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   *Questions; Turn Taking

ABSTRACT
         This volume on pragmatics and language learning
includes the following: "'Cultural Scripts': A Semantic Approach to
Cultural Analysis and Cross-Cultural Communication" (Anna
Wierzbicka); "Issues in Second Language Learning in a Multilingual
Context" (Ayo Bamgbose); "Cross-Cultural Speech Act Research and the
Classroom" (Yamuna Kachru); "Pragmatics Consciousness-Raising in an
EFL Context" (Kenneth R. Rose); "Discourse Analysis and Instructional
Flexibility: A Pragmatic Grammar" (Francois V. Tochon, Jean-Paul
Dionne); "Can NNS Skill in Interpreting Implicatures in American
English Be Improved through Explicit Instruction?--A Pilot Study"
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Strategies Chosen by Japanese Speakers of English" (Hisae Niki,
Hiroko Tajika); "American Students' Questioning Behavior and Its
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Influences on the Acquisition of Discourse Level Constraints on the
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(Muriel Saville-Troike, Donna M. Johnson); "The Distribution and
Function of Relative Clauses in Literature" (Donald E. Hardy, Karen
Milton); "Non-Grammatical Reflexive Binding Phenomena: The Case of
Japanese" (Sonoko Sakakibara); "A Note on Pragmatic Markedness" (M.
Lynne Murphy); and "Acquisition in Context: The Discourse Domain
Hypothesis of Interlanguage Variation" (Shona Whyte). (MSE)

PRAGMATICS AND LANGUAGE LEARNING

Monograph Series Volume 5 1994

Lawrence F. Bouton and Yamuna Kachru

DIVISION OF ENGLISH

AS AN INTERNATIONAL LANGUAGE

University of Illinois

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Pragmatics and Language Learning

Monograph Series

PURPOSE AND SCOPE

Pragmatics and Language Leaning consists of papers selected each year from those presented at the annual conference sponsored by the Division of English as an International Language and the Intensive English Institute at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign. The general theme of this conference each year is on the interaction of pragmatics (including discourse analysis an dconversation analysis) with the teaching and/or learning of a second or foreign language (especially English) in either formal or informal surroundings. Individual papers may be focused on any of the following related topics.

1. the contribution of pragmatics to our understanding of what we mean by communicative competence
2. research into specific facets of English discourse
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Copies can be obtained at a cost of $12.00 each by writing to:

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Lawrence F. Bouton and Yamuna Kachru

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CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION

This volume begins with Wierzbicka's 'A Semantic Approach to Cultural Analysis and Cross-cultural Communication,'a tightly argued, solidly supported challenge to anyone involved in the study of a society's ways of speaking to reach beyond mere behavior to the "tacit system of 'cultural rules' or 'cultural scripts'." To do this without bias, she goes on, "we need a universal, language-independent perspective," one that can be achieved by stating those cultural rules in terms of "universal human concepts lexicalized in all languages of the world." Her paper is rich in examples that fascinate while they persuade, and leave us agreeing with the author that her approach can diminish bias and distortion in our understanding of the cultural norms of societies other than our own while making them much more accessible to the reader.

Bamgbose, in his 'Issues in Second Language Learning in a Multilingual Context,' moves us more toward the problems and questions related to the teaching of a second language in Nigeria. His discussion ranges from the broad, somewhat abstract issues associated with the establishment of an effective national language policy to the more concrete decisions that must be made concerning curriculum, graduation requirements, teacher training and class-room methods and materials. He notes the importance of an awareness on the part of teachers and learners alike of the pragmatic pitfalls associated with the learning of any language.

Yamuna Kachru, in her 'Crosscultural Speech Act Research and the Classroom,' sets herself three goals: to discuss briefly the current state of cross-cultural speech act re-search, to determine its usefulness for the language classroom, and to suggest specific needs that must be met if cross-cultural speech act research is to live up to its potential as a source of valuable information that can smooth the interaction between people from different cultural backgrounds. In essence, the author argues that if language instruction is to lead us past the obtacles that so often arise in cross-cultural interaction, we must first solve a number of theo-retical and methodological problems associated with cross-cultural pragmatic research, e.g., the need for explicit criteria of comparability across languages and cultures, more information of how speech acts are constrained by the environment in which they occur, etc.

Rose, 'Pragmatic Consciousness-Raising in an EFL Context,' offers us a narrower focus than does Bamgbose or Kachru. He first notes that most students in a Japanese EFL classroom, if they use English to communicate with others at all, will find themselves interact-ing with interlocutors who are not native speakers of English. With this in mind, together with the fact that one cannot teach English (or any language) without teaching some system of pragmatics along with it, the author raises the logical question - Whose pragmatics do we teach? And what is our purpose in choosing the path that we do? His solution - to adopt a consciousness-raising approach to pragmatics, thereby "providing learners with a foundation in some of the central aspects of the role of pragmatics which they can then apply in whatever setting they may encounter as their proficiency in English develops."

Tochon and Dionne, 'Discourse Analysis and Instructional Flexibility: A Pragmatic Grammar,' switch our attention from the learner to the teacher. Their interest: to find an effective framework for the analysis of the patterns of discourse adopted by the teacher in an "to adapt subject-matter to interactions" and testing that framework through an intensive

case study of an expert language teacher.

Bouton's 'Can NNS Skill in Interpreting Implicature in American English Be Improved through Explicit Instruction? - A Pilot Study' moves us from the general discussion of how cross cultural interaction should be approached both in and out of the classroom to the consideration of a particular facet of pragmatic competence and how it can be enhanced by dealing with it directly in the ESL classroom. The latest in a series of papers investigating the impact of differing linguistic and cultural backgrounds on the value of implicature as a tool of cross-cultural conversation, this one describes a pilot study designed to answer the question posed by the title of the article. The question itself grows out of earlier discoveries by the author that nonnative English speaking graduate students at an American university derived the same message from implicatures in English as Americans did only from 79% to 85% of the time. Furthermore, they improve in this facet of their competence very slowly if not given explicit instruction designed to develop those skills. The results of the pilot study show that with just 3 to 4 hours of formal instruction over a period of 6 weeks during their first semester on campus, the experimental group attained the same level of skill in interpreting implicatures appropriately as the untaught nonnative speakers had after 3 years. The pilot study had proved direct instruction focused on the development of the skills needed to interpret implicatures in American English to be sufficiently successful to warrant further study.

In 'Asking for Permission vs. Making Requests: Strategies Chosen by Japanese Speakers of English,' Niki and Tajika study the social distance between participants in a conversation and the degree of imposition perceived as they affect the strategy used by Japanese and native English to achieve some desired end. Some of the situations to which the subjects were asked to respond were those in which the Japanese would normally ask for permission when using their own language and others would normally have evoked a requesting strategy. The results suggest a difference in the pragmatic norms of Japanese and American English and support transfer of pragmatic strategies from L1 to L2 as a potential learner strategy. The pedagogical implications of these results are also discussed.

Rees-Miller's 'American Students' Questioning Behavior and its Implications for ESL' provides an interesting analysis of the structure and function of the questions asked by American students in the classroom and compares this behavior with that presented as the norm in ESL texts. Her conclusion: that there is a dearth of material related in any way to classroom questioning techniques and that what is there fails to cover the range of questions that actually exists in terms of either form or function, and that still more research needs to be carried out in this sphere and more and better classroom materials developed to assist nonnative English speakers in adapting to the American classroom.

Counseling and advising has provided a frequently used context for the study of cross-cultural interaction, and Agnes Weiyun He's 'Constructing Facts and Stances through Voicing: Cases from Student-Counselor Interaction' is another excellent addition to that literature. As the title suggests, He focuses directly on the way in which both the counselors and the students invoke others' voices to develop their occasion-specific identities, to lend credibility to their stance and to give force to what they are saying. Well argued and documented, this paper adds to our understanding of the strategies of counselor and advisee alike and describes features of such interactions that we can use to help our ESL students adapt

more readily to those situations when they arise.

In her discussion of topics appropriate to cross-cultural social interaction, Hinkel provides us with a wealth of information concerning the topics that people from different cultures find acceptable for small talk. Small talk is often difficult, even for interactants from the same cultural background, but it grows increasingly difficult the greater the cultural distance between the participants. The strength of Hinkel's paper, 'Topic Appropriateness in Cross-cultural Social Conversations,' is its development of an empirical base from which to describe the topics that speakers of Chinese, Japanese, Korean, Indonesian and Arabic and American English would find desirable or taboo in purely social conversation. It gives us not only a type of information that we do not find in the literature, but it also suggests facets of the topic that we might investigate further. And the wealth of data in her appendices invites both further analysis and the application of what she has found to specific teaching situations.

Berry's 'Spanish and American Turn-taking Styles: A Comparative Study' falls into the tradition of Tannen's Conversational Style: Analyzing Talk Among Friends and like Wieland's 'Turn-taking Structure as a Source of Misunderstanding in French-American Cross-cultural Conversation,' extends Tannen's approach to the study of cross-cultural interaction. Also, like Tannen and Weiland, Berry found that the impact of different turn-taking styles is a two way street, with each group interpreting the behavior of other participants from the perspective of their own style. As a result, Berry says, "each group may misinterpret the other's listening behavior and make incorrect judgements about their character."

McClure's 'Crosslinguistic Influences on the Acquisition of Discourse Level Constraints on the Comprehension and Use of Adversative Conjunctions' is designed to determine whether native Spanish speakers carry over their use of the adversative conjunctions *pero* and *aunque* to their use of *but* and *although* in English. After establishing the Spanish usage on the basis of 37 Spanish monolinguals, she examines the use of but and although by Spanish speakers who are highly proficient in English. Her conclusions: there is a discourse rule governing the use of *pero* and *aunque* that parallels the one for *but* and *although* in English, but that there are educated native speakers of both languages that do not always follow their respective rules. Furthermore, she notes, the Spanish speakers who tend to follow the rule in their own language also do so in English. "The rule is not explicitly taught to either first or second language learners, and it appears that if it is not acquired in the first language, it is not acquired in the second, no matter the length of residence, the education, or the fluency of the learner."

A second study of connectives is found in Kuo's paper, 'The Correlation of Discourse Markers and Discourse Structure.' Using Mandarin Chinese, Kuo proposes a method to quantify the overall correlation between different kinds of connectives occurring in coherent texts. Her method demonstrates both the complexity of the interaction among various kinds of connectives and reveals the patterns of connectives that indicate the logic of the discourse in which they are found.

In their 'Comparative Rhetoric: An Integration of Perspectives,' Saville-Troike and Johnson begin with an analysis of the contributions of second language acquisition and teaching, rhetoric, and text linguistics to contrastive rhetoric - disciplines whose approaches find to be frequently incompatible. Differences, they say, can be found in the attention paid to the nce addressed, to the process of writing as opposed to the product, the importance at-

tached to the artful use of the language, and to the range of genre with which comparative rhetoric should concern itself. Having suggested both the strengths and the weaknesses of the approaches taken to comparative rhetoric by the three disciplines already mentioned, the authors then suggest that by taking an approach derived from the ethnography of communication, what is attempted in comparative rhetoric and what is learned will be greatly enhanced, and the results, they argue, will benefit not only language teaching and learning, but theory building as well.

Hardy and **Milton**, in their **'The Distribution and Function of Relative Clauses in Literature,'** investigate the occurrence and function of relative clauses in a reasonably broad sample of different types of literature and compare these results with those related to an analysis of relative clauses in conversation. Their conclusion: "that the discourse/pragmatic functions of genre may have as much or more to do with the distribution" of different types of relative pronouns than does the informational status of the arguments to which they are attached.

The importance of pragmatic considerations in explaining what seem to be inexplicable syntactic problems is demonstrated by **Sakakibara's 'Non-grammatical Reflexive Binding Phenomena: The Case of Japanese.'** It is an analysis of two non-syntactic phenomena of reflexive binding by *zibun* in terms of Fukada's (1986) Maxim of Politeness and Grice's (1975) Cooperative Principle. The first phenomenon the author describes as "the tendency by native Japanese to avoid referring to an honored person with *zibun* when the honored person's behavior described in the sentence is considered 'inappropriate'." The second phenomenon involves the fact that "a sentence with the reflexive pronoun *zibun* can be ambiguous." By using the two pragmatic principles just mentioned, the author is able to explain both of the characteristics of *zibun* just described, characteristics that would otherwise seem to be erratic and inexplicable.

Just as Sakakibara illustrated the importance of pragmatics in analyzing specific facets of language that are not amenable to syntactic analysis, **Murphy**, in her **'A Note on Markedness** shows us its value as an means of clarifying the theoretical concepts underlying our understanding of asymmetrical distributions. Using gradable adjectives as her specific point of investigation, Murphy notes that the widely held belief that "a single generalization can explain the wider distribution of all unmarked predicates and/or the limited distribution of all marked predicates (for instance, that all unmarked terms have positive polarity or that unmarked terms are psychologically simpler)." But she then goes on to show that "not every unmarked item has the same sets of...properties," and that "the distributional patterns frequently labeled 'marked' and 'unmarked' are too diverse to form monolithic categories." On an item by item basis, pragmatic considerations seem to provide viable explanations. And, she seems to say, it is through lines of reasoning such as those used in this paper that we will be able to explain asymmetrical distributions in more general terms.

Finally, we come to **Whyte's 'Acquisition in Context: the Discourse Domain Hypothesis of Interlanguage Variation,'** an investigation of the effect of a person's knowledge of and personal investment in a specific topic on that person's ability to present his/her ideas related to that topic in a fluent, well organized manner. Given the discourse domain hypothesis (Selinker & Douglas, 1985), says the author, one would expect people who discuss a topic bout which they know a great deal and in which they feel a personal investment to be able to

carry off their part in that discussion fluently and clearly. However, Whyte found her results to be somewhat ambiguous in that only one of the four invested subjects produced a clearly enhanced performance on all three measures when discussing a topic from his major field_a topic that should be both familiar and important to him.

Lawrence F. Bouton

"CULTURAL SCRIPTS": A SEMANTIC APPROACH TO CULTURAL ANALYSIS AND CROSS-CULTURAL COMMUNICATION

Anna Wierzbicka
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ABSTRACT

This paper argues that the ways of speaking characteristic of a given speech-community cannot be satisfactorily described (let alone explained) in purely behavioral terms; that they constitute a behavioral manifestation of a tacit system of "cultural rules" or "cultural scripts"; and that to understand a society's ways of speaking, we have to identify and articulate its implicit "cultural scripts". Furthermore, it is argued that to be able to do this without ethnocentric bias we need a universal, language-independent perspective; and that this can be attained if the "rules" in question are stated in terms of lexical universals, that is, universal human concepts lexicalized in all languages of the world.

To illustrate these general propositions, the author shows how cultural scripts can be stated and how they can be justified; this is done with particular reference to Japanese, (White) Anglo-American, and Black American cultural norms.

The cultural scripts advanced in this paper are formulated in a highly constrained "natural semantic metalanguage", based on a small set of lexical universals (or near-universals) and a small set of universal (or near-universal) syntactic patterns. It is argued that the use of this metalanguage allows us to portray and compare culture-specific attitudes, assumptions, and norms from a neutral, culture-independent point of view, and to do so in terms of simple formulae which are intuitively self-explanatory while at the same time being rigorous and empirically verifiable.

We must begin unpacking culture in a more differentiated, theory-driven way than hitherto. (Bond, 1992, p. 11)

There are a lot of messages implicit in social discourse: messages about what to presuppose, what to value, what to feel, how to classify (Shweder, 1984, p. 56)

INTRODUCTION

Referring to the progress achieved in cross-cultural understanding in recent decades (especially with respect to Japan and America) Edward Hall writes that

... there is one element lacking in the cross-cultural field, and that is the existence of adequate models to enable us to gain more insight into the processes going on inside people while they are thinking and communicating. We need to know more about how people think in different cultures ... (Hall, 1983, p. 91)

It is the purpose of this paper to develop and validate a model of the kind that Hall is calling for. I believe that the model developed here, which can be called the "cultural script model", offers a framework within which both the differences in the ways of communicating and the underlying differences in the way of thinking can be fruitfully and rigorously explored. The basic tenets of the paper can be stated as follows.

1. Ways of speaking characteristic of a given speech-community cannot be satisfactorily described (let alone explained) in purely behavioral terms; in fact, they constitute a behavioral manifestation of a tacit system of "cultural rules" or, as I call them, "cultural scripts"; to understand a society's ways of speaking, we have to identify and articulate its implicit "cultural scripts".
2. To be able to do this without ethnocentric bias we need a universal, language-independent perspective; this can be attained if the "rules" in question are stated in terms of lexical universals, that is, universal human concepts lexicalized in all languages of the world.

In this paper, I will try to show how cultural scripts can be stated and how they can be justified; and I will do so with particular reference to Japanese, (White) Anglo-American, and Black American cultural norms.

The cultural scripts proposed and illustrated in this paper can be compared to Shweder's (1984) "cultural frames"; or to Kitayama and Markus's (1992) "culturally shared ideas":

First and most obvious, these ideas may become widely shared by a vast majority of the people in the society. This consensual nature of the core idea of a given culture results from the fact that everyday activities (including practices, customs, and social norms) constantly provide first-hand evidence for

the core idea for a given society .... As a result, the core idea rarely receives much scepticism from the members of the society and, thus, most often serves as premises (rather than conclusions) in inference or argument. The core idea of the society tends to be taken for granted and, as a consequence, attains a quality as "zero-order belief" (Bem 1972), "cultural frame" (Holland & Quinn 1987), or "social representation" (Moscovici 1984). (Kitayama & Markus, 1992, p. 28-29)

But the cultural scripts advanced in the present paper are more specific than the "cultural frames" discussed by Kitayama and Markus (1992) or by the authors that they refer to. Above all, they are formulated in a highly constrained "natural semantic metalanguage", based on a small set of lexical universals and a small set of universal (or near-universal) syntactic patterns.[1] The use of this metalanguage allows us to portray and compare culture-specific attitudes, assumptions, and norms from a neutral, culture-independent point of view, and to do so in terms of simple formulae which are intuitively self-explanatory while at the same time being rigorous and empirically verifiable.

Speaking of "the cultural unconscious, those out-of-awareness cultural systems that have as yet to be made explicit" and of the tacit rules which "apply to the formative and active aspects of communication, discourses, ... transactions between people, and the action chains by which humans achieve their varied life goals", Hall stresses the need for a special notation, suitable for representing a society's tacit "cultural rules". He writes:

Until notation systems apart from language are developed for culture, it is doubtful that the type of revolution occasioned by the development of writing and mathematics will occur. When this happens, however, there is no way of gauging the effect on human consciousness. Culture is therefore very closely related to if not synonymous with what has been defined as "mind". (Hall, 1976, p. 166)

I would not make as grand a claim for cultural scripts as Hall did for his yet-to-be-developed "culture notation"; I submit, however, that the natural semantic metalanguage based on lexical universals does constitute a language-independent "culture notation", suitable for representing the "cultural unconscious"; that the use of this metalanguage can clarify differences between cultures (including those most directly affecting communicative styles); and that, on a practical level, the metalanguage can facilitate cross-cultural communication.

In what follows, I will present three different illustrations of this approach, in three sections entitled "Apologizing in Japan", "To speak or not to speak: Japanese culture vs. Anglo-American culture", and "Advocates and spokesmen: American "black" and "white" cultural norms".

APOLOGIZING IN JAPAN

In the literature on Japanese culture and society, it is often said that in Japan it is impor-

tant to apologize very frequently and in a broad range of situations. The experience of Western students of Japanese is consistent with such statements. As Coulmas (1981:81), reports, "a Western student who has been taught Japanese experiences the extensive usage of apology expressions as a striking feature of everyday communication when he first comes to Japan. Correspondingly, "Among Japanese students of English, German, or other European languages, it is a common mistake to make apologies where no such acts are expected or anticipated in the respective speech community."

The Japanese psychiatrist Takeo Doi (1981:50) recalls in this connection an observation made by the Christian missionary Father Henvers about "the magical power of apology in Japan", and he comments: "It is particularly noteworthy that a Christian missionary, who came to Japan to preach forgiveness of sin, should have been so impressed by the realization that among Japanese a heartfelt apology leads easily to reconciliation." To illustrate this point, Doi recounts the experience of an American psychiatrist in Japan, who through some oversight in carrying out immigration formalities, "found himself hauled over the coals by an official of the Immigration Bureau. However often he explained that it was not really his fault, the official would not be appeased, until, at the end of his tether, he said "I'm sorry ..." as a prelude to a further argument, whereupon the official's expression suddenly changed and he dismissed the matter without further ado." Doi concludes his discussion with a characteristic comment that "people in the West (...) are generally speaking reluctant to apologize." (p. 51)

But observations such as those made by Coulmas and Doi, though revealing, are not specific enough to be truly effective in teaching culture. To begin with, the concept of "apology" itself is culture-bound and is therefore inappropriate as a descriptive and analytical tool in the cross-cultural field. The words *apology* and *apologize*, which are elements of the English set of speech act terms, include in their meaning the component 'I did something bad (to you)'. But as Doi's little ancedote illustrates, the so-called "Japanese apology" does not presuppose such a component. It is misleading and confusing, therefore, to call it "apology" in the first place.

Furthermore, those who talk of the extensive usage of apologies in Japan (as compared with the West) create an impression that the difference is quantitative, not qualitative. This is misleading and inaccurate: in fact, the difference lies not in the frequency of use of the same speech act, but in the use of qualitatively different speech acts (cf. Wierzbicka 1991a); and the use of these different speech acts is linked with qualitatively different cultural norms. Norms of this kind can be usefully illustrated with schematic scenarios, such as those offered in Kataoka's (1991) culture manual entitled "Japanese cultural encounters and how to handle them". One of these scenarios is entitled "Apology".

> Tom rented a car one weekend. It was his first time driving a car in Japan, but he had been an excellent driver in the United States.
>
> On his way to his friend's house, however, he had an accident. A young child about four years old ran into the street from an alley just as Tom was driving by. Tom was driving under the speed limit and he was watching the road carefully so he stepped on the brakes immediately. However, the car did brush against the child, causing him to fall down. Tom immediately stopped the car and asked a passerby to call the police and an ambulance.

Fortunately, the child's injuries were minor. The police did not give Tom a ticket, and he was told that he was not at fault at all, thanks to some witnesses' reports. He felt sorry for the child but decided that there was nothing more he could do, so he tried to forget about the accident. However, after several days, Tom heard from the policeman that the child's parents were extremely upset about Tom's response to the incident.

Kataoka invites the reader to consider four alternative answers to the question "Why were the child's parents upset?" The following answer is then indicated as the correct one: "They were angry because Tom did not apologize to them, nor did he visit the child at the hospital, even though he was not at fault. Tom should have done these things to show his sincerity." Kataoka comments further: "In Japan, one is expected to apologize and visit the victim of an accident, even if one is not at fault, to show his or her sincerity. In fact, one is expected to apologize whenever the other party involved suffers in any way, materially or emotionally. In many court cases, perpetrators get a lighter sentence when it is clear that they regret their actions, as reflected in their apology." (p. 64)

The cultural norm reflected in Kataoka's story and explanatory comments can be represented in the form of the following cultural script (written in lexical universals):

> if something bad happens to someone
> because I did something
> I have to say something like this to this person:
> "I feel something bad"

TO SPEAK OR NOT TO SPEAK:
JAPANESE CULTURE VS. ANGLO-AMERICAN CULTURE.

Societies differ considerably in the value they place on silence and on nonverbal communication, as opposed to speech (cf. e.g., Basso 1970; Oliver 1971; Giles, Coupland, & Wiemann, 1992). In particular, Japan is often said to differ enormously in this respect from Anglo-American culture.

Befu (1971, p. 176) speaks in this connection of the "suppression of verbalism" in Japanese culture. He points to the Zen Buddhist emphasis on "the inutility of linguistic communication", and its emphatic rejection of verbal instruction; to the emphasis on nonverbal communication in mother-child interaction (with reference to the findings of Caudill & Weinstein, 1969), and to the nonverbal basis of pedagogical procedures in traditional arts and crafts in Japan. Doi (1981:33) notes that "the Western tradition is suffused with an emphasis on the importance of words. In Japan, such a tradition does not exist. I do not mean to suggest that traditional Japanese thought makes light of words, but it seems to be more conscious of matters that words do not reach."

What applies to Japanese philosophical and religious thought and to Japanese pedagogical tradition, applies also to everyday life. For example, Nakane describes Japanese in-group ...ction as follows:

> Among fellow-members a single word would suffice for the whole sentence.
> The mutually sensitive response goes so far that each easily recognizes the
> other's slightest change in behaviour and mood and is ready to act accord-
> ingly. (1970, p. 121)

Commenting on this statement, Morsbach writes: "Such sensitivity is, of course, also discernible among group members of other cultures. The difference is a quantitative, not a qualitative one" (1992, p. 8).

But although differences in communication behavior can indeed often be described in quantitative terms, descriptions of this kind are superficial and not particularly illuminating. In fact, "quantitative" differences in communication behavior are often an external manifestation of "qualitative" differences in social cognition, and in people's psycho-cultural make-up. To understand cultures and societies we need to go beyond the "quantitative" differences visible on the surface of communication processes and to try to discover the underlying cultural scripts—discrete and distinct, and qualitatively different from one speech community to another.

For example, evidence provided in studies such as Fischer and Yoshida (1968) and in numerous other works on Japanese culture and society (e.g. Befu, 1971, 1974; Goldstein & Tamura, 1975; Lebra, 1974; Morsbach, 1988, Doi 1981) suggest the following cultural scripts referring to speech (among many others):

1. it is good not to say to other people all that I think
2. often it is good not to say anything to other people
3. when I want to say something to someone,
    it is good to think something like this before I say it:
         I can't say to other people all that I think
         something bad could happen because of this
4. if I say many things to people
    people may think something bad about me
    I may feel something bad because of this
5. when I want someone to know what I think/feel
    I don't have to say it to this person
    I can do something else
6. it is good if I can know what another person
              feels/thinks/wants
    this person doesn't have to say anything to me

Scripts of this kind are recognizable to all students of Japanese culture, even if they have never seen them stated in this form; and they capture, in a simple and concise form, generalizations alluded to in nearly all studies of the Japanese ethnography of communication. For example, Script 6 corresponds (in part) to the fundamental Japanese ideal of *omoiyari*, which Lebra defines as follows:

Omoiyari refers to the ability and willingness to feel what others are feeling,

> to vicariously experience the pleasure or pain that they are undergoing, and to
> help them satisfy their wishes. (Lebra, 1974, p. 38)

Like other commentators, Lebra stresses the crucial importance for this empathetic understanding to occur without verbal communication (for detailed discussion, see Travis, 1992). For Lebra, the idea of *omoiyari* is so essential to Japanese culture that she doesn't hesitate to characterize the culture as a whole as an "omoiyari culture" (Lebra, 1974). The importance of this concept is also reflected in educational guidelines, where a key role is played by the slogan (Nakatsugawa, 1992)

> *Omoiyari no kokoro o taisetsuni shimashoo.*
> 'Let's treasure the mind/heart of omoiyari'.

It is also significant that in a reader's column in Japanese newspapers, where readers can place a photo of their child and state their wishes and expectations, one of the most common wishes is this (Nakatsugawa, 1992):

> *Omoiyari no aru hitoni nattene.*
> 'Please become a person who has omoiyari.'

Since the ideal of "omoiyari" is quite alien to Anglo-American culture, scripts such as 6 are clearly not included among the shared American norms and expectations.

On the other hand, implicit messages (cf. Kitayama & Markus, 1992) sent by Anglo-American culture to those immersed in it include the following ones, which are reflected in a wide variety of ethnographic data and which can be recognized by any student of American culture:

> 7. everyone can say something like this to other people:
>   "I think this", "I don't think this"
> 8. it is good to say to someone what I think
> 9. it is good to say to someone what I feel

The first of these scripts reflects the cherished Anglo-American assumption that everyone has the right to express their opinions, the second one reflects the value placed on Anglo-American tradition on the free expression of opinions, and the third one, the cultural value of verbalization and an "open", "honest" expression of one's feelings (cf. Katriel & Philipsen 1981; Carbaugh, 1988).

None of the norms stated in the three scripts above (7, 8 and 9) is present in Japanese culture. On the contrary, evidence suggests that Japanese culture includes norms which are very different from, and in some cases diametrically opposed to, those stated in 7, 8 and 9, namely 10, 11 and 12:

> 10. I can't say something like this to other people:
>   "I think this", "I don't think this"   18

11. it is good not to say to other people what I think
12. I can't say what I feel

(For detailed discussion, see Wierzbicka, 1991b.)

Cultural norms such as 7, 8, 9, 10, 11 and 12 are quite general in nature, and they all require further specifications, provisos, and supplementary statements, which cannot be discussed here for reasons of space. But the contrast in the cultural emphasis is very striking: The popular American assertiveness training has the goal "to teach people to express their thoughts and feelings explicitly in words, rather than relying upon indirect or nonverbal messages" (Clancy, 1986, p. 217), whereas the Japanese "empathy training" (*omoiyari* training) teaches interactants to anticipate and understand each other's feelings, wishes, and needs without verbal communication.

Although limitations of space preclude further discussion of this topic in the present paper, it is important to note that "distrust of words" and appreciation of silence may take different forms in different cultures and that the simple dichotomy "to speak or not to speak" is not a sufficient basis for cultural typology. For example, Anglo Australian culture, in contrast to Anglo American culture, can also be said to be characterized by a distrust of words. But the specific cultural norms underlying the Australian and the Japanese "distrust of words" are very different. In particular, Australian culture hasn't created anything like the concept of 'omoiyari' and the ideal of wordless empathy is quite alien to it. In Australia, the key cultural ideal is that of "mateship", which presupposes mutual good feelings, mutual support and unconditional loyalty based on shared experience (without any implications of fine tuning to each other's psychological states). The prototypical "mates" are expected to neither bare their hearts to one another through talk nor to understand each other's hearts through non-verbal empathy; but they are expected to stick together, to do things together, and to rely on one another for company and support.

The anti-intellectualism of traditional Australian culture is linked with a contempt and disparaging attitude towards articulated speech, towards social, intellectual, and verbal graces, towards words and ideas as opposed to practical action. As pointed out by the author of the classic study "Australian English" Sidney Baker (1959:51),

> ...in Australia "the phlegmatic understatement will almost always command greater attention than over-statement, terseness more than volubility, the short vulgar word more than the polite polysyllable".

The well-known social critic Donald Horne (1964:4) makes a similar point somewhat more forcefully when he says that

> In the view of the ordinary Australian, "most of what is pumped out of the word factories is 'bullshit'".

The word *bullshit* used by Horne to epitomise Australian attitudes to "what is pumped out of the word factories" is well chosen since it is one of the key words in Australian English, with a uniquely Australian semantic profile and with a very high frequency of use (cf. Wierzbicka, 1992a).   Nothing could illustrate the difference between the Australian distrust of words and the Japanese one better than the contrast between these two key cultural concepts: *bullshit* and *omoiyari*. (For another, again very different, example of a culture characterized by a distrust of words see Basso 1970).

"ADVOCATES" AND "SPOKESMEN":
AMERICAN "BLACK" AND "WHITE" CULTURAL NORMS.

It goes without saying that different social, and ethnic, groups can share the same language (as a basic lexico-grammatical code) and yet operate in terms of different cultural norms and different cultural scripts. For example, black Americans are well-known to share norms different from those shared by main-stream white Americans (cf. e.g. Abrahams, 1976; Kochman, 1981; Kochman (Ed.), 1972; Labov, 1972; Mitchell-Kernan, 1971; Goodwin 1990; Folb 1980). Some of these differences were described with particular clarity and insight in Kochman's (1981) book entitled *Black and White Styles in Conflict*. For example, Kochman writes:

> The modes of behavior that blacks and whites consider appropriate for engaging in public debate on an issue differ in their stance and level of spiritual intensity. The black mode—that of black community people—is high-keyed: animated, interpersonal, and confrontational. The white mode—that of middle class—is relatively low-keyed: dispassionate, impersonal, and non-challenging. The first is characteristic of involvement; it is heated, loud, and generates affect. The second is characteristic of detachment and is cool, quiet, and without affect. (p. 18)

Clearly, one key issue involved in these different communicative modes is that of attitudes to emotion, which white speakers tend to view negatively, as incompatible with clear thinking and rational argumentation, and which black speakers view positively, as a "natural" and positive force, a sign of sincerity and commitment.

As a first approximation, we can try to reflect these contrasting attitudes to emotion in the following scripts:

White
13.   when I say something like this to someone:
                "I think this", "I don't think this",
          I don't want this person to think that I feel something because of this
          [if people think that I feel something when I say something,
          they will think that I can't think well]

Black

14.   when I want to say something like this to someone:
       "I think this, I don't think this",
       I want this person to know that I feel something because of this
       [if people think that I don't feel something when I say something,
       they can think that I don't think what I say]

As Kochman points out, whites value "dispassionate speech", because they view emotion and reason as antithetical:

> Whites ... regard the black argumentative mode as dysfunctional because of
> their view that reason and emotion work against each other.... This explains
> why discussion, the white mode for testing and validating ideas, is devoid of
> affect and why its presence, to whites, automatically renders any presentation
> less persuasive to the extent that affect is also present. (p. 19)

By contrast, blacks view "dispassionate speech" as "unnatural" and suspicious. They

> misinterpret (and distrust) the dispassionate and detached mode that whites
> use to engage in debate. It resembles the mode that blacks themselves use
> when they are *fronting*: that is, consciously suppressing what they truly feel
> or believe. As one black student put it, "That's when I'm lyin'." (p. 22)

The black concept of 'fronting' is a good example of the unique linguistic features which develop within the speech of a community and which reflect this community's cultural values. The fact that blacks and whites in America share the same basic linguistic code (English) does not detract from the idea that blacks and whites have (partly) different cultural norms and that cultural norms are reflected in ways of speaking. Rather, the shared linguistic code reflects some norms which are common to blacks and whites in America, whereas the well-documented differences in black and white ways of speaking (including the concept of 'fronting') reflect cultural differences. Both the shared norms and the differing norms can be accurately portrayed in cultural scripts.

The preference for "animated", emotional speech goes hand in hand in black culture with other norms such as the preference for what Kochman calls "dynamic opposition", "passionate involvement", disdain for "neutral objectivity", passionate "caring" for one's position, and a desire to struggle for it. One way of generalizing over the differences between the "white" and "black" style is found in Kochman's ingenious formula contrasting "advocates" with "spokesmen":

> Blacks present their views as advocates. They take a position and show that
> they care about this position.... Present-day whites relate to their material as
> spokesmen, not advocates.... How deeply a person cares about or believes in
> the idea is considered irrelevant to its fundamental value.... Whites believe
> that caring about one's own ideas ... will make them less receptive to oppos-

ing ideas.... Thus they are taught to present their ideas as though the ideas had an objective life, existing independent of any person expressing them. This accounts for the impersonal mode of expression that whites use, which, along with the absence of affect and dynamic opposition, establishes the detached character of proceedings in which white cultural norms dominate. (p. 21)

The Anglo "non-advocate" stance can be portrayed in the form of the following script (among others):

15. if I say something like this to someone: "I think this",
    I can't say something like this at the same time:
        "I want you to think the same"
        "it is good to think this"

By contrast, for Black English the following "advocate" script can be posited:

16. when I want to say something like this to someone: "I think this",
    I want to say something like this at the same time:
        "I want you to think the same"
        "it is good to think this"

The cherished Anglo "open-mindedness" (cf. e.g. Bruner 1990, p. 30) can be represented as follows:

17. if I want to say something like this to someone: "I think this",
    it is good to say something like this at the same time:
        "I don't want to say that I will always think this"
        "I don't have to think this"
        "if at some time after now I think that it is good to think
            something else, I will think something else"

This "open-mindedness" is closely related to what Kochman calls the "spokesman" stance. I would represent this stance as follows:

18. I think this: ...
    I want to say why I think this
    I want to say why one may think that it is good to think this
    (I don't want to say that everyone has to think this)

Kochman's assertion that white Anglo culture values an "impersonal" mode of expression may seem to contradict the observation made earlier in connection with Benjamin Franklin's professed preference for a first-person ("I think") mode of speaking. I believe, however, that the contradiction is more apparent than real, and that the source of the difficulty lies in the use ˎue and undefined notions such as "personal" and "impersonal". Compare, for example,

the following two utterances:

    A. This is absolutely wrong.
    B. I don't think so.

Which of these two is more "personal", and which more "impersonal"? Clearly, it is impossible to answer such a question without first clarifying its meaning. Utterance B refers explicitly to "I", so in that sense it is more "personal". At the same time, however, utterance B leaves more room for dissent than utterance A, and there is certainly more "dynamic opposition" and "affect" in A than in B.

It is not that it is particularly helpful, therefore, to label the prevailing Anglo mode as "impersonal". The differences in question can be better clarified in terms of explicit scripts, along the lines of 'I want you to think the same' (black), and 'you don't have to think the same' (white), 'one can't think this', 'it is bad to think this' (black), and 'I don't think this', 'you can think what you want to', 'we don't have to think the same' (white). Often, scripts of this kind find an echo in recorded folk comments, such as the comment about white style attributed by Kochman to one of his black students, Joan McCarty: "You'll stay your way, and I'll stay mine" (Kochman, 1981, p. 20). Roughly:

19. when I want to say something like this to someone: "I think this",
    I can't say something like this to this person:
        "I want you to think the same"
        "it is good to think this"
    it is good to say something like this to this person:
        "I know that you may not think the same"
        "I will not feel anything bad because of this"

20. when someone says to me something like this: "I think this",
    I can't say something like this to this person:
        "I don't want you to think this"
        "it is bad to think this"
    I can say something like this: "I don't think the same"
    I think that you will not feel anything bad because of this

CULTURAL SCRIPTS ARTICULATED AS EXPLICIT CULTURAL MESSAGES

In a sense, cultural scripts belong to the cultural unconscious, (Hall 1976:162), and must be discovered by analyzing what people do. As Bruner (1990, p. 17) points out, the crucial question is: "How does what one *does* reveal what one thinks or feels or believes?" I believe, however, that Bruner is also right in stressing the crucial importance of what people *say*: "A culturally sensitive psychology ... is and must be based not only upon what people actually *do*, but what they *say* they do" (p. 16).

It is important to note, therefore, that while cultural scripts can be seen as hypotheses

about what people think based on the observation of what they *do* (e.g. how they communicate and interact), they can also be seen as statements encapsulating, in a standardized form, things that people frequently *say* they think and do. In particular, cultural scripts can be part of the common lore, codified in common sayings, in proverbs, in set phrases, in clichés, in what are perceived as truisms, in famous quotes, in everyday rhetoric, in common socialization routines, and so on. In the case of modern Anglo-American culture, cultural scripts are often encoded (in a more or less complex form) in the manuals and guidebooks of the popular "self-help" literature.

An excellent example of a common socialization strategy formulated almost like a cultural script is provided by Cook's (1990, p. 384) data on the use of the Japanese particle *no*: In the following example, child C does not want to eat *sashimi* 'raw fish'. The mother, using *no*, tells her not to express likes and dislikes (when she eats).

> Child C (age: 3): *Osashimi iya da! Osashimi iya!*
>   '(I) don't want *sashimi*! (I) don't want *sashimi*!'
> Mother: *Are kore suki kirai iwanai no.*
>   '(We) don't say that (we) like or dislike this or that.'

The mother's suggested script reads:

21. [everyone knows:]
    one can't say something like this: "I like this, I don't like this",
    "I want this, I don't want this"

The component 'everyone knows' (Cook says "common knowledge") represents the semantic contribution of the particular *no*. (For further examples of common socialization strategies as embodiments of "cultural scripts", see Kitayama & Markus 1992; Shweder 1984).

I will refer to a highly representative and very popular "assertion manual" by Alberti and Emmon (1975): *Stand Up, Speak Out, Talk Back! The Key to Self-Assertive Behavior*. Characterizing the desirable "assertive style" and contrasting it with the "nonassertive" and "aggressive" styles, the authors encourage the readers to "openly express [their] personal feelings and opinions" (p. 24), and at the same time not to be "openly critical of others' ideas, opinions, behavior". Clearly, these two injunctions can be translated into the following scripts:

22. it is good to say to other people what I think
23. it is good to say to other people what I feel
24. I can't say something like this to someone:
    "it is bad to think/do what you think/do"

As Kyoko Nakatsugawa (1992) points out, a Japanese cultural equivalent of this book would be likely to have a very different title and a very different overall emphasis: *Sit Down! Listen To! Talk With!*. The cultural norms alluded to by such a title would include the following ones:

25. it is not good to say to other people what I think
26. it is not good to say to other people what I feel
27. it is good to know what the other person thinks
28. it is good to know what the other person feels
29. when someone says something to me,
    it is good to say something like this to this person:
        "I would say the same"

As my second example from "self help" literature, let me quote some "basic rules" put forward in Dale Carnegie's (1981) famous and extremely influential bestseller *How to Win Friends and Influence People*:

Principle 1 The only way to get the best of an argument is to avoid it.
Principle 2 Show respect for the other person's opinions. Never say,
    "You're wrong."

It is interesting to note that while the book urges the reader to avoid arguments as one "would avoid rattlesnakes and earthquakes" (p. 116), at the same time it teaches one to "welcome the disagreement" (p. 120). But "welcoming disagreement" does not mean "maximizing disagreement". On the contrary, the reader is urged to "try to build bridges of understanding", to "look for areas of agreement", to "promise to think over [one's] opponent's ideas and study them carefully" (p. 121). Advice of this kind is very transparently related to the Anglo-American cultural scripts stated earlier.

The injunction to "welcome disagreement" corresponds to the norm 'everyone can say: I don't think the same', whereas that of "looking for areas of agreement" echoes the rule 'it is good to say that I think the same about part of this' (see Wierzbicka, In press). The advice to show respect for the other person's opinions and to promise to study the opponent's ideas suggests the following further script:

30. it is good to say something like this to people :
    "I want to know what you think"
    "when you say what you think, I want to think about it"

The strong warning against "arguments" (in contrast to disagreement) reflects scripts which prohibit telling other people that what they think is "bad" and openly trying to get them to think the same as we do. At the same time, the emphasis on freedom of opinion and freedom of disagreement is combined with pragmatic considerations: by showing respect for other people's opinions we can actually draw our opponents closer to us, whereas by contradicting them directly and making it plain that we want to get them to change their mind we can only drive them further away.

All these principles of successful communication Anglo-American style are reflected in an illuminating way in classical documents of American literature such as Benjamin Franklin's autobiography, quoted by Carnegie. To wit:

I made it a rule to forbear all direct contradiction to the sentiment of others, and all positive assertions of my own. I even forbade myself the use of every word or expression in the language that imported a fix'd opinion, such as 'certainly', 'un-doubtedly', etc., and I adopted, instead of them, 'I conceive', 'I apprehend', or 'I imagine' a thing to be so or so, or 'it so appears to me at present.' When another asserted something that I thought an error, I deny'd myself the pleasure of contra-dicting him abruptly, and of showing immediately some absurdity in his proposi-tion: and in answering I began by observing that in certain cases or circum-. stances his opinion would be right, but in the present case there appear'd or seem'd to me some difference, etc. I soon found the advantage of this change in my manner, the conversations I engag'd in went on more pleasantly The modest way in which I propos'd my opinions procur'd them a readier reception and less contradiction; I had less mortification when I was found to be in the wrong, and I more easily prevail'd with others to give up their mistakes and join with me when I happened to be in the right. (quoted in Carnegie, 1981, p. 129-130)

In this remarkable passage Franklin makes a number of extremely insightful linguistic observations and offers a number of highly pertinent cultural scripts. Franklin's remarks on avoiding all positive assertion of his own thoughts may seem less apposite, given well-known Anglo-American emphasis on "self-assertion", and on clear, uninhibited expression of one's opinion (cf. e.g. Alberti & Emmon, 1975; Smith, 1975; Baer, 1976). But in fact, Franklin is using the word "assertion" in a sense different from the current one. Clearly, he didn't mean to say that it is bad to *express* one's opinion, but only that it is bad to attempt to *impose* them on other people by expressing them in a dogmatic and hectoring manner. The contrast that he is setting up is that between an 'I think X' mode of expression on the one hand and an 'everyone has to think X' and other similar modes on the other. He suggests, in effect, something like the following scripts:

31. it is good to say something like this: "I think this"
    I can't say something like this: "everyone has to think this"

With respect to other people's opinions, Franklin's rules can be stated as follows:

32. if someone says something like this to me: "I think this",
    I can't say something like this to this person:
        "it is bad to think this"

As my last illustration, I will use Donal Carbaugh's (1988) analysis of the common cul-tural assumptions evident in the extremely popular American television talk show, "Donahue". According to Carbaugh, the most salient of these assumptions is that concerning the individual's rights to their own opinions:

This general point, on the individual's right to state any opinion, to act freely, has many particular expressions. Donahue asked a woman audience member to react to a group of feminist guests: "How do you feel about these women?" Her

response was: "Each woman has their own opinion and if that is what they be-
lieve in, fine." The tone of her utterance indicated an implicit disagreement, but
she stated explicitly the cultural premise: Everyone has the right to say and do
what they want. (p. 29)

Rewritten as a cultural script, this premise reads:

33. everyone can say something like this:
        "I think this, I don't think this"

Furthermore, an "assumed cultural premise aired on 'Donahue' [is] that the individual
has something to say and should indeed say it" (p. 38). This means:

34. it is good to say something like this: "I think this, I don't think this"

However, as Carbaugh points out, "an important qualification must be added here: there
are limits to an individual's rights to speak.... when stating a position or opinion, one should
speak only for oneself and not impose one's opinions on others" (p. 30). Rephrased as a
cultural script, this proviso would read:

35. I can't say something like this to someone:
        "you have to think this"
        "you can't think this"

Another norm clearly transpiring from the Donahue discourse is that of "respect" for
other people's opinions, and of "non-judgmental" speech. The common theme is:

Individuals have the right to speak their opinions, a right which should be
respected, and one way of speaking respectfully to others is by being
nonjudgmental of them and their opinions. (p. 36)

As Carbaugh points out, this emphasis on tolerance for a variety of opinions is displayed
in a variety of recurring prefatory comments, such as "That's my opinion. You are entitled to
yours" (p. 36); "I'm not going to argue with anyone's morals"; "If that's what you believe,
fine"; "you have a right to your feeling" (p. 37); or "no one is going to deny you your position"
(p. 31).
The corresponding script can be stated as follows:

36. I can't say something like this
        "you think something bad"
        "you can't think this"

I must stress that explicit cultural messages embodied in proverbs, common sayings,
famous quotes or self-help literature, which can at times be self-contradictory, cannot be re-

garded as conclusive evidence for cultural norms (cf. Hołówka, 1986) and are not proposed here as such. They do, however, provide telling illustrations of the "messages" that a culture sends to those immersed in it. The problem of evidence for the cultural norms represented in "cultural scripts" will be discussed in the following section.

LINGUISTIC EVIDENCE FOR CULTURAL NORMS

Cultural scripts are not statements about people's behaviour, they are statements about "ideas" - expectations, thoughts, assumptions, norms. These ideas are not necessarily conscious, although they do surface from time to time in explicit messages. By and large, however, they are tacit. But how can one study tacit ideas and how can one verify their reality?

In mid-nineties the problem should no longer seem as intractable to social scientists as it did in the hey-day of behaviourism.

In a 1981 discussion on culture theory D'Andrade described the transition from the behaviourist to the cognitivist era as follows:

> When I was a graduate student, one imagined people *in* a culture: ten years
> later culture was all in their heads. (...) Culture became a branch of cognitive
> psychology. We went from "let's try to look at behavior and describe it", to
> "let's look at ideas". Now, how you were going to look at ideas was a bit of a
> problem - and some people said, "Well, look at language." (Shweder 1984:7,
> quoted in Harkness 1992:112)

Indeed, when it comes to the study of (collective) ideas there is no richer and more reliable source of evidence than language. Cultural scripts are no exception in this regard.

In particular, one extremely rich source of evidence for cultural scripts lies in a culture's "key words", that is, frequently used lexical items encapsulating core cultural concepts. For example, in Japanese culture certain key cultural concepts regulating human interaction are encapsulated in key words such as *amae*, *enryo*, *wa* or *on*, words which have no equivalents in English but whose meaning can be portrayed accurately in English (or in any other language) in terms of lexical universals such as 'want', 'know' or 'think'. (For detailed semantic analysis of these key Japanese words see Wierzbicka 1991b and 1991a). For example, the key concept of *enryo* can be explicated (roughly) as follows:

> I can't say something like this to other people:
>   "I think this, I don't think this"
>   "I want this, I don't want this"
> someone could feel something bad because of this

The key Japanese word *enryo* reflects and validates cultural scripts such as:

> I can't say something like this to other people:
>   "I think this, I don't think this"

    I can't say something like this to other people:
        "I want this, I don't want this"
    I can't say something like this to other people:
        "I want you to say what you want"

and so on.

Often, crucial linguistic evidence for cultural norms comes from the area of speech act verbs. For example, Australian English includes (or has for a long time included) the following language-specific speech act verbs epitomizing core cultural values and cultural norms: *whinge, dob in, chyack, yarn* and *shout*. (For detailed semantic analysis, see Wierzbicka 1991a). For example, *whinge* - a derogatory word for something like persistent and helpless complaining - celebrates the Australian values of 'toughness' and 'resilience' and provides partial evidence for the following cultural script:

    when I feel something bad
    because something bad is happening to me
    I can't say something like this to other people:
        "something bad is happening to me"
        "I feel something bad because of this"
        "I want someone to do something because of this"
    people would think something bad about me because of this

The word *whinge* plays a crucial role in the socialization of children in Australia (where "Stop whingeing!" is one of the most powerful devices in parental transmission of the national ethos), as do untranslatable words such as *enryo, wa, on, giri, amae* or *omoiyari* in the socialization of children in Japan.

Among the wide range of linguistic devices implementing cultural norms a particularly important role is played by "illocutionary particles" and other "discourse connectives" such as the English particle *well*, the Japanese particle *ne*, or the Polish particles *ależ, skądże* or *przecież*.

For example, the English particle *well*, which plays a vital role in English discourse, is often used to mitigate disagreements and to seek partial agreement while leaving room for an open expression of differing opinions. Utterances such as "Well, yes" or "Well, no" cannot be translated into Polish, because Polish has no "mitigating" particle like *well* (and no cultural norms calling for such mitigation). On the other hand, Polish conversational terms such as "Ależ skądże!" cannot be translated into English, because English has no "confrontational" particles of this kind (and no cultural norms encouraging unmitigated confrontation). (Cf. Wierzbicka, In press; Hoffman 1989).

Equally revealing is the ubiquitous Japanese particle *no* (cf. Cook 1990; Wierzbicka 1987; Wierzbicka, In press), whose meaning can be represented by means of the following paraphrase: 'I would say the same'. The constant presence of this particle in Japanese conversation both echoes and validates the following cultural script:

when someone says something to me
it is good to say something like this to this person:
"I would say the same"

The examples adduced above are meant to provide no more than an illustration of the claim that languages provide important evidence for cultural scripts. Limitations of space prevent further discussion of this evidence in this paper. But the examples mentioned here should be sufficient to give the reader an idea of how linguistic data can be used to elucidate cultural norms and validate cultural scripts.

CONCLUSION

Although in most societies there is a great deal of variation in people's communicative styles, there is also a considerable level of intra-societal similarity. Even more striking than the similarity in actual behavior, however, is the similarity in expectations reflected in a wide range of ethnographic and linguistic data (cf. Gudykunst and Kim's (1984) "normative patterns"). Evidence of the kind discussed in this paper suggests that every society has a shared set of (subconscious) cultural norms, norms which are quite specific and which can be stated in the form of explicit cultural scripts.

Cultural scripts are above all concerned with things that one can or cannot say, things that one can or cannot do, and also things that "it is good" to say or do. They constitute a society's unspoken "cultural grammar" (whose parts can surface, at times, in open discourse, in the form of proverbs, common sayings, popular wisdom, common socialization routines, and so on).

Despite the dynamic expansion of cross-cultural communication studies in recent years, many leading figures in the field continue to point to a need for further search for innovative and rigorous frameworks for intercultural work (cf. e.g. Giles & Franklyn-Stokes, 1989; Gudykunst & Gumbs, 1989; Gudykunst & Nishida, 1989). The theory of cultural scripts provides, it is hoped, such an innovative and rigorous framework.

Using this framework, we can model cultural attitudes much more accurately and at the same time much more clearly than it can be done using binary labels such as "direct/indirect", "confrontational/non confrontational", "assertive/non assertive", and so on, which have no well-defined content and which often lead to confusion and contradiction in the description of communication patterns across a wide range of cultures (cf. Wierzbicka, 1991a).[2] Furthermore, the use of unique and yet comparable cultural scripts allows us to develop a typology of communication patterns which does not necessitate trying to fit cultures into the straitjackets of binary categories such as "collectivist/individualist" or "high-context/low context" (cf. Hall, 1976; Hofstede, 1983).

It could be argued that the scripts with components such as 'I can say X' and 'I can't say X' are also binary in nature. But in fact scripts are flexible and free of any a priori constraints; since each script is a unique configuration of components the use of the component 'I can say X' in one script does not force us to use its opposite ('I can't say X') in another. Binary oppositions between scripts along the lines of 'I can say X' vs. 'I can't say X' are possible and be used whenever appropriate but they are not forced by the analytical framework itself.

As James Down pointed out, "one of the greatest stumbling blocks to understanding other peoples within or without a particular culture is the tendency to judge others' behavior by our own standards" (quoted in Gudykunst & Kim, 1984, p.83). One of the most important steps towards overcoming this stumbling block is to make the different standards of behavior associated with different cultures explicit. For intercultural communication, it is essential that different cultural norms operating in different societies be explicitly formulated, that they be formulated in a way which makes it easy to compare them, but also that they be formulated in an unbiased way, without distortions deriving from rigid a priori frameworks. It is also essential that they be formulated in a non technical and generally accessible language.

Since cultural scripts can be formulated in lexical universals, they can be easily compared across cultures. What is more, comparison of cultures based on cultural scripts can be undertaken from a language-independent and a culture-neutral point of view, and can be free of any ethnocentric bias. The fact that cultural scripts are directly translatable from one language to another and that they can be accessed, so to speak, via any language whatsoever, ensures their universal and culture-independent character. Natural semantic metalanguage provides us with a universal system of notation for stating and comparing tacit cultural rules in terms of which different societies operate and in terms of which we can understand and make sense of differential communicative behavior.

NOTES

[1] The "natural semantic metalanguage" used in the present paper (and in the author's other works such as Wierzbicka, 1987, 1988, 1991a, 1991b and 1992a) is the outcome of an extensive empirical study of a wide range of languages, undertaken over two decades by the author and colleagues. On the basis of this search a set of lexical universals has been tentatively identified (see Goddard & Wierzbicka (Eds.), forthcoming; Wierzbicka, 1992b), and a universal metalanguage has been developed. Since this lexicographic metalanguage is carved out of natural language and can be understood directly via natural language, it has been called the "natural semantic metalanguage" (NSM). The latest version of the lexicon of this metalanguage, arrived at by trial and error on the basis of two decades of cross-linguistic lexicographic research, includes the following elements:

[substantives] I, you, someone, something, people
[determiners, quantifiers] this, the same, other, one, two, many (much), all
[mental predicates] know, want, think, feel, say
[actions, events] do, happen
[evaluative] good, bad
[descriptors] big, small
[intensifier] very
[meta-predicates] can, if, because, no (negation), like (how)
[time and place] when, where, after (before), under (above)
[taxonomy, partonymy] kind of, part of

These elements have their own, language-independent syntax. For example, the verb-like elements 'think', 'know', 'say', 'feel' and 'want' combine with "nominal" personal elements 'I', 'you', and 'someone', and take complex, proposition-like complements (such as 'I think: you did something bad'). (For fuller discussion, see Wierzbicka, 1991c.)

[2] Robinson and Giles (1990, p. 4) remind social scientists "to be open-minded and careful in the application of models derived in one culture when attempting to export them to others. What will prove to be universal to the species will be determined by evidence yet to be collected and theories yet to be created." In contrast to many other currently used models, the model presented in this paper is not derived from one culture and one language, but is based on a great deal of cross-linguistic evidence which has been collected over several years by a number of scholars (cf. Goddard & Wierzbicka (Eds.), forthcoming). The theory of cultural scripts is based on the empirical findings concerning conceptual universals—that is, linguistically embodied concepts which are indeed "universal to the species".

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ISSUES IN SECOND LANGUAGE LEARNING IN
A MULTILINGUAL CONTEXT

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ABSTRACT

Second language learning in a monolingual situation is perhaps not different
in kind from such learning in a multilingual situation, since there are factors
that are common to both contexts. There are, however, predictable differ-
ences in degree arising from a one-many or many-one language learning situ-
ation common to both contexts as opposed to a many-many language learning
situation typical of a multilingual context. Against the background of lan-
guage learning and teaching in Nigeria, issues of policy (especially with re-
gard to language choice at given levels of education), attitudes, curriculum,
material, teacher, and culture are examined and attention is drawn to the prob-
lems arising from these factors in relation to some current approaches to lan-
guage learning and teaching.

Second language learning occurs in a variety of contexts including foreign versus non-
foreign environment, formal versus informal setting, and monolingual versus multilingual situ-
ation.

A foreign environment is one in which the intended target language is not normally used.
For example, anyone learning Hausa or Kiswahili in the USA can only learn it as a foreign
language. On the other hand, a non-foreign environment can be either one where the target
language is natively spoken or at least used as an official language. Hence someone learning
English in England or in Nigeria is said to be learning it as a second language. The distinction
between a second language (L2) and a foreign language (FL) is not based on the environment
of acquisition alone. The possibilities of informal acquisition and development of non-native
varieties are also characteristics of a L2. In spite of the technical definition of second language
learning "to include all learning of languages other than the first in whatever situation or for
whatever purpose" (Cook 1991:5), we shall have occasion in this paper to make use of the
traditional distinction between L2 and FL where necessary.

A formal setting is a structured one designed specifically for language learning. This is
typically the classroom. An informal setting, however, is a natural one where a learner picks up
a language through interaction with those who speak it. An L2 may be acquired in a formal or
informal setting, but a FL is typically learnt in a formal setting. In spite of Krashen's (1981)

distinction between *acquisition,* which is a result of acquired knowledge in informal settings, and *learning,* which is a result of consciously learnt knowledge, we follow the general practice among second language researchers in referring to both phenomena as either second language acquisition (SLA) or second language learning (Cook 1991:1; Larsen-Freeman and Long 1991:6; Widdowson 1990:20-21).

MONOLINGUAL VERSUS MULTILINGUAL SITUATIONS

From the point of view of L2/FL acquisition, the distinction between a monolingual and a multilingual situation may be characterized in two ways — either in terms of source language (SL) groups or in terms of target language (TL) types.

In a monolingual situation, two kinds of SL groups are typically involved in L2/FL acquisition. On the one hand, several SL groups may be learning the predominantly spoken language in the country as a L2; for example, immigrants or ethnic minorities learning English in England. Let us refer to this as the *many-one* situation. On the other hand, a single SL group may be involved in the acquisition of several languages; for example, native English speakers in the USA learning French, German or Yoruba. This we may call the *one-many* situation. Both these situations also occur in a multilingual context. For example, several SL groups in Nigeria learning English will count as a many-one situation, while a single SL group learning English and another Nigerian language counts as a one-many situation.

The one situation which is only typical of a multilingual context is the existence of several dominant SL groups (and not just minorities) trying to acquire several target languages. For example, when major language groups in Nigeria acquire English, another Nigerian language and a foreign language, this is not comparable to minority SL groups in a monolingual situation acquiring the dominant language and perhaps thereafter a foreign language. In fact, such a case is more like two sequential situations: a many-one followed by a one-many situation. The multilingual case is more aptly referred to as a *many-many* situation.

The other way the difference between a monolingual and a multilingual situation may be characterized is by the type of language acquired. In any situation where more than one language is acquired, such languages are typically foreign languages in a monolingual situation, but they can be foreign languages and/or second languages (L2s) in a multilingual situation. What is even more interesting is that it is only in a multilingual situation that more than one L2 may be acquired. A typical example of this is SL groups in Nigeria learning English and a Nigerian language as L2 as well as French as a FL.

It should be clear from the above comparison that L2/FL acquisition in a multilingual context is not very different from such acquisition in a monolingual context. The differences observed are not so much differences *in kind* but rather *in degree.* It follows from the comparison that the same SLA theories may be found useful for both contexts, and similar problems in respect of methodology, syllabus design, teacher training, preparation of materials etc., may well be encountered, and hence, experiences gained in one context may be found useful in the other. However, the few differences identified point to a greater complexity in second language acquisition in a multilingual context.

From the point of view of language planning, more complicated policy decisions and

implementation procedures are called for. Teacher supply problems are multiplied as provision has to be made for the teaching of more languages. Similarly, materials have to be prepared for learning and instruction in many more languages, attitudes (especially as they affect implementation of policy) have to be considered, and the ever-present problem of cultural bias and cultural interference has to be taken account of, especially in so far as it affects communication and the content of teaching materials. It is these problems that are taken up in the rest of this paper, particularly in the light of the Nigerian experience.

LANGUAGE POLICY

The basis of any language teaching program is a prior decision on language policy. Such a policy may in turn reflect the language policy objectives set for the community or the nation, the so-called "macro-policy goals" (Tollefson 1981). The basic manifestation of the policy is language choice: Which languages are to be taught in the educational system and at which levels? What problems may be encountered in the implementation of the adopted policy?

The choice of languages depends on a number of factors including historical, political, demographic, economic, religious, and linguistic. The historical factor includes practices that have been in existence for a long time. For example, the use of English as a medium of instruction from upper primary grades to the tertiary level in most African countries that were formerly British colonies is largely due to the historical factor. In fact, it is doubtful whether from the historical point of view, one can even talk of a choice, since, as has been pointed out elsewhere, language policies in Africa continue to be a manifestation of an inheritance situation with the colonial experience continuing to shape and define post-colonial policies and practices: "Thus while it would seem that African nations make policy in education, what they actually do is carry on the logic of the policies of the past" (Bamgbose 1991: 69).

The political factor is concerned with the role assigned to a language in the framework of the nation or the international community. It includes the need to give a prominent place in education to a country's official and/or national language, the need to communicate with neighbouring countries and the need to participate in international communication.

The demographic factor concerns the relative weighting given to languages based on number of speakers. Other things being equal, a language with ten million speakers is likely to be given greater prominence in the educational policy than one with half a million speakers. Hence, a country's major languages are sometimes prescribed as languages to be learnt as second languages by speakers of other languages.

The economic factor is often employed in a negative sense to rule out languages whose inclusion in the educational system may be very expensive. In this sense, the factor puts "small group" (or to use the better known term, "minority") languages at a disadvantage. But it is equally possible to apply the economic factor to the opportunity cost of compulsory instruction in a second language measured in terms of high drop-out rate, poor performance, high cost of imported expertise and the consequences of the use of ill-adapted material (Bokamba and Tlou 1980).

The religious factor leads to the inclusion of a language of religion in the educational n. An example of this is the provision for the teaching of Arabic as a foreign language in

junior secondary (high) schools in Nigeria.

The linguistic factor is concerned with the state of languages to be selected for use in education. Languages that already have good descriptions (including grammars and dictionaries) as well as substantial literature stand a better chance of being selected in contrast to those that are yet to be reduced to writing or adequately described.

In the light of the factors described above, Nigeria's educational language policy has made provision for five types of languages:

(a) A mother tongue (i.e a child's first language)
(b) A language of the immediate community (i.e. a language spoken by a wider community and generally learnt and used by those whose mother tongue is a small group or minority language).
(c) The three major languages: Hausa, Yoruba and Igbo selected on demographic grounds.
(d) English (as a second language)
(e) Foreign languages (i.e. French and Arabic)

Choosing which languages should be taught appears to be a much easier task than deciding at which level each language will feature. The age-old convention dating back to the missionary days has been to start with the mother tongue as a medium of instruction and continue with it for the first three years of primary education. Thereafter, English takes over as the medium of instruction till the end of the educational cycle. However, English is taught as a subject from the beginning.

The main bone of contention has always been the position of English in relation to the local languages. Should the teaching of English commence as soon as possible becoming the medium of instruction as early as possible or should a thorough grounding be given first in the mother tongue before English takes over as the medium of instruction? The pendulum has generally swung from one of these positions to the other, with the missionary practice serving as the mean between the two extremes. Under the doctrine of "earlier means better" and the alleged beneficial influence of the 'direct method' of L2/FL teaching, an approach known as "Straight for English" (which involves teaching in English from the child's first day at school) was introduced in Northern Nigeria in 1959 only to be abandoned seven years later. At the other end of the scale, an experimental project known as the Six-Year Primary Project involving the use of an African language as a medium of instruction for the entire elementary education, with English taught as a subject only, was introduced in 1970 in one school in Oyo State and subsequently extended to several other schools (Fafunwa et.al 1989). In spite of these variations, the traditional 3 plus 3 language medium is still the norm in most elementary schools.

The *National Policy on Education* (1981) adopts the traditional division of levels between Nigerian languages and English; but it also prescribes a language of the immediate community as an alternative to the mother tongue both at pre-primary and primary levels, while making it mandatory for one of the three major languages to be taught at L2 at Junior Secondary School. French and Arabic are optional foreign languages also to be offered at secondary level.

It is easier to prescribe than to enforce the levels at which languages are to be taught.

Distortions often arise from such factors as parental preferences, non-availability of teachers for certain languages, inadequacy of materials, half-hearted implementation, etc. To cite one or two examples, although pre-primary education is supposed to be in the mother tongue or the language of the immediate community, the fact that such schools are private fee-paying schools not funded by the Government weakens the ability of the educational authorities to enforce the policy. The parents who send their children to such schools prefer English and that is what they get. In the case of the major Nigerian languages required to be acquired as L2 in Junior Second-ary Schools, this remains an empty provision since teachers are not available to cover the languages and the schools involved. Although certification is supposed to be denied to those who have not compiled with this provision, an escape route is found in waivers which are routinely given from year to year.

When the results of language teaching and learning in schools are evaluated and inad-equacies are detected, it is obvious that the blame cannot go to quality of teacher, method of teaching, and poor materials alone. One of the first questions to be asked is the adequacy of the policy as well as its implementation procedures.

LANGUAGE ATTITUDES

Having a policy and implementing it well are not even enough for success in second language learning. The question of attitudes has to be seriously considered. It is the lack of interest in a mother tongue medium that is responsible for the derailment of this policy at pre-primary level. Similarly, it is the lack of interest in the acquisition of a major Nigerian lan-guage, especially on the part of speakers of small-group languages (in addition to lack of teach-ers) that has virtually killed the second Nigerian language policy.

It is generally accepted that there is a positive correlation between attitudes and motiva-tion on the one hand and achievement on the other. Gardner et al (1977:234) states that studies on this topic "are in agreement showing that measures of achievement in the second language are substantially related to measures of attitudes and motivation." Their own detailed study of an intensive language program in French based on a complex of measures confirms the same general conclusion. In fact, Gardner's SLA model is based on a combination of attitudes, mo-tivation and aptitude all leading to L2 success (Gardner 1985). Yet, experience has shown that there are cases in which attitudes are favourable and motivation quite high without a commen-surate outcome in terms of achievement.

In Nigeria, there is overwhelming interest in the acquisition of English to the extent that in some elite families, English is forced on the children as the language of communication, while education in English-medium schools is highly favoured. In a small study of patterns of language use in the office, Adegbija (1991) reports percentages ranging from 80 to 98 percent in favour of English use in all activities except informal discussion with workmates. One rea-son for the great fascination with English is its "wealth-getting" role, i.e. the fact that it opens doors to the most lucrative jobs. Yet, in spite of the great interest, performance in English in secondary school certificate examination and University Matriculation examination has been very poor in the last few years. It follows from this that factors such as aptitude, learning onment, teaching facilities, adequate supply of teachers, suitable curriculum and method-

ology all have a role to play in the outcome of the learning encounter.

Appel and Muysken (1987) have drawn attention to studies showing that motivation may not necessarily be a good predictor of success in second language acquisition. They then conclude that "Second-language learners cannot be held responsible for their failure because of supposed lack of motivation. Attitudes and subsequent motivation result from certain social-political conditions. They are the result of interactions between characteristics of the individual second language learner and the social environment, especially the target-language community" (p. 94). While it is right to draw attention to the simplistic nature of the motivation-success equation, it is doutbful whether seeking refuge in Schumann's acculturation model is the solution. According to Schumann (1978) successful learning means becoming part of the target culture. If the second language learner feels superior or inferior to speakers of the target language, he or she will not learn the second language well. If this is so, one would wonder how subjugated colonial subjects made to feel inferior (and ultimately accepting that they are inferior) have managed to learn and be proficient in the English language?

LANGUAGE CURRICULUM

Just as language policy is basic to any language learning program, the curriculum deriving from the policy as well as the methodology forms a major plank in the implementation of the policy. In Nigeria, as in many other English Language Teaching (ELT) situations particularly in the Third World, the prevailing curriculum makes a division between Language and Literature, and within language, emphasis is placed on the four skills of reading, writing, listening and speaking. A typical example is the "English Curriculum for Junior Secondary Schools" (Federal Ministry of Education, Science and Technology 1985) which separates the teaching into the sub-headings: Vocabulary Development (including range of vocabulary in different domains), Comprehension (including listening and reading comprehension skills), Structures (rule-governed language structures and their use in communication), Spoken English, Writing (especially effective communication in the written medium), Literature, and Evaluation of attainment in the various skills.

The theoretical basis of the syllabus is presented as follows:

> Methodologically, there are three approaches to syllabus construction. First, we have the grammar-induced syllabus motivated by the need to internalize the rules and sentence structures of the language to the point of automaticity. Second is the situation-induced syllabus which attempts to tackle the problem of appropriateness as conditioned by situations. Finally, the meaning-induced syllabus attempts to help the language user recognize and use different varieties of sentence structures and words peculiar to a given semantic demand.

But the Nigerian experience in English language usage in our schools reveals that our problems cannot be solved if we restrict ourselves to a particular approach in syllabus construction. Consequently our approach is eclectic, for we have drawn from each of the three approaches with a view to solving our problems. (FMEST 1985:3).

In spite of the seeming emphasis on eclecticism of approach, the structures provided in some of the Units are reminiscent of the traditional information-processing model of SLA in which learning starts from controlled processes and progresses through drills and practice until it becomes automatic (McLaughlin, Rossman and McLeod 1983). The kind of syllabus with which this behaviourist model is associated has been called Structural-Oral-Situation (S-O-S) Pedagogy which Prabhu (1987:2) describes as the use of structurally and lexically graded syllabuses, situational presentation of all new teaching items, balanced attention to the four language skills (but with listening and speaking preceding reading and writing) and a great deal of controlled practice using techniques such as substitution and choral repetition.

While ELT in the Nigerian context has benefited from in-depth studies of inadequacies of mere structural syllabuses, with suggestions for the need to take into consideration varieties of use, registers, style, vocabulary development (Grieve 1964), the syllabuses in Nigerian L2 and French have not progressed very much from the audio-lingual approach with a progression from oracy to literacy, while the situational material in the case of Nigerian languages moves from naming to greetings, followed by other cultural situations in the home, in the market place, on the farm etc.

The reference to a "meaning-induced syllabus" in the ELT curriculum is an indication of the awareness of the requirements of the communicative approach to language teaching. Although reference is sometimes made to "a communicative syllabus", Widdowson (1990: 130) has correctly pointed out that there is no such thing as a communicative syllabus. What exists is a communicative methodology since even a structural syllabus can be taught in a communicative manner. Swan (1985) in a devastating critique of the communicative approach has advanced cogent reasons particularly against the usage-use dichotomy, appropriateness, lack of fit between notions and structures and the total negation of insights from the learner's mother tongue. One aspect of the critique which we cannot agree with is the contention that one doesn't need to be taught about use before knowing that such structural exercises as 'This is my room', 'This is my house', 'This is my book' which the author learnt in Russian can only be used in appropriate situational contexts. It may well be that this is a case where adult learners are superior to younger ones in the early stages of second language acquisition (Scarcella and Higa 1981), but there is an actual instance where a young boy seeing a whiteman passing through a village went up to him and said, "Good morning sir. This is my head!" From this incident, one can tell at what stage of English acquisition the boy is. Obviously, the expression has nothing to do with the situation in which it is uttered. All that it goes to show is that the poor child is showing off the little English that he knows, and who better to do it to than a native English speaker?

It is perhaps inevitable that a certain amount of non-functional structures will be introduced in the early stages of language learning. Structures such as "This is a -" are useful for introducing vocabulary items. Others such as "The - is on the -" are useful for showing rlationships between objects. However, it is important to move away from the abstract context of classroom acquisition to application of such structures to appropriate real-life situations.

One other example of the inadequacy of a structural approach is the universal exercise of the shortened answer which learners are encouraged to produce in place of the long one. For example,

Are you coming?   Yes, I am
Is she young?   Yes, she is.

Bouton (1987) has drawn attention to the need to qualify such answers in the light of pragmatic perspective. As he rightly observes, short answers are inappropriate to questions such as:

Are you going to miss our party tonight?   Yes, I am.
Did you lose the book I gave you?   Yes, I did.

One simply does not give such short answers without some apology or reassurance to indicate that no slight is intended. In spite of the view expressed by Swan (1985: 91) that "pragmatics (the study of what we do with language) is greatly overvalued at the moment in the same way as grammar has been overvalued in the past", any effective language teaching and language learning cannot afford to ignore the role of pragmatics in relation to language structure.

Underlying any curriculum design and methodology is a theory of language acquisition. As far as SLA is concerned, some of these theories, including the Monitor Model, information processing model, acculturation model, and motivation-aptitude model have been mentioned in the course of the preceding discussion. One other interesting model not specifically mentioned is the Bangalore Project task-based model in which language form is learnt through a concentration on meaning (Brumfit 1984, Prabhu 1987). Although each of these theories presents a useful insight into an aspect of SLA, we cannot agree more with critics of SLA theories who conclude that, useful as SLA research and theorizing may be, it is "premature for any one of these models to be adopted as the sole basis for teaching, because, however right or wrong they may be, none of them covers more than a small fraction of what the students need" (Cook 1991: 131). This same view is reinforced by Larsen-Freeman and Long (1991: 3-4) when they say:

at the moment SLA research does reveal to a certain extent what learners do and what they know. It has not yet, however, reached the point where we can say with assurance how they have come to do and to know these things, and we are further still from saying what teaching practices should therefore follow.

What all this shows is that models and theories of SLA are to be taken as a guide and no rigid adherence to a specific one is called for, since no single model or theory may be considered adequate for now for all ramifications of second language teaching and learning. However, any theory that ignores the role of the first language in second language acquisition or plays down the communicative role of the second language in a social context is most likely to be farthest from any claim of adequacy.

LANGUAGE MATERIALS

In deciding on language materials to be used in L2 or FL instruction, a number of basic questions must be considered: What variety must texts be based on? Within this variety, which examples can be considered appropriate, especially taking into consideration learner needs as well as social and pragmatic uses of the language? Since language is culture-based, how should the material be organized to reflect differences in the learner's culture and that of the language he or she is acquiring?

In teaching a foreign language, the question of variety or model of the language to be taught does not present a major problem. The usual practice is to present some native-speaker variety and aim at the acquisition of this model, even though actual performance may fall short of it. In the case of an L2, however, another dimension arises because of the institutionalized and generally acceptable varieties which qualify to be used as models of teaching and acquisition. English as a second language provides a good example of the considerations that come into play in this regard.

