

DOCUMENT RESUME

ED 417 626

HE 031 055

AUTHOR Wilkenfeld, Jonathan; Kaufman, Joyce; Starkey, Brigid
 TITLE The International Negotiation Seminars Project. Project
 ICONS.
 INSTITUTION Maryland Univ., College Park. Dept. of Government and
 Politics.
 SPONS AGENCY Fund for the Improvement of Postsecondary Education (ED),
 Washington, DC.
 PUB DATE 1995-09-00
 NOTE 181p.; For related document, see ED 364 473.
 CONTRACT P1168B20355
 PUB TYPE Guides - Classroom - Teacher (052) -- Reports - Descriptive
 (141)
 EDRS PRICE MF01/PC08 Plus Postage.
 DESCRIPTORS Active Learning; Case Studies; Computer Assisted
 Instruction; *Computer Simulation; *Conflict Resolution;
 *Cross Cultural Training; Decision Making; Educational
 Media; Educational Technology; *Foreign Policy; Higher
 Education; International Educational Exchange;
 *International Relations; Internet; Models; Political
 Science; Public Policy; *Role Playing; Student
 Participation; Teleconferencing
 IDENTIFIERS Europe (Central); Europe (East); *ICONS (Simulation);
 Interactive Model; Negotiation Processes; Networking

ABSTRACT

This report of a study at the University of Maryland describes an international, interactive, and interdisciplinary project for first- and second-year students, which combines a large lecture format with small-group, seminar-type sessions organized around a computer-assisted simulation model, the International Communication and Negotiation Simulation (ICONS). Students learned about negotiation strategies through case studies and materials on cross-cultural communication. Strategies were tested in a customized "New Europe Simulation," which features participation from a variety of central and eastern European universities. In addition to focusing on international issues such as trade and the environment, the project involved group decision making as students acted as negotiators for nations other than their own. Students also learned to use technology, including Internet resources and real-time computer conferencing. The simulation experience and the active-learning model were disseminated to other U.S. campuses. Evaluation results indicate high student involvement and identification with simulation roles and international perspectives, and excellent learning from the small group and networking aspects of the project. A course syllabus and other course materials are appended, along with articles about the project, and a list of participating institutions. (SW)

 * Reproductions supplied by EDRS are the best that can be made *
 * from the original document. *

The International Negotiation Seminars Project

ED 417 626

Grantee Organization: University of Maryland, College Park
 Project ICONS
 Department of Government and Politics
 College Park, MD 20742

Grant Number: P1168B20355

Project Dates: August 1992 to September 1995

Project Director: Jonathan Wilkenfeld, Principal Investigator
 University of Maryland

Joyce Kaufman, Project Director
 August 1992-August 1993

Brigid Starkey, Project Director
 September 1993-September 1995

FIPSE Program Officer: Sandra Newkirk

Grant Award: \$235,841

HE 031 055

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION
 Office of Educational Research and Improvement
 EDUCATIONAL RESOURCES INFORMATION
 CENTER (ERIC)

- This document has been reproduced as received from the person or organization originating it.
- Minor changes have been made to improve reproduction quality.

• Points of view or opinions stated in this document do not necessarily represent official OERI position or policy.

BEST COPY AVAILABLE

SUMMARY

The International Negotiation Seminars Project was designed to bring an international, interactive, and interdisciplinary educational approach to a broad range of students early in their academic careers. On the University of Maryland campus, it combined the large lecture format, common to lower division introductory courses with small group seminar-type sessions, organized around the ICONS computer-assisted simulation model. With the help of an interdisciplinary team of guest-lecturers and teaching assistants, students in a newly-created Introduction to International Negotiation class learned about negotiation strategies and tactics through case-studies and materials on cross-cultural communication. Strategies were tested first-hand in a customized "New Europe Simulation," which featured participation from a variety of central and eastern European Universities. This simulation experience and the active-learning model were disseminated to other campuses in the United States. Project evaluation points to high student involvement, strong identification with simulation roles and international perspectives, and excellent learning from the small group and networking aspects of the project.

Project Directors:

Jonathan Wilkenfeld, Executive Director, Project ICONS
Brigid Starkey, Associate Director, Project ICONS
Department of Government and Politics
University of Maryland, College Park, MD 20742
410-405-7857

Project Products:

Brigid Starkey, "Negotiation Training Through Simulation: The ICONS International Negotiation Seminars Initiative." Educators' Tech Exchange, Spring 1994: 6-13.

Judith Torney-Purta, "Psychological Theory as a Basis for Political Socialization Research." Perspectives in Political Science, volume 24, 1995, 23-33.

Brigid Starkey and Jonathan Wilkenfeld, "Project ICONS International Negotiation Seminars Project: Teaching with Technology." MAHE Journal. Fall 1995.

Brigid Starkey and Jonathan Wilkenfeld, "Project ICONS: Computer-Assisted Negotiations for the IR Classroom." International Studies Notes (forthcoming February 1996).

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The International Negotiation Seminars Project

**Project ICONS
University of Maryland, College Park
Department of Government and Politics
College Park, MD 20742**

Project Director:

**Brigid Starkey
Associate Director, Project ICONS
301-405-7857
e-mail: bstarkey@bss2.umd.edu**

Project Overview

With the support of a three-year grant from the U.S. Department of Education's Fund for the Improvement of Post-Secondary Education, ICONS adapted its successful simulation model to target lower-division undergraduates in large lecture course settings. With a premium on cost-effectiveness, the initiative sought to develop ways to enliven the learning experience for first and second-year students in ways that did not require large infusions of scarce institutional funds. The project targeted reform in three broad areas: curricular, structural and technological.

Globalization of the curriculum, with an emphasis on enhancing interdisciplinarity, was the main goal of the project. On the College Park campus, a new course, Introduction to International Negotiation became the vehicle for the FIPSE initiative. A simulation scenario based on post-communist Europe -- the "New Europe" -- was drafted and European universities were recruited to participate. The scenario incorporated four main issue areas: environment, security, ethnicity, and economics. Senior-level faculty members on the campus were invited to deliver guest lectures on these various topics and work with interested students on their research. Structurally, the course took advantage of the conventional discussion sections that complement lecture courses. These sessions became the fora for "country-team" deliberations for the simulation phase of the course. Technology, in the form of the computer-assisted simulation, electronic mail on the University of Maryland campus, Internet resources, and video-conferencing capabilities, all contributed to the active and distance learning components of the experience. In addition to reaching over 400 students on the College Park campus during its three years (1992-1995), the "International Negotiation Seminars Project" encouraged the growth of virtual classrooms on fourteen other campuses in the United States and Europe, reaching an estimated 800 additional students.

Purpose

Increasingly over the past decades, the mandate of the large state university has been to serve large numbers of students in an efficient manner. One major result has been the institutionalization of lecture courses, particularly at the lower-division level. First and second-year students, those who are most at risk to drop out because of alienation, frustration, and lack of direction, are often initially exposed to an unimaginative and impersonal curriculum. This project sought to involve the student in his/her learning process by creating a collaborative learning environment. The students set goals for themselves at the outset of the course and then worked with peers and faculty-level facilitators to achieve these goals. The acquisition of applied skills that could help in the workplace was another target of the initiative. Using technology to conduct research and to communicate was one major aspect of this, another involved learning about conflict resolution skills and practicing the art of negotiation "hands-on."

Background and Origins

The International Negotiation Seminars Project represented a new initiative for an existing organization. The International Communication and Negotiation Simulation (ICONS) Project has been working from its base at the University of Maryland, College Park since the early 1980s to bring simulations to a variety of secondary, post-secondary and applied audiences. On its own campus, ICONS had traditionally targeted upper-division political science majors through a comparative foreign policy seminar. This project broadened the scope to include lower-division and non-major students. Participation on other campuses had mostly been the result of "word of mouth," informal networks of friends, and scattered presentations at conferences over the years. This initiative brought together a new community of participants, based on their interest in the politics of the "new Europe," as well as their desire to bring active and authentic distance learning to their students.

Project Description

There were four main features of the International Negotiation Seminars Project: (1) a substantive focus on international issues, such as trade, the environment, security, and ethnicity; (2) a focus on group decision-making, with students working together to prepare for and then portray high level negotiators for a nation other than their own; (3) an authentic cross-cultural experience, as students negotiated with peers at overseas institutions; (4) an introduction to the technology of the twenty-first century, as students conducted research using Internet resources and communicated and worked with one another using real-time computer conferencing.

Project Results

An extensive multi-method evaluation responsive to the specific nature of the program was conducted. It showed that indices of knowledge and cognitive sophistication about international relations increased in all semesters. Self-monitored knowledge also increased, and the large majority of students were very much involved and learned from the innovative features of the course. As part of the evaluation a computer-assisted questionnaire was developed.

The Introduction to International Negotiation Course and accompanying "New Europe Simulation" will continue to be offered on a yearly basis. Follow-up funding is being sought to explore new mediums of communication for cross-national working groups, including video technology and collaborative "whiteboarding."

Summary and Conclusions

The International Negotiation Seminars Project was designed to reach more students at the critical beginning stages of their college careers with an active learning strategy. To enhance the experience, interdisciplinary teaching assistants and lecturers were brought into the classroom environment. A premium was also placed on collaborative learning, as students worked in small-groups with facilitators to augment the lecture mode of learning. Authenticity was lent to the "New Europe Simulation," developed with FIPSE-funding, through the participation of institutions in post-communist Europe.

Evaluation of the project suggests that for the large majority of students, it has successfully raised their involvement in their own learning process. However, it is not easy to use non-traditional methods of teaching in large, lower-division classes. There is resistance from students who are concerned with the preservation of their grade point averages and do not wish to take a "risk" on group work. Students must also be carefully tracked through the course of the semester to ensure that the experience is positive and that their feedback is receiving attention. This requires that the lead instructor have ample assistance. Requirements must be very clearly laid out in the course syllabus and a distinction made between substantive material that students will be tested on and the undefined parameters for participation in the simulation.

INTERNATIONAL NEGOTIATION SEMINARS PROJECT
(University of Maryland, College Park)

FINAL REPORT

PROJECT OVERVIEW

With the support of a three-year grant from the US Department of Education's Fund for the Improvement of Post-Secondary Education (FIPSE), the International Communication and Negotiation Simulation (ICONS) Project at the University of Maryland has developed a dynamic, interactive model for undergraduate instruction in which role-playing exercises and computer-networked communication are built into an international relations course for sophomores. This initiative built on the success of the ICONS multi-site, computer-assisted negotiation simulation -- used for secondary, post-secondary, and special training activities since the early 1980s. The current project focused on incorporating major aspects of this curriculum innovation for the large undergraduate lecture classroom. Small group collaboration was built into the design of the new "Introduction to International Negotiation" course. A customized "New Europe Simulation," with authentic European participation, allowed the students to gain hands-on training as they played the role of international negotiators.

Previously, ICONS had been used in an upper-division political science seminar setting with students on the University of Maryland campus. The Negotiation Seminars Project targeted lower-division undergraduates from a variety of majors and set up this new course for them, designed to combine lecture with a small-group "seminar" type learning environment (See course syllabus in Appendix A). The weekly discussion section meeting, often used to complement lectures in a large, introductory course, was instead used to prepare students for participation in the negotiation simulation. Each discussion section (of approximately 16 students) was given a country assignment and with the help of a graduate assistant -- acting as a group facilitator -- research, policy formation, and negotiation were carried out (Appendix B: sample group research paper and sample messages). The cross-disciplinary nature of international relations was emphasized through guest lectures from disciplines other than political science and through the use of graduate assistants from various disciplines. Over the course of five semesters, more than 400 students at the University of Maryland participated in the Negotiation Seminars Project. Eight hundred additional students at other institutions in the United States and Europe took part in the "New Europe Simulation," a central feature of the FIPSE-funded project (Appendix C: participating institutions). The multilateral negotiations were launched by a tailored scenario that focused on ethnic relations, security concerns, economic development, and environmental degradation in post-Cold War Europe. Evaluation of the project showed an increase in cognitive outcomes and very high levels of involvement and participation. Several innovations in the design of undergraduate instruction and methods for its evaluation using computer networks were successfully realized.

Since funding has concluded, the initiative is continuing through the continued offering of the

Introduction to International Negotiation course on the Maryland campus, and a new Fall 1995 version of the New Europe simulation has been developed.

In 1994, the International Negotiation Seminars Project was recognized by the Maryland Association for Higher Education (MAHE) as a Distinguished Program at its Annual Meeting in Baltimore, Maryland (See Appendix D for award notification). Descriptions of the project have been published in Educators Tech Exchange (Fall 1994) and the MAHE Journal (Fall 1995) (Appendix E: copies of articles). Presentations of the approach were delivered to the International Studies Association (1995), the Comparative International Education Society (1994, 1995), and the Maryland International Faculty and Administration Association (1994) (See Appendix F for papers). The Evaluator published an article including data from the evaluation in Perspectives in Political Science (1995), and has also delivered papers regarding the evaluation at the American Psychological Association and the American Association of Law Schools.

PURPOSE

The educational problem that was targeted by the Negotiation Seminars Project was the widespread failure of university curriculum to actively engage lower-division students in their own learning processes and in self-monitoring of what they are learning. Large campuses such as the University of Maryland suffer especially high levels of attrition at the first and second year levels. A lack of sense of community, few opportunities to meet students with common interests, little personal contact with professors, and the lack of authentic connections between real life issues and the subject matter of courses are all problems cited by students as primary reasons for disengaging from the college experience. Yet, on these same campuses one also finds professors with expertise on a broad range of subjects connected to vital contemporary issues, expensive state-of-the-art interactive technology, and diverse communities of learners anxious to engage in a common endeavor. The notion that one has to wait for "senior seminars" or graduate school to take advantage of these resources misses enormous opportunities.

In developing a cost-effective way to reach lower-division undergraduates, a necessity in this era of shrinking resources, the Negotiation Seminars model focused on already-existing resources and techniques for enhancing learning. Inviting guest lecturers from relevant disciplines, arranging to "swap" for graduate assistants from other departments, using pre-arranged "discussion sections" as small-group seminars, and using the Internet and other existing technologies to introduce students to communication with those at other universities in the U.S. and the rest of the world are all elements of a model that can now be generalized to other disciplines as well as disseminated to other campuses.

However, even cost-effective measures such as these can be difficult to implement without administrative support. One way to launch an initiative such as this is to take advantage of campus-wide "internationalization of the curriculum" approaches that often have some

funding and other impetuses for cooperation. Other initiatives are also being launched on many campuses to push for further integration of technology into teaching. It is often possible to secure a technical support network through such means -- an important asset for the instructor who is planning to use technology-aided active learning in his/her classroom. Students do need training and monitoring, and requiring students to work in groups also requires that adequate facilitation be provided. Many students are uncomfortable with the idea of collaborative work, especially when grades are based on something other than just individual achievement. Although innovation may be important for program designers, students rightly demand to know clear what the goals, pedagogy, and evaluation methods of a course are going to be.

BACKGROUND AND ORIGINS

The International Negotiation Seminars Project had an advantage in that it was built upon a proven educational tool, ICONS. This simulation model had been developed and fine-tuned over the course of a decade with grant assistance from such sources as the Maryland State Department of Education, IBM, and the United States Institute of Peace. Project ICONS also has institutional support on the University of Maryland campus and benefits in efforts to recruit, train and disseminate, from its location in the greater Washington, D.C. area.

The FIPSE initiative was an opportunity for ICONS to broaden its role on the University of Maryland campus, expand the model to other campuses in the state of Maryland and around the United States, and develop a distance learning connection between American students and their peers in post-communist central and eastern Europe. It capitalized on the existing simulation model and added to it a blueprint for an active-learning approach in a lower-division undergraduate course. The elements of coordination and support that were necessary to the project at an institutional level included: (1) the support and contributions of a number of professors on the College Park campus and at participant institutions who worked with us to develop the approach and worked with the students to implement the New Europe Simulation, (2) the assistance of the Teaching Technologies Staff at the University of Maryland who made state-of-the-art teaching facilities available to the project and assisted in experiments with video conferencing across campuses, (3) support from the University and the College of Behavioral and Social Sciences for the development of the Introduction to International Negotiation course that provided the framework for the project on the College Park campus, (4) support from the College of Education for the evaluation.

FIPSE was the sole external funder of the initiative. However, the project did benefit tremendously from the communications access now afforded by Internet (funded by NSF among other sources). The cementing of partnerships with European institutions, following initial face-to-face meetings, and the ability to disseminate information on the project were facilitated by this channel.

This initiative was, therefore, aided by the existence of a prior, successful simulation model;

an existing organization devoted to the implementation of that model; and, the resources and location of the University of Maryland, College Park. The learning approach developed during the course of the project, however, does not require extensive institutional resources. Curricular and structural innovation can come from taking advantage of existing opportunities. For example, on most college campuses the question now is not how to acquire access to technology, it is how to utilize that technology in the undergraduate classroom.

PROJECT DESCRIPTION

The International Negotiation Seminars Project was designed to bring an international, interactive, interdisciplinary educational approach to a broad range of students early in their academic careers. Recasting the large lecture class into small group seminars and introducing the students to the world of international negotiation through a computer-assisted simulation was deemed a cost-effective way to tackle reform at three essential levels: curricular, structural, and technological. The central features of the project were as follows:

- A substantive focus on international issues, such as trade, the environment, security, and ethnicity within a course in International Negotiations,
- A focus on group decision-making, as students worked together to prepare a set of policy position statements and then to play the roles of high-level international negotiators,
- An authentic cross-cultural experience, as students negotiated with peers at overseas institutions,
- An introduction to the technology of the 21st century, as students conducted research using Internet resources and communicated with one another using synchronous (on-line) and asynchronous (electronic-mail type) modes of computer-facilitated communication.

Pilot Year (1992-93)

An incremental approach was used for the implementation of the project. The Pilot Year was devoted to the development and testing of the approach. This involved designing the new negotiation course and getting it approved by the University. In the meantime, the approach was used in one section of a "Introduction to International Relations" course, a lower-division "survey course." There was also the development of curriculum materials and a scenario to set the parameters and guide the "New Europe Simulation" (See G for the revised simulation scenario). Noted faculty were recruited from across the College Park campus to participate, links were established with European institutions, and graduate assistants from collaborating disciplines were trained as team facilitators. Finally, project

staff worked with internal project evaluator, Dr. Judith Torney-Purta, to develop an evaluation plan for the project.

At the Evaluation Workshop for the Pilot Year, attended by Project staff, faculty participants, and internal and external evaluators, efforts were made to identify goals for the following year and pinpoint areas in need of modification. Two problems identified were that students needed to be better prepared to actually negotiate and that a small number of students prone to marginalization needed to be better integrated into course activities. It was hoped -- and indeed proved correct -- that the new course on international negotiation would be a better home for the project. Other responses to this discussion were the integration of case-studies (Pew Case Studies, distributed by the Institute of International Diplomacy at Georgetown University) into the course syllabus to provide students better and earlier access to the world of negotiation. Facilitators on participant campuses were encouraged to make use of this resource as well. The marginalization problem was thought to have surfaced in large part because sophomore students for whom this was a first course in politics or international relations composed a large part of the student population. It was addressed by alerting the group leaders to potential difficulties and by providing some additional structure to the course. A very clear syllabus was developed that outlined expectations on a week-by-week basis and weekly quizzes and writing assignments were required to encourage students to keep up with readings, lectures, and research on the issue areas.

Year 1 (1993-1994)

During Year 1 the new international negotiation course was offered and the full-blown "New Europe" simulation was conducted with participation from Frostburg State University and Morgan State University in Maryland as well as the University of Warsaw, Lorand Eotvos University in Hungary, Jyvaskyla Technical University in Finland, Novosibirsk State University in Russia and Budapest University of Economic Sciences. Team meetings were also held in the multimedia campus "teaching theaters" for the first time. This necessitated extensive training for the lead instructor and group facilitators assigned to the rooms, who had to work to try to fit the hardware and software capabilities of these rooms to the "ICONS mission" -- enhanced group collaboration and communication. Evaluation efforts were begun in earnest during the Fall semester of 1993, when University of Maryland students were administered paper and pencil questionnaires by the Evaluator. In the Spring Semester of 1994, using software developed by Dr. David Crookal of Project IDEALS at the University of Alabama (FIPSE-funded), an on-line version of Dr. Torney-Purta's pre and post-questionnaire was developed and administered to students, facilitating the collection of data on the project.

At the second evaluation workshop, it was determined that the simulation exercise was running very smoothly and attention should be focused once again on ways to improve the "seminar" experience on the College Park campus. Three areas in need of modification were identified. The interdisciplinary guest lectures were being viewed by too many students as less important than those by the regular lecturer. This was addressed by redesigning the

syllabus so that the faculty experts could work with groups of students -- cutting across country teams -- who were conducting research in their areas of expertise. This small-group mentoring role proved to be more satisfying to the professors and students alike. There were also problems with the "fit" of the interdisciplinary teaching assistants to the course. Recruited based on their knowledge of one of the issue areas central to the negotiations, but outside the traditional purview of political science -- business/economics and environmental resources -- these assistants were uncomfortable working with the undergraduates on the overall course content. It was decided that this could be remedied by redefining their role to be that of "group facilitators" for the simulation. In this way, the weekly team meetings were devoted entirely to preparation, conduct and debriefing of the simulation experience. Theoretical material was handled in whole group/lecture meetings only. Finally, ways to relieve tensions about grading these procedures were discussed. Students were continuing to exhibit discomfort with the group research and participation grades they were assigned. It was suggested that they be given more direct responsibility in the grading through a formal peer review and self-evaluation process.

Year 2 (1994-1995)

In Year Two, students were (finally!) satisfied with the way their efforts were being assessed (Appendix H: Peer Review and Activity Report sheets that were distributed on a biweekly basis). Additional universities from outside the state of Maryland also joined the project (James Madison University in Virginia and The Cooper Union in New York joined the eight existing participants in negotiations on ethnic, security, economic and environmental conditions in Europe). As the final FIPSE-funded year came to an end, the classroom model was firmly in place with the small group seminars running smoothly under the direction of trained group facilitators, peer review of performances constituting an important part of assessment, experts from international business and environmental resources working with groups of students on their research, and multimedia classroom technology aiding in student research and communications efforts. A few students continue to be minimal participants during the semester, a probable reaction to the amount of effort required in the course and to the nature of the course, with its focus on collaboration in an unfamiliar subject area. However, facilitators are encouraged to discuss these problems with the class during the semester, in hopes that the students themselves will be able to encourage one another to remain engaged and participate.

EVALUATION/PROJECT RESULTS

Data were collected from students early and late in the semester each of the four semesters of Years 1 and 2 for the University of Maryland students only; a total of 185 respondents answered both early- and late-semester questionnaires. Only students who completed both early- and late-semester questionnaires were used in the analysis. There was some difficulty in motivating students to complete the late-semester questionnaire because of pressure of time during the last weeks of the semester.

The first semester of the first year used a paper and pencil version of the questionnaire, including a concept map to be drawn relating to the topic Migration in Europe. The second semester of the first year used a computer-assisted questionnaire and a paper concept map on the same topic. Both semesters of the second year used the computer-assisted questionnaire and no paper exercise.

All questionnaires included a variety of self ratings of knowledge and involvement in the course along with short answer questions about the country on whose team the student was playing in the simulation. Each year at least one on-line conference was observed and running notes recorded, as a check on process within the groups.

The majority of students taking the course are sophomores and juniors (70-80%) with a mean age of 21. Although majors across the campus take the course, the large majority in the first year were from fields such as government and politics, history, or economics. In the first year slightly more than half were considering a career in an internationally related field, in the second year slightly fewer than half. The proportion of those taking the class for Distributive Studies credit went from 32.6% in the fall semester 1993 to 49.4% in 1994-95. There was also a wider range of majors represented in students in the second year. All evidence suggests that by the second year the course was enrolling the general undergraduate for whom it was designed.

More males than female enroll, but a check for significant gender differences in achievement or experience revealed very few (e.g, female students are more likely to work in the sections to ensure that everyone's position is heard and considered). One semester when members of a fraternity enrolled in a country section as a group did provide some interesting perspectives on negotiation by all male groups who know each other well!

The remainder of this section will provide information about cognitive change and knowledge (gained from several measures, including concept maps and ratings of short answer responses, some of which will be quoted) and about the characteristics of the course from the students' point of view and student involvement.

6. Evidence Concerning the Characteristics of the Course and Student Involvement

Students were asked to rate each aspect of the course (e.g., lectures, reading and composing e-mail messages, etc.) for what they believed it contributed to their learning. Table 6 presents the figures separately for the two semesters of the first year and then for the entire second year.

Table 6
Mean Ratings for Contributions to Learning of Course Elements
Standard Deviations in Parentheses
(1 = not important at all; 7 = very important)

	Fall 1993	Spring 1994	Fall 1994/ Spring 1995
Preparing to write position paper	5.62 (1.38)	5.60 (1.32)	5.69 (1.36)
Lectures	5.69 (1.35)	4.96 (1.31)	4.77 (1.59)
On-line conferences	5.00 (##)	5.00 (##)	5.60 (##)
Discussions with team members	5.34 (1.77)	5.52 (1.31)	5.48 (1.57)
Reviewing email	5.93 (.93)	5.72 (1.19)	5.61 (1.51)
Reading assignments	5.32 (1.47)	5.29 (1.33)	5.06 (1.51)

Not all students answered this question, as some did not attend any on-line conferences (they were scheduled for Saturdays, which conflicted with the schedules of some students) so standard deviations have not been computed.

The review of e-mail messages during the simulation and preparing to write the policy position paper were rated very highly in their contribution to learning. The on-line conferences were not attended by all students, but made a contribution, more in the second year. The lectures were thought to be more valuable by many students, especially by students in the fall of the first year; discussion with team members were highly valued especially in the spring of the first year and during the second year. Reading assignments make a solid contribution, about equal in the two semesters of the first year, but somewhat less in the second year.

Evidence of Cognitive Change Relating to Major Course Topics

1. Self Ratings of International Knowledge

Most college students are quite aware of what and how they are learning. And one purpose of courses designed for active learning, as this one, is to make students even better at self-monitoring of learning. Table 1 is based on students' self ratings (early and late semester) of their international knowledge in the three general areas of the course. A 9 point scale was used, where 1 represents very little knowledge and 9 the knowledge which a diplomat would have.

Table 1
Early and Late Semester Means on
Self Assessments of Knowledge
Standard Deviations in Parentheses

	Fall 1993		Spring 1994		Fall 1994 and Spring 1995	
	Early	Late	Early	Late	Early	Late
Economics	4.84 (2.22)	5.51 (1.57)	4.35 (1.82)	left out	3.64 (1.95)	4.89 (1.94)
Environment	4.62 (2.27)	4.84 (1.88)	4.40 (1.46)	5.05 (1.99)	3.77 (1.74)	4.80 (1.85)
Politics	5.91 (2.06)	6.86 (1.41)	5.85 (1.73)	6.51 (1.57)	5.11 (2.02)	5.93 (1.82)

Paired t tests for significance applied to the merged 1994-95 data show significant improvements on each of the scales, significant at the .001 level. In the earlier semesters the growth in rating for environment in Fall 1993 would not have been significant; the others would have.

In the second year, perhaps as the course draws a more diverse group with fewer majors in the social sciences, the early semester ratings are substantially lower. The slope of increase appears to be about the same across semesters in ratings of knowledge of international economics and politics, but it is somewhat more variable for knowledge of environmental issues.

For the second year data only, we checked to see whether those students who worked on an issue group in the area showed especially high late-semester ratings. The correlation between being in the group specialized for economics and late-semester rated knowledge of economics was .401, and between being in the group specialized in environment and late-

semester rated knowledge of environment was .363. But there were also correlations between some of the levels of participation variables and these late-semester ratings (to be covered later), suggesting that students who participate and are involved in the process feel that they learn about the general topics of politics and economics even if they are not in the specialized group for those issues. The knowledge of environmental issues, in contrast, seems to be enhanced primarily in the group specialized to deal with that issue.

2. European Union Membership Question

Some of the questions repeated in the early and late semester ask the students about the real life situation of the country on whose team they will be playing. Analyzing these requires coding by team. For example, this is one question "Is your country a member of the EU?" For some teams the Yes answer is correct, for other the No answer; a don't know response was also provided. In the second year data only we coded this for correctness. In the early semester responses, 25.3% gave a correct answer and 24.1% said they didn't know; in the late semester responses, 88.5% gave a correct answer and 2.3% said they didn't know. This is a statistically significant change. This is a basic piece of information which nearly all students acquire.

Other questions, such as those regarding the economic strength of a country or its position on environmental standards, proved to be more difficult to code unambiguously right or wrong. Generally students did show more knowledge of their country-team's position on these questions as well.

3. Justifications of Answers to Questions About Country-Team

In addition to the numerical choice of an answer to the questions about economic strength, the EU, and environmental standards, students responding to each question were asked to justify their response ("what is it about country that leads you to give that response?"). These responses for the second year were printed out in their entirety and then coded on a 4 point scale, where 0 indicates no response, don't know, or completely irrelevant and 3 indicates a well developed response dealing accurately with several points. Two coders worked for reliable coding and then coded the justification given for economic strength, for expanding the EU, and for environmental standards for a random selection of students. Fall data are presented in Table 2.

Table 2
Early and Late Semester Means on Quality of Elaboration in Written Justifications
Standard Deviations in Parentheses
Fall 1994, N = 38

	Early Sem.	Late Sem.
Economic strength	.94 (.804)	1.23 (.634)
EU expansion	.63 (.883)	1.02 (.716)
Environ. standards	.76 (.752)	1.13 (.811)

The economic strength comparison just failed to reach significance, but the other two were significantly higher in the late semester at the .05 level of significance.

We made the mistake of trying to refine these justification questions in the Spring, separating the questions for those who said the country wanted to broaden membership from those who said the EU should be closed. This seemed to confuse some students and cut the number of usable responses.

During the semester of the first year, in which we used paper questionnaires, we used the proportion of respondents who did not write any elaboration as a measure of something similar. (The computer version prompts the student to enter something, even one or two words, rather than leaving the justification blank. Thus the figures for blank are very small for both early and late semester when the questionnaire is given in a computer format.) We analyzed the number of students in Fall 1993 who did not write any justification for the answers (see Table 3).

Table 3
Early Semester and Late Semester Percentages of
Respondents Who Did Not Write Any Justification for Answer
Fall 1993, N = 43

Question Topic:	Early	Late
Economic strength	16.3%	4.7%
EU expansion	74.4	16.3
Environ. standards	65.1	18.6

Table 4 includes a comparison of particular answers for a selection of students from three teams during the fall 1993 semester. Note the extent to which students enter the course with little information generally or specifically about issues relating to the EC/EU but show an ability to call upon more advanced concepts and linkages late in the semester. Of the students who gave a justification in the late-semester questionnaire a large percent dealt with a wish that their country be allowed to enter in order to strengthen their economy in general or obtain access to markets. Among students representing countries which did not favor expansion, common responses were that the country did not want to accept responsibility for weaker nations or wished to maintain the EC's "exclusivity."

Results from the question dealing with the country's position on environmental problems and standards were similar. Here also, the late semester answers show considerably more sophistication. In particular, several students refer to the problem of trade offs or balancing both positive and negative aspects of standards and stressing economic concerns or impacts.

Table 4
Early Semester and Late Semester Selected Open-Ended Responses to
Question: What reasons does this country give for wanting to expand or
limit membership in the EC? (selected)

Team members from Turkey:

20-year old female, major in GVPT:

Early: blank

Late: EC should not give full membership to the Scandinavian countries until Turkey has been admitted. Turkey has been waiting for a long time. Eastern European countries need EC membership in order to further develop economically.

20-year old female, major in GVPT:

Early: blank

Late: Opportunity for free trade; establishment of closer economic ties to countries in Western Europe.

20-year-old female, major in Spanish:

Early: blank

Late: Want to expand to themselves. Convertible money, markets, stable economy, stable government.

Team members from Ukraine:

23-year old female, major in GVPT:

Early: I don't know if it has an interest in expanding the EC, but it had close relations with other Eastern European countries in the past and is open to Western ideas and economical benefits.

Late: It (Ukraine) wants to be independent from the former Soviet Union but knows that it is economically not strong enough to be accepted into the EC. However, it requests aid from EC members to build itself up.

19-year-old male, major in Biology:

Early: Don't know.

Late: Ukraine would like to establish itself as a power before looking for membership in an organization like EC. It hopes other nations feel the same way so that the East bloc becomes stable.

19-year old female, major in GVPT:

Early: blank

Late: Well, we feel that we aren't going to get into the EC anytime soon, so in the meanwhile post-Soviet nations should form an alliance in order to advance economically.

Team members from Germany

20 year old male, major in GVPT:

Early: blank

Late: Although we acted differently (in the team), Germany wants to strengthen its economy through the EC without so many nations having access to the advantages of the EC.

