reached crisis or epidemic proportion. We have a very serious domestic problem that is ruining neighborhoods, schools, families, and is exacerbating racial and ethnic divides in our society. Because we have allowed the situation to reach crisis proportions, our responses to it have become perverse, distorted, and, in many ways, irrational. We run around trying to "do something" about crime because we have a crisis on our hands, but with no apparent regard to whether that something does any good. As a result, we end up with policies such as "three strikes and you're out," an increased use of the death penalty, and chain gangs. In general, politicians appear willing to try anything to demonstrate that they are "getting tough on crime."

The irony is that it is precisely this get tough approach that is at the heart of the failure of our current crime policies. The basic difficulty is that a "get tough approach" is entirely reactive. It is very much like closing the barn door after the cow has gotten out.

An entirely, or even predominantly, reactive policy is ineffective for three basic reasons. First, it fails to respond to a huge proportion of serious violent offenses that are committed. We know that the lion's share of serious crime is committed by a proportionately small group of chronic offenders. By the time the criminal careers of these individuals are serious enough to warrant harsh, punitive responses much, if not most, of the social harm that they will inflict upon society will already have been inflicted.

Second, by waiting until late into their careers, we present the treatment and correctional authorities impossibly difficult cases to change. Chronic offenders are into virtually all other forms of delinquency and crime, are likely to be gang members, to own and use guns, to be involved in drug sales, and so forth. They have risk factors in a variety of developmental areas, such as family relations, schools performance, peer relations, etc. As these deficits become interwoven over the life course they make behavioral change exceedingly difficult. Thus, the future offenses they do commit are unlikely to be stopped.

Third, and finally, a reactive policy does nothing to stop the younger brothers of our current chronic offenders from growing up to follow in their footsteps. This may be particularly devastating in light of the demographic trends mentioned earlier.

For these reasons I do not think we will be able to make a substantial dent in reducing levels of youth violence and related problem behaviors, until we shift the attention of our crime policy from punitive reactions to efforts at prevention. That is, we must shift our attention and resources from the back end of the system to the front end.

There are three reasons for arguing for prevention as the underpinning of our general crime policy.

First, prevention programs deal with proportionally more of the offenses, and especially the serious offenses, that will eventually be committed by the violent few. That is, they do not wait until their careers are half or more over before attempting to intervene in their lives.

Second, earlier in their delinquent careers—when, by definition, prevention happens—there are likely to be fewer co-occurring problem behaviors. Also, the risk factors that do exist are less likely to have become interwoven in creating a downward

behavioral trajectory. Thus, there is a greater likelihood of success since there is less behavioral opposition to overcome.

Third and finally, a preventative strategy does do something about the next generation of chronic offenders. That is, by responding to people earlier rather than later in their delinquent careers it provides an avenue for short-circuiting developing careers.

Preventative efforts should begin as early as possible in the life course. We know that early onset of delinquency and violence is predictive of continuing and escalating criminal careers. There are a host of intervention targets at virtually all developmental stages that can be the focus of early prevention programs. Also, prevention programs need to be comprehensive in strategy. Chronic offenders have multiple co-occurring problem behaviors and risk factors and programs need to be able to respond to each of them and the way they become intertwined over the life course.

Programs need to be made available to their clients for the long term, not the short term. Serious and violent delinquent careers and drug using careers represent very resistant forms of behavior that do not yield easily to our efforts to change them and that persist for many years. We need to make our treatment services available over time to combat the persistent long-term quality of the behavior itself.

Finally, we need to pay much more attention to the results of evaluation research studies than we typically do in the design of prevention and treatment programs. We have a growing body of solid scientific evidence that prevention and treatment programs can be grouped into three categories. Some programs are effective, that is, they reduce recidivism; some programs are ineffective, that is, they produce no real behavioral change; and some programs are harmful or counterproductive, that is, they increase recidivism. Clearly, we need to replicate the first type, experiment with the second type to see if we can make them more effective for certain types of clients, and avoid the third type at all costs. Despite the fact that they may be politically popular some programs are actually harmful and we have the moral and ethical responsibility to remove them from our arsenal of efforts to reduce delinquent, violent, and criminal behavior.

Accomplishing a shift in our nation's crime policy from punitive to preventive will not be easy. There is still a host of questions about its implementation. Nevertheless, I believe it is far more rational than our current punitive response and it is the only policy that is likely to yield positive results.

Senator THOMPSON. Thank you very much.

I am going to yield to Senator Biden.

Senator BIDEN. Mr. Chairman, I think the testimony of our three witnesses is extremely valuable. I unfortunately have to attend a luncheon that started at 12:30 where I am supposed to participate in the lunch and I would like to ask your permission and the permission of the witnesses to be able to submit to them several questions.

I would like to follow up with Dr. Elliott regarding the State role and the Federal role. I have a generic question, followed by specific questions, which is I am a little concerned that if we only focus on research at OJJDP, then there is nothing in my experience of 24 years here to suggest that the States, absent some encouragement, are likely to take the initiative to attempt to implement some of the programs that may be suggested by some serious research like Dr. Wolfgang—you may not remember, Dr. Wolfgang, but back in 1974 the first person who started citing your 1972 study was me, with a great deal of regularity.

Mr. WOLFGANG. I remember.

Senator BIDEN. So there is nothing new in terms of the cohort of people we are looking at. There is, I think, something new in the kind of behavior they engage in, but I may be wrong about that as well.

At any rate, I would like to be able to submit some questions in writing to all of you, and I look forward to the answers and the opportunity to work with the chairman on coming up with what I

hope we can conclude will be a honing of the act rather than an elimination of the act, a honing of the functions of the office rather than it being just a dispensing agency for block grants.

The one question I have for all three of you—any of the testimony any of you have suggested and any of the suggestions you have made—if we turn this into a block grant program, does it answer any of your concerns if we make it a block grant?

Mr. THORBERRY. No. I think, quite the contrary, it exacerbates the problem of missing out on important information about what works and getting that information widely disseminated.

Senator BIDEN. Dr. Elliott.

Mr. ELLIOTT. I don't think you can turn the whole program into a block grant program. I mean, my point is that there is a proper Federal function in this office for doing basic research evaluation, dissemination and training. A lot of what is happening, though, is really off-center and we do need to hone it that way.

Beyond that, I am much more optimistic that States will indeed mount very good violence prevention efforts. I have worked with the Knight Foundation, I have worked with the Colorado Trust, I have worked with the Carnegie Corporation, the McArthur Foundation. They are all very heavily involved in violence prevention work.

Senator BIDEN. I understand that, but none of them, as I recall—and two of the five groups you have just named have issued reports in the last year, not a one of which, as I recall, recommended basically cutting back or eliminating the juvenile court system. Yet, what has your State done with regard to taking juveniles at a younger and younger age and trying them as adults?

Mr. ELLIOTT. We have developed a whole new, what is called juvenile justice serious, violent offender system, so we have got a third tier. We have got the basic juvenile system. We have got a third tier, which is a very interesting alternative, so that kids are, in fact, waived into an adult court, but if they are convicted, they aren't sent to the adult prison. They are given an option of going into a violent juvenile offender system which, unlike the adult system, is very rich in program, very rich in training, education, building competence, and a strong after-care program so that we can re-integrate these kids back into the environment.

Senator BIDEN. You are aware, you are a clear exception in your State? You are aware of that, aren't you?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Sure, sure, but I also know, because I have talked to judges in three or four other States, that other States are looking at that as an option. People are looking for solutions to this problem and I think that is happening at the State level as well as at the Federal level.

Senator BIDEN. They are looking. I am not suggesting they are not.

Mr. ELLIOTT. But this agency can play a role in directing them, in informing them about what works and what does not work. So I think that there is a moderate position here.

Mr. WOLFGANG. Well, I agree. Colorado, I think, is an exception. You are more aggressive than Pennsylvania. I have almost no faith in the block grants in this particular area, this particular field. I think the Federal Government needs to demonstrate leadership. It

can encourage all kinds of State operations, but if I were the Mustafamond of the brave new world, I would not be giving all this OJJDP money to the States.

Senator BIDEN. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I apologize for having to leave.

Senator THOMPSON. Thank you very much.

[The questions of Senator Biden were not available at press-time.]

Senator THOMPSON. Well, I think we are getting to a very interesting part of it because you emphasized research and evaluation, and I think what Senator Biden was really focusing in on is then what? Suppose we come to some conclusions. What do we do with them and who takes over that responsibility at that point? What is the State role and what is the Federal role in that? I think that is what we are all kind of groping for, an answer to that question. What is the proper Federal role in all of this?

I think you are right on in what you say, but then we have got to go back and ask ourselves, if we do our jobs well in the research and evaluation area, then what do we do with that information once we have got it?

Mr. WOLFGANG. Well, one thing is the proper dissemination of the findings of the research, and I would think a Federal encouragement, with financial incentives, to the States to replicate what has been found, or encourage them to go through demonstration projects that are encouraged by the research and evaluation.

Senator THOMPSON. Mr. Elliott, do you have a comment on that?

Mr. ELLIOTT. I have to say that the truly innovative, creative kinds of programs that I have seen in the last 10 years have not come out of demonstration projects in OJJDP. They are projects that have been developed out there in various communities, and it is true that we have to pay attention to providing incentives for States, first of all, to get those good projects evaluated, and that is a Federal role because the States aren't going to be able to do that. I have not encountered a State legislature that is willing to put up the kind of dollars to do the kind of evaluation we are talking about, and that is a problem.

Once we have demonstrated that a program works, it seems to me that it is the role of this agency to, in fact, disseminate that information—and I agree with Marvin—give some incentives to States for implementing those kinds of programs and not implementing other kinds of programs.

One of the most frustrating things to me is that we are spending billions of dollars on things we know don't work. I mean, that is the first tragedy right there, and every time I talk to people about evaluation and they start telling me about the kinds of things they are doing, I say, well, are you aware that those kinds of things aren't effective? It doesn't seem to bother us. We have got very popular programs going on right now, very popular programs, that we have at least fairly good evidence aren't working that we are still spending money on.

Senator THOMPSON. Are you talking about at the Federal level and the State level?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Absolutely, both levels.

Senator THOMPSON. OJJDP and otherwise—there are 131 youth violence programs scattered around the Federal Government in various agencies.

Mr. ELLIOTT. If you look at them, a lot of them are involved in things that we have got pretty good evidence aren't effective.

Senator THOMPSON. Would you all agree with that or do you think we—

Mr. WOLFGANG. I agree.

Mr. THORNBERRY. I would like to add to that because I think we need to define "ineffective." There are some programs that are ineffective; they don't hit the goal of reducing recidivism or violence. There are also some programs that are ineffective in that they increase drug use or increase violence, and I think it is morally imperative that we recognize that just like—you know, if you go to a hospital and take some drugs, some of those drugs will kill you; that is, they have great benefit and they also have great side effects.

Senator THOMPSON. This is very, very enlightening. You are touching on something that I think Mr. Elliott in his statement said, also. He said, "In some cases, these programs may even have negative effects; that is, they may increase the rates of crime within the treated group. Doing something is not always better than doing nothing." Then you give some examples of these programs—psychotherapy—intensive casework, guided group interaction, positive peer culture programs, scare type programs like Scared Straight, boot camps. That is pretty controversial stuff, but I think it is great to get that out on the table that not only do we often-times not know what works, we may be doing some damage that we don't know about in the process.

Do you think we really have gotten to the point where we can really evaluate the effectiveness of these programs? I don't know how self-interested you think you are in answering that question, but I agree and I appreciate the candor about your talking about some of these evaluations and programs. In the first place, I don't think anybody ought to ever evaluate themselves and I think that lets the Federal Government out of that. Otherwise, you are just kind of like polling, you know; it is worse than polling, I think, what you come up with.

Who should be doing these evaluations, and how in the world can you really evaluate a prevention program, for example? Does it not take a long period of time? Everybody talks about how great Head Start is, and maybe it is, but some people say, well, it is good as long as you are there, but as soon as you turn your back on it and they get out of the program, you are back to square one. How much do we know? How much can we know about what works and the effectiveness of programs?