Notwithstanding the concerns of those who believe in a monolithic international standard English as the proper norm for SLA, the case for pluralism of standards arising from nativization of English in non-native contexts ably put by Kachru (1987, 1989) is now generally accepted in ELT circles. Thus, the norm of English to be taught in Nigeria will be different from that of Liberia and both of them will be considered different but not inferior to native varieties. There are, however, two problems that have to be tackled. First, since each non-native variety consists of subvarieties ranging from educated standard to sub-standard and pidginized forms, which subvariety does one consider as representing the norm for the variety? Second, how acceptable are specific usages especially for purposes of teaching and examining?

In relation to the first problem, experience has shown that certain extremes can be easily eliminated and a broad consensus reached on an educated standard. The second problem of which usages to accept and which to reject constitutes a more serious problem. Ideally, an "unacceptable" usage must not be found in a textbook; it should not be marked right by the teacher nor must it be allowed in examinations. The complexity of this problem can be illustrated in the results of a study conducted by Williams (1984). Forty items including pluralization of mass nouns, omission of definite article, adjective used as verb, wrong question tag etc. most of which are common features of Nigerian English were subjected to an Acceptability Rating Scale as well as a forced-choice format in a Use of English test administered to 208 graduates and 150 tertiary level students respectively. In general, the results showed that the higher the level of education, the greater the rejection of the so-called Nigerianisms. But there were also inconsistencies. For example, while *furnitures* was low on the acceptability scale (10% of graduates and 39% of tertiary students), equipments was considered more acceptable (35% of graduates, 69% of tertiary students). Some expressions such as "The Secretary travelled to Kaduna", "Majority of the members" were overwhelmingly accepted by both categories of respondents. What this shows is that although Nigerian English is a reality, there is still a lot of indeterminacy when it comes to particular expressions that should be admitted, especially for teaching and examining purposes (Bamgbose 1983).

In considering what is appropriate and what is not, linguistic appropriateness in terms of ctness of rules or variety is only one aspect. Texts must also be geared to learner needs and

opportunities for use. In the *Foreign Service Institute Hausa Basic Course* (Hodge and Umaru 1963) one of the sentences in Unit 3 is *ìnà nè ófìshìn jàkádàn Amìrkà*? '*Where is the American Consulate*'? For a text meant for American students arriving in Northern Nigeria, this may make sense, but the utility of this expression for functioning generally in that part of the country is almost nil. Several manuals for teaching second or foreign African languages often start with greetings. In the cultural context, this may make good sense; but it is wrong to extend this to language manuals in Western societies where greetings don't have such a high functional load. From my experience in Germany, a manual for Africans learning German should give high priority to the teaching of numerals. This is because one has to use them in everyday encounters in the shops, banks, supermarkets, restaurants, etc. Failure to master numerals in such situations may necessitate the device of topic avoidance (Tarone 1980: 429) for example, by simply handing over a large denomination note whenever payment has to be made, and of course, not disputing any bill presented.

Learner needs also presuppose avoidance of empty linguistic examples designed to teach particular grammatical points. The famous ELT drill, *Go to the door*, *What are you doing?*, *I am going to the door.*, falls into this category. Its pragmatic use is virtually nil as it is limited to classroom exchange. This is the sort of text that has been referred to as 'TEFLese' - "a language designed to illustrate the workings of a simplified grammatical system and bearing a beguiling but ultimately false similarity to real English" (Willis 1990: vii). It is reminiscent of Edward Sapir's famous linguistic sentence "The farmer kills the duckling" whose relevance is not in any sense communicative but merely illustrative of the agentive, the singular and the diminutive suffixes, as well as the SVO word order.

A problematic aspect of second language learning is the contact and possible conflict between the learner's culture and that represented by the target language. Although it is possible to adapt a second language to express one's own culture, the fact is that there is still a constant relevance and comparison between the cultural norms of one's own language and those of a second language. Bamgbose (1992) identifies two kinds of cultural interference: language-motivated and culture-motivated. The former is a case where the interference from the first language to the second involves a transfer of an aspect of the culture of the first language into the second. For example, the transfer of the word order of one language to another may appear to be no more than a mere linguistic phenomenon. Hence to say "I and you" instead of "You and I" is to use a phrasal coordination which sounds impolite in English. The other type of interference is culture-motivated and it arises from an attempt to translate certain aspects of one's culture into the language embodying the culture of another. For example, a Yoruba-English bilingual who refers to "a next-room neighbour" instead of "a next-door neighbour" is only trying to express the reality of his own cultural experience of a neighbour who lives in the next room in a multi-tenanted house, instead of the more affluent and rarer situation of a neighbour who lives in the next house or apartment.

The relevance of cultural interference in the selection of texts is the bearing it has on appropriateness. What is culturally appropriate in one situation may not be in another. For example, Quirk's (1962: 217) letter-writing rule that prescribes an opening with "Dear Mr. Jones" and an ending with "Yours sincerely," which must not be mixed with "Dear Sir" and "Yours faithfully," cannot be taught in ESL situations in many African countries. This is because of the cultural norms of respect for elders which will prevent their being addressed by

name. Instead, what most people do is to mix the formulas by opening the letter with "Dear Sir" and closing with "Yours sincerely", - a practice which Quirk says experienced and well-educated people avoid and frown upon.

The implication of linguistic and cultural pluralism in the second language situation is multiple standards and a potential for cultural conflict, for example, in the production of expressions which may be interpreted by one's interlocutors as impolite or whose meaning may be entirely misunderstood. Textbook writers have to be sensitive to such expressions as well as to negative value-laden terms rooted in Anglo-Saxon culture. For example, compounds with 'black' such as *black-hearted, black art, black eye, blackleg, blacklist, blackmail, black mark, black market, black sheep, blackspot*, etc. will have to be explained against the background of the culture that gave rise to these pejorative meanings. Observed biases in American ESL teaching materials are said to include sexism, racism, ageism, elitism, heterosexism, etc. (Littlejohn and Windeatt 1989).

LANGUAGE TEACHERS

The teacher has always been the focus of the second language teaching classroom. In spite of approaches that tend to de-emphasize the role of the teacher, it is estimated that "teacher-talk makes up around 70% of classroom language" (Cook 1991:94). In many countries in the African region characterized by high pupils-teacher ratio, the role of the teacher becomes more important still, especially as she or he may have to cope with large classes. It is reported that in 1985-86, some African countries had ratios of 60-70 pupils per teacher (UNESCO-UNICEF 1990: 27-28) and large classes ranging from 40 to 60 pupils are not unusual in some primary schools. The context in which second language teaching takes place is therefore often characterized by inadequate teacher strength, and poorly qualified or even unqualified teachers.

In Nigeria, it is recognized that the only viable solution to the teacher problem lies in the training and production of more teachers; but almost in desperation and as a short-term measure, it has been proposed that unqualified native speakers be employed to teach Nigerian languages as second languages much in the same way as artisans are recruited to teach vocational subjects. The outcome from such teaching is expected to be at least a rudimentary oral acquaintance with the language. Needless to say, this is a most unsatisfactory practice, and it is not surprising that it has been singularly unsuccessful in the Junior High Schools where it was meant to operate.

The more viable strategies also being employed include training and deployment of specialist teachers and acculturation programs. Second language teachers of Nigerian languages are made to specialize in their first language as well as a Nigerian L2. Because they major in two languages, their value as language teachers is further enhanced. The conventional training of teachers of ESL remains unchanged, but there is more emphasis on language skills as opposed to a literature-dominated curriculum. What remains to be done is the need to recognize specialist teachers of English at all levels of education, including the primary school. In the Six-Year Primary Project, a specialist teacher was used for teaching English in the experimental classes, but this aspect of the Project was later abandoned. Until the general quality of teachers improves, it is wasteful and unproductive to expect every primary school teacher to be

a good model of both spoken and written English, even of the variety accepted as the norm in Nigeria.

In order to accelerate the production of specialist graduate teachers of Nigerian languages, a National Institute for Nigerian languages has been established at Aba in Abia State of Nigeria. Students admitted to this Institute will major in two Nigerian languages, and be given a reasonable background in linguistics and methodology. Such specialized training is a sensible approach to the second language teacher problem.

One of the recurrent problems in pre-service training of language teachers is the need to give them maximum exposure, especially to the spoken form of the language. In the case of foreign languages such as French, German and Russian, university students had built in into their program, a compulsory one-year abroad scheme. This scheme worked out very well when foreign aid was easily obtained, and the Nigerian economy itself was strong enough to sustain the cost of fares to Europe for all language students. In the era of poor funding, an alternative was found in sending students to the neighbouring West African country of Togo. Even that has now become too expensive. Now, a final solution has been found in "the village concept". A French Village has been established in Badagry near the border with Benin Republic and an Arabic Village has also been established in Borno State near the border with the Chad Republic. For Nigerian languages, acculturation is effected through exchange programs between institutions in different parts of the country.

The teacher problem discussed above is intended to show that no matter how good a language policy is, how effective the curriculum, and how adequate the teaching materials, not much can be achieved without the guidance of a qualified teacher. As the trite saying goes, it is better to have poor materials in the hands of a good teacher than excellent materials in the hands of a bad teacher.

CONCLUSION

Second language learning in a multilingual context presents a challenge to varying groups of persons involved in the language teaching enterprise: the policy-maker, the curriculum designer, the materials writer, but above all the teacher and the learner. One essential ingredient for success is a positive attitude to a multilingual and multicultural context of language instruction. Following Pennington (1989: 96), there are two ways of looking at multilingualism and multiculturalism in the context of second language acquisition. From a narrow, pessimistic, monocultural perspective, their attendant multiple learner needs, incidence of bilingualism, and varied cultural backgrounds, values and experiences can be seen as an impediment; but a more optimistic and positive approach is to consider these factors as an asset that the second language teacher could exploit for successful language teaching and learning.

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CROSSCULTURAL SPEECH ACT RESEARCH AND THE CLASSROOM

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INTRODUCTION

Pragmatics, especially speech act theory, has proved to be one of the most attractive areas of research in language teaching and learning for one obvious reason: it is assumed to provide access to a research area and a set of methodologies which help in teaching and learning the use of language in context. As far as I know, there has been no attempt to examine this assumption explicitly. In this paper, I hope to accomplish three goals: give a brief account of the current state of crosscultural speech act research, evaluate its usefulness for the language classroom, and suggest directions for research which will have more relevance for the classroom. Before I begin, however, let me outline briefly the theoretical background of crosscultural speech act research.

SPEECH ACTS

Speech act theory, as is well-known, is concerned with the use of language to do things and provides a universal characterization of the relationship between 'uttering' and 'doing' (Austin 1962, Searle 1969). There are clearly problems with speech act theory which have been discussed extensively in the literature. For instance, the difference between performatives and constantives is not clear-cut, as was recognized by Austin and has been further discussed by Leech (1983), Levinson (1983), Searle (1969), and others. It is questionable how far speech acts such as promise, *offer*, *request*, *demand*, etc. are discrete categories (Leech 1983). Leech (1983: 178) suggests that they may be more like *puddles*, *ponds* and *lakes* than *monkeys* and *giraffes*. It is also not clear that the locutionary sense, illocutionary force, and perlocutionary effects can be calculated exclusively on the basis of an utterance and the speaker's intentions in uttering it. The role of illocutionary force indicating devices other than the utterance itself, and contextual variables, including the hearer and the receiver, are important for at least some illocutionary acts (Edmondson 1981, Hancher 1979, Leech 1983). One crucial area of diffi-culty from the point of view of the classroom is the relationship between speech acts, the cooperative principle (Grice 1975), and politeness principles (Brown and Levinson 1987). This topic has not yet been explored explicitly, although it has been mentioned briefly in Brown and Levinson (1987), Leech (1983), and Levinson (1983), among others. This point will be taken

er.

CROSSCULTURAL SPEECH ACTS

Recent research on crosscultural speech acts has raised serious questions about the universal applicability of several theoretical notions of pragmatics (Levinson 1983, Green 1989), including speech acts, Gricean maxims (Grice 1975), and the politeness principle (Leech 1983). Unlike theoretical discussions, where an implicit assumption is made that speech acts refer to the same social acts in all cultures, Fraser et al. (1980: 78) explicitly claim that although languages may differ as to how and when speech acts are to be performed, every language "makes available to the user the same basic set of speech acts. . . the same set of strategies—semantic formulas—for performing a given speech act." In contrast, Wierzbicka (1985a, 1985b) claims that speech genres and speech acts are not comparable across cultures and suggests a semantic metalanguage for the cross-cultural comparison of speech acts.[1] Flowerdew (1990) points out some of the central problems of speech act theory, including the question of the number of speech acts. Wolfson et al. (1989) suggest that "just as different cultures divide the color spectrum into noncorresponding overlapping terms, so the repertoire of speech acts for each culture is differently organized" (p. 180). Matsumoto (1988, 1989) questions the adequacy of the theoretical notions of conversational implicature as proposed by Grice, and 'face' as postulated by Brown and Levinson (1978, 1987) to account for the politeness phenomena in Japanese conversational interactions. Wetzel (1988) concludes that the notion of 'power' as discussed in Brown and Gilman (1960) is culturally bound and, therefore, not applicable to a discussion of verbal interaction in Japanese.

Discussing the problems in attempting to use the speech act theory in the analysis of conversation, Schegloff (1988) asserts that speech act theoretic analysis has no way of handling temporality and sequentiality of utterances in actual conversation. Schmidt (1983: 126) points out the limited applicability of speech act theory in the analysis of conversation because speech acts "are usually defined in terms of speaker intentions and beliefs, whereas the nature of conversation depends crucially on interaction between speaker and hearer."

Furthermore, cross-cultural speech act research so far has utilized only a limited range of variables, e.g., those of social distance and dominance (Blum-Kulka, House, and Kasper 1989), and, as Rose (1992) shows, even those are not well-defined.

As regards the data for empirical research on speech acts, only a few studies have utilized the ethnographic method of observation and analysis of utterances produced in real life interactions. Notable among them are the studies of compliments in American English by Manes and Wolfson (1981), of compliments in American and South African English by Herbert (1989), of invitations in American English by Wolfson, D'Amico-Reisner, and Huber (1983), of requests in Hebrew by Blum-Kulka, Danet, and Gherson (1985), and of apologies in New Zealand English by Holmes (1990). The bulk of speech act research, including crosscultural speech act research, has been conducted using either role play or written questionnaires. Furthermore, only a limited range of speech acts have been researched, the most commonly studied ones being requests and apologies, as in Blum-Kulka, House, and Kasper (1989).

Blum-Kulka, House, and Kasper (1989) represents the culmination of the project on Crosscultural Speech Act Realization Patterns (CCSARP) initiated in 1982 by a number of researchers in several countries. Data were collected from the following native speaker groups: Danish; American, Australian, and British English; Canadian French; German; Hebrew; and

Argentinian Spanish. Among the non-native speakers were those of: English in Denmark, Germany, and the United States; German in Denmark; and Hebrew in Israel. The instrument used for data collection was a Discourse Completion Task (DCT) consisting of scripted dialogues of sixteen situations, eight each for requests and apologies. The tasks were constructed to account for variation in speech act realization determined by social distance and dominance. The tasks did involve some role play in that the subjects were, for example, asked to assume the roles of a waiter, a professor, etc. According to Blum-Kulka (1989: 68)), the results of the CCSARP data "revealed the prominence of conventional indirectness as a highly favored requesting option exploited by all the languages studied." For apologies, Olshtain (1989: 171) claims that the CCSARP data showed "surprising similarities in IFID [Illocutionary Force Indicating Device] and expression of responsibility preferences."

RELEVANCE FOR LANGUAGE CLASSROOM

The question that is crucial for relating research in pragmatics to language learning and teaching is: how applicable are the findings of crosscultural speech act research to the teaching of a second or foreign language? Let me review some of the findings of a select number of studies to arrive at an answer to the question.

Blum-Kulka, House, and Kasper (1989) claim to have met the challenge of widening the scope of speech act research by breaking out of the mold of Anglo-cultural ethnocentricity. However, as Rose (1992) points out, all of the languages and varieties studied under CCSARP are either Germanic or Romance, and all of the cultures are either western, or heavily influenced by western culture. Blum-Kulka et al. (1989: 14) themselves note that the DCT was designed to reflect "every day occurrences of the type expected to be familiar to speakers across *western* cultures" [emphasis added].

That, however, does not mean that there are no studies that incorporate data from non-western languages and cultures. Rose (1992) is a large-scale study of requests in American English and Japanese involving more than 150 Japanese subjects and 90 English subjects. The study used both the Discourse Completion Task (DCT) and Multiple Choice Questionnaire (MCQ) to determine the efficacy of such instruments in eliciting reliable data for crosscultural speech act research. The results are interesting on two counts. First, the results of the DCT challenge the prevalent notion that Japanese cultural norms prefer indirectness in verbal communication. The DCT results showed that Japanese requests were more direct than English requests, and conventionally indirect requests were most frequent for both groups. Secondly, for both English and Japanese, there were significant differences between responses on the DCT and the MCQ. While Americans chose to opt out of requests more frequently on the MCQ, Japanese chose to both opt out and use hints more frequently on the MCQ. Rose (1992: 107) concludes that the patterning of responses "seems to support the claim that there are problems with elicited data."

Another study of requests in Chinese and English (Huang 1992), which involved 53 subjects in Taiwan and 27 subjects in the USA, showed that the Chinese preferred the strategies of direct request, including imperatives and query preparatory, which refer to the addressee's and willingness to carry out the act. American English speakers, on the other hand,

preferred the query preparatory in all situations. Also, there were significant differences between the use of alerters, such as "excuse me," or a term of address. The Chinese data had more occurrences of alerters, especially terms of address, in all situations as compared to the English data. Another significant finding was that there was no evidence for a 'bulge' phenomenon (Wolfson 1989) in Chinese. That is, unlike English, the two extremes of social distance—minimum and maximum—do not trigger similar behavior among the subjects as compared to relationships which are more toward the center.

Yet another pilot study of requests in American English and Thai (Tirawanchai 1992) involving 8 American and 8 Thai subjects shows that whereas the most common request strategy in the American data is query preparatory, the Thai subjects had no preferred strategy across the situations. What is significant is that in several situations, the Thai subjects preferred not to request in order to avoid confrontation. The distribution of opting out of the speech act across situations is as follows in the data:

1. STs:	1	2	3	6	7	8
AE	12.5%	12.5%	—	12.5%	—	—
Thai	50%	37.5%	75%	25%	25%	87.5%

Situation 1 involves an unfamiliar peer, whereas situations 3 and 8 involve a person of higher status—a professor. In the first situation, half of the Thai subjects preferred not to perform the speech act, and in the other two, a majority of them preferred the same course of action (or, lack of action). These results seem to correlate with the value the Thais attach to avoiding confrontation, and showing respect to persons of superior status.

Although these studies point to the undeniable value of including data from non-western languages and cultures in speech act research, they illustrate several difficulties in arriving at a clear understanding of speech acts in specific languages and cultures. The variability of data determined by elicitation instruments—DCT vs. MCQ—needs further examination. Also, these studies still have the same limitations as earlier studies. Except for the few ethnographic studies mentioned earlier, all these studies draw data from a limited population—university or college students. They are also restricted to domains of interaction familiar to the subject population. It is difficult to claim that generalizations based on such studies, which elicit data consistent with some assumed 'norm' in the community, would be valid for the culture as a whole, and should be presented in the classroom as models. This is not to deny that these studies have value if they do elicit the assumed 'norms' instead of 'real' performance data; however, they can not be the sole basis for postulating generalizations about the 'usual' practice in the speech community.

DIRECTIONS FOR RESEARCH

Does that mean that we should abandon the attempts at incorporating insights of research in pragmatics, and especially speech acts, into language teaching and learning? The answer is obvious: any attempt at reducing the danger of what Thomas (1983) calls 'pragmatic failure' is

worth making. A slight digression may make my point clearer.

The misunderstanding resulting from cross-cultural linguistic interaction was explicitly recognized in several quarters almost a century ago. For instance, Holcombe (1895: 274-275, quoted in Goffman 1967: 29) observes:

> Much of the falsehood to which the Chinese as a nation are said to be addicted is a result of the demands of etiquette. A plain, frank "no" is the height of discourtesy. Refusal or denial of any sort must be softened and toned down into an expression of regretted inability. . . Centuries of practice in this form of evasion have made the Chinese matchlessly fertile in the invention and development of excuses. . .

More recently, discussing the interpretation native speakers of English give to the utterances of non-native speakers, Gass and Selinker (1983: 12) state (emphasis in the original):

> These speakers are often viewed as rude or uncooperative,. . . or, arrogant or insincere. Native speakers are much more likely to attribute grammatical or phonological errors to a lack of knowledge of the target language. . . conversational features are subtle and not easily recognizable; hence their basis is attributed not to the lang*uage* of the speaker but to the *personality* of the speaker.

In order to produce crosscultural speech act research which would be useful in language teaching and learning and reduce the chances of pragmatic failure, several theoretical and methodological problems need to be solved. I will concentrate on only a few of these.

First, we need explicit criteria of comparability across languages and cultures to identify particular speech acts, or sets of speech acts. The labels we have been using are inadequate, as has been pointed out in the literature cited above. For instance, there are no speech act labels equivalent to apologizing, complimenting, requesting, and thanking in Hindi (see Y. Kachru 1993 for a detailed discussion of expressing gratitude and apology in Hindi). It does not, however, mean that Hindi speakers do not express regret, appreciation, gratitude, etc. The expressions that are roughly equivalent to *apology*, *compliment*, *request* and *thank* are given in 2a-d, respectively (the letters in parentheses indicate the sources of the item: H=Hindi, S=Sanskrit, and U=Urdu):

2. a. *khed* (S),'pain, distress'; *kṣəmā* (S), *māſſ* (U) `forgiveness'
    b. *bəṛāſ* (H), *prəšnsā* (S), *tārſſ* (U) 'praise'
    c. *ənurodh* (S) 'request', *prārthənā* (S) 'prayer'
    d. *ābhār* (S), *krītəʃñətā* (S), *šukrə* (U) 'gratitude'

Note, however, that all the above items have equivalents in English which are far from the sense of apology, etc. This can be clarified by looking at one example in some detail. The lexical item khed in Hindi does not have the properties of apology, though the bilingual dictionaries cite the item as having the same sense. According to Wierzbicka (1987:215):

3. *apologize* means

I know that I *caused something to happen* that was bad for you
I think that y*ou may think something bad about me* because of that and
  feel something bad *towards me* because of that
I say: I feel something bad because of that
I don't want you to *think something bad about me* because of that and to
  feel something bad *towards me* because of that
I say this because I should say it to you

On the other hand,
khed prəkəṭ kərnā means
I know something happened that was bad for you
I think that you may feel bad because of that
I say: I feel bad because of that
I don't want you to feel bad because of that
I say this because I think I should say it to you

Examples: *mujhe khed hai ki bāriš se āpko pərešānT huT.*

I am sorry that you were inconvenienced by rain.

*mujhe khed hai ki səxt sirdərd kT vəjəh se māĩ āpke sāth
nāṭək dekhne nə jā səkT.*

I regret that I could not go to the play with you because of a severe
headache.

Note that the Hindi item does not express any personal causation for whatever happened,
or any ill feeling on the part of the addressee toward the one who is expressing regret [see the
italicized items in the meaning of *apologize.*].

Similarly, there is no exact equivalent for the term *politeness* in Hindi. The bilingual
dictionaries (Bahri 1960, Bulke 1968) give the following equivalents:

4. Bahri: *sīṣṭətā,* (culture, learning, refinement), *saujə̃nyə,* (goodness,
    kindness, benevolence, friendliness), *sīṣṭacǎr* (practice or conduct of the
    learned or virtuous, good manners, proper behavior: MonierWilliams 1899)
    Bulke: *šīṣṭətā, bhədrətā* [from *bhədrə* (disciplined, cultured, edu-
    cated) + *tā* (nominalizing suffix)]

In some recent studies of Indian English, however, the terms *məryādā* "propriety of
conduct" and *lihāz* "deference" have been suggested as representing the relevant concepts
or *politeness* and *deference* in the Indian context (Y. Kachru 1991, 1992, Pandharipande 1992).

A detailed discussion of what these terms mean is beyond the scope of this study.

Secondly, we must have more explicit knowledge of how speech acts are constrained by domains of interaction, status and role relationships, and other situational factors. For instance, in the public domain, cross-sex complimenting behavior with respect to one's appearance is impossible in South Asian society. Complimenting someone on his/her healthy appearance, or complimenting someone's child's appearance could produce anxiety with respect to the 'evil eye' phenomenon.[2] Complimenting someone on his/her learning, wisdom, accomplishments, skills, actions or behavior, however, is perfectly acceptable. A typical compliment may be as follows:

> 5. Nagaraj...said, 'I have not had the good fortune to learn Sanskrit-only English and Tamil.'
> The pundit said, 'I am not surprised. Sanskrit is not a bazaar language. it[sic] is known as "Deva Basha". Do you know what it means?'
> '"Language of gods",' translated Nagaraj promptly, feeling proud of his answer ...
> 'At least you know this much; I am glad. Are you aware Sanskrit can not be picked up at any wayside shop? *You must have performed meritorious deeds in several births to be blessed with a tongue that could spell the Sanskrit alphabet.*'
> '*Ah, what wisdom,* perhaps one's ears too must be blessed to hear the Sanskrit sound,' added Nagaraj, much to the delight of the pundit. More wrinkles appeared on his face as his smile broadened. Nagaraj added to the pleasure of this dialogue by saying, '*God creates a scholar like your good self to kindle the flame of knowledge in an ignoramus like me.*'
> 'Ah, do not degrade yourself,' said the pundit. '*You talk like a poet, no wonder you want to engage yourself in kavya.*'

[Narayan, R.K. 1990. *The world of Nagaraj.* London: Heinemann. 95-96]

> 6. Husband to wife: How lucky I am to have a wife like you.

> 7. Mother to daughter: I must have performed many virtuous deeds my last life to have a daughter like you in this one.

Whereas the example in (5) represents a 'high style' interaction, examples in (6) and (7) are normal in the family domain. There usually is no verbal response to a compliment as in (6) and (7).

I have suggested elsewhere on the basis of data from Indian English that a more complete set of variables, e.g., the set proposed in Hymes (1972; see also Saville-Troike 1982) is likely to be more useful in crosscultural speech act research. Hymes (1972) includes setting (temporal, spatial, etc.), scene (cultural definition of the occasion), participants, purposes or outcome, goals, message form, message content, keys (manner of saying something, e.g., joking), channels (oral, written, etc.), forms of speech (codes, varieties, etc.), norms of interaction, norms of interpretation, and genres (e.g., curses, prayers, myths, etc.) among the relevant variables. It is, of course, obvious that further research is needed to validate the usefulness of the grid provided

by Hymes. Nevertheless, it has been found to be useful to account for the Indian English data I have discussed in my work (1991, 1992).

Thirdly, we must have a more complete understanding of how speech acts interact with Gricean cooperative and politeness principles. For instance, is it possible to set up grids which will predict that flouting of a particular Gricean maxim will have a specific effect on the illocutionary force of a specific speech act and the perceived politeness in interaction? Let us consider a hypothetical case of the speech act of request. Is it possible to say that flouting the maxim of quantity on the plus side, i.e., giving more information than is required, will be perceived as too polite to the nth degree, and too ingratiating, and therefore insincere? There is anecdotal evidence that suggests that letters from international students requesting off prints or other material from Western scholars often produce this reaction.

Fourthly, it is simplistic to categorize societies in terms of vertical vs. horizontal and individualistic vs. group-oriented for the purposes of speech act research as though these labels apply in all domains of a community's life. Matsumoto (1988, 1989) takes for granted that one can clearly demarcate the notion 'self' in terms of individual or group-oriented on the one hand, and societies as either 'vertical' or 'horizontal' on the other. Recent psychoanalytical and social scientific literature, however, suggests a more complicated picture. For instance, Roland (1988: 6) has the following to say in the context of both India and Japan: "I am now convinced that we must speak of three overarching or superordinate organizations of the self: the familial self, the individualized self, and the spiritual self, as well as an expanding self. Each forms a total organization of the self in Eastern and Western (particularly Northern European/American) societies, respectively, with varying suborganizations." It is clear from the discussion in Roland (1988: 8) that in both India and Japan, the familial self predominates, whereas "the individual self is the predominant inner psychological organization of the Americans." Furthermore, it must be remembered that it is not necessary that caste structure in India be seen essentially as horizontal. Not only are the different castes arranged in a hierarchy, even subcastes within a caste are hierarchical. Also, although the caste system appears to be inflexible, it is actually surprisingly flexible in that rank within the hierarchies is negotiable under certain circumstances.[3] A more clear understanding of individual self vs. familial/group self and positive vs. negative face in different domains in both Western and Eastern cultures is necessary before one could argue about the universality of any proposed universal.

Finally, even in an ideal world, where we have answers to questions raised above, it is not clear how necessary or desirable it is to change language learners' behavior to make them conform to the performance of NSs of the target language. Note that I am not talking about making learners aware of the target language patterns. What I am concerned about is insistence on performance. Language use is intimately connected with our notions of who we are. Understanding and awareness of culturally different patterns of behavior, including the performance of speech acts, is one thing, adopting culturally different patterns of behavior wholesale is quite another. An Indian English speaker, though aware of American or British conventions, finds it very difficult to, for instance, to use as many 'thank yous' and 'I'm sorrys' in the intimate domain as do speakers of American or British English. Many Asian and African students are quite uncomfortable addressing their professors by their first names. Many European professors may be equally uncomfortable if their students address them by their first names. We do not have hard evidence to conclude that it is necessary, desirable, and, realistically speaking,

possible to effect change in verbal behavior among adult learners of a second language. On the contrary, we have evidence to suggest that human beings are socialized through language and attain a social and an individual identity in the process. Whether and to what extent these identities are permeable is a moot question..

CONCLUSION

I would like to conclude this paper by making it relevant specifically to the teaching of English as an international language. One major source of interesting crosscultural speech act data is the set of varieties of English indigenized in culturally different contexts around the globe. Paradigms of research that look at an indigenized variety of English as a language with its own "complex network of meaning potential" (Halliday 1978) have important implications for ESL instructional as well as teacher education programs. If the ultimate goal of such programs is to encourage global bilingualism in English, a great deal of sensitivity toward what learners bring to the task of learning an additional language has to be developed. At present, there is a wide gap between the theoretical conceptualization of how children are socialized through language (for example, in Halliday 1975, Hasan 1988, Hasan and Cloran 1990, Heath 1983, Ochs 1982) and the pedagogical attempts in ESL programs to teach adult learners the idealized communicative competence of a monolingual speaker of English. A more realistic, and perhaps, more effective, pedagogical strategy would be to respect the social meanings learners bring to the language learning task and extend their range with those of the target language. This would be possible only if, as D'souza (1988) suggests, monolingual speakers of English realize the need for a wider awareness of the different meaning potentials of different varieties of English. Perhaps the time has come for the ESL teacher education programs to take a leading role in this venture and give it some priority on their agenda for theoretical and pedagogical research. In my view, a research agenda that pays attention to the issues discussed here is vital for meaningful research on communicative competence in world varieties of English and applications of such research for pedagogical purposes.

NOTES

[1] It is interesting to note that the same arguments can be made on the basis of data from varieties of English, certainly the indigenized varieties used in Africa, South Asia, Southeast Asia and other parts of the world.

[2] It is believed that remarks such as 'you look well' or 'your baby looks wonderful' may bring bad luck to the person thus commented upon.

[3] For a comprehensive discussion of caste, see Karve (1961), and for excellent case studies of this phenomenon by both Indian and Western social scientists, see Singer (1959).

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PRAGMATIC CONSCIOUSNESS-RAISING IN AN EFL CONTEXT

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ABSTRACT

While the need for teaching pragmatic competence in ESL contexts seems to
be taken for granted, there are a number of issues to address in considering the
teaching of pragmatic competence in an EFL setting. Among these are that
most learners of English in an EFL setting will use English primarily with
other nonnative speakers (NNS) of English, which raises the issue of just
whose pragmatic system is to be taught, and that most EFL teachers are not
native speakers (NS) of English, which precludes an approach that requires
the teacher to draw on his/her NS intuitions. However, being central to lan-
guage use, and thus language learning, pragmatic issues must be addressed in
language classrooms. This paper discusses one option for incorporating prag-
matics into EFL teaching using pragmatic consciousness-raising. Such an
approach can be adopted by both NS and NNS teachers and has the distinct
advantage of providing learners with a foundation in some of the central as-
pects of the role of pragmatics which they can then apply in whatever setting
they may encounter as their proficiency in English develops.

INTRODUCTION

The need for teaching pragmatic competence[1] in ESL contexts[2] seems to be taken for
granted since ESL learners have both an immediate need for pragmatic competence, as well as
a speech community in which to acquire and use that competence. This may explain why the
majority of materials written with the intention of teaching language use are aimed at learners
in ESL contexts. But what about learners in EFL contexts, who comprise the majority of
learners of English? EFL contexts represent unique challenges for the teaching of pragmatic
competence, and too little attention has been paid to this area. This paper discusses pragmatic
consciousness-raising, one approach to developing pragmatic competence in EFL settings. First,
though, I will briefly summarize the relationship between pragmatics and language teaching,
and outline some of the difficulties in attempting to deal with pragmatic competence in an EFL
context.

PRAGMATICS AND LANGUAGE TEACHING

Since the early 1970's, two key theoretical concepts have dominated efforts to teach language learners how to use language in social contexts: communicative competence and speech act theory. Shortly after Hymes' (1971) brought to the forefront the fact that speaking a language involves a great deal more than possessing the ability to distinguish grammatical from ungrammatical sentences, both Paulston (1974) and Long (1976) outlined the important implications this observation had for language teaching. By the time Canale and Swain (1980) wrote their influential account proposing a theoretical basis for communicative approaches to language teaching, as evidenced by Brumfit and Johnson (1979), the communicative approach had already taken hold. Although the theoretical and empirical bases for communicative competence were not well established then, and remain sketchy to this day, this has not deterred the continued production of materials developed to teach it.

Likewise with speech act theory, it did not take long for the work of Austin (1962) and Searle (1969) to be taken up by those involved with language teaching. Among the first proponents of the application of speech act theory to language teaching were Van Ek (1975) and Wilkins (1976). Their early work can be credited in large part with the proliferation of notional/functional textbooks, an attempt to apply some of the basic concepts of speech act theory to the classroom. And the interest in applying speech act theory in the classroom persists to this day, as evidenced by Flowerdew's (1988) state-of-the-art survey on speech acts and language teaching, and Hurley's (1992) similar outline of issues in the teaching of pragmatics: both see a central role for speech act theory and both advocate application to language teaching of findings from speech act research.

PROBLEMS WITH TEACHING PRAGMATIC COMPETENCE

Although considerable energy has been spent developing materials for teaching pragmatic competence, a number of problems still plague such efforts. Perhaps the most serious stem from the research side: because the research conducted to date has been limited both in scope and design, we still know little about language use, in English or any other language. Wierzbicka (1985) argues that "from the outset, studies in speech acts have suffered from an astonishing ethnocentrism and, to a considerable degree, they continue to do so" (p. 145). And as Kasper and Dahl (1992) point out, interlanguage speech act studies have relied primarily on elicited data, a trend which is found in first-language speech act studies as well. This practice is unfortunate because there are serious questions concerning the validity of such data (see, e.g., Wolfson, Marmor and Jones 1989, and Rose 1993a, in press). We cannot assume that elicitation yields useful data and conduct business as usual until evidence is presented which suggests otherwise. The burden of proof is on researchers who rely on elicited data in speech act studies: it is incumbent on them to demonstrate its validity. While there seems to be a general consensus that elicited data represents only one aspect of a comprehensive pragmatics research program, for some reason elicited data has been favored in most speech act research cted so far. The situation is not much different in the area of communicative compe-

tence. Although some important theoretical work has been carried out (see, e.g., Canale and Swain 1980, Scarcella et al. 1990), it has yet to yield substantial empirical results.

This is not to say, though, that there have been no good studies of language use, or that we should wait for complete analyses to emerge, if they ever do. The demands of the classroom are pressing, and the classroom teacher cannot afford to wait for researchers to provide all the answers. Fortunately, there is a small but growing body of knowledge on which to draw. For example, Holmes and Brown (1987) offer guidelines for the teaching of compliments, one of the few speech acts to have been studied using more than questionnaires or role plays. Likewise, Bardovi-Harlig et al. (1991) have applied research on closing conversations to the analysis of existing teaching materials and found most wanting.[3] They also make the excellent suggestion of engaging learners in the data collection process. And Dornyei and Thurrell (1991) provide practical applications of work on strategic competence to language teaching. Such efforts are surely on the right track and represent a departure from reliance on NS intuition alone. The bottom line, though, is this: the sheer volume of materials produced which attempt to teach communicative competence, notions/functions, or any of the pragmatic aspects of language imply that we have a sufficient empirical base on which to develop such materials. The fact is that we do not.

Another set of problems with teaching pragmatics in an EFL setting has to do with the context itself and the uses (or non-uses) to which English is put. Take the case of Japan. As B. Kachru (1989) would say, Japan is situated in the expanding circle, where English is not an indigenized variety, unlike, say, in India or Nigeria.[4] Japanese do not learn English to speak it with other Japanese. Quite the contrary—there are strong social constraints against speaking English well in the presence of other Japanese. On more than one occasion I have witnessed fluent Japanese speakers of English who have lived in English-speaking countries intentionally alter their native-like English pronunciation in favor of a Japanese pronunciation (sometimes called *katakana* English) when using English with other Japanese in the classroom. When approached about it afterwards, they have informed me of the stigma attached to speaking English well in the presence of other Japanese. The revealing Japanese proverb *the nail that sticks up gets hammered down* certainly applies here.

Most Japanese who are learning English will probably never use it, except perhaps for reading, and those who do use English for communication will do so primarily with other NNSs, most notably for business or diplomacy. But these are important tasks which certainly require pragmatic competence, and the Japanese are well aware of the need for increased proficiency in English to cope with them. This point is brought home in a recent article in *The Japan Times* (14 June 1992) which noted that Japanese nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) were experiencing difficulty at the 1992 Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro due to lack of English skills. In fact, a coalition of fifty Japanese environmental NGOs was "unable to supply adequate input into decisions made at the Earth Summit . . . [because they were] handicapped by a lack of members who [could] speak English well enough to take part in Global Forum debates or lobby Earth Summit delegates" (p. 2). This is a serious problem, especially considering the fact that the Japanese government had announced at the Earth Summit their commitment to contribute more funds than any other nation to global environmental projects in developing countries.

So, the question is, in a setting like Japan where it is clear that the primary purpose for

learning English is not to communicate with NSs, if pragmatic competence is to be taught, whose pragmatic system should serve as the model? In university ESL programs, the answer to this question is simple: there is an immediate need, and thus rationale, for the learning/ teaching of the host community's pragmatic system. In the outer circle, where an indigenized variety of English has developed and is used among members of the community, there is ample justification for learning/teaching the pragmatic system of that variety. But this question is not so easily answered in an EFL context. There are any number of possible target communities, not all of which are NS communities, and if instruction is to be determined by learner needs, as it should be, this question will have to be given serious consideration. Competing varieties would no doubt make this a thorny question, which I will not attempt to answer here.

Another issue which must be dealt with in addressing pragmatic competence in an EFL setting is the fact that the majority of the teachers are themselves not NSs of English.[5] While it should be recognized that NNS teachers have certain advantages over NS teachers (see, e.g., Widdowson 1992, and Medgyes 1992), when it comes to teaching pragmatic competence, the current state of affairs seems to favor the NS teacher. That is, with the prevalent approach to communicative language teaching and its emphasis on ESL settings, the assumption is that teachers will be able to draw on their NS intuitions when dealing with the difficult questions which naturally arise in addressing issues of language use. But NNS teachers do not have NS intuitions to draw on. This seriously limits an approach which aims to teach the details of language use without first spelling out those details. Such an approach would be impractical in an EFL setting, to say the least. This is surely among the factors which have inhibited the spread of communicative language teaching in EFL contexts. If pragmatic competence is to be dealt with successfully in EFL settings, methods and materials must be developed which do not assume or depend on the NS intuitions of the teacher.

In addition to the problems mentioned so far, another rather obvious and quite practical question needs to be addressed: Is the teaching of pragmatic competence effective? After all, when it comes to committing energy and resources to language education, administrators have the right to expect results. Unfortunately, only a few studies have addressed this question. In a follow-up study on NNS ability to interpret implicature in English, Bouton (1992) found that after living and studying four-and-a-half years in the United States but receiving no instruction on interpreting implicature, 30 NNS subjects from his earlier study had significantly higher scores on a test for interpreting implicature. He concludes that this seems to indicate living in the United States was sufficient for these NNSs to develop the ability to interpret implicatures as NSs did. However, the small proportion of subjects from the original study who participated in the second study (30 of 436, or about 6.8%) weakens the results, and Bouton himself points out the need for further research concerning the types of implicature which are difficult for NNSs and the amount of time required for NNSs to develop the ability to interpret implicature correctly. It should also be noted that there is a qualitative difference between correctly inter- preting implicature on a written test and using language appropriately in social contexts. It cannot be assumed that NNSs who correctly interpret implicature on a written test (or even in face-to-face interaction) are able to use such implicatures in their own speech, let alone engage in other socially appropriate language use. Further, even assuming that Bouton's findings are valid, they have little or no relevance in an EFL setting, where learners do not have access to S community that seems to have been sufficient cause in Bouton's study.

Ellis (1992) reports the results a two-year longitudinal study of classroom requests produced by two boys, aged 10 and 11, in an ESL program in England designed to mainstream NNS children into local secondary schools. One of his main objectives was to investigate what opportunities the classroom afforded for performing requests. He found that while the classroom setting provided ample opportunity for making requests, the requests produced were constrained by the narrow range of purposes and addressees. There were also a number of limitations on the learners' ability to perform requests, for example, direct requests were by far the most frequent, there was little use of modification (either internal or external), and requests were not varied according to addressee. In short, Ellis notes that his subjects did not develop target-like sociolinguistic competence, concluding that the classroom may have been "insufficient to guarantee the development of full target language norms, possibly because the kind of 'communicative need' that the learners experienced was insufficient to ensure development of the full range of request types and strategies" (p. 20). That is, face-saving measures such as conventional indirectness and (internal or external) modification were not required in classroom interaction, so there was no opportunity or need for the learners to acquire or use them. However, Ellis points out that this conclusion needs to be treated with caution because no data were collected to show either how NS children performed in a similar setting or how his subjects performed in a naturalistic setting.

We cannot conclude from these two studies that attempts to develop pragmatic competence in the classroom are doomed to failure: much more research is needed to determine the effect of instruction in language use, both in ESL and EFL settings. However, these two studies do not provide much cause for optimism. Bouton's study seems to indicate that any gains in ability to interpret implicature are attributable to living (and studying) in an ESL environment, while Ellis' study may indicate that even living in an ESL environment is insufficient for developing productive pragmatic competence through classroom instruction.

Adding this to the problems discussed above leads to the inevitable question of why any attempt should be made to address pragmatic competence in an EFL context. The answer to that question is fairly simple, but not necessarily helpful: in teaching language, issues of language use simply cannot be avoided. While there may have been a day when form (phonological or syntactic) was supreme and function was ignored, the contributions of people like Hymes, Austin and Searle have created an awareness that language is more than a rule-governed formal system, and learning a language involves more than mastery of that formal system. There is ample evidence that accounting for even phonological and syntactic phenomena is at times impossible without appealing to issues of language use, such as Labov's (1972) work on post-vocalic [r] and Duranti and Ochs' (1979) work on left-dislocation in Italian. How much more, then, is it necessary to discuss pragmatic issues when it comes to the question of learning how to *use* a language? But, again, this answer is not very helpful because we still do not know enough about the details of language use to give them adequate treatment in teaching materials. All of this leads to one quite feasible solution: pragmatic consciousness-raising.[6]

PRAGMATIC CONSCIOUSNESS-RAISING

Pragmatic consciousness-raising has as its aim developing learners' pragmatic aware-

FIGURE 1. Request analysis worksheet

PARTICIPANTS

        Speaker   M/F   AGE:

        Hearer   M/F   AGE:

        Dominance   S > H   S = H   S < H

        Distance   +   -

SITUATION

REQUEST

LEVEL OF DIRECTNESS

        Direct   Conventionally indirect   Hint

ness through classroom application of available descriptive frameworks and research results. It does not attempt to teach specific means of, say, performing a given speech act, but rather attempts to sensitize learners to context-based variation in language use and the variables that help determine that variation. As such, then, it is an approach which can be employed by both `` `` id NNS teachers. Of particular interest here is the use of video, which represents an ideal

medium for introducing pragmatic issues in the classroom. I am not making the claim that video represents authentic speech at any or every level. Most video is scripted, and thus is not authentic speech. However, this does not disqualify it from use in EFL settings, where it is most likely the closest learners will come to authentic language. The fact is that video provides ample opportunities to address virtually all aspects of language use because it provides language used in rich, recoverable contexts which can be exploited in consciousness-raising activities. I'll give one example which focuses on Japan.

To introduce pragmatics into the classroom in Japan, it's not a bad idea to start with something in Japanese. This takes advantage of one of the characteristics of many EFL settings: homogeneity among learners. Rooting the discussion of language use in the learners' L1 provides a foundation which can serve as a basis for application to any number of situations learners may eventually encounter. Juzo Itami's film *Tampopo* (an account of, among other things, one woman's quest for the ultimate *ramen* recipe) provides an excellent sequence for initiating a discussion about language use. It is a fight scene involving Goro (a truck driver) and Pishkin (a contractor), the two central male characters in the film. After they have nearly beaten each other to death and determined (falsely, of course) that Goro has no romantic interest in Tampopo (the *ramen*-cooking heroine), the two proceed to introduce themselves to one another. Pishkin takes the lead with *Ore Pishkin da*, and Goro replies in kind with *Goro da*. *Ore*, used only by men, is the first-person singular pronoun lowest on the scale of formality/ politeness for first-person singular pronouns (which include *watakushi, watashi, boku*, and *ore*) and is used only by men. *Da* is likewise the least formal/polite of the various forms of the copula (which include *degozaimasu, desu*, and *da*). Some rough language for some rough men, but no doubt appropriate for the context.

As a first step, students could view this segment and complete any of numerous active-viewing tasks. For example, after watching with the sound turned off, students could describe the characters, places, and actions that they see, write a few lines of dialogue to guess what the characters have said, then watch the segment again with the sound on to check their predictions. Alternatively, students could listen only to the soundtrack and complete the same kind of basic description of people, places, and actions. (For more ideas of video tasks, see Stempleski and Tomalin 1990, or Cooper, Lavery and Rinvolucri 1991). After students have become familiar with the segment, they could be asked this question: what if Goro had responded to Pishkin with *Watakushi no namae wa Goro degozaimasu*? The answer is immediately obvious to anyone familiar with Japanese: the language would be totally inappropriate for the context because it is much too formal/polite. Truck drivers and contractors are not expected to talk to each other this way. In fact, just considering this option usually produces a round of laughs from Japanese students, which is evidence of the fact that this is not the kind of language they expect to hear from people like Goro. This leads into a discussion of why people talk the way they do in any context, and learners are quick to realize that all of us vary our speech according to (among other things) whom we are talking with, and where and when the interaction takes place.

After having engaged in a discussion of the role of context in language use, learners could carry out guided descriptive analyses of video segments chosen to present any number of features of language use. One good place to begin would be with analysis of some of the more studied speech acts. Figure 1, a request analysis worksheet based on the CCSARP descriptive

framework and coding scheme, could be used for this purpose. Prior to using the worksheet, students would have to be told what constitutes social dominance and social distance, that age and sex often affect how people speak, and that there are (at least) three possible levels of directness in requests: direct (e.g., *Give me your notes*), conventionally indirect (e.g., *Can I borrow your notes*), and hint (e.g., *I missed class yesterday*). They could then view video segments which contain requests, complete the worksheet for each request, and then speculate as to why the requests were made that way. All of this would lead to an increased awareness of how language use is shaped by social context. Of course, to carry out these activities, learners would be required to master some of the pragmatic metalanguage used in speech act analysis, but this is no problem: they are already required to master extensive metalanguage for learning grammar, so it is a practice they are familiar with.

Carrying out this kind of analysis of requests also presents a good opportunity to explore some of the prevalent perceptions of English speakers as more direct than Japanese speakers. I will provide one example. The following excerpt from the American sitcom *Seinfeld* offers some excellent material for discussion of requests, as well as comic relief. In this scene, Seinfeld's friend George is at the airport to pick him up, but George is having trouble locating the right gate. Staring up at a TV monitor announcing departures, George is flanked on his right side by an older woman, and on his left by an older man, both also looking up at the monitor.

George:	It's all departures. I see nothing but departures!
	[To woman on right] Do you know where the arrivals are?
Woman:	[Looks at George, turns, and walks off.]
George:	[To man on left] Excuse me, sir, do you have the time?
Man:	There's a clock over there [pointing].
George:	Where?
Man:	[Pointing again] There.
George:	[Looking at man's wrist] But you have a watch on.
Man:	Right by the escalator.
George:	Why don't you just look at your watch?
Man:	I told you—it's right over there [points again].
George:	[Grabbing man's arm] Let me see the watch!
Man:	Hey! What are you, some kind of nut? [Walks off]
George:	You know, we're living in a society!

Needless to say, there are many ways this scene could be exploited in the classroom. After completing any number of active-viewing tasks such as those mentioned above, students could analyze the requests made by George and participate in a discussion on the use of hints (e.g., *Do you know where the arrivals are?*). Possible angles include why a particular request qualifies as a hint, exactly what George's intentions were in this scene, why he expected them to be obvious to his hearers, and why his requests failed to produce the desired effects. It might also be instructive to discuss how this scene would have played itself out at a Japanese airport. ... the requests have been made? Would they have been hints? Would the hearers have

understood and complied? There are no doubt other tasks and activities which could be constructed based on this segment, as well as many other segments which could be used in pragmatic consciousness-raising.

CONCLUSION

Although we still know little about the details of language use, because of the pioneering work of people like Hymes, Austin, and Searle, the need for developing pragmatic competence in ESL contexts is now taken for granted. Learners have a target community to both model themselves after and practice with. However, in EFL settings this is not the case. Most learners of English will not use it at all, and those who do will use it primarily with other NNSs, so it is not clear just whose pragmatic system is to serve as a model. Most teachers of EFL are NNSs and so do not have the NS intuitions needed to use the approaches and materials common to ESL settings. Also, we do not yet know whether instruction in language use will be effective in developing learners' pragmatic competence. Given these constraints, it seems most feasible to adopt a pragmatic consciousness-raising approach, which has as its aim the sensitizing of learners to context-based variation in language use and the role of variables that help determine that variation. Such an approach can be adopted by both NS and NNS teachers and has the distinct advantage of providing learners with a foundation in some of the central aspects of the role of pragmatics which they can then apply in whatever setting they may encounter as their proficiency in English develops.

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NOTES

[1] Defining the term *pragmatics* and thus delimiting the field is no easy task, as evidenced by Levinson's (1983) thirty-five page attempt to do so. *Pragmatics* here refers to anything having to do with issues of language use in social contexts, while *pragmatic competence*

refers to an individual's knowledge of the pragmatic system of a given language.

² Following convention, the terms *ESL* and *EFL* refer here to the environment in which English is being learned. ESL settings are those in which the surrounding community is English speaking, while EFL settings are those in which the surrounding community is not. While the real world is more complex than this, this dichotomy will serve the purpose at hand.

³ Other analyses of teaching materials have produced similar results, see, e.g., Myers Scotton and Bernstein (1988) and Williams (1988).

⁴ This is not to say, though, that English isn't highly visible in Japan. It is. As Ono (1992) points out, English figures prominently in the style repertoire of much modern Japanese fiction. Also, a recent television show devotes half an hour each week to exposing "useless" English loan words in Japanese, such as *manshon* (for *apartment building*) and *baikingu* (from *viking*, for *buffet*), many of which have been introduced by Japanese businesses and advertising companies eager to cash in on the cosmopolitan appeal of English.

⁵ Again, I am not referring here to countries in the outer circle, where a case can be made for NS status of an indigenized variety. I refer to the expanding circle, where the distinction between NSs and NNSs is still quite clear.

⁶ Ellis (1991) reaches a similar conclusion in a discussion of communicative competence and Japanese learners of English. Note also that I am concerned primarily with EFL settings. In the case of ESL, the immediate need of learners often justifies instruction based on NS intuition.

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DISCOURSE ANALYSIS AND INSTRUCTIONAL FLEXIBILITY: A PRAGMATIC GRAMMAR

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ABSTRACT

Intensive interviewing and observations were conducted in language classes at the junior high level, for the purpose of analyzing the flexible modules teachers use to adapt subject-matter to interactions in a communicative framework. A grammar of teacher cognitions was developed. It is composed of curricular concepts, task domains, pragmatic organizers—types of context-related intentions—and connectors. This grammar allows for the transposition of classroom activities into modular representations, and could be considered a language compilator for the language of practice. It was developed from a corpus of prospective and retrospective verbalizations with thirty expert teachers and then applied to preactive thinking and its interactive actualization within a hundred classroom observations. This article presents the transformations of intentional macropropositions in one case study with an expert language teacher. It illustrates the potential of this analytic framework. Flexibility was analyzed by comparing preactive and interactive patterns. An interview was held after class to examine postactive thinking on the reasons why changes occurred. The hermeneutic aspects of the study gave perspective to the processing of data on how objects in language acquisition move according to interactive conditions of action. This paper provides a framework for the analysis of teacher patterns of intention in language instruction.

There was a time when teachers were not meant to change their plans to fit students' interactions. Within a communicative framework in which oral language is supposed to be developing, however, adaptive teaching becomes a necessity. In this article, the words 'focal teaching' will define interactive teaching at the synchronic junction of teaching/learning (Tochon & Munby, 1993). Focal teaching represents the actual moment of teaching.

To date we are not yet in a position to build mental models of focal teaching. We have only started to shed light on some triggering conditions of pedagogical behavior. Focal teach-

ing implies parallel top-down and bottom-up processes, which seem somehow contradictory. Top-down processing of content opposes the bottom-up management of interactions. These opposed processes define the problem space of focal teaching. We can demonstrate networks of subject-matter instruction, and describe instructional cognitions (Tochon, 1991; Dionne, 1994); but providing evidence of pragmatic regulations of teaching requires sophisticated methodologies. Collins and Michalski (1989) write that cognitive psychology's methods have long been limited to percent-correct and response-time measures. Using these methods to understand processing in the teacher/learner relationships is, they suggest, like conducting a surgical operation with a hammer and chisel. More appropriate tools have to be built. This article is an attempt to explore finer grain tools. We propose a move in this direction; a first exploratory step may be to develop knowledge about pragmatic rules of knowledge transformation in teacher/learner relationships.

This methodology is based upon an analytical grammar built by Tochon (1989a). The grammar is macropropositional (Kintsch & van Dijk, 1983). Its role is to enhance our knowledge so that we may eventually be in a position to build mental models of focal teaching/learning transformations, that is, to have a description and understanding of practical intentionality for a given discipline. Macropropositions provide static descriptions of teaching dynamics.

The present case study uses this grammar of teaching domains, concepts and intentions for demonstration purposes. The pragmatic grammar that is proposed is specific to language teaching. It may be adapted for other disciplines. Even though macropropositional, the grammar is intended to bring to light contextual condition-action rules of teaching intentionality. These will, in turn, allow the elaboration of flexible default hierarchies consistent with mental models. This will be explained below.

Up to now, cognitive science has been divided into two main branches: (1) structural representations of declarative (propositional) knowledge concerned with the content and form of conceptual knowledge, and (2) rule-based goal-directed production-systems describing cognition in terms of procedural knowledge or plans and heuristic control for problem solving. A recent expansion of the second branch of cognitive science indicates the importance of contextual knowledge and situated cognitions in mental models (Holland, Holyoak, Nisbett, and Thagard, 1986; Greeno, 1989). Both branches of cognitive science may converge in the consideration of contextual intentionality within a pragmatic framework.

In the first branch of cognitive science, procedural knowledge may be represented declaratively; declarative representations are useful as instructions to control actions and can be interpreted by a compiler for execution. Such compilers are used in the ACT* production systems (Anderson, 1983, 1990). Thus complex networks of descriptive and control information may be integrated in a single declarative structure. Recent work suggests that the gap between the first branch of cognitive science and the second one is being bridged (Frederiksen & Renaud, 1990).

As teaching is a semantically complex domain, it involves two types of processes. *Top-down* processes of instruction are conditioned by *static* objects which pertain to the instructional system. They are production classes of the subject-matter, and concern domains of tasks, pragmatic organizers and connectors, as well as concepts of the curriculum. Static rules of action may be represented in propositional networks; they belong to the general system.

Such rules are defined by Frederiksen, Décary and Emond (1990) as non-contextual and static grammar rules, compared to their dynamic conditions of action. Dynamic rules are complex and flexible representations of static rules' conditions of application. In other words, the teacher brings his/her top-down plan into the field, and is suddenly involved with a second process which relates to dynamic *bottom-up* accommodations to situations. Bottom-up processes apply to the adaptive revision and accommodation of intentions according to context. Bottom-up heuristic strategies are directed by contextual data. Both top-down and bottom-up processes involve specific types of rules: static and dynamic respectively.

In some highly parallel (non serial) systems, the static/dynamic rules opposition may overlap the distinction between diachronic and synchronic rules. Static rules involve diachronic steps of planning, whereas dynamic rules produce synchronic spreading activations according to *triggering conditions*. A triggering condition is a condition of satisfaction of a rule; particular transformations of teacher knowledge and action are triggered by particular conditions that arise in the classroom environment. For example, teacher 29 in this inquiry says that IF the students are restless and troubled, THEN he opts for the WRITING task domain. The feature {restless and troubled} may be one triggering condition for domain transformation in Language Arts. This in turn will probably condition students' knowledge transformations. As transformations are goal-directed, they reveal teachers' intentionality.

Mental models as defined here are rule-based and deal with problem solving[1]. They are based on condition-action rules (IF...THEN). These basic epistemic building blocks provide the conditions of an action and the default expectations that allow that action to happen. The **IF** part of the rule is the triggering condition for action. Rules are clustered in categories. Rule clusters are organized into *default hierarchies*. They are ordered by default expectations based on subordinate/superordinate relations among concepts (Holland, Holyoak, Nisbett & Thagard, 1986; Dionne, 1994). Mental models have contextual flexibility; in this respect, they constrast with *schemata* or *frames*, which cannot adapt to atypical situations. Adaptive construals of mental models are explained by their default-hierarchy structures; each prototypical hierarchy of a mental model can have exception rules added to it. Exception rules adapt to situational features. For example, when one sees a cartoon with a cat barking, one does not enter it in the dog category. One creates an exception rule that makes the situation understandable. A default hierarchy integrates exception conditions of action; then it represents the variability and uncertainty that exist for any system that operates in complex situations. Mental models may give rise to different assumptions about variability when there exist alternative plausible categorizations of events. Flexibility in mental models is also explained by a high parallelism of structure. Parallel dynamic (synchronic) rules can be put into action simultaneously; dynamic relations hold atemporally between alternate descriptions of states or objects. Static rules, in contrast, represent temporal transitions between intentional states or objects. (We will not here enter the debate about plausible *static synchronic* rules in parallel systems, and about plausible *dynamic diachronic* rules in serial systems.) Parallel processes are emphasized in explorations in the structure of cognition (Rumelhart, McClelland, and the PDP Research Group, 1986).

Dynamic rules may be exception rules in a default-hierarchy, constitutive of a mental model. The way we propose to shed light on the dynamics of transformations in teachers' intentionality is to compare the anticipated statics (intentions) to the actualized statics (what has been taught). It seems possible to get information about top-down planning and compare it

with the immediate retrospective representation of its bottom-up adaptation. The move between the two processes might give indications of dynamic rules activated by the teaching/learning junction. Furthermore, the analysis of triggering conditions might result in a description of condition-action rules that govern task domain changes, pragmatic embeddings and connections. The hypothesis behind this inquiry process is that focal teaching can only be caught through an analysis of previous or immediately posterior representations.

A description follows of how the basic, static rules of the macropropositional grammar used for the study were developed. The static rules are constitutive of the grammar; their application to protocol analysis may shed light on dynamic transformational rules as demonstrated in this article's analysis. Usually, declarative cognitive frameworks isolate rule-nodes and links between semantic structures in the verbalized thoughts of people studied. But studying focal teacher thinking means being involved with actualized intentions. Thus, the pragmatic frame of intentionality may help in the discourse analysis of verbalization surrounding focal teaching. In pragmatic linguistics, for example, Fauconnier (1988) defines *starting* and *target* domains of intentions. His descriptions transcend semantics and deal with intentions or affective tacit knowledge. In this manner, language teaching is situated through pragmatic organizers. These had to be determined in a pre-inquiry phase: it was a matter of knowing what kind of task domains expert language teachers use and what kind of connectors link these domains; in short, of situating the study in light of the relevant questions developed in Tochon (1989a, 1991 and 1993a). The next section highlights the results of the pre-inquiry, which were used for corpus coding processes in the inquiry phase itself.

In this study, domains of tasks were identified by the curricular literature on these objects and their frequencies of occurence in teachers' verbalizations (Tochon, 1991). Their relevance within the corpus was verified. Task domains are networks of organizational nodes defined within the limits of the curriculum. Vertical and horizontal links were found to exist between domains of task organization, thus confirming what had been put forward by the research literature. Task domains were codified in the grammar so their characteristic processing could be studied by identifying them systematically within the corpus.

Horizontal Processing of Domains of Tasks

Theory. The literature dealing with Language classes is based on the co-existence of four skills: oral reception (listening), written reception (reading), oral production and written production. These distinctions, especially in second languages, were endorsed by many authors to the extent that Language curricula quite often adopted it. They imply a form of non-hierarchical framing with *horizontal* links, well known to teachers.

Practice. Language-teaching requires that domains of tasks be defined. The teacher sees his or her students between five and seven hours a week, and s/he tends to divide the domains of tasks in such a manner that students will know how to get organized and will bring the necessary materials to class. The method of dividing domains usually consists of allotting one hour to oral exercises (reception/ mixed production); two hours to continuous reading (novel, etc.) alternating with two hours of composition; two hours to language techniques, spelling and mar (work on the code); and possibly one hour to reading discussions of short texts. While

the vast majority of experts free themselves from this limited structure, they do retain flexible domains of tasks developed in a parallel and therefore horizontal relationship.

In short, both from a practical and from a theoretical point of view, it appears that basic domains of tasks of language teaching possess horizontal connections. Horizontal connectors have therefore been retained as elements of the grammar for coding. Domains of tasks most often studied by the teachers were ORAL (including speaking and listening), READING, WRITING, and Language BASICS (including verbs, words, spelling and grammar).

Vertical Organization of Knowledge

Theory. Current theories of semantic representation propose the existence of embedding among several levels of meaning, ranging from linguistic structures to conceptual frames, and including propositional relationships (Chomsky, 1981). This set of theories also sustains the existence of a vertical axis of conceptual connections.

-**Cognitive analysis of planning in writing** reveals the existence of a vertical axis in the perception of text elaboration. At one end of the axis there are letters and sounds and at the other end ideas and goals. Expression and conceptual development are located at the median point of the axis (Scardamalia and Bereiter, 1986, pp.782-787). Writing experts have control structures which allow them to pass from one level of framing to another effortlessly. This confirms the importance of vertical connections between levels in the cognitive planning of experts (Beaugrande, 1984).

-**Cognitive analysis of planning in reading** also brings out vertical types of inclusive relationships. Focus in reading is constantly being compared with a prototype of textual comprehension (Calfee and Drum, 1986), and decoding is processed through vertical connections between several levels of conceptual connections which fit together

-**The holistic nature of auditing** has been recognized as the embedding of Hearing + Listening + Cognizing (Horrworth, 1966; Pinnell & Jaggar, 1991).

-**Other types of vertical connections** could be mentioned in other sectors of the cognitive sciences (relationships between schema and script or between short- and long-term memory). At all events, a sufficient number of arguments justify coding the elements which illustrate the vertical connections between levels of embedded cognitive tasks.

Practice. Seeing that the curriculum is overloaded, teachers report that they must embed several levels of instruction by creating conceptual connections whenever possible. This means there are vertical connections between practical domains of tasks. This aspect comes out quite clearly in the corpus of the inquiry. In short, both from a theoretical and from a practical point of view, it appears justifiable to assume that vertical types of conceptual relationships exist and that they can be isolated by means of a specific coding as vertical connectors. Vertical connectors connect levels of intentional processing of contents.

Levels of Knowledge Transformation

Theory of learning. Some degree of consensus currently exists about the identification of three levels of knowledge involved in cognitive processing (Paris, Lipson and Wixson, 1983;

Schoenfeld, 1985; Marzano, Brandt, Hugues, Jones, Presseisen, Rankin, and Suhor, 1988; Winograd and Hare, 1988).

  -Declarative knowledge deals with factual data, and answers the question "What?";
  -Procedural knowledge deals with the necessary steps to accomplish a task, and answers the question "How?";
  -Conditional knowledge deals with the conditions for applying knowledge, and answers the questions "Why?", "When?", and "How to evaluate?".

Intentional control is based on activating declarative knowledge by using procedural and conditional knowledge.

Theory of teaching. Tochon (1989b and 1993a) reviewed the work of a dozen authors who had elaborated integrated taxonomies, that is, taxonomies integrating cognitive, affective and psycho-motor domains. These taxonomies involve three levels of teaching knowledge which are surprisingly homogeneous:

  -The first level deals with the disciplinary content of the subject matter;
  -The second level deals with the interdisciplinary processing of this content;
  -The third level deals with self-regulated and context-situated transdisciplinary experience.

Details of the comparison of these taxonomies appeared in Tochon (1989b and 1993a). The *unified taxonomy* and its theoretical use were developed in Tochon (1990a). Pragmatic, deductive and inductive approaches of different authors all corroborate these three levels, which lead us to accept this troika as a valid teaching frame. This structure corresponds with the three levels of cognitive psychology that they are intended to develop functionally. Furthermore, these categories appeared relevant in reading the corpus of the inquiry. The teaching intention of developing declarative, procedural and conditional knowledge is pragmatic; it involves cognition, affective intentions and situated actions. For these reasons, it was decided that in the corpus of the interviews the parts pertaining to these three levels of pragmatic organization must be identified. They are levels of intentional transformation. Related codes are defined below.

Tochon (1991) noted three pragmatic functions related to the three levels above: (1) The narrative pragmatic function, which is intended to transform declarative knowledge into stories, themes and images. This way of transmitting knowledge affectively molds it into narratives (Connelly and Clandinin, 1990; Gudmundsdottir, 1990; Shulman, 1990; Tobin, 1990). (2) The instrumental pragmatic function, which organizes procedural intentions in terms of skills, operations and procedures that could be transferred from one domain to another. (3) The experiential pragmatic function, which transforms conditional or contextual knowledge into global actions, interactions and actualized experiences. These three pragmatic functions of focal teacher thinking seem (as teachers suggested) to be ways of motivating students that were spontaneously developed in teachers' epistemology.

These functions were named in terms of knowledge organizers so as to codify their

occurrences in the corpus of inquiry. (1) The narrative organizers were named *narrativors*, as they shape curricular knowledge in narrative intentions. For example: "Imagine a terrifying and sinister haunted house and start describing its props." The study of props is introduced here through a narrative. (2) The instrumental organizers were named *skillers*, for their purpose is to *skill* students. For example: "Follow these directions regularly, and you'll get skilled in summaries". The study of summary is introduced here by requiring instrumental practice in its components to develop a skill. (3) *Actualizers* was the label for the experiential organizers molding curricular knowledge into experiential intentions. For example: "Go out on the street and question people". The study of argumentation is brought in here through a concrete experience. All three ways of transforming knowledge appear with consistency in the entire corpus. They may be embedded or sequenced through connectors. As for **connections**, there were **horizontal** links between task domains and **vertical** links between functions that could be embedded. **Alternation** connectors chronologically wove horizontal and vertical links in a rhythm of alternate patterns of connections between domains and/or functions.

Relations between different types of domains, organizers and connectors were evaluated in a corpus of some 2000 pages. Correlations between subordinate and superordinate domains were established (Tochon, 1991). For example, Language BASICS does not appear much as a target (superordinate) domain for writing, reading and oral activities. On the contrary, it is most often a subordinate domain of tasks. Individual profiles and the comparison of experts were established from computerized code patterns or sequences, and by independent variables such as school membership, age, and gender. For example, age appears quite strongly correlated to a decrease in the number of skillers (correlation: $-.392$, $p < .025$) and Language BASIC as embedded domain ($.41, p < .01$). Negative regression is graphically noticeable and it might be interpreted as indicating a greater ease, with age, in the use of the whole language approach. Skillers appear as the most frequent organizers of teachers' intentions in the group studied. On the other hand, actualizers are strongly correlated to oral activities as a starting domain ($.8, p < .005$), which is not surprising. There is a strong tendency in the group studied to sequence domains in three steps: reading —> oral —> writing, embedding pragmatic organizers of one domain into another. This result is triangulated by profile analysis and by pattern analysis, as well as by statistical code frequences. The case analysis presented here is strengthened by a larger inquiry with 30 expert teachers.

To summarize, research was conducted within a pragmatic, semiocognitive framework (that is, one that engages with aspects of meaning that transcend the semantic). This methodology was generated by concepts of the curriculum in teachers' intentionality, their domains, their links or connectors, and their pragmatic organizers. Three levels of teachers' intentionality were identified: narrative, instrumental and experiential, respectively organized in narrativors, skillers and actualizers. Once the framework of research was specified, the gathering of data on intentionality transformations began.

SUBJECT

The role of experts in the definition of subject-matter is acknowledged by cognitive research. But cognition is not the sole factor in good teaching, and debate currently exists over

the nature of expertise in teaching (Berliner, 1989; Lampert and Clark, 1990). What, for example, is an expert in language teaching? Is it someone who knows recent trends in research on teaching or on linguistics? Someone who is good at teaching writing or reading or spelling? Expertise has been studied in diverse vocations (Chi, Glaser & Farr, 1988; Ericsson & Smith, 1991). Tochon (1989b) initially compared a dozen research articles on expert teachers to look for a clear operational definition of teaching expertise. It appears that there is no consensual definition of expertise in the field of research on teacher thinking. Some researchers go by recommendations; others rely on process-product correlations or filter-criteria, such as grades in teacher education, role as teacher educators, participation in creating pedagogical material. Defining an expert, who by nature should be atypical, is an inherently paradoxical activity. A generalized definition of expertise implies the kind of paradox we find in guided autonomy and teaching for freedom. They are crucial knots of thinking and basic paradoxes of teaching. Not only does a definition of expertise appear paradoxical; it is also tautological. As in the dilemma of whether the chicken or the egg came first, researchers on expertise must seek out experts in order to study their characteristics, without first knowing the characteristics with which to identify them.

Berliner (1989) suggests that finding good competent teachers is more realistic than looking for experts, even though exceptional people are particularly attractive. Clark (1989) lists a panoply of essential moral attributes he found in good teachers, for instance, love, care and respect. He writes that any teacher has clear harmonious moments of good teaching. The study of these *flow* moments might motivate important changes in the direction for research (Csikszentmihalyi & Rathunde, 1990). Are these good moments not more important to study than ivory tower experts?

Even though the proposed methodology is connected to a specific discipline and its static rules, it can yield insights into ways of balancing problem situations that are used by particularly good teachers. The limits of any definition of expertise being clear, a pragmatic definition of expert teachers that benefitted from many diverse criteria in expert/novice research was chosen.

A sample group of expert junior-high level language teachers was studied for the purpose of analyzing teaching pragmatics. A set of composite criteria for selecting 30 excellent teachers was established (Tochon, 1990b). These included favorable recommendations by teacher educators, academic education, professional training, minimum experience in teaching (7 years), and finally random selection.

The present article is based on one case, with one of these expert teachers. This teacher was selected among the experts in the study because he is representative of transformations in teacher intentions, and because his verbalizations provide clear examples of transformational rules underlying teaching pragmatics.

RESEARCH INSTRUMENTS

The two instruments developed for the research consisted of a semi-directed standard interview protocol to obtain task-centered, immediate retrospective verbalizations, and a simulation protocol to obtain concurrent verbalizations. The interview outline dealt with questions

raised in previous research done on expertise, planning and subject-matter-knowledge in the paradigm of teacher thinking. An example is, "What did you do when such-and-such happened?" (right after a teaching phase). The questions were related to topics in the literature reviewed. In conformity with this type of research, questions were asked to stimulate the teacher to respond initially or when discussion was saturated in one topic or range of topics. The questions dealt with specific events in the classroom or current duties (Ericsson and Simon, 1992). The simulation protocol is not reproduced here because it is not germane to the present case study.

This interview was 180 minutes long and immediately followed an observation phase in the classroom. It was recorded and transcribed *verbatim* for coding and computer analysis. Different procedures were used to demonstrate the teaching of interactive transformations. The problem was to clarify how instructional representation-frames were reorganized by interactions to discover patterns of transformations in teacher intentionality. In this regard, the methodology used in the present study might result in new ways of conceiving situated teaching among expert language teachers.

Pragmatic Grammar Used in the Analysis of Verbal Protocols

The *language of practice* (Yinger, 1986) was analyzed through a pragmatic grammar. This grammar was elaborated so as to analyze verbal protocols; only a brief overview of some grammar indicators is presented here. It sheds light on the horizontal processing of domains of tasks and on the vertical levels of knowledge processing through pragmatic connectors and organizers. To facilitate understanding, no complex language writing is used for the purpose of this demonstration.

Definition of the grammar indicators

Domains of tasks. Language domains of tasks have been defined as curricular domains most often evoked in verbal protocols. They are work spaces for teaching intentionality. These are the ORAL (speaking and listening), READING, WRITING, and Language BASICS (verbs, words, grammar and spelling) domains.

Connector. A connector establishes a pragmatic link between organizers, concepts or domains of tasks.

> (1)   "Writing production will be linked with an oral inquiry."
>   WRITING *C* ORAL (inquiry)

Organizer. An organizer is a pragmatic mold shaping one or more concepts, a curricular task domain, or even an entire instructional unit. It is part of an intentional network and determines the content processing mode and the teaching intentionality. It includes the focal experience of teaching itself in virtual form.

Concepts. A concept is a conceptual node pertaining to one of the task domains of the curriculum. It is also used as a unit in propositional analysis of pragmatic networks.

> (1)   *inquiry*, above.

Functions of the Grammar Indicators

Indicators of language teaching were determined by the literature and by repeated readings of the corpus. The pragmatic grammar presented in this article is new, even though its infrastructure conforms to that of semantic grammars currently being used. The examples given below in word form follow regular bracketing rules.

Vertical connector (code: /). A vertical connector establishes a conceptual link between two or more levels of framing; it determines the relationship of embedding.

> (2)   "We have built actual props from the props we read about orally in this novel."
> ORAL actualizer (WORK) / READING skiller (novel)

Horizontal connector (code: +). A lateral connector establishes a conceptual link between two domains. It often transfers the same organizer from one domain of tasks to another.

> (3)   "We chose a theme together and worked on expressing, then reading, and
> then writing parts of that novel."
> ORAL narrativor (theme) / skiller (ORAL + READING + WRITING)

Narrativor: story-making organizer. A narrativor is a narrative pragmatic organizer; it is intended to develop contents in the form of themes, images, anecdotes or stories.

