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ABSTRACT

This paper presents three case studies of presidential leadership at universities in Georgia, focusing on the difficulties of presidential searches and the importance of finding the right person for the position. The presidency of John Patrick Crecine (1987-1994) at the Georgia Institute of Technology was controversial from the start, in that Crecine had a vision for the school that were not shared by many constituencies. The presidency of John Michael Palms (1989-91) at Georgia State University (GSU) was at a disadvantage due to the fact that his predecessor served for over 30 years as head of the institution. Necessary reorganizations and staff changes, along with Palms' emphasis on the research potential of GSU, created an increasingly frustrating situation that led to his resignation. The selection of Charles B. Knapp as president of the University of Georgia (1987-1997) was made without the full participation of the faculty and without a visit on his part to the campus. However, Knapp was able to overcome questions about his selection by choosing competent administrators, expanding the campus, and leading successful fundraising drives. The paper concludes that presidential selections, especially at public institutions, need to focus on goodness of fit. (MDM)

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PRESIDENTIAL LEADERSHIP AND INSTITUTIONAL MISSION

by
Cameron Fincher

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This paper is an extensive revision of an earlier paper prepared for the 16th Annual EAIR Forum in Amsterdam on August 21-24, 1994. In revising the paper for publication, the author would like to express his appreciation to Dr. Larry G. Jones who, as on two other occasions, presented the original paper in the author's absence.

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PRESIDENTIAL LEADERSHIP AND INSTITUTIONAL MISSION

The appointment of a new president has become a periodic crisis in American colleges and universities. Vacancies are created, on the average, every six or seven years and set in motion an elongated process of recruitment, selection, and appointment that ranges from six months or less to eighteen months or more.

If, during the process, the respective missions, roles, and commitments of institutions are reviewed, institutional leaders will re-discover many challenges to institutional autonomy and independence. As a result, vice presidents and deans may cope with problems they have not encountered previously and for which they will not find immediate solutions. At the same time, they may be distracted by many conflicting signals and confusing messages from state and society. Search, screening, or selection committees will be appointed and uncounted hours will be consumed by procedures requiring a great deal of on-task learning. All such efforts will be predicated — directly or indirectly — on beliefs, opinions, and expectations concerning institutional status, prestige, and functions.

On the premises that: (1) universities in search of new presidents have much to learn from each other; (2) leadership is the most challenging problem with which most universities are confronted; and (3) institutions must accept more responsibility for the recruitment, selection, appointment, and performance of administrative leaders,¹ this paper presents three case studies of presidential leadership. In each case the choice of a new president involved criteria that were less-than-explicit, if not unclear.

Each case study is informative in the sense that each demonstrates the difficulties of presidential searches, as they are currently conducted in many American universities. Collectively the three case studies underscore institutional mission and traditions as crucial variables in presidential appointments, and they direct attention to the presence or absence of personal and situational characteristics that may undermine the best of presidential intentions. As a group, the case studies are especially relevant because:

(1) the three presidents were chosen by the same governing board, but in a different manner, (2) all three appointments were made within the span of two years, (3) the three institutions are located in (or near) a major metropolitan area, and (4) the three institutions have complementary missions that were not fully considered in the choice of their respective presidents. An additional benefit derives from the passage of sufficient time to assess or evaluate presidential performance, effectiveness, *and* the relative influence of personal qualities frequently associated with effective leadership.

In several ways, the three institutions are ideal subjects for a study of institutional missions and presidential leadership. All three are funded as universities in a statewide system of public higher education that also includes four-year colleges and two-year colleges. Institutional missions have been determined, therefore, by their historical development over a period of time — and by their cumulative experience in serving the different educational needs and interests of their respective constituencies.

The institutions discussed in this paper are:

Georgia Institute of Technology: a highly regarded research university, traditionally known for its excellent engineering programs, its football teams, and its college song, "Rambling Wreck." Located centrally in Atlanta, Georgia Tech has long had national visibility as a technological university even though "university" is not part of its title. John Patrick Crecine (JPC) was appointed president in 1987 and resigned in 1994.