Mr. ELLIOTT. I think we can know a lot, but you are raising issues that have to be addressed. There are short-term effects and there are long-term effects, and we know a lot of programs have an immediate effect which is lost in a very short period of time. A lot of the curriculum development programs—can you teach kids to give back to you certain kinds of information about conflict resolution training? Absolutely. Does that help reduce their levels of involvement in violence? Not that we can determine.

So we have got to look at long-range effects and we have got to look at short-range effects. The costs for doing that are very, very great, and that is why it is not done.

Senator THOMPSON. That is why only the Federal Government is probably going to do it.

Mr. ELLIOTT. That is correct, the Federal Government has to do it. In defense of OJJDP, they have found it difficult to sustain funding for the kinds of programs we are talking about—that is, the long-range funding—because to be able to maintain a longitudinal study over 5 to 10 years requires a commitment to funding over that period of time. To do a long-range evaluation of Head Start requires a long-term commitment to funding, and I have to say that a lot of the programs we are talking about here—you have to understand that the effect sizes are very small; that is, the reductions we gain are fairly small, and Head Start is an example of that.

I mean, we are not talking about dramatic kinds of changes here, but if we could develop more comprehensive programs where we build these into larger units that are integrated, then I think we could actually get substantial effects out of it.

Mr. WOLFGANG. I would say, in general, a minimum of 3 years would be required for starting a real evaluation, but as Delbert says, we need long-term evaluation as well as short-term. One of the problems in the Federal Government's participation in long-term research is politics. After all—

Senator THOMPSON. Well, listen, you are preaching to the choir there. If we think down the road longer than the length of our nose, we are lucky, and you are absolutely right about that. To a certain extent, what we are doing here today is an indication of the problem and part of the problem, and it requires such a delicate hand to properly deal with it.

On the one hand, we are saying it takes a long-term commitment and a long-term approach. On the other hand, every year we want to know what works, what works, what works, and nobody likes to come up here and say, we don't know; we may know later, we may not know later. We want some immediate political payoff, you know. That is why we are bankrupting the country because it is our kids and our grandkids and generations yet unborn whose money we are playing with.

You can talk about that and it is esoteric and we all kind of believe in it. But we have got an election in November and that just wipes everything else off the books. So you need to keep delivering that message to everybody in every opportunity that you can. I think if people felt like they weren't just getting some academic hocus-pocus and some self-congratulatory analysis, because people are very, very skeptical of all that.

Our friend from OJJDP is very eloquent and fluent and all that. But I haven't yet figured out what he said about anything. Once you create one of these departments, it is impossible to ever get to the bottom of it. I feel like if people such as yourselves would point out objectively, here are successes, here are failures, here are some things that we don't know, but this is the direction we ought to go in, I think people would rally to that. I think people here are going

to respond to that and I think people out in the States will respond to that. People are looking for solutions and ways to address this.

I didn't mean to cut you off there, but you have really hit on something important in terms of long-term. It appears to me from all of this that you can identify and have identified some programs that work, a few programs that work. They do not necessarily have any relationship to what we are funding. Then with regard to what is working, so-called, the success of the programs is pretty modest. I think, Mr. Wolfgang, you acknowledged that success is pretty modest, really, and you get into a cost/benefit deal.

But we have got to do whatever we can do and it is difficult, I think most of us realize we are only dealing with probably about a 10-percent wedge of the entire chart, and if the breakdown of the home and the illegitimate birth rate and divorce rate and drugs and all that continues, it doesn't make any difference what we do, really. But we have got to deal with that 10 percent as effectively as we can and I really think you have hit upon backing off and taking a new look at what we ought to be doing.

I will ask you, in the meantime, do we know enough to get all these programs under one umbrella, take a look at them one by one and pick and choose? Do we know enough now to pick and choose winners and losers among these programs, understanding that we can't fund all the programs we have been funding and still increase research and development money and evaluation money? How do you think we ought to handle that in this, call it a transition phase, maybe?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Well, right now it looks to me like there are some good evaluations going on in OJJDP and that those ought to be encouraged. It seems to me that we ought to be able to designate other programs which are so widely disseminated out there that they critically need an evaluation, and we know what those are and those ought to be, then, the next targeted national evaluations that are mounted around those programs.

Senator THOMPSON. But in the meantime what should we do about the programs that are being funded now?

Mr. WOLFGANG. Well, I think I would like to have a catalog, not the publication that OJJDP did because, as you and Senator Biden have pointed out, it is a list and you don't know what works, but I think a relatively small catalog of programs that have been demonstrated with control groups and experimental groups over a sufficiently long period of time to have worked.

We do know that things do work and there is an absence of coordination of pulling those things together, disseminating them, from OJJDP to the other agencies, the many programs out there in the country. I think that is what I would do right away. There are other things, again focusing on basic research, but basic research can also have its application.

For example, Senator Ashcroft said, and I think you also said, what can we do—how can we find that 6 or 7 percent who are going to become chronic offenders. In our first publication—Terry, you know this, and I am sure Delbert does, too—in our first publication of "Delinquency in a Birth Cohort," we steered away from making policy recommendations, in general. It was a very descriptive study, but one recommendation we did make that nobody

seems to have paid too much attention to is that we found that after committing the first offense, 42 percent did not go on to a second offense. After committing the second offense, 39 percent did not go on to the third offense. After committing the third offense, 28 percent did not continue, and that 28 percent continues out to the 15th offense.

Senator THOMPSON. The more they did, the more they were likely to do.

Mr. WOLFGANG. Yes. Now, our one recommendation was that except for very violent and serious offenses as the first offense or the second—I am not talking about homicides or rapes, but most juvenile offenses even above the juvenile status level are misdemeanors and they are not very serious, in the early stages. So our recommendation was almost a kind of benign neglect for the first or second offense, but whatever that third offense is, serious or not serious, that is when we should have our most intensive concentration of time, talent, and resources to work in an intensive supervision with those third offenders. I don't mean the third violent offenders, the third of any kind.

Senator THOMPSON. Isn't the horse already out of the barn there, though? If someone is on that track, do we have any evidence that we can turn them around?

Mr. WOLFGANG. Yes.

Mr. ELLIOTT. I have a very different perspective on that. The fact of the matter is when you arrest a person for the first time, you could have a serious, chronic, violent offender even if it is for a minor offense. The problem is that the whole nature of the developmental sequence in the serious, violent behavior involves an escalation in frequency, seriousness, and variety simultaneously, and your worst offenders, your 7 percent, as you call them, commit more minor offenses than they do serious ones and they have a higher risk of arrest for a minor offense than a serious one.

So to take this position, I think, is to, in fact, tell kids that they can commit offenses and get away with it. I would rather that we had a consequence for every single arrest. I don't think it needs to be a humongous, overly dramatic thing, but something has to happen because the kid has to know that there are consequences for that behavior.

Senator THOMPSON. I knew we could get a good debate going here if we stayed at it long enough.

Mr. Wolfgang, your rebuttal?

Mr. WOLFGANG. We don't have the time or talent or resources to concentrate and give enough attention to every single first offender. I disagree, also, that there is continued escalation. In our studies, we did not find an escalation from the least serious to the most serious over the frequency of offending. It is more like a smorgasbord going on.

We found in the juvenile years there is a lack of specialization, also. There isn't auto theft, auto theft, auto theft. They go from one type of facet into another. We followed a sample out to age 30 in our first-birth cohort and we are following a sample in the second birth cohort. We do find that escalation and specialization begin to develop in the adult years after age 18. My suggestion is that the caseload now of social workers assigned from the juvenile court is

so enormous that they simply can't handle them. We should concentrate——

Mr. ELLIOTT. That is not what I would recommend. First, we can handle first minor offenses like we do traffic citations. It requires restitution and a fine, and that can be handled routinely and does not put a burden on probation departments or social workers.

Second, there is very clear escalation in behavior if you look at self-reported data. Marvin is talking about arrest data. Do you know what the probability is of being arrested for committing an armed robbery, aggravated assault, or forcible rape?

Senator THOMPSON. Not much.

Mr. ELLIOTT. One in a hundred. Now, you are going to use those kinds of data to establish whether or not we have got escalations in violent behavior? I think the self-reported studies are very clear. You get an escalation in violent behavior in exactly the way we described about it, and that is why it is so hard for the police because they arrest someone for a minor offense and very often they have got a really serious, chronic kid there. In other cases, they have got a very innocent kid, you know, relatively first-time arrest for a serious, violent offense. These kids have reported to us in excess of 100 prior offenses before they were ever arrested for the first time.

Senator THOMPSON. Well, I think you both make very valid points. I think this goes to show that research in and of itself is not even the answer because we are going to get different conclusions and different analysis on the same question, and that is good. I think it is great. I think it is healthy. It is just something that we are going to have to deal with. We need more of it.

Mr. WOLFGANG. I don't want us to leave with an impression that there is a great debate going on between us. That is not true. I also want to claim that I agree with what Delbert has said about making restitution and having a kind of traffic violation. I would agree with all of that. Also, I agree with the self-report studies, too.

Senator THOMPSON. The question is really, with the limited resources we will always have, at which point do we try to intervene and how forcefully. Those are just policy questions that unfortunately we are paid to deal with.

Mr. ELLIOTT. Could I answer the question you asked before?

Senator THOMPSON. Yes.

Mr. ELLIOTT. I think that what we can do right now is to, in fact, free up monies. I think Ira mentioned that. I think we can free up monies which are currently going to activities which are not directly related to the primary mission of this agency.

Senator THOMPSON. Such as what?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Such as the juvenile court judge—I mean, there are 24, 25 of those listed in their program which involve training and technical assistance. We have got five separate programs providing——

Senator THOMPSON. You heard my questions about that. What can you tell me about the folks out in Reno?

Mr. ELLIOTT. In Reno?

Senator THOMPSON. Yes.

Mr. ELLIOTT. I don't know what they are doing. I really don't know what they are doing.

Senator THOMPSON. Do you?

Mr. WOLFGANG. No. I get copies of their programs, but I——

Mr. ELLIOTT. Nor are there evaluations of what is going on there.

Senator THOMPSON. Well, there has not been any audit of what they are doing either.

Yes?

Mr. THORNBERRY. The little I know about it—I agree I don't know much about what they do, but the little I do know about it is it is a congressional earmark which places some constraints on——

Senator THOMPSON. Well, we are going to take a look at that earmark, along with the rest of them.

Mr. THORNBERRY. You asked what you do in the transition, in the interim. A couple of things are pretty obvious to me. One is there are a relatively small number of programs that seem to be effective, based on good evaluation. One would recommend, obviously, to continue those, but you could play around with them. You could package them together differently to see if you get a bigger bang for the buck by putting a couple of effective things together. OJJ could do things like that.

You could extend the time you offer them to people. You pointed out before that we know that a lot of things make some difference and when they stop, you are back to square one. Well, there are two strategies, then; look for something else or continue doing what works for that child for some longer period of time. So I think there are lots of obvious things, given what we know works, of how to repackage them, and constantly then evaluate those reconfigurations to get more information for the next generation.

Senator THOMPSON. I sincerely appreciate your testimony and I hope that you all will work with us continuously as we proceed on. This has been very, very helpful today and this has been a wonderful panel. Please, let us stay in touch and work together on this. I really appreciate your help.

The hearing is adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 1:44 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]

APPENDIX

QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS

U.S. SENATE,
Washington, DC, June 13, 1996.

Hon. ORRIN HATCH,
U.S. Senate, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Washington, DC.

DEAR ORRIN: This is in response to the three questions you submitted regarding the Subcommittee on Youth Violence's hearing on federal programs funded under the Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention. I welcome this opportunity to discuss the issue of serious juvenile crime, and in particular, the Violent and Hardcore Offender Reform Act (S. 1245).

Question 1. If the purpose of my bill is to identify the hard-core violent offenders, wouldn't it be necessary for the records section to apply to all previous felonies?

Answer 1. Assuming a record has been created and maintained by the respective state agency, the accessibility of those records would allow for the identification of the current crop of serious, violent, and hard-core juvenile offenders. As I explained to Sen. Biden, the bill, as introduced, is to be applied prospectively, however, since it may not be possible or affordable to create records for past violent acts. Enactment of S. 1245, however, would at least begin the process of identifying these hardened young criminals by encouraging states to create, maintain, and share records on them.

Question 2. Do I have any comments on the constitutionality of S. 1245?