> (4)   "As a theme for writing about props, we tackled the slightly stereotyped
> image of the terrifying and sinister haunted house"
> WRITING narrativor (props)

Skiller: skill-making organizer. A skiller is an instrumental pragmatic organizer; it is intended to develop procedural knowledge which focuses on a skill, an operation or a procedure forming a component of an action.

> (5)   "Directions provide a valid reference for the summaries to be done."
> WRITING skiller (summary)

Actualizer: experience-making organizer. An actualizer is an experiential pragmatic organizer; it is intended to develop contextual knowledge by focusing teaching on actions, on the relationship with concrete and everyday experiences[2].

(6)   "The students had the experience of questioning people on the street."
           ORAL actualizer (interviews)

To summarize, a grammar was elaborated to analyze verbal protocols taken from lan-
guage teachers. This grammar is based on task domains of the discipline, pragmatic organizers
involving different levels of knowledge as intentions, and connectors between domains and/or
levels of tasks. Together, connectors, organizers and domains shape curriculum concepts in
teaching/learning intentions.

The accuracy of the grammar was verified in a vast corpus, the results of which appear in
Tochon (1991 and 1993a). The present paper illustrates how this grammar may be used to shed
light on pragmatic transformations in language teaching/learning interactions. To this end, an
excerpt from the corpus is analyzed, that of Teacher 29. Teacher 29 compares his planning to
what happened during and after classroom interactions. He first wrote down his plan and pre-
sented it to his class. His report was verbalized in interview right after the class. He explained
details during the interview. The analysis of the verbal protocol indicates modular changes; the
grammar sheds light on rules used to adapt and contextualize teaching intentions to students'
reactions.

EXCERPT - TEACHER 29

"I had planned to give back the grades for students' files. I also had a text with questions;
as well, I had in my briefcase—you never know, just in case—two previous summaries stu-
dents had written on chapters of a book. I was going to grade them but I decided not to, but
instead to take these summaries back and make the students merge them into one piece of 100
words, so they could develop this abstract skill before I graded it in a normative way. So all that
was in my briefcase, just in case, but I didn't think I would use it. And then I had a text about
the upcoming provincial exams, with concrete examples for each point. Finally, I had a news-
paper article on the evils of credit cards, to provoke debate and argument. I had all that in my
briefcase and also things I had typed in a hurry, ..., just thinking, well, so I have one more text
which seems pretty interesting that I could use. Things I had typed perhaps 15 minutes before
class, but that had been in my mind for two-three days; that I'd been thinking about from time
to time, driving the car or anywhere else.

Then I reached the classroom where the students were... very very restless, choppy and
rough. In class, I opened my file to give them their grades. From the register I became aware I
had given very few grades on basics. When I arrived the photocopier did not work...

In fact, what happened to these plans? I had no copies, so I could not do what I wanted
with the text. Then, as far as reading was concerned, I immediately thought I could use the
book reading (and have time to copy the text on the star system during the break between the
two classes), but the students said: "When will we be done with *Zazie dans le Métro*?" *Zazie*
usually works quite well with students with an extended vocabulary, but they have to like
second-level humor. These students did not seem mature enough, they took everything at face
value, which was not exciting or funny at all.

Almost everything I did emerged from the same materials; but in a completely unexpected

way. One single section that was intended to take 20 minutes took 65 minutes. On the other hand, the homework I had planned to give changed completely. I gave them spelling home-work because, in the middle of the class, I remembered that it was in the provincial exam requirements. I then planned a smaller number of questions, and I organized a new bonus mark on the spot.

The results yielded by all these changes are the following. First, my students were happy because they did not have *Zazie*; they did not receive any immediate grades for dictation. Another result: students calmed down because their attention was captured by the text; and they worked hard. So, in a sense, I feel the class was successful."

ANALYSIS

Even when well planned, the beginning of any class can resemble this one. This teacher reports his intentions and their actualization in two lessons. Field contingencies and students' reactions prompted a strategic change of intentions during teaching.

The teacher came to class with a full briefcase and extensive plans. Confronted by the reality of a restless class, "choppy and rough" on the afternoon before a holiday, Teacher 29 quickly assessed the changed situation and revised his intentions. Significantly, he revealed that he knows how and when to make modifications that suit the class, yet achieve his goals for the session. To resolve the situation and obtain time to reflect, while also calming down the students, the teacher asked them to take a sheet of paper and write down the text from dictation, using their dictionaries as required. Since no dictation had been given for six weeks, and since this one "was only a pretext for looking at new words and meanings, it allowed a quieter text assimilation". He dictated a text on the topic of pop stars and youth idols, which had been planned for reading and debate (he had another text on the topic of "credit cards" in reserve).

This process of task domains and pragmatic organizers derivation can be translated as:

(7)   ORAL (*reading* narrativor) —> WRITING (*basic* skiller)

The text support is the same, but the modification in teaching plan seems radical. The-matic reading in view of a debate becomes simply a basic exercise, writing from dictation, with debate on that reading postponed.

In the notation above, the transformational clause is composed of two intentional phrases. The starting (subordinate) task domains appear within brackets: reading and basics. The target task domains are in capitals (ORAL, WRITING). The pragmatic organizers shaping the start-ing domains are included in the brackets. Bracketing denotes a vertical embedding connection. The arrow indicates a transformation from intention to actualization.

Students had been told that the grading scale for spelling dictation would be strict. When the students calmed down, Teacher 29 proposed that they exchange their copies for peer-grad-ing, using the grading scale presented earlier and a formative evaluation grid. He considered grades as optional, and asked the students to prepare the text for the next week. The 14 ques-tions on the text he had typed before class would be used the next week, as a "free gift" (bonus supplement if answers were correct.

The teacher also authorized two students to keep *Zazie*, as they were enthusiastic about it, while the others returned the book. He reported the enthusiasm generated by these extemporaneous decisions, and the dictations with peer grading resulted in two useful classes. Such initiatives were undertaken only as far as they were well-received by the students, who worked well after a choppy beginning. This teacher expressed the feeling that the smooth working atmosphere was a direct result of the spontaneous transformations of his intentions. In his teaching, he places emphasis on working with pleasure, for the students as well as for himself. He could have used the text for other purposes, as a memory challenge, as a springboard for debate after its oral reading. However, the choice seemed to have been dictated by events: he had to find a peaceful and restraining activity.

While Teacher 29 improvises, as he puts it, ideas become connected, things hang together; some events are suggested by the environment. The teacher responds to the students, joining their subjective needs to the objective needs of the curriculum.

"There is always a balance. I know I respond best to students' needs and to the program by reducing entropy, dispensing minimal energy for maximum results. Indeed, it is only on arriving in front of my students that I know how I'll use the text and how the class will follow."

The knowledge negotiation results in intentionality transformations. The transformations in the teacher intentions for these two classes were the following:

a   The book which was to have kept the students busy for the lesson was abandoned, with the exception of two students who kept it for personal reading for two weeks;

b. Summaries were not used for writing, but individual cases were discussed with students and then saved for a later class, just in case;

c. Text analysis in a discussion situation did not happen, but the text on stars was used for dictation and as a peer-correcting exercise;

d. The teacher plan for half a lesson was extended to one-and-a half classes;

e. Homework was modified.

Texts seem to have many uses in language, regulated by balancing the different task domains.

"If I have used too much writing, I lead the class to reading or to oral activities... A single text has several applications and can be used in many ways I have internalized through practice (but I try to innovate all along)."

Pragmatic epistemology is revealed in that process of focal intentions. Intentions formalize task domain moves, while connections between curricular nodes respond to adaptive contexts. Focal teaching transformations are evidenced in the interview of Teacher 29, when comparing his intentions to their actualization in the classroom.

Intentions	*Actualization*
A. -Individual reading of the narrative on pop stars.	-Dictation spelling exercise of the text on pop stars.
B. -Oral answers to questions	-Practice correcting;

as an exercise.   peer-dialogue.

C.   -Written summary exercise from   -No written summary; oral debate
      two previous abstracts.   after reading previous abstract;
                                               individual case analysis and
                                               narrative.

D.   -Reading of *Zazie dans le*   -Reading dropped; negotiation of
      Métro, with thinking aloud   next reading (undetermined).
      of narrative comments.

E.   -Preparation for a provincial   -Individual silent reading of
      exam using oral reading   provincial exam field, oral expla-
      of the guidelines with the   nation and narrative examples, and
      whole group.   revision on black board.

F.   -Answer to questions on the   -Practice spelling based on the
      "stars" text for homework.   "stars" text for homework.

The following paragraph is a grammar translation of the intentions above, and their actualization. This grammar notation is simplified for easy comprehension. We examined basic patterns and we did not take into account complex embeddings. For example, homework is of course a written exercise, as planned and as actualized. However, its basic intention is reading skills through text study (as planned) and spelling technical skills (as actualized). Thus, in the example of homework, the writing embedding is not mentioned. Other publications consider complex embedding (Tochon, 1991).

Organization in *anticipative statics*	Transformation in *focal dynamics*	Organization in *resultant statics*

READING narrativor (stars text)   —> A —> BASICS skiller (stars text)

ORAL (READING skiller(questions))—> B —> ORAL (BASICS skiller(correction))

WRITING (skiller(abstracts))   —> C —> ORAL + READING (narrativor(abstracts))

READING (ORAL narrativor(*Zazie*) —> D —> ORAL (actualizer(negotiate)) / READING
                                                (narrativor (undetermined))

ORAL (narrativor(common test))   —> E —> READING (skiller(guidelines)) +

                                               ORAL (narrativor(explanations))
READING (skiller(stars text))   —> F —> BASICS (skiller(stars text))

Focal dynamics of transformational functions {A to F} can be deduced from their effects on the teacher's improvisation, as explained retrospectively. An algebraic reduction of the statements above evidences the mathematical modularity of transformation rules. Intentional modules are flexibly adapted to situations.

Suppose a dynamics in which we see represented:

T = <tasks domains> = <T1,T2,T3,T4> R = <organizers> = <R1,R2,R3>
{x;y;z} = <content or material>   R1= <narrativor>
T1 = <READING>   R2 = <skiller>
T2 = <WRITING>   R3 = <actualizer>
T3 = <ORAL>   G=<transformationrules>=<A,B,C,D,E,F>
T4 = <BASICS>

Here is an attempt to define $G(x)$, that is, the focal transformational function for A,B,C,D,E,F, so as to examine the pragmatic transformations of knowledge in teachers' thinking. In this functional notation, *READING narrativor (x = stars text)* is translated R1T1(x); its focal transformation "A" for (x) is **BASICS skiller (stars text)**, expressed as T4R2(x). Thus we can study regularities in focal transformations of teaching. The transformation A (x) may be rewritten as follows:

$$A(x) = \quad T1R1(x) \quad \longrightarrow \quad T4R2(x)$$

$$B(x) = \quad \begin{array}{l} T3 \\ T1R2(x) \end{array} \quad \longrightarrow \quad \begin{array}{l} T3 \\ T4R2(y) \end{array}$$

$$C(x) = \quad T2R2(x) \quad \longrightarrow \quad T3+T1(R1(x))$$

$$D(x) = \quad \begin{array}{l} T1 \\ T3R1(x) \end{array} \quad \longrightarrow \quad \begin{array}{l} T3R3(y) \\ T1R1(z) \end{array}$$

$$E(x) = \quad \begin{array}{l} T3R1(y) \\ T1R2(x) \end{array} \quad \longrightarrow \quad T1R2(x)+T3R1(z)$$

$$F(x) = \quad T1R2(x) \quad \longrightarrow \quad T4R2(x)$$

Note from the algebraic formulation that conservative patterns are preserved, while focal teaching involves quite radical moves as far as pragmatic organizers, task domains and material are concerned. Most often, there is a change in one organizer or in one domain. F(x) involves a transformation where T1 becomes T4, but the R2(x) model stays unchanged. As regards A(x), both domain and organizer move: T1R1(x) becomes T4R2(x).

B(x) indicates a conservative preserved pattern while one embedded domain moves (T1 becomes T4) and the material support of teaching has been changed (x becomes y, questions become corrections). The head domain of the structure remains T3, with the same embedded organizer (R2).

The Teacher 29 excerpt illustrates elements of knowledge transformation in both students' and teachers' reactions. The grammar sheds light on some conditions and action effects of transformations as reflected in teachers' thinking. Transformations imply contextually dependent dynamic rules. Focal transformation or flow dynamics are mediated here in statics by a propositional grammar. The grammar takes the teacher's stand, but the rules which may be evidenced are basic transformational condition-action rules. Such condition-action rules affect teachers' knowledge *and* students' knowledge. See for example this excerpt from Teacher 8:

"During her writing practice, this student did not understand a mistake related
to syntax. I used her (mistake) as an example, her own sentence while she was
speaking about her family this morning. She will remember the rule, because
she is included in my example."

The grammar structure is:

(8)   WRITING (skiller of language BASICS) —>
        ORAL (narrativor of language BASICS)

The transformation above will affect the student's knowledge; it describes one condition-action rule of a successful transformation of knowledge in this particular student. This is an exception based on general domain categories and pragmatic categories in a default hierarchy (Holland et al., 1986). Higher condition-action rules may explain parts of the transformation process. For example, each domain of tasks may be prototypically categorized with condition features like these ones:

(9)   IF class is choppy and troubled   THEN domain used will be WRITING

(10)   IF class is lazy   THEN domain used will be ORAL

(11)   IF it does not work   THEN switch to another domain

(12)   IF exercise is in trouble   THEN finagle personal stories

(The corresponding heuristic rule developed in the student by this last dynamic rule might be:

(13)   IF I've been at loose ends   THEN opt for concrete life examples).

Thus there is no inconsistency in using a propositional framing so as to shed light on ;formational rules that may be used, in turn, to ground pragmatic mental models. Even

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prototypically planned, each situation may at any moment receive exception-rules and a specific organization according to particular events and the expression of students' reactions.

This analysis gives clear indications that teachers' intentionality is:

a **connectional and modular**: changes occur in relation to a context, they connect and modify organizational models with **condition-action rules** activated by the environment;

b. **indexical**: changes are made by integrating students' information and reactions in the actualized model;

c. a **parallel processing**: it involves diachronic rules of instructional sequencing, and at the same time synchronic rules of pedagogical interaction and indexation;

d directed by **pragmatic categories**: groups of rules circumscribing domains of tasks, level of intentions and types of connections among goals;

e. both a **top-down** planning process involving static production rules, and a **bottom-up** actualization process involving contextually dependent dynamic rules activated by situated conditions of action.

DISCUSSION

The usual transformation in focal pragmatics, as illustrated by the verbal protocol of the teacher studied, is to change the processing task domain or the pragmatic organizer. This result was confirmed by verbal protocols of the other teachers studied. The same text would be used for READING or ORAL work, in an instrumental or in a narrative way, or it could lead to a global actualizer. It also happens that the pragmatic structure remains unchanged while the material has been criss-crossed (x becomes y, but the domains and organizers do not change). As for language teaching, this finding occupies the middle ground between the traditional and the whole language approaches (McKenna, Robinson, and Miller, 1990; Edelsky, 1990). The results obtained from experts studied in this inquiry show a practical compatibility of language-teaching paradigms.

Two dimensions of teaching that appear in the excerpt are analyzed. The first one is a static, declarative representation of instruction. We might say it represents long term memory structure and its epistemic network. The second involves dynamic, pedagogical interactions pertaining to short term memory. At a certain juncture, the expert teacher focus is such that instructional patterns are preserved while modular transformations occur.

Content is shaped through contextual constraints and its pragmatic potential is activated. Language teachers seem to process curricular nodes through intentional text materials. The way they process curriculum appears to obey at least three pragmatic functions evidenced in the corpus: narrative, instrumental, or experiential intentions (a demonstration of which appeared in Tochon, 1990a). These organizers of teaching intentionality seem to be confronted by situated transformational dynamics. Eisner (1979) states that there is a hidden curriculum, involving unexpressed aspects of the school programs. Teaching transformations might be the esult of hidden organizers of the hidden curriculum, each organizational pattern of knowledge

being linked in a polar way to its complementary, unnoticed, foreshadowing disorganizing effect.

In short, the analysis shows task domain mobility and flexibility of pragmatic organization in the focal phase of actualization of intentions. Content actualization can lead to domains' derivation (oral becomes writing, reading is changed to debate, and so on). The order of items can be inverted, or modified in any number of ways. Some secondary items suddenly dominate, while important items can be abruptly dropped. Usual modes of teacher planning prescribed in teacher education are rigid compared to expert focal flexibility, which seems to maintain subjective harmony and balance, as well as meeting objective curricular needs.

Focal intentions, as verbalized by Teacher 29, appear to be energy-saving in two ways: they opt for less entropy in classroom action, and obey deep epistemic structures stored in long-term memory. Thus focal transformations consider two levels of goals: (1) long-term diachronic goals are described by static constitutive rules of the grammar; (2) short-term synchronic goals are revealed in transformational dynamics. Dynamic rules have their condition part (IF...) satisfied by environmental informations. This process is described in terms of indexation of curricular concepts (concepts adapt to students' suggestions), and in terms of level of engagement among students (it appears here, and in other parts of the corpus when teachers generally say that the teaching unit ends as a result of a decrease in students' engagement). Following is a further discussion of these two features, indexation and engagement.

Indexation and Students' Engagement

Indexation is the linking of concepts and processing domains. It gives an extended view of the curriculum throughout the year. A surface transformation might express a goal derivation in the deep epistemic structure of the year. Indexation is a form of embedding. A book's index, for example, offers references through multiple connections. As verbally reported, teacher's situated cognition seems to follow similar processes. It does not obey a sequencing from simple intentions to more complex intentions. It embeds spontaneously different levels of knowledge through indexical transformations. As verbalized, language teaching interactive pragmatics resembles a sensitive network of indexations. Each rule-node might spread at any moment in the direction of another related curricular rule-node, and change the course of the year. Even though epistemically immovable in its static structure, the teacher's curriculum appears in deconstruction-reconstruction. It is shaped by interactions on the basis of a grammar of practice. Any pedagogical focus may be the indexed turning-point towards another curricular point of the year.

The second dimension of the transformational process in teacher's intentionality is the students' level of *engagement*. Engagement is attended to if this leads to greater order and harmony. Students' engagement in the language teacher's intentionality is linked to a variability assessment. Teachers seem to assess the degree of variability quite accurately for students' engagement. Variability information about curricular engagement is used in generalizing teaching situations most suitable to producing a harmonious experience. Transformations seem to occur when turning-points are foreseen as potential increases in students' engagement, to keep pace with the deeper goals of the mental curriculum of the year.

The excerpt from Teacher 29 is an examplar of numerous transformations. He says in

another part of the interview that "it" happened this way on this day because of persistent contextual factors (current examination in other disciplines, period of the year, previous hard work, difficulty experienced by the students in getting through the book even with effort). Surface events gave the pretext for deeply motivated transformations to appear. They were *prepared* by the previous week's environmental indications and the sudden disengagement was a triggering condition for new inferences to occur. Expert flexibility seems very different from novice unprepared improvisation. Over the entire corpus, all 30 expert language teachers gave evidence of a well-planned improvisation; this was grounded on modular patterns and the *grammar* of their discipline. Their improvisation cannot be referred to as an expression of *psychic entropy* but as some sort of flow experience (Csikszentmihalyi and Selega-Csikszentmihalyi, 1988).

The excerpt from Teacher 29 and its analysis give clear insights into a focal process that needs more validation. Biases in this exploratory study are related to short-term retrospective verbalization and to the distinctiveness of the individual studied. The gap between diachronic intentionality and synchronic interactions might be different with another teacher. Moreover, it may be different in another discipline, and at another level than junior high. Teaching styles might be different. A grammar of intentional transformations may help in differentiating and analyzing teaching styles.

The methodology proposed here would, in any case, develop interesting knowledge about basic epistemological assumptions related to teaching intentions and processing domains in a discipline. It can provide a way to analyze embeddings of pedagogical knowledge organizers in subject-matter knowledge transformations.

CONCLUSION

This article began by defining teaching in a semiocognitive perspective. We mentioned that the difference between instructional design (organization of content) and pedagogy (organization of classroom relationships to content) corresponds to two basic semiotic orientations. The axes of diachrony and synchrony are significant in the distinction between instructional design and pedagogy, respectively. In the research literature, these distinctive features are consistent with those of the double agenda of teaching. They might differentiate reflection-on-action from reflection-in-action. Thus, they give insight into a unified model of teaching.

Both aspects of the agenda have to be developed to become a good teacher. Of prime importance is the development of heuristics regulating the relations between two types of considerations: considerations about content sequencing time and considerations about pedagogical relationships. This heuristic process was named focal teaching. Teaching may be described as a dynamic function between instructional design and pedagogy, that is, respectively, long-term epistemic structures and short-term situated cognitions (Tochon & Munby, 1993).

The heuristic function of teaching defines a transformational process. It suggests knowledge transformations in the student, but also, as indicated in this article, it expresses transformations of knowledge in the teacher. Evidence was presented for a variety of transformations in the teacher's intentionality and verbalized action:

a. Transformations in processing domains of tasks;
b. Transformations in pragmatic organizers, that is, in the teacher's intentionality;
c. Transformations in the way domains and organizers are connected;
d. Transformations in the curricular concepts used as subject-matter supports;
e. Transformation of the teacher's patterns of response according to students' reactions;
f. Transformation of the curriculum in modular intentions indexed on students' intentions.

There was no evidence of knowledge tranformations either in the teacher's long-term memory or in students' thinking, as the methodology used was not designed to obtain it. The grammar has been conceived on the basis of recurrent aspects of teachers' expressed intentions as evidenced in a corpus of 30 interviews among secondary Language Arts experts. Thus, the grammar indicators are based on long term memory, well-confirmed domains, organizers, and connectors. This methodology may be useful in other branches of learning. Furthermore, it might help develop in other disciplines:

a. A different perspective on instructional designs, with pragmatic domains, core organizers and connectors;
b. Patterns of practical links amongst curricular concepts giving indications for useful curricular changes or adaptation;
c. Growing knowledge of dynamic rules relating field realities to instructional patterns. It might then in some way answer the quest for pedagogical situated cognitions and pragmatics;
d. Indications of how teachers index curricular knowledge to the needs and reactions of students; these indications might inform action research in teacher education and field reflective practice;
e. Pragmatic grammars basic for tutorial intelligent systems providing field simulations(both computational teaching systems and teacher educating systems). Reflective practice in a simulated environment might develop plausible answers to field problems. As far as teacher education is concerned, this last possibility should only be envisaged with caution: one must consider the limitations of micro-teaching in simulated settings. Probably nothing replaces real student teaching and reflective teaching itself for the experiential development of situated cognitions. The well-planned improvisation of a really good teacher is a spontaneous heuristic process in answer to idiosyncratic contexts. We might understand it but not mimic it (Lampert and Clark, 1990).

This article provides indications that focal teaching is tightly shaped by modular connections between task domains and pragmatic organizers. A teacher's way of knowing expresses itself in intentional transformations which can be demonstrated by a pragmatic grammar. The grammar, in turn, might express the middle ground between prescription and rationalization (Floden and Klinzing, 1990), with its rules, its mobility of modelling, and its exceptions. In dance with our research results, the expert teacher is the one who has spent a lot of time to

elaborate accurate planning; who has at his or her hand a large bank of plans; and who ex-presses a manifold planning in a variety of adaptive intentional modules fitting students' en-gagement as closely as possible.

Teacher 29: "Text has one purpose. But I should say that most of the time I do not know how I will use text before coming into class. Here, there was such enthusiasm in the interaction with pupils after I decided to change, and with peer-correction (they liked it). It was a lively and almost joyful event, with a comparison exercise amongst them. Eventually things worked smoothly.

When I reflect on that lesson, I notice great modifications in my plans. And most of the modifications are probably due, on one hand, to the way I use text and planning, ie, my process-ing mode; and, on the other hand, to the time that things take. There, for example, I had planned lots of questions, and I could not touch half of them. The bell had rung. I constantly have to change the pace of action."

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NOTES

[1] The option of mental models taken by Holland, Holyoak, Nisbett & Thagard (1986) seems quite suitable to the present analysis. It implies pragmatic reasoning processes (Cheng and Holyoak, 1985).

[2] Narratives of experiences (Connelly & Clandinin, 1988), which appear frequently in the corpus, are abbreviated narrativor (X) / actualizer (Y) insofar as they draw a student close to an actual experience or a personal feeling; in these cases, an actualizer is embedded in a narrativor. However, an actualizer at Level One clearly has more experiential power than when it is em-bedded in a narrativor at Level Two.

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CAN NNS SKILL IN INTERPRETING IMPLICATURE IN AMERICAN ENGLISH BE IMPROVED THROUGH EXPLICIT INSTRUCTION? - A PILOT STUDY

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ABSTRACT

The ubiquity of conversational implicature has become well known, but the extent to which it is a useful strategy in cross cultural interaction is not so clear. One study that has attempted to answer some of the questions related to this issue has been ongoing since 1986 at the University of Illinois (Urbana-Champaign). Questions such as the extent to which nonnative speakers of English on arrival in the United States can derive the same message from an implicature in English as the native speakers do; how fast the nonnative speakers can close the gap that exists between their proficiency and that of the natives; and whether focused instruction in the ESL classroom can speed up the learning process with regard to this facet of a nonnative speaker's communicative competence have been addressed. This paper will review the results that have come out of that study with a special emphasis on the question of how much explicit classroom instruction can enhance the learner's ability to interpret implicatures in American English as the native speakers do.

THE USE OF IMPLICATURE: INTERPRETING AN UTTERANCE IN TERMS OF IT'S CONTEXT

Conversational implicature is the label Grice (1975, 1981) gave to the inferential process through which the meaning of any utterance is understood in terms of the context in which it occurs. Consider, for example, the question Do you have any coffee? uttered in a fast food restaurant, on the one hand, or in a grocery store, on the other. In the first case, you are asking for a cup of coffee to drink. In the second, you are asking if they have coffee beans in some form and, perhaps, exactly where they are in the store. Or, again, imagine the remark *It's smokey in here* being made by a couple returning home after a vacation, on the one hand, or by a non-smoker among smokers on the other. Uttered by the couple, the comment is an expression of concern or alarm; from the non-smoker, it is an indirect complaint. And if this same remark came from someone sitting in front of a fire in the fireplace on a winter's night, it might be a suggestion that someone check to make sure the flue was open. All of these differences in

the meaning of these utterances are derived from an interaction of the utterance and the context in which it occurred, and that interaction is the basis of *implicature*. Given these examples, together with others that we come into contact with everyday, it is not difficult to see why Green (1989) would see *conversational implicature* as "an absolutely unremarkable and ordinary conversational strategy" and, therefore, very much a part of any proficient speaker's communicative competence.

In describing how implicature works, Grice (1975) begins by noting that all participants in a conversation expect themselves and the others to make their contributions appropriate to the progress of the conversation at any particular moment. In other words, each speaker is expected to make what he/she says truthful, appropriately informative, relevant, and clear. When the literal meaning of what they hear does not seem to have these characteristics, the other participants assume that the speaker is expressing him-/herself indirectly and look for another meaning for what has been said. When they find one that does seem to have those characteristics, they assume that to be the message the speaker intended. Messages derived in this way, along with the process that produces them, can be referred to as conversational implicature.

But for an implicature to have a reasonable chance of being interpreted as the speaker intended it to be, the speaker and hearer must share a common perception of at least four facets of any conversational context (Grice, 1975): 1) the utterance from which the implicature is to be derived; 2) the roles and expectations of the participants in a conversation; 3) the context in which the utterance occurs; and 4) the world around them as it pertains to their interaction. And that raises an interesting question for anyone involved in cross-cultural communication, one that Grice did not address: Given the differences that exist in the way people from one culture or another perceive the various aspects of the conversational context, to what extent can implicature be an effective strategy in an interaction between people with disparate linguistic and cultural backgrounds?

INVESTIGATING IMPLICATURE IN CROSS CULTURAL COMMUNICATION

The first attempt to answer this question was by Keenan (1976). Through her work with the Malagasy, she showed that although Grice's maxims might be universal, they could be implemented differently from one society to another -and that this could cause individuals from one culture to misinterpret implicatures used by those from the other. But until 1986, little else seems to have been done in this area. [1]

The First Longitudinal Study: 1986-91

In 1986, at the University of Illinois (Urbana Campus), 436 nonnative English speaking international students [2] who were entering the university [3] were tested to determine the extent to which their interpretation of implicatures in American English were the same as those of native speakers who took the same test. The test items, two examples of which are given in (1) and (2), consisted of a dialogue containing an implicature that subjects were to interpret and sufficient context to permit them to do so. In answering the item, subjects were to choose one

of the four interpretations following the dialogue 4. Sometimes the necessary context is separate from the dialogue; sometimes it is contained within it. [The expected response here and elsewhere in this paper is indicated by an asterisk (*)].

(1) **Irony** - based on a contrast between an idealized marriage and/or friendship and what Americans seem to see as the potential instability of both.

Bill and Peter have been good friends since they were children. They roomed together in college and travelled Europe together after graduation. Now friends have told Bill that they saw Peter dancing with Bill's wife while Bill was away.

Bill: Peter knows how to be a really good friend.

Which of the following best says what Bill means?

*a. Peter is not acting the way a good friend should.
 b. Peter and Bill's wife are becoming really good friends while Peter is away.
 c. Peter is a good friend, so Bill can trust him.
 d. Nothing should be allowed to interfere with Bill and Peter's friendship.

(2) **Relevance maxim** - based on the regularity of the postman's deliveries. Also relevant is the fact that Helen's statement immediately follows Frank's question and would, therefore, be interpreted as some sort of answer to it.

Frank wanted to know what time it was, but he did not have a watch.

Frank: What time is it, Helen?
Helen: The postman has been here.
Frank: Okay. Thanks.

What message does Frank probably get from what Helen says?

*a. She is telling him approximately what time it is by telling him that the postman has already been there.
 b. By changing the subject, Helen is telling Frank that she does not know what time it is.
 c. She thinks that Frank should stop what he is doing and read his mail.
 d. Frank will not be able to derive any message from what Helen says, since she did not answer his question. [6]

Norms for the test were developed by giving the same items to 28 college educated Ameri-
can NS. The overall results of the study (see Table 1) show that the NNS derived the same
interpretation as the NS approximately 79.5% of the time when they first arrived in the United
States in August, 1986. (For a more detailed discussion, see Bouton (1988)) [7]. Four and a half
years later, subjects from this same group were tested again. By this time, although the perfor-
mance of NS and NNS was still different to a statistically significant degree ($p < 0.019$), the
NNS had come much closer to native-like proficiency in the interpretation of most implicatures,
choosing the same response as the NS 92% of the time. In fact, when the responses the NNS
gave to 20 of the 28 questions this second time around were grouped together, there was essen-
tially no difference at all between the performance of the native and nonnative speakers on
those items. As for the other 8 items, i.e., those that the NNS were still unable to interpret as
Americans do, those items seem to be difficult because of specific points of American culture
found in the *substance* of the particular test item (Bouton, 1992). [8]

Table 1: NNS Interpretation of Implicature in American English:
Growth over 4 1/2 Years

	NNS Aug '86	NNS Jan '91	NS Aug '86
Number of Items	28	28	28
Mean Score	19.97	22.97	25.04
Standard Deviation	3.55	3.05	11.77
Range of Raw Scores	10-26	13-28	22-28
Ration of $Mean_{nns}/Mean_{ns}$	79.5%	91.5%	—
N	30	30	28

From these results, it was apparent that NNS can develop a high level of proficiency in
interpreting implicatures in English if given enough time. But how much time was enough? How
fast had these NNS attained this skill? Had it come quickly? Or did it take the full 4 1/2 years?

The Second Longitudinal Study: 1990-1993.

To answer this question, two more groups of NNS were studied. Both of these groups
were selected from among the 304 NNS whose ability to interpret implicatures in American
English had been tested when they first arrived on campus in August, 1990 - the first group
after they had been on campus 17 months; the second, after 33 months. The test administered
to these two groups was a shorter, revised version of the one that had been used for the 41/2
year study just described. [9]

At the same time, we wanted to compare the 17 and 33 month groups with NNS who had
been on campus more than 4 years to see if the NNS ability to interpret implicature continued
to increase. We could not use the results of the 4 1/2 year study just discussed because of the
difference in the test instruments used. And so, as a temporary measure, while waiting for the
time on campus of the NNS who arrived in August, 1990, to reach 4 1/2 years, we tested a

group of Chinese students who had been on campus between 4 and 7 years (which we will call the *4-7 year group*). The function of this group was to provide a benchmark against which to measure the progress of those NNS in the 17 and 33 month groups in order to see if we could expect much more growth beyond that of the 33 month group.

When the results attained from these two groups were analyzed they showed that their performance after 17 and 33 months, respectively, was significantly better than it had been when they first arrived on campus in 1990 (p <0.0001). Also, although the mean score of the 33 month group (18.80) was slightly higher than that of the 17 month group (18.06), the difference was not significant (p < 0.1869); nor was there a significant difference between the scores of these groups and that of those who had been on campus from 4-7 years. The Scheffe Test showed the mean scores of all three of these groups to differ from that of the NS (a = .05).

Table 2 compares the results attained by the 17 and 33 month groups, the 4-7 year group, and the NS norm. To highlight the growth of each of the NNS groups, the results from the tests given after the NNS had been on campus for their respective periods are in bold type. Also, we have attempted to capture the relationship between the raw scores of the different NNS groups by expressing each as a percent of the score achieved by the NS on the same test.

And so, to the extent that it can be measured by an overall score on an instrument such as

Table 2: Comparison of the Overall Results Attained by the NS and NNS

	NNS BASE GROUP ON ARRIVAL 8/90, 1/91	NNS IMMERSION GROUPS[10]					NS
		17 Month Grp.		33 Month Grp.		4-7 yrs	
		Arr.	17 mo	Arr	33 mo		
Number of Items	22	22	**22**	22	**22**	**22**	22
Mean Score	16.74	16.50	**18.06**	17.17	**18.80**	**18.74**	19.92
Median	16.96	17.00	**18.50**	17.38	**19.14**	**19.50**	20.11
Std Dev	2.80	2.96	**3.11**	2.57	**1.62**	**2.68**	1.54
Range (raw score)	8-22	9-21	**9-22**	9-22	**15-21**	**11-22**	—
Ratio (NNS/NS)	84.02%	82.8%	**91.0%**	86.4%	**94.4%**	**94.1%**	—
N	375	34	**34**	35	**35**	**34**	77

the one used here, much of the progress attained by the NNS in this study in their ability to interpret implicatures in American English seems to have been achieved during the first 17 months of their stay on campus; from that point on progress was slow; and even after 4 years there is still a statistically significant difference between the performance of the NNS and the NS, as there was in the original study after 4 1/2 years.

But the overall statistics do not tell the whole story. To get a more complete picture of the relative competence of each of these groups to interpret implicature, we must also look at the particular items to see which were troublesome and which were not. Since what we are interested in here is the extent to which NNS derive the same meaning from implicatures as American NS do, we will consider an implicature to be *troublesome* to the extent to which interpretations of it by those two groups differ. To find this difference for each implicature, we will subtract the percent of NNS answering as expected from the percent of NS doing so. The data n Tables 3-5 pertain to such an item by item analysis for the NS and for each of the three

immersion groups at the end of their 17 months, 33 months, and 4-7 years. Also, as a base line by which to determine how difficult each implicature was for the NNS as a whole initially, the same data will be provided for the 375 NNS who arrived in August, 1990, and January, 1991.

In terms of their relative difficulty for NNS, the implicatures involved in this study can be divided into 3 sets. The first of these are those for which the percentage of each of the NNS and the percentage of NS doing so is essentially the same (see Table 3).

Table 3: Implicature for Which the Interpretations of NS and NNS Were Similar
(i.e., NS - NNS < 7%) the Relevant Periods of NNS Residence

Item	375 NNS ON ARRIVAL	After 17 Mo NNS	After 33 Mo NNS	After 4-7 Yr NNS	NS	Type
16	99	100	100	100	100	Relevance
19	98	94	100	100	100	Relevance
4	92	100	100	94	97	Relevance
10	94	97	94	100	100	Relevance
25	78	88	89	94	88	Relevance
13	86	91	94	94	97	Relevance
23	75	88	89	94	95	Relevance
12	87	74	89	85	81	Min. Req.
20	82	82	83	82	81	Min. Req.
8	80	91	91	97	91	Ind. Crit.
24	74	74	86	68	70	Scalar
AVG	85.9	89.0	92.3	91.6	92.1	-------

Except for the scalar implicature in item (24), the implicatures represented in this set seem to have been relatively easy to interpret for NS and NNS alike. The scalar implicature is included in this set because although it was more difficult than the other items, it was equally difficult for both the NS and NNS groups. In all of these examples, the percentage of NNS in the three groups who had been on campus for some time and that of the NS differs by no more than 7 points, with the exception of item (12) for the 17 month group. Even the NNS who had just arrived differed from the NS by more than 7 percentage points only 3 times. It also is worth noting that with two exceptions, the scalar implicature and an instance of indirect criticism, the implicatures in this relatively easy set all belong to two specific types: 7 are based on Grice's Relevance Maxim and 2 on a corollary of his Quantity Maxim that we will call the Minimum Requirement Rule (Levinson, 1983; Bouton,1989). At the same time, there are only 2 relevance based implicatures and none based on the Minimum Requirement Rule that are not in this set. In fact, both of these implicature types have regularly proved easier for NNS to interpret than any other single type (Bouton, 1988). Before going on to more difficult types of implicature, we will look at examples of each of these two.

What Grice's Relevance Maxim says is that we expect whatever a person contributes to a conversation to be relevant to the context in which it is said. When this seems not to be the case, members of the speaker's audience simply find another meaning that is relevant and assume that is the message the speaker intended. An example of an item involving this type of implicature is the following:

(3) **Relevance Maxim.**

Lars: Where's Rudy, Tom? Have you seen him this morning?

Tom: There's a yellow Honda parked over by Sarah's house.

What Tom is saying is that...

    a. he just noticed that Sarah has bought a new yellow Honda.
    b. he doesn't know where Rudy is.
*c. he thinks Rudy may be at Sarah's house.
    d. he likes yellow Hondas and wants Lars to see one.

In this particular item, Tom's answer to Lars's question seems like a *non sequitur:* Lars asks about Rudy and Tom talks about a yellow Honda. But neither the NS nor the NNS had trouble making the connection: 100% of the Americans and 99% of the international students chose (c), the expected interpretation.

The second type of relatively easy implicature in this set, those based on the Minimum Requirement Rule (MRR), occur when it is clear from the context that the only information that is desired by the addressee is whether a certain minimum requirement has been met, e.g., the minimum collateral for a bank loan, the minimum score on a test for a particular grade, etc. In these cases, more precise information than that is unnecessary. For instance, in the following example, it is clear that what the banker wants to know is whether Nigel has the requisite 50 cows that will qualify him for the loan he wants. Whether or not he has more is of no importance at the moment. Therefore, the banker's question can be interpreted as "Do you have the necessary number of cows, Mr. Brown?" Under these conditions, all we know from Nigel's response is that he does have enough cows, at least 50. If he has fewer than that, he is lying. But he may well have more. That is not ruled out by the answer he gives to the banker.

(4) **Minimum Requirement Rule.** Nigel Brown is a dairy farmer and
        needs to borrow money to build a new barn. When he goes to the
        bank to apply for the loan, the banker tells him that he must
        have at least 50 cows on his farm in order to borrow enough
        money to build a barn. The following conversation then occurs:

Banker: Do you have 50 cows, Mr. Brown?

Nigel: Yes, I do.

Which of the following says exactly what Nigel means?

    a. He has exactly 50 cows.
*b. He has at least 50 cows - maybe more.
    c. He has no more than 50 cows - maybe less.
    d. He could mean any of these three things.

The second major set of implicatures are also rather easy for most NNS and, in this sense, are like those in the first set (see Table 4). They differ, however, in that in each case, either the 17 month group or the 4-7 year group found them sufficiently difficult so that the percent of that group responding as expected was at least 14% lower than that of the NS. (In each case, the results from the group that found a particular item somewhat difficult appear in bold type.) Also, this set and the next both differ from the first in that both of them together contain only two instances of relevance-based implicature and none based on the Minimum Requirement Rule.

Table 4: Implicature for Which the Interpretations of NS and NNS Were Similar
(i.e., NS - NNS < 7%) - Except for One Immersion Group in Each Case

Item	375 NNS On Arrival	After 17 Mo NNS	After 33 Mo NNS	After 4-7 Yr NNS	NS	Type
2	65	82	94	94	99	Ind. Crit.
7	88	97	94	82	99	POPE Q
5	89	85	91	97	100	Relevance
AVG	80.7	88.0	92.4	91.3	97.0	———

The third set of implicatures is more difficult than the preceding two: this time most of the NNS groups differ from the NS group by at least 14 percentage points - and several times by as many as 24 or more (see Table 5). There are 4 cases in which individual groups come closer to the NS performance for the items in this table, but those groups are clearly the exception in each case. Again, as we did in Table 4, we have put the NNS percentages that differ from that of the NS by 14 or more points in bold type.

The types of implicature that are contained in this more troublesome set involve the Relevance Maxim (1 item), the POPE Q (2 items), a Sequence of Events (1 item)), Irony (2 items) and Indirect Criticism (1 item). Examples of each of these, including the difficult relevance-based item, can be found in (5)-(9).

Table 5: Implicatures More Difficult for NNS

Item	375 NNS On Arrival	After 17 Mo NNS	After 33 Mo NNS	After 4-7 Yr NNS	NS	Type
21	83	82	94	82	96	Relevance
17	79	82	86	92	100	POPE Q
11	65	76	86	65	91	Sequence
6	51	53	57	76	76	Irony
1	48	62	71	53	86	POPE Q
15	60	76	71	76	100	Indirect
18	47	53	60	56	75	Irony
AVG	80.7	88.0	92.4	91.3	97.0	———

(5) **Indirect Criticism through Implicature.** Two teachers are talking about a student's paper:

Mr. R: Have you finished with Mark's term paper yet?
Mr. M: Yeah, I read it last night.
Mr. R: What did you think of it?
Mr. M: Well, I thought it was well typed:

How did Mr. M like Mark's paper?

  a. He liked it; he thought it was good
  b. He thought it was important that the paper was well typed.
  c. He really hadn't read it well enough to know.
*d. He did not like it.

(6) **The POPE Q Implicature.** A group of students are talking over their coming vaca tion. They would like to leave a day or two early, but one of their professors has said that they will have a test on the day before vacation begins. Noone will be excused, he said. Everyone had to take it. After class, some of the students get together to talk about the situation, and their conversation goes as follows:

Kate: I wish we didn't have that test next Friday. I wanted to leave for Florida before that.
Jake: Oh, I don't think we'll really have that test. Do you?
Mark: Professor Schmidt said he wasn't going anywhere this vacation. What do you think, Kate? Will he really give us that test? Do you think we have to stay around here until Friday?
Kate: Does the sun come up in the east these days?

What is the point of Kate's last question?

    a. I don't know. Ask me a question I can answer.
    b. Let's change the subject before we get really angry about it.
  *c. Yes, he'll give us the test. You can count on it.
    d. Almost everyone else will be leaving early. It always happens.
       We might as well do it, too.

(7) **Sequence Implicature.** Two friends are talking about what happened the previous evening.

Maria: Hey, I hear that Sandy went to Philadelphia last night and stole a car.
Tony: Not exactly. He stole a car and went to Philadelphia.
Maria: Are you sure? That's not the way I heard it.

What actually happened is that Sandy stole a car in Philadelphia last night. Which of the two has the right story then?

  *a. Maria.
   b. Tony.
   c. Both are right since they are both saying essentially the same thing.
   d. Neither of them has the story quite right.

(8) **Irony.** At a recent party, there was a lot of singing and piano playing. At one point, Sue played the piano and Mary sang. When Tom asked a friend what Mary had sung, the friend replied,

Friend: I'm not sure, but Sue was playing "My Wild Irish Rose."

Which of the following is the closest to what the friend meant by this remark?

   a. He was only interested in Sue and did not listen to Mary
  *b. Mary sang very badly.
   c. Mary and Sue were not doing the same song.
   d. The song that Mary sang was "My Wild Irish Rose."

(9) **Relevance-based Implicature (one that was difficult for theNNS).** Rachel and Wendy are jogging together.

Wendy: I can't keep up with you, Rachel. I'm out of breath.
           Can't you slow down?
Rachel: I'm glad I don't smoke.

What does Rachel mean by this remark?

   a. She has never smoked and she is glad that she hasn't.
   b. She doesn't want to slow down.
   c. She is stating her belief that smoking is bad for people.
*d. She is saying that the reason that Wendy is out of breath is that she
     smokes.

We can learn several things from considering these three sets of implicatures both in relation to each other and in relation to the different groups of NNS who interpreted them. First, both individual implicatures and whole sets of them varied in the difficulty they posed for NNS and, to a much lesser extent, for NS as well. Occasionally an item that bothered one of the small groups of NNS was easy for another. This variability has been noticed to at least some extent at each step of the overall longitudinal study of which this particular investigation is a part (Bouton, 1988, 1989,1993). But these variations are not merely a matter of chance, although chance undoubtedly plays some role. For one thing, it has been shown quite definitely elsewhere (Keenan, 1976; Bouton, 1988) that the opaqueness of particular implicatures in a specific situation depends to some extent on the cultural background of each of the participants involved, and we have been unable to keep the cultural makeup of the various samples *exactly* the same. However, this study suggests that another factor that makes one type of implicature difficult to learn is the type of reasoning necessary to work out the intended message.

In this latter regard, we can divide the implicatures that were used in this study into two sets: those that are in some sense formulaic and those that are not. Relevance-based implicatures in general, for example, are not: their interpretation is idiosyncratically dependent on the relationship between a particular utterance and its specific context. There is no single structural or semantic formula that underlies the whole range of implicatures that are based on the Relevance Maxim. Each instance of a relevance-based implicature must be approached on its own terms and, more than any other single type, it relies on the speaker and the hearer having a common perception of the principles of conversation and a mutual understanding of the context of the utterance in all its complexity. Relevance-based implicatures are usually easy for NNS from the time they arrive in the United States. On the other hand, when this proves not to be true in a particular case, it is because the hearers do not understand one or more points related to the nature of the utterance, the context, or both, as the speaker does. It follows that to learn to understand a particular relevance-based implicature, the NNS must learn the relevant culture points on which it is based. Given the complexity of the context of some implicatures, it is not surprising that at least some of them based on relevance that are opaque to NNS when they arrive remain impenetrable even after a relatively long stay in this country: items (2) and (21) on the test used in this study are examples of relevance implicatures that have proved difficult for NNS to learn to interpret.

Each of the other implicature types faced by the NNS in this study are based on a formula of some sort - structural, semantic, or pragmatic - that is crucial to a person's effective interpretation of the implicature involved. For example, in the POPE Q implicature, a person responds to one Yes/No question by asking another, to which the answer is obvious, e.g., *Does the sun come of up in the east?* in (6). In such cases, a listener is to assume that the answer to the first question is the same as the answer to the second - and just as obvious. If listeners do not recognize the structural and functional relationships between these two questions, they will not be able to use the POPE Q implicature to understand what the speaker means.

Or consider the implicature that we have labeled *indirect criticism*. Here there is no obvious structural formula, but there is a semantic one that a person can recognize and, from which we receive a clue as to the speaker's message. This implicature is often used in response to a request for a value judgement, e.g., *How do you like my new shoes?* when that judgement might prove offensive to the person asking for it. In this case, the speaker often responds with a positive remark about some peripheral, unimportant feature of whatever (s)he is asked to evaluate. What constitutes a peripheral feature will depend on the context to some extent: a response of *They certainly look comfortable* to the question concerning the new shoes may be a compliment if the shoes are loafers or hiking shoes, or it might be indirect criticism if the shoes are expensive dress shoes, for which the most important characteristic might be their appearance. But whether we perceive it as indirect criticism or not depends on whether we think of the feature to which the praise is directed as peripheral or not, i.e., whether we perceive the speaker's remark as fitting the formula underlying indirect criticism.

In short, in this seasonal longitudinal study, those implicatures on which NNS perform noticeably less well than NS after having been immersed in an American educational environment for an extended period tended to be those based on a formula of some sort - structural, semantic, pragmatic or some combination of these. Only one of the 7 items on which the three immersion groups performed less well was relevance-based, and the only ones based on a formula in the easiest set were related to the Minimum Requirement Rule and the scalar implicature. So we have seen that implicatures differ in their opaqueness and that, in addition to the cultural background of the speaker and hearer, one factor contributing to this variation is the nature of the implicature itself - especially whether or not its derivation is based on a formula of some sort.

A second thing that we can learn from our analysis is that it takes considerable time for NNS to master many of the implicature types that were quite easy for NS to recognize and unravel. At first, the results associated with the 17 month, 33 month, and 4-7 year groups seem to indicate that much of the increase in the ability of the NNS to interpret American English implicatures appropriately came within the first 17 months that they were on campus. However, the data in Tables 4 and 5 shows clearly that the 17 month group has mastered none of the types of implicature listed there. For that group, 9 of 10 items covered in those two tables proved sufficiently difficult to make the difference in the percentage of those answering as expected at least 14 points below that of the NS. In this sense, the troubles that interfered with the performance of the 17 month group came from whole types of implicatures, not from isolated instances of those types. In their 17 month residence, they had mastered no formulaic implicatures that were troublesome for them when they first arrived. For the 33 month and 4-r groups, on the other hand, this seeméd to be less true: for the most part, their problems

seemed to be with specific implicatures and not with whole types.

And so it seems that progress in the development of the knowledge and skills that are needed to interpret implicatures other than those based on the Relevance Maxim or on the Minimum Requirement Rule is a slow process. Furthermore, given the fact that the performance of the NNS groups in the interpretation of most of the **relevance-based implicatures** was as effective as that of the NS, the statistically significant difference between the 17 month, 33 month, and 4-7 year groups and the NS on the test as a whole rests squarely on the formula based implicatures in this study. If it is possible to help NNS increase their ability to interpret these other types of implicatures through instruction in the ESL classroom focused on that objective, then certainly that should be done.

CAN IMPLICATURES BE TAUGHT IN THE ESL CLASSROOM? - A PILOT STUDY

We turn now to a pilot study conducted in the spring, 1993. Prior to that study, it was not at all certain that skills such as these could be taught successfully. Very few ESL texts deal explicitly with this type of communication, and those that do tend to do so only rarely (Bouton, 1990). At the same time, Harris and Chen (1993) report that students enrolled in a short term ESL course in which there was no effort to focus on the development of the skills needed to interpret implicatures in English made no progress at all in this direction. Furthermore, the same conclusion can be drawn from the studies reported on here, since most of the NNS in the immersion groups had been required to take at least one 6 semester hour ESL course during their time on campus. And finally, there was the position espoused by an anonymous reviewer of a paper recently submitted for publication. He commented: "Until we know what kind of skill or whatever implicature is, we cannot reasonably argue that we can teach it. Students can learn it, obviously, and the author should leave it that way." But we have just shown that although students do make considerable progress on their own, those implicature types that are formulaic and were difficult for the NNS when they arrived on campus remained reasonably so - even after periods of from 17 months to 4+ years. And so there was a problem that needed to be dealt with - a question that needed to be answered. We had to find out if the anonymous scholar was right? Was the ability to interpret implicature in English something that we could not teach until our understanding of the nature of implicature itself was more complete?

The rest of this paper will discuss the pilot study. It's purpose was to determine whether focused instruction in the ESL classroom could speed the progress of the NNS attempting to interpret implicature. The results suggest that the answer to that question is a definite *Yes,* though with some qualifications: some types of implicature seem to be more amenable to the instructional approach that we took than others were.

The subjects involved in this study were international students from various departments at the University of Illinois who were taking a regular university course in academic English. One section of that course consisting of 14 students was introduced to the idea of implicature as a tool of indirect communication and to five specific forms that it can take. Three of these - the *Pope Q implicature, Indirect Criticism,* and those involving a *Sequence of Events* - were formulaic and responded well to the instruction we provided. *Irony* remained

difficult at the end of the instruction period, but considerable progress had been made. Only those that were *Relevance-based* and had proved difficult initially proved resistant to our approach.

No items from the test itself were used, of course, since the same instrument was to be the measure of progress at the end of the instruction by defining the relative growth of the experimental and control groups. Instead, examples like those in (10)-(14) were used. The lines containing the implicature to be interpreted in each case are in bold type.

(10) The POPE Q implicature:

    A: Is Brad a talker?
    B: **Is the Pope Catholic?**

(11) Indirect criticism:

    A: Have you seen *Robin Hood*?
    B: Yeah. I went last night.
    A: What did you think of it?
    B: **The cinematography was great.**
    A: Oh, that bad, huh?

(12) Irony:

    A: Hi, Anne.
    B: Hi Joan. What's up?
    A: I was wondering if I could ask a small favor of you. Would
        you read my Linguistics 441 paper?
    B: Gosh, Joan, I wish I could, but I promised Jack I'd go
        bowling with him tonight.
    A: **Yeah. Well, Thanks for the help!**

(13) Relevance:

    A: How about going for a walk?
    B: **Isn't it raining out?**

(14) Sequence - easily seen in the oddness of sentences like...

    >> **Jack jumped out of bed and woke up.**
    >> **Mary went out to her car, drove off, started the engine and**
        got in, just as it started to rain.

The control group for this part of the study consisted of two other sections of the same

ESL course. These sections followed the regular syllabus and received no explicit instruction directed at the enhancement of their ability to recognize and use implicature, since no such instruction would normally have been given.

The initial objectives of the instruction given the students in the experimental section were four: 1) to make them aware of different types of implicature as normal tools of indirect communication in American English; 2) to help them find examples of different types of implicature in both American English and in their own languages (if such examples exist there); 3) to help them learn to recognize and interpret implicatures they hear in their daily interaction with others; and 4) to encourage them to use implicature in appropriate situations.

The instruction itself, which included roughly 6 hours of class time spread over a 6 week period, followed two basic strategies. One of these involved the formal introduction of each implicature type by way of a handout that defined and labeled it and provided several examples of how it might work in different contexts.

These examples provided a springboard for a free-flowing discussion of each new implicature type. In each case, the students were asked to identify the implicature, to explain how they knew that the utterance involved was not to be taken literally and to indicate what message it conveyed. They were also encouraged to offer similar examples that they had heard outside the classroom and to describe similar implicatures that they might have in their own languages. During the introduction of the POPE Q implicature, for example, students noted that in China one hears *Does the sun come up in the west?*; in Puerto Rico, *Will you have poinsettias at Christmas time?*; and in Venezuela, *Does a frog have hair?* [11]

Finally, on occasion during these introductory sessions, students were put in groups of two or three and asked to make up their own dialogues containing the type of implicature that they were discussing that day. In the session devoted to irony, for example, one group came up with the ironic comment that *China is so free you can go to jail any time you want to.*

In each of these formal sessions, students were particularly interested in factors such as register and, by extension, how the relationship between the participants in a conversation made the use of a particular type of implicature more (or less) appropriate. They wanted to know, for example, whether one could use the POPE Q implicature to one's employer or academic advisor. This type of analysis and discussion was typical of the formal introductory sessions for each of the five types of implicature taken up.

The first strategy, then, involved a relatively formal treatment of each of the 5 types of implicature, with each session lasting from 20 to 40 minutes. During the rest of the 6 weeks covered by the study, a second, more informal strategy was followed. For example, every 3 or 4 days, the teacher would bring up examples of implicature during the *warm up* at the beginning of the class and ask students what was going on in each case. She also tried to alert students to some of the more obvious instances of implicature that were used in their own classroom. And she encouraged students to bring in examples from their daily experiences on campus.

So what did we find out? Can NNS develop the skills needed to interpret implicatures appropriately in English more rapidly through formal instruction? On the basis of this pilot study, as Tables 6 through 8 indicate, the answer is clearly *Yes*. The mean score of the experimental group rose from 15.21 before the instruction to 18.80 afterwards, which was a statistically significant improvement ($p < .001$). By contrast, the performance of the control group,

who had had no instruction related to implicature, had not changed significantly. Also, the overall ability of the experimental group to interpret these 22 implicatures appropriately was not significantly different from that of the three immersion groups (see Table 6).

Table 6: A Comparison of the Performance of the Experimental and Control Groups with That of the Immersion Groups at the End of Their Respective Learning Periods

	Experimental Groups				Immersion Groups			NS
	Experimental		Control		17 Mo	33 Mo	4-7 Yr	
	Pre-	Post	Pre-	Post	Post	Post	Post	
Items	22	22	22	22	22	22	22	22
Mean	15.21	18.80	15.66	16.53	18.06	18.80	18.74	19.92
Std Dev	1.93	1.81	2.44	2.14	3.11	1.62	2.68	1.54
Raw Score	11-18	15-21	10-20	10-20	9-22	15-21	11-22	15-22
N	14	14	32	32	34	35	34	77

But just as we saw with the discussion of the progress made by the immersion groups, the overall statistical comparisons give us only part of the story. Again, we must look at the NNS performance on different types of implicatures to complete the picture. Consider, for example, the data in Table 7, which compares the performance of the experimental group with that of the immersion groups in relation to the implicatures based on relevance and the Minimum Requirement Rule. (The scores in bold type are those for items on which the experimental group

Table 7: Comparison of the Performance of the Experimental and Immersion Groups on Implicatures Based on Relevance and the MRR

	Experimental		Immersion Groups			NS	Type
Item	Pre-	Post	17 Mo	33 Mo	4-7 Yr	NS	
4	93	100	97	97	94	97	Relevance
5	93	86	85	91	97	100	Relevance
10	93	100	97	94	100	100	Relevance
13	93	79	91	94	94	97	Relevance
16	100	100	100	100	100	100	Relevance
19	100	100	94	100	100	100	Relevance
21	71	64	82	94	82	96	Relevance
23	71	79	88	89	94	95	Relevance
25	86	64	88	89	79	88	Relevance
12	93	86	74	89	85	81	Min. Req. Rule
20	86	86	82	83	82	81	Min. Req. Rule
24	64	71	74	86	68	70	Scalar
AVG	86.9	84.6	87.7	92.1	89.6	92.1	----

performed less well after the instruction than they had before. Those items for which an immersion group failed to come within 14 percentage points of the NS are in italics.)

In our earlier discussion (see Table 3), we noted that relevance-based implicatures and those based on the Minimum Requirement Rule have proved relatively easy for the immersion groups to handle , and that their overall average for these two implicature types improved slightly with time. But the first thing that we notice in Table 7 is that this did not prove to be so for the experimental group after they had received their instruction. In fact, although their overall average for this set, remained essentially the same, on 6 of the 12 items represented in Table 7, the percent of the group answering as expected actually declined. Why this should have happened in regard to relevance-based implicatures we are unable to say, since no post performance interviews were conducted.

The other two items showing no improvement or an actual decline on the second testing, items (13) and (20), were related to the Minimum Requirement Rule, which was not dealt with in any way during the classroom instruction. Since, as we will see below, the experimental group tended to show significant improvement in their interpretation of all of those formulaic implicatures on which they did receive instruction, and since the MRR is a formula based implicature (albeit it a relatively easy one for NNS to interpret), it is possible that their failure to handle the implicatures related to the Minimum Requirement Rule effectively was a result of their not having been introduced to that particular type in any way during the instruction period. This possibility gains some support from the fact that the scalar implicature, another type that is formulaic (Levinson, 1983, p. 132) and was not presented to the experimental group during the 3 hours of instruction, also saw the students make little progress in learning to interpret it.

Table 8: Comparison of the Performance of the Experimental and Immersion
Groups on Irony and on the 3 Formalaic Implicatures in Which the Experimental
Group Received Instruction

	Experimental		Immersion Groups			NS	Type
Item	Pre-	Post	17 Mo	33 Mo	4-7 Yr	NS	
1	64	100	62	71	53	86	POPE Q
7	86	100	97	94	82	99	POPE Q
17	86	93	82	86	91	100	POPE Q
2	50	93	82	94	94	94	Indirect Crit.
8	71	93	91	91	99	91	Indirect Crit.
15	29	79	76	71	76	100	Indirect Crit.
22	57	100	76	76	91	64	Indirect Crit.
11	43	86	76	86	64	91	Seq. of Events
6	21	57	57	57	76	84	Irony
18	43	71	71	60	56	75	Irony
AVG	55.0	87.2	74.8	78.6	78.3	88.4	----

We turn now to three formulaic types of implicature and to irony, all of which were the focus of instruction. As Table 8 indicates, the instruction focused on the development of skills necessary to the interpretation of these implicatures was highly effective and the progress of the experimental group considerable. With just 6 hours of instruction, the percentage of those in the experimental group who could derive the expected message from these items jumped by an average of 32 points: they responded appropriately as often as the NS, and more often than any of the immersion groups. Furthermore, there was only one implicature in this set on which they did not make this remarkable progress, i.e., (17), and even there there was some improvement. As for irony, while it remained difficult for all of the NNS, the percent of the experimental group who were able to understand the two items based on it exactly doubled and was as good or better than that of any of the immersion groups.

When comparing the progress of the experimental group with that of the three immersion groups, it is important to emphasize here that many of the members of the immersion groups had had regular ESL instruction while on campus, but that none of that instruction had been focused on the interpretation of implicature. In other words, this pilot study seems to indicate that NNS can develop a proficiency in the interpretation of implicature through 3 or 4 hours of formal instruction and a certain amount of informal follow-up that it takes 3 years or more of immersion in the cultural milieu of an American university, including participation in traditional ESL courses, to attain otherwise. Furthermore, journal entries made by the students at the end of the 6 weeks indicated a high interest on their part in what they had learned and a sense that it had already helped them in their interaction with Americans and would continue to do so.

But were there any particular types of implicature that seemed especially easy or especially hard to learn - or to teach? Again the answer seems to be *Yes*. As we noted above, some relevance-based implicatures such as (8) are among those that still prove difficult to interpret both for the long term immersion groups and for the experimental group. More than that, in spite of the fact that the experimental group received a lesson designed to help them develop competence in the use of relevance-based implicatures, they performed less effectively after the 6 weeks of instruction that they had before it began on 4 of the 9 relevance-based items included in this test. As we suggested earlier, the idiosyncratic nature of the many instances of this type of implicature may make the generalization of skills developed in relation to one of them difficult to transfer to another. [12] On the other hand, as we found in our discussion of the progress of the immersion groups earlier in this paper, most relevance-based implicatures are among those that NNS handle easily as soon as they arrive in the United States. Seven of the 10 implicatures in Table 3, from which NS and NNS were most likely to derive the same message, were relevance-based implicatures. From these facts, it would seem that we should not teach the relevance-based implicatures at all until specific ones prove difficult. And when it does become necessary to help students interpret one or more of them, that help will in all likelihood relate to culture points in the context in which it is found. Of course, there are undoubtedly subsets of relevance implicatures the members of which are closely enough related to permit generalization from one to the other on a small scale. In (11), for instance, we could substitute *June* or *July* for *August*, and anyone who understood the implicature as it stands would understand the revised version.

(11) Sam: Do you think we'll need to wear jackets tonight?
     Sue: Sam, it's August!

And so, the lack of any overall system underlying relevance implicatures in general means that they can be neither taught nor learned systematically. Once the students have developed an awareness of the existence of relevance implicatures, we should deal with them individually in the classroom as the need arises rather than as a whole set. Formulaic implicatures, on the other hand, are inherently systematic and can be approached effectively from that perspective.

CONCLUSION

Earlier studies have shown that NNS arriving in the United States tend to have difficulty deriving the same message that native speakers do from several different types of American English implicature. At the same time, the skills needed by NNS if they are to be more effective in interpreting implicatures in English develop rather slowly, especially with regard to implicatures that are formulaic or those that are based on some specific point of culture with which the learner does not happen to come into contact.

On the other hand, **formal instruction designed to develop those skills seems to be highly effective when it is focused on the more formulaic implicatures.** At the end of the 6 week pilot study described here, the subjects given formal instruction were able to perform as well as other NNS who had been attending the University of Illinois for periods of from 17 months to more than 4 years, but who had not received systematic help in interpreting American implicature.   The other, more idiosyncratic, relevance-based implicatures, on the other hand, proved as resistant to formal instruction as they had to the natural learning processes that went on in the case of the NNS are immersed in the American university environment. Given these facts, together with the demonstrated importance of implicature in our daily interaction, it would seem that helping NNS learn to interpret and use the various types of implicature that we can teach successfully should be an integral facet of an ESL program. At the same time, we should also be searching for ways to approach relevance-based implicatures more effectively, and we should be alert to the existence of other implicature types of which we are not presently aware with an eye to including them in our program as well. The percent of class time would be negligible; the learning process, greatly speeded up. What's more, the alternative is to leave our students to learn in 3 or more years what we could teach them in the matter of a very few hours.

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The author is presently an associate professor in the Division of English as an International Language at the University of Illinois (Urbana-Champaign). His interests focus primarily on investigating the importance of Pragmatics to second language teaching and learning in its many facets.

NOTES

[1] Devine (1983) carried out two small pilot studies involving 15 native speakers of American English and 15 NNS from various linguistic and cultural backgrounds. On the basis of this study, she supported Keenan (1976), arguing that "speakers do not uniformly respond to these rules as a Gricean analysis predicts they will" (p. 203). And she continues: "The research further suggests that the failure to recognize implicature is related to the conversational expectations of the interlocutors, and that these expectations may vary because of cultural or situational constraints on the operation of these rules" (p. 203). However, the small size and cultural diversity of her NNS sample, together with the fact that she had to discard approximately 30% of her evidence as inconclusive, made her conclusions tentative and further investigation into the ability of people from different cultural backgrounds to communicate through implicature essential.

[2] We will refer to nonnative English speaking international students throughout this paper with the acronym NNS and to native speakers of American English as NS.

[3] These 436 NNS were those whose TOEFL scores required them to take the university's English Placement Test, in conjunction with which this implicature test was administered. The TOEFL scores for this group ranged from 467 to 672, with 95% falling between 500 and 600 and with a mean score of 554.

[4] We settled on the multiple choice format when it was discovered that an open ended format in which the subjects expressed the meaning of the implicature in their own words led to a great many ambiguous responses that could not be evaluated accurately and, therefore, had to be discarded (Devine, 1982; Bouton, 1988).

[5] This item has proved difficult for all NNS subjects, regardless of how long they have been in the United States. After 4 1/2 years in Illinois, only 50% of the NNS selected (a), i.e., that Peter was not behaving as a good friend should, as the best interpretation of Bill's remark. This compares with 86% of the American NS. Fifty percent is, however, an improvement over the first time these NNS interpreted that item; then, only 33% of them selected (a). The most popular distracter among the NNS both times was (c): Peter is a good friend and Bill can trust him.

[6] Among the NNS who responded to this item after 4 1/2 years at Illinois, only 66% responded as expected, as compared with 82% of the NS. Both of these percentages are quite low when compared with the numbers from other groups who have interpreted essentially the same implicature on other occasions. In these other instances, over 90% of all subjects, NS and alike, chose (a) as expected.

[7] This percentage expresses the ratio between the NNS and NS mean scores (SCORE nns /SCORE ns). The number given here (79.5%) is not the same, however, as that reported initially (Bouton, 1988), which was 75%. The reason for the difference is that ongoing analyses of the results from this and subsequent administrations of this test suggested that 5 items were unreliable: 4 of those were inconsistent in the response they elicited from native speakers and one was shown to focus on conventional rather than conversational implicature. With these 5 items removed, the scores of both the NS and the NNS improved and the ratio of the NNS mean to that of the NS increased from 75% to 80% All results reported in this paper for this initial (1986) study, and for the 4 1/2 year follow up are calculated on the basis of NS and NNS responses to the 28 reliable items.

[8] As we noted earlier, one example of an assumption made by 84% of the American NS but by only 37% of the NNS on arrival in 1986 and 50% in 1991 is the one underlying the implicature in example (1) above in which Bill is told by friends that his wife has been out dancing with Peter. That Bill does not indicate that he was aware of the situation is interpreted by Americans as evidence that he did not know about it; and since he did not know about it, the Americans assumed that the relationship between Bill's wife and his friend must be illicit. The overriding assumption of most NNS who interpreted Bill's response differently was that Peter would not betray his friendship with Bill and so would not become involved in an illicit relationship with his wife.

[9] This new version of the test was normed against the responses of 77 American NS undergraduates at the University of Illinois. As with the first test in 1986, the 304 NNS taking this revised version in August, 1990, consisted of all those required to take the EPT.

[10] These NNS groups are considered *immersion groups* since they have not received any formal training designed to develop the skills needed to interpret implicatures appropriately in the American English context. Later in this paper, they will be contrasted with groups who have undergone such training.

[11] The pedagogical approach used with the experimental section was developed entirely by their classroom teacher, Jane Nicholls, whose excellent instruction is responsible for the firm grasp of implicature that her students demonstrated at the end of the instruction period.

[12] Relevance implicatures are themselves unsystematic in that they arise from the idiosyncratic make up of a particular situation built around particular bits of American culture. Until the NNS become familiar with the specific culture points involved, they cannot recognize or interpret implicatures growing from them. It is for this reason that problems in interpreting specific, troublesome relevance-based implicatures have stubbornly persisted, even for those NNS who have been on campus for from 33 months to 4-7 years.

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ASKING FOR PERMISSION VS. MAKING REQUESTS: STRATEGIES CHOSEN BY JAPANESE SPEAKERS OF ENGLISH

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ABSTRACT

This paper investigates the differences between communication norms in English and Japanese in a unique situation in which the speech acts of 'asking for permission' and 'requesting' merge, focusing on the pair-verbs 'borrow' and 'lend.' Data collected by means of a discourse completion questionnaire, consisting of scripted dialogues, are analyzed according to (1) the social distance between the speakers and the addressees (siblings, friends, and teachers), and (2) the degree of imposition on the addressees (low, medium, and high). The finding was that when alternatives, the 'asking for permission' strategy or the 'requesting' strategy, were available to speakers, the majority of native speakers preferred the 'asking for permission' strategy consistently in most of the contexts, while the preferences of Japanese students varied, with the 'requesting' strategy outnumbering the 'asking for permission' strategy. Pedagogical implications of these findings are discussed; and it is suggested that students acquire communicative rules in the target language.

INTRODUCTION

It is generally accepted that norms of communication differ from language to language, and from culture to culture, and that in order to become more competent at speaking a second language, students have to acquire not only syntactic rules but also pragmatic ones. The Japanese language is well known for its highly developed system of honorifics. Students studying English, however, tend to assume that there is no need to worry about politeness norms in English because syntactic or lexical markers to express politeness are rarely mentioned in English textbooks. This assumption overlooks the fact that English has its own norms of politeness which are pragmatically present.

To be polite in English, speakers give addressees a choice, especially if the interaction is not to benefit the addressees. Therefore, one rule of politeness in English is not to impose,

representing negative politeness strategies to satisfy the addressees' desire to be respected (not to be imposed upon) (Brown & Levinson, 1978). In Japanese, on the other hand, it is more polite for speakers to clarify the benefits they get by verbalising that they are indebted to the addressees. (Koizumi, 1990)

One example that reveals the difference of this communication norm in English and Japanese is the variety of means used to ask for permission and make requests. They are both face-threatening speech acts: asking for permission is risky for the speaker in losing his/her face, and making requests imposes mainly upon the addressee. (Brown & Levinson, 1978) These two speech acts, which our study focused on, merge when a pair-verb 'borrow' and 'lend' is involved. If the speaker wants to use a pen which belongs to the person spoken to, two means of expressions are possible: "Can I /Could I borrow your pen?" and "Can you/ Could you lend me your pen?" The former is the 'asking for permission' strategy and the latter the 'requesting' strategy.

Theoretically, we can choose either expression to achieve the same goal. But if choosing between one of them is consistently preferred by a language norm and the other by another language norm, this is then an implication that there is a communicative 'rule' in the language that determines the choice. In our previous studies we investigated how native speakers of English, Japanese students studying English and native speakers of Japanese differ in utilizing different strategies to achieve the same goal. We found that in English there is a tendency to use the 'asking for permission' form (Can I borrow...?), while in Japanese the 'making requests' form, as in 'kashite-(lend),' is used more frequently. However, the scope of our research was limited to interactions between the speaker and his/her family members. (Tajika & Niki, 1991; Niki, 1993)

RESEARCH QUESTIONS

In the present study, we again focused on the differences between communication norms in English and Japanese in terms of 'asking for permission'(borrowing) and 'requesting'(lending). Bearing the following questions in mind, we presented each group with situations in which the speaker seeks a favor from the addressee; that is, to borrow an item which belongs to the addressee.

1. Which strategies do native speakers and Japanese students prefer to use to achieve the same goal, 'asking for permission' or 'requesting'?
2. Do native speakers and Japanese students change their strategies (for borrowing and lending), depending on the social distance between the speaker and the addressee and the degree of imposition on the addressee? If so, what are the differences and how can they be explained?
3. How can teachers help Japanese students become better communicators in English?

We hoped that by answering these questions we would begin to realize the differences between the communication norms in English and Japanese.

METHOD

Procedures

For our study we prepared a discourse completion questionnaire, consisting of scripted dialogues. Ideally, data should reflect an 'authentic' picture of the spoken language. In our case, the collection of data under field conditions was almost impossible, so we had to use the written elicitation techniques. Rintell and Mitchell, who studied both role play techniques and elicitation techniques, found that "Both role play and discourse completion tests elicit representations of spoken language; informants say, or write, what they or someone else might say in a given situation." (pp. 270-271)

Our dialogues included interactions in which we varied (1) the social distance between the speakers and the addressees and (2) the degree of imposition on the addressees. For the social distance we chose siblings, friends, and teachers. For the degree of imposition we chose items such as pencils, ballpoint pens and erasers used in low imposition cases; umbrellas for medium imposition; and necklaces and cameras for high imposition. Three dialogues were prepared for each relationship in view of 3 degrees of imposition (low, medium, and high); thereby, the total number of the dialogues used was 9.

The requested items and the social distance between the speakers and the addressees were specified, and the pair-verb 'borrow/lend' sentences were left out as blank lines. This was done so that the informants could fill in the missing blanks with the expressions they felt would be most appropriate. The following is a sample of one of the dialogues used:

> (umbrella) (borrow/lend)
> A: you   B: your friend
> A: Oh, no! It's 5:00. I've got to go now.
> B: It's raining. Hurry home, Lisa (Ted).
> A:
>
> B: Sure. Here you are.
> A: Thank you.
>   B: You're welcome.

By using this procedure, emphasis could be placed on the 'appropriateness of the context.' Because our study was aimed at getting a natural intuitive reaction from the participants without calling for metalinguistic judgements, the questionnaire was written in a way that would avoid raising the participants' consciousness regarding the politeness standard.

When this questionnaire was given, the 9 contexts in question were dispersed among 24 other contexts having different illocutionary acts and different verbs. This was done to avoid easy guesses by the participants about the intention of the questionnaire.

Subjects

The target group consisted of 26 native speakers of English and 64 Japanese university

students. Among the 26 native speakers, half were males and the other half females, ranging from 21 to 38 in age (M=27). There were two Canadians, and the others were from the United States. Due to the limited number of native speakers available, those who volunteered were mostly English teachers. Their average stay in Japan was rather short, 1 year and 10 months.

The 64 Japanese university students were given the same questionnaire on the first day of their junior year. They consisted of English majors, most of whom are enrolled in the course of English education, which means that they are hoping to be teachers of English after graduation. We assumed that they are at an intermediate level; i.e., they have at least acquired syntactic rules of English, though it is doubtful whether they have mastered pragmatic competency yet.

Among the 64 students, 59 were females and only 5 were males. Japanese students studying English tend to assume that there is no need to worry about gender differences in English, because syntactic or lexical markers to express gender are rarely mentioned in English textbooks. Therefore, for the present study we did not investigate the gender variable.