18 year old female, undecided about major:

Early: blank

Late: This country has too much of the responsibility for taking in immigrants and for giving money and so does not want to expand membership.

A final question given to the students concerned the extent to which they see the major issues in the simulation as connected or independent.

Which of the following problems do you believe will be most difficult for the countries of Europe (East and West) to solve in the next ten years? Briefly justify.

- 1) establishing economic stability and growth in Europe
- 2) establishing and maintaining democratic governments in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union
- 3) dealing with immigrants and refugees
- 4) these problems are so closely connected that one cannot be solved without the others.

Our interest was especially in the students' gravitating to seeing the relationship of these problems, by choosing 4 late in the semester. That in fact happened. In the fall 1993, 51% chose 4 early in the semester, increasing to 81% in the later semester responses. In the spring 1994, 53% chose 4 early in the semester. The movement this semester was not as striking, with 56% choosing 4 later in the semester. Economic issues were likely to still be thought to be most central in this semester. A few responses from the fall are cited below:

One respondent chose 1 (economic stability) early in the semester but changed to 4 (interrelated) with this justification:

The economy encompasses east and west (although Western Europe doesn't always see it that way). Democracy is vital to accomplishing economic stability. And immigration must be kept in check to ensure economic stability as well. If there is stability in all countries the problem of immigrants and refugees will diminish.

Another respondent chose 2 (democracy) early in the semester, justifying it with reference to the former Soviet republics having "nuclear weapons to go and blow up any one of the other countries." In the late semester questionnaire this student chose 4 (interrelated) with the following justification:

With immigrants you need jobs. With refugees you need money to support them so you need economic stability. They'll be refugees arriving to Western Europe if the countries are in war and not democratic.

In summary, students late in the semester showed considerably more elaborated thinking in dealing with international issues and seeing linkages between problems.

4. Analysis of Concepts Maps of "Immigration in Europe"

Concept mapping techniques can be useful as a measure of something about the structure of prior knowledge brought into the simulation experience and the change or reorganization which takes place. In both semesters of the first year students were asked to draw a concept map of "immigration in Europe" (Fall 1993) and "migration in Europe" (Spring 1994). This technique was not used in the second year in part because proved cumbersome to combine computer-assisted and paper and pencil techniques. (In the future we are planning to develop the computer software to allow students to perform similar tasks on-line.)

The analysis of these concept maps is based on material prepared by Dr. Joanne Hirsch, who developed a number of methods for analyzing these maps as part of her dissertation. The methodology she uses is to read through about one third of the early- and late-semester maps to develop categories of concepts included in maps, then to count instances of those concepts. A map could be coded for including several concepts from one category and could also include concepts from more than one category. Only those who had completed both early-

and late-semester maps were analyzed, so the N's were 53 for semester 1 and 41 for semester 2 of year 1.

Category 1 concepts included causes of migration, primarily in the country of origin. Examples include persecution; language or culture conflicts; ethnic or racial conflicts; religious tensions; economic or political instability; social problems such as housing or health, sometimes phrased as low quality of life; oppression.

Category 2 concepts included reasons for emigrating in the sense of opportunities foreseen in the new country. Examples are better opportunities for jobs, quality of life, education or freedom.

Category 3 concepts included problems faced in the new country by immigrants or created for the country by the presence of immigrants. Examples include nationalism, neo-Nazism, right wing or skinhead movements; immigration policy; ethnic, racial, or religious issues; economic concerns including displacement of host country's workers; civil right and citizenship; social concerns such as overcrowding.

Category 4 concepts included the involvement of nations with each other or the work of international organizations or alliances. Examples include NATO, European Union; economic issues such as regional trade agreements; unification in one Europe with a common immigration policy.

There is a movement from early to late semester from a concentration on the situations causing migration in the home country and the appeal of a new country to problems experienced in countries which have received a large number of immigrants and to cross-national and international issues. The movement to problems in the new country is quite a bit more pronounced in the fall than in the spring semester (where, in general, immigration tends to have been a less prominent issue in the class).

In addition to the data included in these categories, there were historical references, especially in early-semester maps (for example the Spanish Inquisition). Some students also appeared to use references to World War II migrations, the Berlin wall, and the break up of nations to establish a historical context for understanding migration. There were 21 such references in the early semester maps (both semesters) and 6 in the late semester maps. Some students also included the flow of immigration (South to North or East to West), as well as indicating specific countries or regions. There were 36 such references in the early semester maps and 18 in the late semester maps.

Table 5
 Frequency of Concepts Included in Maps by Category
 Early- and Late-Semester Maps separately by Semester
 (1993-94 academic year)

	Category 1		Category 2		Category 3		Category 4	
	Fall	Spring	Fall	Spring	Fall	Spring	Fall	Spring
Early semester	108	77	30	28	57	72	18	8
Late semester	53	52	22	8	74	77	33	13

In the following section (and, see Appendix I) several examples of maps will be presented to show the movement of students from use of concepts from one category to use of concepts from another.

Early Semester Map Category 1, Late Semester Map in Category 3: Figures 1 and 2 illustrate the movement from concern for conditions in the home country which lead to immigration in the first map to concern for the conditions, issues and impacts created in the host country. Figures 3 and 4 are a slightly less full example of the same movement. Students enter the course with a greater knowledge base about why individuals wish to migrate than about resulting problems once they have migrated, and that is what they learn about through the course experience.

Early Semester Map Category 1/2, Late Semester Map in Category 4: Figures 5 and 6 illustrate the movement from primarily category 1 and 2 concepts, causes for migration and positive reasons for migration to a concern for international organizations and for policy issue in the host country and between countries.

In general, these maps and the larger number of students overall who used category 4 concepts in the second map (see Table 5) show the student's heightened awareness of both domestic policy issues and issues existing at the global, international, regional, and national levels (primarily economic issues, with some political ones as well). Problems are perceived from multiple perspective--the immigrant, the host nation, the citizens, international and

regional processes. This is evidence of the impact of the course upon the organization of knowledge

5. Students' Reasoning for Choice of Negotiation Style

Some of the specifics of what students are learning in the course can also be gleaned from their response to a question regarding how they chose their negotiation style. There was considerable variation in whether they thought they were being tough negotiators.

Some mentioned the personal:

I felt that when trying to reach an agreement it is best to have others help form that agreement than to try to force them to "understand" why your own ideas are right.

Some mentioned characteristics of the country:

We were simulating a weak country in economic and political desperation (sic). The strategy we chose reflected this.

Since Ukraine has its valuable resources of soil, agriculture, and nuclear weapons and capabilities, it was able to, in a sense, compromise in a "forceful" way.

Turkey is a country where bargaining about something and haggling is a common way to deal with a situation. They are open to other statements but still take their position as a starting point from where they move towards the other party. Everything is negotiable.

We, France, decided to act fairly bullish in our negotiations because we are a world power. Letting weak countries such as Estonia create the agenda (sic) would not be in our best interest.

We wanted to show that Germany was a major player in the international realm, but we did not want to bully people, especially on the on-line conferences and messages because it was not proper to be bossy when it was not in person.

Russia felt that the other countries held bad feelings towards us, which turned out to be true. We needed the support of the other countries to get the aid we needed in order to further the recovery of our nation. By taking a somewhat relaxed stance we hoped to win the other countries over to our side. Unfortunately this did not happen, so Russia had to take the position of the bully to get things accomplished.

Some had specific policy goals that influenced the policy choice:

I thought that if we sit back and let the "big boys" (France and Germany) fight over the issues, we could do our negotiating bilaterally where we would have more power. We did not have a strong voice in a multilateral level but at the bilateral level.

Clearly, these students have acquired the ability not only to negotiate in a simulated international setting but to be thoughtful about their reasons for choosing a specific negotiating style. These responses also give a sense of how real the role of diplomat was becoming for these students.

Students were in both years, for the most part, highly involved in the program. On a 7-point-scale the mean for "interested" (rather than bored) ranged from 5.5 (in the lowest semester) to 5.8 (in the higher semester); the mean for "challenged" from 5.2 to 5.3; the mean for "identified with the country" ranged from 5.1 to 5.6.

Students were also asked about the process of the team group, especially in the cognitive processes associated with writing messages and positions, and the participation processes. Students reported active participation cognitively in the work of their teams -- again on a 7-point-scale the mean for "analyzed alternative choices" ranged from 5.4 (in the lowest semester) to 5.8 (in the highest); for "suggested alternatives others had not considered" the mean was 5.1 to 5.4; for "ensured messages and positions were clear" the means ranged from 5.2 to 5.4. In contrast, the mean for the item "felt I had few ideas to contribute" ranged from 3.0 to 3.8. Students also tried to listen to each other and encourage everyone's participation. Means, again on a seven point scale for "listened to others' points of view" were 5.6 to 5.8; for "tried to be open to the ideas of others" means were from 5.7 to 6.2.

In the fall semester of 1993, the correlational patterns showed that there appeared to be a cluster of students who rated learning from the ICONS part of the course especially highly, that is there were significant correlations between learning from policy position paper preparation, learning from the online conferences, and learning from email. These students also rated themselves as generally high in involvement in the course (e.g., more challenged, involved and not bored, identified with their country and the role of diplomat). In the spring, because many students did not attend the Saturday online conferences, it was learning from the email that tended to correlate with involvement and challenge. Another cluster of students rated themselves as learning from lectures and from readings, perhaps the more traditional students. There were no significant gender differences in these patterns. Both male and female students are equally represented in those who learn, especially from the innovative course aspects.

In an attempt to investigate more fully the elements specific to this innovative program -- including group-written policy position papers requiring students to take another country's perspective on a relatively narrow international issue, discussing with class members in the context of collaborative decision making for the team, and receiving messages on email from other teams representing other countries' perspectives, and (for some students) on-line conference -- some scale and correlational analysis was conducted for the second year data.

The first step was to construct some scales based on item correlations and to check their reliability. Eighty seven respondents' records were available for this analysis:

Involvement Scale: average of felt interested, very involved, very challenged, identified with role of diplomat, identified with country - alpha reliability .901. Range on 7 point scale, 1.20 to 7.00, median 5.6.

Contribution Scale: average of made suggestions, analyzed alternatives choices, reminded group to stick to goals, suggested alternatives not considered, ensured messages and positions were clear - alpha reliability .904 Range on 7 point scale, 1.20 to 7.00, median 5.8

Encouragement Scale: average of tried to be open to ideas of others, encouraged team members to express views, listened to others' points of view, tried to ensure everyone felt part of discussion - alpha reliability .828 Range on 7 point scale, 1.75 to 7.00, median 5.75

Learning from Innovative Features: average of importance of discussion with team members and importance of reviewing email messages - alpha reliability .804 Range on 7 point scale 1.00 to 7.00, Median 6.00

Among the interesting correlations are these.

Involvement, Contribution, and Encouragement scales all correlate with importance of learning from online conferences, from discussion with peers, and from reading email messages (in general with what we are calling "Learning from Innovative features").

Involvement, Contribution, and Participation scales all correlate significantly with Late Semester self rating of Economics knowledge and with self rating of Politics' Knowledge.

The single ratings for learning from the paper and learning from lecture also correlate with Late Semester self ratings of Economics knowledge and Politics knowledge.

Contribution and Encouragement scales correlate significantly with anticipated grade in the course.

We can conclude that there is a group, representing the large majority of the class, which is highly involved, identified with new roles and perspectives, and learning a great deal from the position paper writing, electronic mail exchange, and team discussions. There is also a sizeable group, overlapping the first, which tries very hard to keep the groups running smoothly and to make sure all opinions are heard. Many students try to convince teammates of their opinions.

There are some students who don't participate much and who, perhaps because they expect a more traditional or less demanding course or prefer learning and making connections by themselves, rather than in groups, are not particularly involved in the innovative aspects of this program. Some of them belong in what we might call a "prefer to learn from traditional means" group. We have done a great deal to involve this small group of students. We cannot, after all, force them to participate. What we have done is to make clear to them at the beginning of the semester what is involved in the non-traditional aspects of this course and how they will be evaluated; then we give them experiences which have been designed over a decade to be interesting to them, and to be authentically related to the real world; finally through the group assistants we give them support and assistance in their involvement if they appear to need and want it.

CONTINUATION AND DISSEMINATION

Both the Introduction to International Negotiation course and the New Europe Simulation experience are being offered during the Fall 1995 semester. The course will be offered again in the Spring semester and then will continue to be offered on a once or twice yearly basis. The structure of the course remains the same without external funding, except that we now must rely on "volunteer" guest lecturers to work with the students and we cannot hire

graduate students from outside our department to work on the course. This will make it challenging to continue the interdisciplinary nature of the class without the external funding. The simulation experience has been modified to focus the negotiations on specific issues. Nuclear proliferation in Europe and transboundary water issues will provide the foci for the exercises, which continue to feature participation from European universities. It is hoped that the issue focus will further increase the level of sophistication of the negotiations. This "experiment" is being conducted in the post-FIPSE environment.

A strong effort was made to seek University of Maryland System funding for a continuation of the FIPSE Project -- incorporating more advanced technology into the interactions between students, and expanding participation to additional universities in the state of Maryland -- but, it was unsuccessful for 1995. We are considering resubmitting this proposal in the 1996 competition. We are also working with Immaculate Heart College Center in California, a recent recipient of a FIPSE grant, in an effort to adapt ICONS to the community college classroom. We are seeking further funds to develop the on-line computer-assisted evaluation questionnaire to make it useful to those in other disciplinary areas and at a variety of institutions. And, an initiative has been developed that would bring ICONS in a concerted fashion to minority student populations, through links with Historically Black Colleges and Hispanic Serving Institutions.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

The International Negotiation Seminars initiative was designed to reach more students at the critical beginning stages of their college careers with an active learning strategy. Using the successful ICONS simulation model, a premium was placed on active, collaborative learning. To enhance the experience, interdisciplinary teaching assistants and lecturers were brought into the learning environment. Authenticity was lent to the "New Europe Simulation" through the participation of institutions in post-Communist Europe. An extensive multi-method evaluation responsive to the specific nature of the program was conducted. It showed that indices of knowledge and cognitive sophistication about international relations increased in all semesters. Self-monitored knowledge also increased, and the large majority of students were very much involved and learned from the innovative features of the course.

This FIPSE-sponsored initiative has produced several legacies that will last well beyond the grant period (See "Feedback to FIPSE" in Appendix J and "Lessons Learned" in Appendix K). The centerpiece course, Introduction to International Negotiation, will continue to be offered on the College Park campus, targeting lower-division undergraduates, many of whom are not social science majors. Relationships built between ICONS and institutions in central and eastern Europe will continue to benefit participants in a variety of ICONS-sponsored simulation activities. The success of this as an effort to use information technologies in a way which incorporates a strong content dimension is also noteworthy. Efforts to disseminate the "lessons learned" through this experience will continue, in hopes that many additional campuses will look inward to take advantage of existing resources in their efforts to offer more engaging learning experiences to their students.

APPENDIX A

GVPT 250
Introduction to International Negotiation
Spring 1995

Instructor: Dr. Brigid Starkey/Office: 1127 C Tydings Hall
Phone: 405-7857/E-mail: bstarkey@bss2.umd.edu
Office Hours: Tues./Wed./Thurs.: 9-10 am/1:30-2:30 pm

Graduate TA's: Deepa Khosla/1127 F Tydings
Arturo Cordero/1127 F Tydings
Vladimir Pavlov/1127 A Tydings
Elizabeth Zinneker/1127 A Tydings

Purpose and Scope of Course

This is an introductory course in the area of international negotiation. It will cover such issues as: the role of negotiation as an instrument of foreign policy; the complexities of negotiations across cultures; the interrelationship between domestic and foreign policies; and the connections between economic, political, and social issues.

The method by which you will learn about international negotiations will involve a combination of lectures, group work, and participation in a "simulation" called ICONS (the International Communication and Negotiation Simulation). In this exercise, you will play the role of an international negotiator for one of the European nations.

This is an "active-learning" course, which means that it is more similar to the approach used in business programs than to traditional social science courses. The initiative is very much with the student. It requires motivation, creativity, and a willingness to work hard in class and outside of class. Much of the work that you do for this class, you will do as part of a group. Due to its unique nature, the course is recommended for students who enjoy being challenged and are willing to work in groups. It is not recommended for students who have very limited time for their courses and/or are unable to commit to the learning process (which includes completing all assignments thoroughly and on time). Your presence in this course beyond the first week will be taken to mean that you have thoroughly read this syllabus, understand all the requirements, and agree to participate fully.

This course has been developed in partial fulfillment of the terms of the grant award P1168B20355 from the Fund for the Improvement of Post-Secondary Education to Project ICONS. This course meets the CORE Human Cultural Diversity Requirement and is, therefore, designed to ensure that you will examine experiences, perspectives, and values different from those that are dominant in the United States.

Required Books

Please purchase the following for this course: (1) Negotiating Across Cultures (1991) Raymond Cohen; (2) Getting to Yes (1991) Fisher and Ury; (3) From the Atlantic to the Urals (1992) Calleo and Gordon; (4) Many Voices: Multilateral Negotiations in the World Arena (1992) Abiodun Williams. All required materials should be purchased at the beginning of the semester. I cannot guarantee availability beyond that point.

Course Requirements/Evaluation

We will meet twice a week in lecture and you will meet once a week in your section with your TA. Please note that discussion sections are not conducted in the traditional sense in this course. Your TA will be a "team facilitator." His/her job will not be to review lecture materials -- that is done in lecture. Rather, the TA will help you organize as a group and encourage you to work together effectively. All sessions are required and important!

There will be 4 components to your final grade:

- 25% Exam 1
- 25% Position Paper *
- 25% Participation/Attendance **
- 25% Final Exam

* The Position Paper is a group research paper. You will receive a subgroup and a whole group grade for this assignment. Each will count for one half of the overall grade for this component.

** You will receive a grade for the quality of your participation in this course. This will be assessed by your TA and by your peers. To this end, you will be asked to complete biweekly activity reports and peer review reports in section meetings. Contribution to the position paper, to the team's efforts during the four week simulation, and to lectures in which the country-teams are asked to present their positions will all be important gauges of your level of performance. Since quality participation is intimately related to attendance in lecture (where you receive important information about negotiation) and section meetings (where much of your work as a country team is done), attendance records will be kept. A pattern of absenteeism (as revealed by weekly discussion section records and periodic checks in lecture) will adversely affect your final grade. The reason for this policy is that this course requires full participation of all involved. A failure of one student to live up to this can hurt others in the group. We do not want to see medical excuses from individuals when sessions are missed. If you have a serious illness that is going to lead to excessive absenteeism, then you should contact the instructor of the course and consider dropping or withdrawing for the semester.

Please note: every effort will be made to accommodate students with disabilities and students who have potential conflicts due to religious observances. Please discuss your situation with the instructor as soon as possible.

Weekly Schedule

Week 1 Jan. 19

Introduction to the Course

Week 2 Jan. 24/26

Lecture: International Negotiation in a Sequential and Cultural Context

Reading: Williams, ch. 1; Cohen, chs. 1, 2

(note: readings should be completed before the first meeting of class each week).

First Discussion Section Meetings:

0101 Tydings 2106 Thursday 2-2:50

0102 Tawes 0135 Tuesday 3-3:50

0103 Van Munching (Business) 2203 Wednesday 2-2:50

0104 Van Munching (Business) 2203 Wednesday 3-3:50

0105 Jimenez 2117 Thursday 9-9:50

0106 Tydings 1108 Thursday 2-2:50

Week 3 Jan.31/Feb.2

Lecture: The Influence of Culture on Negotiation

Reading: Cohen, chs. 3,4,5

Week 4 Feb.7/9

Lecture: The Process of Negotiation: Stages and Factors

Reading: Cohen, chs. 6,7,8,9

** Pre-Questionnaire Administration during Discussion Sections

(please report to the ICONS Lab 1115 C Tydings instead of your usual locations, except sections 0103 and 0104 -- stay in Van Munching)

Week 5 Feb.14/16

February 14 (in lecture): **EXAM 1** (on above material, inclusive)

February 16/Lecture: Simulation and Gaming -- ICONS Approach

Scenario and Background Document distributed in Sections

Week 6 Feb. 21/23

Lecture: The New Europe: State and Non-State Actors

Reading: Calleo, chs. 1,2,3,4

Week 7 Feb.28/March 2

Lecture: The View From Europe: Multilateral Issues

Reading: Calleo, chs. 5,6,7,8

** ICONS System Training during Discussion Sections

(all sections please report to the ICONS Lab 1115 C Tydings instead of your usual-locations)

Week 8 March 7/9

Simulation Issues

Instead of lecture, you will meet in the following assigned locations from 12:30 to 1:20 on Tues./Thurs. to discuss your issue-area in-depth. (* Attendance will be taken)

Environment -- Cole Field House 3112

Security -- Tues: Engineering 1102/Thurs: Engineering 0110

Economics -- Tydings 1111

Ethnicity -- Marie Mount 1400 (regular lecture locations)

Reading: Scenario/Appropriate Sections of Background Document

Week 9 March 14/16

Lecture: How to Negotiate: Learning from Case Studies

Reading: Select and Read three of the case studies from Williams, chs. 2-7

*Position Papers Due to TA

-- Spring Break --

Week 10 March 28/30

Simulation Begins

Lecture: Negotiation Strategies: Principled Bargaining

Reading: Fisher and Ury, chs. I,II

Week 11 April 4/6

Lecture: Negotiation Strategies: Developing a BATNA

Reading: Fisher and Ury, chs. III, IV, V

** April 8: Saturday Conferences 10-12:30 ICONS Lab

Week 12 April 11/13

Lecture: The Complexities of Foreign Policy Decision-Making

Team Presentations on Topic in Lecture (*Attendance will be taken)

Week 13 April 18/20

Lecture: Special Topics in Negotiation: Conflict Resolution Techniques

Handout Distributed

** April 22: Saturday Conferences 10-12:30 ICONS Lab

Week 14 April 25/27

Lecture: Special Topics in Negotiation: International Crises

Handout Distributed

Week 15 May 2/4

Simulation Debriefing (*Attendance will be taken)

** Post-Questionnaire Administration During Discussion Sections

(please report to the ICONS Lab instead of your usual locations, except sections 0103 and 0104 -- stay in Van Munching).

May 15

FINAL EXAM

There will be both Take-Home and In-Class Components

* Since the simulation must start immediately following Spring Break (in order to accommodate the other universities in Europe and the United States which are participating), it is necessary to have the Position Papers due the week before the break. Please note that you are not excused from class that week and are wholly responsible to your fellow team members to help complete the paper on time and hand it in to your TA.

** Because we have simulation participants from as far away as Siberia, we are compelled to hold our on-line conferences on Saturdays. Each subgroup will be responsible for "manning" one conference. Those who are not able for one reason or another to participate in the actual conference should ensure that they help with the preparation and follow-up to the conference.

BEST COPY AVAILABLE

APPENDIX B

THE NEW EUROPE: GERMAN POSITION PAPER

**University of Maryland
College Park
Spring 1995**

ECON:

~~Security~~ J. Hutt, K. Lee, B. Polansky, J. Silverman

Environment: L. Kieffer, T. Connors, A. Sagalkin

Ethnicity and Nationalism: E. Laszlo, B. Frederick, J. Bolinger, C. Corchiarino

Security: D. Peterson, J. Geraci, M. Niemiec, T. Mehok

BEST COPY AVAILABLE

INTRODUCTION

4

Since the fall of Communism, Germany has been reunited and transported back into the center of European affairs. This new German position creates enormous opportunities for our country. As a new world power, we have the responsibility and authority to create structure and stability in all of Europe. In this new unified Europe, we must follow the prevalent trend from defense to protection and from unilateral to multilateral negotiations. As opposed to our post WW II status, we intend to act in our own interests, while following the policies of other European and Atlantic powers.

Our immediate goals for the future involve four basic components: security, environment, ethnicity and economics. We wish to contain and create stability in the Balkans, while maintaining NATO's powerful status. We also want to create high environmental standards that all of Europe will abide by. The deutschmark also must be protected, as unification has had its economic toll. Our policy for the European Union expansion will be to accept other countries very slowly, as they demonstrate their economic and political stability,

In a changing world, Germany is also drastically changing with it. We look forward to our role in the next world order and already have an understanding of our future responsibilities.

SECURITY

2

In the past fifty years, Germany has witnessed its status depreciate from a supreme world power to a country split by foreign interests. From the end of World War II, Germany's policies, goals, and interests were dictated by these foreign powers. Now, with the end of Communism Germany has evolved and reunited to make their own decisions. These decisions have become more complex as European countries have united. Germany's future status in Europe is extremely uncertain as we are still adjusting to unification. Our ultimate goals and likewise our policies to achieve these goals are aimed at peace.

During the post World War II years in Europe, Germany was a struggling country. On February 4th, 1945 at the Yalta conference, key leaders Stalin, Roosevelt, and Churchill established four spheres of influence. These spheres of influence consisted of British, U.S., French, and Russian control. This ultimately led to the separation of East and West Germany. With the separation of our country, came about many conflicting security issues. Troops no longer were allowed to be placed on foreign soil and our country was invaded with allied and communist forces in their respective spheres. Our arms production and military were severely restricted.

The question of whether we could govern ourselves was raised in the beginning of the Cold War. Because of this we were not allowed to make security based decisions. West Germany was controlled mainly by the interests of NATO powers, while East-Germany was dominated by communist Russia. This compelled our policies to be biased solely by these opposing powers.

While the number of people leaving East Germany for the West increased to approximately 250,000 a month, the East German government, under communist influence, choose to stop the influx with a wall that grew to

encircle West Berlin's entire area. (German Embassy 1994) This wall served a functional purpose in keeping people from leaving the East and in a larger perspective; the Iron Curtain, also established by communists, separated the country as a whole. Frictions increased with the Soviets blockage in West Berlin, causing the Berlin airlift, where food, fuel, industrial supplies, and raw materials were prohibited from reaching West Berlin. American aircraft supplied the citizens of West Berlin with access to the materials. This was an example of the high strung tensions exhibited between Soviet dominated East Germany and American dominated West Germany.

German unity and European unity are closely linked and reinforce each other. As a consequence of old distrust, many people assume that the new Germany wants to be independent in Europe. We, as Germans do not want to isolate ourselves in Europe, nor do we wish to see our country be a dominant power on the continent. The stronger we have become, the more determined our government is at working to promote the process of European unification. This includes the Eastern part of the continent.

There is, in our view, no alternative to a European Political Union. We feel that European authorities must restrict their activity to matters which truly require a European policy in exclusive European interests. We wanted the unification of Germany, but we wanted it in the context of a unified Europe. Precisely our historical experience does not allow Germany to stand on the sidelines when it is a matter of securing peace and freedom in the world and in Europe. We want to and must share responsibility together with our allies and neighbors.

Another security concern facing our country is the current situation in the Balkan states and more specifically the former Yugoslavia. Germany was the first to acknowledge Croatia and Slovenia as independent states. By us

recognizing these states, it led for acknowledgement from the European Union, U.S., and other countries to follow. This granted the U.N. and individual countries the right to intervene because the conflict was no longer of civil matter.

The situation in this area is of importance to us for many reasons. One of the most important reasons the Balkans is of interest to German security is because of the fear of "spill overs." "Spill overs" refer to the threat that fighting will spill over into neighboring countries causing more destruction and conflict. Also the amount of killing and destruction involved in this conflict is going against our goal of a peaceful integrated Europe. Because we are concerned with integration, the increased nationalism within this area is also a concern. If too much nationalism is concentrated in such a spot, as the Balkans, it will work against our goal of a unified Europe.

The problem and conflict in the Balkans is a concern for another reason. In Bosnia, U.N. peacekeeping forces are partly equipped with German military personal and equipment. Our troops are also assisting the U.N. in food air-drop operations and in securing the no-fly ban over Bosnia. With German interest directly involved in this situation, it is easy to see why we are eager to find an end to this conflict.

In the near future our plan is to keep assisting U.N. forces with our equipment and troops. We will do whatever we can to aid U.N. forces to ensure peace and stability in this extreme "Hot Spot" in Europe. There must be no toleration of war and destruction by Germany in a growing and integrating Europe.

One of Germany's most important security priorities is our rebuilding and revising of the military structure. On September 12, 1990, the governments of the four World War II allied powers, East and West Germany,

. 5

signed the "Two-Plus-Four Treaty" in Moscow. The treaty terminated the four powers' rights and responsibilities regarding Berlin and Germany as a whole. In October of the same year, we signed with the former Soviet Union the "Troop Presence and Withdrawal Treaty", detailing terms for the departure of all Soviet forces from Germany by the end of 1994 (German Embassy, Aug. 1994)

Germany needs forces which are prepared and equipped to meet the new demands of today. We intend to maintain the agreed force numbering at 370,000 troops (Kohl, Feb. 1994). Military service is and remains an expression of every male citizen's personal share of responsibility for a life of peace and freedom. It is a part of our countries tradition; yet young soldiers and men, for various reasons, are performing alternative service. We acknowledge that this is a problem in our newly unified Armed Forces and we must think intensely about it, to ensure equal obligation from all. We must give careful consideration to the idea of general obligatory service to society.

Our primary and foremost security goal within Europe is to maintain NATO and above all the U.S. security tie as the ultimate insurance against any possible future Russian threat. We feel that NATO's ability to act within the European region of security must be strengthened. NATO provides a stability not found in any other security organization. This is extended to all of Europe because of its assured defence capabilities. Historically no other security organization has been able to provide the power that NATO has.

We wish also to expand NATO's role from one of strictly defense and make it into one of constructive interference. This would involve NATO intervention with any violent deputed that occurred across Europe. This humanitarian effort at stability and peace has already been established by the U.N. Security Council, but we feel that the superior power and technology of

NATO would be beneficial to Europe. 6

We support a limited expansion of NATO to two countries. We would benefit from the joining of Poland and Hungary in that they would act as "buffer zones" in the event of Russian resurgence. We do not though, advocate any further expansion. NATO's success thus far can be attributed to its sustenance as an alliance, rather than a "conglomerate of state" membership. A conglomerate, which would involve numerous other European countries, provokes possible internal dissention and disagreement. This, therefore would cause decisions to be slower and ultimately difficult to be made.

Another benefit reaped from NATO is the extreme money and support that America pours into the program. This while maintaining peace and stability in Europe, relieves a momentous economic burden from us. America also provides its supreme technology, which is the best in the world.

The shift towards regional, low intensity wars in Europe and the fact that Germany is a leading European power has convinced us that our military must be expanded. We do not wish once again to become a dominant threat, but we do want to be a military equal, so that we may act in our own interests to solve any European crisis. We want to pursue German participation in missions to enforce peace, such as the Gulf War. As a world superpower, we can no longer sit and watch other countries solve major conflicts, which ultimately could effect us. The structure of our forces should then be integrated with those of other European states. We would also like to create more of our units within NATO.

This expansion, though, should by no means be reflected as a desire to regain military supremacy. Our intentions are grounded with solely maintaining peace and making sure that European powers are balanced.

Another goal we have is to reassure the French that we do not want to act solely in our own interest, but we want to involve them with these decisions through the EU, as well. The French have reason to be wary of any of our military actions and as indispensable partners of leadership in Europe, we wish to continue to work with them for peace. We are strengthening our military, though in order to limit our dependence on France. Also we want to take special care in not alienating Russia. Doing so could result in a provocation of intensified tensions and perhaps hostility.

Because security can no longer be attained unilaterally through the protection against threats, the evolution of conflicts as they arise will have to be regulated. This is the present situation in the Balkans. Our goals in dealing with this conflict are to first contain them to the Balkans. Spread of these conflicts into Germany could have dire results. The revolutionary nationalism must also be prevented from entering Germany. We also seek to increase our border patrol to prevent an influx of immigrants, which could possibly be the impetus behind spreading of the conflict.

Only after we have prevented a spread of the conflict will we pursue passive military intervention. This is strictly a measure to support the UN and the policy that they have initiated. Our continual support of UN policies will be unquestioned. This is exclusively a humanitarian effort to promote peace and should not be seen as exertion to chastise and exercise control in the area.

One last goal that we share is to demand a world wide ban of nuclear weapons. The Nuclear Non-Proliferation treaty must remain extremely important in our foreign policy. The proliferation of nuclear arms must be stopped, using any means necessary. We wish to replace the importance that nuclear weapons have for security and implement more cooperative security measures.

In achieving these goals we have decided, first and foremost that cooperation and the prevention of crises must take priority. Our policies must be seen in terms of protecting peace, rather than strictly defence. This policy must include European and Atlantic organizations. We must be able to react constructively depending on the situation.

Since 1945, we have been dependent on multilateral cooperation in order to attain our interests. We would like the EU to be the key to political order while the U.S., likewise NATO, will provide military backing.