Answer 2. The Supreme Court, in *South Dakota v. Dole*, stated that: ". . . Congress may attach conditions on the receipt of federal funds, and has repeatedly employed the power 'to further broad policy objectives by conditioning receipt of federal moneys upon compliance by the recipient with federal statutory and administrative directives.'" Continuing, the Court said, "We have also held that a perceived Tenth Amendment limitation on congressional regulation of state affairs did not concomitantly limit the range of conditions legitimately placed on federal grants."

In *Oklahoma v. United States Civil Service Commission*, the court held that: "While the United States is not concerned with and has no power to regulate local political activities . . . it does have power to fix the terms upon which its money allotments to states shall be disbursed. . . . [T]he Tenth Amendment has been consistently construed 'as not depriving the national government of authority to resort to all means for the exercise of a granted power which are appropriate and plainly adapted to the permitted end.'" The Court then found no violation of the State's sovereignty because the State could, and did, adopt the simple expedient of not yielding to what she urged was federal coercion.

First, my bill would amend the state formula grants program in Title II, Part B, of the Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act of 1974. As you know, that program provides financial assistance to state and local governments to improve their juvenile justice systems. The grants are made under Congress' spending power for the general welfare. States are not required to participate in the formula grant program, nor change any law or practice. Only if state legislatures want to fully participate in the program, do states need to try juveniles 14-years-old and older as adults for violent crimes, or create and maintain juvenile criminal records, or share information regarding juvenile criminal records with criminal courts, law enforcement agencies, and school officials. In short, full participation is voluntary, not coerced. The United States Supreme Court has upheld Congress' use of grant-in-aid programs which set conditions for state participation in them.

(111)

Second, my bill would also amend the Federal Juvenile Delinquency Act, a federal criminal statute. It does not enlarge federal jurisdiction, nor does it create new federal crimes. The proposed changes are the same as those proposed regarding the Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act which are encouraged on the part of the states. The only difference is that the changes are made with regard to federal delinquency proceedings. The constitutional basis for these amendments is, of course, the necessary and proper clause.

Question 3. Do I believe that removing the law's current mandates would cause States to return to pre-1974 conditions?

Answer 3. No. Most, if not all, of the states have enacted laws in compliance with the substantive mandates in the Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act of 1974. The current mandates have served their purpose by encouraging states to make the necessary changes.

Orrin, you and I both know that money spent solely on federal social programs will not deter the 7 percent of juveniles who commit roughly 70 percent of the violent juvenile crime in America. There is a role for the federal government. Serious juvenile crime is a national problem, transcending county and state lines. No matter how much progress is being made in some states to toughen laws for juveniles, if contiguous states are not encouraged to do the same, even the committed states will be left with negligible results.

I enjoy working with you on this important issue facing our country. If you have any further questions about my bill, please do not hesitate to contact me.

Sincerely yours,

JOHN D. ASHCROFT, *U.S. Senate.*

ADDITIONAL SUBMISSIONS FOR THE RECORD

U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE,
Washington, DC, May 7, 1996.

Hon. ORRIN HATCH,
Chairman, Committee on the Judiciary
U.S. Senate.

Hon. FRED THOMPSON,
Chairman, Subcommittee on Youth Violence,
Committee on the Judiciary, U.S. Senate.

As part of your consideration of issues related to the reauthorization of the Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention (OJJDP), you asked us to provide information on new discretionary grants awarded for fiscal years 1993 through 1995. This letter responds to your request for this information. Specifically, we are providing you with a list of all the discretionary grants and grantees and descriptions of each award, the proposed project period as of March 1996, and award amounts as of March 1996. In instances where more than one grant was awarded for the same project over the period of our review, we combined award amounts and project descriptions. (See enc. I.)

RESULTS IN BRIEF

For fiscal years 1993 through 1995, OJJDP data showed that it awarded 162 new discretionary grants. Funded projects covered a variety of program areas, including (1) research on juvenile justice issues; (2) demonstration projects testing new approaches to delinquency prevention, treatment, and intervention; (3) training and technical assistance to juvenile justice practitioners; and (4) a mix of these activities. Grantees included colleges and universities, state and local government offices, and nonprofit organizations. All geographic regions of the nation were represented. The proposed project periods for the 162 awards made during this period ranged from 1 year to 9 years, with the average period running 2 years. The highest individual award amount was about \$3.1 million for a 3-year project of the National Center for Missing and Exploited Children to provide the following services: a toll-free hotline, case management, case analysis, legal technical assistance, publication development and dissemination, media relations, nonprofit/state clearinghouse liaison, on-line information network, photo distribution, and age progression. The smallest award amount was \$31,448 for an 18-month project of the California Department of Justice to research, publish, and disseminate a law enforcement manual containing federal and state laws relating to missing children. The grant was also

to fund the development of a training program and 13 training sessions to provide information about various missing children issues. We did not calculate an average award amount because some of the new grants awarded during our review period were incomplete and were scheduled to have other funds awarded in future fiscal years.

SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY

OJJDP provided us with a list of all new discretionary grants awarded during fiscal years 1993 through 1995. We reviewed the official file for each of these grants using a data collection instrument to collect descriptive information.

We did our work between November 1995 and April 1996 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.

AGENCY COMMENTS

On April 22, 1996, we requested agency comments from the Attorney General or her designee on a draft of this letter. OJJDP staff reviewed the draft letter and generally agreed with the information presented. We have incorporated their technical comments where appropriate.

We are sending copies of this letter to the OJJDP Administrator. Copies will also be made available to others upon request.

The major contributors to this letter are listed in enclosure II. Please contact me at (202) 512-8777 if you or your staff have any questions.

Laurie E. Ekstrand,
Associate Director, Administration of Justice Issues.

ENCLOSURE I

ENCLOSURE I

CHARACTERISTICS OF OFFICE OF JUVENILE JUSTICE AND DELINQUENCY PREVENTION (OJJDP) NEW DISCRETIONARY GRANTS AWARDED IN FISCAL YEARS 1993 THROUGH 1994

Program category	Title	Grantee name and location	Project description	Proposed project period	Dollars awarded as of March 1996
<p>Delinquency/Mental Health in the Juvenile Justice System</p> <p>The Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention (OJJDP) noted that at least 20 percent and as many as 60 percent of the youth in the juvenile justice system can be diagnosed as having an emotional disability. The program's purpose was to develop and hold a 2-day conference on juvenile mental health problems for up to 200 juvenile justice practitioners.</p>	<p>Conference on Mental Health in the Juvenile Justice System</p>	<p>National Coalition for Mental Health and Substance Abuse Health Care in the Juvenile Justice System, Seattle, WA</p>	<p>See program category. The conference was to be held by October 30, 1995. It was both to inform participants and propose actions to take to improve the delivery of services.</p>	<p>4/1/95 to 3/31/96</p>	<p>\$100,000</p>

¹In instances where more than one grant was awarded for the same project over the period of our review, we combined award amounts and project descriptions.

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ENCLOSURE I

ENCLOSURE I

Program category	Title	Grantee name and location	Project description	Proposed project period	Dollars awarded as of March 1996
Delinquency Prevention/Law-Related Education in Juvenile Justice Settings Law-Related Education (LRE) is a curriculum for elementary and secondary school students that teaches commitment to good citizenship. In 1990, OJJDP began experimenting with LRE programs for at-risk youths. This program was to fund demonstrations of LRE programs in additional juvenile justice settings.	The Role of Law-Related Education in the Transition of Youth from Correctional Facilities	National Office for Social Responsibility, Alexandria, VA	The project was funded to make LRE part of the transition process for youths who leave correctional facilities and return to high-risk environments. Among other activities, the project was to develop the course curricula, teach them at demonstration sites, and perform an assessment of project results.	3/1/95 to 3/1/97	\$219,923
	Law-Related Education in Juvenile Justice Settings	Seattle University School of Law, Tacoma, WA	The project was funded to bring professional and public attention in the state to the benefits of LRE. LRE curricula were to be created, field-tested, and assessed for use in three major types of juvenile justice settings. A bilingual program was to be demonstrated.	3/15/95 to 6/30/96	\$218,625
	Law-Related Education in Juvenile Justice Settings	American Correctional Association, Laurel, MD	The project was funded to enhance cooperation between New York's state LRE coordinator and juvenile justice agency personnel by providing training, technical assistance, and a demonstration site. Information was to be disseminated to juvenile justice professionals on the LRE philosophy.	10/01/93 to 3/31/95	\$209,179

ENCLOSURE I

Program category	Title	Grantee name and location	Project description	Proposed project period	Dollars awarded as of March 1996
	Law-Related Education in Juvenile Justice Settings	Virginia Institute for Law and Citizenship Studies, Virginia Commonwealth University, Richmond, VA	The project was funded to design and operate a collaborative program with state agencies that would incorporate LRE skills into a treatment program at the Virginia Department of Youth and Family Services Learning Center.	10/1/93 to 12/31/95	\$209,567
<p>Delinquency Prevention/Innovative Approaches in Law-Related Education</p> <p>The purpose of this program was to develop promising, innovative ideas for the delivery of LRE.</p>	<p>Innovative Approaches in Citizenship Law-Related Education for the Schools of Maryland</p>	<p>Professional Development and Training Center, Inc., Schools of MD</p>	<p>The project was funded to design, develop, and disseminate a kindergarten through grade 12 curriculum that weaves alternative dispute resolution philosophy, peer conflict mediation skills, and violence prevention strategies with LRE programs. The curriculum was to be provided to schools throughout the state and to each state education department nationwide.</p>	10/1/93 to 4/30/96	\$100,000
	Law and Society: Rights and Responsibilities	St. Petersburg Junior College, St. Petersburg, FL	The project was funded to develop and implement a training program that features LRE for selected at-risk middle-school youths. Three hundred students were to attend 1-week sessions of an LRE camp during the summer of 1996. The sessions were to include instruction in concepts such as decisionmaking, conflict resolution, and cultural diversity, while making use of realistic scenarios that simulate real-life dilemmas.	10/1/95 to 9/30/96	\$56,937

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Program category	Title	Grantee name and location	Project description	Proposed project period	Dollars awarded as of March 1996
	It's the Law: A Comprehensive Middle School Delinquency Prevention Program	New York City Public Schools	The overall goal for the project was to enhance the prevention of delinquency in and outside of the classroom through LRE. Activities to be pursued were to include professional development of middle-school teachers in conflict resolution, aggression replacement and delinquency prevention strategies, the development of LRE curriculum materials, and LRE instruction for students in five middle schools.	10/1/95 to 9/30/96	\$150,000
	Project Legal Ease	Foundation for Excellence in Louisiana Public Broadcasting, Baton Rouge, LA	The project was funded to produce three instructional videos for teenage audiences in the areas of conflict resolution, violence prevention, and the legal ramifications of drug use/abuse. The videos were to be suitable for widespread broadcast and distributed for use in workshops and at intervention sites throughout the country.	2/15/95 to 2/14/96	\$97,308
	ON-AIR Project	Nevada County, CA, Office of Education	The project was funded as an innovative strategy to help prevent delinquency by giving young people an understanding of and appreciation for responsible citizenship through the creative use of radio dramas. Modeled after a successful tobacco-use prevention program, the project was to develop a LRE radio curriculum for fifth graders. It was also to provide curriculum training workshops for educators in 64 demonstration school sites.	2/15/95 to 6/30/96	\$92,626

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Program category	Title	Grantee name and location	Project description	Proposed project period	Dollars awarded as of March 1996
	Law-Related Education for Adolescent Female Offenders	University of Minnesota, Minneapolis, MN	The project was funded to develop and implement a curriculum aimed at the specific needs of adolescent female offenders, including teenage mothers. It was to adapt LRE strategies that work particularly well with juvenile offenders and incorporate materials to meet the needs of teenagers with various learning styles and abilities.	10/1/95 to 9/30/96	\$94,055
	Experimental Method of LRE Delivery for Inner City Youth Not Reached By Conventional Methods	Donald P. McCullum Youth Court, Inc., Oakland, CA	The project was funded to engage at-risk junior and senior high-school age youths in a legal studies practicum as interns. It was anticipated that 550 high risk middle and high school youths would be reached. Approximately 80 - 100 young people would rotate through intern roles, such as juror, clerk, prosecutor, defense attorney, and others. Related project activities were to include developing a program manual and other training and resource materials.	10/1/95 to 9/30/96	\$149,946
	Delinquency Prevention: Innovative Approaches to Law-Related Education	Virginia Commonwealth University, Richmond, VA	The project was funded to provide training and technical assistance to 15 Richmond middle-school community teams to develop and implement innovative delinquency and violence prevention projects incorporating LRE. The results were to be disseminated through showcases and seminars for educators and juvenile justice professionals and through a compendium of project abstracts.	10/1/95 to 9/30/96	\$149,000