Georgia State University: a large urban university located in the heart of Atlanta near Georgia Tech. The institution has evolved rapidly from an evening college (that first offered accounting courses to engineering students at Georgia Tech) and is nationally known for its programs in actuarial science, insurance, finance, and for its economic forecasting services. John Michael Palms (JMP) was appointed in 1989 and resigned in 1991 to accept the presidency of the University of South Carolina.

University of Georgia: the nation's oldest state chartered university (1785), a premier landgrant and seagrant institution with a pronounced (but balanced) commitment to research, public service, and teaching. Traditionally known as an institution where football and fraternities reign supreme. Charles B. Knapp (CBK) was appointed president in 1987 and continues as president until June 1997 when he becomes president of the Aspen Institute.

COMMON CHARACTERISTICS

The three universities, despite their different missions, have much in common. All three are governed by a Constitutional Board of Regents, with 16 members, having sole authority for the "government, control, and management" of 34 institutions of public higher education in the State of Georgia. Members of the Board of Regents are private citizens appointed to seven-year terms by the Governor. The terms of individual members are staggered as one means of protecting the Board from political interference. Each year the Board of Regents receives (in one lump sum) state allocations to public higher education and distributes to the separate 34 institutions their budgeted funds for institutional programs and operations. In addition, the Board appoints all presidents and approve the appointment of all other administrative officials and faculty. The Chancellor of the University System of Georgia serves as chief-executive-officer and at the pleasure of the Board of Regents. The total enrollment of the University System is over 200,000 students annually.²

As units of the University System of Georgia, the three institutions have made remarkable progress over the past forty years. Each has benefitted greatly from the economic, technological, and cultural growth of the State of Georgia since World War II. Georgia is now the tenth largest state in population, and its projected growth implies that it will become the nation's ninth largest state in the early years of the 21st century. Georgia Tech and Georgia State are centrally located in Atlanta, and the University of Georgia is a mere 65 miles to the east. Student headcounts at the three institutions (in 1994) were 12,901 (GT), 23,776 (GS), and 29,469 (UGA).

PRESIDENTIAL PROFILES

The three presidents have much in common. Each has sound academic credentials, appreciable administrative experience prior to his appointment, and each came from a reputable private institution where his highest level of authority could be identified as "second-in-command." In that capacity each served under a president who was recognized for his institutional leadership.³

None of the three, however, was an internal candidate; within the University System of Georgia, the exclusion of internal candidates has been a pattern of practice, if not implicit policy. Even though presidents do not hold tenure in their offices and serve on annual appointments at the pleasure of the Board of Regents, the departure of presidents is often shrouded in controversy and the appointment of new presidents is often regarded as a means of reducing institutional conflict. For unknown reasons, an institution engaged in a presidential search is assumed to be divided into warring factions — and to avoid offense to any one group of campus constituents, there is a tendency to "go outside the System" and avoid the risk of internal candidacies.

GEORGIA INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY

The presidency of John Patrick Crecine at Georgia Tech was controversial from the beginning. A political scientist who received his B.S., M.S., and Ph.D. degrees from Carnegie-Mellon where he served as senior vice president for academic affairs and provost, Crecine disclosed in his inaugural address plans and expectations that were not shared by many of Georgia Tech's constituencies.⁴ His expertise in computer simulation and his publications in public policy and program development were not sufficient to convince Georgia Tech faculty and students that their institution was in need of radical restructuring. He was criticized severely for his proposed reorganization of the College of Sciences and Liberal Studies, the manner in which the proposal was developed and presented, and his apparent disregard for the preferences (and teaching interests) of the Georgia Tech faculty.