In conclusion, we as Germans see security and its related issues as very important to the progress of an integrated Europe. Germany has a powerful voice and we wish for it to be heard and understood. If we succeed in accomplishing our goals, we feel that this will be the first step toward a peaceful and integrated Europe.

The German Economy

9

Our historical background of Germany begins with the Treaty of Versailles which was signed on June 28, 1919. Almost immediately after the war and the signing of the treaty, the value of the mark steadily deteriorated. "This was due to a few factors and they were reparation payments, the flight of German capital abroad, there were obstacles to reviving our foreign trade and a consequent adverse balance of payments." We were also faced with budgetary deficits and to fight these, we decided to issue more money to meet our expenses, which in turn caused us to have a severely high inflation. At its worst point, the mark was down to 4.2 trillion marks to one American dollar, on November 20, 1923. At this point we were facing threats of a civil war. We had food riots and many of the population was in despair. However, these threats passed and something was needed to be done about our currency problem. A new currency, the Reutenmark, was introduced in 1923. Our stabilization process was painful but it was overcome, helped by Hjalmar Schaaf, the president of the Reichsbank. In 1925, we had a great industrial recovery which lasted for four years then there was the adoption of the Dawes Plan for reparations which reestablished our credit and allowed us to borrow money heavily abroad. This borrowed money was used to pay our reparations obligations, and on public welfare institutions and a lot was spent on our industry, on the modernization of old plants and the building of new ones with modern machinery. The excessive fixing of our industry however caused us a few problems. It gave us a huge foreign debt and also increased our unemployment which was at its worst in 1932. However, in 1933, we had another huge industrial recovery. This was brought on by the

National Socialists ways of reducing unemployment by giving out work at short hours with fixed low wages to many people. Also by 1939, our efforts for rearmament had completely wiped out unemployment. We also decided to try to become self-sufficient and to manufacture our goods from our own domestic sources.

Then came World War Two which brought horrible damage to our industry. "This was fixed by the Potsdam Agreement which was designed to eliminate or control any branches of industry used for military production, to ensure the payment reparation claims, but the agreement would also leave us as a self sufficient economy. After this the structural adaptation of West Germany was completed by the 1950's. They enjoyed full employment, a favorable balance of payments and industrial products that were competitive in foreign markets. East Germany however was not as well of as West Germany by the 1950's, although great steps had been made, they were not as up to date as the West. From this time until the fall of the Wall in 1989, we did not undergo many tremendous economic changes. However after the Wall fell and the western government took over, we underwent tremendous changes. Historically, we have been perceived as a villain in international negotiations which is something we should try to improve upon. We have always enjoyed a tradition of having a highly skilled work force and we also produce very high quality goods. Two companies that are good examples of this are the Balkan Motor Works Co. And the Braun corporation.

Current German Economic Problems

Despite only have 44% of the territory and 28 % of the population of West Germany, its planned economy allowed it to achieve a relatively high standard of living compared to the other former Warsaw Pact countries. It was ranked in 1989 as 17th in the world for per capita income which is comparable to Portugal.¹ The former East Germany, though it had an above average educated workforce compared with other East European countries, compared to West Germany, only had 40% of the overall manufacturing capabilities of the highly industrialized West German economy. Most of unified Germany's economic policies derive from the problems associated with the reunification of east and west Germany, which started 9 November 1989 when the borders were opened. Naturally this has led to several problems which must be resolved if Germany and the European Union are to become an effective economic power.

With the creation of the all German labour market, East German wages and living standards must be brought up to West German standards in order to prevent the immigration from east to west. Following reunification, the German government decided to expand its generous welfare system to East Germany and raise minimum wages to West German levels in order to prevent the mass immigration which greatly strains the West German economy. Unfortunately because of these implementations of policies, unemployment levels were raised, which naturally increased the costs of converting the central planning based

¹ Bernhard Heitger and Leonard Waverman, eds., German Unification and the International Economy (New York: Routledge Press, 1993) 4.

economy of East Germany into the competitive, capitalist market-based economy of West Germany. This did not help the economic situation with slowdown in the economy and the recession that only just now that unified Germany is coming out of. These problems has naturally forced massive borrowing of funds to sustain the conversion of the East German economy. A total of 152 billion marks or 5.0 of annual GDP is borrowed to finance the conversation. Despite the economic recession, the German government has tried to erase the deficit through numerous tax and fee increases, which has naturally proved highly unpopular with the taxpayers. Chancellor Kohl campaign promise not to raise taxes to finance reunification proved impossible to keep, which required the highly unpopular measure to increase taxes, obstinately to finance Germany's contribution to the Gulf War. Even so, the German government has been required to borrow about 170 to 230 billion marks in 1993 to support its own governmental structure not to mention the transferring of funds to East Germany.

When the borrowing of funds proved insufficient, the German government financed its requirements by simply printing more money, which of course resulted in inflation, historically always a great fear of Germany. The inflationary problem has not been helped with the highly favourable conversion of East German currency units into West German marks with the associated wage increases for workers, such as the one just negotiated by the largest union in Germany a few weeks ago. Wage increases combined with the expensive social welfare system and the higher taxes mean that financing reunification has become a highly expensive process - far more than expected by the most

conservative estimates. Naturally, with the Bundesbank instituting measures restraining inflation in Germany's own economy, other currencies within the European Exchange Rate Mechanism have had problems maintaining their positions relative to the strong German mark. The Bundesbank institutes policies it judges as best for Germany and the German economy, rather than instituting economic policies for the good of Europe, as the European Union would have it do. Eventually it is hoped that the Bundesbank will continue its slow reduction in interest rates, which would relieve the monetary tensions thereby continuing the interrupted economic growth of Europe.

The basic plan for economic reunification with East Germany is for East Germany to reform its economic system by restructuring its economy on the market philosophy thereby raising productivity and competitiveness, for only then could a common currency be established within Germany.² Current problems include the opening of the single European market, which has caused German companies to become increasingly competitive in the market as American firms fight for a share of the German market. The privatization of state owned companies combined with the dissolution of current corporate monopolies in the energy sector will hopefully allow German companies to compete more effectively. For the German economy to continue at its present lumbering strength, as it slowly recovers from the recession, it must find solutions to the problems currently facing it. To sum up, the several problems unified Germany

² Bernhard Heitger and Leonard Waverman, eds., German Unification and the International Economy (New York: Routledge Press, 1993) 7.

is currently facing include the rise in German interest rates caused by the unification related demand for West German marks for though it will have an eventual positive effect on the international economy, it will be accompanied by a higher level of prices and interest rates.³ Germany will also try to keep inflation to a minimum but this will keep interest rates high unfortunately depressing the economies of other countries. These two primary problems are directly associated with the immense costs of reunification and must be resolved in order for Germany and the European Union to effectively coexist together as a powerful economic entity.

³ Bernhard Heitger and Leonard Waverman, eds., German Unification and the International Economy (New York: Routledge Press, 1993) 19.

International and Intra-European Policies

To ensure that we, Germany, remain a world leader well into the twentieth century and also to ensure the continued growth of the EU, we have decided that it is imperative to maintain a slow, cautious EU expansionist policy. New members must meet strict standards before being admitted into the EU. These standards include stringent environment policies, individual states' adaptation of practical budget policies, and the elimination of foreign debt. The reason for this is that 60% of the present EU budget already goes toward economic aid for member countries. Couple this with our present economic struggles and you readily can see the validity of our policy. Another reason for the current policy stances lies in the uninhibited movement of labour within the EU. Because of our strong economy in the past there has been a flood of foreign workers seeking German jobs. Therefore, we feel that EU expansion involving countries with less developed economies will lead to a rise in our current unemployment crisis. Within the political structure of the EU present expansion could hinder our economic recovery; if new countries were admitted, our ability to influence key decisions within the European Parliament would be lessened. Current restraint on membership should be pursued to the point of fabricating reasons why countries do not qualify for EU admittance.

However, looking towards the future we plan to push for the admittance of several countries once they become economically mature. These countries include the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, and the Balkans. We have targeted these countries for several reasons. In the area of security, it is always beneficial to have allies as your neighbors. Economically, having allies as

neighbors means that military expenditures are lower than if your neighbor was a threat. Also, though unification, East Germany brought close ties with Eastern Europe; this could foster new markets and provide investment opportunities for German businesses. Our official public policy is that we encourage and look forward to expansion and higher levels of integration of the EU.

Due to the reasons mentioned above, we feel that special consideration should be given to certain post-communist countries. This also will be done to prevent the reemergence of the Eastern Block. However, officially we will not publicly display any preference toward either group of countries. This is to prevent other European countries from becoming cautious of German influences and policies. Our official public policy is that all countries seeking EU admittance will be evaluated on the same level, without any preferences as long as applicants meet required economic and environmental standards.

In the areas of political and security, EU integration looks good, however in dealing with economics, there are some flaws. These flaws center around the Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM), which links individual EU currency based on present exchange rates; the ERM works toward a single European currency, the ECU. The problem lies with the Bundesbank raising of interest rates to fight the inflationary conditions caused by the unification of Germany. Several countries have had to remove their currencies from the ERM because of the strength of the Mark. Because of pressure from other EU members, the Bundesbank has decreased interest rates. However, we will keep interest rates slightly above those of other EU countries until such time as our economic troubles have eased up. On the other hand, officially we will publicly pledge to lower interest rates as

soon as it is economically possible. We oppose a common European currency because to embrace the ECU would mean we would have to devalue our currency. The present value of our currency is allowing us to stimulate domestic growth. Our official public policy is that we will lower interest rates as soon as economic cycles will allow us too and that we oppose a common European currency if the Mark is to be devalued.

Due to our current economic troubles, we are not able to render the amount of economic aid to developing countries that we were once able too. However, lowering tariffs on post-communist countries will do more for their economies than the influx of foreign capital. To do this we will need to group these countries into a semi-free trade zone. They would be treated like the Scandinavian countries, EFTA, before they joined the EU. This will allow them to import certain goods in EU chosen sectors without hurting vulnerable EU industries such as agriculture. By taking these steps to modernize post-communist economies we will not only create stable neighbors, but we will also develop new markets for our exports. Our official public policy is that we will support the forming of post-communist countries into a semi-free trade zone to better develop their economies.

Domestic Policy

Our domestic policy is focused primarily around the need to reintegrate former Soviet-bloc East Germany into the free-market economy of West Germany, as well as maintaining a stable economic environment under which to do so. We have, and are currently initiating policies towards those ends in the service industries, as well as the telecommunications and energy sectors, upgrading East Germany's standards to those of the West through privatization and competition. To achieve these goals however, we must continue to attempt to maintain wages at their current level, keeping them in direct correlation with productivity, and reduce the national debt through a reduction in government spending and a slight increase in the personal contribution to the welfare of the republic. Another focus is the health care system which has already undergone a series of vast restructuring intended to reform its monetary needs. Finally, the movement of the central capitol of the republic to Berlin is a decade long project which should provide the unification between East and West Germany.

The first round of health reform policies came in 1992 under Health Minister Seehofer's health bill which put into motion a series of reforms intended to curtail health care expenditures and restructure costly health insurance policies. Seehofer's bill put a hold on health insurance companies' drug budgets at the 1991 expenditures. This inevitable led to reforms within the pharmaceutical industry which was forced to create new, economical ways to provide its products. More policies are necessary to reduce the total expenditures of the government and decrease the national debt.

Telecommunications and energy reforms are an integral facet in modernizing the former East Germany and are being accomplished through a number of policies. Our first step was to privatize the formerly state run telephone company DBP Telekom which is necessitated under an European Union mandate calling for the end of all telephone monopolies by the end of 1998. In doing so we have replaced large portions of the telephone network in East Germany with new digital overlay networks increasing the number of new connections by almost two and a half million. The second major policy change was the introduction of American businesses into the telecommunications industry where they have become major suppliers of both goods and services. This introduction of American businesses has led to a dramatic increase in both competition and the competitiveness of our companies. Within the energy sector we have initiated policies to end all monopolies and in many cases taken legal action to do so. Our policies are stated as such: we intend to reach an agreement regarding the use of coal and nuclear energy in attempts to remain both environmentally friendly and conscious. We intent do continue our free market policy to ensure economical and efficient supply of energy. We also intent to continue our plans to economize our total consumption and promote research into alternative forms of energy.

The necessity of fully privatizing East Germany is still a major focus of our domestic policy. The Treuhand, which was created to fulfill just that need, has almost completed its duty; of the 13260 businesses in its portfolio, only 401 remain. Through the introduction of American companies into the marketplace

these firms have made investment commitments of DM 7 million and have created more than 42,000 jobs.

Another pressing issue on our agenda is the maintenance of wages in correlation to productivity. The introduction of East Germany into the market place has placed tremendous strains on our ability to both raise the East German standards of living to that of the West and maintain a viable free market economy. Unemployment rates of up to 30% have led to huge governmental expenditures on unemployment benefits which need to be curtailed in order to reduce the deficit. To date, the rapid reunification has caused huge wage increases among the Easterners who wish to live among the standards of the west. However, the productivity of the east has not close the gap between that of the west, leading to huge disparities in the wage-productivity curve and increased unemployment due to the inability of the eastern companies to pay the huge wage increases. One possible policy is the introduction of wage subsidization, which while still costing the government money, would greatly reduce the unemployment rate and the money necessary to support those benefits, as well as stem the influx of east Germans into West Germany.

The reduction of the debt is a major problem facing our nation. To reduce the debt we will need to increase both taxes on the population and companies as well as raise the number of fees. Public spending will also need to be curtailed to feasible reduce the debt, as well as various unpleasant cuts in our generous social benefits. A final response to the increasing debt will be to dramatically reduce foreign aid to refugees and non-Germans.

Our need to reintegrate the former East Germany into a unified German Republic is the driving factor within our domestic policy. In order to both unify Germany and reduce the debt a number of creative cuts in spending as well as the introduction of privatization will be necessary in order to obtain these ends.

ETHNICITY AND NATIONALISM

22

Germany has not always had the problems with ethnicity and immigration as it has today. Back in the era of the Nazis and Hitler, there was a feeling that the Germans were a master race, and that all other races were beneath contempt of the "pure race." But even before Hitler came to power, there were feelings of superiority on which Hitler based his thinking. When the Nazi's did come to power, the attack on all races escalated, especially towards the Jews. Whenever there were movements by the Jews to stop these attacks by the Nazis, they lashed out at the Jews harder. The German public either backed the attacks on the Jews or they just looked the other way. Most of the Germans agreed with Hitler and the Nazis in their way of thinking (McKay p. 943). If there were incidents of opposition, they were met by blockades of every sort. The opposition groups could not band together.

During Hitler's empire (1933-1945), the Nazi's built up the "New Order," which gave special treatment to those racially related to the Germans. All others were labeled as either inferior or sub-human and treated harshly. They also tried to establish a "vast eastern colonial empire," where the people they overcame would be displaced (McKay p. 948). During Hitler's reign, discrimination became worse: Jews were hauled into concentration camps and slaughtered by the thousands daily.

With the defeat of Nazi Germany in 1945, Germany was divided into two separate countries: East Germany and West Germany. Because life in West Germany was more appealing, East Germans fled in growing numbers from 1949 to 1954. With the building of the Berlin Wall in 1961, East Germany stopped this exodus so that they could stabilize their communist government. With tensions between West and East Germany high, Willy Brandt's strategies to make West Germany stable succeeded and the tensions finally lowered to where the two countries could live separate existences with minor tensions (McKay p. 1018).

West Germany's economic growth allowed other people to come in, mainly Turks. They were allowed in because the demand for labor in Germany was so great. Immigrants also came in from Italy, Greece, and Yugoslavia. West Germany and Turkey signed an agreement regulating recruitment, wages, and employment of Turkish people in Germany. Over the next fifteen years, more than half a million Turks entered West Germany, sponsored by the Turkish Employment Service and German employers. Even knowing that the arrangement between Turkey and Germany was temporary, there were some Turkish workers who still wanted to stay in Germany (Gurr, p. 68). Since the Germans thought of the Turkish as temporary workers, they expected these workers to return to their country eventually.

Rising unemployment and a recession in the 1970's gave way to new incentives to get rid of the Turks. When the Turks wanted to stay in Germany or bring in family members from their country to Germany, the German government applied harsh measures, such as denying work permits for those individual refugees who entered Germany after December 1, 1974. This contributed to juvenile delinquency and a rise in unemployment. The German government took tougher measures; in 1980 they made more rules for deportation, and restricted family reunions so that the families of Turks already in Germany could not come over and stay permanently. Despite all of these attempts to deal with the immigration problem, Germany ended up with 1.7 million Turks as permanent residents (Gurr, 69).

Since 1913, Germans and their descendants born outside Germany could claim citizenship in Germany. This provision was also included in the Basic Law. During the Cold War, Germany was actively encouraging Germans in Eastern Europe to come to the home country. This desire was so strong on the German government's part that it was willing to pay a rather high price to the country of origin for each German resettled (Gurr, 71). Prior to 1934, dual citizenship was allowed in Germany,

but since then it was banned making thousands of people ineligible for citizenship. Many of the problems that Germany is facing today stem from these legal problems. At the time they were written they may have made sense but today, in totally changed circumstances these laws have proven to cause problems (Gurr, 70).

Germany is currently faced with problems that stem from the collapse of communism in Eastern Europe, reunification of the two Germanys, an influx of refugees resulting from the war in the former Yugoslavia, and the resettling of Germans and their descendants from abroad. Basically, the main problem is a surge of refugees. This population, set loose by the demise of the Soviet Union and the end of socialist governments, is flooding into an economically and politically stable Germany and causing turmoil throughout the country by living off of government aid and being the victims of xenophobic outlashes by such groups as the skinheads and the neo-Nazis.

Another problem is the "guest worker" issue. They have been in the country for close to forty years and were invited by the government to enter in order to augment a work force seriously diminished by World War II. Although there are many nationalities represented in the guest worker force, a large number consists of Turkish people. These people have been denied citizenship for decades and are essentially lost citizens without a country.

After World War II, due to what happened to the Jews, the German constitution was written liberally for refugees. This made Germany a very attractive place to apply for asylum. With the number of refugees applying for asylum, new regulations were needed to tighten asylum policy, to bar entry of asylum-seekers from countries that are known to have no political persecution, and to speed up the process of evaluating the applications (Chicago Tribune, 18).

As this is a time of economic recession due to the unification, unemployment

and other problems are in abundance, so the immigrants are an easy target for negative feelings. The Republican Party, founded in 1983, provided the citizens with propaganda as to how they can take their aggressions out on the refugees. The feeling is that "taxpayers' money should be used to feed, clothe, and provide work for the indigenous population, not for would-be asylum seekers." (Mushaben, 2) The unemployment rate in the port city of Rostock, although cited at seventeen percent, is close to forty percent. This has contributed to violent uprisings against refugees and their housing. "On August 26, residents in the neighborhood of Lichtenhagen cheered on self-proclaimed neo-Nazi youths as they attacked and fire-bombed a ten-story refugee hostel housing over 200 Romanians and 115 Vietnamese." (Mushaben, 2)

These acts of violence were not recognized as a serious human rights issue by the police force or the government since the refugees, not being citizens, had no priority in protection of their rights. "The wave of foreigners seeking asylum as well as the wave of assaults, firebombings and violence against them and their shelters went unaddressed by political leaders for nearly two years (New York Times, 4)." This "foreigner free" Germany attitude is not the outlook of all citizens. There has been a counter-reaction to the acts of violence, and the conflict is known as the "people power" revolution (Albright, 17).

Due to public opinion pressure, the German judicial system started punishing the perpetrators of violence against refugees with stiffer sentences. At the same time, the government legally banned the Republican Party. In Berlin, Turkish people themselves started to participate in demonstrations against violence toward foreigners as early as 1985 (Gurr, 70).

The war in Yugoslavia has left many people in need of a safe haven. Germany is a main target of refugees because they will be treated humanely and generously provided for in such an economically prosperous country. It is Germany's moral

obligation to provide aid to these people until the situation in their home country becomes stable, however Germany is not the only country in Europe with a conscience. Or is it?

Weakened borders to the east have led to a resurgence of previous citizens in the German Expellee lands -- Silesia, Pomerania, East Prussia, and Sudetenland -- seeking reentry to Germany as citizens in accordance with a blood-line right. Now that there is free movement and travel in Eastern Europe, the people are free to pursue their personal goals that were on the back burner for a long time.

Because so many people decided to pursue their goals at the same time as Germany is concentrating on the issues brought about by the unification, Germany found itself in a troublesome situation that warranted immediate action from the government's part. To address this critical situation, Germany formulated the following goal regarding unwanted foreigners: restriction of further immigration, assimilation of foreigners living legally in Germany, and encouragement of illegal refugees to return to their native countries. Because of the international nature of these issues Germany plans to engage both European Union (EU) members and non-EU members in the problem solving process.

Due to the large number of refugees and the violent incidents involving them in the recent past, Germany decided to develop short range and long range goals. The short range goals are to ease the overloaded refugee processing institutions immediately by decreasing the number of asylum seekers and speeding up the asylum claims clearing process.

Germany has to distinguish between two types of refugees: the political refugees and war refugees mainly from the former Yugoslavia, and economic refugees mainly from Eastern Europe. We understand that most people flee a situation that combines political oppression and severe economic problems. However, these

distinctions have been set in various human rights accords that we are signatories, therefore we have to abide them. Persons persecuted on political grounds are still granted refuge based on Article 16 of the Basic Law also (O'Brien 380). War refugees are considered temporary refugees and are provided shelter up to a number. Our goals and policies are mostly designed to reduce the number of economic refugees who have no legal basis to stay in Germany.

In order to deal effectively with the huge influx of refugees, German legislators passed new regulations regarding the processing of refugees. Administrative procedures are considerably sped up by the setting-up of a two-tier system of "safe third countries" and "safe states of origin." With this system the number of refugees has decreased significantly, 26.4% less in 1993 compared to 1992 therefore we plan to continue enforcing this legislation. The same new legislation also provides for immediate rejection of an application that is judged unfounded (GCI, 3).

Long term goals are more likely to affect legal residents and the ethnic German resettlers. Ethnic Germans who were born abroad and lived all their lives there can successfully claim German citizenship as soon as they are on German soil based on the citizenship requirements that favors German ancestry to birthplace. During the Cold War, this policy perhaps was suitable to entice Germans to the home country, but the unintended consequences of this policy have been obvious since the collapse of the Soviet Union. We are not able to assimilate such large numbers of people, be they Germans or not. It is clear to us that as long as Article 116 is in our constitution, we have a legal obligation to promote and protect the interests of these Germans. We have to look toward the governments of the respective countries to help us deal with this issue. We do not intend to ask something for nothing. In the past, Poland and Romania have been very cooperative in helping Germany alleviate the refugee problem and we will not forget that. We would like to continue such cooperation as

well as initiate similar agreements with Hungary and Czechoslovakia.

The long term residents, but non-citizens in this country are mostly Turks, 2.3 % of the total population (Gopher). They are an integral part of the German economy but are not visible in the political arena because they are not allowed to vote. This must change not only to resolve an ugly issue that gives bad name to Germany abroad but also to face up to the consequences of our previous actions. We must give these people a choice of returning to their native country or becoming naturalized citizens. We stand firmly on the issue of resolving this problem based on individual rights and not group rights. Assimilation of eligible individuals should be made easier and less expensive, so that those who intend to stay can have a fair chance at becoming an integral part of the society as well.

Even though Germany is bearing an unequal share of the refugee problem in Europe, the EU should develop a common immigration policy because the EU will also feel the effects of unregulated migration (O'Brian, 378). It also makes little sense to transfer one country's refugee problem to another. We feel that quotas for war refugees and political asylum seekers is a good way to start in order to spread the hardship evenly. There is nothing to gain for other EU members if Germany is weighed down with refugee problems.

While Germany is not the military giant it once was, it possesses a strong economy which in today's world, provides a more effective power than military might. In addition to the economic base, we possess political power, both inside and outside of the EU. Used properly, these powers can be important bargaining tools in the fight to control the influx of refugees and immigrants.

Economically speaking, Germany is the strongest country in the European Union and one of the top three strongest in the world. Currently, we are a large importer of oil and raw material from third world countries which can be used as I

leverage when bargaining with developing countries. Germany donates the third highest amount of money in aid; 24% goes to the least developed countries (Gurr, 138). In return, we expect cooperation from those countries. This is an opportune moment to mention that refugees from third world countries are not overlooked and any legislation regarding foreigners in this country will apply to them as well. If a particular country is not cooperating with our government we can threaten to take our business to another country. Such a large withdrawal would severely injure a small economy, and that is not good for anyone.

Like our importing power, our exporting of goods increases our ability to influence other countries' policies. Being a strong exporter of various products from hair dryers to automobiles, has increased our overall gross national product and given us the resources to aid other countries. As was the case with Romania, where through diplomatic measures we agreed to pay for the Romas to be removed from our country and returned to Romania. This type of action can be used to keep other immigrants from rushing to our country. We can invest in Eastern Europe, in order to make it more attractive for the citizens to stay in their own country. This can be done by opening plants in these countries, which will create jobs and give the economy a boost. It is hard to refuse the cheap labor these countries possess.

Once the citizens of these countries see that there are jobs and that their country is prospering they will not wish to immigrate. This theory is of course playing on the fact that given a choice most people choose to remain where they grew up and feel comfortable. Another spin off of that method is to just give money directly to foreign governments so that they will keep their people from coming to Germany, as it was done with the Volga Germans in Russia.

Keeping immigrants from entering Germany, goes further than merely throwing money around. We need to gain better control of our borders. Geographically

speaking, we are a vulnerable country, because we have so many neighbors and because we are one of the first developed countries refugees coming from the east encounter. All of our immediate neighbors are considered "safe third states." This means that any refugee entering Germany from any of the EU states, Poland, Norway, Switzerland or the Czech Republic may be turned back at the border. According to Germany, Bulgaria, Romania, the Slovak Republic and Hungary are classified as "safe states of origin" which means we assume there are no political persecution nor inhumane practices taking place, therefore these countries do not generate political refugees (GCI, 3).

Hungary, the Czech Republic and Poland will most likely apply to the EU for membership and could be persuaded to tighten their control on immigration, in exchange for Germany's approval of their applications for membership. Hungary and Romania, while not our next door neighbors need to be give special attention. Both of their admittance depends greatly on their ability to resolve the ethnic Hungarians' situation in Transylvania which has a potential to explode under straining circumstances.. We encourage all parties involved in these negotiations to sign "good neighbour treaties" with each other . Turkey will have to resolve its numerous ethnic conflicts with Bulgaria, Cyprus, Greece and the Kurds because there is too much potential in Turks flocking to other EU members once admitted. Turkey has expressed lukewarm interest toward the Turks in Germany because they are not Turkish citizens.

The use of political clout should not only be confined to strengthening geographical borders, but should also be used to alleviate Germany's current absorption pains. If we, Germany, use our standing in the EU to persuade the other member countries to accept some of the refugees, then we may be able to assimilate more easily the remainder. One way in which we might persuade them, is to propose that all refugees currently in the EU be spread out evenly within the EU. While this

may not make others very happy, it must be pursued. If we notice any chances of winning in this issue, we might want to consider offering a largely symbolic, but an important sounding concession such as our willingness to reestablish dual citizenship in order to help coordinate a common immigration policy within the EU. If we consider the current ban on dual citizenship, in effect since 1934, an outdated vestige of Nazi Germany it may not be such a loss. Especially, if the change will solve so many of our current immigration problems.

Dealing with countries to the east in general is easier than with countries in the EU. Their needs are so great, they cannot afford losing our support. If we encounter any reluctant negotiating partner, we can use a variety of tools to convince them starting with the light ones such as withholding entry visas, work permits, cultural and scientific cooperation, and aid. Some of the more serious retaliations would be a trade embargo or discontinuing diplomatic ties. We are very hopeful that we will not have to use the latter ones.

Another way to achieve our goals is to assign the particular controversial issue to a committee to study it, delaying decision at this time. Military retaliation of course is out of question. We want to convince all governments of our good faith in these negotiations and that we prefer cooperation, interdependence and partnership rather than conflict.

With this last note in mind, we would like to stress that we understand the difficulties Eastern Europe is going through and we would like to help to our best ability but we must do so in such a way that we do not impose a high price on the German people, because they are the ones whom we must ultimately represent, govern and protect.

Environment

32

For most of the earth's history there has been little impact by humans on the environment. It was not until around 1650, the beginning of the industrial revolution, that humans began to effect the biosphere. The dawn of this era brought with it a massive population growth and the need for the consumption of fossil fuels.

Beginning in Europe and spreading throughout the world, the Industrial Revolution brought new machines and new chemicals into use to make the standard of living for people increase dramatically. Ironically these very improvements have caused a striking decrease in that standard due to the negative consequences of not planning ahead.

In Germany, most of the environmental degradation has occurred in the eastern portion of the country, herein East Germany. This area was dominated by the puppet government of the communist Soviet Union. Due to the expenses of the cold war, it believed in high production at very low cost. The government owned industries in East Germany therefore did not concern themselves with the scarcity nor the possible depletion of natural resources that has occurred. Resources such as coal, lignite and oil were allocated by quota, not by necessity or the ability to use it sensibly.

Because of this, there were no incentives developed to create environmentally friendly or energy efficient industries.

3 3

A prime example of this waste can be seen in the field of agriculture. Until the collapse of communism, the government flooded the market with pesticides and fertilizers. Because the farmers were not informed of the potential harmful effects of over fertilizing, they simply dumped all of the chemicals they were allotted onto their fields. The tons of chemicals that have accumulated over the decades have had a terrible effect on the area causing the land to become infertile and poisoning the water supply.

Adding to the problem is the undetonated ammunition that was buried by the Soviet Army during it's occupation of East Germany. Today, thousands of shells are being uncovered at unmarked locals throughout the east. Also, the runoff from the former military installations still carries harmful chemicals to the river networks.

The problems in Europe are not limited to domestic issues, but are of international concern. Because European countries are so close together, and many of them share common waterways, a copious amount of cross border pollution occurs. This makes one country's pollution another country's problem.

There are two major rivers in Germany, the Elbe in the east, and the

Rhine in the west. The Elbe first flows through Poland, carrying in waste from that country's developing industries. In the west, the Rhine brings in pollution dumped by French factories. Both of these rivers empty into the Baltic Sea contaminating it with their harmful contents.

The numerous power plants in Europe have a role in the environmental degradation as well. Most of the power in France and Germany comes from nuclear Reactors. In order to cool these facilities, they are located along the major rivers. The water is run through the plant, which heats the water, and then is dumped directly back to the stream creating thermal pollution.

In Central Europe the main form of heating is coal burning stoves and heating apparatuses. Once again, under communist rule the cost of heating was subsidies. This policy led to very inefficient heating and little conservation of energy. The major problem from this is not necessarily the depletion of resources, but rather the acid rain that occurs with the burning of coal. East Germany and the Czech Republic have some of the highest sulfur dioxide levels in the world (Scenario, 1995). This coupled with the nitrogen oxide and carbon monoxide emissions in West Germany, due to the many car owners located near major cities, has led Germany to study the effects of acid rain. They have discovered that about 57% of the forests within its boundaries have suffered damage from acid rain. Much

of this is located in the east where they receive the worst of both the coal and the auto emissions.

Cleaning up the environmental damage will be a long slow process. Much of Central Europe is facing the problem of rebuilding their economies after the transfer to democratic governments. This is a costly venture, and many of these governments feel that the environment can be pushed to the side to make room for more pressing issues.

There is another dilemma facing these post communist nations, that is the cost of not cleaning up. Health care costs are going to keep escalating at an obscene rate if environmental problems are not given the proper attention they need. The inverse is also true, if the needed money is pumped into environmental concerns, then costs related to health care will decline dramatically. An added plus would be the reduction in the number of environmental refugees because of the cleanliness of their native countries.

There are many goals Germany has which would further their ability as a nation to influence environmental policy throughout Europe. These goals, or objectives, include efforts on both a domestic and an international level. As the leader in environmental technology, surpassing even the United States, Germany is attempting to influence other European nations to adopt similar environmental policies. These goals include the

reduction of domestic and cross-border pollution, giving economic aide to countries to help them implement more advanced environmental policies, to change the socio-economic structure of many countries in Europe into democratic, market economies, and the admittance of Poland and Estonia into the European Union to aide in their strengthening of environmental policies across Europe.

Domestically, Germany has taken many measures to reduce air pollution, and construct effective methods for water and waste management. A program within the auto industry requires automobile manufacturers to recycle old cars, building new cars with the parts of used, dissembled cars. Germany has adopted regulations involving power plants, requiring the retrofiting of all of them. Within these regulations, each plant was required to reduce their air pollutant emissions by approximately 90%, thereby reducing acid rain. In 1989, Germany required that the use of all CFC gasses, which have caused the depletion of the ozone layer, be eliminated by 1995. Finally, the government began a labelling system to "alert customers to product brands that are less harmful to the environment (International Wildlife, 26)." This program in itself has lead to many innovative techniques in the production of materials which could be less harmful to the environment (International Wildlife, 26).