ANALYSIS

Quantitative data

The participants used a variety of expressions as the linguistic form of the head acts. These ranged from direct to conventionally indirect such as preparatory (interrogative forms like "Can I/ Could you...?"), or want statements ("I'd like to ...."), and so forth. Here we should mention that our concern is not to know which is more polite, "Can I borrow a pen?" or "Can you lend me a pen?" The scale of politeness of the expressions given by the participants is beyond the scope of this study.

Blum-Kulka et al. (p.19) contend that "Choice of perspective presents an important source of variation in requests." They distinguished requests by the following: according to the speaker's perspective (speaker-oriented: "Can I ...?"), the addressee's perspective (hearer-oriented: "Can you ...?", the inclusive perspective ("Can we ...?"), and the impersonal perspective ("It needs to be ..."). In this study we are primarily concerned with distinguishing head acts according to whether they emphasize the role of the speaker or that of the addressee. Therefore, we classified the head acts into two strategy types: 'asking for permission' and 'requesting.' Consequently imperatives and preparatory questions ("Can you ... ?") are both in the same category in our data, the 'requesting' strategy. In addition, we had the 'want statement' strategy for our analysis, because in our previous studies Japanese students had used the "I want.../I'd like to borrow ...." form rather frequently.

Table 1 shows a typical example of the expressions obtained from the native speakers and the Japanese students. The focus is on the social distance between the speakers and the addressees: their siblings (status, intimate), friends (status, equal), and teachers (status, different: a significant social distance). To borrow an umbrella (the medium degree of imposition) from respective addressees, which expressions in which strategies do native speakers and Japanese students prefer to use? The choice of native speakers is shown on the left side of the table. Most of them (85% to siblings, 92% to friends and 100% to teachers) chose the 'asking for ission' strategy.

Table 1. DISTRIBUTION OF SOCIAL DISTANCE
Degree of Imposition : medium (umbrella)

Groups: Natives speakers (26)   Japansese Students (64)

Relationship		siblings	friends	teachers	siblings	friends	teachers
Asking for permission	can I	13	12	1	13	17	10
	could I	6	12	10		2	2
	may I			4	7	16	12
	might I						1
	mind (I)	1		1	1		
	wonder (I)						
	would it be ADJ (I)			4			
	do you think (I)			4			
	do you have (I)	1					
	is it OK? (I)						
	let me borrow	1					
	would you let me borrow			1			
Subtotals in % (raw scores)		85 (22)	92(24)	100(25)	33(21)	57(35)	41(25)
Requesting	lend		1		3	1	
	please lend				9	8	
	do you						
	can you				9	4	1
	could you	3			5	3	8
	will you				10	7	4
	would you		1		4	2	21
	mind (you)	1					2
	would it be ADJ (you)						
	do you think (you)						
	do you have (you)				1		
	is it OK? (you)						
Subtotals in % (raw scores)		15 (4)	8 (2)	0	64 (41)	40 (25)	59 (36)
Want statement	I want to				2	1	
	I would like to					1	
	I would like you to						
	I'll be happy ...if...						
Subtotals in % (raw scores)		0	0	0	3 (2)	3 (2)	0
Totals		26	26	25	64	62	61
Others				1		2	3

* Do you want to borrow an umbrella?
wrong answers (Will you use...?/May you lend me ...?/Shall I borrow ...?)

The lower column of Table 1 shows that very few native speakers chose the 'requesting' strategy. Interestingly, there was one native speaker, a female, who used the imperative form, "Lend me an umbrella," when speaking to her friend. But right after this utterance, she added, "Is it alright?" - a mitigating device when asking for permission. One possible explanation for her hybrid expression may be that she has been studying in Japan (one year and two months) and as a result used the 'requesting' strategy. However, in view of the fact that she chose the 'asking for permission' strategy in the other dialogues, we contend that she used the imperative form in this case simply because the conversation was a casual one.

The Japanese students, on the other hand, depended heavily on the 'requesting' strategy as shown in the middle column on the right side. For instance, when they wanted to borrow an umbrella from their friends, 1 student used a straight-forward imperative, "Lend me an umbrella," while 8 students used "Please lend me an umbrella." It seems that the students assumed that the use of 'please' would make the request sound polite.

When they wanted to borrow an umbrella from their teachers, 8 students used "Could you ...?" 4 used "Will you ...?" and 21 (about a third of the students) used "Would you ...?", while no native speaker used any 'requesting' strategy when addressing his/her teacher.

Table 2 shows a typical example based on the degree of imposition on the addressees (teachers, in this case). Which expressions did they prefer to use to borrow a pencil? (low

Table 2. DISTRIBUTION OF EXPRESSIONS: DEGREE OF IMPOSITION
Addressees: teachers

Groups: Natives speakers (26)   Japansese Students (64)

Relationship		siblings	friends	teachers	siblings	friends	teachers
Asking for permission	can I	3	1	1	11	10	7
	could I	9	10	9	3	2	3
	may I	6	4	1	8	12	2
	might I				1	1	1
	mind (I)		1				1
	wonder (I)						
	would it be ADJ (I)			1			
	do you think (I)		4	3			
	do you have (I)		4	4			
	is it OK? (I)	2		1			
	let me borrow						
	would you let me borrow		1				
Subtotals in % (raw scores)		77 (20)	100 (25)	80 (20)	38 (23)	41 (25)	23 (14)
Requesting	lend				5		1
	please lend						
	do you						
	can you				1	1	
	could you	4		1	8	8	8
	will you				4	4	7
	would you	2			18	21	26
	mind (you)			1	1	2	2
	would it be ADJ (you)						
	do you think (you)			2			
	do you have (you)			1			
	is it OK? (you)						
Subtotals in % (raw scores)		23 (6)	0 (0)	20 (5)	61 (37)	59 (36)	71 (44)
Want statement	I want to						
	I would like to				1		4
	I would like you to						
	I'll be happy ...if...						
Subtotals in % (raw scores)		0	0	0	2 (1)		7 (4)
Totals		26	25	25	61	61	62
Others*			1	1	3	3	2

Do you want to borrow an umbrella?/Would you like toborrow mine?
wrong answers

degree of imposition); an umbrella? (medium); and a camera? (high). Again, there is the same tendency. As opposed to the native speakers' preference for the 'asking for permission' strat-

Table 3. PREFERRED STRATEGIES
Social Distance between Speakers and Addressees

*	**	Siblings			Friends			Teachers		
		Low	Med	High	Low	Med	High	Low	Med	High
N.	P	75	85	88.5	84	92	88	77	100	80
	R	25	15	11.5	16	8	12	23	0	20
	S	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
J.	P	37	33	25	44	57	32	38	41	23
	R	63	64	64	56	40	65	51	59	71
	S	0	3	11	0	3	3	2	0	6

*N = Native Speaker
J = Japanese Student
**P = Asking for Permissions
R = Requesting
S = Want Statement

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Table 4. PREFERRED STRATEGIES
Degree of Imposition on Addressees

*	**	Siblings			Friends			Teachers		
		Low	Med	High	Low	Med	High	Low	Med	High
N.	P	75	84	77	85	92	100	88.5	88	80
	R	25	16	23	15	8	0	11.5	12	20
	S	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
J.	P	37	44	38	33	57	41	25	32	23
	R	63	56	61	64	40	59	64	65	71
	S	0	0	2	3	3	0	11	3	7

*N = Native Speaker
J = Japanese Student
**P = Asking for Permissions
R = Requesting
S = Want Statement

egy, more than half of the Japanese students preferred the 'requesting' strategy. The middle column on the right side shows the expressions of the Japanese students. When they wanted to borrow a camera from their teachers (high degree of imposition), 71% of the students chose the 'requesting' strategy.

Table 3 and Table 4 show an overview as to how the participants chose their expressions depending on the social distance and the degree of imposition.

Figure 1. Social Distance

Figure 1 focuses on the social distance between the interactants. We graphed the mean in Table 3. The white space shows the preference for the 'asking for permission,' the darker space for the 'requesting' and the horizontally striped space for the 'want-statement' strategies.

As is clearly demonstrated, the native speakers preferred the 'asking for permission' strategy regardless of the social distance. On the other hand, the distribution pattern for the Japanese students as opposed to the native speakers is very different. As shown in the lower column of the figure, the strategies of the students were divided into two; the students 'requesting' outnumbered those 'asking for permission.' It is interesting to note that there is a quantitatively marked difference between the behavior of the native speakers and that of the Japanese students.

Fig. 2 focuses on the degree of imposition on addressees. As in Fig.1, the native speakers did not change their strategy, showing their preference for the 'asking for permission,' regardless of the degree of imposition. In the case of the Japanese students, when they wanted to borrow an item requiring a high degree of imposition, they used the 'requesting' strategy more (the darker space) and the 'asking for permission' strategy less (the white space). We can see that about 66.5% of the students preferred the 'requesting' strategy. The number of the students using the 'want statement' strategy, though slight, also increased. This probably suggests that many students think the "Would you lend me ...?" structure is very polite. Also,

Figure 1. Social Distance

some students think that the "I would like to borrow ..." structure is preferable in this context.

Individual case

So far we have explained the overall tendency of an interactional style between the native speakers of English and the Japanese students concerning their preference for certain strategies. It is interesting to observe here how individual participants changed their choice of expressions according to the social distance and the degree of imposition.

First, for comparison of the social distance we chose friends (speakers of equal social distance) and teachers (speakers of extreme social distance). The requested item was an umbrella, the medium degree of imposition. When they wanted to borrow an umbrella from their friends and teachers, did the participants use the same expressions or did they change their expressions? If they did, did they stick to the same strategy or did they change their strategy, from the 'asking for permission' to the 'requesting' or vice versa?

Out of the 26 native speakers, 8 used the same expressions with both their friends and teachers: for example, "Could I borrow your umbrella?" 17 changed their choice of expressions, as shown in Table 5. But all of them remained committed to the same strategy. For example, some said to their friends, "Can I borrow your umbrella?" and to their teachers, "Do you think we could borrow your camera?" both in the 'asking for permission' strategy.

In the case of the 64 Japanese students, 18 didn't change their expressions and 5 gave

Table 5. PEOPLE WHO HAVE CHANGED THEIR CHOICE OF EXPRESSIONS
Social Distance: from Friends to Teachers
Degree of Imposition: Medium (Umbrellas)   ( ) = raw scores

		Same Strategy	Different Strategy		
	No.		P ---> R	R ---> P	S ---> R
N.		100%	0	0	0
	17	(17)	(0)	(0)	(0)
J.		49%	32%	12%	2%
	37	(19)	(13)	(5)	(1)

N = Native Speaker
J = Japanese Student
P = Asking for Permissions
R = Requesting
S = Want Statement

wrong answers. As shown in the lower column of Table 5, out of the 41 who changed their choice of expressions, 19 remained committed to the same strategy, and 2 gave inconsistent reactions, such as "Would you lend me your umbrella?" to their friends and a less polite form - "Will you lend me your umbrella?" to their teachers. In order to be polite to teachers, the same number of the students (19) changed their strategies, 13 students (32%) changed from the 'asking for permission' to the 'requesting,' 5 changed from the 'requesting' to the 'asking for permission,' and 1 changed from the 'want statement' to the 'requesting.'

Table 6 shows the number of the participants who changed their choice of expressions by

Table 6. PEOPLE WHO HAVE CHANGED THEIR CHOICE OF EXPRESSIONS
Degree of Imposition: Medium (Umbrellas)
Addressees: Teachers   ( ) = raw scores

	Same Strategy	Different Strategy					
No.		P ---> R	R ---> P	S ---> R	R ---> S	P ---> S	
N.	65%	18%	18%	0	0	0	
17	(11)	(3)	(3)	(0)	(0)	(0)	
J.	32%	35%	14%	3%	5%	5%	Inconsistent
37	(12)	(13)	(5)	(1)	(2)	(2)	(2)

N = Native Speaker
J = Japanese Student
P = Asking for Permissions
R = Requesting
S = Want Statement

the degree of imposition. As a typical example, we chose teachers as addressees. The requested items were pencils and cameras. This time, 3 native speakers changed their strategies from the 'asking for permission' to the 'requesting,' and 3 vice versa.

Interestingly, in the case of the native speakers who changed from the 'requesting' to the 'asking for permission' strategy, they simply changed the verbs from "Could you lend me ...?" to "Could we borrow ...?" They probably thought that in order to borrow a camera the 'asking for permission' strategy from the speaker's perspective was more appropriate. The responses of those who changed from the 'asking for permission' to the 'requesting' strategy were longer and more complex. They not only changed the verbs, but used other means of mitigation as well. One changed from "May I borrow one?" to "Do you have a camera that you might be able to lend us?"; another, "Can I borrow...?" to "Would you mind lending ...?" and the third, "Could I borrow ...?" to "Do you think you could lend us ...?" Thus, they all softened their requests.

In the case of the Japanese students, 23 out of 37 changed their strategies. More than a third (13) changed from the 'asking for permission' to the 'requesting,' 5 from the 'requesting' to the 'asking for permission,' and 1 from the 'want statement' to the 'requesting.' Though the number was small, there were 4 students who switched from the 'requesting' and the 'asking for permission' to the 'want statement.'

It is interesting to note that there is a marked difference in the quality of expressions between those used by the native speakers and the ones used by the Japanese students. Both groups, when asking teachers to do a favor or when trying to borrow an item of high imposition, naturally raised their politeness level in such a way that they could achieve their goal without being offensively direct. The Japanese students who used the imperative forms with or without 'please' softened their requests by choosing interrogative forms such as "Will you lend me/Would you lend me ...?"

As shown in Tables 5 and 6, about half of the students remained committed to the same strategy while the other half changed their strategies. Regardless of whether they changed their strategies or not, we should note that almost all of the students used one mitigating de-

vice; they changed modal verbs. They changed from 'can' to 'may' and from 'will' to 'would.' It should also be noted here that very few students used the modal 'could,' which contrasted with the choice of the native speakers.

The expressions of the native speakers, on the other hand, were more delicately phrased. They used various mitigating devices. Some changed modal verbs from 'can' to 'may,' and to the past 'could.' Examples of lexical and phrasal mitigating devices ('down-graders' in Blum-Kulka's terms) were used a lot, such as consultative expressions ("Do you think I could borrow one?"/"Do you have one I could borrow...?") and understaters ("Could I borrow one just for today?"), softening the request by adding 'just for today.' Some used a politeness marker 'please' within the interrogative form ("Could I please borrow your umbrella?"). Conditional clauses were also used ("Would it be all right if I borrowed one?" and "Would it be possible to borrow one?") When they wanted to borrow a camera from their teachers, "Would you mind if I borrow one?" and "If it's ok, could we please borrow yours?" and "We were wondering if you might have one we could ...?" were used. When the speakers wanted to reduce the imposition placed on the addressees they did so by promising the return of the umbrella ("Do you think I could borrow one? I'll bring it back ....").

DISCUSSION

So far we have seen a variation in the choices among the available strategies and expressions, in a given context. Specifically, we noticed three major characteristics of the Japanese students' behavior as opposed to the native speakers', concerning the pair-verbs 'borrow' and 'lend.'

1. The majority of the native speakers preferred the 'asking for permission' strategy consistently in most of the contexts, while the Japanese students' preference varied. The 'requesting' outnumbered the 'asking for permission' strategy. Some Japanese students chose the 'want statement,' which no native speaker used when the social relationship was distant and the degree of imposition was high.

2. Both the native speakers and Japanese students varied their choices of expressions depending on the social distance and the degree of imposition, but they did so in different ways. Most of the native speakers did not change their strategies, while half of the Japanese students switched theirs. They changed their strategies from the 'asking for permission' to the 'requesting,' especially when the situation called for polite behavior.

3. The linguistic behavior when trying to be more polite, from equal social distance (friends) to extreme social distance (teachers) or from the low degree of imposition (pencils) to the high degree (cameras), showed a marked difference between the expressions used by the native speakers and those used by the Japanese students. The native speakers adopted less direct expressions within the same 'asking for permission' strategy by using various devices of mitigation.

The range of mitigation devices used by the Japanese students, on the other hand, was

rather limited, and many of their expressions were formulaic; they relied extensively on modals, especially 'Can/May/Will' and 'Would.'

What, then, are some possible reasons for this divergence between the native speakers and the Japanese students? One reason is that the Japanese students have not mastered various politeness strategies described by Brown and Levinson (1978) and Blum-Kulka et al. (1989), which explains in part the relative simplicity of the students' expressions. But the more likely explanation, concerning a language-specific preference pattern for a particular strategy, seems to be in the difference of communication norms between English and Japanese.

When alternatives, the 'asking for permission' strategy or the 'requesting' strategy, are available to speakers, the criterion for choosing either one of them as being appropriate seems to have to do with cultural differences of the language backgrounds. In the English speaking culture, independence of individuals is highly valued, and the appropriate manner is: "Don't impose" and "Give options." (Lakoff, 1973, p. 298) In this context, by using "Can I/Could I...?" the speaker can imply that "You have the power to make a decision; however, I will be able to act on my own if you give me permission." If "Can you/Will you ...?" is used in English, the speaker may sound either too dependent on the addressee or too pushy (imposing). As Blum-Kulka et al. contended, "...avoidance to name the hearer as actor can reduce the form's level of coerciveness." (p. 19)

In the Japanese speaking culture, the choice of the addressee perspective has a different social meaning. One rule of politeness in Japanese is to minimize the value of what the speaker gives to the addressee, whereas when the speaker receives something, he/she maximizes its value and often says so to the addressee. Also, since mutual dependence is the appropriate social manner in the Japanese society, the strategy is to emphasize the fact that the speaker is indebted to the addressee. Naming the addressee as actor (benefactor), therefore, is a mitigating device. This strategy tends to make the addressee feel good. When more than 10% of the students (7) used the 'requesting' strategy, "Will you lend me a camera?" to their teachers, they probably thought this expression was polite when addressing their teachers. It is not surprising then that two-thirds of the students (26) used "Would you lend me ...?"

On the other hand, the 'asking for permission' with the verb 'borrow' in the Japanese culture suggests that the speaker is not sure whether he/she can borrow the item or not, which requires the speaker to ask for permission. Using this strategy to borrow an item when the addressee would surely lend one, therefore, creates a sense of distance between the speaker and the addressee. The expression tends to be interpreted as very polite; sometimes too polite in casual conversation.

PEDAGOGICAL IMPLICATIONS

The difference between the native speakers' and Japanese students' responses to the questionnaire clearly shows that communication norms in English and Japanese are different with regard to the type of situation we have presented in this study. This difference calls for attention especially when second language learners try to communicate in the target language. While many of the students in our study could write good grammatical sentences, many still needed to ... ›p a target-like pragmatic competence. In other words, they have to be aware of the

English communication norm in each situation and use it appropriately.

In the classroom students learn two distinct functions, 'asking for permission' and 're-questing' along with the scale of politeness for each function, but they learn them separately. As a result, Japanese students may not be able to use these strategies naturally as the native speakers do. The textbook by Celce-Murcia and Larsen-Freeman (p. 84) is one example of this approach. In it the authors provide examples of 'requests of a general nature' and 'specific requests for permission,' which we can see in the following:

> requests of a general nature:
> Will
> Would you help me with this math problem?
> Can
> Could

> specific requests for permission:
> May
> Might   I leave the room?
> Can
> Could

Although the distinction between 'requests' and 'asking for permission' seems clear, it falls short of teaching communicative rules to students. A table of modals 'will, would, can, could, may, might' given in a list does not help the students, either. Therefore, the uses of such modals have to be taught in context, especially in the case of pair-verb situations like 'borrow' and 'lend.'

The results of our study point to some information which will help students develop a target-like competence.

1. Native speakers of English prefer the 'asking for permission' strategy to the 'request-ing' strategy when they can choose either to achieve the same goal. This fact suggests that the use of this strategy is perhaps more appropriate in the 'borrow/lend' and other pair-verb situations in English, and that this is different from the predominant strategy in Japanese.
2. Native speakers use "Can/Could/May ... ?", but 'can' and 'could' more frequently than 'may,' especially when they speak to friends.
3. Students at the intermediate level should be taught various devices of mitigation, such as "Do you think that ...?" and so on.

CONCLUSION

In the present study, we tried to illustrate the differences between communication norms in English and Japanese in a unique situation where the speech acts of 'asking for permission' and 'requesting' merge, focusing on the pair-verbs: 'borrow' and 'lend.' We have seen a marked

divergence between the native speakers and the Japanese students in their preferences for respective strategies. While our results cannot be readily extended to other verbs such as 'bring' and 'take,' we hope that what we have found will prove helpful in better understanding the communication norms of English and Japanese.

Finally, we would like to pose two questions for future studies.

1. Is it the case that the strategies and expressions used by Japanese students become more like those used by native speakers as their proficiency in English increases?
2. Can our results be attributed to 'universal,' a common aspect of second language acquisition, or to 'language-specific,' a transfer from Japanese to English?

To answer the first question, longitudinal studies will be necessary. To answer the second question, we need to study learners from a variety of native language backgrounds.

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AMERICAN STUDENTS' QUESTIONING BEHAVIOR AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR ESL

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ABSTRACT

Work in pragmatics and the few studies that have been done on foreign students' classroom behavior indicate that asking questions of a professor in class is culturally specific behavior. Foreign students preparing for study at an American university may need instruction on the conventions of how to ask questions of a professor in class.

A pilot study was conducted in an American university to collect natural data on how native English speaking students asked questions in class. The data were analyzed to determine and correlate the use of syntactic forms, formulaic expressions or prefactory comments, terms of address, functions fulfilled by the questions, and politeness markers. These data were compared with material published for ESL students.

The examination of ESL materials revealed a dearth of material addressing the specific function of asking questions of a professor in class. Those few materials that do exist tend to stress one particular form or function which may not be representative of native speaker usage and behavior and may not address the range of needs of international students at an American university.

INTRODUCTION

For international students in an American university, asking questions of a professor in class provides a way to clarify their understanding and increase comprehension. The asking of questions in class also allows international students to participate fully in and profit from their American academic experience by following the conventions of the U.S. classroom.

However, asking questions in class is culturally specific behavior. Whether questions are asked at all and how questions are asked will vary cross-culturally, and ESL students may need ıction in the conventions and norms of class participation in an American setting. In order

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to be effective, the instruction given to ESL students should be based on real-life language use by native speakers.

How do native English speaking university students ask questions in class? And to what extent do published ESL materials reflect actual native speaker behavior in this area? The pilot study to be described here was designed to answer these two general questions. The aims of the study were to collect natural data from native speaking students and to compare these data with published materials designed for ESL students.

Research Questions

From the assumption that foreign students need to understand American students' classroom behavior and that access to such information can help international students function in an American academic setting, a small pilot research project was initiated to gather data on how American students ask questions of their professors in class and how the data from native speakers compared with what is taught to ESL students. The project sought to answer the following research questions:

1. How do native speakers ask questions of their professors in class, specifically:
   a. What syntactic structures are used?
   b. Are prefatory comments or formulae routinely used?
   c. What address terms are used?
   d. What functions do the questions fulfill?
   e. Are particular forms associated with particular functions?
   f. What politeness markers are used?
2. How do the materials published for ESL students compare with native speaker data in the above areas?

REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE

Numerous ethnographic studies have documented differing cultural views of silence and volubility, including such issues as when speech is appropriate and when inappropriate and whether one can ask questions and about what (e.g., Tannen, 1984; Goody, 1978; Scollon, 1985; Basso, 1970). The cross-cultural variation in attitudes towards silence or volubility extends to classroom behavior as well, and specifically to the appropriateness of students asking questions in class (e.g., Dumont, 1972; Philips, 1972; Goody, 1978).

One empirical study of foreign students' classroom behavior indicated that foreign students in general asked fewer questions than did their American classmates in science classes (Shaw and Bailey, 1990), and another study concluded that some groups of foreign students may be more reticent than others (Sato, 1982).

Yet asking questions can have clear benefits for students, both native speakers and non-native speakers alike. A number of psychological studies have indicated a correlation between asking questions, increased comprehension and retention of material and successful task completion (Fishbein, et al., 1990; Schober & Clark, 1989; Gevelek & Raphael, 1985). Furthermore, early experimental studies suggested that, in the United States, volubility is viewed

positively, whereas silence is viewed negatively (Capella, 1985); does this perception extend to professors' perceptions of their students? If the conclusions reached by these studies are correct, then negative consequences accrue for non-native speaking students who remain silent in class. Not only may they miss opportunities to clarify content not fully understood, but their silence may also be viewed negatively by their professors, possibly leading to teacher bias and a subsequent self-fulfilling prophecy (Jussim, 1989).

Despite these possible negative consequences, there are powerful reasons for international students to shy away from asking questions, aside from reasons such as timidity or insecurity about their English. Asking questions of a professor in class is pragmatically loaded behavior that is potentially face-threatening. The function of a question is to elicit a response from an addressee, and a question can thus be an imposition on the addressee (Kearsley, 1976); by asking a question, the student, who is perforce of a lower status than the professor in the classroom, requires a response from the professor on a subject of the student's choosing. Furthermore, simply by asking the question, a student may imply that the professor is responsible for the student's lack of understanding (Goody, 1978; Brown & Levinson, 1978).

It is not only the less talkative students who may face problems, however. Those students from cultures in which questions or requests are posed more directly than in English risk offending their professors and classmates with what is perceived, but not intended, to be rudeness (Saville-Troike, 1980).

To negotiate this potential pragmatic minefield, the international student needs to know how to ask questions politely in order to avoid face-threatening behavior. The force of the question may be softened via various forms of indirectness, which can mitigate the imposition upon the addressee (Allwin, 1991; Brown and Levinson, 1978). However, as the existence of a copious literature on the subject attests, considerable cross-cultural variation exists in levels of directness and indirectness considered polite in a given situation (e.g., House & Kasper, 1981; Blum-Kulka et al., 1989; Blum-Kulka, 1992; Janney & Arndt, 1992). Without knowledge of the choices underlying pragmatic conventions in American university classrooms, international students cannot participate fully in their U.S. education or may give unintended offense (Shaw & Bailey, 1990; Thomas, 1983). If ESL teachers are to help their students in this respect, a prerequisite is a knowledge of what conventions native speaking students actually use.

PROCEDURE: COLLECTION AND ANALYSIS OF NATIVE SPEAKER DATA

Aims

In order to discover what conventions native speakers actually use, this study was designed to collect completely natural data from native speakers. To serve this purpose, the researcher acted as a participant observer in American classrooms. This method was chosen in preference to elicitation. Eliciting from native speakers what they suppose they would say in a given situation may produce language that is idiosyncratic or more polite than they would actually use (Wolfson, Marmor, & Jones, 1989; Cf., e.g., M. Williams, 1988).

Data Collection

Since this was a pilot study, the researcher used a sample of convenience. A total of 33 hours of graduate classes in linguistics was observed at the State University of New York at Stony Brook. Class size varied from 15 to 45 students. Observation was conducted between the fourth and eighth weeks of a 15 week semester. Each observation session lasted the full length of one lesson and thus varied between 45 minutes and two and a half hours, according to the length of the class session being observed.

During an observation session, each question asked by a native speaker was written down by the researcher. A total of 229 utterances was collected, although 15 of these 229 utterances were not fully recorded because of inaudibility or other factors. Since the aim was to collect completely natural data in this pilot study, a video or tape recorder, which might have inhibited the subjects or not picked up the sound adequately, was not used. In further studies, however, this mode of recording would be reconsidered.

Data Excluded

Because of the aims of the study and the method of data collection, certain types of data were not recorded. Since the primary aim was to collect native speaker utterances, those questions asked by non-native speaking students were not noted. For practical reasons, questions asked by the researcher were excluded, as were paralinguistic data and professors' responses to questions. Furthermore, although paralinguistic information and the professors' responses would provide extremely interesting additional data, they fell outside the specific research questions this pilot study was designed to answer.

Analysis of Utterances

Once observations were complete, each utterance was classified according to the syntactic form, use of preface or formula, function, and use of address terms. The subcategories used within each classification arose from the data actually collected and were designed to be mutually exclusive. When the initial classifications were complete, a comparison was made between form and function, and a separate analysis was made of politeness markers used. In this way, the data were utilized to answer the research questions of the study.

RESULTS OF ANALYSIS OF NATIVE SPEAKER DATA

Syntax

A total of 214 utterances were complete and could be analyzed according to syntactic form. Results of the analysis of syntactic form are summarized in Table 1 and represented graphically in Figure 1. Of the total number of utterances, two-thirds were posed in the form of a syntactic question using inversion; yes/no questions accounted for almost half of all utterances. Of those utterances which could be classified as statements (i.e., without inversion), the

large majority were statements uttered with rising intonation, so-called uninverted questions.

Table 1: Syntax
n= 214 utterances were complete and could be analyzed

<u>Questions with inversion</u>   <u>n= 141 (65.9%)</u>

WH- questions   *n= 48 (22.4% of total)*
What + VP   n= 20
               "What's the etymology of the word Creole?"
How   n= 9
               "How can they know that?"
What/How about   n= 8
               "What about constructions such as ...?"
Why   n= 5
               "Why doesn't it carry over to other words?"
Where   n= 3
               "Where do you place the barred i?"
Who   n= 2
When   n= 1

Yes/No questions   *n= 93 (43.5% of total)*

Affirmative:
        be/do/have   n= 51
            "Is the speaker a Japanese speaker?"
        modal   n= 27
            "Could you give an example?"
Negative:
        be/do/have   n= 11
            "But doesn't that get changed a lot?"
        modal   n= 4
            "Wouldn't that be an overgeneralization?"

<u>Statements (without inversion)</u>   <u>n=46 (21.5%)</u>

Statements with rising intonation   *n= 34 (15.9% of total)*
        "You mean you're talking about modern English?"
        "All of the variables were the same?"

Statements with falling intonation   *n= 12 (5.6% of total)*
        "I thought the insertion of <u>be</u> was a leftover from Gullah."
"I'm just having a hard time contrasting between this and contrastive analysis."

Combination   n=27 (12.6%)

"How did he arrive at 90? Why did he rule out 80?"
"What is the criteria, then? There has to be a change in language or what?"

Figure 1: Syntax

Use of Preface or Formulaic Expression

All 229 utterances collected could be analyzed according to use of prefactory comments.
The results are summarized in Table 2 and Figure 2. Perhaps surprisingly, well over two-thirds
of the utterances used no preface whatsoever. Of those utterances that began with some sort of
preface, not quite half used a preface with a "question" word such as wonder ("I was just
wondering"), question ("I have a question..."), or ask ("Can I just ask..."). Another fairly
common preface was a short connecting word such as so, but, now, and used at the beginning
of the utterance. Also represented were references to the professor's earlier remarks or some-

thing encountered in the assigned reading. A minuscule proportion of all utterances (6 out of 229, or 2.3%) began with an apology, explanation for the question, or disclaimer.

Use of Address Terms

In only 3 occurrences in the 229 utterances collected were address terms used, representing 1.3% of the total. Of these 3 occurrences, there was one instance of use of the professor's first name, one of title plus last name ("Professor X"), and one use of <u>sir</u> (uttered by a mature male student who had retired from the Army).

Table 2: Preface or Formulaic Expression
n=229

<u>No preface/formulaic expression</u>	<u>n= 156 (68.1%)</u>
<u>Preface/formulaic expression used</u>	<u>n= 73 (31.9%)</u>

Question word   n= 31 (13.5% of total)
    wonder   n= 10
        "I was just wondering..."
        "I wondered..."
    question   n= 13
    "Could I ask a question?"
        "I have a question (about)..."
        "Just one quick question..."
    ask/ clarify   n= 8
        "Can I just ask (how/ where)..."
        "I just wanted to (ask/clarify)..."
        "Just for clarification..."

Short connector   n= 19 (8.3% of total)
    so   n= 11
        "So is it safe to say that..."
        "So what does that prove?"
    but   n= 4
        "But didn't you say before..."
    now   n= 3
        "Now is New York [r]-less?"
    and   n= 1
        "And that didn't inhibit them... ?"

Reference to prior utterance   n= 17 (7.4% of total)
    "You said that ..."

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"In the reading, it says that... "
"On the same topic, then..."
"This trade jargon, Chinook? ..."

Explanation/ Disclaimer   *n= 3 (1.3% of total)*
"I've always been interested in slavery. Was there a pidgin..."
"This might sound trivial, but..."

Apology   *n= 3 (1.3% of total)*
"Excuse me, was that last one Richards as well?"
"I'm sorry, what's the title?"

Figure 2: Use of Preface

Function

Of the complete utterances collected, 202 could be classified according to function, the results of which are summarized in Table 3 and Figure 3. Of the functions represented, not quite half of the utterances (46.5%) fulfilled the purpose of asking for unknown information relative to the lesson content. Approximately one-fifth of the utterances (21.8%) were instances in which the student questioned or restated some aspect of the lesson in order to confirm his or her understanding. In approximately 15% of the utterances, students requested the professor to repeat or clarify something or to perform a specific action such as spelling or pronouncing a word. In a similar number of instances, students invited the professor's comments on a student-supplied example or solution to a problem or on some student-supplied contradictory information. The remaining functions accounted for a very small percentage of the total and included rephrasing a question the professor had misunderstood and asking per-

mission.

Table 3: Functions
n= 202 utterances could be classified according to function

<u>Asking unknown information</u>   <u>n= 94 (46.5%)</u>
  "What's the difference between compounds like pickpocket and redcap?"
  "Are they trying to say there was a change in teaching?"
  "Are all lingua francas creoles?"

<u>Confirmation check</u>   <u>n= 44 (21.8%)</u>
  "There are predictable areas of fossilization?"
  "Does this mean it's okay to use... ?"
  "Everything you've said relates to child acquisition?"

<u>Requests</u>   <u>n= 30 (14.9%)</u>
  Repetition   *n= 19*
        "Would you mind repeating?"
        "Would you be able to/ Could you repeat...?"
  Specific action   *n= 6*
        "Could you just spell/ pronounce/ give and example...?"
  Clarification   *n= 5*
        "Could you (please/just) clarify/ go through it?"

<u>Inviting the professor's comment</u>   <u>n= 29 (14.4%)</u>
  "What about the Moors in Spain?"
  "Could that be because... ?"
  "Can't it just be irregular?"

<u>Rephrasing a question</u>   <u>n= 3 (1.5%)</u>
  "No, what I'm saying is ..."

<u>Asking permission</u>   <u>n= 2 (1%)</u>
  "May we hand it in on the 17th?"

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Figure 3: Functions

Form and Function

Asking for unknown information. As Table 4 and Figure 4 show, students asked for un-known information in the vast majority of cases by asking questions with inversion (86.1%). This function, however, was achieved more often by a yes/no question (46 utterances out of 94, 48.9%) than by a WH- question (35 utterances out of 94, 37.2%). However, of all WH- questions asked, 87.5% were used for the function of asking for unknown information, which is not particularly surprising since the answer expected from a WH- question is some form of un-known information.

Confirmation Checks. Of the 44 utterances which were classified as confirmation checks, fully half of them were made as statements with rising intonation (See Table 5, Figure 5). This function accounts for almost two-thirds of the occurrences of this form. In general, the use of a syntactic statement with rising intonation used as an uninverted question is very common among native speakers of English as a way of confirming or clarifying understanding (J. Will-iams, 1989). Another quarter of the confirmation checks were expressed as yes/no questions.

Table 4: Form and Function
Asking for Unknown Information
n= 94 (100%)

<u>Questions with inversion</u>   <u>n= 81 (86.1%)</u>

Yes/No questions   n= 46
        "Is that related to fossilization at all?"
        "Do you ask the students questions?"

WH- questions   *n= 35*
> [After the professor said that _finger_ does not rhyme with _singer_] "Why?"
> "How many times should this be done?"

Other   `    `   n= 13 (13.9%)

Table 5: Form and Function
Confirmation Checks
n= 44 (100%)

Statement with rising intonation   n= 22 (50%)
> "So it would only be a lingua franca if it wasn't an official language?"
> "If a student uses a wrong vocabulary word, just ignore it?"

Yes/No questions   n= 11 (25%)
> "Just for clarification, do you want a summary, an overview?"
> "So is it safe to say that ...?"

Statement with falling intonation   n= 5 (11.4%)
> [Summarizing alternative solutions to a problem] "None of those is wrong. It could be
> any."

Miscellaneous   n= 6 (13.6%)

Figure 4: Form and Function
Asking for Unknown Information

Figure 5: Form and Function
Confirmation Checks

Politeness and requests. When students make requests or invite the professor's comments, there is greater potential for giving offense or for face-threatening than is the case with asking unknown information or making a confirmation check.

In the 30 instances of requests, questions with modals were used for over half the requests (See Table 6, Figure 6). This includes almost all uses of Could you... . Other polite forms account for almost all the rest of the requests, including various forms of interrogatives, statements with rising intonation (including hesitancy), and statements with falling intonation in which the subject is I. These statements, such as "I just missed what you said...", are used as indirect hints or implied requests. The use of such measures of indirectness-- interrogatives, rising intonation, hints-- mitigates the imposition of the request on the addressee (Blum-Kulka & Olshtain, 1984; Brown & Levinson, 1978).

Politeness and inviting the professor's comments. The function of inviting the professor's comments is potentially most face-threatening to the professor (See Table 7, Figure 7). It is interesting to note that in these instances, the syntactic forms are hedged with uncertainty. Just over half of the utterances serving this function are expressed as yes/no questions or as statements with rising intonation (the uninverted question).

When the student asks the professor to comment on a student-supplied example, the implication could be that the professor is to be faulted for not having supplied the information himself or not having taken this example into account. All uses of What/How about... served the function of introducing a student-supplied example, for which the professor's comments were elicited.

Even more threatening is the student-supplied counter-example or contradiction. In fact,

half of the occurrences of all negative yes/no questions fulfill the function of inviting the professor's comments and were particularly noted when the student was actually contradicting or disagreeing with the professor. While the use of negation expresses disagreement, the force is mitigated by use of the interrogative form, which invites the professor to comment without overtly disagreeing.

Table 6: Form and Function
Requests
n= 30 (100%)

Questions with modal	n= 16 (53.3%)
"Can you just pronounce Long Island?	
"Would you mind reading that again, please?"	
"Could you tell me what those letters are?"	
Questions without modal	n= 5 (16.7%)
"What'd you say that CV stands for again?"	
"What's the name-- Deborah...?"	
Statement with rising intonation	n= 4 (13.3%)
"The question that you asked was ...?"	
Statement with falling intonation	n= 3 (10%)
"I just missed what you said about..."	
Miscellaneous	n= 2 (7%)

Table 7: Form and Function
Inviting the Professor's Comments
n= 29 (100%)

Yes/No questions		n= 12 (41.4%)
Negative	*n= 9*	
"Can't you just call them soft?"		
"Isn't it hyphenated?"		
Affirmative	*n= 3*	
"Could that be because they were both seafaring communities?"		
What about/ How about		n= 7 (24.1%)
"What about patois?"		
Statement with falling intonation		n= 4 (13.8%)
"I think I would solve it by saying..."		

Statement with rising intonation   n= 3 (10.3%)
    [After professor's slip of the tongue] "Hungarian isn't an Indo-European language?"

Miscellaneous   n= 4 (13.8%)

Figure 6: Form and Function
Requests

Figure 7: Form and Function
Inviting the Professor's Comments

ANALYSIS OF ESL DATA

Collection of Data

In the initial research design, this study was to have examined the topic of asking questions in class as presented in intermediate to advanced level ESL texts devoted to English for academic purposes. Model utterances were to have been collected from these texts and compared with the actual utterances collected from native speakers. However, when the search of intermediate and advanced level EAP texts revealed a dearth of material, the search was widened to include other types of texts as well as teacher resource books. (ESL materials used in this study are listed separately at the end of the paper.)

Out of the 19 potentially suitable ESL publications examined, 8 had nothing at all on questioning in an academic or other formal setting. Of those publications which did touch on questioning or classroom behavior, one text asked students to observe an American classroom and note students' behavior (Robertson, 1991). Another text was a handbook for use by foreign teaching assistants (Smith, Myers, & Burkhalter, 1992); student questions were approached from the point of view of the teaching assistant who would have to field questions. Four other texts had suitable models for asking questions, including asking for information, clarifying, etc., but placed these models in different contexts such as peer interviews, one-on-one interviews with native speakers, or asking questions in the workplace. The remaining 5 publications supplied model utterances for students to use when asking the professor questions in class. From these 5 sources, then a total of 39 model utterances was collected.

ESL Data: General Observations

With such a small number of model utterances provided by the ESL texts examined, it is not possible to make any statistically significant observations. Of the 5 publications which specifically include model utterances to use when asking questions of professors in class, individual publications tend to be idiosyncratic, with greater emphasis on one form or function over others. Nevertheless, some general observations can be made.

First of all, it is surprising that the topic of American classroom behavior is covered in so few texts, particularly given the number of texts that purport to prepare students for study at an American university.

Secondly, ESL students may need to ask certain types of questions more often than their native speaking classmates (e.g., requests for repetition or writing a word on the blackboard). However, non-native speaking students will share the same range of needs as their native speaking classmates in terms of asking for unknown information, making confirmation checks, inviting the professor to comment on a student-supplied example, contradiction, etc. However, unlike their native speaking classmates, foreign students may not know that such functions are permissible or how to achieve them

ESL and Native Speaker Data Compared   150

When the model utterances in ESL publications are compared with the data collected from native speakers in the pilot study, some notable differences stand out (See Table 8).

In the area of syntactic form, the ESL models provided almost no examples of statements with rising intonation, although this form accounts for almost 16% of the native speaker utterances and was the preferred syntactic form for confirmation checks.

In terms of use of preface, over two-thirds of the ESL model utterances began with some sort of formulaic preface, while less than one-third of native speaker utterances began with a preface. When these prefactory remarks are compared, the results are somewhat disturbing. Over half of all the ESL model utterances began with an apology or explanation for the student's question; however, in the data collected from native speakers, only a tiny percentage of actual questions were prefaced with an apology or explanation. It seems that the message being sent to ESL students is that they must apologize for asking a question in class, while native speakers obviously do not feel that this is necessary. Not only may teaching overly-polite forms reduce the range of expression available to ESL students (Cf., Thomas, 1983; M. Williams, 1988), but such emphasis may actually be counter-productive. One study, in fact, has suggested that unnecessary length of utterance, such as the over-elaboration of a request through unnecessary prefactory remarks, may serve to annoy the addressee rather than make him or her more amenable (Blum-Kulka & Olshtain, 1986).

In the use of address terms, again the ESL publications seem to provide more polite models than native speakers use. Address terms are used in over one-third of the ESL model utterances, while they were almost never used by the native speakers observed in the pilot study.

Over half of the ESL model utterances were devoted to the function of making a request, while requests accounted for only approximately 15% of the native speaker utterances. Even considering the greater need non-native speaking students may have to request repetition or clarification, the emphasis on requests in the ESL publications seems disproportionate.

Conversely, no examples or model utterances are given to ESL students to help them express the function with the greatest possibility of giving offense to the professor, namely inviting the professor's comments on student-supplied information or contradiction. Yet this function accounted for almost 15% of the native speakers' utterances.

Table 8: Notable Differences between NS and ESL Data

Syntax
Statements with rising intonation	ESL (100%=30): 3.3%
	NS (100%=214): 15.9%

Preface
Use of preface	ESL (100%=39): 69.2%
	NS (100%=229): 31.9%

Apology/ *Explanation*	ESL (100%=39): 53.8%
	NS (100%=229): 2.6%

Use of Address Terms

ESL (100%=39): 36%

NS (100%=229): 1.3%

Functions
    Requests   ESL (100%=32): 56.3%

                                NS (100%=202): 14.9%

Inviting Prof's   ESL (100%=32): 0%
Comments

                                NS (100%=202): 14.4%

CONCLUSIONS FROM THIS PILOT STUDY

Asking questions in class is culturally specific behavior largely ignored by ESL publications. Where the topic is dealt with at all, the model utterances do not represent the range of form and functions used by native speakers. Furthermore, ESL publications tend to teach students to be more polite than native speakers actually are.

Results from Native Speaker Data

Results from the pilot study of how native speakers ask questions in class suggest that native speakers tend to use interrogatives for asking for unknown information and often use a statement with rising intonation to confirm their understanding. Interrogatives, especially those formed with modals or other indirect forms, are used as measures of politeness when a request is made. The potentially face-threatening act of inviting the professor's comments on a student-supplied example, solution, or contradiction is hedged with indirect forms, such as interrogatives or statements with rising intonation, in order to soften the potential for offense. However, native speakers use prefactory comments for a question relatively infrequently and almost never apologize for asking a question in class. Furthermore, in this pilot study, native speaking students very rarely addressed their professors by name or title when asking a question.

Suggestions for Further Study

As the data collection from native speakers was a pilot study conducted with a sample
nvenience, further research needs to be done to determine how generalizable the results

are. For example, questioning behavior in very large lecture classes or very small seminars may differ from the results in this study. Furthermore, this study was conducted in linguistics classes; would the same types of functions and similar forms be used in different disciplines? The observed linguistics classes were composed of a high proportion of women to men (an average of 4 to 1); would classes with a greater proportion of men display different patterns of questioning? The observed population was composed of graduate students, many of whom are already working. Would similar results obtain in a younger population of undergraduate students? The study was conducted in New York, on the outskirts of the metropolitan area, a region stereotyped among non-New Yorkers for lack of politeness. Would there be different or greater use of politeness markers, more frequent prefactory apologies or explanations, or greater use of address terms if a similar study were conducted in another area of the United States or Canada?

More information needs to be collected on the actual questioning behavior of newly arrived foreign students in their content classes. Empirical data would help ESL teachers know what kinds of behavior and questioning forms need to be taught and practiced and what can be taken for granted.

The study concentrated on verbal communication. Related research could also include studies of paralinguistic data and professors' responses to students' questions.

Teaching Implications

ESL students preparing for or engaged in university study in the U.S. need instruction and practice not only in language skills but also in the pragmatics attached to using those skills. By using the data collected from native speakers in the pilot study reported here, some general observations can be made about what foreign students need to be able to do if they wish to ask questions of their professors in class:

(1) Since interrogatives comprise the bulk of forms used for asking questions in class, students should be able to formulate WH- and yes/no questions with grammatical accuracy.
(2) Because statements with rising intonation at the end are frequently used as confirmation checks, students should be able to recognize and produce such forms.
(3) Students should be able to use certain common formulaic expressions to preface a question, particularly those with the words question or wonder.
(4) Although students should know how to address a professor, they need not use an address term when asking a question in class.
(5) Students should be able to use the correct level of politeness markers, particularly when making a request or inviting a professor's comments. Such forms include: use of interrogatives in both functions; use of modal auxiliaries, particularly the word could in requests; and use of negative interrogatives to invite comment on a perceived disagreement.

The academic preparation of ESL students should address the problem of asking questions in class and be based on actual native speaker behavior. Students need to know not only that asking questions is part of the American educational culture, but that there are rules governing how questions are asked and that these rules can be learned and the forms practiced.

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CONSTRUCTING FACTS AND STANCES THROUGH VOICING: CASES FROM STUDENT-COUNSELOR INTERACTION

Agnes Weiyun He

Drawing data from academic counseling encounters, this paper examines the practice of invoking others' voices as displays of how the participants have come to know about some particular information and of their stances toward what they report. It focuses on voicing and its associated linguistic features in several different topical and sequential contexts: presenting problems, solving problems, seeking a second opinion and establishing authority and credibility.

This study shows that invoking others' voices enables the student to orient the counselor to the problem at hand, to impose a strong interactional demand for the counselor to address the problem, and to elicit a second assessment from the counselor. While pressing the students for the sources of information regarding university rules and requirements, the counselors themselves freely appropriate and superimpose the voice of the university institution. The placements of voicing and the respective modal/temporal choices in the reporting and the commentary show that a speaker's construction of a past interaction embodies not only a reflection of his/her version of the interaction itself but also embodies stances consequential for the here and now.

INTRODUCTION

The notion of *voicing* has been examined in research on participant frameworks, performance and reported speech in association with the definition of speakers, authors, agents and social actors. According to Bakhtin (1981, 1986), words are not semantically stable units with fixed meanings but rather accumulate the heterogeneous overtones of the situations in which they are used and of the conflicting ideological horizons out of which they arise. His approach calls into question the traditional notion that a piece of discourse orients to a single coherent viewpoint. A similar argument but from a sociological, interactional point of view is made by Goffman (1981) who points out that a piece of discourse, even when physically produced by one single speaker, may fail to take the form of a unitary construction, as a consequence of the multiple motivations and identities projected in interaction. Recent critical approaches (e.g., Berman, 1988) also undermine the notion of a unitary speaking ego as the source of discourse,

thus focusing our attention on voice in relation to authorship and interpretation and interposing a plurality of discourse sources.

At the same time, discourse analysts have demonstrated that the traditional grammatical dichotomy between direct and indirect speech, a prototypical way in which dialogical oppositions are created through embedding one person's speech in that of another, has limitations in accounting for the everyday social interaction of reporting what was said with the associated formal markers and prescriptions for appropriate usage. As a number of scholars have observed, the reporting of what was said in a direct speech form is more likely a construction of the reporter than a verbatim record of the actual speech. This phenomenon has been investigated in terms of, among others, pseudoquotation (Dubois, 1989), indirection (Brody, 1991), constructed dialogue (Tannen, 1986, 1989), zero quotatives (Mathis & Yule, 1992), and dialogues of genres (Bauman, 1992).

Taking the above literature as a point of departure, I examine in this paper the practice of invoking others' speech in a particular institutional setting, namely, the academic counseling encounters in an American university, where the academic counselors and their student clients devote a considerable part of their interaction to establishing facts concerning academic problems for which advice becomes necessary and/or facts concerning university rules and requirements which the students should know in order to make their own decisions. In constructing these facts, both the students and the counselors often invoke a third, absent party's or sometimes each other's speech. This paper thus aims to answer the following questions: (1) How is the invocation of others' voices occasioned in such settings? (2) How does the invocation of others' voices contribute to establishing facts and speakers' stances?

Below, after a brief description of the ethnographic background and methodology, I will perform analyses of my data.

ETHNOGRAPHIC BACKGROUND

The data examined in this study are a subset of a database for a larger study (He, 1993), which were collected in a large American university, to which I gave a fictitious name "Central University," abbreviated as "CU." The goals of the counseling services in this university are twofold: to impart information regarding university rules, regulations and requirements and to provide advice on scholarly matters. Specifically, the duties of the counselors include assistance with students' program planning, assessment of students' degree requirements, help in choosing a major, counseling regarding academic difficulties, assistance with requests for exception to regulations, and pre-health, pre-law, pre-graduate school counseling.

In addition to full-time, professional counselors, there are academic counseling assistants who are graduate students in various academic disciplines within the College of Letters and Science, hired half time (20 hours per week). Erickson & Shultz (1982) characterize the school counselor as an "institutional gatekeeper" for he/she has the authority to make decisions about the social mobility of the student and tends the gates and channels of mobility not only within the school but within the larger society as well. In my academic counseling context, however, the counselors are not empowered to make decisions on an individual student's progress within university. They are expected to elicit student goals, to ensure correct information, to not

make decisions for the student and thus to conduct the encounter so as to turn all decisions over to the student.

To arrange for a counseling meeting, the student usually takes the initiative by making an appointment. An appointment slip is filled out which indicates the purpose of the visit, the student's name, student identification number, status (e.g., freshman, sophomore), and major. The counselor / counseling assistant is given the appointment slip before he/she meets with the student. Counseling meetings are one-to-one between a student and a counselor or a counseling assistant. All appointments are scheduled for half-hour intervals. Counseling meetings are held in the academic counseling office, which is a large office divided into small cubicles of counseling assistants' and small offices of counselors'.

DATA COLLECTION AND ANALYTICAL METHODS

Procedures

Three full-time academic counselors, five half-time counseling assistants (hereafter "counselors" except when it is analytically consequential to differentiate them from full-time counselors), and twenty-one undergraduate students participated in the study. Among the counselors, there were three women and five men. Of the twenty-one students, three were male and eighteen were female. The names of the students, counselors, counseling assistants, and those mentioned by the students, counselors, or counseling assistants during the encounter have all been replaced with fictitious ones which retain the same gender and, wherever possible, the same number of syllables.

A total of twenty-one (ranging from 10 to 30 minutes) counseling sessions were video and audio recorded during the period from October 1990 to August 1991. Among these, eleven were transcribed according to conventions developed by Gail Jefferson (Sacks et al., 1974, 731-733; also Atkinson & Heritage, 1984, ix-xvi). These eleven sessions were selected because: (1) they are more audible than others; (2) they cover all counselors and counseling assistants who participated; and (3) they represent a variety of subject matters being discussed in the counseling encounters. These data were first transcribed from the audio and then checked with the video recording. The transcription symbols used in this study can be found in Appendix A.

Analytical methods

For the purposes of this study, I resort to mainly (1) Conversation Analysis (CA) which has provided the methodological apparatus specifically for research on naturally occurring, conversational phenomena and (2) Functional Systemic Linguistics which with its focus on contexts and choices complements the traditional CA analysis (e.g., turn-taking, sequence organization, story construction, repair organization, openings and closings) with more sensitivity and systematicity to grammatical details (e.g., modal choices, tense/aspect markers, projections of ideas and locutions) (for a detailed discussion of these two analytical approaches, see He, 1993: Chapter 2).

Of particular relevance to the following analysis of the practice of voicing is the grammatical description of modality in English by Halliday (1985: Chapter 4) who theorizes that the speaker's judgement of the probabilities or obligations in what he/she says can be traced in the modal forms of the language he/she uses. Halliday (1985: Chapter 3) extends the use of the term modality from auxiliary modal verbs (e.g., "may" or "might) to include lexical elements which have that function (e.g., "probably," "of course," "always," "to my mind," "broadly speaking," etc.). He then divides modality into different values (Halliday, 1985, p. 75) along the parameters of probability (possible -> probable -> certain), frequency (sometimes -> usually -> always), obligation (allowed -> supposed -> required), or inclination (willing -> anxious -> determined), with arrows pointing from low to high modal values.

Building upon Halliday's analysis of modality, I focused on the following modal elements (for a detailed specification, see He, in press, a) in the analysis of the invoking of others' speech.

low modality   can, could, may, might, would, don't have to, I don't know, I'm wondering, not sure, likely, possible, I think, I thought, I don't think, probably, maybe, perhaps

high modality   must, will, should, ought to, have to, had to, has to, need, I'm sure, exactly, certainly, really, definitely, absolutely, of course, supposed to, always, never

In what follows, I examine the practice of voicing and its associated linguistic features in several different topical and sequential contexts: presenting problems, solving problems, seeking a second opinion and establishing authority and credibility.

DATA ANALYSIS

Problem presentation

In a separate paper (He, in press, b), I examined the narrative accounts students offer at the beginning of the academic counseling encounter and how they help construct the students' occasion-specific identities. One of the features of these accounts is that they are often interwoven with reported speech. In this connection, the speaker is not constructing a situation in which two characters are involved in a dialogue; rather, it appears that the speaker is projecting his/her attitude or that of the reportee. Such report is often (1) self-initiated and (2) in the form of indirect quotation.

For example, in the following segment, Helen, another counselor is invoked by the student in her trouble telling; believing Helen or not believing her becomes a central thread to tie together the student's narrative which eventually leads to advice giving (line 29ff). In other words, what is attributed to Helen constitutes the problem which gives rise to the student's stance of uncertainty which in turn invites the counselor's advice-giving:

Extract (1)
Neil2: problem telling through other's voice

((The following occurs at the beginning of the encounter. N and S have just established that S is a pre-math major.))

```
016  S:  =B't um (.2) see (.) um I: would like to go to (.)
017         med school,
018  N:  Uhuh,
019->S:  Ok, (.8) anda when I (.2) when I was in the
020         orientation, (.) Helen told me that (.2) it's a
021         LOT better if I am a MAth major, (.) cu:s er
022         medical schools they prefer math major people.
023         (.4)  And I am not sure how that I mean I I
024         believed her THEN b't NOW I've been talking to
025         people
026  N:  NOW you DOn't believe her.
027  S:  Yeah I am NOT sure if that is the (.2) the RIght
028         thing or no:t.
029  N:  I wud say um (.) I'm not as much of an expert (.)
030         about what happens to math majors (.) as Helen is.
031         Helen's (.2) doing research with what WHAT (.) has
032         happened to CU math majors and where they GO.
033         (.3)
```

Here the student reports that Helen has stated that medical schools accept a higher percentage of math majors. In the report, the student carefully retains her own attitude separate from Helen's. Although the view that medical schools accept more math majors than applicants from other majors is attributed to Helen, the student also conveys her own attitude toward this view. Note that in line 21, the student stressed "lot" (in "a LOT better") and "math" (in "if I'm a MAth major"). Subsequently in line 24, she raised her volume and pitch to the same level when she speaks of "THEN" and "NOW." Hence, the student is presenting a contrast: a strong view of some sort and an equally strong doubt concerning that view.

The separation of the reported speech by Helen and the student's own commentary is made even more salient by the distinct temporal and modal choices. What Helen reportedly said is encoded with temporal markers only (lines 19-22); whereas the student's commentary is encoded with low value modal elements ("not sure" in lines 23 and 27) which help construct a sense of doubt and uncertainty in contrast to the certainty and truthfulness of Helen's speech. Thus the student portrays the account of the problem as certain and truthful and her own attitude as doubtful and uncertain.

Similarly, in the next encounter, the student invokes her degree auditor in explaining the reason for her visit.

Extract (2)
Cecilia1: problem telling: cross speaker similarity

((C and S have just sat down. C is reading S's appointment slip which states the reason for the visit.))

```
007  C:  .hhh Ok, referred by degree (.2) auditor.
008      (.5)
009  S:  Yeah-
010  C:  There must be a story here,
011      (.2) ((S reads Informed Consent Form))
012  S:  °What is the date?  The twenty:°=
013  C:  =Second.
014      (1.) ((S dates Informed Consent Form))
015  S:  Ye:ah well (.2) my degree audit (.) is (.4) ok
016->    with the uh degree auditor but she said that the
017      records at L&S (.3) aren't (.2) up to DATE.  So I
018      have brought her copies of the paper work,
019  C:  HUN.
020  S:  So (.) but (.) my deGREE is ok, bu::t (.3) you
021      know I need to fix it up here.
022      (.3)
```

It is not the case that the student herself has any difficulties or problems with making decisions but that the student is here to take care of problems that may have arisen in the bureaucratic process. The problem that prompted the student's visit is cast directly in the reported speech attributed to the degree auditor. To look closely at the student's language, she embeds the problem (that her records are not up to date) in her report of the degree auditor's speech (line 16ff). Like the student in the previous data extract, the student here reports what her degree auditor says with temporal choices (lines 16-17), with no display of uncertainty of its truth value. Turning on the degree auditor's voice helps the student to project an entirely objective stance toward the issue and warrants her request (line 21), which is framed with a high value modal "need" indicating obligatoriness.

In both cases above, students cast their problems by reporting what another source of institutional authority has told them, thereby attributing the responsibility of the problems to not themselves but those whose speech they are reporting. These reportings are anticipatory in nature in the sense that students provide justifications before the problematic request is identified and before any advisor fault-finding or altercation has occurred.

Problem solution

The practice of invocation of others' voices can also be found in the process of searching for a solution to a presented problem. In this context, students often recast what they understand their counselors to be saying, explicitly or otherwise, in their own words. This happens especially when the students pursue a definite reply from the counselor, as in the next extract.

Extract (3)

Tim1: problem solution: student voices counselor's thoughts

((Student and counselor are discussing courses to take in the next quarter.))

```
423    (.5)
424 S: Now, these four choices (.) what would you say
425    (.) be my first choice?
426    (.3)
427 T: History: (.2) eight C,
```

((In lines 428-554, T clarified with S what the four courses S is referring to in line 424 and discusses the work load involved in each of the four choices.))

```
555    (.5)
556  S: Yeah (.2) the psych ten has some limits on it.
557  T: Right.
558->S: So you think maybe I should have history first.
559  T: Uh::: well (.) yes and no I mean: like you said
560     uh: there's gonna be: (.) you know th' the book
561     that (.) uh:: (.2) will be the reading (.) an:d
562     (.2) and ther' since it is something for your
563     major.
564     (.)
```

((In lines 565-579, T discusses the fact that many students newly transferred from another school are not used to the CU system.))

```
580    (.)
581 T: But if you have any: (.) concerns about that at
582     all then (.) you know uh: you may want to hold up
583     on that until you're a little bit more adjusted
584     so that=
585 S: =Ok, that's interesting
586 T: You know
587->S: So w- these ha- that has the least reading (.2)
588     like (.) this will be the amount of reading in
589     work load.
590->T: Right
591->S: Ok.
592     ((paper shuffling))
593 S: Ok, (.) that's basically what I wanted to ask you
594 T: Ok,
595     (.)
```

Within the topic of choosing courses for the next quarter, the student requests expert opinion (424-425). The counselor and the student together clarify which four choices to choose from (427-555). Yet the clarification does not result in any clear indication of the counselor's preference for any particular course. Until line 555, the student's initial question in 424-425 has not been answered. The student thus pursues the counselor's opinion again in line 558, voicing the counselor's thoughts ("so you think maybe I should have history first"). After the counselor gives an equivocal, noncommittal response ("Uh," "well," "yes and no," and "I mean," line 559ff), the student rephrases his question (line 587) in the form of statement in need of confirmation (change from "what should be the first choice" to "whether a particular course has the least reading"). The counselor reassures the student (line 590). And finally the student acknowledges receipt of confirmation of information (line 591).

It is worth noting that the student shifts his stance from being tentative to being certain in the two times he voices the counselor's opinion. In line 558 the student projects tentativeness through the use of the low value modal "maybe." When he makes another attempt in lines 587-588, he projects a sense of certainty through the use of a superlative degree ("the least reading" in line 587) and a high value modal element "will" (line 588). Consequently, counselor's stance shifts from noncommittal (line 559 "yes and no") to committal (line 590 "right") accordingly.

Here we see that explicitly asking a counselor for advice is not as simple a matter as we might initially think. In this instance, the question in line 424-425 is transformed into a recasting of the voice of the hearer (line 558) and further into a statement in need of confirmation (lines 587-589). These transformations provide further evidence for the negotiated nature of the counseling encounter. The ways in which the student requests advice is shaped by and shapes the extent to which the counselor is committed to what the student takes to be advice.

On other occasions, counselors and students jointly invoke a third party's voice, thereby co-constructing a solution to a problem. In what follows, the student again voices what "Helen said" regarding a petition to have a transfer class accepted for credit and the counselor collaborates in the report:

Extract (4)
Neil2: problem solution: counselor and student merge voices

((N and S are working through the possibilities in choice of major based on what is required of each major and what requirements S is yet to satisfy. S is a transfer student.))

```
225      (.2)
226  N:  Umm (.2) so you need the:se you nee-(.) I guess
227       you need PIC10A (.) right?  you haven't (  )=
228  S:  =Oh NO.
229      (.2)
230  S:  No. Uh I'm going to (.2) well I have a Fortran,
231  N:  Uhuh,
232->S:  That Helen said we can jus=
```

233->N: =*shud shud should* accept that=
234   S: =Right.
235   N: Ok. So. Fine.

The problem in this instance concerns the student's credit for a course PIC[programming in computing]10A, a problem raised by the counselor in lines 226-227. The student first acknowledges the problem ("no" in lines 228 and 230), then goes some way to address the problem ("Uh I'm going to" in line 230) but soon abandons it and moves on to explain what course she has taken ("a Fortran"). Seeing that the counselor displays no explicit response except for a minimal receipt token "uhuh" in line 231, the student in line 232 adds a post modifier which voices Helen's judgment of the Fortran course. The counselor displays his alignment with the student through his understanding of what the student reports Helen said. He does so through a replacement (of "can" with "should") and also an upgrade (from low value "can" to high value "should" indicating stronger agreement) and a collaborative completion of the student's turn (line 233). Further, the latching of the counselor's turn onto the student's (line 232-233) and subsequently the student's onto the counselor's (line 233-234) highlight their strong convergence behavior.

This convergence of both linguistic usage and the participants' stances constructs a shared judgement of the speech of the party being invoked and a shared orientation toward the task of problem solution.

Seeking a second assessment

In this section, I focus on cases in which students report advice from another counselor in a sequential context such that the current counselor is interactionally obligated to offer a second opinion. Analytically, seeking a second opinion through reporting advice by others is different from presenting problems through others' voices in that (1) the reported speech itself doesn't constitute the "problem;" rather, it is a candidate solution offered by a third party; and (2) in real time, it does not occur in the beginning of the interaction, but much later in the interaction. Below, I discuss two extracts, each illustrating a different sequential environment. The first one concerns a student's implicit request for verification by the counselor of what he was told by another counselor:

Extract (5)
Tim1: implicit request for second assessment

((S, a chemistry major, now faces having to change to another major as he hasn't completed the pre-major requirements in time. Beth is another counselor.))

199 S: Before I forget (.) I got admin- a letter from
200   the admissions because I don't have the one year
201   general chem they said I *have to* change my major
202->   from chemistry. .hhh So I talked to Beth and
203   she said just change to anything (.) like math

```
204     whatever
205  T: Uhun,
206  S: An::d I changed to math and she said as far as
207     the credit limit goes uh the department (.2)
208     cybernetics has the final say and .hhh as long as
209->   we see you don't want to stay here forever you'll
210     be fine. You can you know you shouldn't be
211     concerned with that.
212  T: Uhun,
213     (.2)
214  T: Yeah:: the thing is you- you're gonna you're
215     gonna double major right?  Chem cybernetics?
216     (.4)
217  T: Is that what you're-
218  S: No I can't stay in chemistry
219  T: Ok uh I'm s- so jus=
220->S: =Cybernetics.  She also sa- tzs she also
221     mentioned that becau:se (.) cybernetics is such
222     a small department they cou:ld (.2) they could
223     allow students to take more course than the major
224     requires.
225  T: Right.  U::n ((clearing throat)) see (.2) as far
226     as that goes (.) what happens is (.2) uh she's
227     half way correct.
```

In this case the student reports the speech of another counselor, Beth, as a way of seeking confirmation of what he has been told by another counselor. From line 203 onwards, the student appropriates Beth's voice directly (note the use of pronouns "you" and "we" in lines 209 and 210). This direct appropriation is in response to the letter from the admissions office mentioned in line 199. If the letter poses a problem, then what Beth says would be a solution. Hence there would be no "problems" and the purpose of the student's report would be cast in doubt from an outsider's point of view.

The counselor, who is trained to look for problems, however, takes it upon himself to make sense of what has been reported. When he receives no response (line 213) from the student after a minimal acknowledgement token (line 212), the counselor solicits more information (lines 214-224), and finally gives his evaluation of the reported speech that the student attributes to Beth ("what she says is half way correct").

Perhaps not accidentally, the student's recast of what Beth said contains modality markers of different values at two different places. High value modal elements "will" (line 209) and "should" (line 210, in self-repair of "you can") are used in his initial report of Beth's speech. Low value modal "could" (line 222) is used later in his additional report. The discrepancy between the certainty projected in the initial report and the tentativeness projected in the additional report helps invite the counselor's second assessment of what Beth said.

On other occasions students after reporting a third party's speech explicitly state the re-

quest for a second opinion, as we see in the next extract.

Extract (6)
Joyce1: explicit request for second assessment

((S and J disagree on the residence requirement S should be held for))

```
045    ((pause))
046  J: Ok, the resi- the u:m .hhh residence requi:rement
047      is that sixty-eight of your last eight units,
048      (.5)
049  S: Uhun,
050  J: Have to be taken at (.) CU.
051  S: I thought it was thirty-six of your last forty-
052      eight.
053  J: U::m I'm not sure whether you'll be held towards
054      (.2) when you came in or the ones right now this
055      is currently the requirement.
056->S: Uh: ok, oh: becus it was uh is it Dr. (.3)
057      Stein?  I mean-
058  J: Rick Stein?
059->S: Rick Stein?  °I don't remember° Um (.) he
060      told me (.) u::h (.) thirty-six out of (.) the
061      last forty-eight but I wanna make sure .hhh and I
062      think MAYbe you- that's becaus:: I go by:: what
063      the rules were
064  J: Then?
065  S: Then.
066  J: Ok, thirty-six out of the last how many?=
067  S: Forty-eight.
068  J: Forty-eight.
069->S: That's what I needed to find out.
070  J: Ok, I'll check on that for you. I'll talk to
071      Rick.
072      (.2)
```

What is interesting in this instance is that the student does not bring up Dr. Stein when she first displays disagreement with the counselor in line 51 ("I thought"). It is only after the counselor displays further doubts and uncertainties ("I'm not sure," line 53) that the student invokes Dr. Stein. It is worth noticing that having cited Dr. Stein with temporal markers only (lines 59-61), which indicate no equivocation, the student then expresses uncertainty in attempting to explain what she just cited ("I think" and "maybe" in lines 61-62). The implication appears to be that it is not the student who disagrees with the counselor, but another counselor, Dr. Stein, who does. Hence the student is challenging counselor A (Joyce) with words from

counselor B (Dr. Stein) and this has effective interactional consequences: the counselor in lines 70-71 promises to double check with Dr. Stein, a strong obligation as indicated through the high value modal "will" (line 70).

Authority, credibility and voice

So far I have examined some of the ways in which the students invoke some other counselor or other sources of authority. Overall, students use reported speech more frequently than counselors do. Counselors also report other sources. The sources they quote from include (1) the official catalog, a reference many counselors use during the counseling encounter, and (2) authority at a higher level in the institution. In cases when the counselors do borrow others' "voices," they often freely speak for the university institution and do so without mentioning specific sources or even without designing their talk as reported speech in its traditionally prescribed form. For example, in all encounters under examination, the counselors often shift their use of first person pronouns between "I" and "we," depending on what is being said, a phenomenon which warrants special treatment but which is not dealt with on this occasion. What I would like to point out is another phenomenon which resembles what is analyzed by Mathis & Yule (1992), whereby direct speech is reported with neither a reporting verb nor an attributed speaker, a phenomenon which they call "zero quotatives." They indicate that in the paradigm case of zero quotative use, the real speaker can only be inferred through situational and sequential context; the direct speech forms are presented not as reports or pseudo-reports of what was said, but as indications of speaker stance.

The following extract serves as a case in point.

> Extract (7)
> Neil2: projecting authority through displaying intimate knowledge

((S has just asked N if math majors stand a better chance of being accepted by medical school.))

```
033        (.3)
034   N:  Uh b't I wud say that certainly (.) medical school
035        doesn't CAre whatjur major IS.
036        (.8)
037   N:  Y=
038   S:  =Yeah that's what I heard.
039->N:   What they do care is (.2) er did you take the
040        appropriate classes,  Do you have the: (.) the
041        grades for appropriate classes,  Do you have the
042        overall GPA do you have letters of recommendation
043        and so on so on so on.
044        (.5)
```

Here, we do not see the commonly prescribed features of reported speech such as a re-

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porting verb (e.g., "say," "tell," or "remark"), synchronizing of verb tense, and attribution of the speaker; instead, we have a syntactic structure with a subordinate clause which functions as the object of the verb "care" (line 39) and within which some direct quotes are inserted ("did you take...letters of recommendation" lines 39-42). The distance between the counselor and medical school is diminished by not using any reporting verbs. Further, by embedding the reported speech in his own speech (via use of a wh-cleft construction and attaching "and so on so on so on" at the end of the clause), the counselor also superimposes his voice onto that of the medical school. This syntactic embedding as well as the high value modal choice "certainly" (line 34) allows the counselor to stress the wide range of intimate knowledge he has with regard to the position of medical schools. Finally, all of this is framed by "I would say" (line 34); hence the counselor is intertwining his own voice with that of the university.

Thus we have seen that counselors "freely" appropriate the voice of the university institution and other authorities, adopting and adapting the official institutional voice. The student never questions the "practical epistemology" (Whalen & Zimmerman, 1990, p. 465) of how a counselor has come to know about some particular information regarding university rules and requirements. On the contrary, in cases where the student fails to attribute sources for certain kinds of information which he/she asserts with certainty, the counselor usually presses for an attribution. This I illustrate with the next two extracts.

> Extract (8)
> Neil2: credible voice: information regarding course requirements

((S and N are discussing which of the pre-med requirements S has completed and which chemistry classes S is yet to complete.))

> 259   (.2)
> 260   S: So I *have to* take (.) 11C (.) 11B 11C and 11CL.
> 261->N: Ok, so who is this information (from) who told you
> 262   this?
> 263 S: Chemistry department,
> 264 N: Ok, great.
> 265   (.)
> 266 N: That sounds- then then believe it.
> 267 S: ((laughter))

In line 260, the student asserts that he is required to take certain courses (high value modal "have to" suggests certainty and obligation). This piece of information concerns the university requirements, an area in which the counselor is supposed to have expertise but which the student is now asserting without displaying how he has come to know about it. The counselor's uptake in this instance is that he first aligns himself with the student ("ok" in line 261) and subsequently challenges this piece of information that is unattributed ("Who told you this?" in line 261), a practice never reciprocated by the student. Hearing that the answer concerning the chemistry classes comes from the Chemistry Department, which is symbolic of institutional authority, the counselor acknowledges this information as having validity ("then

believe it" in line 266).

Not only do counselors press for students' sources of information when students do not display them, they also pursue specific sources when students report second-hand information which the counselors do not agree with. In the next extract, the counselor finds something in the file concerning which she does not agree with the degree auditor. At this point the student says:

Extract (9)
Cecilia1: credible voice: administrative / procedural information

((S is a graduating senior. Earlier in the interaction, she has told C that her degree auditor had told her paper work at L&S was not up-to-date. "She" in line 53 and after refers to the degree auditor; "that" refers to Women's History.))

```
053->S:  Because apparently she said THAT wasn't in the
054        computer.
055        (.5)
056   S:  So uh=
057->C:  =who who is this?
058   S:  Uh:: Michelle Bateman,
059        ((paper shuffling))
060   C:  Goodness grief.
061        ((paper shuffling))
062->S:  Hhhhh she said that (.) I had four (.) I needed
063        four (.) for my historical analysis still.
064   C:  Four units.
065   S:  Yeah.
066        (.3)
067   S:  And that should be the Women's History and I
068        guess she (.2) just (.) completed this.
069   C:  Interesting.
070   S:  Yeah.
071        (.2)
```

In lines 53 and 62, the student keeps quoting the degree auditor as both the basis and the means of her arguments. In line 57, we see a similar phenomenon as examined in the last extract: the counselor presses for attribution of information. (The student, however, never asks the counselor where she gets her information from.) Here, the categorical identity of a degree auditor is not enough; the counselor presses for her individual identity. The reason why the counselor does such probing becomes clear in the subsequent talk: it is quite clear that here the "expert" voices don't agree with each other; in lines 60 and 69, the counselor remarks "Goodness grief" and "interesting" in response to what the student tells her that the degree auditor has said.

CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSION

This paper has concerned itself with the practice of voicing as an interactional accomplishment of displays of how counselors and students have come to know about some particular information and of displays of their stance toward what they report. It has focused on the topical and sequential contexts of these instances and the accompanying linguistic choices. The term "reported speech" has been used in a broad sense to describe a range of discourse practices, all of which report speech by others in one way or another. To answer the questions raised at the beginning of this paper, the invocation of others' voices is practiced in problem-presentation contexts (Extracts (1) & (2)) in which students invoke some authority figure of the university institution to orient the counselor to the problem that concerns them and to distance themselves from the responsibilities of the problems. In cases where they quote or paraphrase the counselor himself, they impose an interactionally even stronger demand for the counselor to address the solution to the problem (Extract (3)). Reporting what another counselor said also gives the student an opportunity to elicit a second assessment from the counselor while avoiding the problem of directly confronting one counselor's words with those of another (Extracts (5) & (6)).