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Program category	Title	Grantee name and location	Project description	Proposed project period	Dollars awarded as of March 1996
Delinquency Prevention/Pathways to Success The program was to fund projects that promote vocational skills, arts education, recreation, and other programs during after-school, summer, and weekend hours to provide at-risk youths with learning options.	Pathways to Success, Stopover Services, SOS Playback Arts-Based Juvenile Delinquency Prevention Program	Stopover Services of Newport County, Inc. Middletown, RI	The project was to be jointly funded with the National Endowment for the Arts. At least 550 youths were to be served, many of whom resided in public housing. Among the creative arts components to be emphasized was theater training, with performances that included prevention themes, such as substance abuse prevention, visual arts, with a local art gallery displaying the works of the group; and creative writing.	10/1/95 to 9/30/97	\$44,379
	Elementary Baseball Scores Big With Kids: A Program for At-Risk Youth in Washington, D.C.	District Court, Washington, D.C.	The project was to combine participation in a youth baseball league with tutoring and one-on-one interaction with an adult mentor for 80 at-risk 6 to 10 year old children at one Washington, D.C., elementary school.	10/1/95 to 9/30/97	\$50,000
	Pathways to Success: ASPIRA Youth Sanctuary	ASPIRA of Florida, Inc., Miami, FL	The project was to afford 130 at-risk Latino migrant and other minority youths aged 10 to 16 with an opportunity to participate in an after-school vocational career club, recreation and arts education programs, and weekend and summer programs.	10/1/95 to 9/30/97	\$50,000
	Pathways to Success: Project Clear	New York City Public Schools, New York City, NY	The project was to provide 100 students and their families in 2 target elementary school districts with a range of educational, cultural, recreational, and support services. Activities were to be held from 3 p.m. to 5 p.m. 4 or 5 days a week in the two school districts.	10/1/95 to 9/30/97	\$50,000

Program category	Title	Grantee name and location	Project description	Proposed project period	Dollars awarded as of March 1996
Community-Based Alternatives/Program to Promote Alternative Programs for Juvenile Female Offenders	Pathways to Success: Experience Theater	Anchorage School District, Anchorage, Alaska	The grant was funded for the school district in partnership with a nonprofit theater company to offer a mix of community-based and professional theater performances. The grant was also to afford performing arts education to about 160 targeted multicultural middle-school youths in the first year. It was estimated that an additional 800 students would see the performances.	10/1/95 to 9/30/97	\$49,990
Community-Based Alternatives/Program to Promote Alternative Programs for Juvenile Female Offenders	YWCA Tower Expansion Project	YWCA of the National Capitol Area, Washington, D.C.	The Tower Program opened in 1974 and serves about 125 preadjudicated girls. The grant would allow the program to expand services. Among the new services that they planned to provide were a mentoring program; comprehensive crisis intervention assessments on each girl; and training in parenting, life skills, prevocational skills, and other subjects.	7/1/95 to 6/30/96	\$100,000
Community-Based Alternatives/Program to Promote Alternative Programs for Juvenile Female Offenders	Program to Promote Alternative Programs for Female Juvenile Offenders	Cook County Board of Commissioners, Chicago, IL	This project was funded to plan alternative community-based programs for female juvenile offenders in the county. It was designed to enable the offenders to have their specific needs addressed and to ensure that they receive a continuum of care.	8/1/95 to 7/31/96	\$100,000

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Program category	Title	Grantee name and location	Project description	Proposed project period	Dollars awarded as of March 1996
<p>Community-Based Alternatives/Serious, Violent, and Chronic Juvenile Offender Treatment Program</p> <p>QJJD's Comprehensive Strategy for Serious, Violent, and Chronic Juvenile Offenders states that an effective juvenile justice strategy for turning delinquent juveniles around combines accountability and sanctions with increasingly intensive intervention, treatment, and rehabilitation services. Grants under this program were to create treatment programs for juveniles who commit serious crimes.</p>	<p>Development of Comprehensive Programs for Serious, Violent, and Chronic Offenders</p>	<p>National Council on Crime and Delinquency, San Francisco, CA</p>	<p>The project was funded to provide technical assistance for communities implementing the model design for a comprehensive approach to serious, violent, and chronic juvenile offenders. The project was also to provide training for officials with responsibility for dealing with serious youth crime.</p>	<p>10/1/93 to 11/30/95</p>	<p>\$1,154,414</p>

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Program category	Title	Grantee name and location	Project description	Proposed project period	Dollars awarded as of March 1996
	Proposed Scientific Panel to Report to OJJDP	University of Pittsburgh, PA	The project was funded to assist in the implementation of the comprehensive strategy by providing more detailed and precise information than was available previously regarding prevention and intervention in the activities of serious, violent, and chronic offenders. This was one of three project sites that collected information on the causes and correlates of delinquency by tracking at-risk youths through interviews and records analysis. The overall aim of this portion of the research was to enhance knowledge on how best to intervene to reduce or prevent serious, violent, and chronic offending and gang delinquency.	10/1/95 to 9/30/96	\$250,000
	Understanding A Delinquency: A Longitudinal Multi-Disciplinary Study of Developmental Patterns	Regents of the University of Colorado, Boulder, CO	The grant was made to support additional analysis of data collected under OJJDP's program of research on the causes and correlates of delinquency. The data were used extensively in the development of the comprehensive strategy for serious, violent, and chronic juvenile offenders.	9/15/86 to 3/31/96	\$2,775,665
	Program of Research on the Causes and Correlates of Delinquency: A Panel Study of a Reciprocal Causal Model of Delinquency	Research Foundation of the State University of New York, Albany, NY	This was another project site that collected data on the causes and correlates of delinquency. The grant was to fund the same type of analysis as described above for the University of Colorado site.	9/15/86 to 4/30/96	\$3,436,234

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Program category	Title	Grantee name and location	Project description	Proposed project period	Dollars awarded as of March 1996
	Serious, Violent, and Chronic Juvenile Offender Treatment Program	Department of Human Services, Washington, D.C.	The project was funded to develop a plan to reform the city's juvenile justice system using the comprehensive strategy for intervention, treatment, and rehabilitation. The program design included components on various issues, such as victim assistance, parental responsibility, health care, substance abuse and violence prevention, family therapy, and personal accountability.	11/1/93 to 10/31/96	\$1,000,000
	Serious, Violent, and Chronic Juvenile Offender Treatment Program	Jefferson Parish District Attorney's Office, Gretna, LA	The project was funded to implement a statewide strategy of intervention, treatment, and rehabilitation for juvenile offenders. The strategy combined accountability and sanctions with increasingly intensive community-based intervention, treatment, and rehabilitation services as the level of offending increased.	10/1/95 to 9/30/97	\$125,000
	Serious, Violent, and Chronic Juvenile Offender Treatment Program	Massachusetts Department of Youth Services (Hampden County), Boston, MA	Among the specific goals for this project were to increase the number of caseworkers in the area, to implement a youth-service center for tutoring and GED preparation, and to expand youth secure facilities and pretrial detention capacities.	8/1/95 to 7/31/97	\$500,000
	Serious, Violent, and Chronic Juvenile Offender Treatment Program	City of Richmond, VA and Regional Crime Commission, Richmond, VA	This grant was funded to implement a statewide strategy of intervention, treatment, and rehabilitation for juvenile offenders. In addition, the grant was to develop and propose an evaluation strategy that included process and outcome evaluations.	8/1/95 to 7/31/97	\$496,400

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Program category	Title	Grantee name and location	Project description	Proposed project period	Dollars awarded as of March 1996
<p>Juvenile Justice/Accountability-Based Community (ABC) Intervention Program</p> <p>Work under this program preceded development of the comprehensive strategy for serious, violent, and chronic juvenile offenders that was addressed in the program described above. This program was funded to develop a plan for a systemwide strategy of intervention, treatment, and rehabilitation for juvenile offenders. The plan would combine accountability and sanctions with increasingly intensive community-based intervention, treatment, and rehabilitation services as the juvenile's level of offending increased.</p>	<p>Accountability-Based Community Intervention Program</p>	<p>Court of Common Pleas, Allegheny County, PA</p>	<p>The project was funded to develop a plan for a systemwide strategy of intervention, treatment, and rehabilitation for juvenile offenders. The plan was to include a description of the juvenile offender population in Allegheny County; an assessment of existing services and the court's capacity to identify, screen, and assess juvenile offenders; and a program strategy for an accountability based intervention program.</p>	<p>11/1/93 to 11/30/94</p>	<p>\$99,705</p>
	<p>Accountability-Based Community Intervention Program</p>	<p>Department of Human Services, Washington, D.C.</p>	<p>The project was funded to develop a plan for a systemwide strategy of intervention, treatment, and rehabilitation for juvenile offenders. The plan was to include the same components as the Allegheny County project discussed above.</p>	<p>11/1/93 to 10/30/94</p>	<p>\$100,000</p>

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Program category	Title	Grantee name and location	Project description	Proposed project period	Dollars awarded as of March 1996
<p>Community-Based Alternatives/Field-Initiated Research Program</p> <p>This program was funded to support research ideas generated in the field rather than by OJJDP. Applicants were invited to develop research programs that were relevant to the mission of OJJDP.</p>	<p>Field-Initiated Research Program: Self-Evaluation of Electronic Monitoring Programs</p>	<p>Maryland Administration of Justice Services, Rockville, MD</p>	<p>This project was funded to develop a set of practical guidelines and research protocols for administrators and policymakers to use in the self-evaluation of their electronic monitoring programs for juveniles.</p>	<p>6/1/95 to 5/31/96</p>	<p>\$60,476</p>
	<p>Risk Profiling of Juvenile Sexual Offenders: Development of a Classification Model for Predicting Outcome in a Community-Based Treatment Program</p>	<p>Health Related Research, Portsmouth, VA</p>	<p>The project was funded to address a need for research on juvenile sexual offenders to provide guidance on treatment needs and the likelihood of recidivism. The project was to identify sets of variables that predict program outcomes for certain youths referred to a regional juvenile sexual offender program. It was also to develop a classification scheme for clients at "low," "moderate," or "high" risk for program failure and to describe viable community-based treatment approaches and legal management.</p>	<p>8/1/95 to 7/30/96</p>	<p>\$69,938</p>

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Program category	Title	Grantee name and location	Project description	Proposed project period	Dollars awarded as of March 1996
	Field-Initiated Research Program: Waiver and Transfer to the Criminal Justice System	Institute for Law and Justice, VA Alexandria, VA	The project was funded to test a research hypothesis. The hypothesis was that prosecutor and judicial discretionary decisions, which seek and order waivers from juvenile courts to adult courts, are affected by the availability of appropriate juvenile correctional alternatives. Phase I was to be a telephone survey of court practitioners in 105 jurisdictions, and Phase II was to be field work at three sites with different legislative approaches to waivers.	8/1/95 to 7/30/96	\$69,123
	A Field-Initiated Research Project for the Evaluation of a Childhood Violence Prevention Program	Office of Sponsored Programs, Cornell University, Ithaca, NY	The project's goal was to document the impact of a violence prevention program entitled "Let's Talk About Living in a World With Violence." The study was to be done in New York and Illinois with elementary and middle-school children experiencing a range of social problems.	8/1/95 to 2/28/97	\$50,000