His "personal agenda" for the institution did not come through as a "vision" of promising opportunities but as the preferences of a determined administrator. In dealing with the faculty of the School

of Industrial Management, he castigated their courses and programs as unchallenging and out of tune with the times. In particular, his planning process was regarded as hasty, poorly organized, and lacking adequate representation of faculty members affected by changes in academic programs. His management style, as experienced by those with whom he disagreed, was vindictive and autocratic. When a swimming coach complained about the president serving alcohol (in his home) to underaged members of the swimming team, the coach allegedly was relieved of his duties. When a director of continuing education was accused (by his associates) of using office and phone facilities for his private consulting firm, the associates were relieved of their responsibilities. By bringing a \$38 million law suit against the institution, the dismissed staff members received \$340,000 to settle out of court.

Although Crecine named his restructured College of Management, Policy, and International Affairs after an alumnus and highly regarded (former) mayor of Atlanta, his indifference to faculty concerns and institutional traditions is evident in statements to the press and his efforts to communicate with irate faculty members. Those who defend his administration give Crecine too much credit for the work of his predecessor. They point to higher SAT scores and increases in the number of merit scholars as if such indices of academic excellence were the direct outcome of presidential initiative. They are unaware that prior to Crecine's appointment, Georgia Tech had already achieved what one scholar regards as "a highly specialized niche in higher education — a Southern, public, non-landgrant engineering school" that ranked quite favorably among the nation's major research universities.⁵

To some observers, Crecine's major mistake at Georgia Tech was his misconceptions of the institution — and the statewide system of public higher education in Georgia. To others, he was not well informed on matters pertaining to Regents policies and state laws, and his appreciation of Georgia Tech's distinctive characteristics were often in question.⁶ He has been praised for his participation in the City of Atlanta's attraction of the 1996 Olympics, but there is conflicting evidence of high regard for his presidency within the Atlanta community. Georgia Tech and the City of Atlanta have enjoyed close ties for well over 100 years, and at this time, it is

difficult to assess how his presidency helped or harmed community ties. Like Georgia Tech's national championship in football, many good things that happen to institutions are not attributable to presidential leadership.

Governing Board reactions to Crecine's presidency are inferable from the appointment of his successor. Dr. Gerald Wayne Clough is a native Georgian and a graduate of Georgia Tech; his field of specialization is civil engineering, and his Ph.D. was earned from the University of California at Berkeley (a preeminent public research university). He has served as dean of engineering at Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University and as provost at the University of Washington (public universities that are highly regarded). On the "theory" that governing boards often seek to correct their mistakes on the "next go-round," the choice of Dr. Clough tells a great deal about the mistakes they would like to avoid.

GEORGIA STATE UNIVERSITY

The presidency of John Michael Palms at Georgia State is much too brief to evaluate its effectiveness. The oldest of the three presidents considered here, President Palms also has the advantage of distinctive academic credentials, military service as an officer in the U.S. Air Force, and professional experience as vice president for academic affairs and a chaired professorship at Emory University (also located in Atlanta). His membership on several civic, corporate, and professional boards implies active involvement in the Atlanta community and an appreciable amount of national or regional visibility.

His major disadvantage, however, may have been the nature and the quality of his professional and academic background. At the time of his appointment, he was a chaired professor of nuclear, radiation, and environmental physics at Emory University. A native of the Netherlands who became a naturalized citizen in 1956, he is a graduate of a well known military school (The Citadel), Emory University (M.S.) and the University of New Mexico (Ph.D.). Questions about his appointment, therefore, must address his reasons for seeking and accepting the presidency of Georgia State University — as well as the Regents' reasons for appointing him. There is much about his credentials to suggest that he was "the candidate who got away" in the presidential search at Georgia Tech

when Dr. Crecine was appointed. Palms was also a candidate at the University of Georgia and may well have been a more suitable choice there than at GSU.