While in most cases students volunteer the reporting they do, in some instances attribution is elicited by the counselor with respect to the credibility of information regarding university rules and requirements (Extracts (8) & (9)). Whereas the counselors press the students for the sources of their information and opinions, they themselves freely appropriate the voice of the university institution (Extract (7)) with no challenge from the students. The fact that it is the student, not the counselor, who is interactionally driven to turn to authoritative voices can inform us about the issues specific to institutional identities in the counseling encounter. The student is treated by the counselor as lacking in credibility (in terms of reliability of information); the counselor speaks through the voice of the institution and thus he/she is seen to embody the official version of information regarding university policies and requirements.

Crucial to the construction of facts and information is the construction of speakers' stances toward what they know, a process in which speakers' modal and temporal choices play an important role. We have seen that, through making different modal and temporal choices in invoking others' voices and in making their own commentaries respectively, students are able to assign certain stances to the reportees and to project their own stances as being different (Extracts (1), (5) and (6)), a divergence which makes it interactionally imperative for the counselors to address the problem at hand. In other instances, students align themselves with the stance of the reportee (Extract (2)) to make a stronger case for their request and to solicit the counselor's agreement (Extract (4)). In other words, through casting the reportee's particular stance, the student also casts his/her own stance.

Returning to the Bakhtinian (1986) perspective, texts are constituted by and embedded in dialogues. What has been discussed in this paper with regard to the placements of invoking others' voices and the respective modal/temporal choices in the reporting and the commentary shows that a speaker's construction of a past interaction embodies not only a reflection of his/her version of the interaction itself but also embodies stances consequential for the here and now.

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APPENDIX A: Transcription Symbols

CAPS   emphasis, signalled by pitch or volume
.   falling intonation
,   falling-rising intonation
°   quiet speech
[ ]   overlapped talk
-    cut-off
=   latched talk
:   prolonged sound or syllable
(0.0)   silences in seconds and tenths of seconds
(.)   short, untimed pauses of one tenth of a second or less
( )   undecipherable or doubtful hearing
->   turn(s) focused for analysis
(( ))   additional observation
S: at the beginning of a stretch of talk, identifies the speaker; in the following data S is for student, other letters are for counselor
ital   modal elements
> <   rapid speech
< >   slow speech
Joe1   extract is from the encounter between the counselor "Joe" and his first student

TOPIC APPROPRIATENESS IN CROSS-CULTURAL SOCIAL CONVERSATIONS

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ABSTRACT

Among the major features characterizing social conversations, topics play a crucial role in the success of an interaction, yet judgments of what topics are appropriate for casual conversations can vary between different language groups. If a speaker pursues a conversational topic that is considered inappropriate by the hearer, the hearer may be unable or unwilling to respond in the way that the speaker expects. In this case, the speaker's cooperative intent may not be understood by the hearer, and the interaction may not be successful for reasons not that are not always easy for the participants to identify. One hundred and seventy participants in this study (speakers of Chinese, Japanese, Korean, Indonesian, and Arabic, along with a NS control group) evaluated on a 10-point Lickert scale the appropriateness of 104 conversational topics. There was a high correlation among the participants in their judgments of topics pertaining to *Family* and to *Classes, grades, and teachers*. There was less agreement about the appropriateness of topics pertaining to *Age, Money, the Hearer, Personal possessions, Life in the U.S.A., Recreation, Self,* and *Residence*.

INTRODUCTION

Many ESL programs in the U.S. define their curricular goals as providing students with language skills to achieve their academic and social goals. Over the past ten years, ESL professionals have come to recognize that in addition to acquiring skills in L2 reading, writing, and grammar, students need to develop skills to deal with the variety of social interactions, both on campus and beyond, that they regularly face. It has also been noted that successful social interactions can become additional sources of exposure to L2 and may, therefore, facilitate L2 acquisition (Adamson & Regan, 1991; Scarcella, 1990).

Social conversations, even at the peer level, are complex, and many linguistic, pragmatic, and cultural notions come into play. Research has shown that such factors as familiarity of the participants, time of the interaction and time available for the conversation, situation and the environment in which the exchange takes place, and intention have a considerable impact on

interaction (Wardhaugh, 1985; Cocchi, 1992). Among the elements of conversations, such as initiating, turn-taking, interrupting, closing, and terminating, the choice of topics appears to be one of the most specifically defined (Wardhaugh, 1985).

Schneider (1988) found that among the major features characterizing social conversations, topics play a crucial role in the success of interaction. Marsh (1989, p. 89) states that different notions of what topics are appropriate in casual and cross-cultural social exchanges "could seriously affect speakers engaged in cross-cultural communication with those from more distant speech communities." Befu (1986) indicates that in conversations between Japanese and Americans, for example, the topics of social conversations between strangers and acquaintances can determine the success (or failure) of the interaction.

What, in fact, represents a conversational topic has been a subject of debate among linguists. Various scholars have defined the notion of discourse topic differently (Clark & Haviland, 1977; van Dijk, 1977, 1980; Schank, 1977; McLaughlin, 1984). Many researchers have asserted that topics are not static, and that they are continually initiated, negotiated, developed, expanded, shifted, and terminated (Brown & Yule, 1983; Tannen, 1984). Gardner (1984) states that it is frequently impossible to tell where in a conversation a topic is maintained, developed, expanded, or changed. On the other hand, Laver (1975, 1981) and Schneider (1988) found that language users have little difficulty specifically defining topics. In fact, Tannen (1984) indicated that naming conversational topics is a common discourse task, e.g. when the speaker or the hearer is asked what a conversation was about, they can usually clearly state what the topic was.

Choosing appropriate topics is a component of the overall conversational politeness strategy as the participants must decide not only what topics to include but also which ones to avoid (Cocchi, 1992). Topics can be inappropriate for a variety of reasons, as some can prove to be embarrassing and/or painful either to an individual or a group in the role of the hearer (Wardhaugh, 1985).

Wardhaugh (1985) observes that communication breakdowns often occur when the parties are from different ethnic, cultural, and/or social backgrounds because "taking part in a conversation requires cooperation and participation" (p. 52). He notes that in a conversation, participants, however passive, are always "at risk" (p. 54) because they have to play either the role of the speaker or the role of the hearer, both of which entail cooperation. In addition to the visible and much discussed role of the speaker in interaction, the hearer's task is to discern the speaker's intent and purpose and to respond accordingly. If a speaker pursues a conversational topic that is considered inappropriate by the hearer, the latter may be unable or unwilling to respond in the way that the former expects (Recanati, 1991). In this case, the speaker's cooperative intent may not be understood by the hearer, and the interaction may not be successful for reasons not that are not always easy for one or other of the participants to identify.

Many observers have tried to make a list of the topics appropriate and inappropriate in cross-cultural interactions between Americans and speakers of other languages. Hu & Grove (1991, p. 27) state that the selection of the topic in social interactions, for example between Chinese and Americans, should be made with caution, and the authors provide an extensive list of topic "restrictions." Similarly, Masuda (1990) cautions her Japanese audience that Americans consider such topics as individual's health, habits, and marital status intrusive. According to Park (1979, pp. 57-60), many Americans complain that Koreans dwell on personal conversa-

tional topics and often ask inappropriate questions; on the other hand, the author reports being annoyed at the questions that Americans asked him: "How do you like your food?" or "How do you like the United States?" Nydell (1987) dedicates an entire chapter to the discussion of appropriate and inappropriate topics in conversations between Arabs and Americans and highlights those that can be considered "sensitive" (pp. 41-43) by either party.

Although such general guides can be useful, individual variation, context, gender, socio-economic class, and other discrete factors, in addition to the essential liquidity of conversations and topic, makes listing safe and dangerous topics rather difficult. The conversational appropriateness of discussing money has been discussed by many authors, and stories of awkward social situations when money was brought up in ways that Americans considered inappropriate abound. Yet Chinese students who have been told that Americans don't discuss money have been puzzled when American classmates have reported buying sandals for $5.00, getting $100 for a birthday present, or taking a summer job that pays $12.00 an hour.

The purpose of this paper is to establish whether correlation exists between NS and NNS judgments of appropriateness of topics commonly encountered in social interactions and casual conversations. Teaching various aspects of appropriateness in face-to-face interactions is an important component of a communicative syllabus (Marsh, 1989), and the ultimate goal of this investigation is to provide findings that can be incorporated in communicative curriculum and/or training materials for NNSs learning ESL or Americans who frequently interact with NNSs. In general terms, because there are no "objective" means of measuring topic appropriateness, familiarity with relative notions of topic appropriateness in social conversations can prepare all parties for roles as the speaker and the hearer.

To date, little conversational data has been collected for the analysis of topic appropriateness in cross-cultural interactions between Westerners and non-Westerners. This study should be viewed as preliminary and, therefore, limited in scope and application.

SUBJECTS

Of the 170 subjects who participated in the study, 20 were NSs of American English residing in Ohio, Kentucky, or Indiana (NSs); 63 were speakers of Chinese (CH), 33 of Japanese (JP), 21 of Korean (KR), 20 of Indonesian (IND), and 13 of Arabic (AR). All subjects were enrolled at in various departments at the Ohio State University; their ages ranged from 19 to 33.

The NNSs subjects were highly advanced learners with a mean TOEFL score of 587 and had resided in the U.S. for periods of time ranging between 1 and 4 years with a mean of 2.2. It follows that the subjects had had a relatively extensive exposure to the L2 community and its socio-pragmatic norms and interactional frameworks. A shorter length of residence in the host community and exposure to its norms of appropriateness may cause greater variability in subjects' responses.

INSTRUMENT DESIGN

Topic Selection

During the initial stages of the study, topics for social and/or conversations between ac-
quaintances (*someone whom you know but who is not a close friend*) were solicited from 45
university students. Of that number, 7 were NSs of American English, 15 of Chinese, 9 of
Japanese, 5 each of Korean and Indonesian, and 4 of Arabic. An initial total of 168 topics were
collected. After redundancies were eliminated, the remaining 104 topics were included in the
questionnaire in the form of phrases and clauses (e.g. *my life in the U.S.* and *why I came to the
U.S.*) (Tannen, 1984). These topics largely belonged to ten thematic clusters, such as *family/
family members* (15 items); *classes/grades/teachers* (9 items); and *recreation/weather/travel*
(12 items) (see Appendix A for a complete list). In the actual questionnaire the topics were
presented in random order.

Because all topics in the questionnaire were elicited from students, the number of topics
in the clusters was uneven and ranged from 5 associated with *Age* to 15 pertaining to *Family
and family members*. Furthermore, because topics were elicited from a relatively young popu-
lation, most of whom were unmarried, the questionnaire did not contain topics dealing with
spouses, children, or other issues relevant to older populations.

The Frame

Schneider's (1988) investigation showed that food and drink establishments represent
one of the single most common contexts and/or environments for social interaction and casual
talk. For this reason, the situational setting for the instrument was described as a restaurant. In
keeping with the findings of Schneider (1988), Tannen (1984), and Wardhaugh (1985), in order
to allow the subjects to concentrate on interactional topics, the following parameters for other
social conversation variables were established in the questionnaire: the time of day and the
length of the interaction were defined as lunch and about an hour, the social distance between
the participants was delineated as a peer acquaintance, the type of interaction as social/conver-
sational (i.e. *you talk about all kinds of things*), and the implicit intention as cooperative. The
questionnaire instructions (see Appendix A) to the subjects outlined an imaginary conversation
counter-part, i.e., *a student from your department.* The instructions on the questionnaires for
NSs indicated a foreign student and the forms for NNSs an American student.

> *N.H. is a [foreign/American] student in your department. The two of
> you entered the program at the same time and have similar interests in your
> majors. You have lunch together frequently at a restaurant near campus and
> spend about an hour together. When you have lunch, you talk about all kinds
> of things.*

The Scale

The subjects were asked to rank the appropriateness of 104 conversational topics on a 10-
point Lickert scale, ranging from very inappropriate (1) to very appropriate (10).

RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

The rankings assigned to the appropriateness of a particular topic by subjects with the same L1 were averaged to obtain group rankings for each topic. The resulting averages were analyzed in two ways:

(1) The rankings of topics within a thematic cluster were tested for consistency and Kendall's Coefficients of Concordance (W) were obtained across L1 groups.
(2) Correlation coefficients were computed for each topic cluster based on average L1 group rankings to establish the amount of association between each pair.

The Concordance of Rankings

Group rankings were tested for consistency across L1 groups, utilizing Kendall's Coefficient of Concordance (W). The results indicate (see Table 1) that expectably, the concordance in the subjects' judgments of topic appropriateness depended on the topic.

Specifically, the amount of agreement among ranks was high for the topic clusters associated with *Family and family members, Age, Classes, grades, and teachers, Hearer, Money,* and *Own possessions,* with (W's) ranging from .89 to .67 (p < .001). These values imply that overall, regardless of their L1s, the group rankings exhibited systematic similarities.

The subjects' judgments of appropriateness across L1 groups were moderately consistent on topics pertaining to *Life in the U.S.A., Recreation, weather, and travel,* and *Self,* (W) of .56, .53, and .53 (p < .001), respectively. The Coefficient of Concordance associated with the topic cluster *Residence* (W = .27) was not significant, i.e. rankings among groups were markedly distinct.

Table 1
Kendall's Coefficients of Concordance (W) Across L1 Groups

Topic Cluster	Number of Topics in Cluster	Kendall's (W)	Level of significance
Family/family members	15	.89	(p < .001)
Age (own and family)	5	.78	(p < .001)
Classes/grades/teachers	9	.75	(p < .001)
Hearer (possessions/self, etc.)	11	.70	(p < .001)
Money (own/family)	12	.69	(p < .001)
Own possessions	7	.67	(p < .001)
Life in the U.S.A.	14	.56	(p < .001)
Recreation/weather/travel	11	.53	(p < .001)
Self (tastes/experiences)	12	.53	(p < .001)
Residence	8	.27	not significant

Correlations between Subjects' Rankings

The analysis of data below follows the order of concordance coefficients established in Table 1 and examines correlations of rankings in greater detail. To determine associations between the average rankings of conversational topic appropriateness by L1 groups, rank-difference coefficients between each pair of L1-based groups were obtained for the 10 topic clusters outlined in Table 1. (For the full set of values pertaining to the 10 correlation matrices, see Appendix B). However, because this study is primarily concerned with similarities and differences in the appropriateness rankings of conversational topics for incorporation in ESL curriculum, the correlation coefficients between NSs and NNSs were extracted and are selectively presented in Table 2.

Table 2
Extracted Rank Correlation Coefficients between NSs and NNSs, by Group

	Topic Clusters									
	Fam	Age	Classes	H	Money	Poss	U.S.	Rec	Self	Res
	NSs	NSs	NSs	NSs	NSs	NSs	NSs	NSs	NSs	NSs
CH	.92*	.67	.80*	-.23	.64*	.21	.53	.80*	.19	.98*
JP	.75*	.30	.80*	.80*	.58	.96*	.56*	.59*	.20	-.10
KR	.90*	.90*	.60	.74*	.37	.83*	.31	.33	.17	-.81*
IN	.84*	.98*	.90*	.47	.52	.90*	.58*	.45	.03	.41
AR	.91*	.70	.76*	.73*	.51	.68	.45	.29	.15	.90*

* significant at (p £ .05)

[Abbreviations: Family = Fam, Hearer = H, Possessions = Poss, Life in the U.S. = U.S., Recreation = Rec, Residence = Res.]

Family

As the data in Table 2 show, on the topic cluster *Family*, the correlation coefficients between the rankings of NNSs in all L1 groups and NSs are high and significant, with an implication that subjects' perceptions of appropriateness of these topics were similar, regardless of their L1s. Therefore, it follows that relying on NS judgments of appropriateness when discussing family and family members in social conversations is a fairly safe venue among NSs, Chinese, Japanese, Koreans, Indonesians, and Arabs.

Age

However, this does not hold true for the topic cluster associated with *Age*. In particular, the correlation coefficients of subject's rankings were high and significant only between NSs and Indonesians (.98), and NSs and Koreans (.90). In popular literature describing interactions

of Americans with people from other cultures, age is frequently described as a troublesome topic, and Americans have often reported feeling uncomfortable when asked how old they are and how old members of their families are (Nydell, 1987; Lii-Shi, 1988; Masuda, 1990). However, the high positive correlations between the judgments of appropriateness of NSs and Koreans and NSs and Indonesians regarding *Age*-topics indicates that NSs may not be unique and that perceptions of Koreans and Indonesians regarding the appropriateness of *Age* are in a strong direct relationship. In fact, Park (1979) and Smith-Hefner (1988) state that in Korea and Indonesia, respectively, when dealing with females without children, males without sons, and/ or unmarried males in their thirties, discussions associated with *Age* are largely uncomfortable and can be viewed as inappropriate.

The rankings of appropriateness for the topics of *Age* were also high, although not statistically significant, between NSs and the speakers of Arabic and Chinese. Nydell (1987) and Hu & Grove (1991) mention that Arabs and Chinese, respectively, seem to be more open about their age than Americans, although numerous social constraints also apply. Chinese unmarried and/or middle aged women, as well as childless Arab men and women, and those without sons may find the topic inappropriate. The correlation between the rankings of NSs and the Japanese were low (.30), indicating that speakers of American English and Japanese may have different views on whether conversations about *Age* are appropriate in social interactions.

Classes

The correlations between the NS and NNS subjects' evaluations of the appropriateness of discussing *Classes, grades, and teachers* were high and significant between NSs and all NNS groups, except NSs and Koreans, whose rankings correlated marginally (.60). It would seem that native judgments regarding the appropriateness of topics dealing with academics are also fairly reliable guides.

Hearer

In topics focusing on the *Hearer*, such as his or her past experiences, political beliefs, likes and dislikes, the rankings by NSs significantly correlated with those by the speakers of Japanese, Korean, and Arabic. The Indonesians' perceptions of the appropriateness of topics in this cluster exhibited marginal correlations with those of NSs. Those between NSs and Chinese subjects showed a weak inverse relationship (-.23).

Money

The rankings of all NNS groups, except Chinese, showed no significant relationship to those of NSs, with an implication that the speakers of Korean, Indonesian, and Arabic rated the appropriateness of *Money* as a conversational device differently than NSs. The views of the Japanese and NSs showed a marginal association (.58), and rankings of Chinese and NSs demonstrated a moderately significant correlation (.64).

Own Possessions

The topic cluster dealing with *Own possessions* exhibited a great deal of diversity in the subjects' rankings. Strong direct relationships are observed between the rankings of NSs and the Japanese (.96), NSs and Indonesians (.90), and NSs and Koreans (.83). The evaluations by

the speakers of Arabic showed a moderate correlation to those by NSs (.68), while the rankings by the Chinese exhibited little relationship to those by NSs (.21). Lii-Shi (1988) notes that although the Chinese consider discussing their belongings appropriate, they may feel less inclined to talk about the exclusivity of their possessions because they could be seen as braggarts. She also observes that Americans, unlike the Chinese, may not even say that they own an expensive item, such as a computer, for fear of being perceived negatively, a difference in perception of appropriateness that both Americans and the Chinese find bewildering when dealing with one another.

Life in the U.S.A.

The subjects' rankings of the topics dealing with *Life in the U.S.A.* showed no high correlation coefficients, although two were significant, i.e. between NSs and Indonesians (.58), and NSs and Japanese (.56). The absence of strong correlations of rankings and the relatively low amount of consistency with which the subjects ranked the topics in this cluster is not particularly surprising. NS subjects were evaluating the appropriateness of talking about life in their home country, the characteristics of Americans – the population to which they belonged – and the usage of their native language, i.e. topics in which they were or considered themselves experts. Furthermore, when NSs discuss their own country, culture, and/or language, they would clearly feel and display affect different from that of NNSs, often seen as outsiders (Adamson & Regan, 1991; Brown, 1986).

While in social conversations foreigners are routinely asked *Where are you from?, What do you think about this country?,* and *How do you like it here?* (Schneider, 1988), it appears that NSs and NNSs have different perceptions of appropriateness associated with the specific aspects of this topic. Although Schneider (1988) mentions that various aspects of native and host countries represent ritualized and "neutral" (p. 243) conversational topics between NSs and NNSs, his findings, which deal exclusively with speakers of British English, German, and French, may not be fully applicable to members of cultures other than Western.

Another factor to consider is that NS and NNS subjects were uncertain as to whether topics concerned with perceptions of *Life in the U.S.* would be appropriate. Possibly, NNSs were concerned about inadvertently offending their imaginary American counter-part (Nydell, 1987; Lii-Shi, 1988; Park, 1979). Similarly, when the topics of *Life in the U.S.* are involved, NSs may think that NNSs are being critical, which is not necessarily the case (Crane, 1978; Hu & Grove, 1991).

Recreation, Weather, and Travel

While the correlation coefficient between rankings of NSs and the Chinese on the topics of *Recreation, weather, and travel* was high (.80), and that between NSs and the Japanese was moderate (.59), the evaluations of Koreans, Indonesians, and Arabs did not correlate strongly with those of NSs. Recreation and weather in particular have been traditionally viewed as very "safe" conversational topics, so much so that many speakers of American and British English, German, and French consider them trite (Laver, 1975; Schneider, 1988). Schneider (1988) computed that out of 33 social conversations in his data, 23 contained weather and recreation sequences, and "some more than one" (p. 213). Because the topics associated with recreation and weather are often considered neutral, they are often included, discussed, and exemplified

in ESL textbooks for teaching speaking skills and strategies.

It appears, however, that topics pertaining to recreation and weather should not be assumed generally appropriate in cross-cultural conversations in which participants are non-Westerners. Specifically, apart from the Chinese, whose rankings of appropriateness of *Recreation, weather, and travel* topics showed a reasonably direct correlation with that of NSs (.80), the judgments of other NNS subjects differed. The evaluations of appropriateness of *Recreation, weather, and travel* by Indonesians (.45), Koreans (.33), and Arabs (.29) did not show even moderate associations with those of NSs.

Self

Similarly, none of the NNSs ratings of appropriateness correlated with those by NSs on the topic cluster of *Self*. Although some researchers (Brown & Levinson, 1987; Tannen, 1984) have noted that in some English-speaking societies, talking about self can be considered one of the ways of establishing social and conversational rapport, Lii-Shi (1988), Hu & Grove (1991), Befu (1986), and Nydell (1987) comment that talking about self is not viewed as appropriate in many other cultures. These authors further observe that talking about oneself may make one appear self-centered, unconcerned, and socially unastute. An implication of this observation is that talking about oneself, commonly accepted in the U.S. (Tannen, 1984), may not accomplish its purpose of interactional cooperativeness.

Residence

The rankings of topics dealing with *Residence* elicited responses that were least consistent (see Table 1) and most diverse (see Table 2). In fact, the correlation coefficients between NSs and Chinese (.98) demonstrated a very strong direct relationship, followed by those between NSs and Arabs (.90). On the other hand, the rankings of Koreans were in a very strong inverse relationship to those of NSs (-.81), implying that the judgments of Korean subjects regarding the appropriateness of *Residence* topics was quite different from that of NSs. The rankings of NSs and the Japanese were in a weak negative correlation (-.10), and NSs and Indonesians correlated only marginally (.41).

According to Schneider (1988, p.241), "residence is one of the most common and conventionalized" topics that can be used in almost any conversational situation. However, this finding may be true for members of only some language communities; the correlation coefficients of NS and NNS rankings of appropriateness for the *Residence* topic cluster indicate that non-Westerners, in this case Indonesians, Japanese, and particularly Koreans are likely to find it inappropriate.

CONCLUSIONS

As has been noted, the findings in this study are preliminary. The topics in the questionnaire used in this study were solicited from and evaluated for appropriateness by a group of subjects who were all students and of a similar age. The sample is unbalanced for linguistic generalization, but can be useful in designing ESL curriculum. Actual conversational data pertaining to "safe" and "dangerous" topics in cross-cultural social interactions can be collected

and analyzed to verify, amend, or expand upon the results obtained through the questionnaire in this study. Clearly, topics appropriate in cross-cultural conversations need to be studied in greater depth before arriving at definitive conclusions.

The findings of this study provide some insight into judgments of topic appropriateness of NSs of American English and those of speakers of Chinese, Japanese, Korean, Indonesian, and Arabic. The correlation coefficients between the rankings of NSs and other L1-based groups of subjects were high and significant on the topics associated with *Family*. The topics clusters associated with *Classes, grades, and teachers*, followed. Topics associated with *Own Possessions* and *Hearer* seem to be more similarly judged than those associated with *Age, Money, Life in the U.S., Recreation, weather, and travel, Self*, and *Residence*. Although the issue of topic appropriateness in conversational discourse not clear-cut, it also appears to be one of the few that can be taught in general terms within the format of ESL classes and incorporated in the curriculum for teaching L2 speaking skills.

Teaching an awareness that appropriateness of topics varies widely among language groups, that the conversational intent behind a topical line of discussion may be very different from what the student would expect, and that participation in cross-cultural conversations entails sensitivity to verbal and/or non-verbal cues of discomfort and evasion in the hearer can be built into many ESL curricula. Both NSs and NNSs can be taught that their judgments about the appropriateness of some topics are reasonably reliable but unlikely to be so in regard to other topics.

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

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APPENDIX A: THE QUESTIONNAIRE

Please read all of the instructions carefully. It is important that your responses reflect your own individual opinions.

In the questionnaire, you are asked to evaluate appropriateness of conversational topics. For example:

movie stars ··

If you find talking about *movie stars* very inappropriate mark your response as 1. If you believe that talking about movie stars is very appropriate, mark your response as 10. You can mark your responses from 2 through 9 to show your opinion between the two extremes.

When you are responding to the questions, please keep in mind the following imaginary student:

> *N.H. is a [foreign/American] student in your department. The two of you entered the program at the same time and have similar interests in your majors. You have lunch together frequently at a restaurant near campus. When you have lunch together, you talk about all kinds of things.*

CONVERSATIONAL TOPICS

1. whether I am married or not
2. whether I have children
3. my father's/mother's occupation
4. my father's/mother's career
5. my father's/mother's personality
6. my father's/mother's tastes and habits
7. my brothers and sisters
8. my brother's/sister's successes and failures
9. my extended family (aunts, uncles, cousins, etc.)
10. the conversations I had with my father or mother
11. the disagreements I have had with my parents
12. my parents' relationship with my brother(s) or sister(s)
13. my parents' relationship
14. my parents' disagreements
15. my father's/mother's relationship(s) with members of my extended family
16. my age
17. my brother(s)' or sister(s)' age(s)
18. my father's age
19. my mother's age
20. ages of members of my extended family
21. where I live
22. whether I like the city where I live
23. whether I dislike the city where I live
24. why I chose this place to live
25. whether I like or dislike my apartment
26. the conveniences that my apartment has
27. the problems I have had with the facilities in my residence
28. my roommate(s)
29. what I like about life in the U.S.A.
30. what I dislike about life in the U.S.A.

31. what I like about people in the U.S.A.
32. what I dislike about people in the U.S.A.
33. the characteristics of Americans which I find striking or surprising
34. how Americans use time
35. American politics
36. American religions
37. American food habits
38. how Americans behave in certain situations
39. the characteristics of the American society which I find striking or surprising
40. whether I am homesick
41. aspects of American English that I find striking or surprising
42. the meaning and usage of particular English structures and expressions
43. how much money I have or make
44. how much money my father has or makes
45. how much I pay for rent
46. how much my clothes or jewelry cost
47. how much my car costs
48. how much some of my special possessions (camera, computer, etc.) cost
49. how much money N.H. has or makes
50. how much money N.H.'s father has or makes
51. how much N.H. pays for rent
52. how much N.H.'s clothes or jewelry cost
53. how much N.H.'s car costs
54. how much some of N.H.'s special possessions (camera, computer, etc.) cost
55. what classes I am taking
56. the classes I enjoy
57. the classes I don't like
58. my grades
59. why I received a particular grade
60. my teachers whom I like
61. my teachers whom I don't like
62. my teachers' personalities
63. my teachers' way of teaching
64. weather if it's terrible or unusual
65. weather if it's normal
66. what I read for fun (entertainment)
67. TV programs or shows
68. the sports I like to play
69. the sports I am good at
70. the sports I am not good at
71. where I have traveled
72. whether I liked the places I have traveled to
73. whether I didn't like the places I have traveled to
74. what I do on weekends and/or during my free time

75. my clothes or jewelry
76. where I bought clothes or jewelry
77. some of my special possessions (camera, computer, etc.)
78. my musical equipment (stereo, compact disk players, etc.)
79. particular features of my special possessions (camera, computer, musical equipment)
80. particular features of my car
81. why I bought this particular car
82. the food I like or dislike
83. my personality
84. my life in my country
85. what I like about life in my country
86. what I dislike about life in my country
87. what I used to do in the past
88. a car accident that I saw in which I was not involved
89. a car accident in which I was involved
90. something wonderful that I did or said
91. something that made me happy or proud of myself
92. something that embarrassed me or some embarrassing experience
93. something stupid that I did or said
94. N.H.'s clothes or jewelry
95. some of N.H.'s special possessions (camera, computer, etc.)
96. N.H.'s classes, grades, and teachers
97. the food N.H. likes or dislikes
98. N.H.'s past experiences and what N.H. did in the past
99. N.H.'s political beliefs
100. whom N.H. dates or wants to date
101. N.H.'s happy moments
102. N.H.'s embarrassing moments
103. the people whom we both know and whom N.H. likes
104. the people whom we both know and whom N.H. doesn't like

APPENDIX B: COMPLETE RANK CORRELATION MATRICES FOR TOPIC CLUSTERS

Rank Correlation Matrix 1
Topic Cluster: Family and Family Members

	NSs	CH	JP	KR	IN	AR
NSs	1.00					
CH	0.92*	1.00				
JP	0.75*	0.73*	1.00			
KR	0.90*	0.93*	0.87*	1.00		
IN	0.84*	0.88*	0.85*	0.92*	1.00	
AR	0.91*	0.95*	0.68*	0.92*	0.84*	1.00

*(=.52(p 05)N = 15)

Rank Correlation Matrix 2
Topic Cluster: Age

	NSs	CH	JP	KR	IN	AR
NSs	1.00					
CH	0.67	1.00				
JP	0.30	0.82	1.00			
KR	0.90*	0.82	0.60	1.00		
IN	0.98*	0.76	0.46	0.98*	1.00	
AR	0.70	0.67	0.70	0.90*	0.82	1.00

*(= .89 (p .05) N = 5)

Rank Correlation Matrix 3
Topic Cluster: Classes, Grades, and Teachers

	NSs	CH	JP	KR	IN	AR
NSs	1.00					
CH	0.80*	1.00				
JP	0.80*	0.78*	1.00			
KR	0.60	0.38	0.62	1.00		
IN	0.90*	0.95*	0.82*	0.47	1.00	
AR	0.76*	0.75*	0.70*	0.36	0.75*	1.00

*(= .68 (p .05) N = 9)

Rank Correlation Matrix 4
Topic Cluster: Hearer

	NSs	CH	JP	KR	IN	AR
NSs	1.00					
CH	-0.23	1.00				
JP	0.80*	-0.28	1.00			
KR	0.74*	0.02	0.83*	1.00		
IN	0.47	0.03	0.69*	0.86*	1.00	
AR	0.73*	0.11	0.82*	0.99*	0.83*	1.00

*(= .61 (p .05) N = 11)

Rank Correlation Matrix 5
Topic Cluster: Money

	NSs	CH	JP	KR	IN	AR
NSs	1.00					
CH	0.64*	1.00				
JP	0.58	0.87*	1.00			
KR	0.37	0.59*	0.67*	1.00		
IN	0.52	0.35	0.61*	0.73*	1.00	
AR	0.50	0.81*	0.88*	0.68*	0.41	1.00

*(= .59 (p .05) N = 12)

Rank Correlation Matrix 6
Topic Cluster: Own Possessions

	NSs	CH	JP	KR	IN	AR
NSs	1.00					
CH	0.21	1.00				
JP	0.96*	0.39	1.00			
KR	0.83*	0.16	0.88*	1.00		
IN	0.89*	0.17	0.86*	0.83*	1.00	
AR	0.68	0.42	0.64	0.43	0.61	1.00

*(= .79 (p .05) N = 7)

Rank Correlation Matrix 7
Topic Cluster: Life in the U.S.A.

	NSs	CH	JP	KR	IN	AR
NSs	1.00					
CH	0.53*	1.00				
JP	0.56*	0.12	1.00			
KR	0.30	0.16	0.65*	1.00		
IN	0.58*	0.29	0.60*	0.67*	1.00	
AR	0.45	0.56*	0.37	0.49	0.77*	1.00

*(= .52 (p .05) N = 15)

Rank Correlation Matrix 8
Topic Cluster: Recreation, Weather, and Travel

	NSs	CH	JP	KR	IN	AR
NSs	1.00					
CH	0.80*	1.00				
JP	0.59*	0.76*	1.00			
KR	0.33	0.44	0.60*	1.00		
IN	0.45	0.42	-0.05	0.26	1.00	
AR	0.29	0.43	0.28	0.49	0.32	1.00

*(= .59 (p .05) N = 12)

Rank Correlation Matrix 9
Topic Cluster: Self

	NSs	CH	JP	KR	IN	AR
NSs	1.00					
CH	0.19	1.00				
JP	0.20	0.80*	1.00			
KR	0.17	0.34	0.32	1.00		
IN	0.03	0.70*	0.42	0.63*	1.00	
AR	0.15	0.85*	0.77*	0.24	0.56	1.00

*(= .59 (p .05) N = 12)

Rank Correlation Matrix 10
Topic Cluster: Residence

	NSs	CH	JP	KR	IN	AR
NSs	1.00					
CH	0.98*	1.00				
JP	-0.10	-0.19	1.00			
KR	-0.81*	-0.83*	0.38	1.00		
IN	0.41	0.36	0.55	-0.26	1.00	
AR	0.90*	0.81	0.00	-0.74*	0.61	1.00

*(= .74 (p .05) N = 8)

SPANISH AND AMERICAN TURN-TAKING STYLES: A COMPARATIVE STUDY

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ABSTRACT

Research on turn taking in English indicates that there are rules that Americans follow when organizing their conversations. Following these rules, consciously or subconsciously, helps ensure a good conversation because the rules are based on what Americans consider polite, cooperative and efficient. Research on turn taking in other languages, and even in different dialects of English, indicates that the organization of conversation is sometimes different. I have found that the turn-taking styles of some native Spanish speakers is different from that of American speakers of English, and that those differences can cause both groups to misinterpret the other's intentions.

The data consist of two one-hour segments of dinner conversation, one involving four Spanish women and one involving four American women. I examined the turn-taking styles of the participants, paying special attention to overlap and use of backchannel. Then I conducted playback interviews with each of the participants in order to determine what assumptions underlie the different turn-taking styles.

BACKGROUND

Perhaps the most complete discussion of turn taking to date comes from Sacks, Schegloff and Jefferson (1974). They describe a systematic characterization of turn taking in conversation which they claim is context-free (not bound to any particular context) and yet context-sensitive (fitted to the particulars of context). Their model is based on a set of facts, four of which are relevant here (the numbers associated with these facts are those found in the original):

2) Overwhelmingly, one party talks at a time.
3) Occurrences of more than one speaker at a time are common, but brief.
4) Transitions from one turn to a next with no gap and no overlap between them are common. Together with transitions characterized by slight gap or slight overlap, they make up the vast majority of transitions.

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14) Repair mechanisms for dealing with turn-taking errors and violations obviously are available for use. For example, if two parties find them selves talking at the same time, one of them will stop prematurely, thus repairing the trouble (Sacks, Schegloff and Jefferson 1974, pp. 10-11).

Sacks, Schegloff and Jefferson defend these facts with the ideas of turn-constructional unit (TCU) and transition-relevance place (TRP). That is, each turn at talk, whatever type or unit it may be (word, phrase, sentence, etc.), has a possible unit completion point that is projectable before its occurrence. A TRP is a completion point at which it would be possible, but not necessary, to change speakers. So, whoever is listening, can predict the completion point of the TCU and know when to speak, avoiding any overlap. Oreström (1982) agrees about the existence of projectable turn completion points. In the conversations he examined, 95% of the turns ended in a grammatical boundary (marked by a prosodically, syntactically, and semantically completed sequence), and 45% also coincided with a reduction in loudness and pause. Listeners apparently could predict the end of a turn based on these cues to the extent that 87% of the turns involved no simultaneous speech.

However, actual conversation does not always work the way it is described in Sacks, Schegloff and Jefferson's facts (2), (3), and (4). The New Yorkers in Tannen's (1984) study of the conversation at a Thanksgiving dinner exhibited what Tannen called a high-involvement style which included frequent use of overlap. Kilpatrick (1986) recorded Puerto Ricans speaking Spanish and found that 95% of the turns started or ended in simultaneous speech. Wieland (1991) recorded conversations in French between French and American women and found that the French women overlapped twice as much as the Americans. Nor is fact (14) an appropriate description in every case, since the overlaps and simultaneous speech found in these studies were not necessarily considered "turn-taking errors and violations" by the participants.

STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM

The studies mentioned above show that not all speakers in all situations fit Sacks, Schegloff and Jefferson's model. Are they the exception to the rule, or are there other groups of people and other instances that fail to fit the model as well? And if their model does not always apply, how do different conversational styles affect the participants' perceptions of each other. The study reported on here was designed to answer the following questions, which emerged from the results of similar studies done in this area and from my own observation of daily interactions between Spanish and American speakers.

1) Are there differences in Spanish and American turn-taking styles?
2) If there are differences, do they cause each group to misinterpret the other's intentions in speaking the way they do?

METHODOLOGY

In order to answer this question, I hosted two dinner parties. To the first, I invited four American women, and we spoke English. To the second, I invited four Spanish women, and we spoke Spanish. If the Spanish speakers used a style different from the Americans, that should be apparent in the comparison of the styles used during the two dinners.

All of the subjects were graduate students at the same university between the ages of 25 and 35. They were all women, since some research shows differences in the conversational styles of men and women. Three of the Americans were born and raised in the suburbs of Chicago and one was raised in the Boston area. Three had lived in Spain. The Spanish speakers all came from the central and northern parts of Spain, and had been living in the U.S. between two and five years. All of the participants were people who I have found to be open to meeting and talking to new people; the dinners were arranged so that each guest knew at least two other guests but had the chance to meet someone new as well. Finally, the participants did not have prior knowledge of what I was looking for; they were simply told that I was interested in studying conversational style.

The conversations were audio tape-recorded and transribed. Since the focus of the study was turn-taking style, special attention was paid in the transcription to overlap and pause, the length of each being measured in syllables and seconds, respectively. Finally, a one-hour segment was chosen from each conversation to be analysed and compared.

RESULTS

Analysis of the segments yields two important conclusions. First, there were more occasions of overlap in both the English and the Spanish conversations than was expected considering Sacks, Schegloff and Jeffersons's claim that overlap is rare, or common but brief. And second, the duration of overlap in the Spanish conversation was still much greater than that of the English conversation.

In order to find the overall amount of overlap, I looked at the beginning of every utterance (back-channel, main-channel, long stories, short answers) to see how many began in overlap. In the English conversation, 48.8% of the utterances began in overlap. In the Spanish conversation, 50% began in overlap. In both cases, then, overlap was common, and the frequency of overlap was essentially the same. However, I then measured the length of the instances of overlap in syllables and found that the average length of an overlap in the English conversation was only 2.88 syllables, while the average length of an overlap in the Spanish conversation was 4.56 syllables. At first glance, this difference, two or three syllables, would seem insignificant, even when people are speaking at a relaxed speed. However, considering the fact that there were many instances of overlap that were very short in both the Spanish and the American conversations, there must have been some instances that were substantially longer in the Spanish conversation for the average length of overlap in each conversation to differ as much as they did. Finally, I went back to look at what was causing so many instances of overlap in both conversations, and why some were so much longer in the Spanish one.

Overlaps in both conversations were caused by various patterns that happened frequently and that were usually unintentional. For example, overlap was often caused by simultaneous starts. This is a situation in which the floor is free, everyone has equal right to speak, and two speakers choose to start at the same time. (This pattern is mentioned in Sacks, et. al., but it is apparently assumed to be infrequent.) Overlap also resulted when the first speaker paused as though she was finished, but then went on to add something after a second speaker had started, for example, when a first speaker was thought to have finished a question, but then added a tag or an alternative. Other common patterns that caused overlap were interruptions to ask for additional information or clarification, or to make a joke. This type of overlap was intentional, but it was not seen as inconsiderate because it provided information that was necessary at a specific moment. Still another situation that produced overlap occurred when two or more speakers had the same information to share; they often overlapped by telling a story or explaining something together.

These patterns described above were common in both the American and the Spanish conversations and caused the majority of the occurences of overlap. What, then, accounts for the difference in the average length of the overlaps in these two conversations? The answer seems to lie in three patterns that were found far more frequently in the Spanish conversation than in the American one. Those three patterns were longer back-channel utterances, more frequent and longer lasting collaborative sequences, and the tendency to continue speaking when overlap occurs.

Longer back-channel utterances.

Back-channel utterances, as defined in this study, are utterances that add to the quality but not the semantic content of the conversation. In other words, they don't receive or require a response, and their purpose is to show listening and interest. These include mainly utterances like "uh-huh" and "yeah", which show listening and understanding, utterances like "wow" and "you're kidding", that show some type of reaction, and utterances like "that's nice" and "cool", that make a general comment. In English, these backchannel utterances are relatively short, and the Spanish equivalent was often longer. For example, instead of a simple "mhm", or "uh-huh", it was not uncommon to hear the Spanish participants say something like "sí, no, es verdad, sí (yes, yes, it's true, yes)" or "hombre, sí, sí (for sure, yes, yes)". Likewise, instead of saying "oh", a Spaniard might say "ah, de acuerdo (oh, I understand)", or instead of saying "wow", she might say "jo, pues vaya (jeez, well wow)" or "caramba, vaya cosas (wow, such things)".

These few extra syllables can add up, and they contributed to the tendency toward longer overlap in the Spanish conversation, but the type of backchannel that really caused more overlap involved repetition. It occurred when the person listening repeated or slightly reworded what the speaker just said as a way of showing understanding. In example (1), Marisa repeats part of the phrase that she has just heard, but her intonation and volume are more similar to Anne's back-channel comment than to an actual turn that was meant to be heard.

(1) ——

Paula:	y porque ellas tienen sus reglas y sus *cosas/
Marisa:	*Sí/ tie/nen *reglas, es claro/
Anne:	*Sí/
Juana:	*Y estás a/llí an plan en convento...

A similar form of backchannel involved prediction, rather than repetition. It was common, in the Spanish conversation, for the listener to finish the speaker's sentence right along with her to show understanding, as in example (2).

(2) ——

| Marisa: | Bueno, (una mujer italiana) vino sin saber nada y a la semana, usaba elsubjuntivo y los |

| Marisa: | tiempos compuestos, pero vamos, nada, hombre, todo es *es igual/ |
| Emi: | *muy pare/cido, sí |

While backchannel involving repetition and prediction happened five times in the English conversation, it occurred 38 times in the Spanish one.

Collaborative sequences.

The second major cause of longer overlap is the use of collaborative sequences, which occured much more frequently in the Spanish conversation. As the participants confirmed in the interviews, these collaborative sequences are genuinely cooperative in nature and they include completing another speaker's sentence, repeating or rewording what a previous speaker has just said, and contributing to a topic as though one had the floor when, technically, one doesn't.

The first of these collaborative patterns, completing another speaker's sentence, occurs when the "next speaker produces a syntactically fitted continuation of first speaker's utterance" (Lerner, 1989). Utterances of this type are different from the sentence completions classified as backchannel above for two reasons. First, they are responded to or acknowledged. But more importantly, they are often invited. In the Spanish conversation, many times one speaker pauses midthought, and a second speaker continues the thought, sometimes right along with the first speaker. In some instances, the first speaker pauses to think of a word or to decide how to say something, in which case the second speaker jumps in to help her out. But many times, the pause is accompanied by a rising intonation that the participants said they interpreted as meaning "you know what I'm going to say", so they said it along with the speaker. This happens in example (3).

(3) ——

| Marisa: | ...porque... le han suspendido justo en la asignatura | | claro... |
| Juana: | | que mejor lo hacía | |

Marisa's first utterance ends with a rising intonation and clearly needs completing. Juana does not know the woman who failed, so she is not helping to tell a story that both she and Marisa know; rather, she is guessing about what Marisa wants to say, based on the context and the intonation. The same intonation causes overlap when continuation of the first utterance is so obvious that the second speaker goes on with a new thought while the first speaker completes her own sentence at the same time.

(4) ——

Emi: Pues a mí me tocase cocinar yo creo que nunca, vamos para allí yo creo que nunca comería

| Emi: | o sea que mejor que si cada uno, | *hace lo que quiera./ |
| Marisa: | | Sí, yo *no, you cuan/do vine no tenía idea... |

The first part of Emi's turn ends in rising intonation and is followed by a pause; it needs to be finished. However, the sentence completion is so obvious that Marisa goes on to something else while Emi finishes her own sentence in overlap.

A second type of collaborative sequence involves repeating or rewording what a previous speaker has just said. In the following situation, everyone agrees that being afraid to tell your parents that you're living with someone is ridiculous, and everyone says so. Because there is so much overlap, a good deal of the recorded conversation is unintelligible. However, in what can be heard, there is a lot of repetition.

(5) ——

Anne:	y tienen un contestador automático por si llama,	la madre y	
Emi:			*(muffled———
Marisa:			*Pues vaya follón, no?
Paula:		ha	*(muffled)
Juana:			Por *eso la madre (mufld)?

Anne:	
Emi:	——————————————)/ parece fatal/
Marisa:	(muffled———————) si se van de visita./
Paula:	
Juana:	Lo veo un poco, yo se lo digo./ se van de visita, y ven allí todo lo de la chica

Anne:	*Se/ va la *chica/	A mí tam*bien/
Emi:		
Marisa:	*bue-	*sí/
Paula:	eso eso es *un/ po*co./	*(muffled)/

Juana:	*Me pare/ce ridículo. Es *un poco/ ridí-

Anne:		
Emi:	*me parece ridículo/	
Marisa:	*(muffled)/	*aparte de ridícu/lo, es que me parece angustioso, por*que si/ vienen
Paula:	*Es/ un *poco,/	
Juana:	*decirlo/ *(muffled————)/	*claro/

Anne:	*claro/	
Emi:	*Pero todavía pasa esto/	
Marisa:	al *vienen/ un fin de se*mana tienes que sacar/ toda *la ropa/—	
Paula:		
Juana:	*la ropa/	

Again, this type of utterance is different from the repetitions that were classified as backchannel because they are acknowledged. For example, when Juana says "se van de visita", she is not merely showing that she understands or agrees with Marisa's comment; she repeats Marisa's comment as a way of starting her own comment, which is different and new ("se van de visita, y ven allí todo lo de la chica") and which the others in the group listen to and comment on ("se va la chica").

It seems that, in the Spanish conversation, these first two types of collaborative sequences (completing another speaker's sentence, and repeating or rewording what a previous speaker has said) take the place of the backchannel utterances involving prediction and repetition. Indeed, they are similar, except that collaborative sequences are acknowledged while backchannel utterances remain in the background. This may account for the fact that one third of the utterances in the American conversation were said to be backchannel, only one fifth of the utterances in the Spanish conversation fit into that category.

The final type of collaborative sequence that, like the others, was more common in the Spanish conversation involved contributing to a topic as though one had the floor when technically one didn't. Specific instances of this type of sequences involved answering a question directed at someone else, contributing to an explanation given by someone else, or defending a comment made by someone else as though one had said it oneself. The example (6) shows the first two of these patterns. First, Emi answers the question that Paula asked Marisa, then Juana adds to Paula's answer.

(6)

Marisa:	Si oí un reportaje de horas en la televi*sión/ y han y han encontrado agendas con
Paula:	*Sí/ pero

>>>

Marisa:	direcciones *de los/	*de los/ pisos,		(muf*fled————)/
Paula:	*pero Ma/risa,	*eso/	Sabes como funciona ETA?	*Funciona a/sí

Marisa:		*yeah/	
Paula:	*(muffled———) en pirámide. Exacto. *O sea,/ cogen a los tres/ gordos e inmediata-		
Emi:	*Cuando unos bajan otros suben y (muf fled————————) o sea,/		

Marisa:		yeah	
Paula:	mente hay tres más que son gordos	así que no los han cogido	
Emi:			Y que nadie conoce

Marisa:		*ah,/ es un poco...
Paula:	Y que nadie conoce porque *en ese momento/...	
Emi:	*porque porque son otros per/son*as	

As for defending a comment made by someone else as though one had said it oneself, that can be distinguished from overlap that occurs when two people simply tell a story together, which occured in the American and the Spanish conversations, by the way the overlapping utterances are phrased. One speaker starts telling about something; she has the floor. The others know about the topic, so they contribute too. This results in a sharing of the floor, so that eventually, everyone is telling everyone else what they all already essentially know. But instead of just adding something, they phrase their comment as though they had been telling the story in the first place. In example (7), Emi starts out telling about the traffic problems and the strikes in Madrid, but soon, she, Juana and Marisa are all telling about the strikes to each other.

(7)
Emi:	...pero esto ya es España hijas, *así da gusto/		
Juana:	*así funcio/na *todo/		cla*ro/
Marisa:	*están/ todo el día de huelgas, eh *es/-		

Emi:	*Sie/mpre está Madrid así con
Juana:	
Marisa:	tuvieron como dos meses con el los autobuses y el me*tro

Emi:	*huelga con manifestaciones/	Eso debe ser un caos total... todavía hay fiesta
Juana:	*Es que Madrid es un catástrofe/ de ciudad	
Marisa:		

Emi:	por allí	
Juana:	No, pero es una ciudad muy descabalgada, por favor .	
Marisa:	Es que no está preparada	

Emi:	
Juana:	
Marisa:	para tanta gente y tanto coche... un día se van a parar los coches se van a atascar y no

Emi:			*sí/
Juana:		Pues sí	
Marisa:	va a haber quien los saque	no si va- tiene que sacarlos con grúas *por/que es	

Emi:	*sí, sí/	
Juana:		Es que ya no hay espacio.
Marisa:	imposible, *está,/	

When Juana says "así funciona todo (that's how everything works)", she is summarizing what Emi has just said, but the structure of her utterance and the intonation she uses make it seem as though she is continuing her own sentence. Actually, this is the first comment she has made on the topic. Similarly, the phrase "es que", used twice by Juana and once by Marisa, literally means "it's that", but it also seems to imply "I mean". In the passage above, Juana and Marisa seem to be explaining what previous speakers have said, as though they had said it themselves. This sharing of summaries and explanations through language results in a sharing of the floor that manifests itself in longer overlap and that, while present in the English conversation, was much more common in the Spanish conversation.

Continued speaking during overlap.

The third and final reason for longer overlap in the Spanish conversation was the tendency to continue speaking when overlap occured. In both conversations, when one speaker started a turn that would overlap with the speech of another who was already speaking, there were three typical reactions. First, the overlap sometimes caused one or both speakers to hesitate or stutter. Second, the overlap sometimes caused one speaker or the other to stop. And third, sometimes speakers didn't seem to react at all to the overlap, but continued to talk until finished. While all three patterns occured in both conversations, the third pattern was much more frequent in the Spanish conversation. In the English conversation, there were 99 instances of overlap that lasted long enough for a speaker to react to it in one of the ways mentioned above, and 23% of the time neither speaker reacted. In the Spanish conversation, there were 141 instances of this type, and the Spanish women continued until finished without hesitating or stopping 48.2% of the time.

DISCUSSION

After interviewing the participants about previous interaction with the other culture, I found that the potential for cross-cultural misunderstandings was increased in those areas where turn-taking styles in English and Spanish were different. Two areas in particular deserve attention.

First of all, the differing quantities of overlap in each language was a potential cause of misunderstanding. As mentioned above, the greater amount of overlap in Spanish conversation, for the Spanish, showed warmth and sharing, whereas it inhibited the Americans who felt they had to try to be brave if they wanted to say something. But more importantly, the difference in the amount of overlap caused both groups of speakers to draw conclusions about the other group's character that were not always true. For example, the Spanish women in the study said that Americans often seemed less excited and less expressive than Spaniards, not spontaneous, and falsely polite. They also said that they thought Americans didn't really listen and didn't like to talk. On the other hand, the Americans felt that Spaniards seemed aggressive and never let anyone else have the floor. Neither group agreed with the characterizations of themselves made by the other group.

The second potential cause of misunderstanding involved the backchannel behaviors. Some of the listening behaviors used by the speakers are considered polite and sociable in one culture but not in the other. For example, for the Americans, short back-channel comments like "uh-huh" showed interest by allowing the other person to speak uninterrupted. This same behavior in Spanish implied a lack of interest and was interpreted as "yeah, okay, hurry up and finish". On the other hand, the Spanish said that longer back-channel comments showed that listeners were interested because they wanted to share the floor; they were having fun and being touched. For the Americans, longer back-channel comments prevented communications; they felt that the listeners were making too many comments, which showed that they weren't interested in listening.

To summarize, my data show that there are differences between Spanish and English turn-taking styles. There is more overlap in the Spanish conversation due to longer backchannel, collaborative sequences and the tendency to continue speaking when overlap occurs. Two important problems that can occur as a result of these differences are that each group may misinterpret the other's listening behavior and make incorrect judgements about their character.

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CROSSLINGUISTIC INFLUENCES ON THE ACQUISITION OF DISCOURSE LEVEL CONSTRAINTS ON THE COMPREHENSION AND USE OF ADVERSATIVE CONJUNCTIONS

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ABSTRACT

Conjunctions draw attention to and make explicit the logical relationships between propositions. Consequently mastery of the conjunctions of a language is a very important aspect of the acquisition of literacy skills in that language.

McClure and Geva (1983) demonstrated that most college educated adult native speakers of English select *but* to introduce foreground information and *although* to introduce background information and also use them in texts to determine an author's focus. This paper examines whether these conventions are acquired by highly proficient English speakers who are native Spanish speakers.

Forty native Spanish speakers were the subjects. Twenty completed a task requiring them to select either *but* or *although* to unite two propositions in a sentence. The other twenty completed a task requiring them to read a sentence containing two propositions connected by *but* or *although* and choose a continuation sentence which elaborated on one of the propositions. Subjects completed one task in Spanish and the other in English.

Results on the English language tasks showed that although all the subjects were very fluent English speakers, none adhered completely to the discourse level focus rule governing the use of *but* and *although* in English. These findings appear to reflect negative transfer from Spanish.

INTRODUCTION

In the seventies, studies of transfer, shaped up to that time predominantly by the behavparadigm, went into temporary eclipse. The rise of cognitive psychology and Chomskian

linguistics led to approaches in second language acquisition research which emphasized the learners' active and creative construction (e.g. Dulay and Burt 1974, 1975). However, since the existence of crosslinguistic influences is undeniable, the reconceptualization of transfer as a process within a cognitivist paradigm soon followed, and during the last few years crosslinguistic phenomena have received increasing attention (e.g. Gass and Selinker 1983; Kellerman 1979; Kellerman and Sharwood Smith 1986; McClure and Branstine 1990; McLaughlin 1987; Odlin 1989).

Concomitant with the resurgent interest in transfer, there has also been a focus on ultimate attainment in second language acquisition. The prevailing view is that native competence cannot be achieved by postpubertal learners (e.g. Coppieters 1987; Hyltenstam 1990; Johnson and Newport 1989, 1991; Long 1990; Patkowski 1980; Sorace 1991a, 1991b). However, Birdsong 1992 provides evidence which suggests that there are exceptions to this generalization.

The present study combines both a focus on transfer and a focus on ultimate attainment, investigating crosslinguistic influences on the acquisition of discourse level constraints on the comprehension and use of adversative conjunctions by highly proficient second language learners. The conjunctive relation is a very important resource in communicating new information because it is "a specification of the way in which what is to follow is systematically connected to what has gone before" as Halliday and Hasan state (1976, p. 227). Conjunctions act as clues drawing attention to and making explicit the logical relationships between propositions. In oral discourse these relationships may be made clear by context or paralinguistic features. However, in the written mode, conjunctions may be the only clue to the author's perception of the relationship between propositions. Consequently mastery of the conjunctions of a language is a very important aspect of the acquisition of literacy skills in that language.

But and *although* are both adversative conjunctions. However, *but* is a coordinator, *although* a subordinator. McClure and Geva (1983) demonstrated that a majority, but not all, of college educated adult native speakers of English select *but* to introduce foreground information and *although* to introduce background information and also rely on their use in texts to determine an author's focus. This paper examines first whether these discourse conventions obtain in the use of *pero* and *aunque*, the Spanish equivalents of *but* and *although*, and second whether they are applied in English by proficient non-native speakers of English who are native speakers of Spanish.

STUDY I

In study I, we first investigate what discourse rules monolingual Spanish speakers employ in choosing between the adversative conjunctions *pero* and *aunque*. Following McClure and Geva (1983), we examine whether *pero* and *aunque* are selected in accordance with:

(1)   a rule of focus:
        $\text{CONJUNCTION}_{\text{adversative}} \longrightarrow$ aunque   / $\underline{}S_{\text{background}} \, S_{\text{foreground}}$
                                                                      / $S_{\text{foreground}}\underline{}S_{\text{background}}$
                                                     pero   / $S_{\text{background}}\underline{}S_{\text{foreground}}$

(2)   a syntactic rule:

$$\text{CONJUNCTION}_{\text{adversative}} \longrightarrow \text{aunque} \quad / \quad \underline{\hspace{1em}} S_1 \; S_2$$
$$\text{pero} \quad / \quad S_1 \underline{\hspace{1em}} S_2$$

(3)   random choice; or

(4)   a combination thereof.

Second, we investigate what discourse rules monolingual Spanish speakers employ in determining what information relevantly follows a Spanish sentence composed of two propositions conjoined with *pero* or *aunque*. Again following McClure and Geva 1983, we examine whether Spanish speakers behave randomly or in accordance with principles of cohesion based on: (a) primacy, (b) recency, (c) propositional salience, (d) the conjunction as lexical item, or (e) the conjunction as subordinator or coordinator marking focus.

METHOD

Materials

Twelve basic sentences were used to create the items for this study. Each consisted of two propositions which might be appropriately conjoined with either *but* or *although*. The propositions in each pair were selected so that either could occur in initial position regardless of the conjunction used. Thus each basic sentence had six alternative forms. Labeling one proposition A and the other B, the six possibilities were: (1) A *but* B, (2) B *but* A, (3) A *although* B, (4) B *although* A, (5) *Although* A, B, and (6) *Although* B, A. They may be exemplified as follows:

(1)   A *but* B   The box was large, but it was light.
(2)   B *but* A   The box was light, but it was large.
(3)   A *although* B   The box was large, although it was light.
(4)   B *although* A   The box was light, although it was large.
(5)   *Although* A, B   Although the box was large, it was light.
(6)   *Although* B, A   Although the box was light, it was large.

Two continuations were constructed for each of the twelve basic sentences. One continuation sentence elaborated on each of the two propositions of the original basic sentence. Thus for the basic sentence whose propositions were *The box was large* and *the box was light*, the continuations were: *So it was easy to lift* and *So it could hold a lot*. Given that the focus of the original sentence was on the size of the box, the appropriate continuation was *So it could hold a lot*. Given a focus on the weight of the box, the appropriate continuation was *So it was easy to lift*. Again, there were six possible permutations for each basic sentence. For the box example these were:

(7)   A *but* B.B'   The box was large, but it was light. So it was easy
                                to lift.

(8)	B *but* A.A'	The box was light, but it was large. So it could hold a lot.
(9)	A *although* B.A'	The box was large, although it was light. So it could hold a lot.
(10)	B *although* A.B'	The box was light, although it was large. So it was easy to lift.
(11)	*Although* A, B.B'	Although the box was large, it was light. So it was easy to lift.
(12)	*Although* B, A.A'	Although the box was light, it was large. So it could hold a lot.

Two types of items were created from the basic sentences plus continuations. In type one, two sentences were presented. The first sentence contained two propositions and the two adversative conjunctions. The second sentence elaborated on one of the propositions of the first sentence. Subjects had to circle the preferred conjunction in the first sentence. A sample item appears below:

> (13)   The box was large *but/although* it was light. So it was easy to lift.

In the second type of item, the conjunction was supplied and subjects had to select the preferred continuation from two alternatives as in the following example:

> (14)   The box was light, although it was large.
> a.   So it was easy to lift.
> b.   So it could hold a lot.

Since a seventy-two item booklet seemed too long and too repetitive, the seventy-two type one items produced from the six alternatives of the twelve basic sentences plus continuation sentence were divided into two booklets of thirty-six items. Each booklet contained twelve sentences to be conjoined with *but*, twelve to be conjoined with initial *although*, and twelve to be conjoined with medial *although* distributed evenly throughout the booklet. The seventy-two type two items were similarly divided into two booklets of thirty-six items each. Each of the four booklets so produced was then translated into Spanish, thus producing a total of eight booklets. In study I, the type one booklets contained only twenty-four items. The twelve items beginning with a conjunction were omitted because of a ceiling effect - virtually all informants scored 100% on such items in a previous study (McClure and Geva (1983)).[1]

Subjects

The subjects for this study were 37 graduate students from a university in central Mexico. All were monolingual Spanish speakers.

Procedure

All subjects completed both the conjunction choice and the sentence choice tasks. Sub-

jects completed one task and then were given the other task. Booklet and order of presentation of task were counterbalanced.

RESULTS AND DISCUSSION OF SPANISH CONJUNCTION CHOICE

This study was designed to determine whether given a two-proposition sentence and a subsequent sentence indicating upon which initial sentence proposition focus centered, subjects followed a rule in choosing between *pero* and *aunque*. Responses were scored in conformity with the rule of focus proposed by the investigator. *Aunque* was the correct response where a conjunction introduced a proposition which was not focused upon. *Pero* was the correct response where a conjunction introduced a focal proposition. It was possible to determine the focal proposition in the first sentence by reading the continuation sentence.

The data from the conjunction choice task were analyzed in terms of two subtests: items requiring *pero* and items requiring *aunque*. The data were then subjected to an analysis of variance with conjunction type as a within-subjects factor and form as a between subjects factor. The dependent variable was the score of each of the two subtests defined by conjunction type. No significant effect was found for conjunction type ($F(2,36)=.529$, $p<.469$). Looking at the mean scores ($X(pero) = 7.46$, X(medial *aunque* $= 7.78$) might suggest that responses were made at random. However if one looks at each subject's response pattern, it would appear that several did conform to a rule of focus.

If subjects respond completely at random the experiment is a Bernoulli process; subjects have a .5 probability of success on each item. Therefore the binomial formula may be used to calculate the probability of a subject's scoring a given number of correct responses by chance (Lapin, 1973, p. 140). Since subjects' scores may range from 0 to 12, the probability of the chance occurrence of a score greater than or equal to 9 is $p<.05$ as is the probability of a score less than or equal to 3. We have therefore considered these scores to be indicative of rule governed rather than random behavior.

Of the 37 subjects, ten scored nine or above on both the *pero* and *aunque* items. These subjects would appear to have followed the proposed rule of focus.

RESULTS AND DISCUSSION OF THE SPANISH CONTINUATION SENTENCE
CHOICE TASK

The Spanish conjunction choice test investigated Spanish speakers' use of a rule in selecting an adversative conjunction to unite two propositions when the focus of the conjoint sentence was indicated by a subsequent sentence. The Spanish continuation sentence choice test was designed to investigate whether Spanish speakers used the conjunction to detect an author's intended focus in a sentence and chose a sentence which cohesively further developed that proposition. In accordance with the rule of focus proposed above, continuations were scored correct when they elaborated on the first of two propositions conjoined by medial *aunque* and on the second of two propositions conjoined by *pero* or initial *aunque*.

The data were subjected to a one-way analysis of variance with conjunction type as a

within-subjects factor. The dependent variable was the score of each of the two subtests defined by conjunction type. There was a significant effect ($F(2,35)=6.8764$, $p<.0016$). A Newman-Keuls post hoc comparison of means ($p<.05$) indicated that the scores on the initial *aunque* subtest ($X = 8.1111$ and on the *pero* subtest ($X = 7.6944$) were significantly higher than the score on the medial *aunque* subtest ($X = 6.3333$) (see table 1). There was no significant difference between the scores on the first two subtests.

TABLE 1

Choice of continuation sentence task

	Conjunction in the first sentence		
	medial		initial
	aunque	pero	aunque
	---	---	---
means	6.3333	7.6944	8.1111
standard deviations 1.8048	2.4121	2.1217	

(N = 36)
(F = 6.8764, p < .0016)

Medial *aunque* is significantly different from *pero* and initial *aunque* which are not different from one another

Let us now consider whether the data indicate that the subjects followed the rule proposed by the investigator, used some other strategy, or responded at random. Other possible strategies include: (a) a primacy rule, (b) a recency rule, (c) a lexical rule, and (d) a semantic salience rule. Subjects strictly following a primacy rule would always choose continuations which elaborated on the first proposition of each basic sentence. Consequently, their responses would be scored as correct for items in which propositions were conjoined by medial *aunque* and as incorrect for all other items. Thus, their responses would accord with Part 2 of the proposed rule of focus, but would fail both of the subtests for Part 1. Subjects following a recency rule would choose continuations elaborating on the second proposition of each basic sentence. Thus, they would receive high scores on the *pero* and initial *aunque* subtests and low scores on the medial *aunque* subtest. Two contradictory lexical rules can be envisioned: one stating that *pero* directs focus to an initial proposition and *aunque* to a final proposition, the other stating the reverse. Subjects following the former rule would score high on the initial *aunque* subtest and low on the other two subtests. Subjects following the latter rule would score high on the *pero* and medial *aunque* subtests and low on the initial *aunque* subtest. Finally, subjects responding in accordance with a semantic salience rule would elaborate on the proposition they considered most salient regardless of the order of the two propositions or of the conjunction. Therefore, they would select the same continuation for all given permutations of a basic two-proposition sentence.

Of the 36 subjects, two had scores greater than or equal to 9 on all three subtests and therefore appear to have behaved in conformity with the proposed rule of focus.

There is no evidence to support a primacy rule as there are no subjects whose scores

followed a pattern of 9 or above on medial *aunque* items and chance or less on the other items. Six subjects may have been influenced by a recency rule since they scored nine or above on both the *pero* and initial *aunque* subtests and six or seven on the medial *aunque* subtest. These subjects thus perform well where both a recency rule and the proposed rule of focus would predict the same choice and randomly where they are in conflict. Perhaps this pattern reflects alternate use of both rules. There is no clear evidence of the use of any other rule of discourse in the data.

In summary, then, the data from study I suggest that some but by no means all native Spanish speakers (about 5.5% in this sample) follow the proposed rule of focus in their choice and interpretation of *pero* and *aunque*.

STUDY II

Subjects

In the second study we examine the use of adversative conjunctions by native Spanish speakers who are highly proficient L_2 speakers of English. Of interest is whether their use of *but* and *although* follows the same discourse rules as their use of *pero* and *aunque*.

The subjects for this study were forty-two graduate students from a large midwestern university who were native speakers of Spanish. All were highly proficient English speakers. Their length of residence in the U.S. ranged from two months to thirteen years, with a mean of 3.17 years. Twenty-eight had spent at least two years in the U.S.

Procedure

Half the subjects completed the conjunction choice task in Spanish and the sentence choice task in English, the other half completed the conjunction choice task in English and the sentence choice task in Spanish. Booklet and order of presentation of task and of language were completely counterbalanced.

RESULTS AND DISCUSSION OF SPANISH CONJUNCTION CHOICE TASK

As in study I, this part of study II was designed to determine whether given a two-proposition sentence and a subsequent sentence indicating upon which initial sentence proposition focus centered, subjects followed a rule in choosing between *pero* and *aunque*. Responses were scored as in study I. However in this study since no previous investigations of the use of *pero* and *aunque* existed, twelve items containing sentences which correctly began with *aunque* were included to increase the parallelism with the sentence choice task.[2]

The data from the conjunction choice task were analyzed in terms of three subtests: items requiring *pero*, items requiring *aunque* in sentence initial position, and items requiring *aunque* in sentence medial position. The maximum score on each subtest was 12.

The data were subjected to a one-way analysis of variance with conjunction type as a within-subjects factor. The dependent variable was the score on each of the three subtests defined by conjunction type. There was a significant effect $(F(2,60)=13.3347, p=.0000)$. A Newman-Keuls post hoc comparison of means $(p<.05)$ indicated that the scores on the initial *aunque* subtest $(X = 11.9524)$ were significantly higher than the scores on both the *pero* $(X = 9.7619)$ and the medial *aunque* $(X = 8.8571)$ subtests (see table 2). There was no significant difference between the scores on the latter two subtests.

TABLE 2

Spanish conjunction choice task

| | Conjunction in the first sentence | | |
	medial aunque	pero	initial aunque
means	8.8571	9.7619	11.9524
standard deviations	2.6511	2.2114	.2182

(N = 21)
(F = 13.3347, p = .0000)

Initial *aunque* is significantly different from *pero* and medial *aunque*, which are not different from one another

Turning to a consideration of whether the data indicate that subjects followed a rule in responding, three basic alternatives and one combination seem possible. Subjects might have responded in accordance with: (a) the rule proposed by the investigator, (b) a syntactic rule, (c) a random response strategy, and (d) a combination of (b) and (c). Subjects might have disregarded the second sentence entirely and followed an intrasentential syntactic rule, specifying the use of *aunque* in initial position and *pero* in medial position. Subjects following such a rule would score well on the *pero* and initial *aunque* subtests but poorly on the medial *aunque* subtest. It is also possible that subjects might follow a rule prescribing *aunque* initially and respond randomly on the medial conjunction. Subjects following this strategy would perform well on the initial *aunque* subtests but poorly on the other two subtests.

A review of the results of the analysis of variance and Newman-Keuls tests might appear to indicate that the subjects used a rule of syntax. They certainly performed better on the *pero* and initial *aunque* subtests than on the medial *aunque* subtest. Moreover, the means on both of the two former subtests are very high. However, the mean on the medial *aunque* subtest is also fairly high, causing one to question whether use of a syntactic rule can alone account for the data. Consequently, the data were subjected to further analysis.

As in study I, if subjects respond completely at random the experiment is a Bernoulli process and the probability of the chance occurrence of a score greater than or equal to 9 is $p<.05$ as is the probability of a score less than or equal to 3. Of the 21 subjects, 11 had scores greater than or equal to 9 on all three subtests and, therefore, appear to have behaved in conformity with the investigator's proposed rule of focus. Two of these scored 12 on all three subtests.

To calculate the probability of a given number of subjects performing at or above a certain level, it is again appropriate to use the binomial formula as these data also fit the specifications of a Bernoulli process. This procedure, therefore, allows us to look at the probability that the data from a given number of subjects would accord with the proposed rule in its entirety as well as with each part of the proposed rule of focus merely by chance. As mentioned above, 11 of the 21 subjects scored 9 or above on all three subtests, while 2 scored 12 on all three subtests. The probability of these results occurring by chance are $p<1.235 \times 10^{-42}$ and $p<.000000057$ respectively. Results derived from decomposing the rule into its parts are also quite strong. The two parts of the rule state that: (a) When focus is on the second of two propositions conjoined in an adversative relationship, that relationship is indicated by *pero* when the conjunction immediately precedes the second proposition (the "*pero* subtest") and by *aunque* when the conjunction precedes the first proposition (the "initial *aunque* subtest") and (2) when focus is on the first of the conjoined propositions the indicated conjunction is *aunque* (the "medial *aunque* subtest"). Evidence for the first part of the rule, therefore, comes from the *pero* and initial *aunque* subtests. Twenty of the twenty-one subjects scored 12 on the initial *aunque* subtest ($p < 4.020 \times 10^{-73}$). Thirteen subjects scored 9 or above on the *pero* subtest ($p < 3.095 \times 10^{-17}$). Clearly there is very strong evidence that most subjects behave in accordance with the first part of the rule. Evidence for the second part of the rule comes from the medial *aunque* subtest. Fourteen of the 21 subjects scored 9 or above on this subtest ($p<1.6625 \times 10^{-18}$). Thus, the evidence that many subjects behaved in accordance with the second part of the rule is also strong.

There is also evidence that one subject used a syntactic rule. This subject scored eight on the *pero* subtest, two on the medial *aunque* subtest and twelve on the initial *aunque* subtest. This performance suggests reliance on a syntactic strategy of using *aunque* initially and *pero* medially.

An additional two subjects scored ten or above on both the initial *aunque* and the *pero* subtests while scoring five and seven respectively on the medial *aunque* subtest. Thus, their performance is high on those subtests whose correct answers can be predicted both by a syntactic rule and by the proposed rule of focus. This pattern may be the result of use of both rules.

To summarize, it appears that the rule of focus for selection of an adversative conjunction proposed for English in McClure and Geva 1983 also accounts for the Spanish adversative conjunction choice of half of the native Spanish speakers in study II. There is also evidence that a few subjects followed a syntactic rule.

RESULTS AND DISCUSSION OF THE SPANISH CONTINUATION SENTENCE CHOICE TASK

The Spanish conjunction choice test investigated Spanish speakers' use of a rule in selecting an adversative conjunction to unite two propositions when the focus of the conjoint sentence was indicated by a subsequent sentence. The Spanish continuation sentence choice test was designed to investigate whether Spanish speakers used the conjunction to detect an author's intended focus in a sentence and chose a sentence which cohesively further developed roposition. In accordance with the rule of focus proposed above, continuations were

scored correct when they elaborated on the first of two propositions conjoined by medial *aunque* and on the second of two propositions conjoined by *pero* or initial *aunque*. The data were subjected to a one-way analysis of variance with subtest type as a within-subjects factor. The dependent variable was the score on each of the three subtests defined by conjunction type.

As can be seen in Table 3, which displays the means and standard deviations for each subtest, the means on the *pero* and initial *aunque* subtests are significantly higher than the mean on the medial *aunque* subtest which is low but *pero* and initial *aunque* are not significantly different from one another.

TABLE 3
Choice of continuation sentence task

	Conjunction in the first sentence		
	medial aunque	pero	initial aunque
means	7.5238	11.3333	11.5238
standard deviations	3.2499	1.0646	.8136

(N = 21)
(F = 25.9576, p = .0000)

Let us now consider whether the data indicate that the subjects followed the rule proposed by the investigator, used some other strategy, or responded at random. Other possible strategies include: (a) a primacy rule, (b) a recency rule, (c) a lexical rule, and (d) a semantic salience rule. Subjects strictly following a primacy rule would always choose continuations which elaborated on the first proposition of each basic sentence. Consequently, their responses would be scored as correct for items in which propositions were conjoined by medial *aunque* and as incorrect for all other items. Thus, their responses would accord with Part 2 of the proposed rule of focus, but would fail both of the subtests for Part 1. Subjects following a recency rule would choose continuations elaborating on the second proposition of each basic sentence. Thus, they would receive high scores on the *pero* and initial *aunque* subtests and low scores on the medial *aunque* subtest. Two contradictory lexical rules can be envisioned: one stating that *pero* directs focus to an initial proposition and *aunque* to a final proposition, the other stating the reverse. Subjects following the former rule would score high on the initial *aunque* subtest and low on the other two subtests. Subjects following the latter rule would score high on the *pero* and medial *aunque* subtests and low on the initial *aunque* subtest. Finally, subjects responding in accordance with a semantic salience rule would elaborate on the proposition they considered most salient regardless of the order of the two propositions or of the conjunction. Therefore, they would select the same continuation for all given permutations of a basic two-proposition sentence.