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Program category	Title	Grantee name and location	Project description	Proposed project period	Dollars awarded as of March 1996
<p>Community-Based Alternatives/Native American Alternatives</p> <p>OJDP noted that data made it clear that Native American youths are disproportionately involved in the juvenile justice system. This program was to support the development of community-based alternatives for (1) Native American juvenile offenders adjudicated by the tribal courts who were being retained in the community and (2) youths who were returning from institutional placement.</p>	<p>Native American Alternative Community-Based Program</p>	<p>Pueblo of Jemez, Jemez Pueblo, NM</p>	<p>The program was funded to provide outreach services to troubled youths and their families, ensure continuity and consistency of needed services, and link families to needed services. It was based on a comprehensive and holistic approach to handling the rehabilitation, services, and treatment needs of youth offenders. The primary objective was to locate, develop, and place juveniles in community-based programs as alternatives to secure detention and institutional commitments.</p>	<p>5/1/95 to 4/30/96</p>	<p>\$332,000</p>
	<p>Native American Alternative Community-Based Program</p>	<p>Gila River Indian Community, Sacaton, AZ</p>	<p>Three grants were funded for the community during the period between 1992 and 1995. The first grant was for a planning process to identify juvenile justice related needs and problems. It was to identify existing resources that could be used to develop and sustain community-based alternatives and reentry programs. The second and third grants were to implement a project serving about 150 youths who have been adjudicated by the Tribal Children's Court or County juvenile courts.</p>	<p>10/1/92 to 2/28/96</p>	<p>\$346,632</p>

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Program category	Title	Grantee name and location	Project description	Proposed project period	Dollars awarded as of March 1996
	Native American Alternative Community-Based Program--New Beginnings Continuation Proposal of the Red Lake Bands of Chippewa Indians	Chippewa Reservation, MN	This was a supplemental award for the second phase of development of a community-based program addressing juvenile justice needs and concerns. It was to implement alternative/reentry programs for juveniles who previously had contact with the juvenile justice system.	10/1/92 to 9/30/96	\$306,058
	Native American Alternative Community-Based Program of the Judicial Branch of the Navajo Nation	Navajo Nation, Window Rock, Arizona	This was a supplemental award for the second phase of development of a community-based program addressing juvenile justice needs and concerns. It was to implement alternative/reentry programs for juveniles who previously had contact with the juvenile justice system.	10/1/92 to 8/31/96	\$230,000
Juvenile Justice/Hate Crime Study OJJDP noted that sources indicated an increase in juvenile hate crimes-- defined as offenses committed against people because of their ethnicity, gender, race, religion, or sexual orientation. This program was to further knowledge of juvenile hate crimes, including the characteristics of (1) the juveniles who commit hate crimes, (2) the hate crimes committed by juveniles, and (3) the victims of juvenile hate crimes.	Juvenile Hate Crime Study	West Virginia University, Morgantown, WV	The project was funded to begin to look at the extent of juvenile involvement in hate crimes. It was to review existing data sources and address unanswered questions and future concerns through the design of a data collection strategy.	10/1/93 to 11/30/94	\$99,656

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Program category	Title	Grantee name and location	Project description	Proposed project period	Dollars awarded as of March 1996
<p>Juvenile Gangs/Prevention and Treatment</p> <p>This program was to address methods to reduce delinquency and dropout rates; provide educational opportunities for at-risk youths; develop mentoring relationships; and address the problems of gangs. The project was to be at least a 5-year community development effort.</p>	<p>County-wide Youth Gang Prevention Project</p>	<p>Malheur County, OR</p>	<p>The project proposed several strategies to prevent the development of gang activity in the county. These included (1) developing a gang-activity tracking system to enable law enforcement officers to track the movements of gang recruiters and leaders, (2) allowing a uniformed police officer to work full time in the schools, and (3) having the County Children and Youth Services Commission work directly with all resources in the community to promote positive activities and expectations for all youths to prevent involvement in gang-related activity.</p>	<p>10/1/93 to 9/30/94</p>	<p>\$50,000</p>
<p>Juvenile Justice/Hate Crime Prevention</p> <p>This program was to assist in developing an educational curriculum designed to prevent youth hate crimes and offer guidance to youths who commit hate crimes.</p>	<p>Hate Crime Prevention: A Juvenile Justice Approach</p>	<p>Education Development Center, Inc., Newton, MA</p>	<p>The project was funded to identify and assess existing training and educational curriculum materials on juvenile hate crimes, develop a multipurpose curriculum appropriate for a variety of placement settings, and propose sentencing actions as alternatives to incarceration for juvenile hate crime offenders.</p>	<p>10/1/93 to 1/15/95</p>	<p>\$249,984</p>
<p>Juvenile Justice/Due Process Advocacy Program Development</p> <p>This program was to develop approaches for improving due process and the quality of representation for juvenile delinquents in the juvenile justice system.</p>	<p>Due Process Advocacy Program Development</p>	<p>American Bar Association, Washington, D.C.</p>	<p>The project was funded to increase juvenile offenders' access to legal services and to improve the quality of legal services provided. Strategies were to include developing training materials for lawyers, judges, and others and making them available to relevant organizations.</p>	<p>10/1/93 to 3/31/97</p>	<p>\$750,000</p>

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Program category	Title	Grantee name and location	Project description	Proposed project period	Dollars awarded as of March 1996
<p>Improvement of the Juvenile Justice System/Studies of Violence Committed by or Against Juveniles</p> <p>To improve the understanding of juvenile violence, Congress mandated that four violence studies be conducted in urban and rural areas and specified that the urban studies be done in Washington, D.C., and Los Angeles, CA.</p>	<p>Studies of Violence Committed by or Against Juveniles</p>	<p>Institute for Law and Justice, Alexandria, VA</p>	<p>The project was funded to study violence committed by and against youth in Washington, D.C. and to develop a plan to assist the local government in reducing violence in the city overall and in particular neighborhoods. Several objectives were aimed at getting more information about the characteristics of juveniles and violence, including the amount of violence committed by and against minority youths, conditions that cause increases in youth violence, and the accessibility of firearms.</p>	<p>4/1/95 to 3/31/97</p>	<p>\$249,684</p>
	<p>Juvenile Violence in Los Angeles: Collecting Juvenile Violence Data for Juvenile Violence Reduction</p>	<p>University of Southern California, Los Angeles, CA</p>	<p>The project was funded to study juvenile violence in Los Angeles with emphasis on street gangs, which drive many of the youth violence concerns in the city. Principal research components included a household juvenile violence survey, an in-depth study of specific violent incidents, an analysis of juvenile homicide events, and a study of juvenile emergency department admissions for serious violent injury.</p>	<p>7/1/95 to 6/30/97</p>	<p>\$250,000</p>

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Program category	Title	Grantee name and location	Project description	Proposed project period	Dollars awarded as of March 1996
<p>Improvement of the Juvenile Justice System/A Comprehensive Response to America's Gang Problem</p> <p>OJJDP noted that youth gang violence has become increasingly lethal with the ready accessibility of guns. It also stated that gangs in the 1990s are characterized by their diversity in terms of ethnic/racial composition, geographical location, organization, and nature and extent of members' involvement in criminal activities. OJJDP's comprehensive gang response includes several major components.</p>	<p>National Youth Gang Center</p>	<p>Institute for Intergovernmental Research, Tallahassee, FL</p>	<p>The award was made to establish a National Gang Assessment and Resource Center to collect national data on the extent and nature of gangs, to standardize data collection, and to disseminate useful information to help guide juvenile justice policy and program development on this issue.</p>	<p>2/1/95 to 1/31/98</p>	<p>\$750,000</p>
<p>A Comprehensive Response to America's Gang Problem/Comprehensive Community-Wide Approach to Gang Prevention, Intervention, and Suppression Program</p> <p>The goal of this component was to implement and test a comprehensive program model design for gang prevention, intervention, and suppression by mobilizing the multidisciplinary leadership of communities.</p>	<p>Comprehensive Community-Wide Approach to Gang Prevention, Intervention, and Suppression Program</p>	<p>The Regents of the University of California, Riverside, CA</p>	<p>This project was funded as one of five demonstration sites to implement and test a model of youth gang prevention, intervention, and suppression. The project was to engage community leadership in a planning and assessment process and to produce a comprehensive, communitywide action plan. It was to be independently evaluated.</p>	<p>5/1/95 to 4/30/98</p>	<p>\$200,000</p>

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Program category	Title	Grantee name and location	Project description	Proposed project period	Dollars awarded as of March 1996
	Mesa, Arizona's Comprehensive Community-Wide Approach to Gang Prevention, Intervention, and Suppression	City of Mesa, AZ	This project was funded as one of five demonstration sites to implement and test a model of youth gang prevention, intervention, and suppression. See the description under the Riverside project for additional information.	5/1/95 to 4/30/98	\$199,644
	Comprehensive Community-Wide Approach to Gang Prevention, Intervention, and Suppression	Project OZ, Bloomington, IL	This project was funded as one of five demonstration sites to implement and test a model of youth gang prevention, intervention, and suppression. It will be implemented in Bloomington and Normal, Illinois. See the description under the Riverside project for additional information.	5/1/95 to 4/30/98	\$200,000
	Comprehensive Community-Wide Approach to Gang Prevention, Intervention, and Suppression	Police Department, San Antonio, TX	This project was funded as one of five demonstration sites to implement and test a model of youth gang prevention, intervention, and suppression. See the description under the Riverside project for additional information.	5/1/95 to 4/30/98	\$200,000
	Las Vista/Pueblo Gardens Gang Project	Our Town Family Center, Tucson, AZ	This project was funded as one of five demonstration sites to implement and test a model of youth gang prevention, intervention, and suppression. See the description under the Riverside project for additional information.	5/1/95 to 4/30/98	\$200,000
A Comprehensive Response to America's Gang Problem/Evaluation of the Comprehensive Community-Wide Approach to Gang Prevention, Intervention, and Suppression	Evaluation of the Comprehensive Community-Wide Approach to Gang Prevention, Intervention, and Suppression	University of Chicago, Chicago, IL	The primary interest of this project was to develop an effective evaluation of models being implemented at the five demonstration sites discussed above. During the initial phase, the grantee was to assess how the communities could most effectively plan and implement the model and was to be involved in planning for a National Symposium on Gangs.	5/1/95 to 4/30/99	\$250,000

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Program category	Title	Grantee name and location	Project description	Proposed project period	Dollars awarded as of March 1996
<p>Improvement of the Juvenile Justice System/Research</p> <p>This program was established to help OJJDP meet its legislative mandate to collect, analyze, compile, publish, and disseminate statistics on the processing and treatment of juveniles who are treated as adults for purposes of the criminal justice system.</p>	<p>Juvenile Transfers to Criminal Court Studies</p>	<p>National Council of Juvenile and Family Court Judges, Reno, NV</p>	<p>The grantee was to collaborate with four state agencies to conduct studies of juvenile transfers to criminal court for prosecution and sentencing. Among the issues to be addressed were changes in transfer practices that occurred between 1985 and 1994 and comparisons of adult recidivism rates of juveniles processed in criminal courts compared to those going through juvenile court over those years.</p>	<p>10/1/95 to 9/30/96</p>	<p>\$149,856</p>
	<p>Juvenile Justice Transfers to Criminal Court Study--Blending Juvenile and Criminal Justice in Managing Dangerous Juveniles</p>	<p>Juvenile Justice Advisory Board, Tallahassee, FL</p>	<p>The project was funded to examine the way reforms in the juvenile justice system relating to the transfer of juveniles from that system into the criminal justice system are being implemented. The project was also to examine the impact of these reforms on both systems.</p>	<p>10/1/95 to 9/30/96</p>	<p>\$125,000</p>

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Program category	Title	Grantee name and location	Project description	Proposed project period	Dollars awarded as of March 1996
<p>Improvement of the Juvenile Justice System/Performance Based Standards for Juvenile Detention and Corrections</p> <p>In funding this program, OJJDP recognized a need to increase the accountability of detention and correctional agencies, facilities, and staff in performing their duties. The program was to support the development and implementation of performance-based standards, reflecting a consensus of a representative group of national organizations on the missions, goals, and objectives for juvenile detention and corrections. Once the standards are developed, OJJDP plans to promote their nationwide adoption and implementation through training and technical assistance.</p>	<p>Performance-Based Standards for Juvenile Detention and Corrections</p>	<p>Council of Juvenile Correctional Administrators, Boston, MA</p>	<p>The project was funded to design the first performance-based standards for juvenile detention and corrections. It was to systematically measure the performance of juvenile detention and correctional facilities in five key areas: education, treatment/mental health services, safety/security, juvenile rights, and health care.</p>	<p>7/1/95 to 12/31/96</p>	<p>\$249,896</p>