President Palms also had the disadvantage of following an administration that began in 1957. Over that thirty-two year stretch Georgia State had outgrown its status as the Atlanta Division of the University of Georgia, and its previous reputation as an evening college, to become a nationally recognized urban university located in the heart of the South's most visible metropolitan area. When the president of thirty years stepped down, he was replaced by an executive vice president (as interim president) who had been at Georgia State even longer. Among the new president's duties were the reorganization of the administrative structure, the prompting of several key retirements, and the appointment of several new vice presidents and academic deans. Given the longevity of predecessors in several positions, it would have been impossible to make wise and popular choices for each vacancy.

Among his early mistakes as a president, Palms spoke optimistically of Georgia State's potential as a research university and raised many questions about his knowledge of the institution and its history. Like Crecine at Georgia Tech, the new president of Georgia State was not thoroughly familiar with systemwide agreements that had been worked out over a period of years. Although Georgia State had a strong college of arts and science and several professional schools, it was still perceived primarily as an urban university with commuting, part-time students and not as a university in which research was striving for parity with instruction and public service.

Palms' resignation to accept the presidency of the University of South Carolina was a shock to many of his supporters within the institution. Rumors that he was to receive the appointment were denied by "sources close to the president," and the news media raised nettlesome questions about his candidacy at another institution so soon after accepting the presidency at Georgia State. Probing for newsworthy scandals, the news media called attention to the exorbitant expenses of renovating the president's home for purposes of entertaining prospective donors. Despite the Vice President for Business and Finance's commendable willingness to accept responsibility (it was his duty to review all charges and the

payment of all bills), the news media continued to operate on the principle that "when the president leaves suddenly, scandal is the cause." Thus, they continued to publicize renovation expenses that exceeded \$560,000 on a house valued at 1.4 million dollars.

In retrospect, President Palms' reasons for leaving were evident. Not only did South Carolina provide a presidency more in keeping with his presidential aspirations, but it was obvious that his presidency at Georgia State would be increasingly frustrating. The prompting of retirements seldom wins friends for a new president, and Georgia State's mission was no easier to restructure than that of Georgia Tech. And surely, President Palms would have received signals that Georgia State was not in an enviable position to compete with Georgia Tech, the University of Georgia, the Medical College of Georgia, and Emory University for research funds.

The good fortune of Palms' appointment at South Carolina is accentuated by its consequences. His current presidency is far more effective than it would have been at Georgia State. His departure permitted the Regents to appoint the president they should have appointed in the first place. In the interim, Georgia State benefitted from an acting president with whom virtually everyone was quite pleased.

Palms' successor at Georgia State, Carl Vernon Patton, has a professional and academic background that includes unique qualifications for the presidency of a major urban university. These include education, training, and experience in regional and urban planning, degrees in public administration and public policy, active participation in professional societies related to urban planning, and previous consulting work with civic leaders and city officials in Atlanta. On the academic career ladder, he has risen from instructor to full professor, from department head to dean of a School of Architecture and Urban Planning in Wisconsin, and from there to vice president for academic affairs at the University of Toledo. At a time when several pieces of valuable real estate (in downtown Atlanta) were offered to Georgia State for institutional uses, President Patton was the right person in the right presidency to receive such gifts and to put them to educational uses benefiting the Atlanta community.

Patton's appointment as Palms' successor is also indicative that when given a second chance, governing boards will often make a

better choice. Patton was indeed a candidate for the presidency of Georgia State at the time that Palms was appointed. Given the turn of events since Palms' appointment, it is perhaps fortunate that both he and Patton were appointed.

THE UNIVERSITY OF GEORGIA

The presidency of Charles B. Knapp followed the resignation of a president who had served nineteen years.⁷ Fortunately for the University of Georgia and its constituencies, an interim president (with presidential experience at three other institutions) was able to resolve several organizational problems and to restore faculty morale prior to the arrival of a new president in 1987. Had the interim president been less successful in solving administrative problems, the early years of Knapp's presidency would have been far more difficult.