Of the 21 subjects, 8 had scores greater than or equal to 9 on all three subtests and, therefore, appear to have behaved in conformity with the investigator's proposed rule of focus.

Two of them scored 12 on all three subtests (the probability of one subject's scoring 12 is p<.00024).

Again, as in the conjunction choice task, to calculate the probability of a given number of subjects performing at or above a certain level, it is appropriate to use the binomial formula as these data also fit the specifications of a Bernoulli process. Using this procedure, we can therefore look at the probability that the data from a given number of subjects would be in conformity with the proposed rule in its entirety as well as with each part of the proposed rule of focus merely by chance. Pertaining to the rule in its entirety, 8 of the 21 subjects scored 9 or above on all subtests, while 2 scored 12 on all subtests. The probabilities of these results occurring by chance are $p < 3.3213 \times 10^{-31}$ and p<.000000057 respectively. Results derived from decomposing the proposed rule of focus into its parts are also quite strong. We find that on the *pero* subtest, 20 of the 21 subjects scored 9 or above, thus giving evidence that they responded in accordance with the proposed rule ($p < 3.9912 \times 10^{-26}$). On the initial *aunque* subtest, 21 of the 21 subjects scored 9 or above ($p < 2.1437 \times 10^{-27}$), and on the medial *aunque* subtest, 9 subjects scored 9 or above ($p < 3.7196 \times 10^{-12}$). Clearly, the evidence that at least some adult subjects perform in accordance with the proposed rule of focus on all subtests is quite strong.

Conversely, there is no evidence to support a primacy rule as there are no subjects whose scores followed a pattern of 9 or above on medial *aunque* items and chance or less on the other items. Nor are there any subjects whose pattern of responses indicates that they behaved in conformity with either a lexical rule or the semantic salience rule. There is, however, some evidence that the responses of a few subjects were influenced by a recency rule. Two of the 21 subjects scored 11 or above on the *pero* and initial *aunque* subtests and 1 or 2 on the medial *aunque* subtest. These scores are in conformity with a recency rule. An additional six subjects scored 11 or 12 on the *pero* and initial *aunque* subtests and 5 or 6 on the medial *aunque* subtest. These subjects thus perform well where both a recency rule and the proposed rule of focus would predict the same choice and randomly where they would yield opposing choices. Perhaps this pattern is the result of alternate use of both rules.

In summary, it seems that about one third of our subjects follows the proposed rule of focus, while an additional third seems to be influenced by a recency rule.

RESULTS AND DISCUSSION OF THE ENGLISH CONJUNCTION CHOICE TASK

Let us now look at the results of the English conjunction choice test given to the native Spanish speakers. As in the case of the data from the Spanish conjunction choice test, these data were subjected to a one-way analysis of variance with conjunction type as a within subjects factor. The dependent variable was again the score on each of the three subtests defined by conjunction type. There was a significant main effect ($F(2,60) = 14.2918$, $p = .0000$). A Newman-Keuls post hoc comparison of means (p<.05) indicated that all pairs of scores are significantly different, the scores being X = 11.95 for initial *although*, X = 10.24 for *but* and X = 8.95 for medial *although* (see Table 4).

TABLE 4

English conjunction choice task

| | Conjunction in the first sentence | | |
| | medial | | initial |
	although	but	although
means	8.9524 1	0.2381	11.9524
standard deviations	2.5588	1.8413	.2182

(N = 21)
(F = 14.2918, p = .0000)

All three scores are significantly different from each other.

Of the 21 subjects, 12 had scores greater than or equal to 9 on all three subtests, and consequently appear to have behaved in conformity with the proposed rule of focus. One subject scored ten on the *but* subtest, twelve on the initial *although* subtest and three on the medial *although* subtest, thus suggesting he might have been operating with a syntactic rule. Three additional subjects scored twelve on the initial *although* subtest, between nine and twelve on the *but* subtest and between four and six on the medial *although* subtest, suggesting that they might have been using both the proposed rule of focus and a syntactic rule.

RESULTS AND DISCUSSION OF THE ENGLISH SENTENCE CHOICE TASK

Let us now look at the results of the English sentence choice test given to the native Spanish speakers. These data were also subjected to a one-way analysis of variance with conjunction type as a within subjects factor. Again the dependent variable was the score on each of the three subtests defined by conjunction type. Again there was a significant effect. A Newman-Keuls post hoc comparison of means (p<.05) indicated that the mean for medial *although* (X = 7.33) was significantly different from the mean for *but* (X = 10.71) and initial *although* (X = 11.33) but the means for the latter two were not significantly different from one another (see table 5).

TABLE 5
English choice of continuation sentence task

| | Conjunction in the first sentence | | |
	medial although	but	initial although
means	7.3333	10.7143	11.3333
standard deviations	3.0386	1.5213	.9661

(N = 21)
(F = 23.3995, p = .0000)

Medial *although* is significantly different from *but* and initial *although*, which are not different from one another.

Seven of the twenty-one subjects scored nine or above on all three subtests and so appear to have conformed to the proposed rule of focus in English. Two subjects appear to have been following a recency rule. Both scored very low, 2, on the medial *although* subtest and high on the other two subtests, 12 and 12 in one case and 9 and 9 in the other. An additional six subjects scored high, 10 or above, on both initial *although* and *but* and at a random level, between 4 and 7, on medial *although*. These subjects may have been alternating between a recency rule and a focus rule.

COMPARISON OF THE SPANISH AND ENGLISH DATA

McClure and Geva (1983) demonstrated the existence of a rule of focus for the use and interpretation of adversative conjunctions in English. However, while more than half of the graduate students tested used this rule, a substantial number did not. The present study indicates a similar pattern in Spanish. A rule of focus for the use and interpretation of adversative conjunctions appears to exist in Spanish as well as in English. However, clearly, many native speakers do not follow it. Less than a third of the Mexican subjects from study I and between a third and a half of the Spanish and Latin-American students in study II produced responses in conformity to the rule of focus.

What is of particular interest here is whether there is transfer of the pattern of use and interpretation of the conjunctions across languages. In other words, do speakers who employ a rule of focus in Spanish employ it in English as well. Conversely, are there Spanish speakers who do not employ a rule of focus in Spanish but who do so in English?

Of the eleven subjects who clearly demonstrated use of the rule of focus in the Spanish conjunction choice test by obtaining a score of nine or above on all three subtests, five also obtained a score of nine or above on all three subtests of the English sentence continuation choice test. Two more came very close, receiving scores of eleven or twelve on *but* and initial *although* and scores of eight on medial *although*. Four seemed to show conflict between a :y rule and a focus rule.

Of the eight subjects who clearly demonstrated use of the rule of focus in the Spanish continuation sentence choice task, seven clearly demonstrated use of the rule of focus in the English multiple choice task. The other subject came very close, receiving scores of eleven on the *but* subtest, twelve on the initial *although* subtest, and eight on the medial *although* subtest.

It is the case then that those Spanish speakers who demonstrated use of the rule of focus in the Spanish continuation sentence choice task also demonstrated use of the rule in the English conjunction choice task. However a few of those who demonstrated use of the rule in the Spanish conjunction choice task did not demonstrate use of the rule in the English continuation choice task. These results may be due to the fact that for medial and initial *aunque* the sentence continuation choice task was more difficult than the conjunction choice task as was demonstrated by the means:

	medial aunque	initial aunque
sentence continuation	7.43	11.43
conjunction choice	8.90	11.95

and by the fact that in both Spanish and English more subjects demonstrate use of the rule of focus on the conjunction choice task than on the sentence completion task. Part of this difficulty may be attributable to the fact that a recency strategy was possible in the sentence completion task but not in the conjunction choice task.

If we now look at the data from the English conjunction choice test, we see that of the twelve subjects who demonstrated use of the rule of focus, seven also demonstrated use of this rule in the Spanish sentence continuation choice task. Two of the other five seemed to use a rule of recency in choosing a continuation sentence in Spanish as they scored eleven or twelve on the initial *aunque* and *pero* sentences and one and two respectively on the medial *aunque* sentences. The other three scored eleven or twelve on both initial *aunque* and *pero* and five on medial *aunque*, thus perhaps displaying a conflict with respect to use of a recency rule and use of a focus rule.

Finally, looking at the data from the English sentence continuation choice task, we find that of the seven subjects who behaved in conformity with a rule of focus, five clearly also did so in the Spanish conjunction choice task. Another subject probably also did so, as he had scores of twelve on initial *aunque*, nine on medial *aunque* and eight on *pero*. The last subject scored twelve on *pero* and initial *aunque* and five on medial *aunque*. This subject may have vacillated between a rule of focus and a syntactic rule on the Spanish conjunction choice task.

Again it appears that there is a task effect. Those who demonstrate use of a focus rule in the English sentence continuation choice task almost without exception also demonstrate its use in the Spanish conjunction choice task. However, a few of those who demonstrate use of a focus rule in the English conjunction choice task appear to use a recency rule in the Spanish sentence continuation choice task, an option not available in the conjunction choice task. Thus it appears that if a rule of focus is used in the sentence continuation choice task it will be used in the conjunction choice task but the reverse is not always true.

In summary then, it appears that subjects operate with the same discourse rules for the

use and interpretation of adversative conjunctions in both their first language, Spanish, and their second language, English. If they have acquired a rule of focus in Spanish, they will also display its use in English. However if they have not acquired it in Spanish, they will not employ it in English either, regardless of length of residence in the US.[3]

CONCLUSION

This study was designed to investigate two questions: (1) Do native Spanish speakers follow a discourse rule of focus for the use and interpretation of the Spanish adversative conjunctions *pero* and *aunque* which parallels that described for English in McClure and Geva (1983) and (2) Do native Spanish speakers who are highly proficient second language learners of English follow the discourse rule of focus for the use and interpretation of *but* and *although* in English? The results of the study indicate that there is a discourse rule of focus for the use of *pero* and *aunque* in Spanish which parallels the English rule. However as in English this rule is not followed by all well-educated native speakers. Furthermore the results indicate that it is those Spanish speakers who follow a discourse rule of focus for adversative conjunctions in their native language who follow this rule in English. This discourse rule is not explicitly taught to either first or second language learners, and it appears that if it is not acquired in the first language it is not acquired in the second no matter the length of residence, the education, or the fluency of the learner.

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NOTES

[1] Sentences of the type "*But the box was large, it was light" are not only ungrammatical but also meaningless. Consequently it was obvious even to nonnative speakers that only "although" could be used to introduce the first clause in sentences of this type.

² The use of "pero" to begin a sentence of the type "___ la caja era grande, era ligera" is no more grammatical or more logical than is its translation equivalent (see endnote 1). However, since there were no previous studies of the use of the Spanish conjunctions *pero* and *aunque*, items requiring the selection of a conjunction in this sentence frame were included to insure that a complete picture of conjunction choice was obtained.

³ Performance on the tasks was regressed against length of residence in the US. The results showed no significant effect.

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THE CORRELATION OF DISCOURSE MARKERS AND DISCOURSE STRUCTURE

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ABSTRACT

In discourse analysis, connectives have been widely suggested as linguistic markers to indicate the logic linkage between utterances. However, the understanding of the interactions among various kinds of connectives in discourse was limited. The overall pictures of discourse structures, thus, remain unclear.

The purpose of this paper is to propose a method to quantify the overall correlation between different kinds of connectives occurring in coherent texts. My survey of discourse structures is focused on the written text in Mandarin Chinese. Based on this quantitative study, the complexity of the interaction among various kinds of connectives is illustrated. Furthermore, the patterns of connectives which indicate the logic structure in discourse are also revealed.

Recently the correlation method was applied to linguistic elements for measurements of relatedness in dialect affinity. In this study, the numerical measurement of correlation coefficients is used to help us interpret the relations of connectives in coherent texts. Based on the thorough measurement, in my view, a better understanding of the variety of discourse structures can be reached.

1. SCOPE OF THE STUDY

Discourse connectives are regarded as the main linguistic device available for the writer to guide the reader's inferences about the text. Conversely, the reader's interpretation of the logical flow of the discourse is largely based on the distribution of discourse connectives. The logical linkage of a discourse, like the skeleton of a human body, can be illustrated by the use of discourse connectives. Thus, my primary concern in this research is to explore the relationship between discourse connectives and patterns of inference in a coherent plan in order to establish the discourse structure of a text. This study explores the relationship between the contribution of connectives to a higher level of discourse structure.

In order to investigate the overall construction of a discourse, the use of connectives must be investigated. First, one has to consider questions such as, what is a discourse connective?

What is discourse structure? And how does the interaction between connectives reflect the writer's plan and help the reader interpret a fragment of text?

Examples (1) and (2) illustrate some points that will be focused on in the study of discourse connectives. First, in a sentence-based linguistic theory, connectives are known to be used for connecting clauses, phrases, and words. In (1), *keshi* 'but', in the second clause connects two clauses within a sentence: the clause introduced by *keshi* and its preceding clause. However, this analysis is not able to explain *keshi* in (2). On the one hand, *keshi* in clause 4 introduces a new sentence; no clause precedes *keshi* in this sentence. On the other hand, simply connecting the clause preceding of *keshi* (clause 3) and the *keshi*-introduced-clause (clause 4) does not help the reader interpret the whole discourse. Intuitively, in this case, rather than two clauses, larger units of discourse are connected by *keshi*. How large is the scope, then, if *keshi* is used to connect more than two clauses? There must be some general principles of the use of *keshi* that the reader can follow to interpret the discourse. Without knowing the macroclausal (or macrosyntactic) and the clausal (or syntactic)[1] uses of *keshi*, the reader would not know which utterances are connected by *it*.

(1) 1. Ta yiwei ziji   shi tie zuo   de
         he think himself be iron make Nom[2]
         'He thought that he was made of iron,'

     2. keshi ganqing ta ye   hui bing.
         but   actually he too will sick
         'but actually he too could be sick.' (*Luotuo Xiangzi* p.11)[3]

(2) 1. Ta hai qiang da zhe jingshen,
         he still force P energy
         'He was forcing his energy'

     2. buzhuan wei   hun yi tian de   jiaogu,
         not-only because make one day Nom food
         'not only because he need to work to fill his stomach for the day,'

     3. erqie   yao jixu   zhe jichu mai che   de   qian.
         but-also want continue P save buy rickshaw Nom money
         'but also he had to continue saving his money to buy the rickshaw.'

     4. Keshi qiang da   zhe jingshen yongyuan bushi jian   tuodang de   shi:
         but   force keep P energy   always   not   piece proper Nom thing
         'But forcing your energy is never a good thing to do:'

     5. la   qi che   lai,
         pull P rickshaw when
         'when he was pulling a rickshaw'

     6. ta bu neng zhuanxin yizhi de   pao,
         he not able concentrate Nom run
         'he could not keep his mind on the job and run straight along,'

     7. haoxiang lao   xiang zhe xie   shenme,
         like   always think P   some what
         'it was as if he was always thinking of something,'

8. **yue**   xiang
   the-more think
   'and the more he thought'

9. **bian yue**   haipa
   then   the-more afraid
   'the more afraid

10. **yue**   qibuping.
    the-more upset
    'and upset he became.' (*Luotuo Xiangzi* p.10)

Like *keshi*, many other connectives function macroclausally in a coherent discourse. As such, the significance of the function played by connectives can be accounted for only in a discourse-based analysis.

In addition to the function of each single connective in discourse, the second point that will be focused on in this research is the interaction between connectives. For instance, in (2), in addition to the use of *keshi* 'but' in clause 4, other connectives are used to serve different transition functions in the discourse (highlighted in boldface): *Hai* 'still, or again' is used in clause 1; *buzhuan* 'not only', and *wei* 'because' are used in clause 2; *erqie* 'but also' is used in clause 3. In clause 5, *lai* 'at...circumstance' is used; in clause 7, *haoxiang* 'as if' is used; and in clauses 8, 9 and 10, *yue* 'the more...the more' and bian 'then' are used. The interaction of connectives will also be useful to interpret the logical linkage in a larger scope of discourse. For instance, knowing that the connectives *buzhuan* 'not only' and *erqie* 'but also' are used mostly as a pair will help the reader understand that clauses 3 and 4 are closely congruent as a larger statement serving an elaboration function in the discourse.

After knowing the feature of each connective and the interaction between connectives, the construction of the whole discourse in terms of its logical linkages becomes explicit. The third point to be focused on in this research is the construction of the discourse based on the knowledge we obtain on the distribution of discourse connectives.

A quantitative method will be proposed to analyze the discourse connectives used in written texts in Mandarin Chinese. This quantitative study of discourse connectives investigates the interaction of discourse connectives in a communication-based discourse.

2. DATA

In this research, I limited data to the simplest type of discourse, a discourse constituted by a finite sequence of declarative and narrative statements, made by one writer. My survey of discourse connectives and the inferential relation they denoted will be focused on the written text.

The data analyzed are based on *Luotuo Xiangzi* 'The Rickshaw Boy' (1982, first printing in 1936) and *Sishi Tongtang* 'The Yellow Storm' (1983, first printing in 1946 to 1950) written by Lao She, the well-known Chinese twentieth century writer. Lao She's written language is treated as representative of modern Mandarin Chinese (Chao 1968) and is adopted as the data source in various discourse analyses. *Luotuo Xiangzi* and *Sishi Tongtang* are his famous works.

Luotuo Xiangzi in this study is based on the version published by *Sichuan Renmin*

Chubanshe (1982). I transcribed this story into the computer in Pinyin (without tonal indications). *Luotuo Xiangzi* consists of 5,126 sentences, 1,075 paragraphs in print, and a total of 149,040 characters.

The database of *Sishi Tongtang* was established by Fumiyoshi Matsumura between 1986 and 1987.[4] It consists of 27,549 sentences, and 6,201 paragraphs, in a total of 817,000 characters.

3. DISCOURSE MARKERS IN MANDARIN CHINESE

Discourse connective is not a syntactic category; rather, it is a functional term to indicate the logical linkage between utterances. In the study of discourse, although the syntactic category "connective" indeed plays an important role in terms of logical linkage, other syntactic categories such as adverbial and preposition could also play the same role. In Chinese, *guanlian ci* 'relation word' is a particular group of words which are used to connect discourse fragments. The discourse fragments can be of different scopes, such as words, phrases, clauses, sentences and paragraphs. *Guanlian ci* includes expressions in different syntactic categories and has a very similar function as a discourse connective. It has been suggested in Lü (1980:13), and *Hanyu Yufa Xiuci Cidian* (1986:171) 'A Dictionary of Chinese Grammar and Rhetoric' (edited by Dihua Zhang) that *guanlian ciyu* 'relation word/phrase' includes connectives (*lain ci*) and a particular group of adverbials (*fu ci*) and short sentences (*duan ju*) which have the function of connection.

In this study, the discourse connectives include connectives and a particular group of prepositions and adverbials which have the function of connection. Some nouns, verbs, and short sentences which may also have the "function of connection" are excluded in this study. This is primarily because there are many alternatives for the expressions conveyed by the nouns, verbs or short sentences. For instance, *tingdao zhege* 'once hearing it' functions to mark the sequence between the previous action or event and the following utterance. However, this expression is not unique in that there can be other expressions with the same pattern and the same function, such as *xiang daole zhege* 'once thinking of it', *shuodao zhe li* 'once speaking of it', *kandao zher* 'once seeing it' and so on. Other expressions of this sort are also excluded from this study, such as *mingzhidao* 'knowing', *dagaideshu ba* 'generally speaking', *duile* 'it's correct', *xiang bu dao* 'unexpected', *jiashang* 'plus, *jintian* 'today', *zuotian* 'yesterday', *mingtian* 'tomorrow.'

In consideration of the syntactic category involved, I examine the *guanlian ci* 'relation word', *lian ci* 'connective', and *guanxi ci* 'relation word' discussed in Guo (1960), Chao (1968), Lü (1980), Li & Thompson (1981), Okurowski (1986), *Hanyu Yufa Xiuci Cidian* (Zhang 1986), Li (1990), *Zhongguo Yuyanxue Da Cidian* (Chen 1989), Lee (1990), and *Xinhua Judian* (Zhang 1991) in order to give a broader view of discourse connectives in Chinese.

Based on the functions the coherence relations have in discourse, Hobbs (1979) points out that there are four requirements for a successful communication: (i) the message itself must be conveyed; (ii) the message must be related to the goals of the discourse; (iii) what is new and unpredictable in the message must be related to what the listener already knows; and (iv) the speaker must guide the listener's inference processes toward the full intended meaning

1. Additive
    - Unmarked
    - Marked
      - Emphatic (11)
      - Consequence (12)

2. Evaluation (21)

3. Linkage
    - Background
      - Sequence (31)
      - Time (32)
    - Explanation -- Cause (33)

4. Expansion
    - Connective
      - Positive
        - Elaboration (41)
        - Generalization (42)
        - Exemplification (43)
        - Alternation (44)
      - Negative
        - Yielding (45)
        - Contrast (46)
    - Conditional
      - General-condition (47)
      - Only-condition (48)
      - All-condition (49)

Figure 1. A Modified Taxonomy of Coherence Relations

of the message. Corresponding to each requirement is a class of coherence relations which helps the speaker satisfy the requirements. I modified the coherence relations suggested by Hobbs (1978, 1979) and provided them with a more detailed framework so that more proper divisions of inferential patterns are included. In addition, for the ease of data searching and processing, each inferential relation is given a two-digit code as shown in Figure 1. The first digit represents the upper level of the communication taxonomy, and the second digit represents the sub-group. Another task of this research will be to investigate the level of accuracy and completeness of the taxonomy specified thus far.

On the basis of the taxonomy on Figure 1 and the discourse connectives discussed in different studies, in this study Chinese discourse connectives were coded according to their uses and meanings. There are a total of 217 connectives in this study, as listed in Table 1. The first two digits of the code represent the relation group they belong to and the third and fourth digits are the sequential numbers. In the following discussion, a **connective group** will be used to represent the connectives which have the same logical relation, i.e., the first two digits of the code.

Table 1 The Coding of Connectives

1101	hai	1108	fanzheng	1201	jiusuan
1102	ye	1109	shenzhiyu	1202	er
1103	you	1109	shenzhi	1202	conger
1104	geng	1109	shenerzhiyu	1203	zhihao
1105	rengjiu	1110	zai	1204	jieguo
1106	dou	1201	jiu	1205	yizhi
1107	lian	1201	jiushi	1205	yizhiyu

1206	name	3111	disan	4101	budu
1206	na	3112	disi	4101	budan
1207	bian	3113	yibian	4101	buguang
1208	suoyi	3114	jiezhe	4101	bute
1209	yinci	3115	jiner	4101	bujin
1210	yiner	3201	congqian	4101	buzhi
1211	yushi	3201	xianqian	4101	buzhuan
1211	yushihu	3202	yiqian	4102	bingqie
1212	cai	3203	xianzai	4102	shangqie
1213	ze	3203	jinlai	4102	bing
1214	fouze	3204	tongshi	4102	erqie
1215	buran	3205	nashihou	4102	er
1216	gu	3205	dangshi	4103	jiayi
1217	erhou	3206	congci	4103	yiji
1218	yibian	3207	zicong	4105	zaishuo
2101	bucuo	3208	yihou	4106	lingwai
2102	duide	3209	ranhou	4106	ciwai
2103	guobuqiran	3210	houlai	4107	tongyang
2103	guoran	3211	weilai	4108	chule
2106	dangran	3216	qingkuang	4111	hekuang
2106	ziran	3217	zuichu	4111	erkuang
2107	shide	3218	zuihou	4112	ji
2109	zhemeyang	3219	yuanlai	4113	kuangqie
2109	zheyang	3219	yuanxian	4201	zongeryanzhi
2109	zhemezhe	3219	benlai	4201	zongzhi
2110	haozai	3219	yuanben	4202	huanjuhuashuo
2113	kongpa	3220	jizhi	4301	xiang
2115	duiyu	3220	yizhi	4302	bifang
2116	guanyu	3221	shihou	4304	fangfu
2122	yaoburan	3222	zhengdang	4305	liru
2122	buran	3222	zheng	4306	ru
2122	yaobu	3223	jieguyanr	4307	side
2126	zhengshi	3227	dangchu	4308	haosi
3101	diyi	3228	gangcai	4401	huozhe
3102	dier	3228	xianglai	4401	huoze
3103	yibian	3301	weile	4401	huo
3104	yilai	3302	jiran	4402	haishi
3105	erlai	3302	ji	4403	yi
3106	xian	3303	youyu	4404	yaome
3107	yue	3303	jianyu	4405	yuqi
3108	qici	3304	yinwei	4406	ningke
3108	suishour	3304	yin	4406	shuruo
3109	zuihou	4101	budan	4406	buru
	yue	4101	feidan	4406	wuning

4501	suiran	4607	buguo	4707	tang
4501	sui	4608	er	4707	tanghuo
4501	chengran	4609	rengran	4707	tangshi
4501	guran	4610	qishi	4708	wanyi
4501	zongran	4611	buliao	4709	yaoshi
4501	suishuo	4612	kexi	4709	yao
4501	suize	4613	xinger	4709	yaobushi
4502	jinguan	4614	fanzhi	4710	guoran
4503	napa	4615	xiangfan	4710	guozhen
4504	jihuo	4616	dao	4711	zhiyao
4504	jiling	4617	zhishi	4801	zhiyou
4505	jishi	4701	dehua	4802	chufei
4505	jibian	4702	jiashi	4901	bulun
4506	jiushi	4702	jiaru	4901	wulun
4602	keshi	4702	ru	4901	wulunruhe
4603	raner	4703	jiaruo	4902	buguan
4604	queshi	4703	ruruo	4903	fanshi
4604	que	4704	ruguo	4904	zong
4605	fandao	4706	ruoshi	4905	renping
4605	faner	4706	ruo	4905	ping
4606	danshi	4706	sheruo		
4606	dan	4707	tangruo		

4. METHODOLOGY AND ANALYSIS

The correlation coefficient is considered as an indicator of degree of concurrence between connectives, that is, the indicator of the closeness between every two groups. The higher the coefficient value, the closer the connective-groups are associated. Based on this concept, I calculate the correlation coefficients of all connective-groups in each topic continuity, which includes the scope of sentence and the scope of paragraph in print. The scope of sentence is recognized by the use of the full stop punctuation signs: ".", "?" and "!"; and the scope of sentence and the scope of paragraph is recognized by the indentation at thevery beginning of a discourse chunck. [5]

First, all the connectives in Table 1 are searched throughout the text of *Sishi Tongtang*, and all connectives in the text are marked and extracted. For instance, the discourse connectives in paragraph (3) are hihglighted and then extracted as in (4). In (4), one line indicates one sentence. The proposition marking punctuation's like ",", ";", ".", "?", etc. are also extracted for showing the proposition boundaries between the connectives. Connectives which are coded with the same first two digits are considered belonging to the same connective-group.

(3) 1.Guan taitai shi ge da gezi, kuai wushi sui le **hai** zhuan ai chuan da hong yifu, suoyi waihao jiaozuo dachibaor.
"Madame" Guan was a tall woman. She was almost fifty years old but still loved to wear

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2. Chibaor shi ge xiao gua, hongle yihou, Beiping de ertong nazhe ta wan.
"Chibaor is a kind of small squash. After it turned red, the children in Beiping liked to play with it.'

3. Zhege waihao qide xiangdang de qiadang, yinwei chibaor jing ertong rounong yihou, pir biam zouqilai, luchu limian de hei zhongzi.
'This nickname was quite appropriate because after being played with by children, the skin of the chibaor became wrinkled, and the inside black seeds were exposed.'

4. Guan Taitai de lianshang ye you bu shao de zouwen, erqie bizi shang you xuduo queban, jinguan ta hai chafen mohong, ye yanshi bu liao lianshang de zhezi yu heidian.
'Mrs. Guan also had many wrinkles and black spots on her face. No matter how much she powdered and rouged she could not cover up the wrinkles and the black spots.'

5. Ta bi ta de zhangfu de qipai geng da, yiju yidong dou bo xiang Xitaihou.
'Her air was even greater than that of her husband, and each motion and each action was designed to be like the Dowager Empress.'

6. Ta bi Guan xiansheng geng xihuan, ye geng hui, jiaoji; neng yiqi da liang zheng tian zheng ye de maquepai, er hai baochizhe Xitaihou de zunao qidu.
'She liked, even more than Mr. Guan, to cultivate friends and was more capable at this then he. She could at one stretch play mah-jang for two days and two nights and still maintain her loftiness and dignity.' (Sishi Tongtang v. 4, p. 18, paragraph 1)

(4) The coding of discourse connectives in paragraph (6.1):

paragraph 1:sentence 1	,1101hai, 1208suoyi.
sentence 2	3208yihou,.
sentence 3	,3304yinwei 3208yihou, 1207bian,.
sentence 4	1102ye, 4102erqie, 4502jinguan 1101hai, 1102ye.
sentence 5	1104geng, 1106dou 4301xiang.
sentence 6	1104geng, 1102ye 1104geng,,1202er 1101hai.

Second, I counted the frequency of each connective-group in each sentence throughout the entire text. For paragraph (3), as shown in Table 2, in the first sentence, the connective-group 11 (the Emphatic relation in the Additive relations) occurs one time and group 12 (the Consequence relation in the Additive relations) occurs 1 time; group 21 (the Evaluation relation) does not occur; and so on. The frequency of the connective-groups in the other sentences are recorded in the same way.

Table 2 Frequency of Connective-Groups in Sentences 1-6

connective-group coding   11 12 21 31 32 33 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49

sentence		11	12	21	31	32	33	41	42	43	44	45	46	47	48	49
	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	2	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	3	0	1	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	4	3	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0
	5	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0
	6	4	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

Similarly, the connective-groups in the paragraph are also counted. The results are listed in (5).

(5) Frequency of Connective-Groups in Paragraph 1:

connective-group coding	11	12	21	31	32	33	41	42	43	44	45	46	47	48	49
paragraph 1	10	3	0	0	2	1	1	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	0

There are 27,549 sentences in total, and 16,010 sentence have connectives. In terms of the scope of paragraphs, there are 6,201 paragraphs in total, and 6,006 paragraphs have connectives.

Fourteen out of 15 connective-groups actually occurred in the text (the exception was group 42, the Generalization relation). Part of them are listed in Table 4 to illustrate the distribution of connective-groups.

Table 4 An Example of Connective-groups in 6,201 Paragraphs

group coding		11	12	21	31	32	33	41	42	43	44	45	46	47	48	49
paragraph	1	10	3	0	0	2	1	1	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	0
	2	4	1	1	0	0	0	1	0	2	0	0	4	0	0	0
	3	3	3	0	0	1	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	1	0	1
	4	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	5	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	6	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	7	3	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
	8	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	9	0	0	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	10	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0
	11	0	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	12	1	0	1	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	13	2	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	1	0	1	2	0	1	0

Table 3 The Number of Sentences, Paragraphs and the Frequency of
Connectives in *Sishi Tongtang*

The number of sentences:	27,549
The number of sentences containing connectives:	16,010
The number of paragraphs:	6,201
The number of paragraphs containing connectives:	6,006
The frequency of connectives:	33,571

As we compare the data in the scope of sentences (as shown in Table 2), and the data in the scope of paragraphs (shown in Table 4), we find them to have one thing in common. Under both scopes, we can see the tendency for some groups of connectives to cooccur with other groups. For instance, group 11 tends to cooccur with group 12 more frequently than with group 21. In addition, in Table 4, the distributions of connective-groups can also show the linear relation between groups; for instance, when group 11 occurs more in a paragraph, group 12 seems to occur more, and when group 11 occurs less, group 12 seems to occur less as well. The distribution of connective-groups in sentences does not reflect this association. Instead, the information about the presence or absence for each connective-group is more prominent under the scope of sentences.

4.1 The Method of Quantifying

Determining the extent to which variation in one variable is related to variation in another is important in many fields of inquiry. Recently the correlation method was applied to linguistic elements for measurements of relatedness in dialect affinity (e.g., Cheng 1973, 1977, 1986). In this study, the numerical measurement of correlation coefficients are used to help us interpret the relations of connectives in coherent texts. I calculate the correlation coefficients between pairs of connectives.

Pearson's correlation coefficient (Glass & Stanley 1970, Kachigan 1986) is appropriate to show the linear relations of the wider range of continuous data. For instance, to calculate the correlation between connectives *suiran* 'although,' and *keshi* 'but' and the correlation between *suiran* 'although' and *yinwei* 'because' based on the frequency of their occurrences in discourse (a) to (e) in (6a), the procedure is illustrated in (6b). The scope of the "discourse unit" here is not specified; it can represent a clause, a sentence-group or any discourse fragment larger in scope. However, units (a) to (e) all represent the same sort of scope.

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(6-a)

Frequency of the Occurrences

Discourse	*suiran* 'althoug	*keshi'* 'but'	*yinwei* 'because'
a	1	3	0
b	2	4	1
c	0	0	0
d	2	3	2
e	1	1	3

(6-b)

the mean of 'although' = (1+2+0+2+1)/5=1.2
the mean of 'but'   = (3+4+0+3+1)/5=2.2
the mean of 'because'   = (0+1+0+2+3)/5=1.2

r although-but =

$$\frac{(1-1.2)(3-2.2)+(2-1.2)(4-2.2)+(0-1.2)(0-2.2)+(2-1.2)(3-2.2)+(1-1.2)(1-2.2)}{[(1-1.2)^2+(2-1.2)^2+(0-1.2)^2+(2-1.2)^2+(1-1.2)^2][(3-2.2)^2+(4-2.2)^2+(0-2.2)^2+(3-2.2)^2+(1-2.2)^2]}$$

=   0.8727

r although-because =

$$\frac{(1-1.2)(0-12)+(2-1.2)(1-1.2)+(0-1.2)(-1..2)+(2-1.2)(2-1.2)+(1-1.2)(3-1.2)}{[(0-1.2)^2+(1-1.2)^2+(0-1.2)^2+(2-1.2)^2+(3-1.2)^2][(0-1.2)^2+(1-1.2)^2+(0-1.2)^2+(2-1.2)^2+(3-1.2)^2]}$$

=   0.0823

As the result shows, the coefficient of 'although' and 'but,' about +0.87, is much higher than the coefficient of 'although' and 'because,' which is about +0.08. The high positive coefficient shows that when 'although' occurs more frequently, 'but' occurs more frequently, and when 'although' occur less frequently, 'but' occurs less frequently. The low positive coefficient between 'although' and 'because,' on the other hand, shows that the occurrences of 'although' are barely associated with the occurrences of 'because.'

The *Jaccard similarity measure*, also known as the *similarity ratio*, was first proposed by

Jaccard in 1908. It has been extensively applied in numerical taxonomies, especially in the field of ecology and bacteriology (Sneath 1973). In lexicostatistics, the *Jaccard similarity measure* has been employed to measure language relations such as in Cheng (1986). The index of Jaccard is related to the task of determining the **presence or absence** of a relationship between two random variables. A contingency table of the occurrences of two variants can be constructed to illustrate the correlation of two variants. For example, to see the presence or absence of occurrence between connectives *suiran* 'although' and *keshi'* 'but' in one clause, there could be four possibilities:

- the presence of *suiran* and the presence of *keshi* (+,+)
- the presence of *suiran* and the absence of *suiran* (+,-)
- the absence of *suiran* and the presence of *keshi* (-,+)
- the absence of *suiran* and the absence of *keshi* (-,-)

The above four possibilities can be shown in the form of a 2 x 2 tabular arrangement, often referred to as a contingency table, as in the table below. Beginning with the upper left hand cell and moving in a clockwise direction, the four cells of the table correspond to the (+,+), (+,-), (-,-) and (-,+). In this example, the cases where both *suiran*, and *keshi* are present are 40; that means, in 40 discourse units, *suiran* and *keshi* cooccur. Ten cases in which only *suiran* is present; 20 cases in which both are absent; and 15 cased in which *keshi* is present but *suiran* is not.

The correlation of the pair of connectives can be calculated with the *Jaccard's similarity measure*: the cooccurrences of two variants divided by their total occurrences (Gower 1985).[6] As shown in (5.3), S_j shows the proportion of the sum that mutual presence represents. The correlation of *suiran* and *keshi* is calculated as 0.6154.

(8)

$$S_j = \frac{a}{(a+b+c)}$$

he similarity index of *suiran* and *keshi* $= \dfrac{40}{(40+10+15)} = 0.6154$

The coefficients are considered as degree of connective-cooccurrence. The correlation coefficients have values ranging from zero to +1. Unlike *Person's coefficient*, the interpretation of *Jaccard's index* is straightforward: The larger the value, the closer are the pair of connectives. Two connectives are closer in the sense that they cooccur more often than other connective pairs. In the case of connective-cooccurrence in clauses, a high coefficient value suggests that connectives X, and Y are more likely to cooccur in one clause. If X is used, it is very likely that Y is also used. That is, they are used more frequently in a proposition to ice the linkage of an utterance. A low coefficient value, on the other hand, suggests that

(7)

		keshi 'but'	
		+	-
suiran	+	40 (a)	10 (b)
'though'	-	15 (c)	20 (d)

the two connectives are more likely not to occur in the same clause. This indicates that the use of one connective is more independent of the use of the other connective.

To determine which coefficient method is more appropriate in our study of connective cooccurrence, two aspects need to be considered: (i) whether the data are continuous or dichotomous; and (ii) the purpose of the correlation. The data are continuous when they are any whole number. If the data are either 1 or 0 (i.e., present or absent), the data are dichotomous. Notice that in *Pearson's coefficient*, the **frequency** of connective's occurrence is crucial to decide the coefficient's value. For a positively highly correlated pair of connectives, when one connective occurs more frequently in one clause, the other occurs more frequently and when one occurs less frequently, the other occurs less frequently as well. In *Jaccard's index*, the frequency of a connective's occurrence is not as crucial, instead, the **presence** and **absence** of two connectives in the same clause is essential. *Pearson's coefficient* is appropriate to show the linear relations of the wider range of continuous data, while for the absence or presence of two connectives in one record, the *Jaccard similarity measure* is more suitable. The study of the connectives correlation is based on two different discourse scopes: a proposition and a topic continuity. Within these small scopes of discourse, in most cases, if a connective does occur, it occurs only once. Most of the other connectives do not occur at all. Thus, although the distribution of connectives is based on the frequency of their occurrences, it shows the presence and absence information (further illustrated in Section 5.1.2). Since the data is either 1 or 0 in most cases, *Pearson's correlation* will not be able to capture the association between two connectives. Instead, the *Jaccard similarity measure* can capture the cooccurring information better.[7] Unlike the study of connectives, the distribution of the **groups of connectives** based on the scope of a paragraph really shows the frequency of their occurrences, in most cases, not just 1 or 0. In this case, using *Pearson's correlation* to calculate the linear association between two connectives is more appropriate.

To sum up, the *Jaccard similarity measure* is considered more appropriate for the study of connective cooccurrence in a discourse unit smaller in scope, such as propositions and topic continuities, based on the fact that they are basically dichotomous data. On the other hand, *Pearson's correlation* is adopted for the study of connective-groups in a larger scope, paragraphs, based on the fact that the data are continuous and linearly related.

4.2 The Correlation of Connective-Groups in Sentences

The similarity index of the connective-groups in sentences in the entire book of *Sishi Tongtang* are calculated and listed in Table 5. The higher the coefficient, the closer are the pair

of connective-groups. Two connective-groups are closer than other pairs of connective-groups in the way that they cooccur in a sentence more frequently than the other pairs. For instance, connective-group 11 has a coefficient of 0.221 with group 12, 0.028 with 31, and so on.

The highest 10 rankings of the pairs are listed in Table 6. One thing that needs to be pointed out is that the sequence of a pair of connective-groups is not considered in this data processing. For instance, in the pair of group 11 and group 12, the occurrence of a connective which belongs to group 11 can be either preceded or followed by the group 12 connective; once they cooccur in the same sentence, it counts. However, the sequence of connective-groups in a discourse unit is found to be crucial in their modification directions. It will be further discussed in Section 5.4..

Table 5   Correlation Coefficients of Connective-groups in Sentences in *Sishi Tongtang*
(by *Jaccard's Similarity Measures*)

	11	12	21	31	32	33	41	43	44	45	46	47	48
12	.221												
21	.028	.028											
31	.023	.030	.009										
32	.103	.104	.020	.021									
33	.034	.047	.020	.027	.036								
41	.053	.048	.023	.014	.033	.030							
43	.093	.103	.013	.013	.064	.021	.026						
44	.006	.006	.003	.000	.004	.015	.003	.004					
45	.047	.035	.013	.014	.025	.028	.017	.032	.016				
46	.140	.111	.033	.020	.065	.035	.027	.077	.006	.098			
47	.063	.087	.026	.017	.041	.028	.024	.039	.011	.025	.048		
48	.010	.018	.004	.005	.010	.016	.006	.015	.018	.008	.008	.006	
49	.033	.029	.018	.020	.035	.020	.018	.021	.003	.031	.027	.029	.001

4.3 The Correlation of Connective-Groups in Paragraphs

The derived correlation coefficients in the scope of paragraphs are given in Table 7. Although *Pearson's coefficient* ranges from positive 1 to negative 1, in our results, all the coefficients are greater than 0. The positive coefficients indicate that two connective-groups are positively related; namely, when one occurs more in a paragraph, the other occurs more; when one occurs less, the other occurs less. The higher the positive value, the stronger the pair of connective-groups are associated to each other. Table 8 shows the 10 highest ranking pairs of connective-groups.

Table 6 The Highest Ten Ranking of the Correlation Coefficients of Connective-Groups in Sentences

ranking	pair of connective-groups	coefficient value
1	11--12	0.221283
2	11--46	0.140237
3	12--46	0.111423
4	12--32	0.104376
5	11--32	0.103439
6	12--43	0.102879
7	11--43	0.09284
8	45--46	0.098345
9	12--47	0.086678
10	43--46	0.077381

1	11 emphatic -- 12 consequence	(e.g. *ye...jiu* also...then)
2	46 contrastive -- 11 emphatic	(e.g. *keshi...ye* but...also)
3	46 contrastive -- 12 consequence	(e.g. *keshi...jiu* but...and then)
4	32 time -- 12 consequence	(e.g. *shihou...jiu* when...so)
5	32 time -- 11 emphatic	(e.g. *shihou...ye* when...also)
6	12 consequence -- 43 exemplification	(e.g. *jiu...xiang* then...as if)
7	11 emphatic -- 43 exemplification	(e.g. *ye.. xiang* also...or example)
8	45 yielding -- 46 contrastive	(eg.*suiran...keshi* although...but)
9	47 general-condition -- 12 consequence	(e.g. *jiaru...jiu* 'if...then')
10	46 contrast -- 43 exemplification	(e.g. *danshi...xiang* but...for example)

5. IMPLICATIONS

In the study of the correlation of connective-groups, all the connectives which denote the same inferential relation are grouped together. To count the correlation of these connective-groups is then to count the correlation of inferential relations in discourse. Thus, a larger picture of the interaction between inferential relations which are marked by the use of connectives, and interpreted by the language user, becomes explicit.

5.1 Sentence vs. Paragraph

The correlations of connective-groups in sentences and in paragraphs, as shown above, are quite similar. Although the coefficient values under the scope of paragraphs is greater than the similarity index derived under the scope of sentences due to the different formulas used, the degrees of closeness indicated in the pairs of connective-groups are generally the same. Compare the highest ten ranking coefficients on both sides, regardless of the slight differences in the ordering, eight out of ten are identical. An implication drawn from this similarity is that discourse connectives as a linkage device are consistently applied by the writer to construct a coherent text no matter whether the text is a sentence long or as long as a paragraph. A paragraph is simply a "larger size" sentence; and the sentence is the smallest unit of a coherent text.

Table 7 Correlation Coefficients of Connective-Groups in Paragraphs in *Sishi Tongtang*
(by *Pearson's Correlation Coefficients*)

	11	12	21	31	32	33	41	43	44	45	46	47	48
12	.559												
21	.197	.218											
31	.171	.222	.083										
32	.422	.465	.135	.183									
33	.258	.322	.128	.122	.205								
41	.295	.325	.122	.065	.171	.148							
43	.328	.319	.048	.073	.242	.111	.086						
44	.120	.127	.020	.047	.099	.065	.057	.034					
45	.280	.281	.072	.106	.181	.136	.120	.127	.087				
46	.448	.437	.202	.147	.308	.194	.211	.248	.114	.327			
47	.280	.360	.168	.118	.220	.158	.154	.122	.055	.146	.262		
48	.183	.208	.040	.068	.099	.088	.040	.109	.083	.096	.117	.062	
49	.245	.267	.097	.086	.213	.147	.157	.117	.046	.155	.196	.143	.058

Table 8 The Highest Ten Ranking of the Correlation Coefficients of Connective-Groups in Paragraphs

ranking	pair of connective-groups	coefficient value
1	11--12	0.558516
2	12--32	0.465162
3	11--46	0.447638
4	12--46	0.436788
5	11--32	0.421536
6	12--47	0.359919
7	11--43	0.327704
8	45--56	0.327052
9	12--41	0.324987
10	12--33	0.322232

1	11 emphatic -- 12 consequence	(e.g., *ye...jiu* also...then)
2	32 time -- 12 consequence	(e.g., *shihou..jiu* when...so)
3	11 emphatic -- 46 contrastive	(e.g., *ye...keshi* also...but)
4	12 consequence -- 46 contrastive	(e.g., *jiu...keshi* so...but)
5	32 time -- 11 emphatic	(e.g., *shihou...ye* when...also)
6	12 consequence -- 47 general-condition	(e.g., *jiaru...jiu* if...then)
7	11 emphatic -- 43 exemplification	(e.g., *ye...xiang* also...for example)
8	45 yielding -- 46 contrastive	(e.g., *suiran...keshi* although...but)
9	41 elaboration -- 12 consequence	(e.g., *erqie...jiu* moreover...then)
10	33 cause --12 consequence	(e.g., *yinwei..suoyi* because...so)

As discussed in Kuo (1992), in Chinese, there are other pieces of evidence to show that it is the "sentence," not the "paragraph," which is the smallest unit of discourse developing a central topic. The study of correlations in sentences and paragraphs further supports this hypothesis.

5.2 Pedagogical Implication

In addition to the implication discussed above, the correlation values of connective-groups can be used for other purposes. First, concerning language teaching, the ranking of the coefficients provides us with a prioritized list for textbook and material arrangement. In language teaching, connective words are considered essential vocabularies for language learners because they represent the logical linkages between utterances. From the distribution of connectives, readers can pick up the logical flow in discourse easily. And the most efficient way to learn a connective is to learn what other words or patterns this connective usually goes with. For each connective group, the coefficients show the specific degree of closeness with other groups. For instance, to learn how to use contrast connectives, one may want to know how they are used in various situations. From the coefficients index (Table 5), repeated below, we can see that the contrast connectives (46) have higher coefficients with emphatic (11) (with the value of 0.14), consequence (12), (0.111), and yielding connectives (45), (0.098) than other groups. Thus, it may be important to arrange the text material according to the prioritized list.

To teach a particular connective, for instance, *keshi* 'but', teachers can arrange materials according to the prioritized list derived by the correlation of *keshi* 'but' (code 4602) with other connectives as discussed in Chapter 5. For illustration, *keshi*'s highest 20 correlation companions are listed below. For instance, with 1102 *ye* 'and also' the correlation is 0.0232. Teachers can also go further into the running text to show the exact use of *keshi* in the real discourse.

5.3 Reconfirming the Taxonomy of Coherence Relations

Another significance of the coefficients is to reconfirm our taxonomy of coherence relations. Recall that in our theoretical framework, the first task in a successful communication is that "the message itself must be conveyed" and that the Additive relation is used to achieve this task. According to our linguistic knowledge, the Additive relation includes two major logical relations: the Emphatic relation, and the Consequence relation. As the results show, group 11's (additive—emphatic) closest companion is group 12 (additive—consequence) with a coefficient of 0.221. The comparatively high coefficient value of the Emphatic and the Consequence groups reconfirms this taxonomy. Actually, the pair of "emphatic" and "consequence" also has the most frequent occurrences among all the other logical pairs. This suggests that to convey the message itself is actually the most essential step in communication, especially in a narrative

Table 9 The Coefficients of the Contrast Group (46) and th eOther Groups in *Sishi Tongtang*

	em-phatic	conse-quence	evalu-ation	sequence	time	cause	elabo-ration	exempli-fication	alter-nation	yield-ing	genera l-c.	only -c.	all-c.
	11	12	21	31	32	33	41	43	44	45	47	48	49
46	.140	.111	.033	.020	.065	.035	.027	.077	.006	.098	.048	.008	.027

text.

5.4 The Modification Direction of The Inferential Relations

Furthermore, from the distribution of pairs of connectives, it is shown that the sequence of the connectives is crucial. Each inferential relation holds between two adjacent discourse fragments. The discourse fragments may consist of more than one proposition. When an inferential relation holds between two adjacent discourse fragments, the sequences of these two fragments are not always flexible. Li (1990) classifies 116 common-used *quanlian ci* 'relations word' in terms of their syntactic positions into four types: Type A *quanlian ci*'s can only occur in the first clause; Type B can only occur in the second clause; Type C can repeat-edly occur in different clauses; and Type D can only occur between two clauses. The examples

Table 10 The Highest 20 Coefficients of Connectives *Keshi* 'but' (Coded as 4602) and the Other Connectives in *Sishi Tongtang*

	1102 *ye*	1101 *hai*	1106 *dou*	1103 *you*	1207 *bian*	4301 *xiang*	1206 *name*	3203 *jinlai*	3304 *yinwei*	3203 *xianzai*
4602	.0232	.0223	.0168	.0128	.0103	.0093	.0084	.0071	.0065	.0064

	1202 *er*	4904 *zong*	1104 *geng*	4304 *fangfu*	3221 *shihou*	3107 *yue*	4112 *ji*	1201 *jiu*	1209 *yinci*	4307 *side*
4602	.0062	.0059	.0059	.0050	.0049	.0047	.0046	.0038	.0035	.0033

is provided below in order to illustrate the four types:[8] (Li, 1990:356)

(9)   Type A: Ta budan   hui   Yingwen, ye   hui   Fawen.
          he not-only know   English   but-also know French
          He knows not only English, but also French.'

     Type B: Wo renshi ta,   danshi bu da   shou.
          I   know him but   not very familiar
          'I know him, but not very well.'

     Type C: Yaome ni   qu, yaome wo qu, kuai   jueding.
          either   you go or   I   go quickly decide
          'Either you go or I go; make up your mind quickly.'

     Type D: Zuotian   wo jin   cheng mai le ji   ben shu,   lingwai, hai qu kan le yi   wei
pengyou.
               yesterday I enter city   buy P some C   book   besides also go see P one C   friend
               'I went to the city yesterday to buy some books; besides, I also visited a friend.'

In this study, I emphasize the directions of modification of each connective-group instead of the syntactic position of each single connective. Each group of connectives involves certain tions in modifying the other discourse fragments. I will call this phenomenon the prin-

ciple of Adjacency and further illustrate it below.

For some groups, the discourse chunk marked by the connectives tends to modify only its preceding discourse fragment. For some other groups, the inferential relation holds between the discourse fragment in which the connective occurs and the one following it. For some other groups, the discourse fragment either preceding or following the one marked by the connective can be related to. The modification directions of each inferential relation are illustrated in Table 11. A and B both represent a discourse fragment. Discourse fragment A includes the discourse chunks of different lengths. These can be as small as a proposition, or as large as a complex topic continuity. The discourse connective occurs in either A or B. R represents the inferential relation marked by such a connective. The directions of modification between A and B can be presented in two ways: (i) the fragment containing the connective modifies its preceding fragment, or (ii) the fragment containing the connective modifies its following fragment. When the inferential relation of Emphatic (11), Consequence (12), Sequence (31), Exemplification (43), Alternation(44), or Contrast (46) holds between two discourse fragments,

Table 11 The Modification Directions of Inferential Relations

	inferential relation / direction of modification	R ⌐A⌐→B	R ⌐→A B
11	B emphasizes A		yes
12	B is the consequence of A		yes
21	A (B) is the evaluation (or comment) of B (A)	yes	yes *
31	A indicates the sequence of information to B		yes
32	A indicates the time information to B	yes	
33	A (B) is the cause of B (A)	yes *	yes
41	B is the elaboration of A	yes	yes *
42	A (B) is the generalization of B (A)	yes *	yes
43	B is the exemplification of A		yes
44	A is the alternation of B		yes
45	A (B) is yielding to B (A)	yes *	yes
46	B is in contrast to A		yes
47	A (B) is the general-condition of B (A)	yes *	yes
48	A (B) is the only-condition of B (A)	yes *	yes
49	A (B) is the all-condition of B (A)	yes *	yes

* : this case occurs more frequently

the one which is marked by the connective is preceded by the one which is modified. For the relations of Time (32), the discourse fragment modifies its following fragment. For other relations, both directions are possible. However, one of the modification directions is more frequent than the other.

In general, discourse connectives have two functions in discourse: the **transition-marking** function and the **inference-marking** function. On the one hand, they are used to mark the connection between the previous and the coming messages and at the same time to introduce the new message to the reader; this is their transition-marking function. The purpose of the connective-groups' modification directions is to provide us with a general picture of the direction of transition-marking. Based on it, the connection between the discourse fragment marked by discourse connectives and its preceding or following discourse can be predicted.

Besides the transition-marking function, on the other hand, discourse connectives are used to mark the particular inference procedure and guide the reader's inference toward a better understanding of the previous message; this is their inference-marking function. For some discourse connectives, the transition-marking function is more apparent than their inference-marking function; for other connectives, it is the other way around; and for some connectives, both ways may occur. When a connective is used to mark the transition function and when it marks the inference function is not crystal clear. Their functions can only be roughly reflected in the taxonomy of inferential relations noted in our previous discussion.

6. CONCLUSION

The numerical measurement of correlation coefficients can be used for different linguistic purposes. In this study, I use the correlation of connective-groups in sentences and in paragraphs to demonstrate four points. First, the similarity between two sets of results reconfirms the hypothesis that in Chinese, the complex sentence represents a topic continuity. Second, the correlation is useful for language teaching purposes. Third, the correlation result reconfirms our taxonomy of coherent relations. And fourth, and most importantly, from the distribution of pairs of connective-groups, the modification direction for the inferential function denoted by each connective-group can be generalized. This generalization, the Adjacency principle, tells us the direction of the scope covered by discourse connectives. It will be the base for establishing the discourse structure in terms of logical linkages.

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NOTES

[1] This term is defined by Chao (1968). Unlike intrasentential syntactic conjunctions, macrosyntactic conjunctions function intersententially.

[2] Abbreviations in the glosses: P = particle, Nom = nominalizer, C = classifier, Q = question marker.

[3] Examples are taken from Lao She's (1982) *Luotuo Xiangzi*.

[4] The text database of *Sishi Tongtang* was created by Fumiyoshi Matsumura. For the details of the creation see Matsumura (1992). However, I am wholly responsible for the indexing process and the data application.

[5] In this paper, a sentence (or a sentence-group, 'ju qun' in Chinese) represents a basic topic continuity. And paragraph 'duanluo' represents a complex topic continuity. See Kuo (1994) for more discussion.

[6] The cases that both variants are absent (-,-) are excluded in *Jaccard's similarity measure*. In her study of dialect classification, Tu (1994) compares *Jaccard's similarity measure* with phi coefficients and *Ellegard's correlation* based on the quantitative method discussed in Cheng (1986). In her discussion, *Jaccard's similarity measure* is preferred over phi coefficients and *Ellegard's correlation* based on the facts that the former "excludes (0,0), does not derive infinity, and treats (+,+), (+,-) and (-,+) equally" (Tu 1994). In this study, phi coefficients and *Ellegard's correlation* are not considered based on this same reason.

[7] In the calculation, when the frequency of occurrences is 1 or greater than 1, the present index '1' is marked; when no connective occurs, the absent index '0' is given.

[8] Li (1990) is in Chinese. The translation of these example is mine.

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COMPARATIVE RHETORIC: AN INTEGRATION OF PERSPECTIVES

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ABSTRACT

This paper addresses the diversity of approaches to comparative rhetoric and proposes that analysis can be enriched by incorporating an ethnography of communication perspective. First, contributions to comparative rhetoric from the three fields of second language acquisition and teaching, mainstream rhetoric, and text linguistics are discussed, focusing on differences in definition, scope, and focus as well as on the major limitations and biases of each approach. Next, an ethnography of communication perspective is outlined. It is suggested that a comparative, functional emphasis that incorporates rich specification of contextual factors from internal cultural perspectives can significantly enhance validity of interpretation. Finally, practical and theoretical applications of an ethnography of communication approach to comparative rhetoric are discussed.

INTRODUCTION

One reason contrastive rhetoric has captured the interest of a great variety of scholars is that it invites—even requires—interdisciplinary consideration. As in the parable of the three blind men feeling different parts of an elephant and perceiving very different characteristics, analysts of a text are also likely to make very different discoveries about the text depending on the perspective they take. In this paper we will discuss some of the diversity among approaches to analysis within what may be broadly considered contrastive rhetoric, as well as some of the limitations. We will then focus on the aspects of analysis which we believe may be enriched by an ethnography of communication perspective. One aspect of analysis which the ethnography of communication brings into primary focus is function, considering a text and its production as a socially situated communicative event—considering text as praxis (see Duranti, 1988). Exploring this perspective thus seemed particularly appropriate for a conference on pragmat- Moveover, including an ethnography of communication perspective on contrastive rheto-

ric is important for establishing the validity of analysis and interpretation of contrasting texts, no matter what other perspectives are taken. And finally, we would like to strengthen the case for applying an ethnography of communication perspective to language learning and teaching.

We have become acutely aware of the interdisciplinary interest in this topic over the past few years through interactions with our own students. The first author has developed and implemented a graduate-level course titled Comparative Rhetoric within the English Department at the University of Arizona. Students who enroll are majors not only in second language acquisition and teaching, but in rhetoric and composition, literature, and folklore, as well. They come to the topic with different bodies of background knowledge, with different expectations and assumptions about what a course on comparative rhetoric should entail, and with different interests and needs for application. The mixture has been stimulating and challenging, both to them and to us, and has contributed to our views of the state of the art of contrastive rhetoric.

DEFINITION, SCOPE, AND FOCUS OF DISCIPLINARY PERSPECTIVES

Before presenting our views on the value of enhancing contrastive rhetoric with perspectives from the ethnography of communication, we will discuss contributions from the fields of (1) second language acquisition and teaching, (2) rhetoric, and (3) text linguistics. Disciplinary differences involve very basic issues of definition, scope, and focus. Most who come from second language acquisition and teaching begin with Robert Kaplan's definition of contrastive rhetoric, as he first outlined it in 1966 and has elaborated it since (e.g., 1988). Kaplan extended the notion of *contrastive* as it had been established in the theory of contrastive analysis developed by Charles Fries, Robert Lado, and others, a theory which was still widely accepted at that time. He made some major transformations in the contrastive analysis model in the process, as indicated in diagrams (1) and (2):

(1) Contrastive Analysis (e.g., Lado, 1957)
$$NL - TL$$

Simply stated, *contrastive analysis* called for the comparison of learners' native language (NL) and target language (TL), with the claim that such contrast would predict and explain errors that would be likely to occur in the process of second language learning. Focus was on production of the language forms or structures. The assumption was made that only two languages were involved.

(2) Contrastive Rhetoric (Kaplan, 1966)
$$(NL) \quad L2 \quad TL$$

Kaplan's early model of *contrastive rhetoric* involved the application of the procedure of error analysis to rhetorical forms or structures in the learners' production of second language (L2) text, as perceived and interpreted by native speakers of that language. The assumption of contrastive analysis that comparison of the target language and native language would predict learners' errors was transformed into the assumption, illustrated in (2), that learners'

errors would reflect transfer from the native language. Another transformation involved a shift from the almost exclusive focus on oral production in traditional contrastive analysis, to the almost exclusive focus in early contrastive rhetoric on the production of written text. This shift was motivated largely by concerns for improving the academic writing skills of international students who were entering U.S. universities, but also as a reaction against the commonly held view within linguistics that speech is primary and writing is but a secondary representation (Kaplan, 1988, p. 289).

The basic assumption of both contrastive analysis and contrastive rhetoric regarding native language transfer was brought into question by concepts of interlanguage theory, as represented in diagram (3):

(3) Interlanguage Theory (e.g., Nemser, 1971, Selinker, 1972)
NL $[IL_1 \ldots IL_n]$ TL

One basic notion advanced in interlanguage theory was that the learner goes through a series of approximative stages in the process of acquiring the target language, and that errors made during this process often cannot be explained solely by transfer from the native language. Hinds (1983) and others thus criticized Kaplan's model, which based analysis on texts written by non-native English speakers, by suggesting that such IL structures may not reflect the native-language organization at all, but constitute merely a kind of "comparative IL research" (Péry-Woodley, 1990). An important dissertation by Chantanee Indrasuta (1987) at the University of Illinois, under the direction of Alan Purves, involved a triangulated analysis of writing by Thai students in Thai, Thai students in English, and American students in English. She and others indeed proved that inferring native language rhetorical structures from interlanguage production is overly simplistic. Kaplan's more recent work indicates that he would generally agree (e.g., 1988; see also Grabe & Kaplan, 1989), although his original assumption is still reflected in much of the recent work in this field. Interpretation of the sources of interlanguage rhetorical production is also complicated by the fact that many learners are multilingual and multiliterate.

While there are thus problems and disputes with regard to the use and interpretation of the term *contrastive*, definitions and conceptions of *rhetoric* are also radically divergent. A very sharp break is found between approaches in contrastive rhetoric as they have developed over the past 25 years or so in the second language field, and the mainstream traditions of rhetorical analysis as they have developed since the (literally) classical work of Plato and Aristotle. In the field of rhetoric itself, analytical focus has not been on the learner of language, but upon its master; and (in its classical origins, at least) not on the writer, but on the orator. Etymologically, the term *rhetoric* was the adjective form of *rhetor*, or *speaker*. Compare, for example, the definitions listed under (4) (emphasis ours). The first three come from the field of rhetoric, while the final two come from the field of second language acquisition and teaching.

(4) "The Aristotelian text known as the *Rhetoric* is concerned with the *art* of persuasive *oratory*" (Corbett, 1954, p. xiii).

Rhetoric is "that *art* or *talent* by which discourse is adapted to its end"

(Campbell [18th century], as cited in Kinneavy, 1971, p. 216).

Rhetoric is the study of the *orator* and civic leader "who . . . used *artful speech* to make [cultural] values effective in the area of public affairs" (Halloran, 1982:246, as cited in Roland, 1990, p. 36).

vs.

What does contrastive rhetoric look at? Clearly, the objects of study are *written* texts . . . " (Purves, 1988, p. 17).

Contrastive rhetoric is "the comparison of the *writing* of students and accomplished writers from different linguistic and cultural backgrounds" (Conner & Lauer, 1988, p. 138).

Although mainstream rhetorical analysis has contrasted strategies across time and between modes of speech and writing, its scope of analysis is typically the skilled use of language within what is now called the same *discourse community*. This scope is represented by the model in (5):

(5) Rhetorical Analysis (DC_1 = discourse community; R_i = individual rhetor; R_n = one or more audience members)

$$DC_i$$
$$R_i \longrightarrow R_n$$

In this model, a discourse community is defined by similar social characteristics and/or academic or professional orientations, as well as by a shared set of rhetorical norms and conventions. The concept extends the older notion of audience to consider broader social and political contexts of communication, analogous in many respects to the concept of *speech community* as it is applied in the ethnography of communication. A discourse community for rhetorical analysis is generally considered to be much more homogeneous than a speech community, however. Among our colleagues within the English Department at Arizona, for instance, those in the Rhetoric program consider themselves to be members of a different discourse community from those in Creative Writing, those in Creative Writing to be members of a different discourse community from those in American Literature, and so forth. For analytic purposes, the construct is perhaps not entirely unlike the notion of the infamous ideal speaker/ hearer in linguistics (Chomsky, 1957). Just as an analytical emphasis on the ideal speaker/

hearer diverts attention from important sociolinguistic phenomena, too much emphasis on the homogeneity of discourse communities can mask diversity. Moreover, even for rhetorical analysis completely within the domain of a single language and culture, "The sameness that the concept [of discourse community] suggests often obscures the variety, conflict, and anti-conventionalism that exists in most actual discourse communities" (Rafoth, 1990, p. 140).

In applications of this model to the teaching of composition to native English speakers, the concept of discourse community is used "To point out the highly convention-bound nature of writing and learning to write, and to urge that the business of teaching and learning this conventional activity be made more transparent by considering openly the costs and benefits of conforming to conventions" (Rafoth, 1990, p. 142). We will return to the potential appropriateness or inappropriateness of this notion for second language instruction later in the paper.

Another characteristic of the work of mainstream professional rhetoricians is that considerable attention is given to the effects of particular rhetorical strategies on audience. These effects are represented with arrows in (5). In other words, analysis focuses not only on the production strategies of the speaker or writer, but also on the interpretation and response of the listener or reader (which in turn provides feedback for production), and on the joint construction of contexts and meanings. This model thus differs from most work in contrastive rhetoric not only in considering native speakers of the same language and members of the same social group, but in putting focus on the effect or function of rhetorical strategies along with description of their form or structure. This latter distinction between rhetorical analysis and contrastive rhetoric is neither absolute nor trivial, but of central concern as we consider rhetoric in relation to pragmatics and second language teaching/learning.

Another disciplinary perspective which maps onto the subject matter at issue is that of text linguistics. Both at its inception and after a quarter century of evolution, most who have worked on contrastive rhetoric have considered their task to be largely one of describing linguistic structures beyond the sentential level. The two quotations from Kaplan in (6) emphasize identification with text linguistics, while the quotation from van Dijk, who is well known for his contributions to the model, defines this disciplinary point of view:

(6) "Given the increasing interest in text linguistics, of which contrastive rhetoric is probably a subset . . . " (Kaplan, 1988, p. 275)

" . . . contrastive rhetoric belongs to the basic tradition of text analysis." (Kaplan, 1988, p. 278)

"Textual dimensions [of analysis] account for the structures of discourse at various levels of description. Contextual dimensions relate these structural descriptions to various properties of the context, such as cognitive processes and representations or sociocultural factors . . . " (van Dijk, 1988, p. 25).

Van Dijk spoke for a tradition in discourse analysis which makes a distinction between text and context, with text linguistics quite naturally claiming text (not context) as its domain. Although text analysis is an important component of discourse analysis in general, locating ..stive rhetoric within this tradition contributes to the contradictory notions of rhetoric that

we find when we look across disciplines. While there is brief mention of factors such as audience considerations and rhetorical context features in Grabe and Kaplan (1989), for instance, these generally have not yet been integrated with analyses of second language text production. On the other hand, they are central to both definition and process of rhetorical analysis. They are also central in current approaches to discourse analysis (e.g., Duranti & Goodwin, 1992).

The product-oriented perspective on rhetoric as represented by Kaplan and van Dijk in (6) contrasts with the perspective of rhetoricians as represented by the quotations in (7):

(7) "Although a product usually results from rhetorical activity—namely, a speech— rhetoric is primarily an art of process" (Corbett, 1954, p. vii).

"The study of the art of rhetoric should begin where the study of grammar leaves off" (Hughes & Duhamel, 1966, p. 3).

" . . . both classical and modern rhetoric deals with the persuasive dimension of language use and, more specifically, with the account of those properties of discourse that can make communication more persuasive. These rhetorical structures of discourse . . . are not themselves linguistic or grammatical" (van Dijk, 1988, p. 28).

Corbett summarizes the classical perspective when he defines rhetoric as "an art of process," and Hughes and Duhamel represent the mainstream principle in modern rhetoric that the "art of rhetoric" is outside the bounds of the study of grammatical form. We have included the quotation from van Dijk in (7) to illustrate that he, too, considers rhetoric distinct from textual linguistic structures in a very significant respect, although he has also stated that "rhetorical structures of discourse . . . are [in part] also based on grammatical structures" (the insertion "in part" is ours). While rhetoricians have disagreed for centuries over whether to limit rhetoric to the study of persuasive language use or to include a broader range of communicative functions, the focus has consistently been on process, and the central concern beyond the bounds of grammar.

One solution to the contradictory concepts represented by the term *rhetoric* in the domains of contrastive rhetoric and mainstream rhetoric might be to reduce both to their common denominator, and to suggest that contrastive rhetoric should merely be renamed *comparative discourse analysis* to better capture its scope and process. While this label would be most appropriate for characterizing the analysis of divergences in second language production of texts from target language norms, as well as for comparing a very broad range of communicative phenomena across languages and cultures, it fails to capture the focus which rhetoric (with its traditional meaning) is intended to convey: the skilled and artful use of language.

The characterizations we have made so far of contrastive rhetoric (as it is currently defined in second language acquisition and teaching) vs. rhetorical analysis (as it is defined in mainstream rhetoric) are summarized in Table 1.

TABLE 1

CONTRASTIVE RHETORIC	RHETORICAL ANALYSIS
Primary Subjects:	
L2 learners	Skilled, artful speakers/writers
Mode:	
Writing	Speech/writing
Task:	
Error analysis	Strategic analysis
Focus:	
Structure/product	Function/process
Text over context	Text in context
Composition of speech/discourse communities:	
Heterogeneous	One homogeneous discourse community
Cross-linguistic	
Perspective of interpretation/response:	
Native speaker of target language	Audience in same discourse community
Theoretical goal:	
Description/explanation of L1 influence on L2	Description/explanation of effect
Pedagogical application:	
Teaching structures in L2	Teaching art in L1

While we can find exceptions on both sides in particular studies, the major limitations of analysis from the perspective of contrastive rhetoric are (1) that it generally neglects pragmatic considerations of "the interaction between communicative codes and the contexts of their use" (Duranti & Schieffelin, 1987, p. i), and (2) that it typically fails to establish the validity of interpregets the grease" in English vs. "The bird that sings loud gets killed" in Chinese.

Moreover, the concept of situational context also goes well beyond the concept of rhetorical context as it is usually applied in rhetorical analysis. Situational context includes much richer specification of participants in a communicative event than does the traditional rhetor/audience notion, for instance, particularly in terms of their role-relationships, and their respective rights and responsibilities. The relationship of rhetor and audience must be viewed as dynamic involvement, and rhetorical strategies considered in terms of their role in shaping and changing that relationship. These issues add additional requirements for adequate analysis. Even when the text under consideration is a printed product which cannot change in physical form, constructivist views stress the audience's changing perception of text and author as part of a dynamic communicative process (Duranti & Goodwin, 1992).

To provide another example of what is involved in specifying and interpreting situational context, students in the Comparative Rhetoric course were asked to analyze advertisements which would be considered particularly effective from different cultural perspectives. In the ethnographic tradition, they looked for patterns of contrast across both verbal and nonverbal modes, and in visual as well as printed media. One salient pragmatic contrast between Ameri-
nd Japanese persuasive strategies which they noted was the American imperative to "buy

this" versus the Japanese strategy of developing pleasant sensory images within a scene which is subsequently associated with the product. Text analysis alone would miss the most important dimension of contrast. Another difference students noted was the explicit comparison of one product with another in American advertisements on television (e.g., Pepsi vs. Coke), and the rejection of this strategy by Japanese. Appropriate analysis of this phenomenon would need to be situated not only in an understanding of historical trends in both countries, but in an understanding of the type of responsibility Japanese versus U.S. television stations accept for the content of advertising which they broadcast, the loyalty which is expected of them by their customers, and how such loyalty is defined. For example, because the same Japanese television station is likely to air commercials for competing products (or at least might wish to be able to accept advertising from the other company in the future), to explicitly criticize one customer in favor of another would be unwise business practice in Japan.

Some other aspects of situational context which are likely to be relevant for comparative rhetorical analysis may be framed by the following questions:

What technology is utilized in different cultures for dissemination or broadcasting of diferent rhetorical genre? We have seen dramatic changes in political speaking styles in the United States, for instance, with the shift from large public gatherings and radio to the medium of television. These changes are clearly illustrated in comparative analyses of strategies used by John Kennedy versus Ronald Reagan. Another change is seen as commercials on television are starting to print more information on the screen, knowing that viewers tend to mute them.

What social roles in each culture require particular rhetorical skills? Within the United States, highly developed (and systematically different) speaking skills are expected of preachers and politicians, but do not constitute an expectation for professors or engineers. Preachers must sound inspirational, and politicians must project sincerity and solidarity according to culture-specific norms of interpretation. Although professors are not required to develop specific speaking skills, they are expected to have mastered the technical writing conventions of academic publication.

How does distribution of differing rhetorical styles and skills relate to the distribution of power in a society? Some styles require special interpretive skills, which preserves limited access to some domains. Philips (1982) claims that this is the case for legal cant, for instance, and Prelli claims that scientists have cultivated language differences to "draw sharp contrasts between themselves and `nonscientists' to enhance their intellectual status and authority vis-a-vis the `out groups,' to secure professional resources and career opportunities, to deny these resources and opportunities to `pseudo-scientists,' and to insulate scientific research from political interference" (1989, p. 52). And for generations, Chinese writers learned established conventions for writing eight-legged essays as a prerequisite for obtaining prestigious positions with the civil service.

A final question will help illustrate the point that situational context must be richly specified. How do rhetorical patterns relate to political thought and activity? Bloch (1974) has argued that political language should be studied as a preliminary to studying politics; that the intentions of speakers may be inferred by the implications of the type of speech they use. His hypothesis is that when a speech event is formalized, there are fewer options for participants; thus, more social control is exerted. In formalizing a situation, the propositional content, the logic, is essentially removed.

The interest we have in the relation of rhetorical strategies to social stratification and political organization in different cultures does not merely reflect relatively recent develop-

ments in sociolinguistics and discourse analysis. The Aristotelian conception of rhetoric was also essentially social in nature. Halloran (1982) described the "cultural ideal" in the classical tradition as the orator and civic leader "who understood all the values of this culture and used artful speech to make those values effective in the area of public affairs" (1982, p. 246).

We would now like to return to the issue of validity. A major problem with establishing validity in interpretation is that cultural differences in rhetorical style are likely to be plotted onto dimensions which imply value judgments and privilege the English-speaker's point of view. Most analysts taking a contrastive rhetoric approach would compare the American and Japanese strategies of advertisements on a dimension of "directness-indirectness," with the American strategy described as more "direct." This is almost as ethnocentric as Kaplan's original (1966) characterization of the logical development in an English L1 essay as a "straight line" versus spiral and other configurations in differing rhetorical traditions. The notion that an imperative form in syntax is more direct in pragmatic intent and effect than evocation of satis-fying sensory experiences is itself a cultural artifact. From a different cultural point of view, there may be reasons to consider appeals to sensory experiences as more direct than those which require verbal mediation. We must also consider the possibility that U.S. English speak-ers' notions of directness are not valued in certain cultures or are not viewed as important categories/dimensions of analysis or evaluation within those cultures.

Such a relativistic perspective should also be incorporated into comparative rhetorical analysis. The methodology and terminology of contrastive rhetoric (including the application of error analysis to L2 texts) has given us a deficit model in which it is difficult to be objective. For instance, our Japanese and Chinese students, in order to relate to the existing literature in contrastive rhetoric and to use the language and concepts of that discourse community, adopt and use the negative terms that Americans have used to describe "what's wrong" with their rhetorical styles from the viewpoint of the American audience and analyst: "nonlinear," "circu-lar," "slow to get to the point," "indirect," "lacking cohesive ties," "digressive," etc. To take a somewhat Whorfian view, they are being forced into a colonialist deficit perspective rather than a multiculturalist difference perspective. There is clear need for ethnosemantic study in this field, to determine how different rhetorical structures and strategies are perceived and labeled by their users. In one Comparative Rhetoric class, this approach was applied by asking Japanese students to characterize the usage that Americans dichotomize as "direct" vs. "indi-rect" from their own cultural perspective. It furthers our goals of cultural relativism in analysis to be aware that the Japanese term which characterizes "direct" American style can best be translated as "rude."