It is programs like these which Germany would like other European nations to adopt. However, few of these countries have the economic strength to do so. Bi-lateral agreements "primarily aiming at the exchange of political, administrative, scientific and technical information" have been made with other countries-- funding for these programs is a serious issue for these nations (Hermann, 47). As a solution to this problem, Germany has agreed to fund countries in it's region towards their advancement in environmental technology. In Gliwice, Poland, Germany is funding a program which would reduce all energy emissions in a new heating system. A program in Hungary is being funded by Germany to renovate the air pollution network (Hermann, 47).

In sum, efforts have been made by Germany and other neighboring countries to cooperate in the expansion of environmental technology and policy. This funding and cooperation will in turn aid Germany in their basic goal of reducing cross border pollution.

A change in the socio-economic structure of other countries in Europe is another goal Germany would like to achieve. In the past 45 years, communist industrialization has greatly contributed to the European pollution problem. This is partly due to that structure's characteristic of state ownership (which often entailed ignorance to the uses of scarce resources), non-enforcement of environmental laws, and

the lack of concern for environmental issues by state authorities (Hermann, 45). By influencing a change to a democratic nation entailing a market economy, Germany hopes to curb these problems. It hopes that this would be a step in the right direction in the reduction of pollution. Along with this implementation of an open market, a policy concerning effective administration of environmental regulations to monitor any progress is needed for success (Hermann, 46).

In an effort to achieve the goals mentioned, Germany would most desire the admittance of environmentally friendly countries, concerned with cooperation in an effort to reduce pollution, into the EU. The country most suited for this, in Germany's opinion, is Poland. Poland has been very cooperative in environmental policies in recent years with Germany, resulting in agreements to minimize pollution and the adaptation of technologically advanced policies. It is for this reason in which Germany feels Poland's admittance to the EU would be beneficial to the success of achieving all the environmental goals set forth.

The process to clean up the European Continent, is not one that will be completed over night. In an attempt to get the clean up under way, Germany has taken many steps in both it's domestic and international policies that will aid that effort.

Within Germany itself, there are numerous environmental concerns.

From acid rain destroying the Black forest, to river pollution eroding the ecosystems of the Rhine, the people of Europe are poisoning the land. The German people are very aware of the problems facing them in the next decade, and they support the strong initiative, mentioned above, that the German Government has taken to bring the entire country to an acceptable level of cleanliness.

The focus of Germany's policies is in the international realm. From Bonn to Berlin, the country is faced with many problems that Germany has not created, yet are forced to deal with due to cross border pollution. In order to solve the problems mentioned above, several measures will be attempted during the negotiation process.

It should be noted at this time that all foreign policies of the German Government mentioned in this paper are to be kept confidential, and the release of any portion of the policies could have detrimental effects on the success of the programs and procedures mentioned herein.

There are several countries that Germany has ties with that are currently not members of the European Union (or EU). As a general policy, Germany is supporting the growth of the EU in slow and controlled steps. One way that is going to be used to control the expansion of the Union is to establish a certain level of pollution controls that a country must achieve before it will be considered for admission into the EU.

After careful consideration and debate between subgroups, it has been decided that a level of cleanliness on par with that East Germany would be a fair standard. These measures would consist of existing factories conforming to West German Standards or be shut down by the end of the decade (Scenario, 1995).

There are some countries, especially Poland, that Germany would like to have join the EU in the very near future. Poland is very appealing in several ways to Germany, environmentally, they have taken many measures to reduce their pollution levels, they have stable economies, and Poland is the most industrialized of all the former Soviet dominated countries. Along with sharing a common border, these facts make Poland the prime choice for admittance as an example to the rest of post communist Europe.

In order for this process to go ahead at full steam, Poland will need more assistance from stronger nations. In addition to the aid normally received from the EU, a coalition between Germany and Finland would quietly provide additional aid in the way of technology and money in order for them to reach the position where they will be considered for membership. Because both Finland and Germany are suffering from the contamination of the Baltic, they both stand to gain from an improvement in Polish pollution standards. The proper pressure applied to the Finnish

Government will convince them to join Germany in aiding the Polish EU membership movement.

In regards to the other non-EU members, many methods could be used to help with their progress. By simply stating that a certain level must be achieved before they will be considered for acceptance, these countries will step up their efforts. We wish to emphasize that a good number of these countries may not actually be wanted in the EU, but it is important that they believe they are potential members, eg. being considered.

There are other ways to influence these countries, however they must first be cleared with other subgroups. One such way would be to lower tariffs on the specified country in exchange for a certain rate of cleanup. The opposite approach can also be used, that of threatening to raise tariffs and trade barriers if certain criteria are not met.

It must be noted, that if a country does satisfy the requirements for consideration, yet for one reason or another there is opposition to their membership, the requirements can always be changed.

Within the EU, there is a great disparity in the concern for the environment. There is an even greater disparity between what a country's foreign policy is on the subject, and what its domestic policies are. It is much more difficult to convince the members to change their ways, because there is nothing that can be done in the way of trade

barriers. Our emphasis is on two countries, France and The United Kingdom. France is a very strong proponent for cleaning the environment, while the UK is doing little in the way of stopping their own pollution of Europe.

The Black forrest in Germany has suffered greatly from Acid Rain caused from English industrialization. Little can be done in the way of threats against the UK, mainly because they have one of the most stable economies in Europe along with a powerful voice in the EU, so the best approach to take with them is one of a guilty conscience. A coalition dubbed "Leading Partners" because the two primary members, Germany and the UK, have two of the strongest economies in europe, and are looked to as leaders of the EU, would be formed. The main idea behind this coalition is to shame England into providing protection for the environment abroad. If they refuse to join the coalition, the negative publicity will harm their public image. It may be deemed underhanded, but it can be very effective if worded correctly. This would hopefully cause them to feel the need to take the necessary steps in the environmental arena.

France has traditionally been a pain in the side of Germany. On some issues, such as the environment, both countries recognize the problem and want Europe to do something about it. Despite their differences on topics

such as NATO, French support for the environment is vital.

The major source of conflict between the two countries is the pollution of the Rhine. Germany desperately needs France to stop damaging the ecosystems of the river with the runoff from its numerous nuclear facilities. Therefore, several methods are being considered for negotiations with France. Some of these may be applied to other situations in Europe as well.

The first technique we will attempt will be to use our banking power to raise or lower France's inflation rate to force them to do what we want. It can be viewed as either an incentive, or a threat, depending on France's response to our offer. If this is not completely successful, we will then attempt, through careful wording and double talk, to convince them we would support the removal of NATO from Europe. We actually have **no** desire for NATO to leave Europe, but if we focus on strengthening the Euro-corp, they may just assume that is our desire. This is a very risky concept, therefore we would much prefer the first method to work. Our last resort, because it could blow up in our face, is to mobilize the French Green Party through various false fronts and secret agreements. If we must do this, France **must not** have any knowledge of our maneuvers. If they discover we are doing this, there would most likely be serious repercussions.

Overall, the need for environmental protection throughout Europe is a serious affair. Germany is taking the lead in rescuing the continent from the damage done from hundreds of years of contamination and pollution, and as we represent that country, we are willing to gamble on certain negotiating strategies to accomplish our goals.

CONCLUSION

With the unification, Germany suddenly accumulated high levels of power which coupled with the strong economic power we already had, Germany has become a country with enormous political power. Some say, that the new Germany might use its powers in a wrong way, thus should not be allowed to hold such power. During these negotiations we would like to demonstrate to the whole world that Germany is a very stable democratic country whose main interests are coupled with Europe's main interests. Germany does not want to overshadow any country; we would like to develop effective partnerships and a cooperative atmosphere throughout Europe.

Our goals and policies are designed in such a way that they address not only German domestic issues but also their effect on the international stage. For example, we would like to see a common immigration policy within the EU. This would not only alleviate Germany's problems with the influx of refugees but would also standardize procedures within the EU which would leave to a deepening of the European integration.

Germany does not want to neglect widening the EU either. We understand that the post-communist countries are struggling to establish new ways. We can assure these countries that Germany is sensitive toward the unequal relationships that have evolved in the last forty years. We strive to address common problems with mutual sympathy and understanding and our goal is to help them stabilize their democracies and market economies. At the same time, we have to assert that high standard will have to be met on economic, environmental and security levels in order to accept any country in the EU.

We hope that these negotiations will produce several agreements that will assure us of the seriousness of each country involved regarding the particular issues discussed and also regarding the emergence of a new Europe.

ECONOMY

Works Cited

History

Footnote #1 -- page 337

Footnote #2 -- page 352

Encyclopedia Britannica
1972

Volume 10

Garrison-Halibut

William Berton Publishers
Chicago

Problems and Policy

Hietger, Bernhard and Waverman, Leonard, eds., German Unification and the International Economy (New York: Routledge Press, 1993)

OCED Economic Surveys: Germany 1992/1993 (Paris: OCED Press, 1993)

OCED Economic Surveys: Germany 1993/1994 (Paris: OCED Press, 1994)

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Security:

Baring, Arnulf. Germany's New Position in Europe. Berg publishers
United Kingdom. 1994.

Gutjahr, Lothar. German Foreign and Defense Policy after Unification.
Pirter publishers New York. 1994.

Project Icons. The New Europe: An International Negotiation Seminars
Project Scenario. College Park, Maryland. Spring 1995.

Project Icons. Background Documents. College Park, Maryland. Spring
1995.

German Embassy, Press Department US Troops Leaving
Berlin Following the Withdrawal of former Soviet Troops from Germany.
Washington DC. August 1994.

Kohl, Helmut. European Security and Germany's Role. Feb. 5, 1994.
(speech).

BEST COPY AVAILABLE

ETHNICITY AND NATIONALISM

- Albright, Joseph: "Fervor for German unity may give extreme right the opportunity it craves" in The Atlantic Journal, A,17:1, Dec.14, 1989.
- Brochmann, Grete: "'Fortress Europe' and the Moral Burden: Immigration from the 'South' to the European Economic Community" in Cooperation and Conflict, vol. 26, no.4:185-95, Dec. 19, 1991.
- Faist, Thomas: "How to Define a Foreigner?" in West European Politics, vol.17, no.2, April 1994.
- "For the German 'Expellees,' the Past is a Future" in New York Times, 4, 2:1, March 4, 1992.
- German Information Center (GIC): "Focus On...", 7 pages, June 1994.
- "Germany's Problems with Foreigners" in Chicago Tribune, 1, 18:1, Dec.14, 1992.
- Gopher\Background\Germany\Fact book\Human rights
- Gurr, Ted Robert; Harff, Barbara: Ethnic Conflict in World Politics, Westview Press, Boulder, CO, 1994.
- Hacke, Christian: "Germany and the New Europe" in From the Atlantic to the Urals, edited by Calleo, David P.; Gordon, Philip H.; Seven Locks Press, Arlington, VA, 1992.
- Manfrass, Klaus: "Europe: South-North or East-West Migration?" International Migration Review, vol.26, no 2; 388-99, Summer 1992.
- McKay, John P.; Hill, Bennet D.; Buckler, John: A History of Western Society, Fourth Edition volume II., Houghton Mifflin Co, Boston, MA, 1991.
- Mushaben, Joyce: "Germany's Rising Nationalism: Everyone Deserves Some Blame" Christian Science Monitor, vol. 9, no. 1, Oct. 21 1992.
- O'Brien, Peter: "German-Polish Migration: The Elusive Search for a German State" International Migration Review, vol. 26, no. 2: 373-9, Summer 1992.
- Institute for National Strategic Studies Strategic Studies: Strategic Assessment 1995, 38, 39, 48.

ENVIRONMENT

- Federal Environment Ministry of Germany. Environmental Policy. August 1994.
- Federal Environment Ministry of Germany. Ordinance on the Prohibition of certain Ozone-depleting Halogenated Hydrocarbons. May 6, 1991.
- FIPSE Scenerio Spring 1995
- Hermann, Hans-Joachim, Federal Environmental Agency, Umweltbundesamt, Federal Republic of Germany, 1992.
- Stigliani, W.M., P.R. Jaffe, S. Anderberg. 1993. Heavy Metal pollution in the Rhine basin. *Environmental Science and Technology*. vol.27(no.5) : pp.786-793.
- Worster, Donald, ed. *The Ends of the Earth: Perspectives on Modern Environmental History*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

FROM: finland
DATE: Wed Apr 19 04:37:36 1995 (GMT)
MSG #: 678
KEY: economics

MESSAGE:

*****EU MEMBERS:

Thanks to the generous inputs from the ministries of economic of both France and Germany, Finland is pleased to put forth the most comprehensive and pragmatic criteria for admitting EU members. This is the newly updated version of the proposal: *****THE 1995 EU-ADMITANCE POLICY*****

~ I. ADMITANCE EVERY 7 YEARS EFFECTIVE 1995:

This allows for prospective countries to prove themselves economically within the seven year international business cycle, either through THEIR OWN economic policies or with the assistance of cost effective EU programs like the STEP program.

ENFORCEMENT: This 7 year goal should be adhered to by all prospective EU members, however, if countries prove that within 3 or 4 years their economies can grow substantially they would be considered for "early admittance" provided all remaining 4 points are adhered to.

~ II. ONLY 2 COUNTRIES PER ADMITANCE PERIOD:

This creates an incentive for countries to compete. The end result would be more efficient industries, and greater growth on the part of their economies.

ENFORCEMENT: Since the 7 year cycle has the potential to be by-passed by strong emerging economies, it allows the possibility for more than 2 countries to be admitted within a 7 year business cycle.

~ III. TRANSITION TO MARKET ECONOMY AND GOAL OF 21% GROWTH WITHIN 7 YEARS:

This is imperative for admittance. Centralized economies will only hurt the EU. In reference to 21% growth, this would be spread out over 7 years, allowing countries to have a bad year and still make up for it. The growth averages to 3% per year, a reasonable figure (Down from 5% per year suggested previously).

ENFORCEMENT: Strict enforcement of Market Economy standard.
Evaluation of growth based on 7 year international business cycle.

~IV. IMPLEMENTATION OF ENVIRONMENTAL STANDARDS AS IT RELATES TO INDUSTRY:

This creates at the onset, a set of comprehensive and environmentally friendly laws that protect the European environment. This includes:

- a) Countries to abide by National Standards for all Water Bodies.
- b) Initial 15% reduction in Eutrofication over next 5 years
- c) Initial 10% reduction in transboundary pollution on the part of industry over next 5 years.

ENFORCEMENT: Strict Enforcement should be required. Percentage reduction open to interpretation.

~V. REDUCTION OF TRADE BARRIERS WITH EU-MEMBERS AND NON-EU MEMBERS ALIKE:

This is imperative if prospective EU-members want to participate in a free market economy. A 15% reduction in the next 7 years would be required. This allows for some protection of "infant industries" while prospective countries are fully adjusting to market economy.

ENFORCEMENT: Imperative.

*****NECESSARY REQUIREMENTS WHEN PROSPECTIVE COUNTRIES APPLY*****

For our evaluation, we would request:

- 1. Economic performance records for past 7 years (ie. GDP)
- 2. Allocation of budget for fiscal year 1996
- 3. Long range budget allocation for next 7 years
- 4. Comprehensive intergovernmental agencies' planning/coordinating efforts for 1996
- 5. Comprehensive needs assessment from each governmental agency for the next 7 years

These documents will help us to determine what countries stand the best chance of becoming members. It also allows us to analyze how economic policies were set in the past. Finally, it helps us determine what countries most need aid-- to enable us to set up cost-effective programs like STEP that would reward countries who are clearly on the right track and with the most need.

*****END OF PROPOSAL***** (FDE)

BEST COPY AVAILABLE

FROM: germany
DATE: Thu Apr 13 19:54:15 1995 (GMT)
MSG #: 659
KEY: economics

MESSAGE:

Greetings,

At this time we, Germany, are prepared to put forth our proposal for EU expansion and intergration. In order to develop a strong base for further EU economic growth we must not let this opportunity to unite Europe slip through our grasps. This unity will allow all European nations to expand and compete in the new economic world order. Our plan, The Junior EU System, formerly know as the "mini-EU", will allow the EU to address a number of individual nations concerns while maintaining a strong and solvent base for expansion.

Our plan entales:

- 1) The creation of several sub-regions consisting of economically and geographically similiar applicant nations into individual cooperative blocks.
 - a) Within these sub-regions will develop common policies on trade, immigration, and the transition to free market economies.
 - b) These regions will consist of 3-4 countries whose members will benefit from a greater resource pool with the cooperation of the EU.
 - c) As these regions develop a strong economic base that is consistant with present EU nations they will be considered for full membership.
 - d) The EU will evaluate the regions on rotating seven year cycles while still evaluating each nation on an individual basis.
 - e) Each region will also be required to meet present EU nations environmental standards for full admission.
- 2) This plan will benefit the EU in the following manner:
 - a) A reduction in trade barriers between the Junior EU Sub-regions and the full EU members will increase competitiveness and economic stability for all of Europe in the world economy.
 - b) The present EU nations will gain valuable natural resources from the Sub-regions, who will in turn benefit from EU's manufactured goods. This plan will be a win-win proposition for all parties involved.
 - c) Under this plan, pan-European economic integration will take place without undue burden placed upon any one group of nations.
 - d) The European Union will develop into an active economic body that will allow us to compete unmatched by either NAFTA or the Asian economies in the future economic world.

Through the development of this proposal, we, Germany, have taken into account the concerns and reservations of all parties involved through diplomatic channels. We feel this proposal will successfully meet the economic needs of all European nations as Europe enters the twenty-first century.

Regards,
Germany

BEST COPY AVAILABLE

FROM: france
 DATE: Tue Apr 11 14:50:45 1995 (GMT)
 MSG #: 490
 KEY: economics

MESSAGE:

Greetings from French ministry of economics.

In response to Finnish message#482 we want to offer some recommendations about development of East-Central European states.

There is the problem of competition EU states with US and Japan on Eastern market. If we do not want to give them the leadership in world economy then we should develop Eastern economy as the base of market for our produce.

We offer to limit the grants formed aid for these countries and concentrate on technology development on exporting experts to grow up their industry and economics. Also we think that EU should regulate quantity of aid by criterion of economical growth. Moreover this policy will help us to solve problem of unemployment.


France offers the "System of Economical Privileges"(STEP) project. It means dividing all countries of Europe into four classes. These classes may be determined by their economic level of development:

EU's members.

States just before joining EU.

States with low economical level.

States with unstable policy and economics.



We would like to create institute, which could relate with E-C European states as the EU's representative organization.

Respectfully, Ministry of Economics.

APPENDIX C

**LIST OF PARTICIPANT-INSTITUTIONS:
THE INTERNATIONAL NEGOTIATION SEMINARS PROJECT**

- State of Maryland:

University of Maryland, College Park
Frostburg State University
Morgan State University

- US/Outside Maryland:

The Cooper Union, New York
James Madison University, Virginia
Whittier College, California

- Europe:

American University in Bulgaria
Budapest University of Economic Sciences, Hungary
Lorand Eotvos University, Hungary
Novosibirsk University, Russia
Jyvaskyla Technical University, Finland
University of Warsaw, Poland

APPENDIX D

MAHE
Maryland Association for Higher Education

Bridget Starkey and Jonathan Wilkenfeld
Project ICONS, Department of Government and Politics
University of Maryland
College Park, MD 20742

August 12, 1994

Dear Ms. Starkey and Mr. Wilkenfeld:

Your program "The International Negotiations Seminars Project" has been selected as the First Place winner in the Instructional Category for the 1994 MAHE Distinguished Program Awards.


All winners will be recognized at the MAHE Fall meeting at the Baltimore Trade Center on Friday, October 14, 1994. Please bring any materials available about your award-winning programs to the meeting to disseminate to your colleagues in higher education.

Please call my office at 410-541-2416 to confirm your attendance at the Fall conference. If you will not be able to attend, please provide the name of the person who will be accepting the award on your behalf.

An announcement of the winning programs for this year will be sent to all Presidents and Institutional Representative of institutions holding MAHE membership. In addition, winners will be recognized in the Fall MAHE Newsletter. The committee also urges you to submit the narrative of your program for publication in the MAHE journal.

Congratulations on your achievement. This program brings deserved recognition to you and your institution.

Sincerely,



Rosemary Wolfe
Chair, MAHE Distinguished


APPENDIX E

TECH

E X C H A N G E

An Edutech Publication for the Academic Computing Community

SPRING 1994



WELCOME TO
 THE LEARNING SPACE
 BEYOND PLACE

Canada

Sweden

Slovenia

France

College Park,
Maryland



CONTENTS

FEATURES




NEGOTIATION TRAINING THROUGH
 SIMULATION: THE ICONS INTERNATIONAL
 NEGOTIATION SEMINARS INITIATIVE

6

BRIGID A. STARKEY
 UNIVERSITY OF MARYLAND

Using an active-learning pedagogy developed at the International Communication and Negotiation Simulation (ICONS) Project over the past twelve years, a new initiative, designed to expose lower-division undergraduate students to the complexities of foreign policy decision-making and international negotiation, has emerged. The students role-play, using a computer-assisted simulation model to interact with peers at Western, Central, and Eastern European universities.



DIVERSE NETWORKED LEARNING IN A
 BINATIONAL ENVIRONMENT

14

ARMANDO A. ARIAS, JR., TEXAS A&M UNIVERSITY-KINGSVILLE AND
 BERYL L. BELLMAN, CALIFORNIA STATE UNIVERSITY, LOS ANGELES

BESTNET, the Binational English and Spanish Telecommunications Network, has evolved from a bicultural/bilingual, distance learning utility in the early 1980s to its current role as a cross-border, binational, computer-mediated, networked learning environment.

Participants are investigating possibilities for academic/commercial collaboration in networked learning situations, specifically, the North American Free Trade Agreement.



CLOSE ENCOUNTERS WITH VIRTUAL WORLDS

23

SARAH J. SLOANE
 UNIVERSITY OF PUGET SOUND

How may contemporary theories of narrative and rhetoric contribute to strategies of building stories in virtual reality? Follow an English professor as she experiences a virtual version of Seattle at the University of Washington's Human Interface Technology Laboratory. She details the connections between poststructuralist theory and virtual worlds and speculates on how two particular virtual bodies (fire and water) would affect a user's experience of virtual stories.

DEPARTMENTS

LIFE ON THE GLOBAL NET

13

COMMENTARY BY ESTHER DYSON

CAMPUS FORUM

30

Is distance learning using electronic means anything other than a New Age version of the correspondence course?

PROFILES IN INNOVATION

37

Virtually Yours

UPDATE

Coming Attractions in Hardware and Software

38



BRIGID A. STARKEY
UNIVERSITY OF
MARYLAND

NEGOTIATION TRAINING THROUGH SIMULATION:

THE ICONS INTERNATIONAL NEGOTIATION SEMINARS

The **ICONS Model**. Imagine the frustration of Hungarian, Polish, and Rumanian negotiators, intent upon convincing the European Community to accept their membership applications. Imagine the feeling of accomplishment when associate status, with full membership pending, is finally achieved. Students participating in the International Communication and Negotiation Simulation (ICONS) Project of the University of Maryland experience the highs and lows of international negotiations during the course of a semester through a computer-assisted simulation model.

Project ICONS, under director Jonathan Wilkenfeld, has been working since the early 1980s to address longstanding problems in higher education. Among those the project targets—the disinvestment of college students from their own education, the lack of relevance of university curriculum to the changing workplace, the isolation of students from faculty members, and a singular, passive definition of “learning.” Simulation games promote an active learning process, providing students with incremental, cooperative tasks to perform. It prompts students to develop their own interpretations of events and share their perceptions of problems, and possible policy responses, with peers. In an ICONS simulation, cross-cultural awareness comes not only through the experience of playing the roles of high-level foreign policy decision-makers but also through the ability of the computer network to link the negotiators to peers at institutions around the world. Bringing technology to the classroom shrinks the globe, promoting a variation of distance education for the international system of a new era.


Cognizant of the difficulty educational institutions can have acquiring state-of-the-art equipment, participation in ICONS has never required more than a personal computer, a modem, a printer, and communications and word processing software. Participants are linked to a host computer at the University of Maryland, where project facilitators have taken advantage of global commercial networks (ARPANET, TELENET/SPRINTNET, NSFNET, and now Internet) to fashion a near universally-available product. Current participants at Novosibirsk

University in Siberia can attest to the easy availability and now take advantage of Internet access to eliminate even the long-distance costs associated with commercial network contracts. POLNET III software, developed for ICONS at the University of Maryland, lets participants send and receive daily diplomatic communications. It also provides for real-time conferencing, enabling country-teams to hold multilateral summits on such issues as cross-border pollution and ethnic conflicts. The POLNET software is written in C and run under a UNIX operating system. It combines features of electronic mail and real-time teleconferencing, or asynchronous and synchronous modes of network-reliant communications.

Using computers to teach about negotiation has some distinct advantages (Wilkenfeld and Kaufman, 1993). Students develop an appreciation of precise and careful wording and a realization that language problems abound in intercultural communication. Many ICONS simulations have featured a foreign language translation component to further awareness of the crucial role of language in diplomacy. While some participants have complained

ERIC Full Text Provided by ERIC

The most prevalent, and perhaps useful, schematic framework remains that of the “bargainer” versus the “bully.”



that the computer hinders their ability to speak directly and freely with their negotiating partners, others have applauded the leap of imagination that computers—as the “great equalizers” and anonymous channels of communication—provide.

The ICONS simulation experience is typically built around three phases: preparation, simulation, and debriefing. Research, using a project-generated scenario and computer training, constitutes the initial stage. Dissemination of relevant research materials in electronic form has been aided by the addition of a gopher server to the ICONS system. While it cannot hold copyrighted information, materials such as treaties and government documents now form the basis of a common resource base for students participating in a given exercise. Policy planning and implementation occupy participants during the simulation phase. Debriefing gives everyone involved an opportunity to reflect on the entire experience.

The ICONS model is currently applied in a variety of different settings. College Park serves as the hub for the majority of exercises, including three university-level simulations per year; ten to fifteen exercises at the high school level; a summer program for gifted high-school students, run in conjunction with the Maryland State Department of Education; a Pacific Rim


exercise for the East York Board of Education in Ontario, Canada; and a special application for the Organization of American States Inter-American Drug Abuse Control Commission. Other applications are housed at various “regional centers,” including sites in California, Florida, Iowa, and Connecticut.

The International Negotiation Seminars Project

The Fund for the Improvement of Postsecondary Education (FIPSE) of the United States Department of Education is currently supporting a new ICONS initiative, the “International Negotiation Seminars Project.” Its aim is to bring a meaningful learning experience to as many lower-division students as possible by combining the traditional “large lecture” university class with a small-group seminar, organized around a simulation. In addition to refocusing the place of ICONS on the University of Maryland campus, the initiative provides for expansion of the model to other campuses in Maryland, several large state universities around the United States, and institutions in post-communist Europe. The Seminar Project addresses four specific areas identified by FIPSE as requiring creative attention (see “Agenda for Improvement,” 1993).

Teaching Students About the World Beyond Our Borders

“Internationalizing the curriculum” has been an educational battle cry for over a decade now. However, as noted by FIPSE analysts, initiatives are often launched without



attention to goals. An integral part of ICONS is to develop cross-cultural awareness among students and broaden their knowledge of global problems. Obviously, the ideal way for students to learn about the world is through travel. Access to these opportunities, however, is severely restricted. Simulation games are an alternative way for students to look at the world through different cultural lenses, rewarding the thoroughness of their research into all aspects of life in their "new country." The International Negotiation Seminars Project, launched in 1992, uses a "New Europe Simulation" to focus the attention of participants on the myriad difficulties western European and post-communist nations are experiencing in the post-Cold War era. Computer-facilitated distance learning affords students a true cross-cultural experience, as students from the United States negotiate with peers in Finland, Hungary, Poland, and Russia.

Adjusting to a Changing and Globalizing Economy

Domestic competition for jobs and international competition for markets are affecting the educational agenda to a greater extent every year. In the social sciences, there is a realization that emphasis is better placed on developing students' reasoning skills than on the conveyance of factual knowledge. Not only do "facts" change at a rapid pace today, but the nature of issues does as well. The focus now is on such areas as natural resource management and building infrastructures that can support political and economic democracy. Success at both the individual and societal levels depends on familiarity with rapidly-changing technologies and an understanding of how to learn new skills. An important goal of the ICONS International Negotiation Seminars Project is to teach students how to reason, how to work effectively in a group, and how to negotiate agreements on complex issues. Active learning and the teaching of applied

skills (computer technology and diplomatic negotiation) enhance the relevance of this course to the students.

Creating a Learning-Friendly Campus Ethos

Part-time and commuting students, international exchange students, returning students, and many others who are sometimes marginalized from university life are often deprived of the social and intellectual stimulation that can come from sustained interaction with peers and faculty members. The central goal of the FIPSE-funded project is to enrich the college experience of lower-division students, often disoriented and disappointed with university life and at risk to drop out. The Seminar Project has created a new lower-division course, "Introduction to International Negotiation." The class is divided into smaller subgroups which function as country-teams under the supervision of graduate assistants. In evaluations of the project, students have indicated this course gave them a rare opportunity to make friends on campus. Opportunities to work with faculty are also provided, as an interdisciplinary team complements the lead professor with featured guest lectures and informal assistance to issue-area working groups within the class. The ICONS computer lab at the University of Maryland becomes a hub of activity during the simulation—a place where team representatives meet to discuss items on their foreign policy agenda. The "Introduction to International Negotiation" course has also been fortunate in gaining access to two new multimedia classrooms on the College Park campus, the AT&T and IBM Teaching Theaters. Country-teams assigned to these facilities can take advantage of computer technology to fuse individual thoughts and suggestions into group positions, using software specifically designed to enhance collaboration in every area from writing to brainstorming.

The ICONS simulation experience is typically built around three phases: preparation, simulation, and debriefing...

Assessing for Improvement


Many programs and strategies aimed at reform sound good, but administrators and instructors learn to be cautious about both the scope of programs and their effectiveness. As part of the FIPSE mandate, the International Negotiation Seminars Project has an extensive evaluation component which allows for modifications to the project on a semester-by-semester basis. University of Maryland Professor of Human Development Judith Torney-Purta observes the students while they deliberate and reads the "electronic journals" they submit to gauge the learning process. Her observations of this and other ICONS initiatives have contributed to an extensive body of work on the process of political socialization (Torney-Purta, 1989). Through analysis of students' words and actions, project facilitators are better able to gauge their success in meeting the many educational goals that have been articulated. An online questionnaire function has also been added to the POLNET III software, letting evaluators compare responses to questions asked before the simulation with those posed in the aftermath.

In addition to addressing these pedagogical purposes, the Seminars Project sets substantive "knowledge" goals as well. The "Introduction to International Negotiation" course complements the experiential module of the semester (The New Europe Simulation) with a prior unit which combines study of the theory of negotiation with a case study approach. This provides the student with a variety of examples of both successful and unsuccessful negotiations.

Learning How to Negotiate

Distinctions between politics, economics, and business are becoming ever more tenuous in the contemporary international arena. Whether the issue to be negotiated is a minor legal dispute or a decades-long protracted conflict, what marks negotiation as a process is the willingness of both sides to seek a solution through means other than physical force. To focus a course on diplomatic negotiation is to bring a variety of other issues to the fore. The formulation and implementation of a negotiation strategy is linked to a variety of concepts and processes that are central to the study of international relations, among them: agenda-setting, decision-making, consensus and bloc-building, cross-cultural dissonance, and bargaining. The most prevalent, and perhaps useful, schematic framework remains that of the "bargainer" versus the "bully." Students learn that they must fashion strategies that fit with the capabilities of the nation-states they are portraying.


Theory meets practice when the country-teams enter the simulated world of the "New Europe" about halfway through the semester. Divided into delegations according to issue area (e.g., environment, security, economics, ethnicity), the team brings into the exercise an elaborate "position paper," the culmination of a group project. The first week or so is spent setting forth their nation's positions on important policy questions. The remaining three weeks of the exercise revolve around the process of "give and



take," as diplomats coordinate and cooperate with, or obstruct, the efforts of their negotiating partners. Since the simulation is set three to six months into the future, the students must reach beyond the headlines in their efforts to grapple with issues of contention in Europe. Finding a balance between playing a "realistic" Russia or Germany and allowing room for creative problem solving is a source of consternation for the team members. Inevitably, there are complaints that one nation or another is acting out of character. This kind of problem challenges the facilitators to keep the students in-role and focused on their task.