Much to the dismay of faculty, students, and alumni, Knapp's appointment was made without full participation by a faculty search committee and without a visit to the University of Georgia campus. In the opinion of some observers, the appointment was made hastily because the Regent serving as chairman was a lame-duck member of the Board (his term of office had expired, and he was serving until replaced or reappointed by the Governor). Knapp's acceptance of the presidency without ever having been on campus was a shock to faculty members with ingrained suspicions of presidential power.⁸

As president of a major research university, Knapp could and did make mistakes. He reputedly brought his own secretary from Tulane University where he had served as executive vice president, and he replaced a popular and highly effective vice president for development with a personal friend whose qualifications were questioned by faculty critics. He recovered from these and other mistakes by fostering the recruitment of minority faculty members and by creating a vice presidency for legal and minority affairs. His choice of candidates for the latter was well received, and his appointment (upon the resignation of his first appointee) of a new vice president for development with substantial academic credentials convinced faculty skeptics that he was quite capable of learning from experience. Like Palms at Georgia State, Knapp became a candidate for a more prestigious presidency too soon after his inauguration at UGA. Withdrawing his candidacy at the

10 / Conclusions and Implications

last moment, he has maintained a lower profile on controversial matters and served much more effectively as a spokesman of the University of Georgia in educational matters.

To understand Knapp's presidency at UGA, notice must be taken of his immediate predecessor Henry King Stanford who did indeed resolve difficult administrative, organizational, and governance problems prior to Knapp's appointment. Stanford also left in place a strong tier of vice presidents with an appropriate and highly functional division of administrative responsibility. Vice presidents for academic affairs, research, and public service administer the majority of institutional (and governing board) policies pertaining to instruction, research, and service (the three major functions of the university itself). Vice presidents for business and finance and for student affairs administer policies pertaining to university personnel and programs and to student activities. By the addition of a vice president for legal and minority affairs, Knapp strengthened his administrative corps and re-affirmed institutional commitments to under-represented constituencies.

In 1997 his presidency must be regarded as quite successful. With the election of a new Governor, significant changes in the state funding climate, and a highly effective fundraising drive, his presidency can take credit for almost \$400 million in capital funds — and an extension of the UGA campus that includes a remarkable physical activities center, a performing arts center, and new buildings for the School of Music and the Georgia Museum of Art. His resignation, after serving as UGA president for ten years, was a surprise to faculty and alumni, but the prestige of his new position and his timing in resigning at the peak of his presidency was fully appreciated.

CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS

From the experiences of Georgia Tech, Georgia State, and the University of Georgia there is much to be learned. In each case a new presidency either began in controversy or ran the risk of later difficulties. In each case no serious questions were raised about the administrative experience of the chosen candidate, but there should have been reservations about the suitability of each president for his particular institution. From the perspective of a statewide system of

public higher education, unexpected appointments had been made in three key positions of institutional leadership, and questions should have been raised about governing board policies and practices in the selection of presidents.

Given the three institutions with their different missions and a common governing board, the mismatch between individuals and institutions is *not* easy to explain. Several tentative explanations may be offered:

1. In its searches the governing board was more concerned with administrative competence than with effective leadership. In other words, the search committees may have employed "the wrong model." In seeking chief-executive-officers, search committees would have placed a considerable premium on administrative experience at previous institutions, and each candidate would have been perceived as a logical choice. Crecine, Palms, and Knapp evidently had served well in administrative posts at their previous institutions, and each came to his respective presidency with strong recommendations. Crecine, in particular, was criticized for his management style — and not for his management ability. There are many reasons to believe, however, that Georgia Tech, Georgia State, and the University of Georgia did not need competent administration as much as they needed institutional leadership.
2. In the appointment process, inadequate attention was given to institutional mission and the particular needs of each institution. From a systemwide perspective, the institutional missions of the University of Georgia (as a landgrant, seagrant, capstone, public research university), Georgia Tech (as a technological, engineering-based, research university), and Georgia State (as a business-oriented, urban, comprehensive university) were well established. The complementary features of their respective missions are underscored by the presence of a fourth university, the Medical College of Georgia in Augusta. In other words, the missions of four universities were decided some years ago, and their

respective sizes (in resources, faculties, and enrolled students) were not conducive to extensive reorganization of institutional purposes, programs, personnel, and services without affecting the overall structure and functions of the University System.