We should be especially aware of the hazards of dichotomized categories applied across languages and cultures. In addition to "direct" vs. "indirect," some commonly used dichoto-mous terms in contrastive rhetoric are "group-oriented" vs. "individual oriented," "linear" vs. "nonlinear," and "reader responsibility" vs. "writer responsibility." Part of the problem such polarities present is that they imply culturally biased value judgments. An additional problem is that analysts tend to write about these constructs in quantitative rather than qualitative ways. The notion of "reader vs. writer responsibility" provides a good example, since this is a widely accepted dichotomy first posited by Hinds (1987) to characterize differences between Japanese and English. There is a danger of ethnocentric bias or stereotyping and oversimplification in claim that the reader in Japan makes more inferences than the reader in the United States.

Rather, because all human communication involves inferencing, description should focus on the kinds of inferences that one is expected to make in the two speech communities.

One of the most important contributions of an ethnography of communication perspective is thus not only to situate interpretation of communicative events within the context of their host speech communities, but to require an internal (or native) point of view as a criterion for validity of interpretation. We have represented this perspective on comparative analysis with the model in (8). Just as valid interpretation of rhetorical strategies in SC_x requires an internal point of view, the same holds for SC_y. The arrows in (8) represent these internal points of view.

(8) Ethnography of Communication (SC = speech community)

$$\boxed{\; \uparrow\!\!\blacktriangleright \mathbf{SC_x} \;} \qquad \boxed{\; \mathbf{SC_y}\!\blacktriangleleft \;}$$

Questionable interpretations of the reasons for differences in rhetorical strategies abound in the published literature on contrastive rhetoric, primarily because analyses do not adequately provide and account for an internal point of view. For instance, the organization of appeals in Chinese discourse which requires justification of a request prior to its explicit verbal formulation has been interpreted as a non-confrontational style reflecting a desire to maintain harmony/solidarity and to avoid potential interpersonal conflict (see Young, 1982). Native speakers of Chinese, on the other hand, are more likely to attribute the sequencing in appeals to the "logical" need for prior motivation of a request. In both American and Chinese communicative events, the failure of an addressee to accept justifications presents similar potential to create interpersonal disharmony. Although the rhetorical organization is indeed different, the reported inference that a different pattern reflects different cultural values is of very questionable validity if it is made from an external point of view. This is akin to the invalid conclusion reached by many of our students that English speakers in the U.S. are cold, uncaring, or hypocritical when they ask "How are you?" but don't really want to know. Both analysts and language learners need to be able to distinguish between differences which indeed have a reason that can be inferred with cultural knowledge and experience and those which can be attributed solely to social and linguistic convention. When they are cultural outsiders, analysts must be open to all possibilities, and utilize data collection and analytic methods which will compensate for unavoidable biases.

The comparative view we have taken thus far, and the one which is represented in (8), focuses on the speech community as a basic unit for analysis, on the way rhetorical structures and strategies are organized, realized, and situated within that unit, and it takes as its primary analytic task describing and accounting for similarities and differences in patterning within different speech communities. Unlike the definition of discourse community for mainstream rhetorical analysis, there is no expectation from an ethnography of communication perspective

that a speech community will be linguistically homogeneous. While one can focus on a single age range, or a single gender, or a single profession, an integrated ethnographic approach would require relating such subgroups to the social and cultural whole, with its full complement of roles. There is also no expectation that rhetorical skills and arts will be equally distributed in a speech community, but that judgments of what is appreciated as skilled and artful use of language, and of who is perceived to speak or write effectively, are made relative to the whole. As we indicated earlier, such perceptions will be relative to the roles the speaker/writer is accorded in that society, along with other social factors.

Comparative analysis of skilled language use in different speech communities can already claim a solid body of scholarship, ranging from Yamuna Kachru's (e.g., 1988) culturally-situated analysis of writing conventions in Hindi and English, to Johnstone's (1986) analysis of the rhetorical situation and persuasive style of argumentation in Farsi and English, to Tsuda's (1984) analysis of Sales Talk in Japan and the United States. Although some of these works were labelled "contrastive rhetoric," they are notably different from the model proposed by Kaplan (1966) by focusing not on the description/explanation of L1 influence on L2, but on different usage and situational contexts of use in different speech communities, from a bilaterally internal perspective. These analyses satisfy criteria for valid comparative rhetoric.

CROSS-CULTURAL COMMUNICATION

Finally, the model in (9) represents an extension which must be made to include cross-cultural communication within our domains of analysis.

(9) Cross-Cultural Communication

Participants in an intercultural event must still be viewed from the internal perspective of their respective speech communities, but the dynamic interaction between them requires additional dimensions of analysis. Speakers' or writers' production will be influenced not only by the conventions of their native languages and cultures, but also by the knowledge they have of the addressees' language(s) and culture(s), by their knowledge of the resources of the linguistic code(s) selected, and by the expectations and attitudes they hold and develop in the process of interaction. The external arrows in (9) indicate the same considerations of interac-
construction of meaning and reciprocal negotiations as we find in rhetorical analysis which

is conducted within the same discourse community (as in diagram 5).

In extending an ethnography of communication perspective to cross-cultural communication, we are drawing on the work of John Gumperz (e.g., 1984, 1992) on conversational inferencing. As with contrastive rhetoric, however, most work on conversational inferencing across cultures has involved error analysis and has focused on *mis*communication (e.g., Gumperz, 1982; Michaels, 1986). For purposes of comparative rhetoric, we also need to consider and be able to account for skilled, artful, and successful cross-cultural communication. Skilled multilingual rhetors do not necessarily merely adopt the rhetorical structures and strategies used by native speakers of the linguistic code they select, any more than they necessarily merely transfer the structures and strategies of their own native language(s) and culture(s), even if they are fully conscious of the differences. Rather, multilinguals have a wider range of options for accomplishing communicative goals, including a capacity for style shifting and style creation or blending (depending on desired audience effect) which exceeds monolingual competence (Kachru, 1987; Hanks, 1986).

Also, the speaker or writer may use aspects of language as a personal or national identity badge, even when essentially producing the linguistic code of the addressee, or when using an international language which is spoken natively by neither. The work in accommodation theory (e.g., Beebe & Zuengler, 1983; Coupland, Coupland, Giles & Henwood, 1988) is highly relevant to the analysis of these phenomena, since it examines convergence and divergence as rhetorical strategies for establishing and negotiating ideational or interpersonal positions or relationships. Highly creative features must also be accounted for, and here we approach rhetorical processes as art.

APPLICATIONS AND IMPLICATIONS

Finally, we would like to briefly address some of the potential practical and theoretical applications of the perspective that we have presented. For practical applications to second language teaching, we distinguish between the development of receptive and productive competence, emphasizing that goals for each should differ. For second language learning, we suggest that students can expand their rhetorical competence not only through reading and writing, but through engaging in comparative rhetorical analysis.

First, for the development of receptive competence in a second language, an ethnography of communication perspective can be profitably brought into the classroom for the study of second language texts. Teachers employing this perspective would emphasize the necessity of taking situational context into account in interpreting the meaning of texts. Specifically, in studying authentic readings or recordings, teachers can lead students to integrate textual/linguistic analysis with inquiry about related social and cultural phenomena. They can do this by encouraging students to ask many relevant background questions and to investigate contextual issues in a variety of ways. We are not suggesting that either teachers or students develop encyclopedic cultural knowledge, but that both teachers and students might develop an increased sensitivity to the importance of context in interpreting texts and to the range of questions which should be asked. We also believe that the body of authentic written and oral texts

made available to students for study should include non-native as well as native models of skilled and artful use of language.

An ethnography of communication perspective has some important implications for developing productive as well as receptive competence in an additional language. Perhaps most important, some understanding of comparative rhetoric is crucial for teachers in cultivating a difference rather than a deficit mentality toward student writing. Knowledge of the ways in which rhetorical structures and strategies differ across cultures will help teachers better understand the reasons for students' "deviations" from native speaker/writer norms. Understanding why students might make certain choices in constructing texts can lead teachers to develop more tolerant and appreciative attitudes toward "pluralistic rhetorics" (Land and Whitley, 1989) while, at the same time, recognizing and supporting students' real needs and desires to operate effectively within certain discourse communities. Further, when teachers promote their students' receptive competence by using texts that embody skilled and artful use of the second language by proficient non-native speakers, implications for productive goals naturally follow. As Yamuna Kachru and others have pointed out, there is no necessary reason why goals for production in a second language need to be the norms of its native speakers. In fact, there are some instances in which native-like competence can be counterproductive.

On the students' side, many second language rhetorical conventions can be consciously learned, especially when they are wanted and needed for participation in a particular discourse community. Much current theory emphasizes the acquisition of genre knowledge through active participation in a discourse community. Berkenkotter & Huckin (1993), for example, claim that "knowledge of academic discourse . . . grows out of enculturation to the oral and written `forms of talk' of the academy," rather than through explicit teaching (p. 485-486). For some second language learners, however, doing rhetorical analysis is probably the best learning procedure. Such analysis might involve comparative rhetorical analysis across languages and cultures or it might involve analysis comparing structures and strategies in effective texts across discourse communities, situations, audiences, and so on, within a particular culture. Regardless of the specific comparison, sophisticated rhetorical analysis aimed at developing advanced rhetorical competence is just as applicable for L2 students who are approaching skilled and artful use of the second language as it is for native speakers. Here again, the corpus of texts used for analysis should include non-native, as well as native, models. In summary, we believe that the process of comparative rhetoric—comparative rhetoric that incorporates an ethnography of communication perspective—is often more relevant for teaching and learning than are the products of others' analyses.

An ethnography of communication approach to comparative rhetoric should contribute not only to teaching and learning, but to theory building as well. While we believe that error analysis is a very useful procedure in study of the nature of rhetorical phenomena in interlanguage, the influences of native language and culture cannot be identified without direct understanding of the rhetorical structures and strategies of that speech community. Nor can they be interpreted in a valid manner without an internal perspective. To understand those strategies used in cross-cultural communication which cannot be attributed to first language transfer, we require more knowledge of the processes that multilinguals use in interactional negotiations as well. While much research has been conducted in recent years on the strategies by speakers with limited proficiency (with strategy being defined in a compensatory sense;

e.g., Tarone & Yule, 1989) we know far too little about skilled and artful cross-cultural communication, and about how such skills are acquired. Such knowledge would make a significant contribution to adequate second language theory-building. In our discussion we have alluded to several different theories of language processing and analysis which go beyond textual considerations. An implicit point we hope to make in doing so is that we should not attempt to be theoretical purists in our approach: an integration of perspectives is needed for understanding and explaining such complex phenomena. The contribution of an ethnography of communication perspective for both practical and theoretical goals is toward descriptive adequacy and validity of interpretation.

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THE DISTRIBUTION AND FUNCTION OF RELATIVE CLAUSES IN LITERATURE

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ABSTRACT

Contrastive data from literary narrative, expository writing, and oral conversation reveal functional motivations for the distributions of relative clauses in two types of literary narrative, those from first-person narrators and those from third-person narrators. It is shown that frequencies of relativization on subjects of transitive verbs (A-relatives), subjects of intransitive verbs (S-relatives), and direct objects of transitive verbs (P-relatives) rely upon genre constraints particular to literary narrative broadly and first-person narrative vs. third-person narrative narrowly. Our genre-based functional explanation of the distribution of relative clauses both supplements and in part contrasts with Fox's (1987) functional and cognitive explanation of the distribution of relative clauses in conversation. We show that high exophoric reference in a text, whether literary or otherwise, tends to produce high frequencies of P-relatives. High informativeness in a text, especially in expository texts, tends to produce high frequencies of S-relatives. A-relatives, which create relevance for new NPs through intratextual anchoring, are preferred only in narrative that lacks the functional motivation for high frequencies of P-relativization—high exophoric reference.

INTRODUCTION

The primary goal of this study is to explore the distribution and function of relative clauses in literary narrative, taking as our initial data two first-person narrated American novels: Jim Lehrer's 1992 *Short list* (*SL*) and Stephen McCauley's 1988 *The object of my affection* (*OA*). Data from conversation, two written expository works, six more novels, and twenty short oral narratives are also briefly considered for comparative purposes. This study is a pilot for a more ᵃᵐᵇⁱᵗious multi-genre analysis of relative clauses. On the basis of a sample of 1000 relative

clauses from literary narrative, 273 relative clauses from expository discourse, 118 relative clauses from oral narrative, and descriptions of 92 relative clauses from conversation, we have identified tendencies in the distribution and function of relative clauses, especially within literary narrative, that will be the point of departure for further investigation. In particular, we argue that Barbara Fox's 1987 description of the functions of relative clauses in spoken conversation holds generally for literary relative clauses, but that there are additional complexities in the form, distribution, and function of literary relative clauses necessitated by the context and structure of literary narrative.

In a collection of over 100 relative clauses gathered from transcripts of spoken conversation, Fox discovered equal numbers (46 each) of relativizations on subjects and relativizations on direct objects (the latter termed "P-relatives"). Fox excluded from consideration relativizations on all oblique objects, a practice which we follow in this study in order to facilitate comparison of figures for narrative and expository relative clauses with those for Fox's conversational relative clauses. In a P-relative, as in (1), the head of the relative clause is the direct object of a transitive relative-clause verb:

> P
> (1) The man [I hired yesterday] is late today.[1]

Of the 46 relativizations on subjects in Fox's conversational corpus, 36 were relativizations on subjects of intransitive verbs ("S-relatives") and 10 were relativizations on subjects of transitive verbs ("A-relatives"). In an S-relative, as in (2), the head is the subject of an intransitive relative-clause verb:

> S
> (2) There's a woman [who's a mechanic] on my block.

In an A-relative, as in (3), the head is the subject of a transitive relative-clause verb:

> A
> (3) The man [who bought the cocker] told me where to find a springer.

Fox (1987, pp. 861-62) argues that the overriding functional purpose of all three types of relative clauses in her conversational data is to make an NP referent which is new to the discourse relevant within that discourse. Fox finds two particular functions for P-, S-, and A-relative clauses: 1) to introduce a referent by describing it and thereby make it relevant to the discourse and 2) to introduce a referent by anchoring it to a referent already established and thereby make it relevant to the discourse.[2] The first function is realized primarily by S-relatives. As Fox and Thompson argue in a more detailed examination of the relative clause strategies first explored in Fox 1987, intransitive verbs used as characterization "name habitual attributes or properties or describe features of their subjects" (1990, pp. 306-07). Although there are additional complexities in the form and function of the S-relatives in our literary data, characterization is one of their recognizable functions, as in (4):

(4) It had leather seats like these, and it had <u>a rear window</u> [that went up]
$$S$$
    (*SL*, 1992, p. 52).

The second relative-clause function, of anchoring new referents to referents already established in the discourse, is realized by transitive relative clauses, either A-relatives or P-relatives. Again, although there are additional complexities in the form and function of A-relatives and P-relatives in our literary data, anchoring is one of their apparent functions, as in (5) and (6):

(5) A WM-24 (white male, twenty-four years old) had broken into
    <u>a substantial house</u> outside Nowata . . . .
         A   **ANCHOR**
    "<u>The woman</u> [who owns <u>the house</u>] is a big ear-splitting Baptist."
    (*SL*, 1992, pp. 29-30)

(6) <u>She</u> sat up on the sofa and raked her hair off her forehead with her
                              P   **ANCHOR**
    vermillion fingernails.   <u>The eight silver bracelets</u> [<u>she</u> always wore]
    slid to her elbow with a clank. (*OA*, 1988, p. 10)

In (5), the A-relative anchors <u>the woman</u> to <u>the house</u>, already mentioned in the previous discourse. In (6), the P-relative anchors <u>the eight silver bracelets</u> to <u>she</u>, a pronominal referent in the previous discourse.

Fox (1987, pp. 860-61) argues that the small number of A-relatives (10) and the large numbers of S-relatives (36) and P-relatives (46) in her conversational data result from the typical information flow status of A (subject of a transitive verb), S (subject of an intransitive verb), and P (object of a transitive verb) arguments.[3] Fox finds Du Bois's (1985;1987) hypothesis of a Preferred Argument Structure especially helpful in explaining the pragmatic nature of the skewed distributions of S-relatives, P-relatives, and A-relatives in her data. Du Bois (1985, pp. 347-50;1987) argues that the preferred argument structure in Sacapultec (and probably cross-linguistically) is for each clause to have only one lexical NP. For intransitive clauses, the lexical NP is the S. For transitive clauses the lexical NP tends statistically to be the P, while the A tends to be a pronominal. Figure 1 illustrates these tendencies.

Figure 1. Du Bois's Preferred Argument Structure
S
Lexical NP + Intransitive Verb

A   **P**
Pronoun + Transitive Verb + Lexical NP

Fox, in fact, found in her data that 87% of the As in transitive main clauses were pronomi-
nal while 77% of the Ps were lexical NPs (1987, p. 863). Fox argues that relativization on
lexical NPs, then, leads to a predominance of S-relatives and P-relatives over A-relatives in
conversational English.

On the basis of an initial corpus of 250 literary relative clauses, with equal numbers taken
from *SL* and *OA*, we have found that the distributions and functions of P-relatives, S-relatives,
and A-relatives in literature present several interesting complications that are indicative of
general discourse/pragmatic differences between oral and written communication, as well as
suggestive of discourse/pragmatic structures peculiar to narrative. In the next section, we give
an overview of the distributional differences between Fox's conversational data and our liter-
ary data from *SL* and *OA*. Subsequent sections 1) discuss the forms and functions of the P-
relatives, S-relatives, and A-relatives in *SL* and *OA*; 2) compare these results to the distribution
and functions of relative clauses in written expository discourse, as well as six other novels and
twenty short oral narratives, and draw conclusions from the distributional data about the func-
tions of relative clauses in literature; and 3) consider the influence of general discourse/prag-
matic functions *vs.* information flow in determining the frequencies of P-, S-, and A-relatives
in various genres.

Distributional Differences between Conversational and Literary Data

Consider the frequency distributions of P-relatives, S-relatives, and A-relatives in Fox's
conversational data as compared to the data from our initial two novels, SL and OA:

Table 1: *Frequency of P-, S-, and A-Relatives in Conversational and Literary Data*

	Conversations	Novels
P-Relatives	46 (50%)	84 (34%)
S-Relatives	36 (39%)	88 (35%)
A Relatvies	10 (11%)	78 (31%)
TOTALS	92	250

If the distribution of relative clauses in literary narrative were the same as that in conver-
sation, we would expect out of a total of 250 literary relative clauses for 125 to be P-relatives,
98 to be S-relatives, and only 27 to be A-relatives. However, as Table 1 shows, there are fewer
P-relatives and S-relatives in the literary narratives, and considerably more A-relatives, than
we would expect.

Supporting our figures is a 1975 study of relativization strategies in both literary and
expository discourse by Keenan, which reports percentages for relativizations on subjects (with-
out distinguishing between S-relatives and A-relatives) and for relativizations on direct objects
that are approximately the same as those found for our literary data in Table 1, with about twice
as many subject relatives (S-relatives and A-relatives) as P-relatives. Keenan concludes that

the higher percentages of subject relatives reflect a cognitive principle of subject primacy. It is this "subject primacy" that Fox's high numbers of conversational P-relatives challenge. Fox speculates in a footnote that the frequency of P-relatives in her own conversational data and Keenan's written data "may differ . . . precisely because anchoringIdisplaying the relevance of what you are saying to what has been said before, and to the co-present participantsIholds much less significance in writing than it does in conversation, and is accomplished in very different ways" (1987, p. 861). We argue here that anchoring, as well as characterization, of referents is just as important in literary narrative as it is in conversation and that relative clauses in literary narrative are just as important for those functions as they are in conversation. Relative clauses could be said to be used in "different ways" in literary narrative and conversation, but the differences in use are as much the result of pragmatic function and narrative voice as they are the result of differences between spoken and written language per se.

Forms and Functions of P-, S-, and A-Relatives

After describing the forms and functions of P-, S-, and A-relatives in both conversation and literary narrative, we will return in the next section to offer a possible explanation for the frequency differences in the distribution of the three types of relative clauses in conversation and novels, as well as other genres and sub-genres.

The forms and functions of P-relatives.

There are three formal patterns in Fox's P-relative data that prove interesting in comparison with the P-relatives in our literary data. First, Fox (1987, p. 860) reports that her P-relatives "tend to use a very low-transitivity, semantically bleached verb," as in the P-relative in (7) with *have* as the main verb:

    · **P**

(7) This man [who I have for linguistics] is really too much.
    (Fox, 1987, p. 859)

In fact, in Fox's data, have occurs as the main verb in 75% of the P-relatives when the head of the relative clause serves as the subject of the main clause. (Figures for relative clauses with heads serving in other grammatical relations within the main clause are not provided.) Fox (1987, p. 860) comments that have is an ideal verb for establishing a "non-specific" relation between an NP new to the discourse and a participant (lexical NP or pronoun) already known in the discourse. Of the 84 P-relatives examined from our two novels, however, only 6 (7%), three from each novel, use have as their main verb. The relations established by P-relatives in our literary texts are overwhelmingly specific, using verbs such as loved, received, kept, wore, felt, tell, carried, and bought, as in 8:

    P

(8) The neurobiologically disordered person [I'd accosted at the party] turned

out to be as I'd expected. (*OA*, 1988, p. 25)

The greater lexical specificity of the relative verbs in our literary data accords with Halliday's (1979) observation that written texts have "high lexical density" and spoken language "low lexical density." Lexical density is measured not only by words per clause but also by the specificity of lexemes.

A second formal characteristic of Fox's spoken P-relatives is that the As within them tend to be pronominal in keeping with the general function of spoken P-relatives, which is to anchor an NP new to the discourse to a participant already established in the discourse and thereby make the new NP relevant. This is also a characteristic of the majority of P-relatives in our literary texts, as in (8) above with a first-person singular pronominal A. Table 2 gives the frequency distributions for pronouns and lexical NPs as As in Fox's (1987, p. 863) conversational data and our two novels.

Table 2: *Frequencies of Pronominal and Lexical-NP As in* Conversational and Literary P-Relative Clauses

	Conversations	Novels
Pronoun	43 (93%)	76 (90%)
Lexical NP	3 (7%)	8 (10%)
TOTALS	46	84

There is a slight tendency for the literary relative clauses to have fewer pronominal As and more lexical NP As, but the tendency is not statistically significant ($G^2 = .48$).

A third formal characteristic of Fox's P-relatives is that their pronominal As tend to be exophoric (first or second person) rather than anaphoric (third person). Without giving exact figures, Fox reports that the 43 pronominal As in her P-relatives are "usually 1st or 2nd person, but occasionally 3rd person" (1987, p. 860). As Table 3 reveals, 61% of the pronominal As in our literary P-relatives are first or second person.

Table 3: *Frequencies of Exophoric and Anaphoric* Pronominal As in Literary P-Relatives

	Novels
1st, 2nd	46 (61%)
3rd	30 (39%)
TOTAL	76

We will discuss in a later section the significance of this distribution as well as some possibly related important differences in the frequencies of P-relatives between our two novels.

Thus, lexical specificity aside, literary P-relatives are formally and pragmatically the same as conversational P-relatives in using primarily pronominal As for anchors to make new

NPs relevant to the ongoing discourse.

The forms and functions of S-relatives.

There are four characteristics of conversational S-relatives mentioned by Fox (1987, p. 859) that are of interest to us. First, they are stative, with <u>be</u> as the main verb in 43% of their occurrences. Second, 68% of the head NPs are indefinite. Third, the referent is introduced in the discourse for the first time by means of the S-relative. And fourth, the S-relative character- izes the new referent. The following exemplifies each of these S-relative characteristics:

S
(9)   and he's got <u>a spring</u> [that comes way up] (Fox, 1987, p. 859)

The data from our two novels show literary S-relatives to be frequently highly stative as well. The main verb is <u>be</u> in 31% of the S-relatives, with the difference between the occurrence of <u>be</u> in conversational data and literary data being significant only at $p < .05$ ($G^2 = 5.84$). The heads of S-relatives in our novels, like Fox's spoken S-relatives, tend to be indefinite (70%), with no significant difference between the written and spoken data. Consistent with the ten- dency toward indefinite heads and stativity, literary S-relatives also tend to introduce partici- pants for the first time to the discourse and to characterize them, as in (10):

S
(10)   He said that he had <u>a Smith Corona Typewriter</u> [that was ancient,
        upright, and in working order]. (*SL*, 1992, p. 41)

In spite of these four similarities between the spoken and the written discourse, there is one additional complexity in the form and function of literary S-relatives. Fox reports no examples of S-relatives with either oblique or possessive pronouns in her conversational cor- pus. But in our literary data, 15 (17%) of the 88 S-relatives have either an oblique pronoun or a possessive pronoun, as in (11) and (12):

S
(11)   I reached out my arm to try and get my balance and slammed into <u>the man</u>
        [who was walking in front of <u>me</u>]. (*OA*, 1988, p. 30)

S
(12)   I picked out <u>a man</u> standing by the window dressed in a Lacoste shirt
        and cordovan loafers [who seemed compatible with <u>my</u> sexual preference
        if nothing else]. (*OA*, 1988, p. 24)

In these and other examples like them, it is doubtful that one can clearly distinguish between characterization of the head for the purposes of making it relevant in the discourse and anchoring the head to an already established participant to make it relevant to the discourse. s in these S-relatives with oblique and possessive pronominals are usually stative and

hence characterize the new referent, while the pronouns serve as anchors. Pending investiga-
tion of larger written and spoken corpora, we may tentatively conclude that the S-relatives with
anchoring oblique or possessive pronominals—still relatively infrequent since they constitute
just 17% of our S-relatives—result from the greater lexical density of writing.

The forms and functions of A-relatives.

The A-relatives in our literary data do not tend overwhelmingly to use a pronominal P to
anchor the new A head to the discourse. Only 35% of our A-relatives have a pronominal P, as
in (13), or some other pronominal, as the possessive in (14):

<div align="center">A</div>

   (13) There was <u>an explosion</u> [that miraculously blew <u>him</u> free from the
       plane]. (*SL*, 1992, p. 19)

   (14) Her efforts at dressing up all her second hand clothes to look as if
<div align="center">A</div>
       they'd been designed expressly for her was <u>another quirk</u> [that raised
       skeptical eyebrows among <u>her</u> political friends]. (*OA*, 1988, p. 14)

However, if one includes definite lexical NPs in the figures, fully 63% of the Ps in A-
relatives are definite. This figure approaches the 70% definite P figure Fox found for her oral
data; however, recall that her corpus included only 10 A-relatives, so the figures could be non-
representative of larger samples.

Fox comments of her 10 A-relatives that they have the "function of linking the current
utterance to the preceding discourse, using the object of the relative clause as the bridge" (1987,
p. 859). Although 63% of the Ps in our literary A-relatives are definite, it does not seem to be
the case that the new NPs are linked, or anchored, solely by means of the P. Rather, the new
NPs are made relevant to the discourse by what one might call intratextual propositional an-
choring, in which the relative clause proposition repeats, paraphrases, or adds to propositions
of the narrative.

Note first the almost exact repetition of a previous statement in the A-relative in (15):

   (15) <u>The plant would employ 150 to 175 Oklahomans, so</u> it was considered a
       vital addition to Panhandle Process, Inc., which sounded important and
       scientific enough. It wasn't until I got there and actually saw the name
<div align="center">A</div>
       on the side of <u>the new factory</u> [that <u>would employ 150 to 175 Oklahomans</u>]
       that I realized the company initials were C.R.A.P. (*SL*, 1992, p. 6)

In (15), the VP of the A-relative repeats exactly the entire main-clause VP of the previous
underlined sentence, not just the P. Whatever the implicatorial effect of repeating the VP is, <u>the
new factory</u> as an NP is made relevant through intratextual reference to a narrative proposition,
not simply through anchoring the head to a previously mentioned P.

The A-relative in (16) does not repeat a previous VP exactly, but merely invokes the previous narrative by collapsing into a paraphrase previous clauses:

(16) I was sitting at the makeshift table on the opposite side of the room
reading the World War I diaries of Siegfried Sassoon and eating a fried-
egg sandwich. . . . Nina's lower lip was thrust out but I couldn't tell
from her expression if she was genuinely upset, so I used my standard
tactic for dealing with anything unexpected: I pointed out a water stain
on the hem of her dress and passed her half the sandwich. ...
                         A
I was obviously the kind of person [who could offer a friend in need
nothing more substantive than half a fried-egg sandwich]. (OA, 1988, pp.
9-12)

In (16), the A-relative makes the kind of person relevant by mentioning a fried-egg sand-
wich as well as paraphrasing the previous narrative. As in (15), although one of the NPs within
the A-relative has been mentioned before, it is the entire relative-clause proposition that serves
to make the head relevant to the discourse.

A third type of A-relative found in our literary data does not repeat or paraphrase previ-
ous propositions, but instead mentions new information which is merely relevant to surround-
ing discourse, as in (17):

                          A
    (17) The idea that someone [who'd spent a good portion of her life crusading   for
reproductive rights] should be unintentionally pregnant sounded crazy   to me. (OA, 1988,
p. 10)

In (17), the narrator does not mention a previously mentioned NP or proposition but
merely provides ironic information about the referent of the head of the relative clause given
that she has just informed him that she is "unintentionally pregnant."

A fourth type of A-relative in our data provides neither background information, such as
repeated propositions or paraphrased previous propositions, nor new information, such as an
evaluatory comment on foregrounded narrative. Instead, this fourth type advances the narra-
tive itself in the relative clause, as in (18):

(18) After four years of being on display at the funeral home, the body was
                 A
sold to a man [who rented it out to carnivals]. It went all over the
country, to towns large and small. (SL, 1992, p. 26)

As one might expect, the first type of A-relative|exact repetition|and the fourth
type|advancement of the narrative|are the rarest types of A-relative functions in our data.
Bernardo argues that the rarity of "next event" (i.e. advancement of the narrative) relative
clauses in oral data is a result of the general function of relative clauses|"to construct a 'pic-
of the noun phrase referent at a particular point in time in the narrative" (1979, pp. 549-

50). The implication of Bernardo's argument is that relative clauses that advance the narrative are rare because they not only assert new information about the head but also "picture" the referent with information that is not, in a sense, true of the referent in the world of the narrative until it is mentioned.

The influence of genre on the distributions of P-, S- and A-relatives.

Table 1 showed that there are fewer P-relatives and S-relatives and considerably more A-relatives in the two novels than one might expect from their distribution in conversation. As our contrastive data sets stand now, there are a number of differences between the forms and functions of relative clauses in literary narrative and conversation that could be contributing to the different distributions of the three types of relative clauses in these two genres. Although the two data sets differ functionally and formally in that one set is oral and conversational, the other written and narrative, there are also two important similarities between them. First, as one might expect, the conversations are thick with first-person references; both novels we have discussed to this point have first-person narrators. Second, both natural conversation and literature are relatively non-informative, as Biber (1992a, p. 153;1992b) has shown in frequency counts of highly referential devices such as relative clauses across several genres including conversation and fiction. Certainly, there are other genres such as first-person oral narrative that we have yet to investigate; but if we supplement the figures in Table 1 with distributional figures from expository discourse (Finegan and Besnier's 1989 *Language*, Blakemore's 1992 *Understanding utterances*) and novels with third-person narrators (Lodge's 1984 *Small world*, Donaldson's 1992 *The gap into conflict*) as in Table 4, we gain further insight into the distributional patterns of relative clauses across genres.

Table 4: Frequencies of P-, S-, and A-Relatives in Conversations, First-person Narratives, Third-person Narratives, *and Expository Writings*

	Conversations	First-person Narratives	Third-person Narratives	Expository Writings
P-Rels	46 (50%)	84 (34%)	64 (26%)	67 (24%)
S-Rels	36 (39%)	88 (35%)	81 (32%)	128 (47%)
A-Rels	10 (11%)	78 (31%)	1 05 (42%)	78 (29%)
TOTALS	92	250	250	273

In the absence of more varied samples, one cannot speak with confidence of statistical significance. Nonetheless, in this pilot sample it appears that there are three distinct patterns of distributions of P-, S-, and A-relatives across these four genres.

First, expository discourse (in our sample 273 relative clauses from two introductory books on linguistics) exhibits significantly higher percentages of S-relatives than conversation or literary narrative, whether first- or third-person. There may turn out to be a significant difference between narrative and conversation that more data will reveal, but for now we can conclude that this split in the distribution of S-relatives reflects the difference in informative-ness between expository writings on the one hand, and conversations and narratives on the

other, as is illustrated in Figure 2:

Figure 2. Continuum of Functional Informativeness and Frequency
of S-Relatives

Relatively Informative	Relatively Non-Informative
Expository Writings (47%)	Conversations (39%) 1st-person Narratives (35%) 3rd-person Narratives (32%)

The stativity of S-relatives makes them ideal for the definitions and characterizations that are prominent in informational discourse, such as in example (19) from a linguistics text:

$$S$$
(19) Spanish has a voiceless velar fricative [x], [which also exists in many
$$S$$
other languages,] and a voiced velar fricative [ ], [which is less
common]. (Finegan and Besnier, 1989, p. 45)[4]

A second pattern revealed in Table 4 is a scale of frequency of P-relatives, with conversation at one end of the scale and third-person narrative and expository writing at the other end. First-person narrative patterns between these extremes. The data suggest that the scale of P-relativization correlates with what seems to be a scale for frequency of first- and second-person reference. Recall that Fox found that 93% of the anchoring As in her conversational P-relatives were pronominal and that her pronominal As within P-relatives were "usually 1st or 2nd person, but occasionally 3rd person" (1987, p. 860). Biber (1992b, p. 235) has found that exophoric pronouns (first- and second-person) are about three times as numerous in conversation as in fiction (undifferentiated in his samples for first- and third-person narrators). He has also found exophoric pronouns to be about three times as numerous in fiction as in humanities academic prose, a category within which we consider our expository linguistics texts to fall. Thus, as Figure 3 shows, higher percentages of P-relativization correlate with the amount of exophoric reference in the text.

FINAL

Figure 3. Continuum of Exophoric Reference and Frequency of P-Relatives

Exophoric   Anaphoric
Reference ————————————————————— Reference

Conversation (50%   1st-person   3rd-person
                    Narrative (34%)   Narrative (26%)
                                             Expository
                                               Writing   (24%)

P-relativization, then, favors anchoring the relative-clause head to an exophoric pronoun and will be used relatively frequently in discourse which is highly exophoric. The 16% difference in frequency of P-relatives between conversation and first-person narrative is interesting in that it appears at first as if it also might correlate with a difference in exophoric reference between the two genres; however, the percentage for first-person narrative in Figure 3 is not completely reliable because of a large difference between the initial samples from the two novels *Short list* and *Object of my affection*. *Short list*, in fact, has what seems to be an unusually low percentage of P-relatives, as shown in Table 5, which also includes for comparison relativization figures for four more first-person narrated novels: Jay McInerney's *Story of my life*, Richard Ford's *The sportswriter*, Nicholson Baker's *The mezzanine*, and Larry McMurtry's *Some can whistle*:

Table 5: *Frequencies of P-, S-, and A-Relatives in Six First-person Literary Narratives*

	P-rels	S-rels	A-rels	TOTALS
Short list	20 (16%)	52 (42%)	53 (42%)	125
Object . . .	64 (51%)	36 (29%)	25 (20%)	125
Story of my life	61 (49%)	30 (24%)	34 (27%)	125
Sportswriter	50 (40%)	42 (34%)	33 (26%)	125
Mezzanine	65 (52%)	27 (22%)	33 (26%)	125
Some can whistle	51 (41%)	46 (37%)	28 (22%)	125

Note from Table 5 that although the P-relative frequency is the lowest among the frequencies for the three types of relative clauses in *Short list*, the P-relative frequency is consistently the highest in each of the remaining five first-person narrated novels. With *Short list* excluded from the list, the average P-relative frequency of the other five novels is 46.6%, a figure very close to Fox's 50% P-relative figure for her conversational data. For two of these novelsl*Object of my affection* and *The mezzanine*lthe P-relative frequencies slightly exceed the comparable figure for Fox's conversational data.

We suggested above in our discussion of Figure 3 that high exophoric reference might

correlate with high frequencies of P-relatives. Although it is likely that there are other as yet undetermined factors encouraging P-relativization, random 1000-word samples of each of our first-person narratives do seem to support the correlation of high exophoric reference with frequent P-relativization. Table 6 reports the results of our sampling.

Table 6: *Frequencies of Exophoric Nominative Pronouns in 1000*-Word Samples in First-person Literary Narratives*Compared with P-Relativization Frequencies from Table 5*

	Pronouns	Exophoric Nominative P-rels
Short list	26	20 (16%)
Object . . .	75	64 (51%)
Story of my life	68	61 (49%)
Sportswriter	66	50 (40%)
Mezzanine	53	65 (52%)
Some can whistle	56	51 (41%)

Short list, with the lowest percentage of P-relatives compared to A-relatives and S-relatives, shows in our 1000-word sample less than half (26) of the average number (63.6) of first- or second-person nominative pronominal arguments that appear in the 1000-word samples of the remaining novels.

Tables 5 and 6 support the conclusion that first-person literary narratives vary in the degree to which they are exophorically grounded. Thus, the suggestion is that first-person novels that are sparse in first- and second-person nominative referenceIthe preferred pronominal anchors in P-relativesIwill have fewer P-relatives than those first-person novels with heavy exophoric nominative reference.[6]

Two questions remain: why is the percentage for A-relatives lowest in conversation among all genres examined and why is the percentage for A-relatives in third-person narrative higher than those in first-person narrative and expository writing? The low percentage of A-relatives in conversation could be a result of the Preferred Argument Structure effect being stronger in oral language, which would consequently suppress the percentage of A-relatives in conversation. However, it is more likely a genre constraint such as informativeness (which encourages S-relativization) in conjunction with high exophoric reference (which encourages P-relativization) rather than the more cognitively based Preferred Argument Structure that suppresses A-relatives in conversation. This suggestion is supported, for instance, by data from the twenty oral Pear Story English narratives collected by Chafe et al., in which we find the distribution for P-, S-, and A-relatives provided in Table 7:

Table 7: *Frequencies of P-, S-, and A-Relatives in The Pear Stories*

P-rels	28 (24%)
S-rels	44 (37%)
A-rels	46 (39%)
TOTAL	118

These widely-analyzed narratives, told by college-age women, are third-person retellings of a short film involving the theft of a basket of pears. First, there is a considerably higher frequency of A-relatives than one might expect if the Preferred Argument Structure were constraining A-relativization in these oral texts, as Fox argues that it does for her oral conversational data. Furthermore, the relative frequencies of the three types of relative clauses in these third-person oral narratives are very close to those for our third-person literary narratives (compare Tables 4 and 7), though the difference between A- and S-relativization frequencies is not as large in the oral narratives, probably because of the strongly descriptive nature of most of the retellings, which would encourage the occurrence of more S-relatives than A-relatives. It is possible that the difference in planning time involved in the production of literary *vs.* oral texts may have an influence on the frequencies of the different types of relative clauses, but whatever effect planning time may have is dwarfed by the influence of genre and sub-genre. Note again from Tables 4 and 7 that the third-person oral narratives of *The pear stories* are more like the third-person literary narratives than any of the other genres, with A-relatives being more frequent than either P-relatives or S-relatives and with S-relatives being more frequent than P-relatives.

Since the motivations for high S-relativization and high P-relativization appear to be functional, we look to a functional answer to our final question as to why A-relativization is relatively more frequent in third-person narrative than in the other genres we have examined. As we have argued, if a discourse is primarily informational, S-relativization will predominate, as in our expository linguistics texts. For example, the following are three of the first seven sentences containing relative clauses, all of them S-relatives, from Chapter 2 of Finegan and Besnier's *Language: Its structure and use*:

S
(20) Somewhat less obvious is the number of sounds [that occur in the words *speakers, series, letters,* and *sequence*;]

S
(21) The system [that had evolved in Wessex before the Norman Invasion of 1066]gave us such spellings as *ee* for the sound in words like *deed* and *seen.*

S

(22) The system [that was overlaid on the Old English system by the Normans,
     withtheir French orthographic customs,] gave us such spellings as*queen*
     (for the earlier *cween*) and *thief* (for earlier *theef*). (*Language*, 1989,
     pp. 32-34)

Each of these S-relatives characterizes its head and makes it relevant to the surrounding discourse. In (20), the surrounding context is the problem of identifying the number of sounds in written words since English orthography and English phonemics are non-iconic. By providing inside the S-relative several words whose numbers of sounds do not equal the numbers of letters, the mentioned NPIthe number of soundsIis made relevant to the surrounding discourse. Sentence (20) would be obviously non-felicitous if it simply read, "Somewhat less obvious is the number of sounds." Sentences (21) and (22) occur in a list of some of the origins of English orthography. Again, both heads are characterized by the S-relatives and since the propositional content in the relative clauses refers to historical development of orthographic systems, it obviously makes the heads relevant to the surrounding discourse context. The near absence of exophoric reference in the linguistics texts precludes heavy P-relativization. And as we will argue below, only third-person narrative among the genres we investigate in this paper has the necessary characteristics to encourage heavy A-relativization.

If a discourse is primarily non-informational, as are conversation, first-person narrative, and third-person narrative, then new NPs made relevant by means of relative clauses can be said more specifically to be made relevant most often by anchoring to characters and events in the on-going discourse. If the discourse reference is heavily exophoric, as are conversation and first-person narrative, then P-relativization will predominate. For example, in the following two paragraphs from McInerney's *Story of my life*, the first-person narrator of the novel, Alison Poole, reports on her sensory exercise in her acting class:

(23)   They told me later that within two minutes I had
              the teacher watching me and that pretty soon he told
              everyone else to knock off what they were doing and
              watch me. I don't know, I was off in my own world,
              acting. I'm doing something true, I know I'm not just
              faking it this time and even though it's acting
                   P
         something [I'm not really experiencing] it's absolutely
                                  P
         honest, my reaction, the sensations [I'm feeling] and
              I'm completely in my own reality, it's like dreaming,
              you know, or like riding when you feel almost like you
              and your horse are the same animal, taking your best
              jumper over a hard course and hitting everything
              perfectly. . . .

P

<u>Something good</u> [that I did for someone] . . . sharp
taste. I was combining these two incredible sensations.
         P
And I knew it was <u>the best</u> [I had ever done]. It was
taking me to a place I'd never been. (*Story of my life*, 1989, p. 47)

Each of the four relative clauses bracketed in (23) is a P-relative, using the first-person singular pronoun as an anchor to make the head relevant to the discourse. There is a fifth relative clause in the second paragraphI"a place [I'd never been]"Iand although it is a relativization on an object of a deleted preposition, the anchor is the first-person singular pronoun.

We have found in our data that if a discourse is neither heavily informational (encouraging S-relatives) nor exophorically grounded (encouraging P-relatives), it will tend most frequently to use A-relatives to make a new NP relevant, as is the case with both literary and oral third-person narratives. Since the A-relatives in our data most frequently make a new NP relevant through intratextual propositional anchoring, we look to the motivation for intratextual anchoring for the ultimate cause of high A-relativization in third-person narrative. The following two paragraphs, from the first chapter of Donaldson's *The gap into conflict*, introduce the two main characters of the novel, Morn Hyland and Angus Thermopyle, as they appear together in a bar:

(24)   It began when Morn Hyland came into Mallorys with
       Angus Thermopyle.

    Those two called attention to themselves because they
    obviously didn't belong together. Except for <u>her ill-</u>
             P
<u>fitting and outdated shipsuit,</u> [which she much have
scrounged from someone else's locker,] she was gorgeous,
     A
with <u>a body</u> [that made drunks groan in lost yearning]
         A
and <u>a pale, delicate beauty of face</u> [that twisted
dreamers' hearts]. In contrast, he was dark and
              A
    disreputable, probably <u>the most disreputable man</u> [who
    still had docking-rights at the Station]. (*The gap into conflict*, 1992, p. 4)

In (24) there are one P-relative and three A-relatives. The three A-relatives use transitive predicates to make their head NPsIa body, a pale, delicate beauty of face, and the most disreputable manIrelevant to the narrative. Each of these A-relative-clause predicates is an important bit of characterization or information within the narrative. Morn Hyland's body and face are lescribed as affecting drunks and dreamers because her beauty is in part responsible for Angus

Thermopyle's and Nick Succorso's rivalry in the novel. But even more immediately, two pages after the paragraphs in (24), Donaldson writes of Morn and Nick, who leave the bar together, without Angus, "They left to become the kind of story drunks and dreamers told each other in the Station's standard morning . . ." (*The gap into conflict*, 1992, p. 6). The third A-relative of (24) anchors "the most disreputable man" to "docking-rights at the Station," since both Angus and Nick have these rare rights and since their possession of them leads to the climax of the novel. A-relatives are used to create links between characters and events in a narrative. Third-person narrative will not use P-relatives predominantly to make NPs relevant simply because the exophoric pronouns encouraging their use are absent. S-relatives will not be used predominantly since they lack the extra object argument which typically helps to create the coherence that narrative demands, with multiple characters and events interacting across often large stretches of time. As we recall from sentences (15) and (16), the most obvious types of intratextual propositional anchoring are performed by those A-relatives that repeat earlier propositions and those that paraphrase earlier propositions. Thus, the intratextual propositional anchoring that is characteristic of A-relatives is functionally heavily motivated within the genre of third-person narrative but not within conversation, expository discourse, or first-person narrative.

CONCLUSIONS

The implications of this study are that the discourse/pragmatic function of genre may have as much or more to do with determining the particular distributional frequencies of P-, S, and A-relatives than does the informational status of P, S, and A arguments. We have discovered three distributional patterns that reflect the sensitivity of relative clauses within both spoken and written genres to the broad functions of discourse: 1) S-relatives occur in greater percentages in informative discourse; 2) P-relatives occur in greater percentages in exophoric discourse; and 3) A-relatives occur in greater percentages in third-person narrative discourseIwhether oral or literateIwhich demands interaction among characters and events on a time line and which lacks high concentrations of exophoric reference conducive to high P-relativization. One of the most interesting patterns that we think worth further investigation is high P-relativization in both conversation and first-person narrative. Theoretically, first-person narrative could use A-relatives primarily to anchor new NPs, just as does third-person narrative. But instead, P-relativization in first-person narratives appears to dominate if exophoric reference is high. This suggests that P-relativization is favored over A-relativization if the condition for P-relativizationIhigh exophoric referenceIis present. Our pilot study has, thus, pointed to what appear to be fruitful avenues for future research in the effect of genre on the structures and distributions of grammatical devices like relative clauses that serve to anchor referents to discourse context. Future research will concentrate on including a wider variety of genres, among them first-person oral and literate exposition and first-person oral narratives, in order to test the hypothesis that some relativization strategies are preferred over others even given equal functional motivations.

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NOTES

[1] Examples 1-3 are constructed. All other examples in this paper are gathered from either conversation or writing.

[2] Fox bases the term *anchoring* on Prince's (1981) discussions of the role of "anchors"Iprimarily given informationIin the presentation of new information.

[3] Fox borrows these case role labels from Dixon 1979.

[4] Example (19) is the first non-restrictive relative clause that we have presented. Like Fox (1987), we do not distinguish in this pilot study between restrictive and non-restrictive relative clauses. Fox and Thompson (1990, pp. 297-98), who also do not make the distinction in their study, comment on the extreme difficulty of distinguishing between restrictive and non-restrictive relative clauses in oral data. In future work, we will consider the difference for only written genres.

[5] We count only nominative pronouns in our samples in order to restrict our counts to ACTOR referentsIthat is, those referents that are likely to surface as As in P-relativesIalthough the ratios would be the same even if we had considered accusative pronouns as well.

[6] We are currently collecting data from first-person detective novels that appear to be much like Lehrer's novel in being sparse in both exophoric nominative reference and P-relatives. The stylistic causes and effects of these patterns await further analysis.

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NON-GRAMMATICAL REFLEXIVE BINDING PHENOMENA: THE CASE OF JAPANESE

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ABSTRACT

Two non-syntactic phenomena of Japanese reflexive binding by *zibun* (which means 'self') are analyzed systematically with respect to a pragmatic use condition on *zibun*, a culture-specific condition, and the Maxim of Politeness (Fukada 1986) which is derived from Cooperative Principle (Grice 1975). The first phenomenon is the tendency by native speakers of Japanese to avoid referring to an honored person with *zibun* when the honored person's behavior described in the sentence is considered 'inappropriate'. For example, speakers try to avoid uttering (i) in which *zibun* refers to an honored person (a school principle) and his behavior is considered 'inappropriate' by the speaker (noticed by Inoue 1976).

(i) Koochoo-wa   go-zibun-gaoshieteirassharu seito-to   kekkon shitagatte-orareru.
     School principle-Top Hon-self-Subj teaching student-with get married eager to-Hon

(Lit. The school principle is eager to get married to one of self's students) 'The school principle is eager to get married to one of his students.'

The second phenomenon is that a sentence with the reflexive pronoun *zibun* can be ambiguous. For example, example (ii) gives either the implicature that the speaker is blaming on the prince for his behavior, i.e., choosing his wife, or that the speaker is giving him credit for the same behavior.

(ii) Sono Nihon-no   wakai kootaishi-wa   zibun-no kisaki-o   kimeta.
     that Japanese-poss   young prince -Top   self-Poss princess-Obj decided

   (Lit. The young crown prince decided himself's bride.)
   "The young crown prince of Japan himself chose his wife.'

I propose as a pragmatic use condition on Japanese reflexive pronoun *Zibun* that the use of *zibun* is an act that involves a speaker's attributing responsibility to the referent of the reflexive pronoun for her action expressed by the predicate of a sentence. Also, as a culture-specific condition, I propose that in Japanese culture, to attribute responsibility to an honored person for her 'inappropriate' act is face threatening for the honored person. The first phenomena can be explained by the combination of the use condition, the cultural-specific condition, and Maxim of Politeness which states "Be polite". The second phenomena can be explained by the fact that each speaker holds different belief about what is 'appropriate' behavior and what is not.

INTRODUCTION

In previous literature, conditions for what kind of NP can be the antecedent of *zibun* (Japanese reflexive pronoun meaning 'self' which does not show any inflection for person and number) or what kind of NP *zibun* can bind (condition on zibun-binding) have been intensively analyzed syntactically.[1] An exception for such syntactic analyses was observed (Inoue 1976) but was never be analyzed systematically.[2] I will account for two such "exceptions" systematically by using pragmatic notions. These two phenomena (one is from Inoue (1976), and one originates in this paper) cannot be accounted for syntactically since they are related to politeness phenomena or speaker's attitude. One phenomenon is that native Japanese speakers tend to avoid referring to an honored person with *zibun* when they are referring to the honored person for her 'inappropriate' behavior. For example, some speakers avoid referring to a school principle (male, here), *koochoo* in example (1), with *zibun* when they are referring to him for his 'inappropriate' behavior, which is exactly the case in example (1)[3]. Here, the 'inappropriate behavior' is his showing romantic emotion towards one of his students. Therefore, they will avoid uttering (1a), and instead, they will choose to utter (1b) in which *zibun* is not used.[4]

(1) a.   Koochoo-wa   go-zibun-ga   oshieteirassharu seito-to   kekkon shitagatte-orareru.
     School principle-Top Hon[5]-self-Subj   teaching   student-with   get married eager to-Hon

     (Lit. The school principle is eager to get married to one of self's students)
     'The school principle is eager to get married to one of his students.'

   b. Koochoo-wa   [∅] oshieteirassharu seito-to   kekkon   shitagatte-orareru.
      school principle-Top   teaching student -with get married eager to-Hon

     (Lit. The school principle is eager to get married to one of [∅] students)
     'The school principle is eager to get married to one of his students.'

The other phenomenon which syntax cannot explain is that a sentence with a reflexive un *zibun* can give two opposite connotations: the speaker's positive attitude toward the

action of the referent of *zibun* or her negative attitude toward the action of the referent of *zibun*. For example, example (2) could mean either that the speaker was irritated that Taroo[6] kept talking about himself, or it also could mean that the speaker was pleased for the same reason.

(2) Taroo-wa   zibun-no   koto-o   hanashi-tsuzuke-ta.
    Taroo-Top self-Poss[7] Comp-Obj   tell - keep-Past

(Lit. Taroo kept talking himself's story.)
'Taroo Kept telling his own story.'

To account for these non-grammatical phenomena, I propose that the use of the Japanese reflexive pronoun *zibun* is an act that involves a speaker's attributing responsibility to the referent of *zibun* for her action expressed by the predicate of a sentence (pragmatic use condition). The goal of this paper is to give systematic analyses for these two phenomena and to demonstrate how Grice's Cooperative Principle and Fukada's Maxim if Politeness contribute to the account.

HYPOTHESIS AND CONSTRAINT

In the previous section, the pragmatic use condition on *zibun* was proposed. I also propose the following cultural/social constraint against "attributing responsibility" (in the pragmatic use condition) to someone.

Constraint on Attribution of Responsibility (CAR): In Japanese culture, to attribute responsibility to an honored person for his/her inappropriate behavior is face threatening for the person who is being referred to by *zibun*.[8]

'Inappropriate behavior' is behavior which a speaker believes is socially or culturally inappropriate.[9]

ANALYSIS

Zibun-binding to an honored person

Inoue (1976) reported that native speakers try to avoid using a sentence with *zibun* when *zibun* refers to an honored person, i.e., they try to avoid referring to the person with *zibun* as in (3a), and prefer instead (3b), in which no such reference is made.[10] Namely, speakers intuitively judge that (3b) is a proper way to talk about a school principle (who is supposed to be highly respected in Japanese society), but (3a) is not. Inoue (1976) also reported that (3a) has an 'accusatory' connotation while (3b) does not.

(3) a. Koochoo-wa   go-zibun-ga oshieteirassharu   seito-to   kekkon shitagatte- orareru
       School principle-Top Hon-self-Subj   teaching   student-with   get married eager to-Hon

(Lit. The school principle is eager to get married to one of self's students)
'The school principle is eager to get married to one of his students.'

b. Koochoo-wa   [ø]   oshieteirassharu   seito-to   kekkon shitagatte-orareru
   school principle-Top   teaching   student -with   get married   eager to-Hon

(Lit. The school principle is eager to get married to one of [ø] students)
'The school principle is eager to get married to one of his students.'

There are two questions to be answered here. First, why do some people hesitate to use (3a)? Second, why does (3a) have an accusatory connotation as Inoue (1976) reported?

The first question is answered as follows. If a speaker believes that the act of showing romantic emotion to one's student is an inappropriate behavior for a school principle, and the speaker also considers that the school principle is a socially respected figure, referring to the school principle by *zibun* will imply that the speaker is attributing responsibility to an honored person for his inappropriate behavior. According to CAR, such use of *zibun* will be a face-threatening to the school principle. It follows from the Maxim of Politeness that Fukada (1986) derived from Grice's Cooperative Principle that a speaker will try to be polite by avoiding a face-threatening act, in this case, by avoiding using *zibun*.

Maxim of Politeness: Be as polite as required by culture-specific standards as to when and to whom to show respect and what counts as polite (p.27).

Hence, a speaker will try to avoid using (3a) in this context so as not to appear to be placing blame on an honored referent (i.e., in the context that the speaker believes that it is socially inappropriate for a school principle to show romantic emotion to his own student).

The second question, why (3a) has an accusatory connotation, is answered as follows. If the speaker is following the Maxim of Politeness (as she follows the CP in general) but intentionally did not avoid uttering (3a), the speaker's utterance of (3a) can be analyzed as an exploitation of the maxim. Namely, when (3a) is actually uttered, it seems that the speaker ignored the Maxim of Politeness. The speaker knows the attribution of responsibility to the honored referent (i.e. the school principle) for an 'inappropriate' behavior is a face-threatening action to him and it should be avoided in order to be polite. However, the speaker used *zibun* intentionally to imply something (e.g., an accusation that his action is not socially acceptable). Since a conversational implicature is always realized when some particular maxim appears to be violated[11], this should be the case for the 'accusatory' connotation that Inoue (1976) observed.

Just as we analyzed the accusatory connotation of (3a), my hypothesis and the Maxim of Politeness can explain the cynical connotation given by the utterance of (4).[12] The situation of the utterance is as follows. Hanako's teacher did not show up for the class. Later, she found out that the teacher could not remember the location of the classroom something that should be familiar to the teacher - and that's why he missed the class. Hanako is telling this to her ⁻◌   ds.

(4) Sensei-ga   go-zibun no kyooshitsu-o   owasureni natta
    teacher-Nom Hon-self-Poss classroom-Obj   forgot   -Hon

> (Lit. Teacher forgot self's classroom.)
> "The teacher forgot his classroom in which he always teaches.'

If the speaker is following the Maxim of Politeness, she could have avoided uttering the sentence (4) since she knows it is impolite to attribute responsibility to an honored person for his inappropriate behavior[13]. However, the speaker exploited the maxim by uttering (4), i.e., the Maxim of Politeness appears to be violated intentionally. This exploitation of the maxim explains for the implication that the speaker is being cynical toward the behavior of the teacher.

The hypothesis and the maxim also predict that a native speaker will not hesitate to utter the sentence (5) compare to example (3a). The situation of utterance for (5) is as follows. For some people, it is generous that superior people lend their own property to juniors. Here, the teacher generously lent his book for Hanako. Hanako is reporting this to her mother.

(5) Sensei-ga go-zibun no   hon-o   kashite-kuda-satta.
    teacher-Top Hon-self-Poss book-Obj borrow-let me-Hon

> (Lit. The teacher let me borrow self's book.)
> 'The teacher let me borrow his own book.'

Example (5) illustrates that the referent's behavior was evaluated as 'good' (thus, 'appropriate') by the speaker but not as 'inappropriate'. Since the Maxim of Politeness does not prohibit the attribution of responsibility to a superior's 'appropriate behavior', the speaker will refer to the teacher with *zibun* without any problem.[14]

Hence, the hypothesis and the Maxim of Politeness explains reasonably why some native speakers try to avoid referring to an honored person with *zibun* in certain situations, namely, those situations in which the zibun refers an honored person, and the person's behavior which is described in the utterance is 'inappropriate'.

3.2 Opposite readings of a sentence with *zibun*.

The second non-syntactic phenomena is that a sentence with the reflexive pronoun *zibun* can be ambiguous. For example, example (6) can give contrasting implicatures—either that the speaker is blaming the prince for his behavior, i.e., choosing his wife, or that the speaker is giving credit for the same behavior.

(6) Sono Nihon-no   wakai kootaishi-wa zibun-no   kisaki-o   kimeta.
    that Japanese-poss   young prince -Top   self-Poss princess-Obj decided

> (Lit. The young crown prince decided himself's bride.)
> 'The young crown prince of Japan himself chose his wife.'

How this ambiguity arises[15] can be explained as follows. In the utterance of (6), the speaker used *zibun* to implicate that she is attributing responsibility to the prince for his action of choosing his own wife. If we assume that the prince is honored by the speaker of (6),then the question need to be asked whether the responsibility has been attributed to his 'appropriate' behavior or 'inappropriate' behavior because the issue (prince's free will to choose his wife) is controversial, and also since the utterance will give different implicature depending on the answer to this question. Namely, if the speaker attributes responsibility to his 'inappropriate' behavior, the use of *zibun* will give some negative implicature, i.e, 'blaming; implicature as it is reported in the first paragraph of this section. Otherwise, it will give a positive implicature, i.e, 'praising' implicature as reported.[16] It is a tradition of the Japanese royal family that a bride of a crown prince is decided by special royal committee. Therefore, the prince cannot make any decision without the consent of the committee. Some people believe that the convention should be strictly followed. Therefore, that the ignored the committee and chose his wife by himself is 'inappropriate' in that sense. On the other hand, some people believe that the convention is an old, absurd, and inhuman rule. For them, the prince's behavior was brave for breaking a nonsensical rule from the past. Therefore, it is 'appropriate' behavior.

This question, i.e., whether the behavior of the referent of *zibun* is appropriate or not, was not asked when I analyzed (3a) (repeated here).

(3) a. Koochoo-wa   go-zibun-ga   oshieteirassharu seito-to   kekkon shitagatte-orareru.
    School principle-Top honorific-self-Subj   teaching student-with get married eager to-Hon

    (Lit. The school principle is eager to get married to one of self's students)
    'The school principle is eager to get married to one of his students.'

I did not question whether the school principle's behavior (showing romantic emotion to one of his student) was appropriate or not. Rather, it was taken for granted that the behavior was 'inappropriate'. However, there is no empirical evidence to say every Japanese speaker believes the principle's behavior is 'inappropriate'. It is just that the belief is widely held among many people in the society.[17] Therefore, logically, there always exists a choice for a speaker to believe a behavior is 'appropriate' or 'inappropriate'. What each speaker believes about a behavior all depends on what each speaker believes about the behavior in question and what kind of attitude each one tries to project toward some social convention by showing what she believes.[18] Therefore, the ambiguity of example (6) is expected to arise since each person's belief about what the prince's marriage should be like varies.[19]

Since speakers' belief about the appropriateness of any behavior may differ, it is predicted that to communicate her intention successfully, a speaker needs to assume that her hearer shares the same belief, or at least the speaker needs to believe that the hearer recognizes the speaker's belief. In other words, since the speaker must speculate about the hearer's belief about the appropriateness of some behavior, it is predicted that there can be a miscommunication caused by the attribution of responsibility for that behavior. The following example illustrates this point.[20] A football player whom a lot of girls are always chasing has never asked ～ l out (since girls come to him) and he was always proud of this fact. However, the time

came when he wanted to go out with the most popular girl in his school. He thought that she would come to him like other girls did, but she never paid attention to him. As time passed, he got desperate and finally he asked her out. Then, a person who does not know about the player's pride in being so popular that he had never had asked a girl out uttered (7).[21]   The football player was angry and the speaker did not know what he had done wrong.

(7) Koitsu-ga   zibun-de kanojyo-o   sassottanda -ze.
     this guy-Nom self -by   the girl-Obj   asked out -you know

     (Lit. This guy asked the girl out by self.)
     'This guy asked her out, you know.'

The point is this; the speaker judged the referent's (=football player's) act as a 'good act' and intended to praise the football player's brave, manly action of asking out the most popular girl in his school. However, the football player, being the most popular boy in the school and being proud of it, was insulted; he interpreted the person's uttering of (7) as an offensive comment on his popularity, since attribution of responsibility implied (for the player) that even a popular guy like him could not get her attention without asking for it. In other words, the football player believed that the speaker of (7) judged his act as a 'bad' one and attributed responsibility to him for his 'shameful act'. Therefore, for the football player, the speaker's use of *zibun* in (7) was face-threatening.[22] The participants' views toward the action of asking a girl out are opposite. One thinks it is courageous, and the other thinks it is shameful.

These phenomena follow from my hypothesis automatically if we assume that the attribution of responsibility totally depends on the speaker's belief and that successful communication assumes that the speaker and the hearer share the same belief (mutual belief). However, the only way for a speaker to know her hearer's belief is by speculating. Therefore, there can sometimes be a misunderstanding caused by the attribution of responsibility, like the case shown above.

CONCLUSIONS

I showed that two non-grammatical phenomena of *zibun* binding can be systematically analyzed by a pragmatic use condition, a culture-specific constraint, and the Maxim of Politeness which has been derived from the Cooperative principle. They are summarized below.

Pragmatic use condition of Zibun: the use of the Japanese reflexive pronoun *zibun* is an act that involves a speaker's attributing responsibility to the referent of the reflexive pronoun for her action which is expressed by the predicate of a sentence.

Constraint on attribution of responsibility. (CAR): In Japanese culture, to attribute responsibility to an honored person for his/her inappropriate behavior is face threatening for the person who is being referred to by *zibun*.

Maxim of Politeness: Be as polite as required by culture-specific standards as to when ind to whom to show respect and what counts as polite.

The fact that native speakers tend to avoid refering to a honored person with *zibun* can be explained by speaker's tendency to follow the Maxim of Politeness. They avoid threatening the honored person's face by not referring to the person with *zibun*, since the use of *zibun* can attribute responsibility to the person for her 'inappropriate' behavior. At the same time, it has also been correctly predicted that native speakers would not avoid referring to the honored person with *zibun* when they are attributing responsibility to the person for her appropriate act since the Maxim of Politeness does not mention that the speaker's attributing responsibility to an honored person for her 'appropriate' act is a face threatening.

For the phenomena that a sentence with the reflexive pronoun *zibun* can be ambiguous, it was explained that when there are two contrasting beliefs, or attitudes, towards the 'appropriateness' of the behavior of the referent of *zibun*, it gives ambiguous implicature. As we saw in the prince's case (example (6)), if the matter is controversial, it tends to be easily interpreted ambiguously. If the behavior in question is not controversial, i.e., almost all member of society hold one same belief towards the 'appropriateness' of the behavior, there will be no ambiguity. The hypothesis also successfully explained the misunderstanding, or miscommunication which may occur through the use of *zibun*. The speaker and the hearer can have different beliefs about the appropriateness of the referent *zibun's* behavior, and therefore, the hearer may misinterpret the speaker's intention in uttering the sentence.

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NOTES

[1] Kuroda 1965; Kuno 1973; N. A. McCawley 1976, among others.

[2] To account for other apparent counter examples to those syntactic analyses which are not discussed in this paper, Kameyama (1984) proposed a 'logophoric' analysis, and Iida (1990) proposed a 'perspective' analysis. In my current research (dissertation in progress), it seems to be possible that those examples and the examples which are discussed in this paper follow under one unified pragmatic condition.

[3] Here, two cultural notions are assumed. One is that in Japan, a person can be "honored" for his age, social status, and all sorts of achievements. However, the age factor seems to be placed above of all other factors. Also, some professions, e.g., professors, teachers, bosses tend to be placed higher in society. (Whom one honors depends on one's attitude toward the Japanese social system. If one wants to conform to the system by honoring old people, one can. If one wishes to show a different attitude, i.e., a radical, or non-traditional attitude toward the system, this is also possible. Convention is not an absolute rule to be followed, but it is a system which people can conform to or not as they wish. I just assumed that the speaker respects a teacher in the case of (1)). The other assumption is that that the teacher is behaving romantically toward one of his students is socially not acceptable, thus, 'inappropriate'.

[4] This phenomenon first described by Inoue (1976), pp.125-6 (modified).

[5] "Hon" stands for "honorific suffix" which is used to form the honorific form of the verb which refers to respected person's action.

[6] "Taroo" is a male first name used throughout this paper. "Hanako" which appears later is a female first name.

[7] "Poss" stands for "possessive case marker".

[8] A similar type of constraint to CAR has was speculated by Inoue (1976) as a native speaker's intuition.

[9] This notion of "inappropriate behavior" will be expanded later in section 3.2.

[10] Inoue (1976) does not claim that a sentence like (3a) can never be uttered. What she observed was native speakers' prevailing preference for uttering (3b) but not (3a) under a certain condition. Therefore, (3a) is a possible sentence.

[11] Grice shows that "as long as participants in a mutual enterprise such as a conversation each assume that the other is adhering to the Cooperative Principle, meanings that are conveyed without being said follow as inferences from the fact that some particular maxim appears to be being violated." (Green 1989, p.88)

[12] Example (4) is modified example from Inoue (1976), p.126.

[13] Here, "forgetting the location of the classroom" is not exactly a socially inappropriate behavior as it was defined in section 2, but rather it is inappropriate in the sense that it is 'shameful' for a teacher to be absent minded or stupid and forget his classroom. Thus, now the "inappropriate behavior" includes 'shameful' behaviors, too. This will be discussed more in detain in section 3.2.

¹⁴ Example (5) has an implication which (5') below does not. (5) implies that the speaker is praising teacher's generous act of letting his student borrow his book. However, (5') is a neutral description of what the teacher did. Therefore, unless *zibun* is used to attribute responsibility for 'inappropriate' behavior, some 'positive' implicature seems to arise.

>   (5') Sensei-ga   ∅/kare-no hon-o kashite-kudasa-tta.
>   teacher-Subj ∅ he-Gen book-obj lend-let-Past

¹⁵ We saw in the previous sections that the interpretation of *zibun* crucially involves the speaker's belief toward 'respectedness' of the referent and the 'appropriateness' of the referent's behavior. If the speaker is referring to the 'respected (or honored)' person with *zibun*, the 'appropriateness' of the referent's behavior was crucial to the decision as to whether she should use *zibun* or not. Here, the problem is not whether the speaker uses *zibun* or not. What is discussed here 1) is the fact that once *zibun* is used as in (6), the use couldtrigger ambiguous implicatures, and 2) how this ambiguity arises.

¹⁶ See footnote 14 for an explanation for the positive implicature given by the use of *zibun*.

¹⁷ Therefore, (3a) could be interpreted different way. If a speaker believes that the principle's action is 'appropriate' for some reason, (3a) will be not an accusation, but could be admiration since the speaker is not attributing a responsibility to his 'inappropriate' behavior, but for his 'appropriate' behavior (e.g., the speaker think that the school principle's behavior is romantic or something).

¹⁸ The choice also depends on the speaker's <u>world view</u>, Matsumoto (1990) showed that one headline from a sports newspaper (a relative clause), shown below in (i), can be interpreted in two opposite ways according to the world-view of readers.

>   (i) [[Yaburu Kyojin]]
>   beat   Giants

A group of baseball fans in the Tokyo area will take (a) as meaning; Giants beat (some team), while a group of fans in the Osaka area will take (a) meaning; Tigers (franchised in Osaka, and the team name is not overtly expressed in (a)) beat Giants (These two interpretations were possible because case markers are suppressible in news headlines.) Those two opposite interpretations of one headline demonstrate that there can be two groups whose world-view toward one topic is different. These two groups of fans have different world-views toward the power relationship between the Giants and Tigers-each group of fans holds its own desires and those desires are assumed to be held by all others. These different views (beliefs) allow each group to interpret (a) differently.

¹⁹ Especially, the belief would differ between the Japanese elder generation and younger ·ation.

[20] The example was suggested to me by Georgia Green (personal communication.)

[21] The more detailed situation of the utterance (7) is this. This person heard the rumor that this football player asked the most popular girl out. He thought it was very manly behavior. One day the person was introduced to the football player in some party, and the person realized this is the person who asked out the girl. So, he told his friend who was with him that he is the (famous) guy who did that brave act.

[22] As I mentioned in a previous footnote, I need to expand the notion of 'bad act' a bit. The notion of 'bad act' could be expanded to include such an act that a speaker of an utterance believes that the act would throw mud (figuratively) on a referent's face for any reason.

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A NOTE ON PRAGMATIC MARKEDNESS

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ABSTRACT

Since the concept of markedness (asymmetrical pairing in language) was first developed in the Prague school, it has been taken to heart by linguists, semioticians, and psychologists alike, who often use markedness relations to explain various asymmetries within languages. But what explains markedness? The literature on gradable predicates provides many hypotheses, most of which assume that a single generalization can explain the wider distribution of all unmarked predicates and/or the limited distribution of all marked predicates (for instance, that all unmarked terms have positive polarity or that unmarked terms are psychologically simpler). But such a scenario seems unlikely, since unmarked terms vary greatly in the distributions that identify them as 'unmarked' as do marked terms. This paper argues that patterns of unmarked distribution should be considered on a case-by-case basis in order to gain insights into the causes of the distinctions between the marked and the unmarked. It is shown, with reference to gradable predicate, that markedness and unmarkedness follow from facts about the reference and use of these terms.

The aim of this paper is to question the value of markedness theory in constructing explanatory models of linguistic meaning. This goal grew out of my frustration in reading repeatedly in the literature on gradable adjectives that certain differences in the distributions of members of an antonym pair can be "explained" in terms of markedness, which is represented in these treatments as a lexical feature or a semantic primitive (e.g., in Rusiecki, 1985; Lehrer, 1985), while other authors give unconstrained or unmotivated explanations of markedness, many of them claiming that unmarked concepts are 'psychologically less complex' than marked ones (e.g., Bartsch and Vennemann, 1972; Lakoff, 1987). This paper questions the claim that the pairs of terms in sentences (1)-(3) are in a single type of relation ('marked'/'unmarked') that accounts for all of the differences between the (a) terms and the (b) terms, including differences in use in measure phrases, nominalization, and implications for *how* questions, as shown in these examples.

(1) a. How tall are you?   (no implication that you are tall)
    b. *How shórt are you?   (not statable with sentential stress on *short*)

(2) a. How **good** is that paper?   (no implication that the paper is good)
    b. How **bad** is that paper?   (implication that the paper is bad to some degree)

(3) a. How **warm** is the soup?   (implication that the soup is warm)
    b. How **cool** is the soup?   (implication that the soup is cool)

As indicated by the title, this paper argues that the phenomena that form the basis of the argument for a marked/unmarked distinction are predictable from the meanings of the words, extralinguistic knowledge, and pragmatic principles. Thus, the terms 'marked' and 'unmarked' are not useful to an explanatory theory of gradable adjective meaning.

Markedness theory concerns the proliferation of binary distinctions in natural language and is intended to account for the asymmetries in these binary distinctions. The terms 'marked' and 'unmarked' originated in the structuralist phonology of Trubetzkoy (1939). Although the use of the terms today differs quite a bit from Trubetzkoy's original intention, we can see the legacy of the Prague Circle in modern phonology, where binary feature systems and underspecification theories depend upon asymmetrical distribution of features or phonemes.

The concept of markedness was later extended to semantics by Roman Jakobson (Battistella, 1990, p. 16). In the original estimation of markedness, marked/unmarked relations were context-dependent, language-specific, and potentially arbitrary. In more recent work, linguists have updated the concepts of marked and unmarked in order to conform to generative theories of linguistics, whose background assumptions and goals differ in a number of ways from those of the structuralist theories. However, what was interesting in structuralist theories is not necessarily explanatory. It is the latter qualification that is required in modern linguistics.

Two important facts to keep in mind about markedness are: (a) that markedness relations are necessarily binary relations, and (b) that these relations are completely relative. For example, we cannot say simply that *tall* is an unmarked term; instead we must say that it is unmarked with respect to *short*, which is its marked counterpart. Thus, a linguistic item might be marked with respect to a certain other item, but unmarked with respect to yet another. Croft (1992) provides a nice example of this in the Chumash verbal agreement system, shown in (4), for which it is claimed that the plural is marked relative to the singular, but unmarked relative to the dual, as judged by morphological complexity.

(4)   Chumash verbal agreement system (Croft, 1992, from Koeber 1904, p. 33):

		singular	plural	dual
1st person	k-	k-i-		k-i-s-
2nd person	p-	p-i-		p-i-s-
3rd person	s-	s-i-		s-i-s-

The criteria for determining which member of a pair is marked and which unmarked vary among authors and linguistic phenomena. For instance, when sorting gradable adjectives in terms of markedness, Hamilton and Deese (1971) use two criteria, listed in (5).

(5) Hamilton and Deese criteria for unmarked terms (context neutralization):
   a. basic root form of the unmarked member is also the name of the dimension
      (e.g., *wide/width* vs. *narrow/*narrowth*)
   b. term can be used impartially in *how* questions (e.g., (1a) and (2a) above)

However, Battistella (1990) notes that markedness cannot be determined by such absolute criteria as those in Hamilton and Deese (1971), or similar short lists used by other linguists and psychologists. Instead, the spirit of relativity in the markedness theory would hold that whichever member of a pair displays the most unmarked characteristics is the unmarked member. Not every unmarked item, then, has the same sets of these properties. Thus, the items listed in (6) that fulfill some of the unmarkedness criteria with respect to their antonyms are just as much unmarked items as those which fulfill more than one criterion.