Consideration of how the simulated Europe matched up to expectations of negotiations in the actual region is held for the debriefing period. Appraisals of successes and failures are aided by the data archive that has been created in the ICONS system. The final project systemizes their reflective analysis by asking them to create their own case study, which they accomplish by tracing the course of events in one specific issue-area on which they negotiated. A POLNET III function opens the archives at this juncture, allowing country-teams the opportunity to see what their allies and adversaries were doing during the five week simulation. France and Germany, for example, can be stunned to find that Britain was pursuing two different approaches with them on the issue of European monetary union. This revelation comes after a careful reconstruction of the sequence of events and consideration of message content.

The International Negotiation Seminars Project is designed to bring an international, interactive, interdisciplinary educational approach to a broad range of students early in their academic careers. Recasting the large lecture class into small-group seminars and introducing the students to the world of international negotiation through a computer-assisted simulation is a cost-effective way to tackle reform at three essential levels: curricular, structural, and technological.



Resources

"Agenda for Improvement," in Application for Grants under the Comprehensive Program, United States Department of Education, Office of Postsecondary Education, The Fund for the Improvement of Postsecondary Education. Washington, D.C. (1993).

Torney-Purta, Judith. "Political Cognition and Its Restructuring in Young People," Human Development 32 (1989) 14-23.

Wilkenfeld, Jonathan and Kaufman, Joyce. "Political Science: Network Simulation in International Politics," Social Science Computer Review 11:4 (Winter 1993).

Brigid A. Starkey
Associate Director
Project ICONS
University of Maryland
INTERNET: BSTARKEY@BSS2.UMD.EDU

Simulation games are an alternative way for students to look at the world through different cultural lenses...

Project ICONS International Negotiation Seminars Project: Teaching with Technology

Brigid Starkey and Jonathan Wilkenfeld

Introduction

Over the past decade, an increasing number of reports and national studies have highlighted the failure of postsecondary curricula to involve students in their own learning and to provide them with the problem-solving skills they will need to function in a complex and interdependent world. Moreover, the contemporary workplace is infused with information technology and is global in scope. Students' academic preparation typically gives them too few opportunities to be active participants rather than passive observers. And the technology that they will need in the workplace is under-utilized in the college classroom, where the integration of computers into the learning process is significantly lower than in the K through 12 environment (Norman, 1994).

To better prepare postsecondary students to function in today's workplace, the International Communication and Negotiation Simulation (ICONS) Project at the University of Maryland provides structured exercises that build communication skills and cross-cultural awareness through the use of technology. A recent ICONS initiative, the "International Negotiation Seminars Project," was recognized by the Maryland Association of Higher Education (MAHE) in 1994 for instructional excellence and innovation. This article describes the general ICONS approach and details this latest enterprise.

Collaborative Distance Learning Through Simulation

Foreign language instruction, student exchanges, and a conscious emphasis on world cultures, geography, and history are some of the strategies that have traditionally been used to globalize the curriculum. The arrival of the virtual classroom — a technology-mediated environment that can support a "dispersed community of learners" (Hiltz, 1994) — provides

new media through which students can transcend borders. This is especially important for the majority of students who do not have the resources to travel abroad. Educational technology can facilitate a learning model that encourages true experiential and collaborative work. An active learning environment allows the learner to manipulate dependent and independent variables, experimenting with different scenarios and different outcomes. A collaborative learning environment encourages synergy in problem-solving. It counters the focus on individual achievement that dominates American post-secondary education, shifting the nature of the educational enterprise to cooperation, rather than competition. A further gain from a group-oriented learning process is that social interaction becomes a prominent aspect of the methodology (Alavi, 1994).

ICONS

In using negotiation as the theoretical context for the ICONS simulations, an automatic emphasis is placed on group process and communication skills. The computer-assisted simulation, able to support worldwide participation, provides an authentic cross-cultural communication experience. Using a combination of synchronous and asynchronous communications, ICONS participants negotiate with one another by exchanging positions and “meeting” on-line in bilateral and multilateral conferences in hopes of achieving mutually acceptable outcomes. Learning is in the hands of the learners, who work in groups to accomplish simulation-related tasks. Student-participants are cast in the roles of high-level negotiators for various nations and must research positions and formulate policies as they engage in the negotiation process. As part of the group of activities in the field of international relations that are referred to as simulation and gaming exercises, the ICONS model facilitates interdisciplinarity and internationalization of the curriculum. Social, behavioral, physical, and environmental sciences are all relevant to the research and negotiation phases of the model, as are foreign language and culture studies (Wilkenfeld and Kaufman, 1993).

ICONS now reaches over 5,000 university and high school students and teachers on a yearly basis, with a variety of simulations. From its inception in the early 1980s, the Project has capitalized on the ability of computers to link learners at remote locations to one another during participation in the negotiations. Initially, ICONS utilized ARPANET, Sprintnet, and NSFNET to facilitate the distance learning component, linking American students to peers in Asia, Europe, Canada, and Latin America. Now, the wide accessibility that the Internet offers has made ICONS available to students in virtually every corner of the globe.

The International Negotiation Seminars Project

With the support of a three-year grant from the U.S. Department of Education’s Fund for the Improvement of Post-Secondary Education (FIPSE), ICONS adapted its simulation model to target lower-division undergraduates in large, “lecture” course settings (Starkey, 1994). With a premium on cost-effectiveness, the initiative sought to develop ways to enliven the learning experience for first and second-year students in ways that did not require large infusions of scarce institutional funds. The project targeted reform in three broad areas: curricular, structural and technological.

Globalization of the curriculum, with an emphasis on enhancing interdisciplinarity, was a main goal of the project. On the College Park campus, a new course, Introduction to International Negotiation, became the vehicle for the FIPSE initiative. Accepted as one of the courses that meets “cultural diversity” requirements on campus, the class was open to all lower-division undergraduates, although it was required that they have at least one political science course as a prerequisite. A simulation scenario based on post-communist Europe — the “New Europe” — was drafted and European universities were recruited to participate. The scenario incorporated four main issue areas: environment, security, ethnicity, and economics. Senior-level faculty members on the campus were invited to deliver guest lectures on these various topics and work with interested students as they delved more deeply into such subjects as the pollution of the Rhine River, in preparation for the negotiations.

Structurally, the course took advantage of the conventional “discussion sections” that complement lecture courses. Students who signed up for the Thursday morning session did so without knowing that this would predestine them to become part of the Russian negotiating team. The Tuesday morning session became France, and so on. These “country-teams” (groups of 15-20 students) used the weekly discussion section meeting of the class to work as a group, with facilitation from a graduate teaching assistant and consultation from the lead professor and other guest lecturers. Hence, a seminar-type experience was integrated into the course structure. Negotiation theories, tactics, and strategies were presented in the twice-weekly large group or lecture meetings, which also relied on case studies to bring the topic of negotiation to the students.

Technology, in the form of the computer-assisted simulation, electronic mail on the University of Maryland campus, Internet resources, and video conferencing capabilities, all contributed to the active and distance learning components of the experience. Students and faculty were able to exchange thoughts through electronic mail, the Worldwide Web facilitated research searches on the Internet, and students at remote locations were able to “debrief” with their peers following the simulation experience using video technology. In addition to reaching over 500 students on the College Park campus during its three years (1992-1995), the “International Negotiation Seminars Project” encouraged the growth of virtual classrooms on fourteen other campuses in the United States and Europe, including Frostburg State University and Morgan State University in the state of Maryland.

The ICONS Negotiation Seminars Project produced a model, with the following central components:

- A substantive focus on international issues, such as trade, the environment, security, and ethnicity.
- A focus on group decision-making, as students worked together to prepare to play the roles of high-level international negotiators.
- An authentic cross-cultural experience, as students negotiated with peers at overseas institutions.
- An introduction to the technology of the 21st century, as students conducted research using Internet resources and communicated with one another using synchronous and asynchronous modes of computer-facilitated communication.

Evaluation of ICONS: Some Findings

Using evaluative techniques such as a recently developed on-line (pre and post-test) questionnaire, cognitive mapping schemes, and think-aloud problem-solving techniques, the ICONS evaluator concluded that participants' understanding of the complexity of international issues increased as a result of participation. Post-simulation "maps" showed not only a greater fact base, but also an enhanced understanding of the possible options and alignments of players in the international system. She also reported an increased sensitivity to cultural and linguistic perspectives that nations bring to negotiation situations (Torney-Purta, 1992).

Evaluations of the ICONS Project have also highlighted language (reading/writing) outcomes. Three levels of communication have been identified as central to the simulation process (Torney-Purta, 1994): (1) between-team interaction among peers representing different countries sending messages via the computer network; (2) within-team interaction and co-construction of messages in oral discourse resulting in message entry; and, (3) individual processing, cognitive representations/schemata, and restructuring. Using data collected through field and video observation, the evaluation found that "task-related" behavior such as reading messages, processing the main points of those messages, and communicating those points to peers accounted for the majority of activity during the actual simulation. The high involvement levels of students in the process were attributed to the following:

First, the computer screen is an object of highly focused student attention because it is constantly changing and providing valuable information in a way the blackboard or textbook does not; this appears to enhance individuals' processing of information... The process of co-construction and group revision of the message on the screen provided a potent stimulus for elaborating individuals' representations, and for students' discovering that what seemed obvious to one about a situation was not obvious to another. Often participants would see complications even in a simple proposal. The computer system provided information corresponding to examples in a science text to be dealt with at a deep or surface level (Torney-Purta, 1994, p.70).

The simulation process keeps students involved in a cycle of thinking, revising, and explaining that carries over from the within-team dialogue to the between-team negotiations.

Conclusion

The International Negotiation Seminars initiative was designed to reach more students at the critical beginning stages of their college careers with an active learning strategy. Using the successful ICONS simulation model, a premium was placed on active, collaborative learning. To enhance the experience, interdisciplinary teaching assistants and lecturers were brought into the learning environment. Authenticity was lent to the "New Europe Simulation" through the participation of institutions in post-Communist Europe. This FIPSE-sponsored initiative has produced several legacies that will last well beyond the grant period. The centerpiece course, Introduction to International Negotiation, will continue to be offered on the College Park campus, targeting lower-division undergraduates. In addition,

relationships built between ICONS and the University of Warsaw, Budapest University of Economic Sciences, Novosibirsk University in Russia, and American University in Bulgaria will continue into the future, providing American students with a unique opportunity for interaction.

References

- Alavi, M. 1994. "Computer-Mediated Collaborative Learning: An Empirical Evaluation," *MIS Quarterly*.
- Hiltz, S.R. 1994. *Virtual Classroom: Learning Without Limits Via Computer Networks* (Norwood, NJ: Ablex Publishing Corporation).
- Norman, K. 1994. *HyperCourseware* (Internal Paper, University of Maryland).
- Starkey, B. 1994. "Negotiation Training Through Simulation: The ICONS International Negotiation Seminars," *Educator's Tech Exchange*.
- Torney-Purta, J. 1992. "Cognitive Representations of the Political System in Adolescents: The Continuum from Pre-Novice to Expert," in Helen Haste and Judith Torney-Purta, eds. *The Development of Political Understanding: A New Perspective* (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass).
- Torney-Purta, J. 1994. "Peer Interactions Among Adolescents Using Computer Networks in an International Role-Playing Exercise," in *Technology-Based Learning Environments*, eds. Stella Vosniadou, Erik De Corte, and Heinz Mandl (Heidelberg, Germany: Springer Publishing).
- Wilkenfeld, J. and Kaufman, J. 1993. "Political Science: Network Simulation in International Politics," *Social Science Computer Review* 11:4.

Jonathan Wilkenfeld is chair of the Department of Government and Politics and Executive Director of Project ICONS at the University of Maryland at College Park. Brigid Starkey is Associate Director of Project ICONS.

APPENDIX F

**Negotiation Training, Active Learning, and Cross-Cultural
Awareness-Building: The "New Europe" Simulation Model**

**Brigid A. Starkey, Ph.D
Associate Director, Project ICONS
University of Maryland, College Park
bstarkey@bss2.umd.edu**

**Prepared for Delivery at the 1994 CIES Conference
San Diego, California**

The ICONS Model

Imagine the frustration of Hungarian, Polish and Romanian negotiators, intent upon convincing the European Community to accept their membership applications. Imagine the feeling of accomplishment when associate status, with full membership pending, is finally achieved. Students participating in the International Communication and Negotiation Simulation (ICONS) Project of the University of Maryland experience the highs and lows of international negotiations during the course of a semester through a computer-assisted simulation model.

Project ICONS, under director Jonathan Wilkenfeld, has been working since the early 1980s to address longstanding problems in higher education. Among those that the project targets: the disinvestment of college students from their own education; the lack of relevance of university curriculum to the changing workplace; the isolation of students from faculty members; and a singular, passive definition of "learning." Simulation gaming promotes an active learning process, providing students with incremental, cooperative tasks to perform.¹ It prompts students to develop their own interpretations of events and share their perceptions of problems, and possible policy responses, with peers. In an ICONS simulation, cross-cultural awareness comes not only through the experience of playing high-level foreign policy decision-makers, but through the ability of the computer network to link the negotiators to peers at institutions around the world. Bringing technology to the classroom shrinks the globe, promoting a variation of distance education for the international system of a new era.

Cognizant of the difficulty educational institutions can have acquiring state-of-the-art equipment, participation in ICONS has never required more than a personal computer, a modem, a printer, and communications and word-processing software. Participants are linked to a central computer at the University of Maryland, where project facilitators have taken advantage of global commercial networks (ARPANET, TELENET/SPRINTNET, NSFNET, and now Internet) to fashion a near universally-available product. Current participants at Novosibirsk University in Siberia can attest to the easy availability and now take advantage of internet access to eliminate even the long-distance costs associated with commercial network contracts. POLNET III

¹ See Jonathan Wilkenfeld and Joyce Kaufman, "Political Science: Network Simulation in International Politics." Social Science Computer Review 11:4 (Winter 1993); and David Crookal and Patty Landis, "Global Network Simulation: An Environment for Global Awareness." In Global Interdependence: Proceedings of the 22nd International Conference of the International Simulation and Gaming Association (1992).

software,² developed for ICONS at the University of Maryland, allows participants to send and receive daily diplomatic communications. It also provides for real-time conferencing, enabling country-teams to hold multilateral summits on such issues as cross-border pollution and ethnic conflicts.

Using computers to teach about negotiation has some distinct advantages. Students develop an appreciation of precise and careful wording and a realization that language problems abound in intercultural communication. Many ICONS simulations have featured a foreign language translation component to further awareness of the crucial role of language in diplomacy. While some participants have complained that the computer hinders their ability to speak directly and freely with their negotiating partners, others have applauded the leap of imagination that computers -- as the "great equalizers" and anonymous channels of communication -- provide.

The ICONS simulation experience is typically built around three phases: preparation, simulation, and debriefing. Research, using a project-generated scenario, as well as computer training comprise the initial stage. Dissemination of relevant research materials in electronic form has been aided by the addition of a gopher server to the ICONS system. While it cannot hold copyrighted information, materials such as treaties and government documents now form the basis of a common resource base for students participating in a given exercise. Policy planning and implementation occupy participants during the simulation phase. Debriefing provides everyone involved an opportunity to reflect on the entire experience.

The ICONS model is currently applied in a variety of different settings. College Park serves as the hub for the majority of exercises, including two "globally-focused" university simulations per year; ten to fifteen exercises at the high school level; a summer program for gifted high-school students, run in conjunction with the Maryland State Department of Education; a Pacific Rim exercise for the East York Board of Education in Ontario, Canada; and a special application for the Organization of American States Inter-American Drug Abuse Control Commission (CICAD). Other applications are housed at various "regional centers," including sites in California, Florida, Iowa and Connecticut.

² The POLNET software is written in C and run under a UNIX operating system. It combines features of electronic mail and real-time tele-conferencing, or asynchronous and synchronous modes of network-reliant communications.

The International Negotiation Seminars Project

The Fund for the Improvement of Post-Secondary Education (FIPSE) of the United States Department of Education is currently supporting a new ICONS initiative, the "International Negotiation Seminars Project." Its aim is to bring a meaningful learning experience to as many lower-division students as possible, by combining the traditional "large lecture" university class with a small-group seminar, organized around a simulation. In addition to refocusing the place of ICONS on the University of Maryland campus, the initiative provides for expansion of the model to other campuses in Maryland, several large state universities around the United States, and institutions in post-Communist Europe. The Seminar Project addresses four specific areas identified by FIPSE as requiring creative attention.³

Teaching Students About the World Beyond Our Borders

"Internationalizing the curriculum" has been an educational battle cry for over a decade now. However, as noted by FIPSE analysts, initiatives are often launched without attention to goals. An integral part of ICONS is to develop cross-cultural awareness among students and broaden their knowledge of global problems. Obviously, the ideal way for students to learn about the world is through travel. Access to these opportunities, however, is severely restricted. Simulation-gaming provides an alternative way for students to look at the world through different cultural lenses and rewards the thoroughness of their research into all aspects of life in their "new country." The International Negotiation Seminars Project, launched in 1992, uses a "New Europe Simulation" to focus the attention of participants on the myriad difficulties western European and post-communist nations are experiencing in the post-Cold War era. Computer-facilitated distance learning affords students a true cross-cultural experience, as students from the United States negotiate with peers in Finland, Hungary, Poland and Russia.

Adjusting to a Changing and Globalizing Economy

Domestic competition for jobs and international competition for markets are impacting the educational agenda to a greater extent every year. In the social sciences, there is a realization that emphasis is better placed on developing students' reasoning skills than on the impartation of factual knowledge. Not only do "facts" change at a rapid pace today, but the nature of issues does as well. The focus now is on such

³ "Agenda for Improvement," in Application for Grants under the Comprehensive Program, United States Department of Education, Office of Postsecondary Education, The Fund for the Improvement of Postsecondary Education. Washington, D.C. (1993).

areas as natural resource management and building infrastructures that can support political and economic democracy. Success at both the individual and societal levels depend on familiarity with rapidly-changing technologies and an understanding of how to learn new skills. An important goal of the ICONS International Negotiation Seminars Project is to teach students how to reason, how to work effectively in a group, and how to negotiate principled agreements on complex issues. Active learning and the teaching of applied skills (computer technology and diplomatic negotiation) enhance the relevance of this course to the students.

Creating a Learning-Friendly Campus Ethos

Part-time and commuting students, international exchange students, returning students, and many others who are sometimes marginalized from university life are often deprived of the social and intellectual stimulation that can come from sustained interaction with peers and faculty members. The central goal of the FIPSE-funded project is to enrich the college experience of lower-division students, often disoriented and disappointed with university-life and at risk to drop out. The Seminar Project has created a new lower-division course, Introduction to International Negotiation. The class-as-a-whole is divided into much smaller subgroups which function as country-teams under the supervision of graduate assistants. In evaluations of the project, students have indicated that this course provided them with a rare opportunity to make friends on campus. Opportunities to work with faculty are also provided, as an interdisciplinary team complements the lead professor with featured guest lectures and informal assistance to issue-area working groups within the class. The ICONS computer lab at the University of Maryland becomes a hub of activity during the simulation; a place where team representatives meet to discuss items on their foreign policy agenda. The Introduction to International Negotiation course has also been fortunate in gaining access to two new multimedia classrooms on the College Park campus, the AT&T and IBM Teaching Theaters. Country-teams assigned to these facilities are able to take advantage of computer technology to fuse individual thoughts and suggestions into group positions, using software specifically designed to enhance collaboration in every area from writing to brainstorming.

Assessing for Improvement

Many programs and strategies aimed at reform sound good, but administrators and instructors alike learn to be cautious about both the scope of programs and their effectiveness. As part of the FIPSE mandate, the International Negotiation Seminars Project has an extensive evaluation component, which allows for modifications to the project on a semester-by-semester basis.

University of Maryland Professor of Human Development Judith Torney-Purta observes the students while they deliberate and reads the "electronic journals" they submit to gauge the learning process. Her observations of this and other ICONS initiatives has contributed to an extensive body of work on the process of political socialization.⁴ Through analysis of students' words and actions, project facilitators are better able to gauge their success in meeting the many educational goals that have articulated. An online questionnaire function has also been added to the Polnet III software, enabling evaluators to compare responses to questions asked before the simulation to those posed in the aftermath.

In addition to addressing these pedagogical purposes, the Seminars Project has substantive "knowledge" aims as well. The Introduction to International Negotiation course complements the experiential module of the semester (The New Europe Simulation) with a prior unit which combines study of the theory of negotiation with a case study approach, providing the student with a variety of examples of both successful and unsuccessful negotiations.

Learning How to Negotiate

Distinctions between politics, economics, and business are becoming ever more tenuous in the contemporary international arena. Whether the issue to be negotiated is a minor legal dispute or a decades-long protracted conflict, what marks negotiation as a process is the willingness of both sides to seek a solution through means other than physical force. To focus a course on diplomatic negotiation is to bring a variety of other issues to the fore. The formulation and implementation of a negotiation strategy is linked to a variety of concepts and processes that are central to the study of international relations, among them: agenda-setting; decision-making; consensus and bloc-building; cross-cultural dissonance; and bargaining. The most prevalent, and perhaps useful schematic framework remains that of the "bargainer" versus the "bully." Students learn that they must fashion strategies that fit with the capabilities of the nation-states they are portraying.

Six interrelated concepts are stressed as comprising a negotiation framework: (1) **goal identification** and compatibility of multiple goals; (2) identification of parties needed for a **cooperative strategy** to work; (3) identification of **tactical problems**; (4) choice of a **bargaining strategy**; (5) identification of **commitments** that will be needed on the path to an agreement;

⁴ See, for example, Judith Torney-Purta, "Political Cognition and Its Restructuring in Young People," Human Development 32 (1989): 14-23.

and (6) conditions necessary to a binding **agreement**.

Theory meets practice when the country-teams enter the simulated world of the "New Europe" about half-way through the semester. Divided into delegations according to issue area (environment, security, economics, ethnicity), the team brings into the exercise an elaborate "position paper," the culmination of a group project. The first week or so is spent setting forth their nation's positions on important policy questions. The remaining three weeks of the exercise revolve around the process of "give and take," as diplomats coordinate and cooperate with, or confute, the efforts of their negotiating partners. Since the simulation is set three to six months into the future, the students must reach beyond the headlines in their efforts to grapple with issues of contention in Europe. Finding a balance between playing a "realistic" Russia or Germany and allowing room for creative problem-solving is a source of consternation for the team members. Inevitably, there are complaints that one nation or another is acting out of character. This kind of problem challenges the facilitators to keep the students in-role by focusing them on their task rather than the nature of the simulated world.

Consideration of how the simulated Europe matched up to expectations of negotiations in the actual region is held for the debriefing period. Appraisals of successes and failures are aided by the data archive that has been created in the ICONS system. The final project systemizes their reflective analysis by asking them to create their own case study, which they accomplish by tracing the course of events in one specific issue-area on which they negotiated, using the negotiation framework presented above. A Polnet III function opens the archives at this juncture, allowing country-teams the opportunity to see what their allies and adversaries were doing during the five week simulation. France and Germany, for example, can be stunned to find that Britain was playing them off one another on the issue of European monetary union. This revelation comes after a careful reconstruction of the sequence of events and consideration of message content.

The International Negotiation Seminars Project is designed to bring an international, interactive, interdisciplinary educational approach to a broad range of students early in their academic careers. Recasting the large lecture class into small-group seminars and introducing the students to the world of international negotiation through a computer-assisted simulation is a cost-effective way to tackle reform at three essential levels: curricular, structural, and technological.

**Distance Learning and the Globalization of Education:
The Use of Simulation**

**Prepared for Presentation at the 1995 CIES Annual Conference
Boston, Massachusetts
March 29 - April 2**

**Brigid A. Starkey, Ph.D
Associate Director, Project ICONS
University of Maryland, College Park**

Introduction

Increasingly over the past decade, reports and national studies have highlighted the failure of the university curriculum to involve students in their own learning and to provide them with the problem-solving skills they will need to function in an increasingly complex and interrelated world. In Higher Learning, Derek Bok asserts that "in the Colleges, the most apparent need is to change the emphasis of instruction away from transmitting fixed bodies of knowledge and of understanding ... a shift toward more active forms of instruction."¹ It is especially imperative that post-secondary instruction respond more effectively to two major worldwide trends: the globalization of the marketplace and the revolution in information technology.

Project ICONS

With the support of a three-year grant from the US Department of Education's Fund for the Improvement of Post-Secondary Education (FIPSE), the International Communication and Negotiation Simulation (ICONs) Project at the University of Maryland has developed a model for undergraduate instruction

¹ See Derek Bok, Higher Learning (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1986), p. 165.

which incorporates distance and active learning techniques. This model builds upon the success of the ICONS computer-assisted negotiation simulation, which has been used for secondary, post-secondary, and special training activities since the early 1980s. The core of this model is the scenario-guided representation of the international system and regional subsystems. Student-participants play the roles of high-level negotiators for various nations, researching positions on a wide variety of foreign policy issues. As part of the group of activities in the field of international relations that are referred to as simulation and gaming exercises, the ICONS model facilitates interdisciplinarity and internationalization of the curriculum. Social, behavioral, physical and environmental sciences are all relevant to the research and negotiation phases of the model, as are foreign language and culture studies.² ICONS now reaches over 5,000 university and high school students and teachers on a yearly basis, with a variety of simulations. From its inception, the project has capitalized on the ability of computers to link learners at remote locations to one another during participation in the negotiations. Initially, this was done via ARPANET, Sprintnet, and NSFNET. Now, the wide accessibility which the Internet offers has made ICONS available to students in virtually every corner of the globe.

In the FIPSE-funded "International Negotiation Seminars

² See Jonathan Wilkenfeld and Joyce Kaufman, "Political Science: Network Simulation in International Politics," Social Science Computer Review 11:4 (Winter 1993).

Project," students at universities in the United States engage in negotiations on post-Cold War Europe with peers at Novosibirsk University in Siberia, the University of Warsaw, and Budapest University of Economic Sciences, among others.

Using a combination of synchronous and asynchronous communications, ICONS participants negotiate with one another by exchanging positions and proposals, and "meeting" at real-time bilateral and multilateral conferences in hopes of achieving acceptable outcomes. Learning is in the hands of the learners, who work in groups to accomplish simulation-related tasks. The FIPSE-funded project has brought this model to the lower-division "lecture" course to try to infuse that level of the curriculum with an active-learning technique. "Country-teams" (groups of 15-20 students) use the weekly discussion section meeting of the class to work together. Negotiation theories, tactics, and strategies are presented in the twice-weekly large group or lecture meetings, which also rely on case studies to bring the topic of negotiation to the students.³ Exchanges between students and between students and faculty mentors are facilitated by the use of electronic mail. The Worldwide Web and other sites on the Internet provide crucial research information for the aspiring policy-makers. The project has encouraged the

³ For a more detailed description of this project, see Brigid A. Starkey, "Negotiation Training Through Simulation: The ICONS International Negotiation Seminars," Educator's Tech Exchange (Spring 1994).

adaptation of "virtual classrooms"⁴ at the University of Maryland and over fourteen other campuses in the United States and Europe.

Collaborative Distance Learning Through Simulation

Foreign language instruction, student exchanges, and a conscious emphasis on world cultures, geography, and history are some of the strategies that have traditionally been used to globalize the curriculum. The arrival of the "virtual classroom" in the 1990s provides new mediums through which students can transcend borders in the learning process. This is especially vital for the majority of students who do not have the resources to travel abroad.

A virtual classroom, when developed properly, creates an environment that is receptive and conducive to true experiential and collaborative learning. Exercises to support learning in this environment should allow the learner to manipulate dependent and independent variables, experimenting with different scenarios and different outcomes. A collaborative learning environment encourages synergy in problem-solving. It counters the focus on individual achievement that dominates American post-secondary education, shifting the nature of the educational enterprise to cooperation, rather than competition. A further gain from a

⁴ The term "Virtual Classroom" is used by Starr Roxanne Hiltz, who was instrumental in the development of the concept. In her book Virtual Classroom: Learning Without Limits Via Computer Networks (Norwood, NJ: Ablex Publishing Corporation), 1994, Hiltz defines the term as, "the social invention of building and operating computer-mediated communication systems to support dispersed communities of active learners" (p. xvi).

group-oriented learning process is that social interaction becomes a prominent aspect of the methodology.⁵

In using negotiation as the theoretical context for the ICONS learning model, an automatic emphasis is placed on group process and communication skills. The computer-assisted simulation, able to support worldwide participation in any given exercise, also provides an authentic cross-cultural communication experience, in addition to the simulated or virtual one.

Synchronous conferencing capability, already a feature of the ICONS software, is now being joined by a variety of technological advances which facilitate collaborative learning. Project ICONS is currently working to develop a pc-based video conferencing component which would add a new layer of interaction to the model. Cross-national working groups could be formed to augment national negotiations, replicating the importance of "epistemic communities" in the contemporary international system: collections of experts in various fields who work together, across borders, to solve collective interest problems, such as environmental degradation.⁶ The interactive video component would further enhance the learning model by enabling faculty mentors at campuses across the world to work with groups of students on specific issues and problems. Document-sharing,

⁵ See Maryam Alavi, "Computer-Mediated Collaborative Learning: An Empirical Evaluation," MIS Quarterly (June 1994).

⁶ See Peter M. Haas, "Do Regimes Matter? Epistemic Communities and Mediterranean Pollution Control," International Organization 43 (Summer 1989), pp. 378-403.

another component of the pc-video technology, is also a valuable tool for the ICONS negotiation simulation. Student groups can work together on the language and content of proposals, treaties, and protocols, replicating an important phase in the international negotiation process.


The ICONS Negotiation Seminars Model thus incorporates the following components:

- A substantive focus on international issues, such as trade, the environment, security, and ethnicity.
- A focus on group decision-making, as students work together to prepare to play the roles of high-level international negotiators.
- An authentic cross-cultural experience, as students negotiate with peers at overseas institutions.
- An introduction to the technology of the 21st century, as students conduct research using Internet resources and communicate and work with one another using synchronous and asynchronous modes of computer-facilitated communication.

The necessity of incorporating technology into instruction at the post-secondary level in the United States is underscored by the following figure, which indicates the asymmetry that exists across the educational spectrum.

Figure 2

Computer Presence in the Classroom



Source: Kent Norman (HyperCourseware, 1994).

The ICONS simulation provides a structured exercise for students, which primarily builds communication skills and cross-cultural awareness, and secondarily encourages the use of technology in the learning process. It facilitates the globalization of the college classroom, and provides a path for meaningful cross-national curriculum development.

Cross-National Curriculum Development: The ICONS Model

Though few would doubt the need for active learning as a means of better preparing students to manage the enormous amounts of information increasingly available to them, the question of how to evaluate alternative approaches to learning is problematic. As Dr. Judith Torney-Purta, who has served as the evaluator of the ICONS Project, has pointed out, alternative learning is not necessarily well served by traditional assessment

methods. Hence, she has attempted to devise assessment techniques that more accurately reflect how the students have learned -- that get at the way the "cognitive maps" of students are changed as result of their participation in activities associated with the simulations.⁷

Using evaluative techniques such as a pre- and post-test questionnaire (now available on-line, using the ICONS software), cognitive mapping schemes, and think-aloud problem solving techniques, Torney-Purta has concluded that participants understanding of the complexity of international issues increases as they experience what it is like to formulate foreign policies for a nation other than their own. They also report an increased sensitivity to cultural and linguistic differences and a greater understanding of the differing perspectives nations bring to negotiating situations. More than 90 percent of the students surveyed expected to read more international news and to understand it better as a result of their simulation experience. In cases where student interviews resulted in cognitive maps, their post-simulation maps showed not merely a greater fact base, but also a greater understanding of the possible options and alignments of players in the international system, in short a more "expert" or sophisticated map of the connections among

⁷ Judith Torney-Purta, "Cognitive Representations of the Political System in Adolescents: The Continuum from Pre-Novice to Expert," New Directions for Child Development (no. 56, Summer 1992) pp. 11-25.

issues in the international system.⁸ Table One below provides some comparative data from the pre and post-test questionnaires for students at the University of Maryland during the Fall 1993 and Spring 1994 semester.

Table One

Early Semester and Late Semester Selected Open-Ended Responses to Question: "what positions does this country take on international efforts to establish environmental standards in the real world?"

Team members from Turkey:

18 year old male, major in Economics:

Pre: blank

Post: wants either strong or weak standards depending. Pro standards on pollutions from abroad, contra are that "environmental concerns" are too frequently a source of trade limitation and even a sort of xenophobia.

20 year old female, major in Government and Politics:

Pre: blank

Post: is neutral about standards, but it does not have a proud history on environmental issues.

Team Members from Ukraine:

19 year old female, major in Journalism:

Pre: It wants weak standards because it needs to develop and therefore has difficulty in meeting high standards.