3. In all three appointments there was a pervasive lack of experience (in selecting university presidents) on the part of the governing board, search committees, faculties, and administrative staffs.⁹ Quite often the participants in search, screening, and selection procedures are not as well informed about their respective institutions as they believe themselves to be. Institutional missions, traditions, reputations (and related issues, objectives, and needs) are taken for granted and never seriously questioned. In each case alumni, faculty, and students were invited to submit nominations, but their views, opinions, and beliefs about their institution were not considered. More often than not, the limited contacts between institutions and members of their governing boards preclude any in-depth knowledge of faculties, programs, students, and services.
4. Each of the presidents was a strong candidate chosen for unstated reasons. Within the constituencies of relatively large, multi-purpose institutions, there are idealistic conceptions of the university presidency, as well as many unrealistic expectations concerning institutional change. The discrepancy between what a new president can do and what he or she is expected to do — is often enormous. In similar manner, presidential candidates are often encumbered with personal agendas and the advancement of their professional careers. Bright, ambitious, and energetic candidates can be individuals with mistaken beliefs and opinions; in turn, they can seek an institutional presidency with inadequate knowledge and experience. Compounding these difficulties was a Board practice of recruiting the “second-in-command” at other institutions. In the opinion of some critics, the assumptions underlying this practice have never been critically reviewed.

5. The subcommittees of the governing board were unduly hasty in making their recommendations. If so, the subcommittees must share the blame for the troubled administration of JPC and the short tenure of JMP. Viewed from a distance, it is clear that mistakes were made in their appointments; neither candidate was well prepared to provide the kind of leadership each institution needed at the time of his appointment. Their professional backgrounds and interests were not as compatible with institutional needs as members of the search committee assumed. The difficulties of Crecine's presidency at Georgia Tech underscore, therefore, the good fortune in Palms' resignation at Georgia State. As a result, the governing board was lucky in two out of three of their appointments.

If we ask why this particular governing board did not give sufficient attention to institutional missions and needs, did not adequately explore the complementary needs of three institutions for which they were equally responsible, and did not seize the opportunity to recruit university presidents who were outstanding leaders in education, we mean them no disservice. It is altogether possible that they reflected the climate of public opinion that existed in the State of Georgia at that time. Most members of the Board were business or professional leaders serving at a time when public leadership was not highly visible. Gubernatorial leadership, in particular, was lacking and national leadership was educationally inept. If they believed themselves to be choosing a chief-executive-officer who could issue orders and have them carried out by dedicated subordinates, they were merely reflecting their views of corporate business. It is possible, nonetheless, that a mistake was made by using a private consulting firm experienced in searches for corporate executives.¹⁰ No one heeded the advice of a former chancellor that the best presidential candidate is a reluctant one.

And if the subcommittees were hesitant to throw open the doors to presidential search procedures, actively consult with university faculties, and solicit the opinions of students, they were probably wise in doing so. University faculties are notorious for "thinking otherwise," and they prove on many occasions that they do not debate intelligently the purposes and priorities of the university

they serve so well. And there is indeed an element of truth in the suspicion that the departure of a controversial president leaves a campus divided and demoralized. There is even more reason to believe that a wise choice of a university president cannot be made under the glaring lights of the news media.

AVOIDING THE MISTAKES OF THE PAST

Observers and critics have often noticed "a swinging pendulum" in presidential appointments. This is nothing less than a tendency to "do the opposite" on the second time around. Search committees can tacitly agree that they do not want to select presidents like their predecessors, and they may openly agree that "what we need this time is the exact opposite of what we had." A "swinging pendulum" can be seen in subsequent appointments at Georgia Tech and Georgia State. In both appointments there was better recognition of institutional mission, status, and commitments — and appreciable effort to regain institutional momentum.