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Program category	Title	Grantee name and location	Project description	Proposed project period	Dollars awarded as of March 1996
<p>Improvement of the Juvenile Justice System/Evaluation of Intensive Community-Based Aftercare Demonstration and Technical Assistance Program</p> <p>Intensive community-based aftercare programs seek to address the acute personal and emotional needs of chronic juvenile offenders. This program was funded to support OJJDP's commitment to improvements in aftercare philosophy and practice. It was to assess the process used by four demonstration states to implement the intensive community-based aftercare program and to evaluate the technical assistance provided to the states.</p>	<p>Evaluation of Intensive Community-Based Aftercare Demonstration and Technical Assistance Program</p>	<p>National Council on Crime and Delinquency, San Francisco, CA</p>	<p>The project was funded to design and conduct a process evaluation and to design and prepare for an impact evaluation, which may be conducted during the second and third years of the project period. The grantee was to assess the process used by four demonstration states to implement the aftercare program and evaluate the technical assistance provided. The grantee was also to assess the potential at each of the four sites for doing an impact evaluation and was to complete an impact evaluation design.</p>	<p>2/15/95 to 2/14/98</p>	<p>\$220,000</p>
<p>Improvement of the Juvenile Justice System/Telecommunications Assistance</p> <p>The program was funded to establish for OJJDP the technical capability to sponsor audio conferences, teleconferences, and other means of electronic communications among groups at various locations for training, information sharing, and other purposes.</p>	<p>Telecommunications Assistance</p>	<p>Eastern Kentucky University, Richmond, KY</p>	<p>The project was funded to develop OJJDP's capabilities to communicate by teleconference and other distance technologies. Specifically, the grantee was to deliver requested satellite teleconferences and audio conferences, develop a telecommunications manual, conduct in-service training for staff, and do other related tasks.</p>	<p>1/15/95 to 3/31/96</p>	<p>\$199,998</p>

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Program category	Title	Grantee name and location	Project description	Proposed project period	Dollars awarded as of March 1996
<p>Improvement of the Juvenile Justice System/Statistics and System Development Program</p> <p>The program was to (1) develop and implement strategies for improving the quality and utility of juvenile justice statistics and (2) improve decisionmaking and management information systems within the juvenile justice system.</p>	<p>Juvenile Justice Statistics and Systems Development Program</p>	<p>National Council of Juvenile and Family Court Judges, Reno, NV</p> <p>National Center for Juvenile Justice, Pittsburgh, PA</p>	<p>The project was to continue work began with a 1990 grant. It was divided into two tracks: a statistics track and a systems development track. The statistics program was to produce a series of reports on the extent and nature of juvenile offending and victimization and the justice systems' response. The systems development track was to assess juvenile justice agencies' decisionmaking and related management information systems and was to then develop models. Training was to be developed and technical assistance provided to promote the adoption of the models at test sites.</p>	<p>10/1/90 to 7/31/96</p>	<p>\$2,524,896</p>
<p>Improvement of the Juvenile Justice System/Interventions to Reduce Disproportionate Minority Confinement in Secure Detention and Correctional Facilities</p> <p>OJJDP noted that national data have demonstrated that minority offenders are overrepresented in secure facilities across the country. This program was to fund state and local governments and nonprofit organizations to demonstrate effective interventions designed to eliminate the disproportionate confinement of minority juveniles in secure facilities.</p>	<p>Disproportionate Minority Confinement--A Time For Change</p>	<p>American Correctional Association, Laurel, MD</p>	<p>The project was funded to provide training on cultural and racial differences to law enforcement agency personnel and juvenile justice staff to help them avoid bias in decisionmaking. It was part of the effort to reduce disproportionate representation of minority children in secure confinement.</p>	<p>5/1/95 to 4/30/96</p>	<p>\$87,598</p>

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Program category	Title	Grantee name and location	Project description	Proposed project period	Dollars awarded as of March 1996
	Interventions to Reduce Disproportionate Confinement in Secure Detention and Corrections Facilities	The Academy, Inc., Columbus, OH	The project was funded to develop methods for evaluating the effects of changes in court policy and procedures impacting on the disproportionate secure confinement of African-American juveniles in secure detention in Ohio. Goals included (1) providing diversion programs for minority youths who come into contact with the juvenile justice system, (2) examining the impact of efforts to change regulations and procedures to reduce disproportionate minority confinement in secure facilities, and (3) improving systems that collect and analyze data on this issue.	5/1/95 to 10/31/96	\$62,010
	Comprehensive Intensive Aftercare for Incarcerated African-American Youth	Department of Public Safety and Corrections, Baton Rouge, LA	This program was funded to implement a replicable culturally specific intensive aftercare program in the Louisiana Training Institute. The purpose of the program was to reduce recidivism and, therefore, reduce the disproportionate representation of minorities in secure confinement in Louisiana facilities.	5/1/95 to 4/30/96	\$100,000

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Program category	Title	Grantee name and location	Project description	Proposed project period	Dollars awarded as of March 1996
	Intervention to Reduce Disproportionate Minority Confinement in Secure Detention and Correctional Facilities	Washoe Tribe of Nevada and California, Gardnerville, NV	The program was funded to do planning activities that would reduce the disproportionate representation of Native American juveniles in secure confinement. The grantee's work was to include (1) collection and analysis of data on characteristics and needs of youthful offenders who come before tribal courts; (2) design of a desired program (including facility and service options, academic and vocational linkages; staffing needs, oversight, peer programs, and evaluations); and (3) preparation of an implementation plan and a grant proposal for funding of the designed facility.	5/1/95 to 4/30/96	\$52,594
	Intervention to Reduce Disproportionate Minority Confinement in Secure Detention and Correctional Facilities	Project Heavy West, Los Angeles, CA	The project was funded to expand a case management model diversion program serving African-American youths. The diversion-based project will provide services for risk assessment, mandatory parenting education, counseling, tutoring, community restitution, and conflict resolution skills development. A primary expected outcome was to reduce the disproportionate representation of minority juveniles in secure confinement.	5/1/95 to 4/30/96	\$70,382

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Program category	Title	Grantee name and location	Project description	Proposed project period	Dollars awarded as of March 1996
	Community Alternatives to Detention	Chatham-Savannah Youth Futures Authority, Chatham-Savannah, GA	The project was funded to implement a program with four components designed to reduce disproportionate minority representation in the county's secure detention and correctional facilities. The components are a mentoring program for juvenile offenders, a community peer-review group to review cases of students who have committed violent acts at school, parenting classes and support groups, and a mechanism to determine systemic risk factors.	5/1/95 to 4/30/96	\$48,506
	Intervention to Reduce Disproportionate Minority Confinement in Secure Detention and Correctional Facilities	Office of Criminal Justice Services, Columbus, OH	With the Governor's Council on Juvenile Justice, the grantee was funded to work on pilot projects in Akron and Cleveland that provide direct services to youth. Among the goals were to (1) develop intervention strategies to reduce disproportionate minority confinement in secure facilities, (2) assess the impact of the intervention models, and (3) explore legislative and administrative policy changes that could impact on disproportionate minority confinement levels.	5/1/95 to 4/30/96	\$100,000

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Program category	Title	Grantee name and location	Project description	Proposed project period	Dollars awarded as of March 1996
	Teen Court Youth Diversion Program	Lummi Tribal Nation Bellingham, WA	The project was funded to develop and coordinate three treatment strategies to improve the juvenile justice system's impact on young minority offenders through reestablishing traditional Lummi cultural approaches to unacceptable behaviors. The three components are: (1) a teen court (a court of teenage jurors for juvenile referrals who are deemed appropriate by the Probation Department), (2) an elder/juvenile justice forum committed to providing cultural support for positive behavior of young offenders, and (3) victim-offender mediation services designed to guide participants to solutions that will help them heal.	5/1/95 to 4/30/96	\$67,405
	Intervention to Reduce Disproportionate Minority Confinement in Secure Detention and Correctional Facilities	Superior Court of New Jersey, Paterson, NJ	The project was funded with the goal of reducing the number of minority youths in secure detention and correctional facilities by 30 percent. It was to create an age-specific program for 12- to 15-year olds at an existing day school as an alternative to secure confinement. Before the award, the school was serving a 16- to 18-year-old high-risk offender population who were trained in culinary arts in addition to an academic program. Other project components were to organize a multicultural advisory board and ease overcrowding at the county detention facility.	10/1/95 to 3/31/97	\$100,000

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Program category	Title	Grantee name and location	Project description	Proposed project period	Dollars awarded as of March 1996
	Intervention to Reduce Disproportionate Minority Confinement in Secure Detention Facilities	Wayne County Neighborhood Legal Services, Detroit, MI	The project was funded to implement a mediation program as an alternative to incarceration for minority children and to aid victims with resolving offense related trauma. Over the next year-long pilot period, 300 mediations were to be conducted.	10/1/95 to 9/30/96	\$50,000
	Disproportionate Minority Confinement in Secure Detention Facilities	Transition, Inc., Miami, FL	The project was funded to address joblessness among at-risk youths and juvenile offenders in two predominately minority neighborhoods in South Dade County as a means of reducing juvenile crime and recidivism. Eighty at-risk youths were to be served with the goal of 90 percent of them being in unsubsidized employment at the end of 1 year.	10/1/95 to 9/30/96	\$50,000
	Disproportionate Minority Confinement in Secure Detention Facilities: Minority Youth Job Opportunities in Business	Pima County Juvenile Court Center, Tucson, AZ	The project was funded to test the hypothesis that providing job sites designed to increase the competency of minority juvenile offenders would significantly reduce offending behavior and subsequent detention. It was also to do work that included improving data collection and analysis systems and designing a program evaluation to measure the impact of the project.	10/1/95 to 9/30/96	\$100,000

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Program category	Title	Grantee name and location	Project description	Proposed project period	Dollars awarded as of March 1996
<p>Improvement of the Juvenile Justice System/Training for Line Staff in Juvenile Corrections and Detention</p> <p>QJJD noted that data showed that more than 38,000 juvenile detention and corrections staff worked in the United States in 1993, and that the majority of the staff had few opportunities for professional training. This program was established to create a multiyear training program.</p>	<p>Training for Line Staff in Juvenile Corrections and Detention</p>	<p>National Juvenile Detention Association, Eastern Kentucky University, Richmond, KY</p>	<p>The grant was to create a unified program for juvenile detention and corrections line staff training. The first-year goals included completing a needs assessment, developing curriculum, and planning for training delivery.</p>	<p>1/15/95 to 1/14/98</p>	<p>\$649,899</p>
<p>Improvement of the Juvenile Justice System/Training and Technical Support for State and Local Jurisdictional Teams to Focus on Juvenile Corrections and Detention Overcrowding</p> <p>QJJD cited a study it did that found overcrowding to be the most urgent problem facing juvenile corrections and detention facilities. This program was to support the development and implementation of strategies to reduce overcrowding.</p>	<p>Training and Technical Assistance to Reduce Juvenile Correctional and Detention Facility Overcrowding</p>	<p>National Juvenile Detention Association, Richmond, KY</p>	<p>The project was funded to develop and implement strategies to reduce overcrowding in juvenile correctional and detention facilities. Among its specific objectives were to review and document experiences in selected areas that used court orders to improve conditions to juvenile facilities, and to develop and test training and technical assistance materials for officials responsible for placing juveniles in custodial facilities.</p>	<p>3/1/95 to 2/28/98</p>	<p>\$99,726</p>

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Table

Program category	Title	Grantee name and location	Project description	Proposed project period	Dollars awarded as of March 1996
<p>Improvement of the Juvenile Justice System/National Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Training and Technical Assistance Center</p> <p>The program was funded to develop, enhance, and expand the professional skills of juvenile justice and delinquency prevention practitioners.</p>	<p>National Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Training and Technical Assistance Center</p>	<p>Community Research Associates, Inc., Champaign, IL</p>	<p>The project was funded to create and operate a training and technical assistance center. Specifically, it was to develop a training and technical assistance clearinghouse and inventory and create a database of juvenile justice training/technical assistance resources. The center was to be a single, central source of information pertaining to the availability of OJJDP-supported training/technical assistance programs.</p>	<p>3/1/95 to 2/28/98</p>	<p>\$299,370</p>