Post: it is neutral about standards. They're trying to develop so they don't want strong standards that will inhibit their growth. In the meantime they're concerned about the environment because of Chernobyl. So they go neither way.

19 year old female, major in Government and Politics:

Pre: blank

Post: Wants strong standards because of its location near nuclear active countries, polluted waters, and they

⁸ Judith Torney-Purta, evaluations of the FIPSE ICONS Project, Spring Semester 1993; and Fall Semester 1993 and Spring Semester 1994. Unpublished.

want to establish themselves as a stable, reliable country in the European community.

23 year old female, major in Government and Politics:

Pre: is neutral because it has more pressing problems, such as hunger, to focus on immediately.

Post: It has been sadly neglected environmentally. However, the biggest concern is posed by nuclear power plants and the storage of nuclear weapons. It is neutral because it has more pressing problems to deal with, such as its economy and defense.

Team Members from Germany

20 year old major in Government and Politics:

Pre: blank

Post: it wants stronger standards because they will lead to better treatment of resources and actually help industry in the long run. Concerned about pollution creeping across borders of France and Poland.

18 year old female, undecided major:

Pre: blank

Post: The environmental conditions in West Germany are very good, but the conditions in East Germany is (sic) slightly primitive. They want strong standards because they know that the value of the environment in the long run is very important. They've known this for quite a while. They have very strict policies in Western Germany.⁹

Evaluation material on the FIPSE-supported project and other ICONS initiatives point to these kinds of substantive knowledge gains for student-participants. In addition to facilitating learning about the international system, the computer-assisted simulation model offers rich possibilities for collaborative design of curriculum. Scenario development, case study applications, and group debriefings are three components of the

⁹ Source: Judith Torney-Purta, "An Evaluation of the FIPSE ICONS Project Fall Semester 1993 and Spring Semester 1994." Unpublished Document.

FIPSE project which have encouraged the development of a cross national "virtual classroom." The scenario sets the context for group negotiations in a given semester. ICONS staff seek the input of faculty participants, experts in various disciplines, in the preparation of this document. All students participating in a given exercise then use the scenario as the basis for their talks. Case study materials from the Pew Charitable Trusts¹⁰ provided a further common basis for shared curriculum.

Participants were encouraged to make use of certain cases that dealt with post-Cold War Europe during the preparation phase of the simulation process. Finally, on-line computer, and video-conferencing debriefing sessions were held with participants to explore the impact of the simulation experience on students in the United States and Europe. This medium provided an opportunity for student and faculty participants to reflect on simulation as a learning tool.

¹⁰ Pew Case Studies in International Affairs are distributed by the Institute for the Study of Diplomacy, Georgetown University.

**THE NEW EUROPE:
AN INTERNATIONAL NEGOTIATION SEMINARS PROJECT
SCENARIO**

SPRING 1995

**PROJECT ICONS
UNIVERSITY OF MARYLAND
COLLEGE PARK, MARYLAND 20742
301-405-4172**

TABLE OF CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION	1
SECURITY	2
Responding to the Conflict in the Balkans	3
The Future of NATO	6
European Security and Arms Control	10
ECONOMICS	11
European Integration	11
Economic Modernization	14
ETHNICITY AND NATIONALISM	17
Nationalist Tendencies	17
The Conflict in the Balkans	21
Anti-Immigrant Tensions	22
ENVIRONMENT	24
Environmental Conditions	24
Cross Border Pollution	28
Environmental Conflict	30
ISSUES FOR NEGOTIATION	32
GLOSSARY	34

INTRODUCTION

The ICONS simulation places students in the role of decision-makers and negotiators on issues of international importance. Working together on "country-teams," participants model real-world international interactions between countries. The simulation is conducted on two levels: deliberations within the team and between the teams. Within a team, students will research their assigned country, and working as a group, formulate their country's foreign policy, including goals and strategies for achieving those goals through negotiation. They will then communicate their policies and conduct international negotiations with the other country-teams by sending written messages over a computer-based communications system. During the simulation, the country-team groups will continue to meet to discuss strategies and responses to other teams' proposals.

This scenario is an introduction to the issues you will be discussing in the ICONS simulation. It also gives a very brief overview of some of the interests and policies of the individual nations that will be represented. The scenario is not meant to be the principal resource for the development of your policies or the conduct of your negotiations. It is a starting point. You now need to research your assigned nation's history, foreign policy, and relations with the other countries involved.

This simulation exercise can be thought of as a set of interlocking subgames. Each subgame focuses on a particular issue that is outlined in this scenario. The exercise is intended to focus on some of the primary problems in Europe. The main issue areas can be identified as the following:

- Security, focusing upon the evolving security structure of post-Cold War Europe
- Economics, focusing upon the dual processes of European integration and economic modernization
- Ethnicity and Nationalism, focusing upon ethnic nationalism and the resulting myriad of conflicts and anti-immigrant tensions
- Environmental Concerns, focusing upon cross-border pollution

Negotiations may be conducted either on a multilateral or bilateral basis. A list of possible "Issues for Negotiation" is located at the end of this scenario. This list concentrates primarily on the multilateral issues that are relevant to all of the teams participating in the simulation, such as the establishment of European environmental standards. All nations should expect to participate in every subgame, and should develop policies and strategies for the issues discussed below. In addition, individual country-teams may identify particular bilateral concerns within the context of this scenario and conduct negotiations to resolve these issues. An example of this type of negotiation would be attempts to solve a border dispute.

The countries that will be simulated are Bulgaria, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Kazakhstan, Poland, Romania, Russia, Turkey, Ukraine, and the United Kingdom. A brief overview of these countries, with particular attention to the scenario issues, is provided in the background document.

There is neither an easy nor a clearly correct way to designate regions in contemporary Europe and the former Soviet Union. The situation is too fluid and the amount of subjectivity involved too great. Much depends on whether one uses geographic, political or cultural definitions. What were formerly known as Western Europe, Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union are now very fragmented subregions. During this simulation, you will see the following designations used: western Europe (France, Germany, Greece, United Kingdom, Finland and Turkey); East-Central Europe (Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland and Romania); and eastern Europe (Russia, Ukraine, Estonia, Kazakhstan). You will also see multiple references to the "post-communist" nations and frequent distinctions suggested between the "East" and the "West." There are problems with these groupings. Neither Turkey nor Kazakhstan fit neatly into the categories. The subject of categorization is a difficult one and should be the subject of discussion as you prepare for the simulation.

This scenario establishes the context for the negotiations that are to be conducted. Although the simulation will be run in March-April 1995, the setting for the simulation will be Summer 1995. The purpose of this is to give the country-teams flexibility in the formation of policies and negotiation strategies, while still subjecting them to the constraints imposed by specific domestic and international conditions. This scenario is updated for events occurring through mid-December 1994; a brief scenario update will be sent to all teams shortly before the simulation begins. This update will contain any new, pertinent events which have not been covered by this scenario, as well as any assumptions to be made about international conditions in Summer 1995. **Once the simulation has begun, subsequent real world events will not be reflected in the negotiations.**

It is common for teams to begin the simulation in a passive mode with plans to respond after other country-teams take the lead. This creates an unrealistic foreign policy atmosphere and ensures a slow start to the exercise. Country-teams are urged to begin implementing their negotiation strategy at the start of the simulation.

SECURITY

The collapse of the Soviet Union shifted the axis of global politics in a way that few historical events have ever done. While initially hailed as a victory for democracy, the end of the Cold War has also unleashed a period of great uncertainty in Europe. Nuclear weapons housed outside of Moscow's sovereign grasp, resurgent nationalism in Russia and the Balkans, confrontational Islamic radicalism in Central Asia and the Caucasus, and the danger that the many burgeoning ethnic conflicts will become interstate wars, all combine to cast a long shadow over European security. The array of institutions founded during the Cold War are now

undergoing reexamination as the architects of the "new Europe" search for appropriate crisis coping mechanisms.

Responding to the Conflict in the Balkans

For more information about the historical background of the crisis in the former Yugoslavia, please see the ETHNICITY AND NATIONALISM section.

In the Cold War period, Western Europe and the United States developed plans and policies designed to cope with possible conflict with the Warsaw Pact countries. After the fall of the Berlin Wall, many believed that Europe would enter a new era of peace; counting on the notion that democratic nations rarely fight one another in wars. However, the long-suppressed ethnic tensions raised the specter of another type of conflict in Europe, between rival ethnic groups. The war in the former Yugoslavia has presented the European Union (EU, formerly the European Community or EC) with a devastating regional crisis, one for which it does not yet have the proper tools to cope.

By the end of 1994, the conflict appeared to enter its final stage. The ethnic Serbs victories on the battlefield have crippled the Muslim government of Bosnia-Herzegovina and created divisions within the United Nations and NATO over the most appropriate international response to the continuing Serb aggression. While it appears unlikely that the international community will withdraw completely from the conflict, the international response will become increasingly less dependent on a military component. The United Nations, led by Secretary General Boutros-Boutros Ghali, considered withdrawing all peacekeeping forces from Bosnia-Herzegovina. The European members of NATO, who provide the majority of UN peacekeepers deployed in the region, disagreed vehemently with the United States over a more assertive policy toward the belligerents. The American decision to no longer enforce the arms embargo on the Muslim government of Bosnia-Herzegovina was particularly contentious. In December, the United States placed its ties with the NATO allies ahead of resolving the Balkan conflict and shifted its support to finding a diplomatic solution without additional military intervention. With the enthusiasm of the UN and NATO for maintaining large numbers of vulnerable peacekeepers fading, the role of the international community may be limited to the provision of humanitarian relief to the isolated pockets of Muslim civilians.

The situation in the Balkans is of particular urgency because the war and resulting shortages of food and shelter are costing civilians their lives. Sarajevo and other isolated pockets of Muslim territory will be cut off from supplies for the third consecutive winter. The conflict has already claimed over 25,000 lives, countless non-fatal casualties, and created over two million refugees. The threat that it will spill over borders into neighboring nations such as Albania, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria, Greece or Turkey is also very worrisome. They, along with the rest of Europe, are dealing on a daily basis with the already severe refugee crisis. Despite the depth and severity of this ongoing security crisis, and the fact that the practice of ethnic cleansing has been internationally condemned, the response of the international community has been hesitant and dilatory. The EU, in particular, has proven extremely ineffectual in dealing with the conflict.

The whole situation, frankly, caught those who should have been in a position to respond to a European security threat unprepared to do so. A response should have been forthcoming as early as the summer of 1991, when Croatian and Slovenian intentions to seek independence became known. Both the United States and the European Community initially discouraged these intentions, stating their preferences for a unified Yugoslavia. This was the result of fears that a split would set a dangerous precedent for the Soviet Union. This international response probably encouraged the Serbs to use force against the two republics.

Although the EC negotiated an early cease-fire in Slovenia, the lack of a credible military force to ensure compliance and uncertainty about how best to respond to the crisis rendered it ineffective and short-lived. There were divisions within the EC, with Germany strongly advocating immediate recognition of Croatia and Slovenia and increased EC involvement, while the UK and France supported a more cautious policy, suggesting unification negotiations among the warring parties. In January 1992, Germany recognized Croatian and Slovenian independence, an action which precipitated official EC recognition. United Nations action then became warranted, as the conflict had turned from an internal to an interstate one. The UN negotiated a successful cease-fire agreement between Slovenia and Serbia. The government of Serbia feared that further conflict with Slovenia would escalate to involve Slovenia's neighbor, Italy and then all of the NATO partners. The UN ceasefire did not resolve the entire conflict, however, as fighting shifted to involve Bosnia-Herzegovina in addition to Croatia. Bosnia-Herzegovina, in turn, declared its independence from Yugoslavia in February 1992.

The United States moved to recognize Bosnian independence in April 1992, believing that the recognition of Croatia and Slovenia by the EC and UN had helped dampen hostilities. However, Serbia took the situation in Bosnia very seriously due to its concerns over the very large resident Serbian population. Serb forces attempted to change the demographics of the region through "ethnic cleansing." The UN and EC responded to this brutality by imposing economic sanctions against Serbia in May 1992.

Despite on-going attempts to find a diplomatic solution to the conflict in the former Yugoslavia, none of the belligerents seem truly closer to laying down arms and ethnic Serbs in Bosnia and Croatia seem on the edge of victory. Hopes for a settlement were first raised in August 1993 when the Bosnian president Izetbegovic accepted the possibility of a division of Bosnia-Herzegovina into three separate states. Two factors derailed this proposal. First, the Bosnian parliament reversed Izetbegovic's decision in September of 1993. Second, negotiations have stalled over Bosnian demands for Serbian withdrawal from an additional three percent of the territory which they control. Croatia has also balked at Bosnian demands for territory which would give Bosnia-Herzegovina access to a seaport. Croatia, for its part, continues to insist that Serbia give back all of the territory in Krajina before it will seriously discuss the laying down of arms.

American and European policy toward the conflict during most of 1993 and 1994 consisted of limited direct involvement coupled with sanctions aimed at increasing the likelihood of a diplomatic settlement. The initial response of the Bush administration and then the Clinton administration was to regard the conflict as a "European" problem. Both administrations

received heavy criticism for their failure to take a stronger leadership role in the conflict resolution and peace process. France was particularly vocal in its criticism of America's lack of leadership. The Clinton administration began assuming a more active role in late 1993 by attempting to involve NATO in the peace process and by issuing threats of airstrikes against Bosnian-Serb positions around Sarajevo. The initial threat to use airstrikes was received coldly by France, Russia, the UK, and UN Secretary General Boutros-Boutros Ghali, all three of whom feared Bosnian-Serb retaliation against personnel of the international humanitarian mission and United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR). The UN-sponsored humanitarian airlift in Bosnia has now become the longest in history. At the NATO summit in January 1994, the threat of airstrikes was reiterated, this time with the support of all NATO members. Shortly thereafter, the UN finally agreed upon the use of NATO airstrikes to protect UN forces in immediate danger.

In February 1994, particularly brutal attacks on civilians in Sarajevo prompted NATO, with UN support, to issue an ultimatum to Serb forces. NATO demanded that all heavy weapons be withdrawn out of an exclusion zone comprising a twenty kilometer belt around Sarajevo or surrender to UN control. Any heavy weapons found in the belt after midnight on February 20-21 would be attacked without warning. The armed forces of Bosnia-Herzegovina promptly surrendered their few heavy weapons to UN control. After much confusion, the Bosnian-Serbs complied with the ultimatum by surrendering a small number of weapons and moving the majority to other positions outside of the exclusion zone. The general ceasefire around Sarajevo held through the Summer of 1994, but Serb forces resumed random artillery and sniper attacks in October 1994. March and April saw the fighting shift away from the UN safe area at Sarajevo to the UN safe area at Gorazde. After two weeks of unrelenting shelling and ground attacks against the city, the UN and NATO declared a twenty-mile exclusion zone around Gorazde and issued very credible threats of airstrikes against Bosnian-Serb forces. Almost immediately, the Bosnian-Serbs began to withdraw to positions outside of the new exclusion zones and Ukrainian peacekeepers arrived in Gorazde. Importantly, NATO aircraft did attack Bosnian-Serb forces that had attacked UN observers in Gorazde.

The Muslims and Croats agreed in March 1994 to settle their differences and create a federated state for both populations. The accord between Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia calls for a loose confederation between the two states and created a federated government in Bosnia-Herzegovina for the ethnic Muslims and ethnic Croats. However, the federation took on primarily cosmetic purposes. Throughout much of Bosnia-Herzegovia, the Bosnian government and the Croatian government maintain separate infrastructures serving each ethnic population. If the military situation continues to deteriorate for the Muslim government of Bosnia-Herzegovina, it is likely that the Croatia government and the Croatian population of Bosnia-Herzegovina will dissolve the federation.

In July, France, Germany, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States unanimously endorsed a plan drafted by a group of representatives from these five states known as the Contact Group. The Contact Group proposed to end the conflict by partitioning Bosnia-Herzegovina into one loosely federated state with three ethnic divisions. The partition plan gives 49 percent of Bosnia-Herzegovina to the Bosnian Serbs and 48 percent to a federation established

by the Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats. Sarajevo would become an international city under the administration of the United Nations. The plan involved both carrot and stick incentives for all three warring ethnic factions, including the use of airstrikes. The parliament of the Bosnian-Muslim government in Sarajevo accepted the proposal, as did Bosnian-Croats and the Croatian government. The plan was rejected when Bosnian-Serb negotiators, led by Radovan Karadzic, met with representatives of the plan's five sponsors. All subsequent diplomatic efforts to pressure the Bosnian-Serbs into accepting the plan yielded nothing but frustration. Sir Michael Rose, the commander of UN forces in Bosnia-Herzegovina, prophetically stated that he did not believe NATO and Russia would support their earlier threats.

Following the rejection of the Contact Group's plan by the Bosnian-Serbs, Slobodan Milosevic declared that Serbia had closed its border with Bosnia-Herzegovina to all but humanitarian supplies. This action would deprive the Bosnian-Serbs much of their supply of arms and ammunition and isolate them from their ethnic cousins in Serbia. In September and October, forces of the Muslim government of Bosnia-Herzegovina began an offensive against Bosnian-Serb forces in the northwestern region of the country, near Bihac. The government offensive met with dramatic initial success. Many external observers concluded that the border with Serbia was indeed closed and that the lack of supplies had changed the tide of the conflict in favor of the Muslim government.

The leadership of the Bosnian-Serbs called for an all-out effort to resist the government offensive and launch a counterattack to regain the lost territory. By the end of November, the Bosnian-Serb forces, with cooperation from Croatian-Serbs operating across the Bosnian-Croatian border, crushed the government forces involved in the successful offensive only a month before. In early December, only 700 of the estimated 20,000 strong government force remained to defend the beleaguered civilian and refugee population in Bihac. The sudden reversal in the fortunes of war prompted a similar reversal from the outside observers, many of who now concluded that the war was all but over and that the Bosnian-Serbs had won. The strength of the Bosnian-Serb counterattack also brought into question Milosevic's claim to have closed the border between Serbia and Bosnia-Herzegovina. Among the various pieces of evidence which place this into question are advanced surface-to-air missiles used by the Bosnian-Serbs, the sudden appearance of abundant fuel, and a suspicious number of helicopter flights near the supposedly closed border. Members of Serbian paramilitary units have also been spotted in Bosnian, indicating that Milosevic is providing some troops as well as supplies.

The international community reacted to the resurgence of the Bosnian-Serb offensive and the apparent defeat of the Muslim government of Bosnia-Herzegovina with confusion and division. Initially, NATO aircraft attacked an airfield in Croatia used by Croatian-Serbs to launch airstrikes on both military and civilian targets in and around Bihac. This was, however, the extent of the UN and NATO's military response. The United States, acting in accordance with a legislative mandate, stopped enforcing the arms embargo against the government of Bosnia-Herzegovina. European members of NATO reacted angrily to this change in US policy, creating a significant split between the members of the alliance. The Russian government also denounced the American decision and pressed for a resumption of purely diplomatic efforts to resolve the conflict. Sir Michael Rose declared that if the military situation continued to

deteriorate, UN peacekeeping forces should be pulled out of Bosnia-Herzegovina. UN Secretary General Boutros-Boutros Ghali, after being snubbed by Bosnian-Serb leader Radovan Karadzic, speculated that all UN personnel may have to be withdrawn. France and the UK first requested that NATO begin to plan for an emergency evacuation of all UN peacekeepers, but then reconsidered. They fear that the absence of a UN presence would prompt the United States to follow a more aggressive military policy.

Currently, the international community, led by the UN and NATO, is calling on all parties to respect a cease-fire. The Muslim government of Bosnia-Herzegovina accepted the terms of the cease-fire immediately, but it was rejected by the Bosnian-Serbs and the Croatian-Serbs. The government of Croatia seems increasingly willing to abandon their federation with Bosnia-Herzegovina. If the Serbs do indeed emerge as the clear victor, the likelihood that Bosnia-Herzegovina continues to exist is rather slim. Instead, the ethnic Serbs will most likely join with Serbia and the ethnic Croats will join with Croatia, creating both a "Greater Serbia" and a "Greater Croatia", both containing very vulnerable minority populations of ethnic Bosnian-Muslims. The unresolved territorial disputes between Serbia and Croatia could then result in yet another conflict and war.

The Future of NATO

As the nations of eastern and East-Central Europe struggle to consolidate their independence, they do so in a region now devoid of any articulated and proven security regime. While professing to have pan-European objectives, the West has yet to articulate a definitive framework. Various institutions are currently vying for primacy, specifically, NATO, the Western European Union (WEU), and the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). However, it seems very safe to assume that in the near future, NATO will remain the primary framework for European security due to its existing infrastructure, history of inter-allied cooperation, and its trans-Atlantic ties to the United States.

Responding to pressures from the East, each has developed structures designed to include and assist the post-communist nations. NATO first established the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC), which includes East-Central Europe and the new states of the former Soviet Union. In January, 1994, NATO initiated the Partnership for Peace program, which is aimed at the same countries as the NACC. These same nations are all members of the CSCE, which benefitted from the early endorsement of Moscow. The WEU, designated as the defense arm of the European Community at the Maastricht meeting of December 1991, has offered associate membership to Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic and Slovakia. However, it is hampered by continuing questions about its ability to operate independently with its current function and scope, let alone -- critics say -- an expanded one.

The Partnership for Peace program quickly became the primary mechanism for tying the post-communist governments of Central/East Europe and the Former Soviet Union to Western Europe in a security relationship. The program provides an opportunity for all members of the former Warsaw Treaty Organization to engage in military cooperation with NATO. Clinton was also able to immediately win Russian president Boris Yeltsin's endorsement of the plan, the lack

of which had been hindering progress on a new NATO-backed security regime. The plan establishes two sets of criteria for forming "partnerships." The first, and formal criteria, include civilian control of the military, the opening of defense budgets to public scrutiny, military modernization programs, and commitment to peaceful dispute resolution. The second, informal criteria, involve efforts toward democratization and market reforms.

The "Partnership for Peace" proposal, as put forward by President Clinton at the NATO Summit, was received enthusiastically by all of the former Warsaw Pact members with the exception of Poland. Lech Walesa's government pushed for formal, full membership in NATO for the emerging democracies of East-Central Europe as quickly as possible and felt rebuffed by the lack of a definite time-table in the Partnership for Peace program. Romania and Lithuania became the first official "partners" in January 1994 and were followed shortly thereafter by Estonia and a Poland, which quickly decided that something was better than nothing when it came to security. Since the program was unveiled in January 1994, twenty-two nations have joined. The Russian government originally accepted membership in July and withdrew their formal objections to the possible expansion of NATO. However, in December Russian president Yeltsin refused to sign the formal agreement to institute the "Partnership".

While the plan permits the admission of new members to NATO at an unspecified future date, it refrains from specifying who these new additions will be, nor does it set a timetable. President Clinton reiterated his commitment to bringing the new "Partners for Peace" into NATO. The speed with which NATO expands has become an extremely contentious issue between the alliance and Russia. Concerns that NATO would expand rapidly motivated President Yeltsin's refusal to formally enter Russia into the program. President Clinton has stated that no single nation outside of the alliance will be permitted to prevent NATO's expansion; a clear signal of the alliance's resolve to Russia.

As the Cold War ended, many Europeans feared that the United States would become disengaged from Europe. Contending that the EU should define its security requirements independent from external influences, including the United States, France began to advocate WEU supremacy. Germany and the United Kingdom became the prime advocates of keeping America involved in European security affairs and of keeping NATO as the primary security institution for western Europe. Over the past year, it has become increasingly clear that the United States will not disengage from European security affairs. President Clinton has reiterated the long-standing linkage between peace and stability in Europe and American national security. He also pledged to maintain approximately 100,000 American troops in Europe as a tangible sign of America's commitment. The American authorship of the Partnership for Peace program and the enthusiasm with which it was received by the European members of NATO bear strong testimony to the long-term commitment of the US to the security of Europe. Even the French government of President Mitterrand has lessened its call for replacing NATO's institutions with the WEU. Instead, Mitterrand has called for parallel institutions that would co-exist and complement each other. Relations between the US and the European members of NATO were strained by the unilateral decision of the US to stop enforcing the arms embargo on the government of Bosnia-Herzegovina. In subsequent policy decisions, the US responded by placing alliance unity clearly ahead of US policy toward the conflict.

Former NATO Secretary General Manfred Woerner (who died in August 1994) argued that stability will be the most precious commodity in the future Europe. He maintained that the EU, while dynamic in the economic realm, cannot match NATO as a security institution. Woerner cited the inability of the EU to take strong action in both the Gulf War and the Yugoslavian conflict as examples of the difficulty it encounters in this regard. In contrast, Woerner pointed out, the value of NATO was demonstrated by its ability to implement the UN Security Council resolutions with respect to Iraq.

Although the political debate over the relationship between NATO and the WEU has been clearly settled in NATO's favor, important steps toward a WEU military structure have been completed. France joined with Germany in proposing and subsequently forming a corps-sized force, the "Euro-corps," to form the backbone of a collective European security system. French units assigned to the corps would remain outside of NATO's operational control, while German units would continue in their assignments to that institution. Germany and the Netherlands agreed to form an additional, similar multinational corps to supplement the Franco-German unit.

NATO initially responded to the Eurocorps as if it were a threat to its own role in Europe and countered by suggesting that a "Rapid Reaction Corps" be formed, comprised of armed forces from all members and designated for missions outside of the NATO area. At the NATO summit in January 1994, the idea of the Rapid Reaction Corp was replaced with a concept known as the "Combined Joint Task Force" (CJTF). The Combined Joint Task Force will, for the first time, permit the European members to deploy NATO military assets even if the United States does not contribute forces of its own. In addition, the CJTF establishes a mechanism for NATO forces to deploy in multilateral missions with non-NATO states and Partnership for Peace states. The CJTF can also be used to deploy NATO forces on WEU initiatives, when approved by the North Atlantic Council. The French acceptance of the CJTF concept further indicates their commitment to maintaining NATO as the primary instrument for guaranteeing European security. The "Eurocorps" is now seen as the potential core of a CJTF mission designated by NATO to support policies of the WEU. In such circumstances, it is conceivable that French units in the Eurocorps would be at least partially given over to NATO command and control.

The decision to maintain NATO as the primary European security institution was determined by the strength of its existing military infrastructure. Military assets are finite and the nations of Western Europe cannot afford to duplicate the extensive and expensive collection of combat forces, logistical units and command and control infrastructure already present in NATO. Instead, they have opted to employ the already impressive capability found in NATO and supplement it with an additional, European, capability to operate outside of NATO's traditional realm. The Eurocorps, when teamed with NATO's logistic and command control communications and intelligence capabilities, would give the European members a significant expeditionary force to use both in and out of Europe. The overall goal, as stated at the January NATO summit, is to implement a principle of "separable but not separate" military capabilities that could be employed by either NATO or the WEU.

European Security and Arms Control

The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) and the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) also have significant relevance to the future security of the European region. The CSCE agreement, signed in Helsinki, Finland in 1975 and otherwise known as the Helsinki Accords, is a non-binding, but highly influential basis for arms control in Europe. CSCE was greatly strengthened by the recent NATO decision to place its forces at the disposal of the CSCE for peacekeeping missions. At a July 1992 summit, a broad array of institutions for protecting the rights of national minorities, and for conciliation, mediation, and crisis management were also established. On December 5, 1994 the parties to the CSCE agreement renamed the institution the Organization European Security and Cooperation (OESC).

Proposals have been made to use the CSCE framework as a basis for conflict resolution in the Balkans. These proposals overlook several key features of the accords. First, the CSCE process works only by unanimous consent of all parties. Serbia possesses a legitimate claim to be the inheritor of the original Yugoslavian seat and could therefore veto any such action. Second, the CSCE framework is non-binding on the parties and thus cannot compel any action. Third, no institutional framework exists within CSCE for peacemaking or peacekeeping operations such as would be needed in the Balkan conflict, although, cooperation with NATO may improve this situation.

The post-communist nations once viewed the CSCE mechanisms as important channels for increasing their integration into the security institutions of western Europe. Former Czechoslovakian President Vaclav Havel proposed giving CSCE documents a "more pronounced character of international agreements whose observance can be monitored and whose breach would result in sanctions." Havel also proposed the establishment of an institution similar to the UN Security Council for the CSCE framework. Neither proposal met with enthusiastic external support. NATO's "Partnership for Peace" program has all but completely replaced the CSCE framework as the basic avenue for security integration. The Russian government contends that CSCE should constitute the dominant security institution in Europe, with NATO and the Russian-led Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) existing as subservient institutions.

The CFE treaty, signed by all members of NATO and the Warsaw Treaty Organization (WTO) on 19 November 1990, limits the conventional military forces deployed in Europe (from the "Atlantic to the Urals") by members of NATO and the former members of the WTO. Twelve of the former republics of the Soviet Union jointly decreed in the Tashkent Accords to accept and abide by the limitations of the treaty and published details on how the treaty quotas would be divided among the newly independent states. (Ukraine refused to sign the Tashkent Accords, but has stated that it will abide by the CFE provisions). Belarus and Armenia have not yet ratified the treaty, but have reaffirmed their commitment to the treaty and its implementation. All other former members of the WTO have signed the treaty and have committed themselves to its implementation.

Ironically, there exists a possibility that the CFE agreement and other arms control agreements negotiated for the Cold War environment may prove to be destabilizing factors in the new, post-Cold War environment. The CFE agreement and its limitations on conventional arms were negotiated with respect to a specific conflict between specific coalitions of adversaries. Neither that conflict nor those coalitions exist any longer. Instead, they have been replaced by a myriad of unspecified possible conflicts between a variety of different individual nations and coalitions. As a result, while CFE mandated rough parity between NATO and the WTO, the agreement may well create situations where nations or coalitions of nations of widely different strengths oppose one another. The Russian government has requested certain exemptions from the treaty provisions in order to maintain security in Central Asia and the Caucasus.

Another major development in European security affairs coincided with the NATO summit in January of 1994. After much haggling, the United States, Ukraine and Russia announced that Ukraine would destroy all of its nuclear weapons and deliver the warheads to Russia. At the CSCE meeting in December, Ukraine signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and renewed its pledge to surrender all nuclear weapons.

ECONOMICS

It is no longer so easy to distinguish between the traditional "high politics" of security and military affairs and the "low politics" of economics. These so-called low-political issues are proving to be crucial to the future of the European continent. In fact, developments on the economic front have been very dramatic in recent years, with two parallel "revolutions" ongoing. The first is the transition begun in western Europe from the sovereign state system to a system of "benign supranationalism," represented by the European Union (EU). The second revolves around the economic modernization of post-communist nations to levels of development comparable to those of western Europe. These two powerful forces have a very uneasy relationship in a contemporary European region that is being pulled in two radically different directions -- the centripetal pull of integration -- and the centrifugal force of ethnic fragmentation.

European Integration

In the post-Cold War world, the movement for European unity has often seemed headed for a crisis, as the countries of the West no longer feel the need to unite against a common threat from the East. Although the member governments of the EU still see integration as the way to protect Europe's place in the world economy, a diminished threat to security coupled with economic difficulties has encouraged governments to place their primary focus on domestic considerations. The difficulties with the Maastricht ratification process have led to increased discussion of the extent to which integration should continue. While it would be impossible to return to the per-EC status quo, the extent to which integration can and should proceed is still an open question. The major question facing the EU is to what extent the institution should focus on "deepening" cooperation between the existing members as opposed to "widening" to

encompass the many nations that wish to join.

The Maastricht Treaty, negotiated in December of 1991, finally ratified by all members in October 1993, puts the community on course for an Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) by 1999 at the latest. Its cornerstone is the "Exchange Rate Mechanism" (ERM), which is working to coordinate national currencies with the end-goal of a single common currency and the creation of a common central bank. However, there are serious problems with Maastricht which go beyond the embarrassing "referenda crises" (political elites versus anti-Maastricht popular opinion) of the last several years.

The deeper difficulties were evidenced during the monetary crisis of 1992-93. This debacle was brought on by a number of events, all of which highlight the potential dangers of governments tying their national currencies to one another. First, the reunification of Germany turned out to be highly inflationary. Officials of the Bundesbank, Germany's central bank, were over-sensitive to inflation, so they raised interest rates quickly to tighten the money supply. This had the effect of pushing up interest rates in the other Community countries, where the main problem was not inflation, but recession. Since high interest rates constrain growth, this led to economic problems for everyone. Furthermore, the Spanish, British, and Italian currencies were overvalued, reflecting economic problems in their own domestic systems. Finally, when countries began to express doubts about unification (Denmark, the UK, the narrow approval of Maastricht in France), it led speculators to doubt the political will surrounding the ERM. They then attempted to make money by selling the currencies of those weaker economies as rapidly as possible. Because a common unit would require that all members' currencies be as stable as the mark, the implementation of a European unit is unlikely before the end of the decade.