In selecting presidents for Georgia Tech, Georgia State, and the University of Georgia the governing board was limited by policies and practices of the past. The prestige of Carnegie Mellon, Emory, and Tulane universities may have influenced unduly the governing board's choice of three candidates without extensive experience in public research universities. Experienced search committees would have been more aware of many differences (subtle and profound) between public and private institutions. Committee members may have inquired more diligently as to why JPC and JMP wanted to leave the institutions at which they previously served. In both cases each was leaving an institution that would be regarded by most of his colleagues as more prestigious than the institution to which he was moving.

To an appreciable extent, *no* unavoidable mistakes were made in the appointments of new presidents at Georgia Tech, Georgia State, and the University of Georgia. In all probability, the effects and outcomes would have been different if: (a) governing board policies and guidelines for presidential appointment had been more explicit; (b) more careful instructions (substantive and procedural) had been given to search committees; (c) more open thought and discussion had been given to institutional purposes, priorities, and

expectations; (d) recognition had been given to the distinction between institutional management and institutional leadership; and (e) more active participation by campus constituents had been possible. Thus, a statewide governing board (with the authority to appoint 34 presidents) has a special need for explicit and practical policies concerning the recruitment, selection, and appointment of presidents.

ENDNOTES

- 1 Cameron Fincher. "Cooperative Strategies in Administrative Leadership." (Paper presented at the 1992 EAIR Forum in Brussels, September 1992).
- 2 Cameron Fincher. *The Historical Development of the University System of Georgia: 1932-1990*. (Athens, GA: Institute of Higher Education, University of Georgia, 1991).
- 3 President Richard M. Cyert (Carnegie-Mellon) was well known for his campuswide innovations in computer science; Presidents James T. Laney (Emory) and Eamon Kelly (Tulane) were highly regarded for their personal influence and fundraising.
- 4 This and other observations of JPC's presidency have been drawn from newspapers and copies of inter-campus memoranda that were available to the author. *The Atlanta Constitution* and the *GIT Technique* have been major sources.
- 5 Roger L. Geiger, *Research and Relevant Knowledge: American Research Universities Since World War II*, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993):
- 6 See Robert C. McMath, Ronald H. Bayor, James E. Brittain, Lawrence Foster, August W. Giebelhaus, and Germaine M. Reed, *Engineering the New South: Georgia Tech, 1885-1985*. (Athens, GA: University of Georgia Press, 1985).

- 7 See Thomas G. Dyer, *The University of Georgia: A Bicentennial History, 1785-1985*, (Athens, GA: University of Georgia Press, 1985).
- 8 As a descendent of Seaman A. Knapp, a pioneer in agricultural research and the establishment of landgrant colleges, CBK was regarded as a remarkable choice by faculty members familiar with the landgrant movement in American higher education. Unfortunately, CBK's ancestry does not appear to be a deciding factor in his appointment.
- 9 There is an abundance of published research and professional assistance that is readily available to institutions seeking new presidents, but the use of such assistance within the University System of Georgia is unknown. Robert F. Carbone, *Presidential Passages*, (Washington, D.C.: American Council on Education, 1981); Joseph F. Kauffman, *At the Pleasure of the Board: The Service of the College and University President*, (Washington, D.C.: American Council on Education, 1980); and Clark Kerr and Marian L. Gade, *The Many Lives of Academic President: Time Place and Character*, (Washington, D.C.: Association of Governing Boards of Universities and Colleges, 1986) are three of the many sources that are available. More recently (1996), the Association of Governing Boards has issued a report entitled, *Renewing the Academic Presidency: Stronger Leadership for Tougher Times.*" This report follows four other reports: *Presidents Make a Difference* (1984), *Presidential Search* (1984), *Presidential Assessment* (1984), and *The Guardians: Boards of Trustees* (1989). All can be read with substantial benefit.
- 10 In view of later rulings concerning sunshine laws, the use of private consulting firms may be the only way to protect the privacy of candidates who would be interested in another presidency.