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Program category	Title	Grantee name and location	Project description	Proposed project period	Dollars awarded as of March 1996
<p>Safefutures: Partnerships To Reduce Youth Violence and Delinquency</p> <p>Safefutures was funded as a program to enhance existing community partnerships to address the needs of at-risk children of all ages, including delinquent youths. The partnerships was to include public and private agencies; community-based organizations, such as religious, civic, and business groups; community residents; and youth. It was also to place a strong emphasis on linkages to other ongoing federal, state, local, and tribal initiatives concerned with youth development, economic development, and public safety. The program was to seek to build capacity at the local and tribal level to ensure that the efforts were sustained for the long term. Grants were awarded to five communities to help them implement a safe futures program.</p>	<p>National Evaluation of Safefutures Program: Phase I Study of Program Development and Implementation</p>	<p>Urban Institute, Washington, D.C.</p>	<p>The project was funded to evaluate Phase I of OJJDP's Safefutures initiative, which seeks to develop comprehensive community partnerships to reduce youth violence and delinquency. It was to document the process of community mobilization, planning, and collaborative program offering comprehensive prevention and intervention strategies for at-risk juveniles and juvenile offenders.</p>	<p>10/1/95 to 9/30/98</p>	<p>\$149,728</p>

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Program category	Title	Grantee name and location	Project description	Proposed project period	Dollars awarded as of March 1996
	Overarching Program to Reduce Youth Violence and Delinquency: SafeFutures	Imperial County, El Centro, CA	The project was funded as one of five initiatives under the SafeFutures program. It was to involve a variety of public agencies in bringing the diversity of services for at-risk and delinquent youths to outlying areas. These services had previously only been available at the county seat. The vehicle for achieving the goal was to establish family resource centers.	10/1/95 to 9/30/00	\$1,410,000
	Fort Belknap College: SafeFutures Program	Fort Belknap College, Harlem, MT	The project was funded as one of five initiatives under the SafeFutures program. It was to implement nine components over a 5-year period designed to reduce the incidence of delinquency and violence among tribal youths on or near the Fort Belknap Reservation. Components were to include a program for at-risk and delinquent girls; after-school activities; mentoring; mental health services; and a program for serious, violent, and chronic offenders.	10/1/95 to 9/30/00	\$900,000
	SafeFutures: Partnerships to Reduce Youth Violence and Delinquency	Contra Costa County, Martinez, CA	The project was funded as one of five initiatives under the SafeFutures program. It was to focus on a specific set of neighborhoods in the region known as West County--an area with a primarily urban, minority, undereducated, and poor population with high levels of violent crime. The project was to seek to increase protective factors for children and create a continuum of graduated sanctions to hold youths accountable for delinquent acts.	10/1/95 to 9/30/00	\$1,410,000

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Program category	Title	Grantee name and location	Project description	Proposed project period	Dollars awarded as of March 1996
	The Boston Blue Hill Avenue Coalition Safe Corridor Project	City of Boston, MA	The project was funded as one of five initiatives under the SafeFutures program. It was to attempt to prevent and control juvenile violence and delinquency in targeted communities and improve the delivery of services for at-risk and delinquent juveniles and their families. It was also to determine the success of program implementation and the outcomes achieved.	10/1/95 to 9/30/00	\$1,410,000
	SafeFutures: Partnerships to Reduce Youth Violence and Delinquency	City of St. Louis, St. Louis, MO	The project was funded as one of three urban programs to be funded under the SafeFutures Initiative. It was to prevent and control juvenile violence and delinquency in targeted communities and improve the service delivery and life opportunities for at-risk and delinquent youth. It was also to determine the success of program implementation and the outcomes achieved.	10/1/95 to 9/30/00	\$1,410,000
Missing and Exploited Children Program OJJDP noted that the issues surrounding missing and exploited children are varied and complex. The goal of the program is to ensure that information from prior research and demonstration programs is successfully incorporated into new OJJDP projects.	Overcoming Confidentiality Barriers to Find Missing Children	American Bar Association, Washington, D.C.	The project was funded to address problems that law enforcement faces in gaining access to confidential records when attempting to locate missing children. The project was to determine various types of information, agencies, and professionals that can help locate missing children. A draft guide for using agency records was to be developed and reviewed during an invitational symposium.	1/1/93 to 9/30/94	\$124,995

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Program category	Title	Grantee name and location	Project description	Proposed project period	Dollars awarded as of March 1996
	Obstacles to Recovery and Return of Parentally Abducted Children	American Bar Association, Washington, D.C.	The project was funded to increase the knowledge of relevant professionals about parental abduction laws through avenues that include training and technical assistance. An interorganizational council made up of relevant professional organizations was to be established to enhance collaborative efforts.	1/1/93 to 2/29/96	\$678,562
	Model Treatment and Services Approaches for Mental Health Working Professionals Working With Families of Missing Children	Western Center for Child Protection, Reno, Nevada	The project was to fund activities that include the (1) consolidation of the knowledge base pertaining to that treatment of families victimized by the abducted/missing/recovered children experience, (2) construction of mental health treatment models applicable to the victimized families, (3) testing of the models, and (4) development of the training manuals for implementing the treatment models.	4/1/93 to 5/31/96	\$493,914
	Model Sentencing and Custody Guidelines in Parental Abduction Cases	American Prosecutors Research Institute, Alexandria, VA	The project was funded to develop guidelines for prosecutors and judges on the effective handling of parental abduction cases. Among its goals were to improve the quality of local parental abduction investigation and prosecution and to enable judges to make more accurate and effective decisions in postabduction or postrecovery custody determinations.	3/1/93 to 1/31/96	\$124,936

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Program category	Title	Grantee name and location	Project description	Proposed project period	Dollars awarded as of March 1996
	Child Abuse Prosecution Training and Technical Assistance	American Prosecutors Research Institute, Alexandria, VA	The project was funded to support the programs of the National Center for the Prosecution of Child Abuse. The services that were to be provided to prosecutors included training, technical assistance, and publications. Workshops, conferences, and information were also to assist law enforcement personnel, social workers, therapists, and others handling child abuse cases. The Center responds to more than 3,400 requests for technical assistance annually.	10/1/95 to 10/31/96	\$5,996,031
	Investigation and Prosecution of Parental Abduction Cases	American Prosecutors Research Institute, Alexandria, VA	The project was funded to upgrade prosecutor and investigator competency in the area of parental abduction. Services were to include training, technical assistance, and information materials.	8/1/93 to 12/31/96	\$499,967
	National Resource Center and Clearinghouse	National Center for Missing and Exploited Children, Arlington, VA	The project was funded to continue to provide the following missing/exploited children services: a toll-free hotline, case management, case analysis, legal technical assistance, publication development and dissemination, media relations, nonprofit/state clearinghouse liaison, on-line information network, and photo distribution and age progression for missing children.	4/1/95 to 3/31/98	\$5,224,435

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Program category	Title	Grantee name and location	Project description	Proposed project period	Dollars awarded as of March 1996
	Missing Children Training and Technical Assistance Program	Fox Valley Technical College, Appleton, WI	The funding was to be used to provide input and direction to the missing and exploited children training and technical assistance program. Training and technical assistance was to be developed and given to staff of federal, state, and local governments; nonprofit organizations; missing children state clearinghouse personnel; and grantees. It was to increase awareness of and ways to deal with missing and exploited children's issues and to develop effective community approaches for delivering services.	6/1/95 to 5/31/98	\$750,000
	Effective Community-Based Approaches for Dealing with Missing and Exploited Children	American Bar Association, Center for Children and the Law, Washington, D.C.	The purpose of the funding was to identify, research, evaluate, and document effective community-based organizations nationwide that use multidisciplinary team approaches to address complex issues related to missing children and their families. One result was to select five communities with viable working multiagency responses that hold promise for replication.	9/1/95 to 8/31/98	\$249,234
	Second National Incidence Studies of Missing, Abducted, Runaway and Thrownaway Children	Temple University, Institute for Survey Research, Philadelphia, PA	The project was funded to conduct the Second National Incident Studies of Missing, Abducted, Runaway and Thrownaway Children. Work was to include conducting a household survey interviewing caretakers and children, performing a police records study, conducting a juvenile facilities study, and developing an estimate of missing children.	10/1/95 to 9/30/98	\$1,494,782

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Program category	Title	Grantee name and location	Project description	Proposed project period	Dollars awarded as of March 1996
<p>Regional Children's Advocacy Center Program</p> <p>The program was established to fund four regional centers to provide services to children who are victims of abuse and their families.</p>	<p>Southern Regional Children's Advocacy Center</p>	<p>National Children's Advocacy Center, Huntsville, Madison, AL</p>	<p>The project was funded as one of four regional children's advocacy centers. The Center was to provide abuse prevention programs, child-focused intervention, and treatment services for sexually and physically abused children and their nonoffending family members. Major objectives included enhancing southern state communities' responses to child abuse, developing training and technical assistance materials, and promoting national standards of practice in child abuse cases. The Center was also to work within the national network of children's advocacy centers to develop comprehensive strategies; strengthen organizational infrastructures; and build replicable training models, methods, and materials based on national standards.</p>	<p>1/1/95 to 3/31/96</p>	<p>\$125,000</p>
	<p>Western Regional Children's Advocacy Center</p>	<p>Pueblo Child Advocacy Center, Pueblo, CO</p>	<p>The project was funded as one of four regional children's advocacy centers. The Center was to assist communities in the western states with training that promoted a disciplinary team response to victims of child abuse and their nonoffending family members. The Center was also to work within the national network of children's advocacy centers with objectives similar to those described for the Huntsville southern region above.</p>	<p>1/1/95 to 4/30/96</p>	<p>\$125,000</p>

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Program category	Title	Grantee name and location	Project description	Proposed project period	Dollars awarded as of March 1996
	Northeast Regional Children's Advocacy Center	Children's Advocacy Center, Inc., Philadelphia, PA	The project was funded as one of four regional children's advocacy centers. It was to develop multidisciplinary models and coordinate training and technical assistance in the Northeast region. The project was to assist communities with program start-up and help to strengthen existing centers. It was also to work within the national network of children's advocacy centers with objectives similar to those of the Huntsville southern region described above.	1/1/95 to 4/30/96	\$249,496
	Midwest Regional Children's Advocacy Center	La Rebida Children's Hospital and Research Center, Chicago, IL	The project was funded as one of four regional children's advocacy centers. It was to develop multidisciplinary team models and coordination of training and technical assistance resources, regionally. It was also to work within the national network of children's advocacy centers with objectives similar to those of the Huntsville southern region described above.	1/1/95 to 12/31/95	\$124,914
Missing and Exploited Children's Program	Families of Missing Children: Psychological Consequences and Promising Interventions	Langley Porter Psychiatric Institute, University of California San Francisco, CA	The project was funded to increase understanding of the psychological effects of the missing child experience on families. It was to assess changes that had occurred about 2 years after an original data collection in the post-trauma responses of 279 families.	11/1/93 to 10/31/94	\$149,979

Program category	Title	Grantee name and location	Project description	Proposed project period	Dollars awarded as of March 1996
	Issues in Resolving Cases of International Parental Abductions of Children	American Bar Association, Washington, D.C.	The project was funded as a descriptive study of the issues involved in resolving cases of international parental child abduction. It was to include social science and legal literature reviews and both qualitative and quantitative research components.	10/1/93 to 2/29/96	\$193,443
	Remember, They're Children: Using Video to Train Law Enforcement in the Investigation of Child Maltreatment	National Child Welfare Resource Center, University of Southern Maine, Portland, ME	The project was funded to reduce the negative impact of law enforcement investigative procedures on maltreated children. This was to be accomplished through the development and dissemination of a comprehensive video training curriculum to law enforcement personnel.	10/1/93 to 9/30/95	\$399,920
	Stranger Abductions of Children: Analysis of a National Survey of Children's Experiences	Office of Sponsored Research, University of New Hampshire, Durham, NH	The project was funded to support analysis and dissemination of new findings from a survey done on children's experiences with stranger abductions. Among the objectives were to estimate the annual occurrence of abductions and attempted abductions of children ages 10 to 16 by strangers in cars, to identify factors that indicate increased vulnerability for children, and to determine the psychological impact of experiencing an abduction or attempted abduction by a stranger.	11/1/93 to 9/30/94	\$48,408