Meanwhile, questions about the realizability as well as the desirability of EMU continue. Some observers complain that it will result in an "Esperanto currency" for Europe, others warn of a "Bundesbank tyranny." On the surface, the EU is continuing to move toward EMU and ERM implementation. On January 1, 1994, the second stage of the EMU came into effect with the establishment of the European Monetary Institute (EMI), as a precursor to a European central bank. Stage one of the EMU was implemented in July, 1990. Yet, the EMU will have little meaning unless the ERM is rebuilt after its 1992-93 collapse. The ERM currently suffers from a severe credibility shortage. Many European financial leaders feel that member states can no longer look to the ERM to provide monetary discipline and that the new emphasis has to be on internal efforts. This would make the formation of a single, unified currency all but impossible.

On another front, there is great concern in the EU with the sustained high levels of unemployment in member nations. With the ranks of the out of work stuck near double digits all over western Europe, debate over a proper policy response is raging. European Commission President Jacques Delors issued a white paper in December 1993 which pointed to structural problems in the labor market as the main villain. Stating that recovery from the recession may not be enough to get people back to work, Delors emphasized the need for job-training programs, tax incentives for job creation, and job sharing schemes as solutions to what he sees

as the "high cost/low skill" status of workers in the European welfare states. In addition, Delors called for the construction of high-tech transportation, energy, and information links, areas where he believes the private sector can take the lead. Critics of the Delors point of view call for more drastic government intervention schemes, pointing to proclamations by some economists that nothing short of 4 percent national growth rates will be able to generate even 1 percent growth in jobs. Many of these economists are calling for lower interest rates as the only solution, a policy response which fueled recovery in the United States and mitigated the recession in Japan. The German Bundesbank is accused of blocking efforts in this regard, with critics stating that its lack of enthusiasm for this tactic comes from the "selfish" decision in Bonn to fund reunification through heavy state borrowing.

Luckily for Monsieur Delors and other advocates of deeper integration, there was, however, a bit of good news for the EU in late 1993 and early 1994. European and American negotiators shocked observers by meeting the December 15, 1993 deadline for conclusion of the Uruguay Round of GATT talks. French farmers had been the biggest stumbling block to the conclusion of these world trade talks, threatening to reject the "Blair House Agreement," which was the basis of the agricultural compromise designed to break the deadlock. This framework dictated that over a six year period, subsidized farm exports would be cut by 21% in volume and 36% in value, with domestic subsidies reduced by an overall 20%. The French government prevailed in the construction of a further compromise, which exempted the EU's grain stocks from reforms and based cuts in farm subsidies on 1991-92 figures, rather than 1986-89 levels, when output was lower. In addition, France got the EU to agree to compensate farmers if, due to GATT, they had to take more land than expected out of production. Unresolved European-American differences over the entertainment industry and financial service issues were swept under the carpet for the time being to allow negotiators to reach the deadline.

In addition, on January 1, 1994, the European Economic Area (EEA) officially came into being, joining the European Union to the European Free Trade Area (EFTA) nations (Austria, Sweden, Finland, Norway and Iceland). This creates the largest free trade zone in the world, spreading from the Arctic to the Mediterranean and embracing 372 million consumers. To some extent, the realization of this 1990 agreement is now muted by the fact that, with the exception of Iceland, these nations will be joining the EU itself in 1995. Its importance stands more now in its promise to the eastern and East-Central European nations, who are hoping that they too are in an EU "waiting room." For Turkey, Cyprus and Malta, the realization of the EEA and the 1995 membership expansion are further reminders that they are again being passed over in their quest for full membership rights.

The current EU members hesitate to admit new members for a variety of reasons. First, most of the nations with outstanding applications or applications expected in the near future are significantly less developed than the EU on average. In many cases, entire countries would qualify for economic assistance under the structural funds "Objective One" category. Those regions with a GDP per head of less than 75 percent of the EU average meet this criteria. The funds come, of course, from the annual contributions made by the other members. Thus, the potential cost is very high. If the Visegrad states of Poland, Hungary, Slovakia, and the Czech Republic were to be admitted, then the annual contribution of the other members would increase

by approximately sixty percent.

Hesitation over expansion is compounded by the sticky question of institutional balance of power. Under the current system the larger countries (as defined by population) have more votes in the European Council of Ministers where many important decisions are made, but smaller countries are protected by a system of weighted voting, where it takes 54/76 council votes to get a qualified majority. Therefore, the small countries only have to collect 23 votes to block. When new nations are admitted the balance changes. With the next wave of expansion, the balance will shift in favor of small countries. Now that Austria, Finland and Sweden have joined, eight countries, accounting for only 12 percent of the population, will be able to block the other eight with 88 percent of the population.

The issue of additional new membership, beyond the current expansion, is a sticky one as well. While the Baltic states have the opportunity to eventually join the EU, the other republics of the Former Soviet Union, including Russia, probably will not. The EU has offered "partnership" agreements to all of the former republics, without distinction between those in Europe and those completely outside of Europe. Ukraine is the first of the states to enter into such a partnership agreement. The agreement provides for closer economic and political cooperation and the eventual possibility of a free trade zone. In the meantime, such nations as Turkey, Cyprus and Malta are left wondering if their applications will continue to be ignored by the EU, while new applications from the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia are moved to the top of the pile.

All of these issues together, give the "deep versus wide" debate a new urgency. The likely scenario for the future will be what one analyst called "Europe a la carte," with different member nations and subgroups of members proceeding at different speeds with economic, political and security integration schemes. Subgroup identity is a major theme in Europe right now, as cooperation between Arctic, Baltic, and Nordic nations compete with, for example, Mediterranean and Black Sea integration schemes.

The "deep versus" wide debate and the question subgroup identity strained the tight relationship between France and Germany. Traditionally, France and Germany have been closely allied on almost all EU issues. However, France's emphasis on increasing the degree of integration before additional expansion is at odds with Germany's desire to bring the former communist states of Eastern Europe into the EU at a much more rapid pace. The rate of expansion is only one of the issues of contention between the two states. They are also becoming divided by a question over the future direction of EU policy. France, Spain, Italy and the other Mediterranean EU members want to place more emphasis on North Africa and the Mediterranean littoral in hopes of stabilizing the region and reducing the flow of refugees to Europe. Germany and the other Northern European members of the EU want to focus on Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Republics for many of the same reasons. Since these regional outlooks are perceived to be competition with one another, Germany and France have found themselves on opposite sides of a fairly heated policy debate.

Economic Modernization

Meanwhile, post-communist nations are struggling mightily with the modernization process that replaces command economies with market-based structures. Future aspirations are very much tied to EU membership and integration with the world market economy. Poland, Hungary, and the Czech and Slovak Republics, in particular, hope for membership in the near future. Their entrance will not come as quickly as it will for the EFTA states, but EC President Jacques Delors says that they could be ready to join by the end of the decade.

EU members understand that it is to their benefit to promote economic growth in the non-EU states, in order to avoid a huge, destabilizing influx of immigrants seeking to escape economic hardship. In December 1991, the EC proposed to phase out over a six year period the tariffs on products from the four Union hopefuls, thereby creating a free trade zone. They have entered into similar agreements with Bulgaria and Romania and hope to eventually reach a similar arrangement with Ukraine. The Union also agreed to go first, before the East-Central European countries, in beginning the tariff cuts (special restrictions remain in place, however, on the textile, coal, steel, and agricultural sectors). It is this last area, agriculture, which not surprisingly presents the greatest problems. The EU's farming pressure group (COPA), has argued that EU farmers have already been hurt by the increase in imports of agricultural products from East-Central Europe. On the other side, the Polish Foreign Trade enterprise Animex has calculated that if there were no EU tariff barriers Polish exports of meat and meat products to the community would rise by 50%. It has argued that "the aid from the EU which is so often reported is in fact a drop in the ocean by comparison with what the community could do for Poland by improving access to its markets."

One of the reasons that central planning failed was that it did not make the best use of scarce resources, a key feature of modern market economies. Industries were responsive to central directives rather than market signals; managers were overtly discouraged from relying on a market to give them information about what or how much to produce. Salaries were completely independent of productivity, and there were no individual incentives to operate efficiently and profitably. Prices failed to reflect the true value of commodities and could not be raised. In the case of scarcity, which was the rule rather than the exception, managers simply controlled access to the goods. Profit maximization was not a concern; there was no attempt to find the optimal size of enterprises. Central planners intentionally built on a very large scale, even when it was not appropriate. Capital for building new factories was distributed without interest charges, giving managers no incentive for efficient development. Land and raw materials were treated as free goods for which the supply was limitless. Also, by refusing most foreign business and foreign trade, the Soviets and Eastern Europeans tried to be self-sufficient, an economic strategy that leads to great inefficiencies.

Eventually, it did become clear that this kind of waste was costly to the economy. In a world of limited resources, inefficient use will eventually lead to economic collapse. This is what happened in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, and what led Gorbachev to implement his program of **perestroika** (economic restructuring). While this plan failed to bring about an efficient economic system, it did contribute to the political and civil dissension which eventually overthrew the communist system.

Critics say that Gorbachev's gravest error was not going far enough to encourage a large-scale private sector and an extensive private property scheme. Instead, he tried to create a limited private sector, while still maintaining a largely command economy. It is this transfer of control from the public to the private sector that holds the key to the successful modernization of the post-communist systems.

Almost all of the post-communist governments quickly embarked on modernization programs designed to replace their command economies with market economies. "Shock therapy" began as the favorite modernizing mechanism of western institutions such as the IMF and World Bank as well as western governments and intellectual elites. It was adopted by post-communist governments based on the projections of its theoretical results toward rapid modernization. Shock therapy aims to create an economic system comparable to those of western Europe by replacing existing institutions -- wholesale -- with new ones. This approach, therefore, contains an implicit assumption that institutions can be created quickly enough for short-term gains to outweigh short-term dislocations caused by rapid reform.

The failure, or very limited success, of shock therapy has forced governments to adopt an evolutionary approach to economic modernization. The failures also forced the IMF and other international financial institutions to take a softer line on the requirements for loans and other financial assistance. There is also a realization by all parties that reforms that succeed in one post-communist state may not work and may even prove disastrous in another state. The details on each nations' modernization programs are found in their respective sections of the FIPSE Background Document.

The interest and involvement of the West in the ongoing modernization process of the post-communist states is important to all of Europe. The main obstacle has been finding the funds to aid the effort during a period of prolonged recession. Western governments have pledged \$27 billion to the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, and Poland, but only 14 percent of that is in grant form. The rest is mainly loans and credit guarantees. Furthermore, the West has only delivered a fraction of that money. Russia has received \$24 billion from the IMF in assistance, but the IMF and Western governments have been most reluctant to pledge more. Perhaps, the most important help the West will be able to provide will be in the forms of increased foreign investment and enhanced trade opportunities.

Attracting investment and accompanying hard currency can be frustrating for nations in the midst of reform, as it is greatly dependent on the ability to project an image of stability. American companies have invested about \$300-400 million in Russia, compared with \$1 billion in Hungary, which is perceived to have a more stable and modern economy. The Baltic states of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania have emphasized privatization in their bid to attract more foreign investment from the Nordic nations, as well as the United States.

The success of modernization and integration for eastern and East-Central Europe is dependent, in large part, on the ability of these economies to undertake trade with the West. During the period of communist rule, most Eastern European countries traded almost exclusively with each other. Hungary became the exception to this rule during the 1980s when it sought to

develop increased ties to the West. The Soviet Union had established a Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (COMECON) which institutionalized bilateral trading relationships between the Soviet Union and the nations of Eastern Europe. Under this system, goods were traded at prices that were below market levels, and the trade was conducted in rubles only. The system was also highly dependent on barter. With the fall of communist governments, the trading relationship between Russia and the former Soviet satellites collapsed. This collapse destroyed the primary markets for many enterprises, and exacerbated the economic problems associated with reform. Now, full market prices must be paid and goods which meet a legitimate, rather than contracted, demand must be produced. New nations such as Kazakhstan and Estonia are torn between their desire to be free of Moscow and their lingering infrastructural dependence on the "center."

Post-communist countries must hasten the task of building export economies. One of the problems with this is that Soviet-style development emphasized heavy industry, and ignored most consumer goods. Now, these nations must diversify their production bases by converting defense and heavy industries to consumer goods production. In addition, the quality of the goods must be raised to Western standards. There is an even deeper slump in the many heavy machinery, coal, and steel industries in the region.

In contemporary Europe, economic integration and economic modernization must go hand-in-hand. There is no longer any doubt that the EU will become a wider institution as the states of East-Central Europe modernize their economics and political systems. The major remaining issue is the eventual depth of integration. To what extent can a diverse group of nations surrender sovereignty in the name of supranationalism?

ETHNICITY AND NATIONALISM

Nationalist Tendencies

With fluctuating and unstable borders, many Europeans have historically developed stronger loyalties to their ethnic groups than to their countries. This is especially true in eastern and East-Central Europe. A true nation-state, where ethnic and political borders are roughly the same, such as France, is actually somewhat of an anomaly in Europe. Even Great Britain is torn by nationalism, as Scottish independence parties have become increasingly popular and conflict continues to rage in Northern Ireland. Then there is the case of Yugoslavia, where widely disparate ethnic groups, some with animosities dating back hundreds of years, were forced to live together under one government. Modern national boundaries in the eastern region of Europe were largely imposed and, therefore, as is the case in much of Africa, they do not reflect natural population islands. This makes current territorial boundaries seem illegitimate and leads to high levels of inter-group tension.

Under Soviet control, nationalistic tendencies were subverted. Marxism did not see people as divided by ethnic groups, but by class. A member of the working poor in Russia was really no different from a member of the same class in France. The communist ideology was

based upon the notion of a classless society. In Eastern Europe, the governments suppressed ethnic identity by a number of means, such as allowing only one official language. Governments maintained state security agencies, through which they tried to prevent what they called "anti-state" activities. They had a great deal of power to suppress any internal insubordination. However, this did not stop all people from expressing their linguistic, religious, and general ethnic identities. They simply found other channels (the home, the neighborhood, etc.) through which to self-actualize and build a sense of community.

With the collapse of communism, many of these ethnic tensions began to come to the forefront, as groups used the new political space to organize and openly seek self-determination. National minorities that had been subjected to a long process of cultural assimilation under communist rule (the Hungarian and Turkish minorities in Romania and Bulgaria, respectively, for example), reasserted their collective identity as the new era began. Deep-seated historical animosities have been surfacing in virtually every contemporary European state. Because of the lack of a democratic tradition in the region, the "newness" of the attempted transformation raises some fresh questions and returns some old ones to the top of the agenda:

- To what extent can governments protect members of their own dominant ethnic group, who constitute minorities in other countries?
- How can constitutions be written and political rights established in a way that does not allow majority populations to subvert the rights of minorities?
- How can rights to self-determination be balanced against the maintenance of state integrity and recognition of minority rights be kept from subverting the will of the majority, the cornerstone of modern democracy?

Although the conflict in the Balkans represents the most extreme case, nationalism and ethnic conflict are prevalent throughout the post-communist world.

The collapse of the multi-ethnic, multi-national Soviet Union unleashed a potential nightmare of ethnic conflict and nationalistic war. There are fifteen newly independent nations, each of which is a hodgepodge of ethnic groups resulting from the artificial boundaries imposed by Soviet leadership in Moscow, forced relocation of certain ethnic groups, and an intentional policy of "russification"; the attempt to increase the proportion of ethnic Russians throughout all regions of the former Soviet Union.

The startlingly successful showing in the parliamentary elections of ultra-nationalist Vladimir Zhirinovskiy had two distinct effects. The first and most understandable was increased fear of Russian nationalism in the other former republics of the Soviet Union. The second and more significant effect was on the policy of Boris Yeltsin's government. Following the parliamentary elections, Foreign Minister Kozryev announced that Russia would protect the lives, property and interests of ethnic-Russian's living abroad with all means necessary, including the use of armed force. This declaration has been coupled with a more active, aggressive Russian foreign policy that stems from the stabilization of the Russian economic and

political systems. Russian foreign policy toward the other former republics has also taken on a tone that could be considered chauvinistic. As Russian foreign policy became increasingly aggressive, the other former republics have been termed the "Near Abroad". The "Near Abroad" has taken a place in Russian foreign policy which appears very similar to the imperialistic policy of Tsarist Russia.

Currently, the most explosive situation involving ethnic Russians is centered on Ukraine and the Crimea. Ukraine has the largest number of ethnic Russians, approximately 11 million. The semi-autonomous government of the Crimea has lobbied for independence from Ukraine and the possibility of unification with Russia. But Crimea is considered to be of extreme strategic importance for both countries and it, therefore, seems clear that there will be a struggle over its future.

A tense situation also exists in Moldova, where Russians living in the Trans-Dneister region (where they comprise 23% of the population) have established a breakaway republic. They were reacting to the expressed desire of many Moldovans to seek reunification with Romania, their mother country prior to World War II. Out there without even a common border with Russia, the rebels are relying on the support they have received from the Moldavan-based Fourteenth Army, ostensibly a Russian peacekeeping force, which has backed the separatist cause.

The rights of ethnic Russians are also threatened in the Baltic states. Estonia, for example, has defined its citizens as those who held that status themselves, or are directly descended from those who did, prior to 1938. Most of the Russian-speaking residents of Estonia (40% of the population) arrived after Stalin annexed the republic in 1940. Russia reacted strongly to the recent Estonian law that set language and other requirements for citizenship by threatening an oil blockade and arguing their case before the CSCE and the Council of Europe. Estonians and other citizens of the Baltic states were especially concerned by comments attributed to President Clinton in Moscow earlier this year, when he gave credence to the notion that Moscow must protect Russians living in those states from "unfair treatment." Officials in Tallinn immediately complained that the Americans had not bothered to seek independent information on the situation and that, certainly, every sovereign nation had a right to promote its own language. The situation has calmed dramatically and in July the Russian government recognized that the treatment of ethnic-Russians had improved enough for the removal of the last Russian troops; which departed Estonia in August.

Ethnic conflict rages throughout the former Soviet Union, home to approximately 500 separate ethnic groups. War continues between Armenia and Azerbaijan over the status of Nagorno-Karabakh, an Armenian enclave within Azerbaijani territory. The Azerbaijani blockade of Nagorno-Karabakh has been in place for five years now. Over 5,000 people have died over the issue of who would control this territory. CIS, primarily Russian, peacekeeping forces have declined to involve themselves in the conflict, something they do not do when their own interests are perceived to be at stake -- as, for example in Tajikistan -- home to 300,000 Russians. There, Russian troops have been active in fighting the forces of the political opposition, including troops of the Islamic Renaissance Party (IRP).

"Peacekeeping forces" are also stationed in the Georgian region of South Ossetia, which is seeking to reunite with the Russian region of North Ossetia. However, these forces all came from the areas that were involved in the conflict -- Russia, Georgia, and South Ossetia -- making their use as peacekeepers rather dubious. Georgia has also experienced severe problems in the region of Abkhazia, which has tried to secede and join the CIS as an independent republic. The Abkhazian separatists, with clandestine and possibly officially sanctioned support from Russia, defeated the Georgian army in late 1993. While the CIS has not recognized Abkhazia as a republic, the government of Georgia has not regained control over all of its territory. Russian support for the Abkhazians vanished after Georgia joined the CIS in December, raising suspicions within the Georgian government that Russian aid to the Abkhazians was designed to accomplish just that.

The Russian government attempted to gain the status of UN Peacekeepers for their CIS forces deployed throughout the former Soviet Union. The UN declined to grant this status, noting that UN Peacekeeping missions must originate in the Security Council, have a chain of command that terminates with the UN, and be of a truly multilateral, multinational character. The CIS forces deployed as peacekeepers are almost exclusively ethnic Russian and take their orders from the Russian Ministry of Defense, rather than an international institution.

There are even secessionist movements within the newly- defined boundaries of Russia. Tatarstan and Chechnya, both located in south-central Russia, are the most notable examples. The Russian government began to crack down on these rebellious regions in December, 1994.

Hungary is in a similar position with respect to the large number of nationals who live outside of its borders. The late Prime Minister Antall raised fears in neighboring states during a June 1990 speech, when he claimed that the Hungarian government has a "moral and spiritual duty to be responsible for every member of the 15 million strong Hungarian community." One of Hungary's biggest problems is with Slovakia, which it accuses of restricting the political and linguistic rights of the Hungarians living there. Slovakia has expressed concerns over Budapest's territorial ambitions. But, the rise of nationalism in Slovakia and its separation from the Czech Republic are equally troubling to Hungary. The controversy over the Danube only further escalates regional tension. Budapest also sees its nationals at risk in the Serbian province of Vojvodina and in the Romanian region of Transylvania. While these governments suppress minority rights, they also accuse Hungary of wanting to encroach on their territory. This is especially true in Transylvania, which Hungarians regard as the birthplace of their culture. Ethnic nationalism is also rearing its head in Hungary itself, where a leader of the ruling Hungarian Democratic Forum, Ivan Csurka, spoke of the need to defeat the "Jewish conspiracy to ruin Hungary." This, in a nation with one of the largest Jewish communities in Europe.

There are also suspicions in Bulgaria that neighboring Turkey harbors irredentist goals and is contemplating backing a movement toward independence or autonomy among Bulgaria's ethnic Turkish population. The fact that Turkey has the most powerful military force in the region, with a substantial part situated near the Bulgarian border, does not help alleviate these fears.

What particularly troubles observers of ethnic conflicts within countries is the potential for spillover into neighboring states. Many fear that the situation in Moldavia could escalate to war between Russia, Moldavia and Romania. Similarly, there is apprehension that the conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh could eventually pit Iran, Turkey and Azerbaijan against Armenia and Russia. Obviously, the most immediate danger of ethnic conflict turning to interstate war is in the Balkans.

The Conflict in the Balkans

For details concerning the conflict and the international response, see **Responding to the Conflict in the Balkans** in the Security section.

The situation in the former Yugoslavia is the most violent example of ethnic conflict in Europe today. Although some warned that the end of the Cold War would lead to a new era of ethnic tensions, the rapidity with which Yugoslavia collapsed into warring factions took most observers by surprise. The Yugoslavian case is significant in its own right, but it is also useful to examine as an example of the importance of taking ethnic and nationalist concerns into account.

The Balkan region has long been considered the powderkeg of Europe by virtue of its ethnic and religious diversity and antagonisms. It was authoritarianism that suppressed ethnic violence during the post-World War II era. Yugoslavia was forcibly born in 1918 out of the conglomeration of several rival ethnic and religious groups. Although the goal was to dissipate hostilities, ethnic tensions continued to boil beneath the surface. During World War II, approximately one-tenth of the Yugoslav population was killed in nationalistic and religious conflict. After the war, Marshal Josip Tito established a communist regime in Yugoslavia, and managed to quell conflict through communist ideology, repressive tactics, and the sheer force of his personality. After his death in 1980, nationalist sentiments began to rise once again as did resentment over Serbian domination of the armed forces and central government. As communism collapsed throughout Eastern Europe, the Croatian, Bosnian, and Slovenian republics of the Yugoslavia decided to declare independence from the central government. In contrast, Serbia and Montenegro, led by Serbian ex-communist Slobodan Milosevic, wanted to preserve the nation of Yugoslavia and maintain control over a central government.

The issue of independence was greatly complicated by the results of Tito's scheme for ethnic integration. It resulted in, for example, significant numbers of Serbs living in Bosnia and Croatia (25% of Serbian nationals), and vice-versa. None of the republics of the former Yugoslavia are ethnically pure. The population of Bosnia-Herzegovina before the conflict was 43.7 percent Muslim, 31.4 percent Serbian, 17.3 percent Croatian, and 5.5 percent who did not claim an ethnic grouping. The key to Serbia's initial response to the moves for independence by other republics is this so-called "Serbian question." Serbians remember World War II, when Serbs living in Croatia suffered at the hands of a fascist regime. This led them to fear for the rights and well-being of their numbers in the newly-formed countries. Special attention was focused on the Serbs who formed the majority in the Croatian region of Krajina and the ethnic

Serb population in mostly Muslim Bosnia-Hercegovina. Once the conflict erupted, the desire to construct ethnically pure regions resulted in the massive human rights violations under the policy of "ethnic cleansing". While "ethnic cleansing" was practiced mainly by ethnic Serbs, the Croats and Muslims also used similar practices against Serbian civilians.

The next trouble-spot in the former Yugoslavia may well be the province of Kosovo. Over 90 percent of the two million persons who live there are ethnic Albanians. Kosovo is the heart of the medieval Serbian empire, and for that reason, Milosevic stated in 1990 that it should be forcibly reintegrated into Serbia. Since then, schools have stopped teaching in Albanian, and many thousands of Albanians have lost their jobs. The ethnic Albanians are responding to repressive tactics with passive resistance and are calling for independence within Kosovo's existing borders, with guaranteed rights for the Serbian minority. The UN has stationed peace-keeping forces there in an effort to stave off what is probably an inevitable explosion of conflict.

Anti-Immigrant Tensions

Resurgent nationalism is not a problem exclusive to Eastern and East-Central Europe. Problems with xenophobia and anti-semitism in western Europe have been steadily increasing since German Reunification and are exacerbated by ever-rising intra-regional refugee flows. In the face of a worldwide economic recession and widespread ethnic tensions in eastern and East-Central Europe, controlling the flow of people across borders has become a central concern for the EU. British Foreign Minister Douglas Hurd went as far as to state that the control of immigration is the most serious policy problem facing western Europe. Two concurrent trends complicate the situation: (1) there are more and more people seeking to enter western Europe; but (2) there are fewer countries willing and able to take them in.

Traditionally, it was the northern, advanced industrial nations of Europe that received the most immigrants, both from southern Europe and from various post-colonial societies in the developing world. These individuals were motivated to relocate in search of work. Their status in the receiving country was normally that of "guest worker" -- designed to alleviate temporary labor shortages -- not guaranteed a permanent new home. However, these receiving nations underestimated the long-term impact of the policy. Naturally, many guest workers preferred to find ways to stay permanently in the host nation, and worked to have family members join them. This was allowed, if not encouraged, during times of relative prosperity. But, economic recessions always engender questions about entitlement; a situation that was complicated by the implicit state-society agreements inherent in the postwar, European social welfare systems. In addition to these problems with the guest worker policies, there is an ongoing debate about the status of political versus economic refugees in the current international system. Many nations, including Germany, France and Sweden, had welcomed political asylum-seekers in the post-World War II period. However, the past decade has seen an increase in societal dissatisfaction with this policy. Many western European citizens feel that economic opportunity, not political danger, is actually motivating most of the movement and they perceive themselves to be supporting and subsidizing large-scale relocation programs. These tensions are now greatly exacerbated by the instability in the post-communist nations.

By the early 1990s, the total foreign population in the EU member states was estimated at around 13.7 million, or 4.28% of the EU's total of 320 million. EC citizens represented 5 million of that number (36.4%); foreign workers and their families from outside the EC some eight million (58.3%). Add to this asylum-seekers, whose ranks continue to grow (over 545,000 applied in 1990); and then illegal immigrants and refugees for whom no reliable estimates exist.

These large-scale population movements, together with the prolonged recession, have provided the catalyst for right-wing nationalist movements. The tension has been mounting in France and Germany for some time now, but recently it has begun to spread to countries such as Spain, Denmark and Sweden. Ironically, analysts predict that in the long run, western Europe will once again face labor shortages. The official French statistical agency estimates that France alone will have a shortfall of 150,000 workers per year by early in the next century. However, even if the economic need is there, there are still questions of cultural tolerance. For many of the right-wing groups, the problem goes beyond economics; they are averse to accepting so many people who are "different." This explains the French National Front slogan of "France for the French," a thinly veiled racist slogan. Intolerance toward the Muslim population in France, many of whom are now second or third generation, has been a particularly controversial issue. The French government has been spending time in court defending its position that no pupil be allowed to attend school in religious garb. This came in response to young Muslim girls being turned away from French schools for coming to class in veils. Clashes with Muslims have also taken place in Great Britain, most notably over the Salman Rushdie Affair, and in Germany, where Turkish guest workers have been targets of right-wing, neo-Nazi attacks.

The German government argues that management of the immigration issue has been made particularly difficult by the disproportionately large share of the refugee burden from East-Central Europe that it has shouldered. It was the primary destination of so many because of its geographic proximity and liberal asylum laws. It alone took in over 225,000 refugees in 1991. Germans have expressed anger, particularly at France and Britain, for not taking on a greater share of this burden themselves. At a meeting of the immigration ministers of the 12 EC countries in November 1992, Germany proposed a quota system for handling the Yugoslav refugees. Under this system, each EC member would be required to accept a specified number of refugees, thereby alleviating some of the pressure on Germany. This measure was defeated, with the ministers instead deciding that an appropriate response would be to tighten procedures and regulations for those asylum-seekers in all of Europe.

Undoubtedly thinking that if you can't get them to join you, you had better join them, Germany changed its liberal asylum laws during the summer of 1993. Klaus Kinkel, German foreign minister, stated that immigration threatened the stability of the German democracy. A sign of the new German policy is the recent agreement between Germany and Romania, whereby the former will return Gypsy refugees to Romania and pay that country \$21 million to accept them. This prolongs the ordeal of Gypsies in Europe, who have for centuries been unfairly and harshly characterized as "dirty, illiterate thieves". Their leaders claim that if returned to Romania, they will have to endure further repression and persecution. Despite this rethinking

of the German immigration policy, the government is very concerned with the resurgence of right-wing intolerance and terrorism. It has now outlawed the most violent of the neo-Nazi groups, and is increasing its surveillance and restraint over the others.

Ironically, at the same time that pressure builds in Europe to shut its borders to the outside world, the EU is continuing to work toward economic unification, with free movement of labor. The result of these simultaneous occurrences is an unfortunate "continental racism" that attempts to draw lines of distinction between "desirable" and "undesirable" relocated labor.

These issues become increasingly important as the EU moves to lift border controls among member nations. There is tension between the desire to maintain national control over borders and the need for a new supranational territorial policy. The UK has been particularly reluctant to relinquish any control. What has caused much concern is the realization that the policy for the entire community is, in fact, set by the nation with the most lax security. It will become the target entry point of those looking to enter the new Europe. Those who wish to take a positive rather than a negative approach to the problem of East to West migration argue that encouraging and promoting economic development in the post-communist countries will do the most to control population relocation.

If the EU wishes to develop a truly coherent policy toward immigration, member states will have to standardize their practices. Currently, Germany, Denmark, Iceland and Portugal assign citizenship as the result of parentage or blood ties, while other member states emphasize the place of birth. Britain, France, Ireland and Italy allow dual citizenship, while other member states such as Germany and Denmark do not.

ENVIRONMENT

The condition of the environment is one of the most important long-term problems facing the continent of Europe today. From east to west, people and governments are trying to come to terms with the environmental damage wrought by heavy industrialization and population growth. Although the damage is more severe in the East, the issue is complicated by the fact that the environment does not respect national borders; pollution in one country is often carried either through air or water currents to other countries. Consequently, pollution is a regional, not a national, problem.

Dealing with environmental damage and initiating programs to protect the environment is neither cheap nor easy. The countries of Europe will be challenged to deal with the damage that they have already incurred, in addition to preventing future damage.

Environmental Conditions

One of the major problems that has become apparent since the collapse of the communist party is the enormous environmental costs associated with the industrial policies of the previous 45 years. The Soviet-dominated system concentrated on large-scale development of heavy

industry; the emphasis was on high production at low cost with little regard for environmental impact. The scarcity of resources was not taken into account because resources were allocated by quota, rather than by productivity of use. (In a free market economy, scarce resources command a higher price, and therefore, only those firms that are able to employ those resources most efficiently will be able to afford them). Furthermore, there were no incentives to develop and run factories in such a way as to encourage the use of costly environmentally-friendly and efficient technology. (In the West, the oil shocks of the 1970s provided very striking incentives for developing and implementing energy efficient technology). Finally, citizens had little to no influence on government activities. Public works projects were bestowed upon those who had done loyal work for the Communist Party, and were designed to impress others; public need had little bearing on the design or implementation of projects. Although environmental standards in the post-communist nations are very stringent on paper, they were set without economic consideration. This has slowed enforcement. In a state-controlled economy, the enforcer and the polluter are one in the same.

As a result, cities dating back to medieval days are blackened and crumbling, hillsides are deforested, and crop yields are diminishing throughout the region. Air and water pollution are at levels the West experienced in the 1950s and 1960s, when heavy industries were still predominant and before environmental standards were enacted. The most alarming consequence of the environmental problems is the health problems experienced by people in the most polluted parts of these countries. (Economic planners tended to concentrate development in specific geographic areas). In some heavily industrialized areas, life expectancies are five years lower, and cancer rates and reproductive problems are significantly higher, than in cleaner areas.