ADDENDUM ON PRESIDENTIAL PROFILES

GEORGIA INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY

JOHN PATRICK CRECINE (*48 years old when appointed*)

- born August 22, 1939
- all three degrees from Carnegie-Mellon; BS Industrial management (1961); MS (1963); PhD (1966)
- assistant professor of political science and sociology at Michigan
- economist at RAND Corp. 1967-1968; fellow at Center/Advance Studies Behavior Science 1973-1974
- professor of political economy at Carnegie-Mellon 1976-1987; Senior VP for Academic Affairs, provost 1983-1987
- president and professor/industrial systems engineering (and international affairs) Georgia Tech 1987
- commendable expertise in computer simulation, and development of programs in public policy
- Board of Directors/Atlanta Committee for Olympic Games 1990-
- but not an active participant in civic, cultural affairs (Atlanta or Georgia)

GERALD WAYNE CLOUGH (*53 years old when appointed*)

- born September 24, 1941
- BS in Civil Engineering (Georgia Institute of Technology, 1964); MSCE (Georgia Institute of Technology, 1965); PhD (University of California, Berkeley, 1969)
- associate professor to professor of civil engineering, Stanford University, 1974-1982
- professor of civil engineering, coordinator of geotechnical program, Virginia Polytechnical Institute and State University, 1982-1983
- professor of civil engineering, head of the department, 1983-1990
- dean of the college of engineering, 1990-1993
- provost-professor of civil engineering, University of Washington, Seattle, 1993-1994
- president of Georgia Tech, Atlanta, 1994-

GEORGIA STATE UNIVERSITY

JOHN MICHAEL PALMS (*54 years old when appointed*)

- born June 6, 1935 in The Netherlands (became a naturalized citizen in 1956)
- BS in physics (The Citadel, 1958); MS (Emory University, 1958); PhD (University of New Mexico, 1966)
- military service in USAF, rising to the rank of Captain, Reserve
- assistant to the professor and chair/department at Emory
- vice president for academic affairs, arts and sciences 1982-1988
- chaired professor (nuclear, radiation, and environmental physics) 1988-1990 before accepting presidency of Georgia State in 1989
- member of numerous boards (civic and professional, corporate business, governmental)
- was an applicant for presidencies at both University of Georgia and Georgia Tech (ties with Atlanta "communityPresidential power structure" suggests that he should have been an "ideal" candidate at Georgia Tech?)

CARL VERNON PATTON (*48 years old when appointed*)

- born October 22, 1944
- BS in Community Planning (University of Cincinnati, 1967); MS in Urban Planning (Illinois-Urbana, 1969); MS in Public Administration (Illinois-Urbana, 1970); MS in Public Policy (University of California-Berkeley, 1975); PhD Public Policy (1976)
- director, Bureau of Urban and Regional Planning Research 1977-1979
- professor, Chairman of department 1979-1983
- professor and dean, School Architecture and Urban Planning, Wisconsin-Milwaukee
- vice president of academic affairs, professor political science, geography and urban planning, University of Toledo, 1989-1992
- author of several scholarly books
- editor and member of editorial boards for several scholarly journals
- member of numerous boards (civic and professional, corporate, governmental)
- president of Georgia State University, 1992-

UNIVERSITY OF GEORGIA

CHARLES B. KNAPP *(40 years old when appointed)*

- born August 13, 1946
- BS (Iowa State, 1968) where great-great grandfather had been president; MA, PhD in economics (Wisconsin, 1972)
- assistant professor/research associate, Center for Study of Human Resources (University of Texas, 1972-1976)
- special assistant to the secretary of labor, Ray Marshall, in Carter administration 1977-1979; deputy assistant/secretary of labor 1979-1981
- associate professor, public policy/George Washington University 1981-1982
- associate professor, economics/Tulane University
- senior vice president 1982-1985; executive vice president 1985-1987
- not an "active joiner" of civic or professional associations
- given credit for resolving athletic scandals at Tulane

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
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