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Program category	Title	Grantee name and location	Project description	Proposed project period	Dollars awarded as of March 1996
	Criminal Justice Response to Parental Abduction Cases	American Bar Association, Washington, D.C.	The project was funded to learn about and describe how the criminal justice system handles parental abduction of children cases. It was to examine how decisions are made within the criminal justice system, how cases are processed, and how model programs are developed. It was to include two phases: a literature review and a multisite study of justice system case processing.	11/1/93 to 4/30/96	\$505,998
	Examining the Relationship Between Child/Adolescent Abductions and Adolescent Sexual Offending	Children's Hospital Research Foundation, Columbus, OH	The project was funded as the first effort to build a multistate database of information on abductors and sexual offenders. The study was to include 468 juvenile sex offenders between the ages of 12 and 19.	12/1/93 to 9/30/95	\$99,971
	Symposium on International Child Abduction	American Bar Association, Chicago, IL	The grant was to support the development and implementation of a symposium on international child abduction. It was to provide practical information to lawyers, judges, and other practitioners. In addition, one or more reports discussing the need for future study, legislative or policy reform, and training and information were to be produced.	1/1/93 to 4/30/94	\$198,987

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Program category	Title	Grantee name and location	Project description	Proposed project period	Dollars awarded as of March 1996
	Funding Support for Specific Programs Development for State Clearinghouses for Missing Children	Iowa Division of Criminal Investigation, Des Moines, IA	The project was funded to research, publish, and disseminate a law enforcement manual containing federal and state laws relating to missing children. A training program was also to be developed and 17 training sessions to be held to cover missing children issues. Issues were to include applicable laws; advances in computer, communication, and investigative procedures; and abduction prevention education.	3/1/93 to 9/30/94	\$32,848
	On-Line Missing and Unidentified Persons System (MUPS) User's Training	California Department of Justice, Sacramento, CA	The project was funded to research, publish, and disseminate a law enforcement manual containing federal and state laws relating to missing children. A training program was also to be developed and 13 training sessions to be held to provide information based on the research.	3/1/93 to 12/30/94	\$31,448
	Missing and Exploited Children Comprehensive Action Program (MCAP)	Public Administration Service, McLean, VA	The project was funded to help local agencies develop multiagency teams with skills to handle missing and exploited children cases. It was also to provide directed and supportive training and technical assistance to encourage, guide, and focus community development and planning on priority missing and exploited children's issues. During this stage, the project was to be replicated in up to 90 jurisdictions.	1/1/93 to 3/31/96	\$2,799,866

Program category	Title	Grantee name and location	Project description	Proposed project period	Dollars awarded as of March 1996
	<p>Outreach Program: Funding Support for Specific Programs Development for State Clearinghouses for Missing Children</p>	<p>Missing and Exploited Children Clearinghouse, New York Division of Criminal Justice Services, Albany, NY</p>	<p>The project was funded to develop outreach programs to enhance the effectiveness of the clearinghouse by educating agencies, community groups, and federal, county and local officials about how to take full advantage of it.</p>	<p>3/1/93 to 5/15/95</p>	<p>\$50,000</p>
	<p>Investigative Case Management for Missing Children Homicides</p>	<p>Washington State Attorney General's Office, Seattle, WA</p>	<p>The project was funded to improve investigative procedures for murders of missing, abducted, and runaway children and to solve child murder and serial child murder investigations more effectively. It was to analyze up to 400 missing children homicide cases to identify, assess, test, demonstrate, and describe the practices that most effectively marshalled resources to manage and quickly solve the investigations.</p>	<p>11/1/93 to 10/31/96</p>	<p>\$449,887</p>

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Program category	Title	Grantee name and location	Project description	Proposed project period	Dollars awarded as of March 1996
<p>Juvenile Mentoring Program (JUMP)</p> <p>This program was designed to match adults in one-to-one relationships with young people having difficulty in school. It was planned to serve about 4,000 at-risk students in 25 states. The goals were to improve academic performance, reduce school drop-out rates, and prevent delinquent behavior. Various programs proposed using as mentors senior citizens, college students, and business and government employees. Some projects emphasized tutoring and academics, while others emphasized vocational counseling and job skills. The funded sites were to serve as models that could be replicated throughout the country.</p>	<p>41 different grantees</p>	<p>Locations nationwide, representing all U.S. geographic regions.</p>	<p>See overall program category at left.</p>	<p>7/1/95 to 6/30/98</p>	<p>\$8,000,000</p>

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Program category	Title	Grantee name and location	Project description	Proposed project period	Dollars awarded as of March 1996
<p>Public Safety/Gangs and Delinquency Research</p> <p>This program was designed to increase knowledge of how violent youth gangs contribute to serious, violent, and chronic juvenile crime. For example, it was to document the delinquency for which gang-involved youth were responsible, the dynamics of gang membership, and the risk and protective factors that impact gang involvement.</p>	<p>Delinquency and Criminal Street Gang Affiliation Among Southeast Asian Youth</p>	<p>City of Westminster, CA</p>	<p>The project was funded to examine the relationship between juvenile delinquency and gang and nongang affiliation of Southeast Asian refugee youths. Data from law enforcement records and in-depth interviews with delinquent and nondelinquent youths were to be gathered. It was anticipated that findings would yield (1) a profile of the proportion of juvenile delinquency for which youths affiliated with gangs and nongang groups were responsible and (2) an understanding of risk and protective factors that impact movement in and out of gang and nongang groups. Such knowledge would contribute to developing community-based intervention strategies.</p>	<p>10/1/95 to 9/30/96</p>	<p>\$147,789</p>
	<p>Gang Membership and Involvement in Serious and Violent Delinquency</p>	<p>State University of New York, Albany, NY</p>	<p>This project was funded to analyze data already collected as part of another youth development study. See the causes and correlates project on page 12. The prior work traced the delinquent careers of a sample of urban at-risk youths from ages 13 to 14 to ages 20 to 21. This analysis was to use the data to estimate the proportion of offenses attributable to gang members and to increase knowledge of how gang membership contributes to serious and violent crime.</p>	<p>10/1/95 to 9/30/96</p>	<p>\$140,000</p>



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	Socialization to Gangs in an Emerging Gang City	Curators of the University of Missouri, St. Louis, MO	The project was funded to replicate a prior study on gangs in Chicago for a study of at-risk youths in St. Louis. Among its objectives were (1) to test the general applicability of measures of gang involvement developed for a population in a chronic gang city to a population of youths in an emerging gang city and (2) to identify key risk factors for gang involvement and delinquency for the at-risk youths.	10/1/95 to 3/31/97	\$116,615
	The Developmental Dynamics of Gang Membership and Delinquency	University of Washington, Seattle, WA	This project was funded to analyze data already collected as part of another youth development study. See the causes and correlates project on page 12. It was to detail predictors of gang membership, age of initiative, length of membership, and consequences at age 18 of gang membership during early and midadolescence. Traditional and new analytic techniques were to be used.	10/1/95 to 9/30/96	\$149,903
Public Safety/Field-Initiated Gang Research This program was funded to support research initiated in the field contributing to knowledge on gangs.	Field-Initiated Gang Research: Finding and Knowing the Gang Naye in the Navajo Nation	Navajo Nation, Window Rock, AZ	This project was funded as the first comprehensive assessment of gang activity in Indian County. It was to use a mixed research approach of quantitative and qualitative assessment. The research was to actively involve communities; to educate citizens on data from justice agencies; and to elicit their views on the nature, extent, and causes of Navajo Nation gang violence. The research was to discover approaches to gangs which are grounded in Navajo culture, for replication by other Indian nations.	10/1/95 to 3/31/97	\$125,000

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Program category	Title	Grantee name and location	Project description	Proposed project period	Dollars awarded as of March 1996
<p>Training and Technical Assistance</p> <p>The program was funded to support training for juvenile justice system personnel.</p>	<p>Training in Cultural Differences for Law Enforcement/Juvenile Justice Officials</p>	<p>American Correctional Association, Lanham, MD</p>	<p>The project has developed, and was funded by this grant to continue to implement, training on cultural and ethnic differences. The training was to be given to juvenile justice system officials, including police and intake, detention, probation, courts, corrections, and aftercare personnel. The project was also to prepare trainer and trainee guides and other reference materials pertaining to cultural diversity.</p>	<p>9/30/91 to 2/28/96</p>	<p>\$558,515</p>
	<p>Project to Expand and Improve Juvenile Restitution Programs (Continuation of Balanced Approach/Restorative Justice Project)</p>	<p>Division of Sponsored Research, Florida Atlantic University, Boca Raton, FL</p>	<p>The project was funded to prepare materials and training for court-correctional system personnel interested in the concept of restorative justice. Restorative justice has a goal to use community service and other innovative programs to change from traditional retributive-rehabilitative system models for juvenile justice. Training and technical assistance were to be provided at regional roundtables and at juvenile justice conferences. Hands-on technical assistance was also to be provided to three sites.</p>	<p>9/30/92 to 12/31/96</p>	<p>\$648,415</p>
	<p>James E. Gould Memorial for Technical Assistance for Juvenile Corrections and Detention</p>	<p>American Correctional Association, Lanham, MD</p>	<p>The project was funded to provide technical assistance to staff of juvenile corrections, detention, and community residential facilities. It was to result in a national forum on juvenile corrections/detention for agency administrators, and it was to provide workshops on emerging issues. Papers and monographs on the field were to be developed and disseminated to the field.</p>	<p>10/1/94 to 9/30/96</p>	<p>\$424,999</p>

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Program category	Title	Grantee name and location	Project description	Proposed project period	Dollars awarded as of March 1996
<p>Project Pulling America's Communities Together (PACT)</p> <p>This was an initiative launched by six federal agencies as part of the Interdepartmental Task Force on Violence. It was designed to empower communities to fight crime by developing and coordinating local and statewide anti-violence initiatives.</p>	<p>Training and Technical Assistance for Family Strengthening Programs</p>	<p>University of Utah, Salt Lake, UT</p>	<p>The project was funded to develop and implement a model training and technical assistance system to support communities nationwide in their implementation of family-strengthening programs. Activities were to include a literature review; national search, rating, and selection of family-strengthening models; the development and implementation of a marketing strategy; and the selection of technical assistance sites. Additionally, the grantee was to convene two regional conferences, produce users and trainers guides, and disseminate videos of workshops.</p>	<p>10/1/95 to 9/30/98</p>	<p>\$250,000</p>
<p>Team Support for Project PACT</p>	<p>Team Support for Project PACT</p>	<p>National Council on Crime and Delinquency, San Francisco, CA</p>	<p>The project was funded to allow the PACT Team to do several tasks. These tasks included (1) advising on the process by which local steering groups could develop comprehensive strategic plans; (2) identifying successful crime prevention and violence reduction programs and models for possible adaptation in PACT area violence reduction strategies; and (3) linking PACT cities and areas into networks and coalitions and also linking them with national organizations that can provide additional information, sources of advice, and programs to help reduce violence.</p>	<p>4/1/94 to 9/30/94</p>	<p>\$278,933</p>

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Program category	Title	Grantee name and location	Project description	Proposed project period	Dollars awarded as of March 1996
Youth-Centered Conflict Resolution	Project to Promote Youth-Centered Conflict Resolution	Illinois Institute for Dispute Resolution, Urbana, IL	The project was funded to promote conflict resolution programming in schools, community youth service organizations, and juvenile facilities. This was to be accomplished through a national dissemination and information campaign, four regional technical assistance workshops, and a plan for broad-based local participation.	10/1/95 to 9/30/97	\$200,000
Professional Development for Youth Workers	Professional Development for Youth Workers	Academy for Educational Development, Washington, D.C.	The project was funded to disseminate a curriculum developed and tested in prior years and to train facilitators to teach. The grantee had been funded previously to develop a core curricula for workers addressing the needs of high-risk youths. The model for the training is youth development based on strengths rather than a punitive model.	10/1/92 to 10/30/96	\$649,847

ENCLOSURE II

MAJOR CONTRIBUTORS TO THIS LETTER

General Government Division, Washington, DC—Weldon McPhail, Assistant Director, Administration of Justice Issues, Deborah A. Knorr, Project Manager, Patricia J. Scanlon, Deputy Project Manager, Dennise R. Sticklely, Staff Evaluator, and Charlotte A. Moore, Reports Analyst.

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