Several factors have contributed to the worsening environmental conditions in the region. In the East, the primary form of heating is still locally-available lignite (brown or soft coal), the sulfur content of which is very high, and which is most often burned without the benefit of pollution control technologies. Before German unification, East Germany and Czechoslovakia alone burned almost one-third of the world's lignite. In addition, because energy prices were subsidized under communist rule, there was no incentive to conserve energy. Now, because no changes have been made to the energy production infrastructure, energy production continues to be highly inefficient. East-Central and eastern European countries therefore have some of the highest sulfur dioxide (SO₂) levels in the world. Emissions of nitrogen oxide (NO₂) are also very high. NO₂ is a contributor to both acid deposition and ground level ozone, which are harmful to humans, trees, and crops. NO₂ is emitted by automobiles, factories, and power plants; although there is a lower rate of automobile ownership than in the West, auto emissions in the East contribute a greater share to pollution because pollution per automobile is very high. Finally, industrial emissions of various toxic chemicals and hazardous waste disposal have gone largely unregulated.

The Soviet and Warsaw Pact militaries are responsible for a large portion of the hazardous waste problem. The withdrawal of Soviet forces from eastern Europe has revealed military installations with extensive environmental damage. In addition, the military often dumped fuel, wastes, and unexploded ammunition at unmarked locations off the bases. In the Czech province of Moravia, the groundwater at one location is heavily contaminated with diesel

fuel. In central Bohemia, groundwater tests show the presence of toxins at 30-50 times the allowable limit. As many as 8,000 square kilometers, amounting to 6 percent of Czechoslovakian land, have been polluted in this manner. Military operations, even just practice maneuvers, have also exacted a price. It is estimated that 10 percent of East German territory was damaged by Soviet military operations.

Agricultural productivity has decreased sharply during the period of industrialization, despite the availability of fertilizers and pesticides. Actually, the inappropriate use of agricultural chemicals is a reason for decreased productivity. Because fertilizers have been heavily subsidized, farmers have had no incentive to choose the optimal level of treatment; instead they have just dumped on more and more chemicals, regardless of their relationship to yield. The emphasis on short-term production has discouraged agricultural planners from considering the long-term effects of certain practices. In the former Soviet Union, approximately two-thirds of the arable land has declined in fertility due to soil erosion. The Aral Sea is the most striking example of land mismanagement. Industrial pollution is affecting crop yields and damaging forests. A 1989 study by the UN Economic Commission for Europe found that 82 percent of Poland's forest are showing signs of damage, along with 78 percent of Bulgaria's, 73 percent of Czechoslovakia's, 57 percent of East Germany's, and 36 percent of Hungary's. This affects biodiversity; in Hungary, 53 animal species and 40 plant species have become extinct in the last 100 years.

Municipal wastewater is another concern. In Czechoslovakia, less than 50 percent of the wastewater is adequately treated. Half of Poland's cities, including Warsaw, do not treat their sewage. In 1988, it was estimated that the Soviet Union had only enough treatment plants to fully treat 30 percent of its sewage. Twenty percent was dumped directly into lakes and rivers. These practices, coupled with industrial and agricultural contamination, have rendered clean drinking water a scarce commodity in most of eastern and East-Central Europe. In Hungary, 700 of the 3,000 towns and cities rely primarily on bottled water or water piped in from another town. Most of the wells in these cities and towns are contaminated with pesticides and nitrates from fertilizer oversaturation. In some areas of Czechoslovakia, pregnant woman and infants are advised not to drink the tap water because of nitrate contamination. In Poland, 65 percent of the river water is so corrosive that it cannot even be used in industrial processes. Lake Baikal, which contains 80 percent of the former Soviet Union's supply of fresh water and is the one of the largest bodies of fresh water in the world, is threatened by industrial pollution and agricultural runoff.

In the post-communist nations, environmental conditions and public health are tightly linked. In areas with high levels of pollution, there are higher reported rates of malignant tumors, respiratory diseases, and skin diseases. Children are also subjected to lead at dangerously high levels. Some health problems may be associated with agricultural practices. Areas with high nitrate concentrations from fertilizer runoff have a higher incidence of cancer and blood and cardiovascular diseases. Young children in regions where pesticide use is high have overall sickness and death rates nearly five times higher than those of children living in cleaner areas. These are only the reported statistics; much of the data regarding deaths and injuries caused by environmental problems is still suppressed, or grouped under general or

natural causes of death.

Environmental damage to human health are exacerbated by inadequate health care, poor diets, and high rates of smoking. For example, in Poland in 1982, 81 percent of the men and 57 percent of the women in their early 30s smoked cigarettes, as compared to 40 percent of men and 37 percent of women in Great Britain.

While cleaning up the environment has its costs, its present condition should also cause economic concern. Decreased agricultural productivity and rising health care costs are two of the most prominent problems. Other costs are less obvious. The Caspian Sea at one time held 90 percent of the Soviet Union's caviar-producing sturgeon, but over the past 20 years, populations of sturgeon and other valuable fish have dropped by between 66 and 96 percent. Resort beaches along many of the eastern and East-Central European seas have had to close periodically due to polluted and unswimmable waters.

Focusing on environmental issues will not be easy for post-communist countries, which are struggling to rebuild their economies, and social, political, and industrial infrastructures. The new governments have political and economic concerns which often take priority over environmental protection and clean-up. Throughout the East, cleaning up the environment is going to be a costly job. However, the costs associated with not cleaning up are high as well. Economists have estimated Poland's environmental problems cost it 10-20 percent of its GNP every year. This includes the costs associated with less-than-efficient and tainted production, including agricultural and resource losses. For Czechoslovakia, the cost is 5-7 percent. This also includes health costs. In 1987, the Soviet Union spent \$330 billion on health care relating to environmental problems, almost 11 percent of its GNP. Given the linkages that have been drawn between pollution and health, enhancing the quality of the environment will lower health care costs.

There have been many requests for assistance with environmental clean-up efforts. However, the cost of these projects is extremely high and international assistance is limited. In 1989, the United States Congress allocated \$25 million in assistance for eastern Europe. This funding covered the renovation of one set of smokestacks in Krakow, not expected to have a significant impact on the general level of pollution in the region. Given the cross border nature of many of Europe's pollution problems, it is to the advantage of the West to help it deal with these problems. Although western countries are constrained in the amount of aid they can provide, they can help in other ways: through education programs, the sharing of information, and making technology easily available. The West can probably do the most good by promoting the integration of economic and environmental considerations through lending and trade policies.

One temptation that the West must overcome is to subject the other European countries to environmental imperialism, i.e., where Western companies shift their more heavily polluting industries to the East to take advantage of lax or unenforced standards. Environmentalists advocate agreements to force companies to maintain EC environmental standards when investing in the East.

There is no denying that there are severe environmental problems in the East. However, a recent study by an economist at the University of Edinburgh suggests that eastern Europe today is not much more polluted than comparably poor states in western Europe were 20 years ago. With enlightened development strategies, the West was able to overcome many of its environmental injuries. For this reason, in a time of limited economic resources, he de-emphasizes vast spending for environmental cleanup in favor of sensible, environmentally-friendly strategies of economic development. Focusing on the future may be more effective than trying to correct the problems of the past.

The market has already begun its work; increasing energy prices to OECD levels, which will help clean up the air by cutting energy use and providing incentives for the use of cleaner, more efficient technology. This is of course contingent on the ability of post-communist countries to gain access to such technology. The market is not sufficient to provide environmental protection, because it fails to account for hidden costs, such as those associated with pollution. In order to deal with these problems, the governments will have to take an activist stand. The strength of Green movements throughout Europe should help in this process.

With all the attention that is focused on economic development in the East today, there is a danger that the environment may not be given the attention it deserves. Some observers advocate developing eastern European economies in an environmentally-friendly way. On one level, this means trying to keep the East from going the way of the West. For example, instead of encouraging the automobile as a primary form of transportation in those countries, attention should be given to encouraging reliance on mass transit systems. In addition, economic development does not have to mean the creation of a throw-away economy; the groundwork should be laid for efficient use and re-use of resources. As the rebuilding process continues, developing nations can learn from Western experience in dealing with environmental problems. They can use this knowledge to their benefit by implementing policies that encourage energy efficiency and efficient use of limited resources.

Cross Border Pollution

One of the most important reasons that western Europe is, and should be, concerned with environmental conditions to the East is that prevailing winds and water currents carry pollution from the East to the West. The nations placing the greatest pressure on the post-communist states to concentrate on environmental renewal are those that share their borders. Because their own domestic environments suffer from the pollution that seeps across borders on wind currents, in water, and in rain, they cannot take unilateral action to alleviate the problem. Although the flow of pollutants receives the most attention, transboundary pollution is also an issue of concern in relations between the nations of the East and those of the West.

The cardinal rule in the prevailing international system is the right of each state to sovereignty over its own territory. From this follows the idea that a state is not subject to rules imposed by external actors on its territory without its consent. The principle of territorial integrity holds that a state's territory may not be interfered with by another state. Where there are no cross-border effects of domestic action, these two principles may coexist peacefully. In

an increasingly interdependent world, however, one state's sovereign rights may contradict another state's territorial integrity. The concepts of sovereignty and territorial integrity have become much less clear-cut as activities within one state have potential direct impact upon the citizens and environment of another.

Acid deposition or acid rain is the term used to describe industrial and vehicular emissions containing sulphur dioxide and nitrogen dioxide, which is transported in wind currents and deposited by rain. The acidity of rain can have very damaging effects. Lakes, especially in Scandinavia and Canada have been devastated by acid rain as the pH level of the water no longer supports aquatic life. Acid rain has been blamed for the deaths of trees in Canadian, American, and European forests. The browning of the Black Forest in Germany has been attributed to acid rain, which also damages buildings and other man-made structures.

Most countries exchange some level of pollution back and forth across their borders. Acid rain becomes a particularly difficult international issue when the level of exchange is extremely unequal or when there is a significant difference in the political commitment to control the problem. Both factors have contributed to the acid rain tension between Canada and the United States, between the former Soviet Union and Scandinavia, as well as between Scandinavia and continental Europe. The close proximity, dense population, and small size of the nations of Europe contribute to the international tensions of cross border pollution as well. Although acid rain emissions originate in almost all countries in Europe, the problem coming from the east is greater because of higher levels of emissions.

Chemical wastes, industrial emissions, and pesticides that reach the water supply also travel across borders and affect the quality of life in neighboring countries. Ground-water pollutants travel across border areas and international rivers producing tension between neighboring countries. Cross-border water pollution is a particular threat in developing countries where little, if any, of the sewage or industrial emissions are processed or treated.

River pollution can lead to tensions among the countries that share a water basin system. In western Europe, the Rhine delivers French industrial emissions to the German water supply. The Netherlands has complained about the level of salinity of the river when it enters Dutch territory. Romania's pollution of the Tisza River upstream of Hungary has been a source of conflict between these two nations for many years. Following a Czechoslovakian oil spill on the Odrathe, the Polish government asked for compensation for the resultant damages. The Danube, flowing through Germany, Austria, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, Romania, and the Soviet Union, is polluted with industrial and biological waste as it passes through every country. Few of the cities in the East treat the sewage that is pumped in. The polluted rivers in this region eventually lead to the seas and oceans. The Elbe, for example, carries ten tons of mercury, 24 tons of cadmium, and 142 tons of lead per year into the North Sea, and then the Atlantic. The Caspian Sea receives over 40 percent of the former Soviet Union's untreated wastewater each year, most of it from the Volga. The Black Sea annually receives 4,300 tons of nitrogen compounds, 600 tons of lead, and 200 tons of industrial strength detergents from the Danube and Dnieper rivers.

Exploitation of fresh water supplies has long been an international issue as rivers, tapped and dammed by one nation, limit the downstream supply of water to others. The issue of water rights has become more pressing as not only the supply, but the quality of fresh water becomes increasingly dubious. Limited financial resources have rendered the monitoring of water quality a difficult task, and remedial efforts are crippled by economic constraints. The question of who has the rights to use the water for what purposes has not yet been settled; every country wants to benefit from the river passing through its territory, but no one wants to be responsible for picking up its share of the preservation costs. The most widely accepted principle of international law as it applies to cross border pollution is limited territorial sovereignty, which allows use of river water to the extent that it does not harm the other basin states. However, the use of this legal concept is most valuable when the focus is on redressing wrongs, for example, on determining liability and paying damages to injured parties. Reliance upon this concept alone is not useful in terms of protecting a resource from its users. To meet this criterion, a joint resource requires joint management.

Concern over cross-border pollution is not limited to particular pollutants. The Chernobyl nuclear reactor accident in the Soviet Union resulted in one of the worst cross-border pollution scares in history. Contamination was detected in milk as far away as France. This demonstrates the potential for one country to destroy other societies' environmental and health standards through negligence. This raises issues of international concern which have yet to be fully addressed.

Although most nations would like to control pollution and emissions in neighboring countries that could potentially reach their territory, few countries have the resources or financial commitment to fund the required measures. In addition, few countries are willing to sacrifice sovereignty to other nations to dictate domestic pollution standards. On a technical level, it is often difficult to trace the exact source of a contaminant that has travelled long distances, and nations often disagree about the responsibility for specific damage to a regional environment.

Environmental Conflict

Within the next 50 years, the planet's human population will probably pass nine billion, and global economic output may quintuple. Largely as a result of these two trends, scarcities of renewable resources will increase sharply. The total area of high quality agricultural land will drop, as will the extent of virgin forests and the number of species they sustain. Coming generations will also see the widespread depletion and degradation of aquifers, rivers, and other water resources; the decline of many fisheries; further stratospheric ozone loss; and perhaps significant climate change. If such "environmental scarcities" become severe, they could precipitate violent civil or international conflict. Right now, from Somalia and Ethiopia to Indonesia and the Philippines, environmental disasters (natural and man-made) contribute to conflict processes. Population displacement, forced population movements and uneven access to vital resources are major factors in many communal conflicts the world over.

The World Bank has recognized the need to promote international coordination vis-a-vis environmental problems. It established a Global Environmental Facility in 1991 which is designed to run the finances of the two environmental treaties signed in 1992 on climate change and bio-diversity.

ISSUES FOR NEGOTIATION

Following are some possible issues for negotiation which have been drawn from the scenario discussion. This is not an inclusive list, and should serve only as a starting point. Each country is free to establish its own priorities for negotiation within the scope of the scenario, including both multilateral and bilateral priorities.

Security

- Which security institution should take concrete action in the former Yugoslavia and what should that action be?
- Should the countries of eastern and western Europe arrive at a single policy to deal with the conflict in the former Yugoslavia?
- What should be the security relationship of the United States to the countries of Europe?
- Should the EU continue to promote the development of its own military arm? If so, how will it deal with the imminent admission of historically-neutral countries?
- Should Eastern "partners for peace" be allowed full membership in NATO? If so, how quickly should this happen?
- Will the NATO charter be rewritten to make it a collective security arrangement rather than a defensive alliance?
- Should the CSCE, NATO and the WEU be perceived as competing security frameworks in Europe? Or, will proponents of each push for cooperative efforts and a coordinated regime?

Economics

- Should the EU preserve its status as a "western European" institution and continue down the path of tighter integration? Or, should it become a European-wide organization, broadening its membership to include eastern and East-Central European states?
- If further membership expansion takes place, should the applications of post-communist countries be given preferential status over the "stalled" applications of states such as Turkey, Cyprus, and Malta?
- Is it realistic to continue talking about unified EU political, economic and security policies? How much of a factor is "sub-regionalization" in contemporary Europe?

What steps can post-communist countries take to improve their external trade?

- Should the countries of eastern and East-Central Europe receive more economic support from the countries of western Europe? If so, what sorts of aid should be offered?

Ethnicity and Nationalism

- To what extent can governments protect members of their dominant ethnic groups, who form minority groups in other countries?
- How can constitutions be written and political rights established in a way that does not allow majority populations to subvert the rights of minorities, while still protecting democracy?
- How can rights to self-determination be balanced against the maintenance of the integrity of a state?
- Can the EU develop a common immigration policy? If so, will there be "privileged" groups of refugees?
- Should the immigration status of political and economic refugees be considered separately? Can they be separated?

Environment

- What strategies can the countries of eastern, East-Central and western Europe follow to address environmental concerns?
- Should adherence to certain environmental standards be considered a condition of participation in international groups, such as the EU?
- Should the West assist the East in improving its environmental conditions? What kinds of support should be offered?
- What rights should countries that are subject to cross-border pollution have?
- What should be the relationship between national environmental policy, and mutually recognized (i.e., international) standards?

GLOSSARY

AUSTERITY MEASURES: Reduced government spending. In order to stabilize their economies, many governments are being told by the **IMF**, **World Bank**, and other lenders that they must reduce deficit spending. Austerity measures result in less government spending for health, education and infrastructure.

BIO-DIVERSITY: The earth's vast array of plant and animal species. Many of the existing plant and animal species have yet to be fully studied and some scientists project that existing species may hold untapped medical and scientific potential. Industrialization and deforestation currently result in the loss and extinction of plant and animal species.

BRADY PLAN: A debt restructuring plan proposed by former U.S. Secretary of the Treasury, Nicholas Brady, in 1989. The details of the Brady Plan are negotiated individually with each participating nation. However, the basic framework offers some debt forgiveness and interest rate reduction in exchange for economic reforms including austerity measures, trade liberalization, and privatization.

BRETTON WOODS: The international monetary system created in 1944 to stabilize international exchange rates and control international finances following World War II. The Bretton Woods system collapsed in 1971 when the United States abandoned the gold standard.

CARRYING CAPACITY: The ability of the earth or a specific area of the earth to maintain population and human activity.

CHEMICAL WEAPONS: Weapons of mass destruction that employ gaseous or vaporous chemicals to attack both military and civilian targets.

COMMONWEALTH OF INDEPENDENT STATES (CIS): A cooperative institution involving most of the republics of the former Soviet Union and concerning political, economic and security issues. The Baltic states are the most-notable non-members.

CONFERENCE ON SECURITY AND CONFIDENCE IN EUROPE (CSCE): A conference and subsequent set of agreements involving most European nations, Canada and the United States. Originally formed in 1976, CSCE has become a prominent mechanism for human rights enforcement and arms control negotiations.

CONVENTIONAL FORCES EUROPE AGREEMENT (CFE): A conventional arms control treaty reached between NATO and the Warsaw Treaty Organization prior to the collapse of the Soviet Union. The treaty is still in force and parties to it are obligated to reduce their conventional militaries in compliance with the treaty.

CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS: Weapons that do not employ chemical, biological, or nuclear means to destroy a target.

DEBT DEFAULT: Failure to make the required debt or interest payment without making arrangements with the lending government or institution.

DEBT RESTRUCTURING: Various proposals for relieving the debt burden of highly indebted nations. Many governments are unable to service their debts incurred by loans from both foreign governments and private financial institutions. Debt restructuring could involve complete or partial debt forgiveness, temporary or permanent debt moratorium, interest rate reduction, and term extensions.

DEBT SERVICING: Payment of the basic installments as due on the loans. Without the ability to service the existing debt, many nations find that they are unable to secure additional loans. Debt servicing is not debt payment, and the debt continues to mount as unpaid interest is added to the original principal.

EUROPEAN CURRENCY UNIT (ECU): The single EU currency proposed under the Maastricht treaty.

EUROPEAN ECONOMIC AREA (EAA): The world's largest regional trade zone, formed in 1994 by merging the European Union and the European Free Trade Association. Membership in the EEA does not automatically result in membership in the EU.

EUROPEAN FREE TRADE ASSOCIATION (EFTA): A regional free trade zone including many non-EU nations in Europe.

EXCHANGE RATE MECHANISM (ERM): Europe's system to stabilize currency values by linking the value of all EU member currencies to the German Deutschmark (DM). The permitted fluctuation from the DM was widened in August 1993 to give EU members more freedom to adjust economic policies.

FREE TRADE ZONE: An agreement between two or more nations to eliminate tariffs and other trade barriers.

HARD CURRENCY: An internationally accepted means of exchange. Hard currencies are currently considered to be the U.S. dollar, Japanese yen, and German Deutschmark. Since most international obligations must be paid in hard currency, it is very important to have enough exports, which earn hard currency, to be able to meet foreign obligations.

INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND (IMF): An independent international organization created in 1945 as a result of the Bretton Woods conference. The IMF has as its chief purpose the maintenance of international monetary stability. The IMF also provides loans to countries for currency stabilization and other macro-economic policies.

MAASTRICHT TREATY: The EU treaty adopted in 1993 that outlines plans for a single currency, coordinated social policy and coordinated foreign policy.

NON-TARIFF BARRIER TO TRADE: Regulations or requirements designed to meet non-trade related goals, but which limit or restrict imports.

NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL (NAC): The political governing body of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION (NATO): A 16 member collective defense organization established in 1949 to protect Western Europe.

PRIVATIZATION: The process of selling government owned enterprises to private companies and investors.

PROTECTIONISM: A policy designed to shield the local economy from outside competition through high tariffs, subsidies, or non-tariff barriers.

TRADE LIBERALIZATION: The reduction of protectionist barriers to trade so that foreign competition in the domestic market increases and foreign investments are made in the domestic economy.

UNITED NATIONS PROTECTIVE FORCE (UNPROFOR): United Nations humanitarian and peacekeeping mission to Bosnia-Herzegovina.

WISEGARD ACCORDS: A series of agreements pertaining the economic, political, and security matters signed by the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia after the collapse of the Soviet Union and Warsaw Treaty Organization.

WARSAW TREATY ORGANIZATION (WTO): The Soviet-dominated alliance that served as the counterpart to NATO. Formed in 1953 as a response to NATO and the rearmament of Germany, the WTO ceased to exist after the collapse of the Soviet Union.

WESTERN EUROPEAN UNION (WEU): The European defense and peacekeeping structure, formed in 1954.

WORLD BANK: Created as a sister organization to the International Monetary Fund as a result of the Bretton Woods conference. Its purpose is to lend funds at commercial rates for micro-economic projects and to provide technical assistance for economic development. Officially called the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development.

APPENDIX H

Activity Report

Name: _____

Date: _____

Sub-group: _____

What particular topics did you research in the last two weeks?

What are the most important findings that you uncovered from this research? (be as specific as you can)

What other activities did you perform during the past two weeks?
(for example, review of the scenario/background document, out-of-class meetings with a sub-group, messages read/sent, etc.)
(be as specific as you can)

Peer Evaluation

Your Name: _____

Date: _____

Sub-group: _____

Please evaluate the work performance of the other members of your sub-group. Considering the amount of work that **you** expected them to complete over the past two weeks, did they do . . .

Names of your sub-group members:	more than expected	as you expected	less than expected
_____[][][]
_____[][][]
_____[][][]
_____[][][]

In the space provided below, please evaluate the performance of the other sub-groups on your team. For each sub-group, consider their overall participation, their communication with your sub-group, amount and quality of messages sent/received, etc.

a) _____
sub-group name

b) _____
sub-group name

c) _____
sub-group name

In the following space, please feel free to provide any comments regarding the participation of your team or sub-group members. You may also comment on any other aspect of the group project. This question is optional.

APPENDIX I




Figure 1
Early Semester Map
Student on Bulgarian Team—Male
110273M




Figure 2
Late Semester Map
Student on Bulgarian Team—Male
110273M




Figure 3
 Early Semester Map
 Student on Bulgarian Team—Male
 092670J




Figure 4
Late Semester Map
Student on Bulgarian Team—Male
092670J




Figure 5
Early Semester Map
Student on French Team—Female
061673K




Figure 6
Late Semester Map
Student on French Team—Female
061673K

APPENDIX J

Feedback to FIPSE

1. What forms of assistance from FIPSE were most helpful to you? How can FIPSE more effectively work with projects?

Site visits from both Sandra Newkirk, our Program Officer, and Charles Karelis, FIPSE Director, were very helpful to us because they asked us questions we had not considered and pointed to similarities between our work and that of other funded projects. The yearly Director's Meetings were also a good opportunity to learn from other projects' experiences and to reflect on our own. The publication "Lessons Learned" was another valuable resource.

2. What should the FIPSE staff consider in reviewing future proposals in your area of interest? What are emerging new directions? What are key considerations?

There has been a virtual explosion of interest in multimedia learning devices over the past several years. There appears to be a scramble on the part of institutions of all kinds to come up with ways to integrate technology into the classroom. At this juncture, however, we remain one of the few organizations in higher education that has a proven learning program design to utilize the possibilities that the Internet, among other information technologies, presents. Projects that are in a hurry to jump into this "market" sometimes fail to identify their pedagogical goals or to survey in depth the content with which they hope students will grapple. They sometimes attempt to use familiarity with technology as an end in itself. Technology that facilitates collaboration is currently of much interest. Projects, such as this, that can suggest meaningful uses for it special warrant attention. Another key consideration is the evaluation of projects. The use of multiple methods and continuous assessment has been invaluable to us.

APPENDIX K

LESSONS LEARNED

THE INTERNATIONAL NEGOTIATION SEMINARS PROJECT PROJECT ICONS THE UNIVERSITY OF MARYLAND, COLLEGE PARK

Purpose of Project

The aim of this FIPSE-funded initiative was to bring a meaningful learning experience to as many lower-division students as possible by combining the "large lecture" university class with a small group seminar, organized around an ICONS computer-assisted simulation. Students worked collaboratively on "country-teams," cast in the role of international negotiators. The "New Europe" simulation featured the participation of university students in Bulgaria, Finland, Hungary, Poland, and Russia. In addition to refocusing the place of ICONS on the University of Maryland campus, the initiative provided for expansion of the model to other campuses in Maryland and the United States at-large.

Innovative Features

An authentic distance learning component was a central feature of this project, as American students negotiated with peers in post-communist Europe. On the University of Maryland campus, a large-lecture class was transformed to include a small-group seminar experience. This was done by utilizing the weekly discussion sections, that usually accompany such courses, as "country team meetings." Senior faculty and interdisciplinary teaching assistants were recruited to work with the students on negotiation issues, including: European environmental problems, ethnic tensions, regional economics, and security concerns.

The students worked together on a group research project and to formulate policies for the country they were portraying. Educational technology, including Internet-based research and communications, supported the learning process.

Evaluation

Using evaluative techniques such as a recently-developed on-line (pre- and post-test) questionnaire, cognitive mapping schemes, and think-aloud problem-solving techniques, assessments showed that participants' understanding of the complexity of international issues increased as a result of participation. Post-simulation "maps" showed not only a greater fact base, but also an enhanced understanding of the possible options and alignments of players in the international system. There was also evidence of increased sensitivity to cultural and linguistic perspectives that nations bring to negotiation situations. The simulation process keeps students involved in a cycle of thinking, revising, and explaining that carries over from the within-team dialogue to the between-team negotiations.

Impact

Over 400 students on the College Park campus, a majority of whom were lower-division undergraduates, participated in the program, as did students at fourteen other campuses in the United States and Europe. A new course was set up to house the project, Introduction to International Negotiation meets diversity and social science requirements on the University of Maryland campus and, as such, attracts students from a wide variety of majors. In 1994, the Negotiation Seminars Project won the Maryland Association of Higher Education Award for innovation in instruction. Internet-based resources were set up to facilitate research on developments and trends in post-communist Europe. Using the New Europe Simulation as the prototype, ICONS is developing a series of case-based simulations which focus on specific geographic regions and issues.

What Activities Worked Unexpectedly?

The ability of American students to keep up in negotiations *on* Europe with peers *from* Europe was a pleasant surprise. The use of case studies in the International Negotiation course contributed significantly to the knowledge base which these students brought to the talks. The willingness of the students to work in groups and to accept grades based on that group work, previously a sticking point for ICONS courses, was facilitated by the introduction of a formal, anonymous, written peer review process.

What Activities Didn't Work?

Students in the negotiation course did not initially respond well to interdisciplinary guest lectures. They viewed these sessions as opportunities for unscheduled "holidays." The response was much more positive when we brought the "guest lecturers" into working group situations and had them work on an informal, advisory capacity with the students. Similarly, the role of the teaching assistants from other disciplines had to be refined to deal with their low comfort level with theoretical political science material that was being presented in the lecture portion of the course. Defining the role of these TAs as "group facilitators" proved to be a more effective model.

What Do You Have to Send Others? How Do They Get It?

Sample scenarios and information on simulation participation can be obtained by accessing the ICONS WorldWide Web page at: <http://www.bsos.umd.edu/icons/icons.html>. The current cost for institutional participation in ICONS university-level exercises is \$500.00 for "global," five-week simulations and \$300.00 for case-based, three-week simulations. It is possible that in the future the cost of participation will be passed on to the individual student through the sale of a multimedia workbook that will include registration for a simulation exercise. Information on ICONS can be obtained by writing to:

Brigid Starkey, Project ICONS
Department of Government and Politics/Tydings Hall
University of Maryland, College Park, MD 20742
301-405-7857
e-mail: bstarkey@bss2.umd.edu

Products

Published articles on the project are listed below:

Brigid Starkey. Spring 1994. "Negotiation Training Through Simulation: The ICONS International Negotiation Seminars," Educator's Tech Exchange.

Brigid Starkey and Jonathan Wilkenfeld. Fall 1995. "Project ICONS International Negotiation Seminars Project: Teaching with Technology," Maryland Association of Higher Education Journal.

Brigid Starkey and Jonathan Wilkenfeld. (forthcoming Winter 1996). "Project ICONS: Computer-Assisted Negotiations for the IR Classroom," International Studies Notes.

What Has Happened to the Program Since the Grant Ended?

The Introduction to International Negotiation course continues to be offered every semester at the University of Maryland. A modified version of the New Europe Simulation also continues to be offered, as do other case-based simulation exercises with other regional/issue foci. ICONS is working on new initiatives that target community college and minority populations of students.

BEST COPY AVAILABLE



U.S. DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION
Office of Educational Research and Improvement (OERI)
Educational Resources Information Center (ERIC)



NOTICE

REPRODUCTION BASIS

This document is covered by a signed "Reproduction Release (Blanket)" form (on file within the ERIC system), encompassing all or classes of documents from its source organization and, therefore, does not require a "Specific Document" Release form.

This document is Federally-funded, or carries its own permission to reproduce, or is otherwise in the public domain and, therefore, may be reproduced by ERIC without a signed Reproduction Release form (either "Specific Document" or "Blanket").

<u>ACCNO</u>	ED364473	
<u>CHNO</u>	SO023542	
<u>PDATE</u>	93	
<u>ISSUE</u>	RIEAPR1994	
<u>LEVEL</u>	1	
<u>PAGE</u>	27	
<u>AUTH</u>	Vavrina, Vernon J.	
<u>TITLE</u>	A Practical Guide to Using ICONS (International Communication and Negotiation Simulations).	
<u>PTYPE</u>	150	
<u>PTYPE</u>	141	
<u>MF</u>	01	
<u>PC</u>	02	
<u>LANG</u>	English	
<u>GEO</u>	U.S.	
<u>REG</u>	New York	
<u>NOTE</u>	27p.; Paper presented at American Political Science Association meeting (September 2-5, 1993). International Relations Political Science Role Playing Simulation Decision Making Higher Education Policy Formation Position Papers Problem Solving Public Policy ICONS (Simulation) University of Maryland College Park	; of the Washington, DC,
<u>DEMAJ</u>		
<u>DEMAJ</u>		
<u>DEMAJ</u>		
<u>DEMAJ</u>		
<u>DEMIN</u>		
<u>DEMIN</u>		
<u>DEMIN</u>		
<u>DEMIN</u>		
<u>DEMIN</u>		
<u>DEMIN</u>		
<u>DEMIN</u>		
<u>DEMIN</u>		
<u>IDMAJ</u>		
<u>IDMIN</u>		
<u>ABST</u>	The appallingly inadequate knowledge of current and international affairs among U.S. college students is well documented. ICONS, the International Communication and Negotiation Simulations program, offers an encouraging initiative for addressing the problem. ICONS is a "model United Nations" that the staff of the University of Maryland at College Park administers. Students from participating schools play the roles of decision makers of assigned countries as they negotiate a host of international issues. The schools generally get students involved through a course such as comparative foreign policy, a single-nation policy course, or international politics. Phase one, lasting 6 weeks, begins with the instructor offering students a pre-simulation questionnaire. Students then work to develop bibliographic and other library skills. At some schools, political science and foreign language students may work together, which makes the simulation more realistic. The first phase also includes a case study of one nation's foreign policy and an analysis of a detailed international scenario. The next step is the preparation of a class position paper on the scenario. In phase two the students communicate with peers around the country and world via regular mail and real time on-line conferencing through POLNET II. Phase three encompasses a debriefing of the students to determine what they have learned, a post-simulation questionnaire	

*Related
Doc*

and course evaluation, testing, and grading. The exercise requires hard work and commitment on the part of instructor and students alike, but it also can be fun for all participants. (SG)
ERIC |D 1994 03 28 |T 00:00

UPDAT

End of report