(6) Items that fulfill both (7a and b): *true(false)*, *good(bad)*, *high(low)*, *long(short)*, etc.
   Items that fulfill only (7a): *warm(cool)*
   Items that fulfill only (7b): *big(little)*, *hard(easy)*, *old(young)*, etc.
   Items that fulfill neither: *first/last*, *solid/hollow*, *left/right*, *tiny/huge*, etc.

Battistella's more complete, and necessarily more vague, list of criteria for all types of markedness relations is listed in (7). This list reflects his summary of markedness theory as developed by scholars from Trubetzkoy onward.

(7) **Criteria for Linguistic (Un)Markedness (Battistella, 1990)**
I. Distributional Criteria
   a. Neutralization
      • marked term is excluded from the context (cf (1b,c) and (2b,c))
   b. Optimality
      • if a language has X (marked), then it necessarily has Y (unmarked)
      (e.g., every language that has /ü/ has /i/, /i/ = unmarked with respect to /ü/)
II. Amount of Structure Criteria
   a. Indeterminateness
      • unmarked term has less specific meaning, may stand for both poles of the opposition
      (e.g., *tall* can be used in referring to both tall and short things in contexts like (1b,c))
   b. Simplicity
      • unmarked elements are less elaborate in form (e.g., *host* vs. *hostess*)
   c. Syncretization
      • unmarked may be differentiated into more subcategories
      (e.g., present tense often has more conjugational forms than past)
III. Prototypicality
      • unmarked form is "best example" of the category

Neutralization is often considered the most general criterion for markedness. Lehrer (1985) lists the most common ways in which neutralization occurs in antonymous adjectives,

and her list is presented here in (8). As in the simpler list given by Hamilton and Deese (1971), the variety neutralization contexts represents a variety of different ways in which an unmarked member of a pair can fulfill the unmarkedness criteria. No single unmarked member of a pair must occur in all of these neutralized contexts, though some do.

(8) **Markedness properties of antonym pairs** (Lehrer, 1985)
  I.   Neutralization of an opposition in questions by **unmarked** member
       (*How tall/*short are you?*)
  II. Neutralization of an opposition in nominalizations by **unmarked** member
       (*warmth/*coolth*)
  III. Only the **unmarked** member appears in measure phrases   (*three feet tall/*short*)
  IV. If one member consists of an affix added to the antonym, the affix form is **marked**
       (*happy/unhappy*)
  V.   Ratios can be used only with the unmarked member (*twice as old/*young*)
  VI. The **unmarked** member is evaluatively positive, the **marked**, evaluatively negative
       (*good/bad*)
  VII. The **unmarked** member denotes more of a quantity; the **marked** less (*big/little*)
  VIII. If there are asymmetrical entailments, the unmarked member is less likely to be
       'biased' or 'committed' (*X is better than Y*: X may be good or bad.
       X is worse than Y: X must be bad (not good))

The problem with these efforts to categorize markedness criteria is not the interest in the asymmetry in pairs of linguistic items, but rather the trend toward treating the descriptive terms 'marked' and 'unmarked' as having explanatory value. Although we speak of words or phonemes or features as being marked or unmarked, and although the evidence for markedness is to be found in linguistic data, there is no reason to believe that the asymmetries noted in markedness theory represent linguistic phenomena, since our utterances and meanings are not only limited by the grammar, but also by their communicative purposes. That is, since when we use language we make reference to things in the world, qualities of those things (and our understandings of them) affect how we use language to refer to them. For instance, it is no accident of form that *water* is not a count noun—the lexico-grammatical treatment of *water* in English reflects speakers' understanding of the substance.

'Marked' and 'unmarked' merely label the symptoms of semantic asymmetry—not the causes. While labeling symptoms may be a convenient means for abbreviating the causes behind the symptoms, if we don't know what those causes are (and so far, we don't), the terms 'marked' and 'unmarked' have no theoretical import. In the case of phonological or phonetic markedness, marked/unmarked patterns may be, to a certain degree, arbitrary, and Trubetzkoy has claimed that they are language-specific. (Although the move in generative phonology has been toward universal statements of markedness.) But any non-arbitrary markedness relations require explanation. In phonology, for instance, non-arbitrary markedness may have physical explanations, based on ease of pronunciation or differentiation. In the lexicon, it is difficult to argue that any of the marked/unmarked pairings are arbitrary.

Gradable adjective distribution provides a good test for the claim that so-called marked/unmarked pairs have predictable distribution, based on semantic and pragmatic facts about the adjectives and the way that they are used in context. This test is particularly fitting, since many

linguists working on gradable adjective meaning have let markedness into their theory either as a lexical feature (+/- (UN)MARKED) or as a semantic primitive that distinguishes two members of a pair. Such treatments fail to identify any explanation for the dichotomous division and asymmetrical distribution of such terms. Instead, the most common reason for the use of markedness in such theories seems to be that the theorist has been unable or uninterested in finding asymmetries in the meanings or possible uses of antonymic adjectives that would account for differences in distribution. For example, Rusiecki (1985) gives a picture of the meanings of *tall* and *short* in a scalar model, for which *tall* and *short* are identical sides of a scale, as in (9), which satisfactorily accounts for the uses of *tall* and *short* in (10). However, this does not account for why *tall*, but not *short* can occur in measure phrases like *6 feet tall* or impartial *how* questions. In order to account for the facts in (12), Rusiecki posits that *tall* represents another scale (11) in just those cases where it occurs in a *how* question or measure statement, and that *short* is associated with no such unidirectional scale.

(9) short   tall
    <————————————————N————————————————>
                                |
                    neutral height

(10) a. The University Inn is tall.
      b. Jiminy Cricket is short.
      c. Jiminy Cricket is short, but he's tall for an insect.
      d. The University Inn isn't really tall, but it's tall for Champaign.

(11) 0—————————————————————————>tall

(12) a. Jiminy Cricket is two inches tall/# short.
      b. How tall/# short is the Urbana skyline?

How, then, does the language user know for which adjectives to posit the additional, asymmetrical scale of the type in (11)? According to Rusiecki's treatment, only unmarked terms have such scales, but markedness is treated as a given — a feature of the lexical item. However, this treatment is not sufficient, since it does not even hint at an explanation for the variety of distributions of adjectives.

Theories that rely on markedness as a theoretical primitive run into four problems. First of all, individual lexical items cannot be said to be 'marked' or 'unmarked'. Rather, they are marked or unmarked with reference to another item. If markedness is treated as a lexical feature, there is no principled limit to the number of markedness features an item would have, for it would have to have one for every other item it contrasts with. For cases like *tall*, this does not seem to be a problem, since we normally think of *tall* as contrasting only with *short*. *Short*, on the other hand, would need at least two lexical features concerning markedness: marked-with-respect-to-*tall* and marked-with-respect-to-*long*. Still other gradable adjectives have con-‹pendent opposites. So, for instance, it might be necessary for *dry* to have markedness

features for its relations to *wet*, *sweet* (as in *dry/sweet wine*), *moist* (as in *dry/moist cake*), and so forth. This problem also exists for nouns. *Cow* contrasts with a number of other items (*bull*, *calf*, *horse*) and has 'unmarked' distribution with respect to some of them. Even if a term is unmarked with respect to each and every term it contrasts with, it still must have as many lexical features for that unmarkedness as the number of terms it contrasts with. Because markedness is formulated as a relation among two lexical items, the theory fails to acknowledge or utilize any generalizations that can be made about, for instance, the fact that *short* is in marked distribution with respect to both *tall* and *long*.

The second problem in using markedness as a theoretical tool is that semantic markedness relations seem quite universal, with only minor variations. For instance, we never find that *short* is unmarked with respect to *tall*, even among short people. Were we to find a cave-dwelling culture where shortness was more valuable than tallness, it would still be surprising if they measured items using their term for *short* rather than *tall*. However, since markedness is a relation between lexical items, generalizations cannot be made across languages, since different languages have different lexical items.

Third, treating 'marked' and 'unmarked' specifications as means for differentiating types of distributional patterns ignores the variety of different distributional patterns found within those items labeled marked/unmarked. It is not enough to claim that items are labeled in the lexicon as +/-MARKED, as this will not differentiate items in terms of the types of marked/unmarked symptoms that they display. For example, it is not sufficient to label both *short* and *bad* 'marked' and claim that this explains their distributional patterns *vis-à-vis tall* and *good*, for all of these terms have different distributional patterns, as shown in (13). If, however, we take the stance that the meanings of these items determine their possible distributions, then it is not surprising that they distribute differently, since their meanings fall into very different semantic realms.

(13)   a.   How bad is it? (committed) *vs.*   *How short is it?
             vs.   How good is it? (impartial?) *vs.*   How tall is it? (impartial)
       b.   # You're 3 points good. *vs.*   You're 5 feet tall.
             vs.   # You're 3 points bad. *vs.*   # You're 5 feet short.

Finally, the focus on the distinction between marked and unmarked ignores the fact that not all antonymic pairs have asymmetrical distribution. For example, while *warm* is unmarked with respect to *cool* because it can be nominalized (as *warmth*), there is no such asymmetry among *hot* and *cold*, for which we have nominalizations *heat* and *cold* as well as symmetrical distribution in *how* questions, measure phrases, etc. Simply marking some items in the lexicon as 'marked' or 'unmarked' begs the question of why some pairs are asymmetrical in distribution.

As an alternative to markedness theory, a theory of gradable adjectives (or any other asymmetrically distributed category) should look for semantic and pragmatic reasons for specific distributional patterns. The questions we should ask are: What are the meanings of adjectives that can appear in syntactic/semantic context X (e.g., measure phrases, impartial *how* questions), and how do those meanings correlate with the adjectives' ability to occur in that context? What facts about the meanings of the adjectives that cannot occur in context X

explain their failure to occur in such constructions? What facts about human interaction with the world (perceptual capabilities, social/cultural rules, beliefs) limit the distributions of adjectives?

Van Langendonck (1984) follows Lakoff and Johnson (1980) in asserting that markedness properties can be derived from properties that humans display. He proposes a hierarchy of these human properties , as given in (14).

(14) **Hierarchy of human properties affecting asymmetrical distribution**

    a. biological (e.g., *tall* has unmarked properties because people get taller, not shorter)
    b. perceptual (e.g., *positive* is unmarked with respect to *negative* because positive = existent, and existent things are more perceptually salient than non-existent things)
    c. cultural
    (van Langendonck 1984)

Van Langendonck's hierarchy is open to a lot of individual variance, since he focuses on any and all properties of the speaker. It is, however, possible to give a more constrained hierarchy. In such a treatment, the distributional characteristics of adjectives can be explained by appealing to what language users know about the world, that is, what they know about what they're talking about. Such knowledge is of two types, physical and cultural, and the relevance of this knowledge is hierarchically arranged, such that physical facts have much stronger effects on distributions of adjectives than do cultural facts.

(15) **Hierarchy of Language User's Knowledge of World** (according to strength of effect on grammaticality judgments)

    a. physical facts (as filtered through human perceptual mechanisms)
    b. cultural knowledge

The remainder of this paper gives some examples of how knowledge of the world affects the distribution of gradable adjectives in the sorts of contexts considered so far. But first, some basics about gradable adjective meanings are in order. Gradable adjectives are those that represent qualities that can obtain, for any particular referent, at a variety of degrees. Such adjectives can be modified by degree markers like *very*, *hardly*, and *extremely*, and can be used in equative, comparative, or superlative constructions. So, the gradable adjectives in (16) contrast with the non-gradables in (17).

(16)   a. The Sears Tower is especially tall, it is taller than the CN Tower.
        b. It's a little hot in here, at least hotter than I like it to be.
        c. The play was really bad; worse, in fact, than the novel.

(17)   a. # Three is an especially odd number, much odder than two.
        b. # The phone is a little dead, but not as dead as it'll be tomorrow.

Murphy (1993) sketches a theory of gradable adjective meaning in which gradable adjec-
tives represent an inherent **comparison** between the degree to which the referent is claimed to
have the quality described and some standard degree of comparison, either a neutral (or unre-
markable) degree or a degree of zero. Objects are compared with the standard degree of com-
parison within a particular **dimension**, for example, HEIGHT, AGE, TEMPERATURE, or CLEANLINESS.
The ordered range of possible degrees within a dimension is called the **scale** for that dimen-
sion. Antonymic gradable adjectives indicate different **directions** on a scale within the same
dimension. So, for example, *cool* indicates the direction of the temperature scale which runs
from higher to lower degrees of temperature, while *warm* indicates the opposite direction.
Some adjectives, like *hot* and *cold* indicate directions within **subscales** of the dimension. These
subscales are indicated in the scale in (18) by the bold area. So, when I say that something is
warm, I claim that it is warmer than some neutral temperature. That neutral temperature is, of
course, subject to contextual interpretation. So, if I say *my toes are warm*, then I may be
claiming that my toes are warmer than I expected them to be, or warmer than my shoes, or
warmer than some other contextually salient standard.

(18) TEMPERATURE SCALE
cool <——————————————————N—————————————————> warm
    cold   **hot**

The claims made here about gradable adjective meaning are summarized in (19), the
most important aspect of which (for the present discussion) is item (c), that different types of
constructions indicate different comparison relations. This predicts that if a certain type of
comparison is impossible, for example, if a standard of comparison cannot be identified for the
dimension, then whatever linguistic constructions reflect that type of comparison will not be
found in the language. Thus, asymmetrical distributions of antonymous adjectives indicate
that some asymmetrical knowledge about or mental representation of the antonyms.

(19) **Claims about Gradable Adjective Meaning** (Murphy 1993)

    a.   Gradable adjectives are inherently comparative
    b.   Lexical representations differentiate gradables by:
          • their dimensions
          • their scalar directions
          (• what sub-range of the scale they indicate)
    c.   Different types of constructions indicate comparison with different standards.

Hence, if a type of comparison is impossible within a dimension, the associated linguistic
constructions will not exist.

Some of these claims are exemplified in the treatment of *tall* and *short*. These two
words represent different directions of measurement in the height dimension, but as shown
above, they have very different distributions, as repeated in (20)-(21).

(20)   a. The Empire State Building is tall.
       b. The Empire State Building is 102 stories tall.
       c. How táll is the building? (no implication that the building is tall)

(21)   a. My house is short.
       b. # My house is three stories short.
       c. # How shórt is your house?

The (a) evaluation sentences are fine for both *tall* and *short* because such evaluation implies comparison with a neutral point, which in this case is unremarkable building height or median building height, or whatever is relevant to the context in which these sentences are uttered. A comparison between my house, H, and the neutral point, N, in scale (22) is as possible as a comparison between the Empire State Building, E, and the neutral point. Thus, (20a) and (21a) are reasonable sentences which reflect those comparisons.

(22) HEIGHT DIMENSION (WITH RESPECT TO BUILDINGS)

<short   tall>
0————————H————N————————————————E————————>
       H = my house   N = neutral point   E = Empire State

But note that the scale in (22) is not symmetrical. While it can extend indefinitely in the tall direction, it ends at point zero on the other side. This affects the reasonableness of sentences (20b and c) versus (21b and c), since measure phrases and *how* questions do not involve comparison with the neutral point, but rather with the zero (or starting) point. Measuring, then, involves comparing an object's degree within the dimension to the beginning of the measurement scale, in this case the complete lack of height, zero. We cannot measure buildings negatively, since there is no salient starting point for measuring the vertical space that a building does not take up versus the vertical space that it does fill. Thus, our knowledge of measuring prevents us from using the weirder forms in (21).

But all gradable adjectives do not indicate asymmetrical scales. Compare the asymmetry of *tall* and *short* to the symmetry of *warm* and *cool* in the same sentence constructions, shown in (23)-(24).

(23)   a.   The soup is warm.
       b.   # The soup is 80° warm.
       c.   How warm is the soup? (implies the soup is warm)

(24)   a.   The cocoa is cool.
       b.   # The cocoa is 50° cool.
       c.   How cool is the cocoa? (implies the soup is cool)

The symmetry of *warm/cool* reflects the symmetry of the temperature scale, as illustrated in (25).

(25) TEMPERATURE SCALE (WITH RESPECT TO HEATED DRINKABLE LIQUIDS)

cool <———————————C————————N————————————S————————————> warm

                    C = cocoa   N = neutral   S = soup

Neither term can be used in a measure phrase because there is no starting point in the temperature scale. There may be zeroes in the Fahrenheit and Celsius systems, but these zeroes are not at the beginning of the scale, so they don't count as starting points for measurement. Although absolute zero is a possible candidate for a starting point, it is not salient, for none of us has ever felt absolute zero. Thus, our knowledge about measurement and the limits of our perception predict that we cannot use measure phrases with temperature terms. The *how* questions formed with these terms entail an expectation that the soup is warm or the cocoa is cool, in contrast to the *how* question for *tall* which is neutral with respect to evaluations of the height of the building. This follows from the fact that there is no starting point on the temperature scale. Since there is no starting point, the only other option for comparison is the neutral point. So, the question (23c) can be paraphrased as 'How much warmer than the neutral temperature is the soup?' Since the soup is being compared to the neutral point using the term *warm,* which indicates the direction toward higher temperatures, the speaker has taken a side on the soup-temperature issue: It is assumed to be warm.

Note that while we can compare warm and cool things to the neutral point in *how* questions, we cannot do this for short things. It is not the case that the *short how* question entails shortness, it is just not a good sentence if it carries the usual sentential stress on the adjective. There seems to be some principle which prevents committed *how* questions on scales with starting points, whether or not the adjective in question can be used in comparisons involving the starting point. This fact has been noticed as well by Bierwisch (1989), and I have yet to find a language in which this generalization does not hold.

Dimensional adjectives such as *tall, short, warm,* and *cool,* seem to be easily accounted for with reference to knowledge that we as language users have about the qualities they denote. All of the sorts of distributional asymmetries cannot be addressed in the space of this paper, but tougher cases are to be found in terms such as *good* and *bad* and *clean* and *dirty,* in (26) and (27).

(26) a. How good is it?   (impartial)
      b. How bad is it?   (implies badness)

(27) a. How clean is it? (impartial)
      b. How dirty is it? (implies dirtiness)

The scales themselves do not necessarily show any asymmetries, since there is no salient absolute bad or absolute state of filth. This is good for the analysis, since if there were a starting point on the scale, the (b) sentences would be prevented, just as *How short are you?* is prevented. But, still there is an asymmetry to be accounted for here, and so I'll take a very preliminary stab at it. *Good* and *clean* represent qualities that are evaluatively positive to the extent that there are almost no actual contexts where goodness and cleanness are not desired states. Compare these, for instance, to other adjectives whose desirability varies among con-

texts. For example, *hard* and *soft* do not show these asymmetries, as in (28), and neither is clearly a positive quality. Whether you like pillows, butter, or wood to be hard or soft depends completely upon your individual tastes and the purposes to which you wish to put these objects. The *how* questions that result betray a presupposition about the referent's qualities.

(28)   a. How soft is the mattress? (committed)
       b. How hard is the mattress? (committed)

A proposal with possible merit is that our conceptions of *good* and *clean* as positive qualities and *bad* and *dirty* as negative ones are strong enough that politeness dictates that the positive item be used pseudo-impartially so that we are not forced to commit to one side or the other of the merit or cleanliness scales when inquiring about these scales. So, we ask *How good is it?* even if we recognize the possibility that it is bad because asking *How bad is it?* would, in most situations, be impolite. This would be a case in which social knowledge, knowledge of how to interact with others, affects the distribution of adjectives. Note that the effects of this type of knowledge on distribution are less rigid than the effects of knowledge of the physical world. While *How tall is it?* is necessarily impartial, *How good is it?* is more ambiguous as to whether it is committed or impartial.

In conclusion, the distributional patterns frequently labeled 'marked' and 'unmarked' are too diverse to form monolithic categories and too interesting not to try to account for in some more explanatory way. This is not to say that the intentions of markedness theory are not good. Semioticians especially have looked for explanation for the marked/unmarked distinctions they posit. Andrews (1990, p. 137) states that "the purpose of markedness theory is to explain the properties of meaning that are invariant, not to justify a system based on statistical frequency." But in the shift from structuralist to generativist interest in language, requirements for explanatory adequacy have shifted, and the artifacts of markedness theory have been misappropriated. Battistella (1990, p. 6) notes that markedness has lacked serious, modern linguistic treatment because of the proliferation of reinterpretations of the terms 'marked' and 'unmarked', many of them at odds with each other and with the structuralists' original intent. Perhaps, then, we will not be able to produce a coherent discussion of asymmetrical distribution patterns until these misunderstood categories are abandoned. While the task of explaining these distributions is not a simple one, owing to the complexity and variety of distributions, it should not be an impossible one, for these distributions are far too regular within and across languages not to be predictable at some level.

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ACQUISITION IN CONTEXT:
THE DISCOURSE DOMAIN HYPOTHESIS OF INTERLANGUAGE VARIATION

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ABSTRACT

This study tests a refined version of the discourse domain hypothesis (Selinker & Douglas, 1985). It defines the discourse domain as a topic area in which learners demonstrate extensive, current, and important knowledge, a definition which includes both a cognitive dimension (insofar as the domain is a particularly well-developed schema) and an affective dimension (in the sense that the speaker's orientation to a domain topic shows high investment). Previous studies suggest that learners show enhanced performance on discourse domain topics, and the present study is designed to test this prediction.

Four ESL learners (*invested* subjects) were interviewed on major field and neutral topics, and their performance was compared with that of a control group of 4 learners (*uninvested* subjects) on two neutral topics. Data were analyzed for fluency, syntactic development, and discourse organization. Results indicate enhanced performance by one invested subject on all three measures on the major field topic. The remaining three invested subjects produced ambiguous results, whereas the control group showed little variation across topics.

The study therefore provides a measure of support for the discourse domain hypothesis and lays the foundations for further research in the area of topic-related variation.

According to the discourse domain hypothesis (Selinker & Douglas, 1985), learner language varies relative to topic of discourse, specifically in relation to topic areas in which learners are knowledgeable, on which they talk frequently, and which are important to them. The hypothesis has so far proved almost as untestable as it is intuitively appealing. It lacks both theoretical foundation and falsifiable predictions, and key concepts, including the *discourse domain* itself, have proven resistant to definition and operationalization. Yet the possibility of proposing a coherent theory to explain interlanguage variation among subject-specialist sec-

ond language learners remains seductive. For this reason, the discourse domain hypothesis seems worth pursuing, and this paper reports on a study designed to test a refined version of the hypothesis.

Little empirical support for the discourse domain hypothesis is yet available, although a number of second language studies of topic-related variation have produced results which can be interpreted in the light of the hypothesis. Selinker and Douglas conducted a series of case studies involving interviews of nonnative graduate students on work and life domain topics. They showed that subjects employed different communicative strategies in talk on their major fields than in talk on their own lives or culture (Selinker & Douglas, 1985, 1987b, 1989). For example, one learner appeared competent and confident in his work domain, able to circumvent vocabulary gaps and to correct his native interlocutor, but seemed less motivated to find vocabulary items and more deferential in life domain talk (Selinker & Douglas, 1985). These studies suggest that second language variation occurs across different discourse domains and can be perceived at the level of communication strategies and discourse or rhetorical organization.

Research within the language for specific purposes (LSP) paradigm has also focused on the relationship between content knowledge and linguistic performance. This orientation is illustrated in the a special issue of *English for Specific Purposes Journal* devoted to discourse domain research in an LSP context (Selinker & Douglas, 1987a). One study examined the French production of a Flemish undergraduate student in economics, who had been exposed to French through an LSP class oriented toward her major (Cornu & Delahaye, 1987). The learner exhibited more complex and varied syntactic forms and more flexible communication strategies when she talked about economics than when she discussed her hobbies and interests. In another study involving undergraduate LSP students in Zaire, the high frequency of low-level language errors found in second year economics students' essays on a major field topic was attributed to failure on the students' part to have developed a mature discourse domain for their major field (Skelton & Pindi, 1987). When the cognitive framework for a topic area is not yet in place, learners cannot rely on a solid knowledge base to inform second language production, and the extra resources needed to process new knowledge detract attention from form. Thus, while domain-related differences may appear at fairly early stages of knowledge development, the process of development of that knowledge may obscure domain-related variation and even obstruct second language production.

Studies of more advanced students and practicing professionals suggest that a high level of content knowledge in a particular field can compensate for restricted second language competence. Briggs (1987) examined the oral production of students in a graduate architectural design course during the final juried presentation, which simulated an architect's professional presentation to a client. Instructor-judges were more collegial toward an advanced student who had had several years of professional experience in his home country, and they rated his English as adequate, although Briggs noted that he "appeared not to exhibit an extensive verbal repertoire" (p. 155). The conclusion that native-speaker tolerance of nontargetlike production may be related to perceptions of content expertise finds its corollary in St. John's investigation of the written production of Spanish scientists enrolled in an ESP writing seminar (St. John, 1987). The author found that these academics had difficulty accepting that their content conrol over their work domain did not extend to its expression in English, and that they resented

editorial suggestions by native-speaking colleagues which went beyond syntax to the level of discourse and meaning. If native speakers are more favorably disposed to nonnative speakers who show competence in their field of expertise (as Briggs, 1987, suggested), nonnative experts may be less open to native-speaker input in this area. These two studies suggest that professional expertise can reduce motivation for interlanguage development: If native speakers can communicate reasonably successfully with their nonnative colleagues, then such learners have no incentive to move closer to target, and they may even perceive second language assistance as a threat to their professional face.

Authority by virtue of expertise also formed the focus of a language variation study by Woken and Swales (1989). Subjects were three dyads each formed by a nonnative computer science graduate student who instructed a nonspecialist American undergraduate in the use of a wordprocessing program. The nonnative speakers were found to talk more than their interlocutors, giving more directions and explanations and making more inquiries and corrections. At no time did they request or receive linguistic help. These results suggest that expertise can lend nonnative speakers greater authority and promote enhanced language production.

In related work on native-nonnative graduate student dyads talking on work domain and neutral topics, Zuengler and Bent reported similar findings (Zuengler, 1989; Zuengler & Bent, 1991). By manipulating the relative knowledge of interlocutors to produce dyads where either the native or the nonnative speaker was expert in his major field domain (or both speakers had equal knowledge), these studies tested the effect of content expertise on interaction. They found that greater content knowledge canceled out any bias toward native speaker monopolization of talk, on measures of amount of talk and dominance behavior such as interruptions and topic moves. These studies also compared talk on the work domain topic with talk on a neutral topic, food in speakers' own cultures. In practice, however, the food topic appeared to elicit domain talk from the nonnative speakers, because participants tended to focus on the culinary traditions of the nonnative speaker's country, which were unfamiliar to the American speaker, rather than on American traditions, which were familiar to both (Zuengler & Bent, 1991). The elicitation of neutral or nondomain talk remains a problem in discourse domain research.

These studies reveal a number of sources of variation related to the concept of discourse domain. One factor is clearly the extent of the content area knowledge possessed by speakers: This expertise may lead to more talk, more overt dominance behavior, and may override questions of intelligibility and grammatical accuracy which can surface in native-nonnative interaction on topics where the learner has less authority. Many of the studies cited above show language performance to be enhanced in talk on domain topics. Importance to the speaker is clearly another key element of the discourse domain construct, because speakers are more motivated to talk and indeed to appear competent on topics which are meaningful to them and which play a significant role in their lives. Finally these studies suggest that currency, or the frequency with which a speaker interacts on a given topic, is also relevant to the discourse domain hypothesis. Learners may perform better on discourse domain topics because they have practiced interacting in the target language on those topics.

Theoretical framework

The findings of these recent studies of topic-related variation provide a promising start-

ing point for a refined definition of the discourse domain which places the construct within a wider theoretical framework and provides a basis for predictions within the discourse domain hypothesis. Because topic knowledge is clearly an essential component of the discourse domain, it seems appropriate to relate the domain to the established concept of *schema*, or dynamic knowledge structure (Bartlett, 1932). The discourse domain can be viewed as a particularly well-developed schema, which is *elaborated*, in the sense that it contains a substantial amount of information, *central* to a speaker's network of interconnected schemata, and conse-

Figure 1: Domain dimensions, with topic and speaker characteristics

quently *active,* or frequently invoked. However, in its original conception, the notion of discourse domain encompasses more than topic area. It is not simply a topic of expertise for speakers, but one which is important to them. An affective component must accordingly be added to the cognitive dimension to account for the particular speaker orientation to discourse domain topics. Domain speakers can therefore be characterized as *knowledgeable,* on the basis of their expertise in the topic, *confident,* due to practice effects related to the currency of the topic, and *invested,* because of the central position occupied by this topic in their lives.

These cognitive and affective dimensions of the discourse domain are shown in Figure 1. Schema and domain are viewed as parallel constructs, varying in their degree of development along three continua, the dimensions of expertise, practice, and investment, which include both topic and speaker characteristics. This perspective permits the following definition of the discourse domain: a topic area which is characterized by extensive knowledge (for which speakers possess an elaborated schema, and which they control completely), by current knowledge (which speakers use frequently in interaction, and about which they are confident), and by important knowledge (which is central to speakers' networks of schemata, and in which they are invested).

This definition sheds some light on the findings of the studies reviewed above: Learners show enhanced performance on major field topics because of a practice effect. Discourse domain topics are by definition current, and improved language production due to practice is to be expected. The other dimensions of the discourse domain reinforce this practice effect, because investment is likely to increase motivation to engage in interaction, and expertise may free learners' memory resources for attention to language. For these reasons, then, enhanced second language performance is predicted on discourse domain topics.

Empirical support for this prediction is provided in the following language examples from a case study designed to investigate features of talk on discourse domain topics (Whyte, 1992a). The subject (F), an international doctoral student in mathematics, demonstrated extensive, current, and important knowledge in talk with a naive native-speaking interlocutor (A), on a major field topic, the mathematical definition of chaos. Part of this episode is shown in example (1), where F responds to A's request for an explanation of chaos with highly structured talk. He begins with the intention of contrasting "chaos" with "deterministic behavior" but immediately realizes that his interlocutor is likely to need a gloss for the technical term *deterministic.* He begins the gloss, but is interrupted by a request for an example. Having completed both side sequences, F returns to his original plan, as indicated by "but what I was saying," and completes the intended contrast. He then goes on to give an example of waves breaking to illustrate his point. The underlined portions in example (1) show the argument structure.[1]

(1)

A ... what's the definition of chaos?

F Oh it's hard to put in nonmathematical terms but, *chaos is the like um how something which, over, um, a certain period of time sounded and looked pretty much deterministic,* that means if you know the state of   something, at a given time, you can predict and, if you know some evolution, behavior, you can predict what the state   will be at a later time

A   /mhm/
A Like something like what, like a piece of matter?   Just anything?
F   /I dunno/
F This is the smallest, the the simplest physical system you can think about is something I dunno you
take, in the gravity field you take a stone you throw it and it falls down
and you know the laws
A   /mhm/
F of gravitation and you can predict the movement if you know the initial position and whatever and
you know the behavior and you know where the stone is at some time and you know what the speed
is and, then you can predict what it will be at a later time and you can predict the position that it was.
This is what is called the determining, the deterministic system, *so but what I was saying* it turns out
that in the real world in physics, uh it can happen that over a small period of time, *a system a
physical system looks did look developed pr etty much deterministic, and then, after a finite period
of time, stops looking deterministic, and this is this is chaos* , um *to give you some sort of hokey
example*, um, think about a a fluid, which is flowing, think about I dunno simple waves, uh on on a
shore . . .

From this episode, it appears that domain talk is characterized by lengthy time at talk, including long turns, a finding that is consonant with the elaborated nature of the speaker's schema for the topic. The complexity and flexibility of the discourse domain schema is further revealed in the speaker's ability to follow a plan across intervening side sequences and to modify his contribution to fit his perception of his interlocutor's needs. Such flexibility implies a practice effect, supporting the inclusion of the notion of currency as a component of the discourse domain. Finally, the importance of the topic to the speaker can be inferred from the length of the turn and the obvious attempts to make the topic accessible to his interlocutor.

However, affective factors are also involved in domain talk. A speaker with more extensive knowledge of a topic than his interlocutor has higher status, which may lead to didactic talk. In example (1), F took the role of teacher, instructing A in the theory of chaos. Higher status may, however, make a speaker reluctant to engage a technical topic with a lay interlocutor, as occurred at the beginning of the same episode, shown in example (2). On four occasions during the 8-turn exchange, F attempts to close the episode, underlining his expert status by contrasting A's borrowing of a "high-tech" term with his need for a "nonmathematical" explanation, and showing great reluctance to engage a topic for which his interlocutor appears so unprepared. A is forced to take a low-status position - "I don't know anything about mathematics" - and to make a very direct appeal - "can you like try to explain it?" - before F finally consents to discuss the topic.

(2)

A So are you in the same, d'you study the same kind, are you in the same uh area as Ivan?
F Yeah we're in the same in the same field, *yeah, same sort of thing*
A Chaos, are you studying chaos?
F Oh, if you wanna, *if you like high-tech names, maybe*
A [laughs] He just kind of explain   was tryin' to explain something to me,
some math
F   /there is/
A theory of chaos,   I have actually no idea what he was talking about

F   /this is, this is/
F   There, there there is a connection with mathematical theory of chaos.   That's not the main thing, but
    it really is connected to this, *yeah*.
A   Well can you expan- can you like try to explain it I don' t know anything about mathemat-
    ics, except arithmetic.   So some kind of mathematical model about how things, how
    a random event occurs
                    /mhm/
    or something? What is cha- what's the definition of chaos?
F   *Oh it's hard to put in nonmathematical terms* but, . . .

These examples illustrate the importance of affective factors related to the cognitive di-
mension of the extent of knowledge present in a discourse domain. In example (2), F showed
reluctance to engage the chaos topic belonging to his major field domain because of the differ-
ence in knowledge between his interlocutor and himself. Later, however, as was shown in
example (1), he allowed himself to be placed in the role of teacher, another way to frame his
greater knowledge in this area.

If this study tentatively identified discourse features related to dimensions of the dis-
course domain, it did not, however, elicit sufficient nondomain talk for comparison purposes.
A second study designed to allow such comparison examined 4 midcareer professionals in
interviews covering work and life domain topics, as well as the nondomain topics of a folk tale
and arranging to view a videotape of the interview (Whyte, 1992b). Results of an analysis of
fluency (time at talk, turn length, and hesitation) and grammatical accuracy (copula, noun mark-
ing, and past tense marking) revealed that two speakers showed differences in accuracy and
fluency across domain and nondomain topics: Both were more accurate on domain topics, and
one also produced more talk in his work domain than on other topics. However, perhaps more
important than the results of this study were the methodological issues it raised.

Methodological considerations

The first problem concerns independent support for the domain and nondomain status of
topics. In Whyte (1992b), the domain status of life talk was assumed, that of work talk was
inferred from subjects' educational qualifications, professional experience, and career plans,
and the nondomain character of the remaining topics was judged by the absence of such crite-
ria. However, subjects sometimes responded to prompts intended to elicit nondomain talk by
invoking domain topics. In example (3), Carl, a Czech psychiatrist, has been asked to relate a
folktale from his country as a means of initiating a nondomain episode. Yet he relates the topic
to his work domain by placing the narrative in a child psychology frame, focusing on children's
reactions to the story and on the psychological reasons for these reactions. The underlined
portions indicate such evaluative comments:

(3)

C   . . . maybe uh you know you know uh the story   about Li-little Red Riding Hood
J   /yeah/   /yeah/
C   about about l-little girl who uh-h-h mo- whose mother uh send her with some cake

                    during a Sunday
J   /mhm/
C   afternoon to uh her her grandmother   she she has to uh go through a wood by the wood
    and uh
J
                                                              /yeah/
C   uh *it's a quite a-adventurous uh story* or the she's a very uh little girl and when she when she uh
    passed
    the wood and she checked the door of uh her grandmother she found finally woof uh coyote woof in
    the
     in the   house of her grandmother so uh *there is a quite popular uh place of the story* when she's
    coming
     entering the house of her mother and uh   g r a n d -
    mother and uh uh she is looking at the bed
    uh where where
J
                                                                    /mhm/
C   grandmother   should lay and she saw that it's not correct something's some-
    thing something's
J   /mhm/
C   wrong because there's no no uh she grandum grandmother changed her face and so so *that is*
    a popularpopular place of it and um and uh lot of childr en uh like to to uh to to r eplay   this this

J

                                                                    /that scene/
    C   *yeah this this scene this place*   *of   the*
    story and uh uh-h the-e-e repeat sentences as uh

                        /uh-huh/
C   like uh oh my grandmother why why do you have so so uh \big\   eyes and why do
    you have so J

                ∧uh-huh∨
C   big teeth . . .
    :
    :
C   . . . *it's quite aggressive and maybe therefore a lot of children uh like it to to uh. They know actually*
    that   the end is OK
                        it's a happy end uh so they they
J   /uh-huh uh-huh/
C   *can uh spend maybe quite uh well emotional time better with playing about uh about the scene*
    where uh woof or uh coyote is, eating the grandmother . . .

By concentrating on the audience's reaction to the story rather than the actual sequence of
events, the speaker moves from narrative to interpretation, and thus from neutral ground to his
work domain. This example illustrates the perils of assigning nondomain topics by default.
Like the food topic in Zuengler's (1989) study, the folktale topic in this study failed to elicit
neutral talk. One way of avoiding this problem may be to ask subjects about their views on

potential neutral topics before recording.

There are a number of other topic-related variables to be taken into account in designing a study to test the discourse domain hypothesis. One is the cognitive complexity of topics: A number of studies have contrasted work domain (or major field) and life domain (or own culture, hobbies) with the aim of isolating domain-related variation (e.g., Cornu & Delahaye, 1987; Selinker & Douglas, 1985; Whyte, 1992a, 1992b). Because, however, these topics are likely to differ along the parameter of cognitive complexity, with life topics probably more "cognitively manageable" (Tapia, 1993) than work or research-related topics, these studies cannot claim that any variation detected is due solely to discourse domain effects. Another uncontrolled variable is task: Talking on different topics may mean changing modes, from the personal narrative requested by life domain prompts, to mini–lecture in the work-domain, or to apparently aimless conversation on assigned "neutral" topics (cf. Selinker & Douglas, 1985; Whyte, 1992a, 1992b; Zuengler, 1989; Zuengler & Bent, 1991). This factor, too, may contaminate data and confound results. A third relevant variable is that of context of situation, insofar as speakers' perceptions of the appropriateness of a given topic in the recording situation may vary. Some learners appear to view life domain topics as an invasion of privacy, and prefer to discuss work and studies with an unfamiliar interviewer; others are willing to discuss families and personal histories, but are reluctant to engage work domain topics with a nonspecialist interlocutor (Whyte, 1992a, 1992b).

A final methodological consideration involves the control of both the cognitive and the affective dimensions of the discourse domain. A strict test of the hypothesis requires the researcher to demonstrate that topic-related variation is attributable not just to more extensive knowledge on one topic compared to another, but rather to greater knowledge of *and* greater investment in that topic on the part of the learner. This requirement suggests a research design where invested subjects talking on domain and nondomain topics are compared with a control group of subjects talking on two neutral topics.

The present study aims to test the refined version of the discourse domain hypothesis outlined above. It starts from a definition of the discourse domain as a topic in which learners have expertise, investment, and practice, and it examines support for the prediction that learners will show enhanced production on such topics. In so doing, the study attempts to control for a number of variables which have clouded research results in this area to date.

METHOD

Subjects

Eight subjects were recruited from Levels 6 and 7 of the Intensive English Program in the Center for English Language Training at Indiana University on the basis of their availability for interview at the time of data collection. They were advanced learners of English who had been in the Program for 4-12 months and had TOEFL scores ranging from 470-580.

Topics

Subjects were interviewed by the researcher on two topics: Topic A, their major field, or

a topic they had selected for a class research paper or oral presentation assignment during the session before the interview, and Topic B, a neutral topic selected by the researcher from a Level 6 class textbook.

Independent support for the classification of topics as domain and nondomain was collected by questionnaire immediately before the interview. Subjects answered questions about their education and professional training, plans for study in the United States, and career goals. Their answers were used as an indication of expertise and investment in their major field topics. Subjects were also asked to select Topic A, described on the questionnaire as "your major field, or a topic you used for your Level 6 research paper or Level 7 oral presentation." Four subjects had graduate or other specialized training in their major fields, including related professional experience, plans to study at the graduate level in these fields in the United States, and the intention to pursue careers in these fields. All four selected their major field, which was also the topic of their research papers or of an oral presentation, as Topic A. These data are taken as independent confirmation of the domain status of the major field topic for those speakers, who are termed *invested* speakers in this study.

The remaining four subjects selected research paper or oral presentation topics for Topic A, and in three cases these topics did not coincide with their major fields. The fourth subject was an entering freshman intending to major in a field related to his Topic A; however, he had no prior training or professional experience in this field and was therefore not considered to have developed a mature discourse domain for this topic. On the basis of these data, talk on Topic A for these subjects is classified as nondomain talk; these subjects served as a control group, and are termed *uninvested* speakers.

Independent evidence for the nondomain status of Topic B for all subjects was established through an 8-item multiple choice section in the pre-interview questionnaire. These questions tested the extent, currency, and importance of subjects' knowledge of four topics chosen from the Level 6 reading/writing textbook: education, women's rights, democracy, and the media (Franks, 1990). The topic in which each subject demonstrated the least interest was selected as Topic B for that subject.

In this way, the study attempted to ensure uniformity of cognitive complexity, familiarity, and appropriateness to the situation across topics: All subjects had recently spent time reading, writing, and talking about their chosen Topic A in the context of working on their papers for the research class; Topic B was a topic of discussion in a reading/writing class. All eight subjects also knew the researcher as a teacher in their English program, and it was therefore expected that both topics would seem appropriate in an interview with her.

A final effort was made to ensure similar task demands across topics by imposing a problem-solution format on each topic. Subjects were given a prompt card with their chosen Topic A written on one side, and the assigned Topic B on the reverse. For each topic, the same two questions were also printed on the card: "What are some of the important problems or questions related to this topic?" and "what solutions or answers can be found for these questions?" Subjects were given a few minutes to consider the topics and to make notes on the card if they wished.

Details of subjects' backgrounds and interview topics are given in Table 1. Readers will notice a slight mismatch between groups, with the invested group a little older and more proficient than the control group, and all three female subjects in the study in the uninvested group.

Data collection

After completing the pre-interview questionnaire and spending a few moments prepar-

Table 1: Subjects' backgrounds and interview topics

INVESTED SUBJECTS	FL	JS	RF	TK	Group Mean
TOEFL	587	547	580	517	558
L1	Spanish (Panama)	Spanish (Colombia)	Spanish (Colombia)	Japanese	
GENDER	male	male	male	male	
AGE	25	26	29	23	26
MAJOR	law	dentistry	telecommunications	Shinto religion	
TOPIC A	takeover practices	gum disease	educational TV	life and death in Shinto	
TOPIC B	the media	women's rights	women's rights	the media	
UNINVESTED SUBJECTS	AK	KH	KL	NY	Group Mean
TOEFL	470	553	540	477	510
L1	Japanese	Korean	Swedish	Japanese	
GENDER	female	female	female	male	
AGE	24	22	25	23	24
MAJOR	music	English	nonstudent	mass communications	
TOPIC A	US civil rights	alcohol advertising	the Amish	racing sponsorship	
TOPIC B	the media	democracy	education	women's rights	

ing the two topics on the card, subjects underwent a 20-30-minute oral interview with the researcher, which was recorded on audio cassette. Each interview began with the warm-up question, "why did you come to Bloomington?" The question was intended both as an easy question, which subjects were likely to have rehearsed, and also as a check on the information provided about their major fields in the background questionnaire. The interviewer then in- vited the subject to talk about Topic A, followed by Topic B, using the questions on the prompt cards and other content questions when these were necessary to keep the conversation going.

After the interview, subjects completed a second questionnaire intended to verify the expected difference in domain status of the two interview topics. The questionnaire included 5 multiple choice items concerning the extent, currency, and importance of the topics, and a free response prompt asking subjects to comment on their performance, to be answered first for Topic A, then for Topic B.

ANALYSIS

Selection of measures to test the discourse domain hypothesis obviously depends on the researcher's interpretation of the "enhanced performance" predicted in domain talk. Much of the previous research on topic-related interlanguage variation has focused on qualitative dis- course analysis (Selinker & Douglas, 1985, 1987b; Whyte, 1992a) and on quantitative mea- of conversational involvement and dominance (Woken & Swales, 1987; Zuengler, 1989;

Zuengler & Bent, 1991). The present study combines examines quantitative measures, such as time at talk, in order to characterize the overall fluency of learners' production. However, it also includes an investigation of syntactic development, because it has been claimed that the discourse domain influences "the syntactic units of interlanguage development" (Selinker & Douglas, 1985, p. 199). The study goes on to provide a close qualitative analysis of the discourse organization of individual speakers on particular topics in an attempt to explain the patterns which emerge from the quantitative analysis.

Fluency

Four discourse variables were investigated by timing learner turns and dividing each into clauses. *Time at talk* for each subject was calculated as the total time spent by each subject on each topic, expressed as a percentage of the total interview talk by both speakers on that topic. *Mean turn length* was calculated by dividing the total time at talk of the learner by the number of learner turns.

Because both the measures of learner time at talk and mean turn length are to some extent dependent on the behavior of the interviewer (and not only the learner), it is important also to investigate other aspects of learner speech which are less interactionally determined. One such measure is the *mean number of clauses produced per minute* of speech, which provides an indication of speech rate in terms of the number of propositional units expressed in a given period of time. The number of clauses per minute is calculated by dividing the learner time at talk in seconds by the total number of clauses produced by the learner on each topic. A second measure of speech rate is simply the *mean number of words per minute*, which is calculated by dividing the total learner time at talk for each topic by the total number of words uttered.

Syntactic development

Following Bardovi-Harlig and Bofman's (1989) analysis of the syntactic accuracy and surface errors in the written compositions of advanced ESL learners, syntactic development is measured in terms of utterance complexity and error rate. Grammatical complexity is measured by the *number of clauses per t-unit*. Accuracy is measured by the *number of errors per clause*. Errors are classified as syntactic errors (including word order, absence of constituents, and sentence-combining), morphological errors (involving nominal and verbal morphology, determiners and articles, and prepositions), and lexical-idiomatic (or vocabulary) errors.

Discourse organization

Following Selinker and Douglas (1985, 1987b, 1989), discourse is compared across topics and across speakers by identifying "analogous rhetorical units." Fine-grained discourse analysis is used in the present study to support and amplify findings of the quantitative analyses of fluency and syntactic development.

RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

To support the prediction of enhanced performance in domain talk, invested subjects should show greater fluency on Topic A than Topic B. Similarly, in terms of syntactic development, their talk on Topic A should be characterized by greater complexity and lower error rates than talk on Topic B. These quantitative differences should be supported by qualitative differences in discourse organization across topics: In line with previous findings illustrated in examples (1) through (3), it is predicted that domain talk will show evidence of more planning (e.g., complex discourse structure), more personalization of the topic (e.g., self-reference, emotional reactions), and generally greater enthusiasm and communicative effort. These differences across topics for the invested group should be balanced by a lack of such variation in the control group.

Results indicate that only one invested speaker varied consistently across the domain and nondomain topics in terms of fluency, syntactic development, and discourse organization. Although results for the other three invested subjects are more ambiguous, none of the uninvested subjects showed variation which would indicate a domain effect. In the following, quantitative measures of fluency and syntactic development are discussed, followed by a qualitative analysis of the discourse organization shown by individual speakers.

Quantitative analysis

Measures of fluency and syntactic development are presented in Tables 2 and 3. Looking

Table 2: Fluency for invested and uninvested subjects

INVESTED SUBJECTS	FL		JS		RF		TK	
	Topic A	Topic B	Topic A	Topic B	Topic A	Topic B	Topic A	Topic B
interview time	212	536	1324	427	547	663	748	645
learner time	1157	489	1239	389	507	569	565	573
% time at talk	96	91	94	91	93	86	76	89
turns	13	6	41	10	12	8	18	9
mean turn length	89	82	30	39	42	71	31	64
clauses	306	143	338	106	201	267	111	88
clauses per minute	16	18	16	16	24	28	12	9
words	2545	768	2354	688	1228	1419	627	579
words per minute	132	94	114	106	145	150	67	61

UNINVESTED SUBJECTS	AK		KH		KL		NY	
	Topic A	Topic B	Topic A	Topic B	Topic A	Topic B	Topic A	Topic B
interview time	734	332	366	412	759	447	663	423
learner time	546	250	266	249	580	366	524	347
% time at talk	74	75	73	60	76	82	79	82
turns	26	17	16	14	16	8	21	10
mean turn length	21	15	17	18	36	46	25	35
clauses	123	63	54	64	202	124	91	57
clauses per minute	14	15	12	15	21	20	10	10
words	840	383	311	409	1324	737	713	453
words per minute	92	92	70	99	137	121	82	78

first at the invested subjects, greater fluency on Topic A is apparent for only one of the invested subjects, FL, a lawyer, who discussed first "takeover practices" (Topic A), followed by "the role of the media in our society" (Topic B). FL took more time at talk on Topic A, (96%) than on Topic B (91%) and also took longer turns (89 seconds on average for Topic A, 82 seconds for Topic B). Although he produced more clauses per minute on Topic B, the nondomain topic, he produced more words on Topic A (132 words per minute, compared with 94 words per minute on Topic B). FL also shows the clearest difference in grammatical complexity and

Table 3: Syntatic development figures for invested and univested subjects

| INVESTED | FL | | JS | | RF | | TK | |
	Topic A	Topic B	Topic A	Topic B	Topic A	Topic B	Topic A	Topic B
t-units	78	46	37	40	134	71	62	33
clauses	306	145	338	106	201	267	112	88
clauses per t-unit	2.62	2.01	2.09	2.52	1.55	2.24	1.54	1.35
errors	117	76	185	51	40	32	53	47
errors per clause	0.38	0.52	0.55	0.48	0.2	0.12	0.47	0.53
UNINVESTED	**AK**		**KH**		**KL**		**NY**	
	Topic A	Topic B	Topic A	Topic B	Topic A	Topic B	Topic A	Topic B
t-units	78	46	37	40	134	71	62	33
clauses	123	63	54	64	202	124	91	57
clauses per t-unit	1.55	1.37	1.46	1.6	1.49	1.75	1.47	1.73
errors	111	43	37	39	79	47	83	68
errors per clause	0.9	0.68	0.68	0.61	0.39	0.38	0.91	1.19

accuracy across topics. On Topic A, he produced more complex speech (2.62 clauses per t-unit, compared with 2.01 clauses per t-unit on Topic B) and fewer errors, averaging just over 1 error in every 3 clauses in talk on Topic A as against 1 in 2 for Topic B.

The other three invested subjects, JS, RF, and TK, showed less clear patterns of fluency across topics. All produced longer turns on Topic B, which may be an effect of the ordering of topics in the interviews. All subjects spoke first on Topic A (in order to avoid the potential disruption of talk on the domain topic by poor performance on Topic B) and thus talk on the domain topic may have served as a warm-up for Topic B. If this is indeed the case, the domain effect shown by FL is all the more striking.

In terms of syntactic development, TK patterns parallel to FL, but the differences across topics are less marked. Given his youth and overall lower proficiency relative to the other invested subjects, it seems possible that Topic A is an emerging domain for TK, and that a stronger domain effect may appear in later stages of his interlanguage development. JS and RF, on the other hand, show greater syntactic development in talk on Topic B. This may be an ordering effect, as mentioned above, or it may be that Topic B did, in fact, serve as a prompt for domain talk, in spite of the precautions taken in the study to ensure a neutral topic.

For the uninvested group, less variation in fluency across topics is apparent, and no clear patterns emerge for any individual. This finding provides additional support for the interpretation that the higher fluency shown by FL on Topic A is indeed a discourse domain effect. Table 3 indicates that the control group also shows less variation in syntactic development across ʼpics than was the case with the invested subjects. KH and KL produced more complex

speech on Topic B, but showed little difference in accuracy. AK and NY showed greater complexity and lower accuracy on the same topic, and their scores were the lowest of the eight subjects interviewed. It appears that these subjects were working at the limits of their competence. One might conclude that any topic-related variation is likely to be obscured by production problems in subjects at this level of proficiency.

This quantitative analysis has shown a clear domain effect for one invested speaker, FL, with perhaps a more modest effect for TK. No such effect was found for the remaining two invested speakers, JS and RF, and no pattern of variation emerged in the uninvested subjects.

Qualitative analysis

To present convincing evidence in support of the discourse domain hypothesis, it is instructive to supplement quantitative measures of fluency and syntactic development with fine-grained analysis of discourse organization. Once again, the aim is to show differences in the structure of discourse across topics for invested speakers, and an absence of such differences in the control group. In line with the quantitative findings, discourse analysis reveals that FL produced more effective discourse organization on Topic A than Topic B, constructing more structured and complex discourse in domain talk. JS and RF exhibited no such variation, producing similar discourse features on both topics. Although the fourth invested speaker, TK, was unable to structure his contributions for full communicative effect, his domain talk was characterized by greater effort to interact and to use his interlocutor's contributions to build further turns. The uninvested subjects did not show enhanced performance on either topic.

In the following discussion of these three patterns of behavior shown by the invested speakers, examples of domain talk by each speaker are compared with nondomain talk and with talk by uninvested speakers on both topics. Enhanced performance by FL in domain talk is shown in terms of more effective *planning*. Lack of variation across topics by JS and RF is explained with reference to their *personalization* of domain topics. Finally, modest domain effects in the speech of TK are identified in his use of *scaffolding* to pursue communication. Each feature of discourse organization is examined in turn.

The best evidence in support of the discourse domain hypothesis to emerge from this study is the superior fluency and syntactic development shown by FL on his major field topic, as compared to the uniform performance across topics by the uninvested subjects. An analysis of the transcripts should therefore provide examples where FL shows more extensive, practiced, and invested speech on Topic A than on Topic B, with the lengthy, structured turns identified with domain talk apparent in the major field topic (cf. example 1). The transcripts of the uninvested subjects should show no such pattern. Data from the interviews of FL and KL, the most fluent and accurate of the uninvested subjects, provide support for this claim. Comparable rhetorical units are ensured by selecting responses to an *or*-question prompt from the interviewer.

Planning

Evidence of planning by FL in domain talk can be seen in the long, structured turn and unambiguous discourse markers in example (4). Toward the end of talk on Topic A, "takeover practices," FL is asked why he chose the topic. His reply is highly structured, including a statement, "in Panama it's not really a problem," support for this statement, and a clearly

marked example, "I will give you an example." This high level of organization gives the impression of advance planning, an impression which is further strengthened when the speaker continues with a rhetorical question which is not a response to an interlocutor query, but rather part of a preconceived expository plan. This digression on personal corporations is closed with a summary, again clearly introduced by the conjunction "so."

(4)

I   So is this is this a topic that that uh is relevant in Panama or is this something you've got interested in when you got here?

FL [thesis]   No, uh I was interesting to read about this topic because *in Panama it's not really a problem*

I   /uh-huh/

FL [support] *and it's not really a problem because* our corporations, uh in Panama uh, are incorporated looking for other kind of services not really to develop each corporation as uh, active uh entity in the uh economic marketplace, OK.

I   /mhm/

FL [example]   *I will give you an example. Uh, an example with percentages.* Uh, in Panama
     more or less   eighty percent of the corporations that are incorporated in Panama and that are
     sell to other   countries to people who lives in other countries, eighty percent of them are used
     as   personal corporations.

I   /mhm/

FL [rhetorical   *What do I mean with personal corporations ?*
     question]

FL Corporations that you incorporate just to put in name of those corporations your real property , your assets, and your money. In that way you can keep your money and your assets and your uh (brought?) uh properties in good uh you can put safe in name of a corporation or it' s not in your own name or it's not in the name of a corp- of in the case of American of the United States it' s not in name in the name of a corporation which was incorporated in United States and uh, because of that a corporation uh that the courts must get uh you know money or   whatever if you are sue in the United States or in other countries

I   /I see/

FL [summary]   *So you buy a corporation in Panama*   *and you put all your assets*

I   /yeah/

FL *and all your real property in name of that corporation*   a corporation in which . . .

I   /mhm/

FL goes on to provide a full answer to the question: He became interested in takeover practices in the US because of their rarity in Panama, where most corporations are not active.

     The complex and clearly marked discourse of talk on Topic A shown in example (4) gives an impression of planning and practice. It recalls the similarly complex discourse organization shown by F in domain talk in example (1). In contrast, FL's speech on Topic B, "the role of the media," appears less structured and more spontaneous, as is illustrated in example (5). Asked whether the media causes social inequality or simply advertises the fact, FL appears to be thinking on his feet, producing a chain of ideas, each point generating the next: The media affects us, its effect depends on individual programs, negative effects on children can be mitigated by parental supervision, and a change in attitude to the media is required if parents are to ulfill this role. It is hard to identify a thesis statement, far less support, examples, or a clear

conclusion. As an answer to the interviewer's question, it is in many ways less communica-tively effective than the domain talk response in (4).

(5)

I   You think it shows the unfairness or it actually causes unfairness?

FL I don't think that causes that it it it it causes uh directly . I think that it shows uh how the injustice is OK but because you can' t do anything about that then you began to interact in the same way. So it has two sides it's like try to say what what' s first the egg or the chicken   [point #1]   that's the same question. Uh the real issue is that *media is there and it's affecting us*, every time, *in positive way*

I   /yeah/

FL which with we have good programs   *and in negative way* with bad programs.

I   /uh-huh/

FL [point #2]   So the uh the uh *the uh good or bad effects that you can get fr om media depends on the content   the content of the programs* and the messages that media broadcasts every day

I

  /uh-huh/

FL not depends on media itself depends on the content of the programs that they broadcast every [point #3]   day. Uh, *I think that we can uh deal with these (?) r eality of the media if we can get mor e supervision uh from from mother and father* from more parental supervision on children uh [point #4]   trying to look forward the bad programs for for them. Uh, *of course we need a change in in   attitude a change in mind in the whole society* because . . .

From examples (4) and (5), then, it seems that FL is able to produce more structured talk on the domain topic than on the neutral topic. No such difference is apparent in the data on KL, who talked first on her research paper topic, "the Amish," and then on "the role of education."

In example (6), from talk on the Amish topic, it is apparent that the speaker is aiming at fairly sophisticated rhetorical organization. Asked about the uncertain future of the Amish, she predicts that more will leave the community in the coming years, offering as support evi-dence of current problems surrounding "people in their own communities that have to work outside." To illustrate, she contrasts the "plain" lifestyle of the Amish in the past and the "decorations" common nowadays. She continues with a second, more specific problem, girls who "earn more money," and attempts to make a parallel contrast between the past and present. However, this fairly complex argument structure is not clearly marked: The thesis itself is not stated outright, but must be inferred by the interlocutor, the supporting arguments are not ex-plicitly linked to the main argument, and there is no concluding summary to drive the point home. For these reasons, the contribution is fairly difficult to interpret as a response to the interviewer's question.

(6)

I   And is it is the community dying out then or is the separate communities dying out?
               :

KL [thesis] . . . maybe people would would prefer to live in the broader American society than They have problem but uh anyway it' s still it hasn' t increased there' s still around seven or eight percent that leaves the church   \but\   it hasn' t increased as much

```
        now but I
I                                                      /uh-huhV
KL                      think they will face it more uh during the nineties
    because they have
I                                                      /yeah/
KL [problem 1]         problems they say they see people in their own communities that have to work
    outside in our            society
I                                      /uh-huh/
KL [before]  and they change and uh Amish people uh they live very plain they are not allowed to have
             curtains pictures on the wall, the carpets, uh not not nothing that,
             uh, uh, gl-                            no decorations
I                           /decorations/
KL [now]     and uh people that worked outside start to have small decorations  anyway and
[problem 2]  and then a lot of the girls then they earn more money uh
[before]     before they had help each other  generations
I                                                      /mhm/
KL                      generation and if you were about seventeen eighteen and not married uh they
    don't marry                before twenty uh you work in another family' s house with housework
    and earn maybe
[now]        fifty dollars a week it's the same money you can earn in a day in the, world
             but now they have problems with it                      noone helps each other . . .
I                                            /mhm/
```

Unlike the clearly marked rhetorical organization of FL's talk in example (4), the struc-
ture of KL's contribution in example (6) is not overtly marked. The listener might understand
the speaker's argument more easily if each example of the Amish problems were marked as
such, and the contrast between past and present indicated with phrases such as "in the past" or
"until recently," and then "now" or "nowadays." Alternatively, the argument might have been
structured chronologically, beginning with past practices and moving on to present difficulties
as an indication of future problems. Such strategies would reflect the kind of advance planning
associated with fully mastered and rehearsed domain topics; the lack of effective structuring
devices in (6) is consonant with the nondomain status of the topic for KL.

A similar failure to mark discourse structure again characterizes talk by the same speaker
on Topic B, "the role of education." In this instance, in response to a question concerning the
West's responsibility to support education in developing countries, the speaker attempts to
articulate a nuanced position: "we have to help them . . . but I think we have to be careful."
Particularly striking in the excerpt is the unannounced example in line 7, where KL moves
from an abstract explanation of her views to an impersonation of those who seek to exploit
developing countries.

(7)

```
I              Do you think the west has a responsibility then to help developing countries or do you
    think it's            just a nice thing to do if we have money?
KL [position]           Yeah but if the things can. I think we have to do that . I don't think that's a nice
    idea.  But that [problem]       uh uh, I think we have done it wrong because we take our values, sh-
    from theirs, and uh
             then force them to want our way of living, o- our society                uh
I                                                                    /mm/
```

```
/I know what                    you're saying uh/
KL [example]                              "I think you would like to have a tape r ecorder wouldn't you
    we can
I
KL                     make more tape recorders and send them ther e"
I                                                                    /uh-huh/
KL [position]             but I think we have to help them no- no- not to make them uh benefits, uh profits
    money bu-                          that's a cycle circle too if we help them there they can get something
    and then we can
            give something                    it's not
I                      /mhm/
KL [solution]             but I think we have to be careful
```

As in example (6), KL appears to have a complex argument in mind, but lacks the means to mark her argument in a nativelike manner and thus to convey her thoughts effectively.

From examples (4) through (7), it is apparent that whereas the domain speaker, FL, shows more sophisticated discourse organization on domain talk, the uninvested speaker, KL, shows similar patterns of complex organization yet a lack of discourse markers in talk on both topics. These data support the hypothesis that domain talk is characterized by highly structured, planned discourse.

Personalization

Quantitative analysis of the interviews by two invested speakers, JS and RF, revealed enhanced syntactic development on Topic B, suggesting that Topic B may have elicited domain talk for these speakers. Some evidence in support of this interpretation is provided by a close examination of the interview of RF, who appeared to be personally invested in both Topic A, "educational TV," and Topic B, "the role of women."

Example (8) is taken from talk on Topic A, where RF is asked to describe the training required for his job in educational media in Colombia. The frequency of personal reference is indicative of the personal relevance of this topic to the speaker.

(8)

```
RF Uh well uh, when I began to work communication I mean I I've finished my undergraduate studies
    and then I          went to work for the government a kind of uh educational company a training
    company. . . . So when I began        to work then I was in charge of the communication depart-
    ment so we began to think uh how to use
    media                         and we began to make a radio educational radio program and then
    after a couple of years we
I          /mhm/
RF began to work on television when I mean I told you about the local channel . . .  And for year I
    studied there       as an instructor, so I got my my degree as an instructor in social communication
            that is my
I
            /mhm/
RF major as a as undergraduate student, and also I got my certification as instr uctor.  So that's the
    training I have for education  and I've been teaching in a kind of technical institution  uh during six
    or seven
I                                  /mhm/
```

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RF years   at night so I've been teaching for some years so that' s experience
I   /uh-huh/

Less personal involvement would be expected in Topic B, if truly neutral talk had been elicited. On the contrary, however, RF appears highly motivated to discuss the topic of "the role of women," as the following example illustrates:

(9)

RF *it's really an interesting topic* and, I would say that we have to make a a di- a distinction because you can   see this topic, a according to y-your cultural values, because for example in, we know that *in Colombia* we   have I mean women women are of high right and things are- women are doing here, but something that we   can we   can see is that women in Colombia they still they still keep being women you know *I I I I'm gonna*   *would like to explain* . . .

In fact, RF provides ample evidence of the relevance of this topic to his own life: "I have had many experiences," and "I had two bad experiences," which he goes on to detail. He even relates the topic to his own family:

(10)

RF . . . I think primarily in *my wife is working* and and I think that she has to keep working she' s studying too and I think that's really important   for her and she has to do that as long as she
I   /mhm/
RF wants but I think that *when we get our babies we have to think about tha* t and it is necessary to make make   a stop for two or three years to take care of the babies and things like that so we should do it, because I   think that's the most important thing for a couple I mean the babies . . .

In addition to being important to the speaker, the topic also seems current. RF twice mentions previous conversations with Americans on the same topic: "you know there's some-thing that I told someone . . ." and "I have been talking to some American women . . . and they say that . . ." Both importance to the speaker and currency of the topic are, of course, defining characteristics of the discourse domain. A third piece of evidence that talk on Topic B is domain talk for RF is the extent of his knowledge of the topic. Example (11) shows that RF is indeed fairly well-informed about the legal aspects of women's rights in both Colombia and the United States:

(11)

RF . . . women in the USA haven't for example uh women who are working and when they uh get pregnant and   have a baby as far as I know, they they can be sometimes they they fired no in I
                               /in, Colombia?/
RF the USA they fired and so women after one month or forty-five days or two month they have to go back to   work but in Colombia since the last year , we got a new law where women after when they get a ba- I mean   if you are if if a woman get pregnant she cannot be fired during that time even after ninety days I mean   ninety days after she she get a baby . . .

Examples (8) through (11) suggest that the nondomain topic prompt in this study does

not appear to have elicited nondomain talk for this speaker.[2] Discourse analysis reveals a high level of personalization of both topics, which is associated with domain talk. These examples recall example (3), where the narrative prompt intended to elicit neutral talk produced domain talk, a psychologist's view of Little Red Riding Hood. It is difficult to see how this methodological problem can be remedied, because once conversation begins some subjects seem to warm to topics they previously classified as uninteresting. (See Tapia, 1993, for a discussion of this phenomenon in relation to second language writing.) The most practicable solution seems to be to have subjects complete a post-interview questionnaire indicating their views on topics discussed; in this way, those who did become involved in the nondomain topic can be identified. Unfortunately, the questionnaire intended to serve such a purpose in the present study failed to elicit the necessary data.

Scaffolding

A final question raised in the quantitative analysis of the interviews concerned the possibility of an emerging domain for the invested subject, TK. This subject showed the lowest fluency and syntactic development of the invested group, but produced more clauses per minute and per t-unit in talk on Topic A than on Topic B, suggesting a nascent domain effect. Analysis of his transcript offers some support for this interpretation, with conversation apparently moving more smoothly on Topic A, "life and death in Shinto," than on Topic B, "the role of the media." No such pattern is apparent in the data on NY, who showed comparable levels of fluency and grammatical complexity with TK, and uniform performance across topics. Data from both subjects is shown in examples (12) through (16), where the common rhetorical element is a comprehension check on the part of the interviewer in which she paraphrases the subject's previous contribution.

In talk on his major field topic in example (12), TK has some difficulty explaining the Shinto view of death, but the interviewer is able to paraphrase accurately and TK is able to use her contribution to scaffold his next turn and continue the conversation:

(12)

TK   . . .only gods know when he when somebody is born or somebody die dies so, I think it is, it can be said will   gods' will go-gods' will, uh, uh everybody has to follow gods' will or, not not has to follow but uh nobody can uh. See future   or   yeah
                        yeah,
I   /right/   /like destiny?/   /yeah/

TK   but nobody-hh know what what uh god gods' will for him so he can decide he can decide what his destiny   what he, uh wants to have what his. Role uh his no his uh
                                    yeah uh
I   /his role? Is that what you said?/
I *Let me see if I understand. You're saying that*, uh only the gods know *what exactly will happen to you   and because you don't know then you have some freedom to choose what you will do*
TK   /ah yes/
I right,   yeah

TK   /mhm/
TK   Yeah, uh, god, uh only uh nobody can choose family or something it' s very important for
             people, uh, it's uh   gods' will   uh, so in my case, uh my I was born and
             as uh Shinto priest . . .
I   /right/

In talk on the nondomain topic, however, TK is not able to use the interviewer's contribu-
tion in the same way. In example (13), instead of building on the notion that television stations
"don't care whether it's a good program or not," TK allows the interviewer paraphrase to bring
closure to the topic. Similarly in example (14), TK accepts the vocabulary items "comedians"
and "imitate" suggested by the interviewer, but appears unable to use them to build a further
contribution.

(13)

TK   . . . uh television stations, uh doesn' t care about quality of programs   they, they
       just I
             /mhm/
TK   need a high, high how to say uh percentage of uh, how to say , uh they just care about their
       sponsors   advertising   so
I   /right advertising/   /yeah/

I   *So they want to know how many people ar e watching   but they don't care,*
    whether
TK   /ah yes/
I   *it's a good program or not*   yeah
TK   /yeah/

(14)

TK   they use f-family, comedians   but they are not good they are they use
       very stupid
I   /mhm/
TK   words or something   and uh I like them but   but it's I
       think it's problem uh
I   /yeah/   /yeah/
TK   the language Japanese Japanese language   how to say Japanese Japanese

I   /mhm/
             /words?/
TK   words?   (??) broken?
I   /expressions?/
I   *Ah they're changing the language?*   *The the comedians have an influence on*
    the Japanese
TK   /uh-huh/
I   *that people speak?*
TK   Not only comedians but, uh because of TV programs   and uh so many
I   /yeah/
I   *Because people imitate the way the language is used on television ?*
TK   Uh sometimes people imitate but, uh before they notice they uh they use strange Japanese
       . . .

Unlike his performance on Topic A, shown in example (12), on Topic B, shown in (13) and (14), TK appears unable either to construct a coherent turn independently, or to use the interviewer paraphrase constructively. Note, too, that the interviewer's contributions in (13) and (14) are inferences rather than paraphrases, and they take the form of questions rather than statements, indicating that TK's production on this topic is less easily comprehensible.

TK's less successful performance on the neutral topic is similar to the talk produced by NY on both topics. On Topic A, "Racing sponsorship," shown in example (16), the speaker argues that some drivers become Formula One competitors because of their ability to raise sponsorship, rather than their driving ability. The interviewer's attempt to encourage him to expand on this notion is met with closure.

(15)

NY . . . I like Formula One and there some of that kind of driver I mean uh he, the
 reason the reason why he can   be uh Formula One racer is only bringing the money
     to the team uh there are some, uh very bad I
                    /wow/
NY   and uh, I think they are, uh, if, they are that that kind of driver uh a lot of people are not
     interested in   Formula One because they are just it's kind of a taxi driver racing team it will be
     a rent-a-car company   [laughs]
I   *I see so it has a negative effect on the sport in general*
NY   Yeah I think it's very negative

A parallel example of topic closure occurs in talk on Topic B, "the role of women," shown in example
     (17).

(16)

I   So do you think there are problems in Japanese society do you think maybe other people don't think
     the   same as you?
NY   Uh I think I think uh the position of woman is still under the man   uh   be-
     cause, so,
I   /yeah/
NY   al- although sh- she wa- one woman apply w- apply the job apply the job
          she refuse I
                    /uh-huh/
NY   refused refused by uh for only, re- reason is only she just women women
     :
     :
NY   Mm, but, but I think uh, but man's position woman's position is getting close
     I think uh
I
     /mhm yeah/

I   *So do you think it should be exactly equal men and women should have exactly ?*
NY   Yeah yeah I think have exactl- it should be exactly same   yeah
I   /uh-huh/

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Instead of using the interviewer prompt to clarify the argument and to permit further elaboration, as TK was able to do in his major field (example 12), NY takes his interlocutor's contribution as evidence that she has understood his point, and that he need not elaborate further.

This section on discourse organization across topics has shown that differences in fluency and syntactic development indicated by the quantitative measures are borne out, and in some cases motivated, by an investigation of learner discourse on these topics. FL, the only speaker in the study to reveal clear domain-related differences across topics, showed more complex and more clearly marked discourse organization on his major field topic than on the neutral topic; the significance of this finding was supported by the absence of such differences in the production of the uninvested speaker, KL. A similar finding emerged in the comparison of TK's performance across topics with that of NY: The invested speaker, TK, appeared better able to use his interlocutor's turns to build his own contributions in talk on his major field than on the neutral topic. Once again, the same was not true of the control subject, NY. Finally, the analysis of the discourse of RF on each topic suggested that the neutral prompt failed to elicit neutral talk. This speaker used ample personal reference in talk on both his major field and the role of women, indicating that he may have developed discourse domains for both topics.

CONCLUSION

This study provides a degree of support for the discourse domain hypothesis of interlanguage variation. One speaker, FL, showed a striking difference in both fluency, syntactic development, and discourse organization across domain and nondomain talk, while another, TK, showed signs of an emerging domain. Patterns of language behavior for the uninvested group did not show clear differences across topics, increasing confidence that the study does in fact tap domain-related differences in performance for the invested subjects, rather than general topic effects.

However, two of the invested subjects showed enhanced performance on the topic intended to elicit nondomain talk. RF and JS showed greater grammatical complexity and accuracy, and possibly also greater fluency, on Topic B. Topic B for both speakers was the role of women in society, and it may be that talk recorded on this topic was not nondomain talk at all, in spite of the precautions taken to ensure a neutral topic. The data samples from the interview of RF, shown in examples (8) through (11), support the interpretation that both Topic A and Topic B were domain topics for this speaker. Another possible explanation for the differences in performance across the four invested subjects is that *not all* learners develop discourse domains for particular topics. Thus it is possible that the interlanguages of the subjects JS and RF are not sensitive to domain-related differences, and that the differences detected in this study are general topic effects. This is clearly a problem of research design to be remedied in future studies: An improved postinterview questionnaire should provide the relevant evidence.

The uninvested subjects showed in general less variation across topics than the invested group. They also, however, performed at lower levels of fluency and grammatical complexity and accuracy, which limits their value as a control group. While it would appear to be a rela-

tively simple matter to obtain more closely matched groups, my experience with data collection for a larger, follow-up study suggests that uninvested subjects tend to be less proficient than their invested counterparts. Of the students who select a research paper topic within their major field, and are therefore expected to be invested subjects, the more advanced learners (as measured by TOEFL score) indicate high investment in that topic on the post-interview questionnaire, whereas the less advanced learners do not. Similarly, of those students who select a research paper topic outside their major field, and who are thus expected to be assigned to the uninvested group, the more advanced learners tend to indicate that they are strongly invested in the topic, while those who are less proficient do not.

Thus this study raises a number of methodological issues to be addressed in future research. In spite of the somewhat ambivalent nature of the findings which have emerged, however, the study does provide important indications about the nature of the discourse domain and its effect on second language production. As is so often the case in second language research, it is now necessary to collect more data on more subjects in order to obtain a clearer picture of the possible relationship between the discourse domain and second language acquisition.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

NOTES

[1] The transcription conventions are as follows:

backchanneling   /   /

```
    F        . . . these two years are only mathematics and physics.              So that's
. . . B                                                                 /mhm/
```

overlapping speech   \
                              \   \

```
    A        What did you do \in the military?\
    F                          \in Nancy\ I was uh
```

latching |
              | 324

```
    F        Sol
```

B |You sit around and you

action   [ ]

F   Oh, if you wanna, if you like high-tech names, maybe
A   [laughs] He just kind of explain-

short pause   ,

longer pause   .

material excerpted from turn   ...

material from several turns excerpted   :
                                                :

[2] Similar examples can be identified in the transcript of JS, but are not included for reasons of space.

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